the treuegemeinschaft sudetendeutscher sozialdemo

Transkript

THE TREUEGEMEINSCHAFT SUDETENDEUTSCHER SOZIALDEMOKRATEN AND ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAK PLANS
FOR GERMAN TRANSFER
by Francis D. Raška (Praha)
first publication
1 Kopecký, M./Bílek, O.: Sněmovna se
postavila za dekrety. In: Lidové noviny, April 25, 2002.
2 Brügel, Johann Wolfgang:
Tschechen und Deutsche 1918-1939.
München: Nymphenburger 1967.
3 Kural, Václav: Konflikt místo
společenství? Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1993.
4 Brandes, Detlef: Der Weg zur
Vertreibung: 1938-1945. München:
Oldenbourg 2001.
5 Raška, Francis: The Czechoslovak
Exile Government in London and the
Sudeten German Issue. Praha:
Karolinum 2002.
6 Wingfield, Nancy Merriwether:
Minority Politics in a Multinational
State. Boulder: Columbia UP 1989,
p. 146ff.
7 Ibid., p. 149f.
8 Raška 2002, p. 19f.
9 Raška, Francis: The Emigration of
Sudeten Germans to Canada (19381939). In: Slavic Almanac [Pretoria]
9/12 (2003), pp. 177-197.
page 1 31 | 03 | 2004
Introduction
The transfer of the Sudeten Germans after World War II continues to be one of the the most
emotional and controversial political issues in the Czech Republic until today. In 2002, several
German, Austrian, and Hungarian politicians called for the revocation of the Beneš decrees –
namely the presidential directives issued between May 19 and October 27, 1945 on which the
post-war treatment of Germans and Hungarians was based – in connection with the Czech Republic’s application to join the European Union. The Czech political parties, involved in an election campaign, responded with a fury of nationalistic statements. On April 24, 2002, the Czech
Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution tracing the origin of the decrees to the defeat
of Nazism and pointed out that while no new legal measures could be based upon them the
existing consequences were unchallengeable and could not be changed. The Czech legislators
stressed the positive significance of the Czech-German declaration of 1997 and urged that future relations between the two countries not be complicated by political and legal issues of
the past.1
The history of the German minority in Czechoslovakia between the two world wars has been
summarized in monographs by Johann Wolfgang Brügel2 and Václav Kural.3 During the national elections of 1935, the Sudeten Germans supported the Sudetendeutsche Partei, which
was escalating its demands on the Czechoslovak Government. In 1938, this Party rejected
offers of significant concessions by the government and, thus, precipitated a crisis. On September 29, 1938, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy decided at Munich that Czechoslovakia would have to surrender its frontier regions along with their German population to Germany. Despite guarantees provided by the Munich Agreement, remaining Czechoslovakia was
occupied by Nazi Germany on 15 March 1939 and Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into
the Reich under the name Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren.
Edvard Beneš and his exile government in London considered a reduction of the size of the
German minority the cornerstone of Czechoslovak renewal. The history of Czechoslovak plans
to expel the Sudeten Germans has recently been analyzed in monographs by Detlef Brandes4
and Francis Raška.5 Early Czechoslovak plans developed from territorial cessession combined
with compensatory population exchanges to the creation of three German regions. The domestic resistance in the protectorate demanded German expulsion and, from 1942, German
transfer became Czechoslovak policy. Beneš won the approval of the Allies for his transfer
plans and in December 1943 he declared in Moscow that renewed Czechoslovakia would be a
national state.
The largest organization of democratic Sudeten exiles in London, namely the Treuegemeinschaft sudetendeutscher Sozialdemokraten led by Wenzel Jaksch took a stand against the Czechoslovak government’s position. The Treuegemeinschaft was the continuation of the German
Social Democratic Party in Czechoslovakia. The German Social Democrats had joined the Coalition Government in 1929 and had been the most powerful German political party in the Republic until the 1935 elections when they were defeated by Konrad Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche
Partei. Wenzel Jaksch, a young Social Democratic deputy, became the leader of the Sudeten
German resistance to Henlein’s movement. Jaksch formulated a new political philosophy called ›Volkssozialismus‹, which stressed that workers shared interests with other social classes.6
In an attempt to radicalize the anti-Henlein focus of Sudeten German politics, Jaksch established so-called ›Jungaktivismus‹, which also involved younger members of other Sudeten German political parties. The Jungaktivisten called on the Czechoslovak government to change its
attitude towards the Sudeten Germans and requested generous economic aid to the severely
depressed border regions.7 During the crisis of 1938, the Social Democrats continued to support the Czechoslovak Republic.8 Their leadership worked tirelessly to help Sudeten German
Social Democratic refugees who had fled the frontier regions after Munich and found themselves in rump Czechoslovakia and to relieve the plight of party members who had remained
in the territories ceded to Germany.9 The party was disbanded under its old name on February
22, 1939 and was renamed to become the Treuegemeinschaft sudetendeutscher Sozialdemokrahttp://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/FRaska1.pdf
THE TREUEGEMEINSCHAFT SUDETENDEUTSCHER SOZIALDEMOKRATEN
10 Wingfield 1989, p. 182.
11 On pp. 79-132 Raška 2002 provides
a detailed description and analysis
of the Treuegemeinschaft’s activities.
12 Vondrová, Jitka: češi a sudetoněmecká otázka. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1994, document
no. 6, pp. 21-33.
13 Bachstein, Martin K.: Wenzel Jaksch
und die Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie. München: Oldenbourg 1974,
pp. 206f.
14 Brügel, Johann Wolfgang/Goldschmidt, Leopold/Kolarz,
Walter: Le probléme du transfert de
population – Trois million sudètes doivent-ils émigrer? Paris: s.t. 1939.
15 Public Record Office [PRO], F0371,
File 24291, C7749/534/12, Jaksch to
Makins, July 9, 1940; Holmhurster
Grundsatzerklärung.
page 2 31 | 03 | 2004
ten.10 More than 3,000 members of the Treuegemeinschaft escaped into exile, primarily to Britain, Sweden, and Canada. In Britain, they were supported by the Czech Refugee Trust Fund. The
Treuegemeinschaft’s political program was declared at a meeting at the Holmhurst Hotel in
Loughton where the so-called Loughton Declaration (Holmhurster Grundsatzerklärung) was
adopted in March 1940. The Loughton Declaration called for a Sudeten German authority within the framework of a federal Czechoslovak state.11 Despite attempts to become an integral
part of the Czechoslovak exile resistance movement, the Treuegemeinschaft failed to reach an
agreement with Czechoslovak political leaders on a solution that might have allowed both
Czechs and Germans to live in a common state once again. The Treuegemeinschaft rejected population transfer and the activities of its members through-out the war and later unsuccessfully focused on turning public opinion in the West against the idea. This article aims to summarize the details of the Treuegemeinschaft’s anti-transfer activities.
Rejection of Early Rumors of Transfer
In the summer of 1939, rumors of demands for the expulsion of the German minority by the
domestic resistance circulated among the Czechoslovak émigré community in both Paris and
London. These rumors were based on the position of the two domestic resistance organizations, namely Politické ústředí and Obrana národa.12 Beneš himself acknowledged these rumors in a meeting with Treuegemeinschaft representatives in September 1939, but personally
rejected them and characterized them as »foolishness«.13 Three members of the Treuegemeinschaft, Johann Wolfgang Brügel, Leopold Goldschmidt, and Walter Kolarz challenged the ideas
of transfer in a pamphlet entitled Le probléme du transfert de population – Trois million sudètes doivent-ils émigrer?14 They analyzed the historical facts surrounding German transfers in
South Tyrol, which they characterized as a manifestation of pan-Germanism. They also carefully recapitulated the earlier mass transfer after the Greco-Turkish War authorized by the
Lausanne Conference and pointed to the unfortunate results. In 1930, after the Commission of
the League of Nations had been disbanded, tens of thousands of refugees still remained in
tents. In the authors’ opinion, the transfer of the Sudeten Germans could be accomplished
only by force and the new Europe could not even contemplate such a measure. There was a
contradiction between encouraging the fight for freedom on one hand and denying freedom
to millions on the other. They also recapitulated the active role of the democratic forces in the
Sudetenland and stated that those who had been forced to leave their homeland had no other
option, but to return to it after the liberation. They also pointed out that history showed that
extensive intermarriage had taken place between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans. The
authors carefully analyzed the economic consequences of transfer. Both the transferred population in Germany and the abandoned depopulated Sudeten industries would be left in a catastrophic state. The transfer would convert the most populated and industrious region in the
country into a graveyard. Ideologically, the transfer would mean both capitulation to and acceptance of Hitler’s formulation of nationalist principles – Ein Volk, ein Reich. If Germany were
forced to accept the transfer, one of the consequences would be the creation of new industries
operated by the available skilled labor force, which would, in turn, damage Czechoslovakia
economically. They concluded by stating that the idea of transfer was incompatible with the
ideas of the late President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk because it had no humanitarian, economic, or social foundation. The document was of outstanding quality. The authors’ presentation
of the historical facts as well as their economic and philosophical analysis were correct. At the
time of writing, however, the authors could not have predicted the brutal nature of the war or
the extent of Nazi atrocities. Their assumption that there would be a public outcry against
transfer or hope that the experience of the catastrophic results of the Lausanne Conference
might prevent it were all mistaken on account of later developments in the war. All their predictions, however, of the consequences if transfer were implemented would prove correct.
The principle of population transfer as a solution to the Sudeten German problem was rejected again in the Treuegemeinschaft’s Loughton Declaration15 of 1940, which stated that the
idea of autonomy for the Sudeten regions should serve as a basis for later negotiations with
the Czechs.
16 Brandes, Detlef: Die Britische Regierung kommt zu einem Zwischenergebnis. Die Empfehlungen des Britischen Interdepartmental Committee on the Transfer of German Population vom Mai 1944 in Pousta, Zdeněk/Seifter, Pavel/Pešek, Jiří (eds.):
Occursus-Begegnung-Setkání.
Praha: Karolinum 1996, pp. 45f.
17 PRO, F0371, File 30825,
C6788/326/12: Transcript of War
Cabinet meeting, July 6, 1942.
18 Archiv Ústavu T.G. Masaryka,
[AUTGM], Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8:
Report on Jaksch’s meeting with
Kreibich and Winternitz,
July 14, 1942.
19 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních
věcí [AMZV], LA, Box 156,
5900/dův/42: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on Jaksch’s lecture at Federal
Union, November 24, 1942.
20 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/3:
Beneš’s position on Treuegemeinschaft conclusions of June 7, 1942,
December 1, 1942.
21 Beneš, Eduard: Memoirs of Dr.
Eduard Beneš. London: Cambridge
UP 1954, pp. 320-334.
Arguments against Transfer in 1942 and 1943
In 1942, the question of transfer was not yet broadly discussed in public. The British government, however, assumed that the transfer of minorities in Central and Southeastern Europe
would take place after the war. In February, the Foreign Research and Press Service assumed
that a transfer of 3 to 6.8 million Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia would take place.16
The War Cabinet approved of this idea, on principle, in July.17
In the summer of 1942, Jaksch met with the Communist functionaries, Karl Kreibich and
Josef Winternitz, who assured him that the Soviet Union would never sanction the forced
transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia. They agreed to collaborate in this area and to share
any news concerning the intended transfer. This interaction was in correspondence with the
West European section of the Comintern’s decision to initiate a campaign against the Czechoslovak government’s plans to transfer the German minority. Jaksch then addressed this question to Soviet ambassador Bogomolov and was purportedly happy with the answer he received. 18
The Nazi terror in the protectorate that followed Heydrich’s assassination stimulated a further increase in anti-German sentiments worldwide. Any arguments Jaksch and his followers
could bring forth against the transfer would effectively be neutralized by public opinion. In
November 1942, Jaksch delivered a lecture at the conference of the Federal Union entitled Can
the People of Europe Unite? He endorsed the idea of a federalization of Europe from which the
Soviet Union would be excluded. Jaksch presented arguments in favor of international planning. He dismissed plans for the renewal of small, independent states as naïve notions of politicians in exile. He predicted that if 26 separate states were to be renewed in post-war Europe,
they would not survive for twenty years because of economic problems. He urged Britain to
help Europe and America to abandon isolationist policies because such policies would give a
free hand to 80 million Germans. He also argued that ideas concerning transfer and exchanges of population were impractical because of technical difficulties.19
Beneš began laying the groundwork for terminating his negotiations with Jaksch in the
summer months of 1942. His position on the conclusions of the Treuegemeinschaft conference
of June 1942 were summarized in a document he handed Jaksch on December 1, 1942, which
specifically stated:
The Czechoslovak Government cannot and never will accept the principle of selfdetermination for 3 million Germans as it was formulated, interpreted, and asserted
at the last peace conference and for a full twenty years afterwards.20
Beneš unilaterally terminated contacts with the Treuegemeinschaft in a letter of January 10,
1943. He pointed out Jaksch’s failure to associate the Treuegemeinschaft unconditionally with
the Republic. In addition, Beneš listed the following specific issues: According to him, it had
been a »cardinal political mistake« that Jaksch’s willingness to join the Czechoslovak struggle
during the first two years had always been conditional. The republic’s recognition had thus
been accomplished without German participation. Beneš inserted quotations from a number
of documents written by Jaksch and other members of the Treuegemeinschaft. His chief objections were directed at Jaksch’s unwillingness to grant unequivocal recognition to the theory
of legal continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic and at his reservations about joining the Czechoslovak State Council without first receiving guarantees of national self-determination.
Beneš also raised the matter of army service by Czechoslovak citizens of German nationality.
Among many other negative facts, Beneš also listed Jaksch’s BBC broadcasts to Germany, but
in particular his protests against the renunciation of the Munich Agreement. Beneš ended his
letter as follows:
Do you think it possible that any Czechoslovak – and not only a Czechoslovak, but any
Allied politician – would understand if there were nominated to the State Council, or
among the Czechoslovak civil servants someone who, until now, has never publicly
declared himself a Czechoslovak citizen, who refuses to fulfill his civic duties and who
still makes conditions about his belonging to the state and still leaves open a door so
that he can advocate a different view later on? I do not think that this impossible situation can continue any longer.21
After the break with Beneš in January 1943, Jaksch and his close associate, Richard Reitzner,
continued to issue regular circulars to members of the Treuegemeinschaft. In these circulars,
page 3 31 | 03 | 2004
22 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/1/2:
Treuegemeinschaft circular 3/1943,
April 6, 1943.
23 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 899/ dův 41943: Interior Ministry report on
Jaksch’s group, May 29, 1943.
Report on News Digest extract,
June 28, 1943.
25 Sudetendeutsches Archiv, Nachlass Jaksch, File E3: Treuegemeinschaft circular, July 1943.
26 Ibid., Nachlass Jaksch, File G18:
Can Industrial Peoples Be Transferred? The Future of the Sudeten German Population.
Report of the Interior Ministry on
the Treugemeinschaft’s anti-transfer
campaign, July 27, 1943.
28 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/1/2:
Wenzel Jaksch – concepts of his politics, March 1, 1943.
29 Vondrová 1994,
document 127, pp. 258-261.
page 4 31 | 03 | 2004
they presented the political situation from their own perspective and brought to light various
facts about the situation in the Sudeten regions. The question of transfer was becoming the
leading topic. They paid close attention to any public statement by both Allied and Czech political leaders and tried to counter them with both factual and political arguments. Yet, while
deploring the Czechoslovak policy on transfer, they repeatedly offered their willingness to collaborate and participate in negotiations concerning arrangements for a life in a common
state. However, Jaksch continued to refuse any collaboration with the other Sudeten German
exile groups.
In a circular dated March 1943, Jaksch reacted to the latest speech by Churchill on the new
organization of Europe, indicating the formation of a European council with a joint European
court and defense system. Churchill had urged small nations towards federation and pointed
out that the independence of small state entities was a thing of the past. Jaksch stated that
he had already proposed a very similar arrangement in the Loughton Declaration and that the
Czech-German problem would need to be solved on a »higher plane«. He expressed hope that
the Czechoslovak leadership would abandon its antagonistic position towards its neighbors
and might find a way of incorporating the Czech nation as a »Qualitätsfaktor« in the new European order.22
After the Czechoslovak government’s program for the transfer of the German minority was
publicly acknowledged, the Treuegemeinschaft initiated a counter-offensive designed to influence public opinion. Jaksch began a correspondence with former Czechoslovak senator
Siegfried Taub in the United States and asked him to start a campaign against the transfer to
America. Taub pledged his support and also intended to request an interview with Beneš
during the latter’s trip to America.23
In June 1943, C60 Arbetaren in Stockholm published an article entitled Central European
Post-War Problems, which stated »Czech nationalists suggest radical measures for the solution
of the Czech-German problem«. They wished to retain the historic frontiers and reduce the
number of Germans at the same time. The article referred to Beneš’s interview with an American journalist and pointed out that preparations were under way for mass expulsion. It also
referred to Hubert Ripka’s note The Repudiation of Munich stating that an attempt was being
made to hold all Sudeten Germans equally responsible for the actions of Karl Hermann
Frank.24
A circular released in early July announced a new publication by Jaksch entitled Can Industrial Peoples Be Transferred? – The Future of the Sudeten Population.25 In it, Jaksch pointed out
that the Czech-Sudeten problem would come forward once the outlines of a new peace settlement in Europe were drawn. He recapitulated the history of his negotiations with the Czechoslovak government and referred to Beneš’s various earlier statements concerning minority
problems. Jaksch pointed out the industrial potential of the Sudeten regions and tried to address future solutions on the basis of historical, economic, and political arguments. He concluded by stating that short-cut improvisations, while appearing to effect a settlement, would
lead to deeper conflicts in the future.26
Furthermore, Robert Wiener was selected by other members of the Treuegemeinschaft to
prepare materials needed for a campaign designed to inform the British and American public
about the plan for the mass expulsion of Germans.27 Indeed, Jaksch and his colleagues prepared several complex documents for the third regional conference of the Treuegemeinschaft
planned for the autumn of 1943. The first document, Unsere Konzeption, contained political directives. It discussed the Atlantic Charter and displayed a willingness to renew the common
state within the historic borders. Politically, the Party declared its right to negotiate constitutional and legal questions and asked for freedom of political action even if the Sudeten regions should be militarily occupied. The Party should have the freedom to decide on retribution and punishment with respect to Nazi terrorists and should have an adequate role in the
state administration. A complex program for the revival of economic and social conditions was
also offered.28 In a second document, The Application of the Atlantic Charter to the Sudeten
Problem, Jaksch and his colleagues demanded solutions to the Sudeten German problem in
terms of either an internal Czechoslovak federation or through a broader federation of Central
and Eastern Europe.29
In the International Socialist Forum of the Left News, Jaksch published The Transplantation
of Millions: Problems of the Socialist International, in which he referred to Beneš’s earlier interview with the New York Times and pointed out that the official policy of the Czechoslovak go-
30 AUTGM, Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8,
1475/4/43: Jaksch’s article in The Left
News, August 23, 1943.
31 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/8:
Jaksch’s minority report at the
Federal Union, September 6, 1943.
32 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/1/2:
Resolution of the third Treuegemeinschaft Landeskonferenz,
November 11, 1943.
33 In: Manchester Guardian,
November 29, 1943.
34 Vondrová 1994,
document 132, pp. 267-270.
vernment had become the expulsion of the German population. He discussed the ramifications of transfer and correctly predicted that transfer included expropriation; he also questioned the technical feasibility of transfer implementation.30
In the 1943 Annual Report of the Federal Union, it was acknowledged that unity had not
been reached on the question of mixed populations. In a minority report, Jaksch asked for the
right of national minorities to elect their representatives who would be empowered to choose
national committees for deciding the future form of national institutions in the European federation. He also requested the protection of minorities through a special federal law.31
The third conference of the Treuegemeinschaft took place on November 7. Jaksch’s plenary
address Socialist Possibilities in Our Time emphasized that the question of punishing Nazi criminals ought to be separated from questions concerning the peaceful arrangement of Europe.
Both regional and federal organizations should consider the maturity of social development in
individual nations with the goal of overcoming nationalism in political as well as economic
matters. After a lively discussion, the conference called for the punishment of fascist criminals,
arrangement of international relations on the basis of equality, and the solution of European
problems through the formation of a European federation. The resolution warned against unilateral dictates in states containing multiple nationalities.32 It stated:
Any system of supra-national collaboration in Europe would be endangered from the
outset if once again there would be established within ethnically mixed states a central predominance of one privileged nation over other underprivileged nationalities.
This is why we advocate the internal federalization of Czechoslovakia based on the
Swiss model […]33
This statement, in fact, amounted to acceptance of Beneš’s Third Plan of 1938. In response to
the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty signed in Moscow in December 1943, Jaksch prepared a memorandum Mass Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans that emphasized his opposition to the concept of the post-war transfer of the German population on the basis of historical, economic,
and political arguments.34
In 1943, the battle Jaksch was waging against mass transfer was already lost. Beneš had
the approval of all the Allied Powers for this concept and even had been able to gain the
approval of the Czechoslovak Communists, who, in 1942, had assured Jaksch through their Sudeten German members that transfer would never be sanctioned by the Soviet Union.
February 8, 1944.
36 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 61, XI, 1/2:
March 11, 1944.
37 Ibid., Fond 40, Box 62, XI, 1/18:
Jaksch’s letter to The Times,
March 2, 1944.
page 5 31 | 03 | 2004
Programs in 1944
Jaksch refused to accept political defeat. The transfer was the central topic of the Treuegemeinschaft circular of January 1944, which referred to the British United Press Report of January 5 on Beneš’s speech to the Czech colony in Cairo. It also mentioned an address by
Minister Hubert Ripka to the State Council on December 15, 1943, where future Czechoslovakia
was described as a nationally homogeneous state. According to this circular, the Czechoslovak
government intended to implement the expulsion as broadly as technically possible. The circular also pointed to manifestations of insecurity in the camp of the United Anti-Fascists, who
tried to remind the Czechoslovak Government of its past promises. The circular stressed that
the transfer would be the greatest such measure in Central Europe since the Thirty Years’
War.35
The March circular showed dissatisfaction with Churchill’s speech in Parliament, in which
he had stated that the principles of the Atlantic Charter would not be applied to Germany.36
In a letter to the editor of The Times published on March 2, Jaksch addressed the problem of
minorities and responded to a letter by Eduard Táborský on the transfer of minorities from
Czechoslovakia. He raised some valid points. He asked why 3.5 million Germans in Czechoslovakia were referred to as a minority whereas 500,000 Ruthenians were seen as a state nation.
The economic comparison of these two national components further showed the artificial vocabulary of the conferences of 1919 and also the error of building countries on the basis of national advantages, disregarding their socioeconomic functions: This had only led to the frictions that had provided Hitler with an excuse for his conquests. Solutions of minority problems by forced assimilation or forced transfer were thus merely a continuation of Hitler’s
practices.37 Another Treuegemeinschaft circular released at the beginning of April reported on
the meeting of the Party leadership in March. Following the resolution of the third regional
38 Sudetendeutsches Archiv,
Nachlass Jaksch, File E5: Treuegemeinschaft circular, April 1944.
39 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Report of the
Czechoslovak Information Services
on Jaksch’s letter to Taub,
March 29, 1943.
Nachlass Jaksch, File G4: Postwar Europe: Nation-States or Socialist Federation?, May 1944.
41 Bachstein 1974, p. 275f.
42 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Interior
Ministry report on W. Kolarz article,
June 26, 1944.
43 Vondrová 1994, document 136,
p. 279ff.; AMZV, LA, Box 158:
Democratic Sudeten Committee,
August 1, 1944.
44 Vondrová 1994,
document 147, p. 301ff.
45 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Gottlieb’s
report to Ripka on Taub’s letter to
Jaksch, November 1, 1944.
46 Jaksch, Wenzel: Europe’s Road to
Potsdam. London: Praeger 1963,
p. 398f.
page 6 31 | 03 | 2004
conference of 1943, the Treuegemeinschaft Executive rejected the idea of population transfer
on the grounds that it would interfere with the punishment of Nazi criminals, would taint democratic sentiments with new hatreds, and that the economic devastation that had developed as a result of the war would be further complicated by new social and economic unrest.38
In the spring months of 1944, Jaksch tried to explain his position to Siegfried Taub in a letter.
Jaksch recapitulated the most salient points of his negotiations and pointed to Beneš’s ill will
and his distortion of the facts. He also pointed out Beneš’s positive attitude towards the Sudeten German Communists despite their scandalous behavior during the early stages of the war.
Jaksch stated that he harbored no illusions about Czech intentions, which were designed to
heal the rift between the Czechs and Slovaks through an all-out drive against the Sudeten
Germans. He described his restraint and constructive offers which had not come to fruition on
account of Czech intransigence. He went on: »Every real statesman would congratulate himself for being such a constructive partner […] yet, the present attitude on the Czech side leaves
no room for hope.« The question remained what to do? Jaksch and his co-workers believed
that there are times in politics when one must stick to one’s principles at any cost. He concluded by acknowledging that Taub might feel differently. If he felt, Jaksch added, that anything
had been neglected or any real opportunities missed, then Taub was welcome to try to reach
a solution with the Czechoslovak side himself. In his letter, Jaksch also prophetically predicted
that the Czech Socialists, Ripka and Stránský, »who are trying to destroy the Treuegemeinschaft in spite of their better conscience, are digging their own political graves«.39
In a brief historical analysis entitled Post-war Europe: Nation-states or Socialist Federation?
published in May, Jaksch expressed again his strong opposition to nationalism citing past experiences.40
The Treuegemeinschaft had expected that the war would end in 1944. In its evaluation of
the potential post-war situation, it preferred the occupation of the Sudeten regions immediately after the war by any forces other than Czech ones in order to create a basis for a negotiated solution during this transition period.41
In June 1944, Walter Kolarz published an article The Czech-German Problem: Historical and
Cultural Background. He wrote that the transfer of the Germans might not have British support because it was a barbaric solution for the new world. He warned, however, that the British
position was not focused on transfer from Czechoslovakia due to their poor understanding of
the problem. He pointed out the roots of the breakdown of pre-war Czechoslovakia and tried
to put the Czech-Sudeten German problem in historical perspective. He convincingly rejected
the idea of collective guilt as a basis for expelling the Germans, but he opined honestly that
the present chances of reaching agreement were nil.42
In 1944, Jaksch formed the Democratic Sudeten German Committee, which consisted of representatives of the Treuegemeinschaft and of Catholics and was led by Jaksch, Reitzner, and
Father Emanuel Reichenberger. In an appeal published in Der Sozialdemokrat, they stated that
their aim was to purge the Sudetenland of Nazis and to restore democratic institutions. They
declared that the Sudeten Germans were not a minority and they expressed opposition to any
plans for mass transfer of the Sudeten German population. They suggested that an interim administration under Allied auspices be constituted to safeguard a better democratic settlement
at the peace conference.43 Taub was critical of the composition of the Democratic Sudeten
German Committee. He questioned the appointment of some of the Catholic members who,
in his opinion, represented only a minimal segment of the Sudeten German population.44
Taub was also critical of Jaksch’s methods used to form the Democratic Committee and complained that neither he nor other functionaries in the United States and Sweden had been properly consulted. Taub also questioned how careful the process used to screen the members
had been and called such »people’s democracy« a house of cards. He called for greater understanding of the other side (i.e., the Czechs) and warned of the dangers posed by ignorance of
Czech history. »It should surprise nobody that the present sufferings of the Czech nation prevent them from paying much attention to memories of past joint anti-Fascist activities.«45
Out of desperation, Jaksch wrote to Clement Attlee on July 31 about the plight of the Sudeten
German Socialists and asked for help. In a formal, cold letter, Attlee, who himself was protransfer, referred Jaksch to the Government of Czechoslovakia.46
In a September circular, Jaksch rejected Ripka’s claim that the democratic and socialist politics of the Treuegemeinschaft represented a continuation of Henlein’s activities. Jaksch stated
that the Czech nation could not have had better allies than the Sudeten German democratic
47 AMZV, LA, Box 158: Interior
Ministry report on September, 1944
Treuegemeinschaft circular,
September 14, 1944.
Nachlass Jaksch, File G5: Mass
Transfer of Minorities, October 1944.
49 Táborský, Eduard: Prezident
Beneš mezi Západem a Východem.
Praha: Mladá Fronta 1993, pp. 98-141.
50 AMZV, LA, Box 130, 2112/dův/45,
Jaksch’s politics, February 23, 1945;
Ibid, 3173/ dův 4/45: Report on
Jaksch, February 14, 1945.
51 Ibid., 34/ dův/45: Report on repatriation and a copy of Treuegemeinschaft February 1945 circular,
February 16, 1945.
52 Ibid., 2377/dův/45: Jaksch’s position on the transfer, March 5, 1945.
page 7 31 | 03 | 2004
workers who had fought for the Republic. Of course, they had fought for a democratic republic
and not for a national state formed on the basis of fascist principles. Jaksch also rejected the
Ausschuss circular signed by Alfred Peres, which informed readers that the Ausschuss has requested the Czechoslovak government to adopt a formal position on Jaksch’s Sudeten Democratic Committee. Jaksch was not surprised by the fact that Sudeten German Communists
welcomed the attempt by renegade socialists to destroy the Sudeten German Social Democrats. Jaksch also reminded the Communists that as the supposed representatives of German
workers in Czechoslovakia they were »digging their own graves by supporting the expulsion
of those very people they claimed to represent.«47
In October, Jaksch wrote an article entitled Mass Transfer of Minorities in the journal Socialist Commentary. He presented his case against such transfers by placing them on an equal
footing with »one of the most odious Nazi methods«. He raised political and economic objections to the transfer: First, the attempt to create nationally homogeneous states ran counter
to the trends of European history. Second, the proposed transfer could only be effected
through a disregard for human rights and by sheer force. Third, it was impossible to speak of
an organized transfer in a more or less chaotic period of transition.48
In 1944, the transfer was already decided upon. Only its scale was still open to discussion.
In April, the British were assuming that of more than 3 million Germans, at most 1.25 million
would remain in Czechoslovakia after the war. Their plan still considered the possibility of a
small territorial cession of the westernmost portion of Bohemia. Jaksch, however, still hoped
for federal arrangements in Europe. Again, he failed to recognize existing reality. While the British had been advocating earlier federal arrangements to stabilize Central Europe, Stalin was
of another opinion. Czechoslovak plans for a federation with Poland had been vetoed even before Beneš went to Moscow in 1943.49
Treuegemeinschaft Attempts to Block Transfer at the End of the War
Early in 1945, Jaksch still did not believe that the transfer of the Germans could take place. He
was convinced that those democratic Germans who had approved the transfer would be completely discredited in Czechoslovakia. Jaksch was also alleged to have claimed that right-wing
political parties in Czechoslovakia would not endorse the transfer and would cooperate with
him. He continued to express confidence in the Western Allies and predicted that the Soviet
Union would be willing to make some concessions on the issue of transfer in order to secure
American financial assistance.50 When the Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Welfare issued
questionnaires to Czechoslovak citizens asking whether or not they wished to return to Czechoslovakia, the Treuegemeinschaft leadership, after some hesitation, provided this information to its members in a February circular.51 Two weeks later, Jaksch issued a confidential memorandum to the Party membership in which he provided a surprisingly accurate and detailed account of the Czechoslovak plans concerning transfer. In the introduction, he pointed out
that the plan did not as yet have the approval of the Allies, including the Soviets, and he predicted that these plans would be the subject of Beneš’s negotiations in his upcoming trip to
Moscow. In his final analysis, Jaksch stressed three major weaknesses of the plan: 1) The plan
was at variance with international and Czechoslovak legal norms. »Sooner or later it would be
acknowledged that the plan for transfer was based on force, attempts to seize property, and a
national need for retribution. Anyone who participated could no longer claim to be a civilized
European…« 2) He hoped that there would not exist a central administration in defeated Germany capable of absorbing millions of homeless people. 3) He doubted that Czechoslovakia
could tolerate two years of economic, legal, and personal uncertainties in the most industrialized parts of the country. Jaksch also attacked the Sudeten German Communists and the Zinnergruppe for their participation in the planning of the proposed transfer. He emphasized the
personal responsibility these groups were taking upon themselves.52 Jaksch’s opinion and his
confidence that his position on the matter would be vindicated by history have proven to have
been correct. The text of the Czech-German declaration of 1997 is strikingly similar to Jaksch’s
words. It has to be remembered, however, that the Czech-German Declaration was the result
of a fundamental change in Europe’s multinational arrangements, which made it necessary to
seek ways of resolving old historical divisions. Though Jaksch was not correct in his argument
that a more positive treatment of the Sudeten Germans would be a requirement for any
future supranational arrangements in Europe, realization of his early European federalist
views most likely would have made the current good neighborly relations between Czechs and
Germans even simpler.
Nachlass Jaksch, File D39: Memorandum on the Indiscriminate Measures of the Czechoslovak Government
against the Sudeten Population,
June 10, 1945.
54 Ibid., File D50: Peace through
Terror?, June 1945, An Appeal to All
Friends of Justice in the Free World,
June 1945.
55 Ibid., File D39: Information Regarding the Position in the Sudeten
Territory June-July 1945,
July 15, 1945.
56 Ibid., File F8: Cable from Jaksch,
De Witte, and Katz, June 1945.
57 Ibid., File D43: The New
Statesman and Nation,
August 25, 1945.
58 Ibid., File D40: It Is Not the Czech
People, July 25, 1945.
59 Ibid., File D41: The »Prodigious
Drama« of the Sudeten People. The
Position on the Eve of Winter 19451946, October 8, 1945.
60 Ibid., File F10: The Policy of Minority Extermination in Czechoslovakia, September 15, 1945.
61 Ibid., File D44: Re-expulsion from
Austria in Mid-winter times,
February 1946.
62 Grünwald, Leopold: In der Fremde
für die Heimat. Sudetendeutsches
Exil in Ost und West. München:
Fides 1982, pp. 60-66.
63 Sudetendeutsches Archiv, Nachlass Jaksch, File D45: 500,000 Outcasts. Non-Transferred Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. An American Responsibility, September 1947.
Jaksch’s Activities after the War
Jaksch and his closest associates did not stop their attempts to block the transfer even after
the war.
On May 11, 1945, the then-Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Klement Gottwald called for the wholesale expropriation of the German and Hungarian minorities during a radio
broadcast. Jaksch and his co-workers issued a protest memorandum on the Indiscriminate
Measures of the Czechoslovak Government Against the Sudeten Population53 and also issued an
appeal for help to all »friends of justice in the free world« entitled Peace through Terror?54
After a Presidential decree of June 21, 1945 implemented the expropriations, Jaksch presented an analysis of the situation in the Sudeten territory and offered alternative solutions.55 In
June 1945, Jaksch, De Witte and Katz sent a telegram to the leaders of all socialist parties in Europe and to the leaderships of various trade unions in the United States. The telegram read as
follows:
Parliamentary delegation of Sudeten Labor calling for moral aid against declared intention of Prague Government to carry out wholesale expropriation and expulsion of
4 million former minority citizens – Solemn promise of President Beneš to protect democratic Sudeten Germans and Hungarians broken by his Government – Political and
trade union and co-op branches of Sudeten Labor with a well-known fighting record
still banned and in danger of final destruction – We protest in the name of 300,000
voters against further victimization of the first victims of Munich Agreement – On
behalf of 20,000 martyrs of Sudeten Labor we ask for moral intervention at Czech Legation of Prague Government.56
In August 1945, Jaksch appealed for help against the transfer in The New Statesman and Nation.57 In his memoranda, Jaksch blamed the Czechoslovak Government and not the people for
the plight of the Sudeten Germans.58 In the autumn months of 1945, Jaksch, De Witte, and
Katz reflected on the realities of the »wild transfer« (»divoký odsun«) and called for an end to
lawlessness and chaos. They stated that »Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich and Frank together did not
bring such misery to the Czech people as is now being inflicted on the Sudeten Germans«.
They pointed out that responsibility is not limited to Czechoslovak authorities, but also includes Great Britain, the United States and France. The memorandum called for an inquiry into
the validity of the Presidential (Beneš) decrees and pleaded that those Sudeten Germans in
»U.S.-occupied western Bohemia« should be given the same guarantees enjoyed by Germans
in the U.S. occupation zone of Germany.59
In September, a protest publication entitled The Policy of Minority Extermination in Czechoslovakia was issued. It pointed out the excesses of the »wild transfer«, challenged the Czechoslovak government’s official statements and called for the restoration of basic human rights.60
In February 1946, a call for mercy was issued against mid-winter re-expulsion from Austria.61 The last major appeal Is Socialist Consciousness Still Alive? was issued by Jaksch, De Witte,
and Katz to the delegates at a Socialist conference at Clacton-on-Sea on May 1, 1946. After
recapitulating the history of the Sudeten German Social Democrats, they declared that
The treatment of our movement and its men and women by the present Prague
Government and its socialist exponents is the worst fratricide in the history of
European labor. Do not allow German anti-fascists to be further retained in labor
camps in Czechoslovakia or forced to remain as slave workers in a country that no
longer wants them as equal citizens.62
In the summer of 1947 Jaksch, De Witte, and Katz blamed the Americans for not taking more
expellees during the transfer to fulfill the original quota. He asked that help be provided to the
Sudeten Germans, who remained in Czechoslovakia without civil rights.63 At the end of 1947,
Jaksch tried to put the new reality into historical perspective. He stressed the geographic, economic, and historical interconnection between Czechs and Germans and pointed out that
when relationships between the Czechs and the West sour, the Czechs would then turn towards the East. The beneficiaries of the present state of affairs were the Communists who created a virtual »party state within the state« in the depopulated frontier regions. The sympathies of the poor were gained by the re-distribution of German property. According to Jaksch,
the West tolerated »the expulsion horrors to win the masses of Czech people back to Western
Democracy.« He characterized it as naïvety and predicted a complete Sovietization of Czecho-
page 8 31 | 03 | 2004
64 Ibid., File D46: The Expellee
Problem. Czech and Sudeten
Germans after the Expulsions,
December 1947.
65 Sozialistische Nachrichten 2,
November 20, 1940, p. 3.
66 Sozialistische Nachrichten 19,
July 16, 1941, pp.2ff.
67 Sozialistische Nachrichten 18/19,
September 15, 1942, pp. 1-4.
68 Sozialistische Nachrichten 20-21,
October 15, 1942, p. 4.
69 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 978/dův
4/1943: Interior Ministry report on
the Zinnergruppe, June 4, 1943.
October 15, 1944, p. 8; AMZV, LA, Box
158, 6173/dův 4/44: Interior Ministry
report on the Zinnergruppe,
October 9, 1944.
June 15, 1945, p. 5ff.
72 Neutatz, Dietmar: československo
v zahraničně politických představách
německého odboje a exilu. In: Cesta
do Katastrofy. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů 1992, p. 97.
73 AMZV, LA, Box 158, 828/dův 4/43:
Report on the Beuergruppe,
May 7, 1943.
74 Grünwald 1982, p. 22.
75 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 1028/ dův
4/1943: Interior Ministry on the
group of Dr. A. Peres, June 17, 1943.
76 Ibid., 516/ dův/4-1943: Interior
Ministry report on Dr. A. Peres,
March 18, 1943.
77 AUTGM, Fond 40, XI-3: Report of
the Ministry of the Interior,
August 27, 1942.
78 AMZV, LA, Box 157, 830/ dův 41943: United Front of anti-fascists;
Resolution on forced transfer,
May 7, 1943.
page 9 31 | 03 | 2004
slovakia within six months.64 As a permanent solution and condition for peace, he resurrected
his old call for either a multinational Danubian Federation or for »abrogation of the Sudeten
expulsion and the creation of a multinational federation in the Bohemian lands.«
The Position of Other Sudeten German Groups
The positions of other sections of Sudeten exiles did not support Treuegemeinschaft efforts.
Unlike the Treuegemeinschaft, the splinter Zinnergruppe believed that a dialogue concerning
the fate of the Sudeten Germans after tha war could only develop through a process of co-operation with the Czechoslovak Exile Government. They also recognized the Czechoslovak concept of legal continuity, which held that Czechoslovakia had never legally ceased to exist and
that Beneš’s resignation in October 1938 was invalid because the Czechoslovak Parliament had
never formally accepted it.65 Initially, the Zinnergruppe had opposed solutions of minority problems through population transfer and reacted negatively to Ripka’s 1941 article.66 In September 1942, the Zinnergruppe joined the Communists and Peres’s Liberal Democrats in the
United Front.67 The Zinnergruppe simply ignored the nationality problems of future Czechoslovakia and characterized Jaksch’s policy requiring guarantees or contractual solutions as reactionary.68 Although the Zinnergruppe claimed that, in 1943, it had sought support against
the transfer from the Czech Social Democrats69, it did approve of the Czech demand for the
right to determine which of those Germans who wished to remain in Czechoslovakia could do
so in October 1944.70 They also accepted the Czechoslovak plans for general transfer in 1945 as
a »rational decision of Czechs and Slovaks.«71
Until 1943, the Communist Party opposed plans for German transfer.72 In May 1943, Josef
Winternitz labeled the opinions of Czechoslovak Government officials on transfer as »stupid,
short-sighted, and irresponsible.«73 At a joint conference with the Zinnergruppe on 27-28 January 1945, a decision was made to support the course that had been decided upon by both the
Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak Communist leadership located in Moscow.
First, it was stated that the overwhelming majority of Sudeten Germans had supported the
war and, therefore, they deserved the same treatment as was accorded to Germans in the
Reich. Second, the Sudeten German working class as well as the workers of Germany had betrayed the international proletariat and a thorough cleansing would need to take place. Third,
Jaksch’s Treuegemeinschaft had propagated the theory and practice of Volkssozialismus for the
salvation of German imperialism. Any attempt to gain national autonomy for the Sudeten
Germans would thus serve only to deepen feelings of hostility on the part of the Czechs towards the Sudeten Germans.74 Both the Communists and the Zinnergruppe thus accepted the
program of transfer sought by Beneš and his Government.
In 1943, the leader of Liberal Democrats, Alfred Peres expressed disappointment over the
position of the Czechoslovak government and intended to protest publicly against the plans
for transfer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.75 After meeting with Ministers Masaryk and Ripka, he expressed his disillusion with Czechoslovak policies because he was unable to obtain
any information on the Government’s plans.76 Peres was an opportunist, however, and, in public, he strongly supported the Czechoslovak position.77
During 1942, the Sudeten German Communists were able to form a new organization called the Sudeten German Anti-Fascist Unity Committee (Sudetendeutscher Antifaschistischer Einheitsausschuss). This organization consisted of the Sudeten German Communists, the Zinnergruppe, and Peres’s Liberal Democrats. The aim of the Committee was to enroll all Sudeten
German Anti-Fascists in the Czechoslovak anti-Hitler cause in support of the war of liberation,
increase the representation of democratic Sudeten German subjects in the Czechoslovak State
Council and other official organizations abroad.
However, the leadership of the Ausschuss was initially strongly opposed to the idea of the
transfer. At a meeting of May 1-2, 1943, the leaders of the group unanimously resolved that
steps needed to be taken with the British, Czechoslovak, and American authorities to prevent
the forced transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia. They also prepared specific plans for further action. The Communists (Beuer and Winternitz) deferred their agreement with the plans,
but both the representatives of the Zinnergruppe and Peresgruppe declared that they would
follow the proposed plan even in the absence of formal approval by the Communists.78 The
meeting was declared strictly confidential. Afterward, Zinner expressed concern about losing
ground and not finding support among the Sudeten population for Czechoslovak policies, par-
79 Ibid., 82/ dův 4-1943: Report on
the Zinnergruppe, May 8, 1943.
80 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Archiv,
Seliger Archiv, TG England, File 21:
Do boje za společnou vlast,
16-17 října 1943.
81 Brandes, Detlef: Großbritannien
und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten. München: Oldenbourg 1988,
pp. 106-108.
82 Bachstein 1974, p. 111.
83 PRO, FO371, File 24291,
C729/534/12: Jaksch to Makins,
January 11, 1940.
page 10 31 | 03 | 2004
ticularly regarding transfer. Jaksch’s uncompromising attitude made Zinner’s position even
more difficult. Yet, he hoped that Britain and America solve this problem by not sanctioning
the transfer because it was in conflict with the Atlantic Charter.79
The national Conference of the Sudeten German Anti-Fascists in Great Britain took place on
October 16-17, 1943 at the Beaver Hall in London. The conference identified itself with the goals
of the Czechoslovak government. Nowhere, however, did it adopt or endorse the notion of
mass transfer as an appropriate solution to the German minority problem.80
Conclusion
Jaksch lost the battle against the transfer of the Sudeten Germans. It is debatable whether the
outcome would have been any different had he associated with the Czechoslovak cause earlier on. His arguments, while factually correct, could not have changed the process fueled by
anti-German sentiment, which had culminated during the last year of the war. Allied soldiers
and also the population in the Protectorate had had the opportunity to witness the results of
Nazi atrocities. The behavior of Sudeten German population as well as the other Germans in
the Protectorate also had not helped matters. In the eyes of the Czechs, however, the behavior
of the Sudeten Germans during the war had been worse than that of the Germans who had
come from Germany. After all, the most brutal oppression after the Heydrich assassination
was directed by the Sudeten German, Karl Hermann Frank. Instead of adopting more conciliatory attitudes towards the Czechs during the last months of the war, the repressive measures
brutality intensified. Thus, there was no hope of even softening the effects of the transfer on
the German population in Czechoslovakia.
Jaksch and his close associates in the Treuegemeinschaft focused their efforts on preventing British support for a large-scale German transfer, and they tried to maintain their position
of »somewhat adjusted« notions of future autonomy of the Sudetenland in the renewed republic.81 They became ever more isolated, however, and the British did not react favorably to
their requests. Their active attempts to organize anti-Nazi activities in the Sudetenland in 1944
also failed.
It remains a burning question why Jaksch had been so completely out of touch with the
views of other Czechoslovak politicians and was unable to adapt his position to the changing
conditions during the war. Before the war, the Jungaktivisten under Jaksch’s leadership pointed out the necessity of changing the status of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, thus addressing the contradiction between the national state defined in the constitution and the de facto
existence of a state of nationalities.82 They also called for proportional representation of various national groups in the state and public sectors. It should be noted that, although the
Jungaktivisten considered the Germans to be the »second state nation«, their program did not
call for autonomy because they feared that autonomy would create a Nazi enclave in democratic Czechoslovakia. In exile, however, Jaksch took a much stronger position. In his Principles
of International Policy for the Sudeten German Social Democrats drafted in 1939, Jaksch stressed that Sudeten German autonomy based upon federalization was the only acceptable solution and that a return to a state such as pre-war Czechoslovakia was out of the question.83 In
the Loughton Declaration adopted in the spring of 1940, the renewal of a common Czechoslovak state was identified as the »best solution«, but preference was in fact implied for a broader federal arrangement.
At the beginning of the war, the British were aware of previous Sudeten German grievances against the Czechs and they were therefore eager to protect the rights of Sudeten Germans residing in Britain. Even at the time of formal British recognition of the Czechoslovak
Government on July 18, 1941, the Sudeten Germans were specifically exempted from the Czechoslovak Government’s jurisdiction. Jaksch was aware of the British position from the beginning and tried to use it to his advantage. With early German victories, fears of German invasion, and reports of Nazi brutality in occupied countries, anti-German sentiment in Britain continued to increase and Jaksch’s position gradually weakened. Jaksch failed to recognize that
his position was changing as the war progressed. His interactions with the Foreign Office revealed this fact. Though the officials at the Foreign Office did not point out the changing reality to Jaksch either, they did express their sympathies for him in statements included in confidential internal memoranda, e.g.: »The Relationship between Beneš and Jaksch had deteriorated through the fault of Dr. Beneš [...] It is not prudent to throw Herr Jaksch to the wolves as
84 Ibid., File 30834, C6447/326/12:
Vansittart to Eden, May 10, 1942,
Roberts’s Minute, June 16, 1942.
85 Raška 2002, p. 115f.
86 Smutný, Jaromír: Němci v československu a jejich odsun z republiky.
In: Svědectví prezidentova kancléře.
Praha: Mladá fronta 1996,
p. 279.
87 Jaksch, Wenzel: Was Kommt nach
Hitler? Die Möglichkeiten und Voraussetzungen einer demokratischen
Föderalisierung Zentraleuropas.
London: s.t. 1939.
Lord Vansittart and Lockhart recommend [...]«84 In the end, the British indeed threw Jaksch to
the wolves. In fact, he was not even permitted to move to Germany until several years after
the war.
Jaksch did not learn a lesson from the split of his organization initiated by the Zinnergruppe in the autumn of 1940. Most difficult to understand were his inexplicable protests
against the British renunciation of Munich.85 Jaksch’s insistence on self-determination above
and beyond autonomy provoked a negative counter-reaction on the part of Czechoslovak politicians. While nobody could doubt Jaksch’s firm opposition to Nazism both before and during
the war, in exile »in his attitude towards the Republic and the Czechs, he had become a typical Sudeten German.«86
Throughout all his activities in Britain, Jaksch refused to join the United Front with the
Communists and correctly predicted the future of the Zinnergruppe and of the Liberal Democrats in post-war Czechoslovakia. His predictions were also correct with respect to the Czechoslovak non-Communist Socialist politicians. He was an early European federalist. His views in
Was Kommt nach Hitler?87 had preceded those of the British, who viewed the creation of a federation of small European states as a measure against Soviet domination of Europe. To the
Czechs, however, these views represented only pan-Germanism, which contributed to the failure to reach agreement with the Treuegemeinschaft about a common future in a common
state.
Francis D. Raška, Ph.D., Ass. Prof. of American Studies at the Inst. of Internat. Studies, Faculty of Social
Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Holds a B.A. in political science from Le Moyne Coll., Syracuse, NY, an
M.A. in Slavonic and East European Studies from the Univ. of London, an MPhil from the Univ. of Dundee
and a Ph.D. in modern history from the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. Doctoral thesis:
The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue (Praha 2002).
contact: [email protected]
page 11 31 | 03 | 2004

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