Counterfeit Components..

Komentáře

Transkript

Counterfeit Components..
Counterfeit
Components..
Risk & Reality from
Counterfeit Presentation
Part 1: Major Source of Threat
Part 2: The Threat is Refined
Part 3: Threat Mitigation @ SMT
Part 1:
Major Source of
Threat
China Trip
2008
City of Shenzhen
China’s Main Entry Point
of Counterfeit Electronics
Into the Global
Marketplace
Reels of 0402
Case Size
Capacitors
Vehicle Inspection
Point Just Outside
City of Shantou
Electronic Debris Stored
in Front and Back Yards
Seen While Driving
Through City Streets
Components Being
Washed in the River &
Laid on Bank to Dry
Components on River Bank
Drying
Washing Components in River
Pulled Components
Drying on City
Sidewalks, then
Separated by Type
0402 Case Size Capacitors
($.0025 ea from Fran. Disty)
Pulled Components
Stored in Bags, Being
Delivered and Awaiting
Processing
Floor #1
Pulled Components
Sorted by Sifting
Shantou Warehouse:
Boards Stacked, Waiting
for Chip Removal
Targeted Components Have
Already Been Removed
Pulled Components
Prepared for
Counterfeiting Process
Remarked Components
Ready for Counterfeit
Packaging and
Distribution thru
Shenzhen’s Global
Market
1997 Parts
Remarked as
2006: Nine
Years Difference
Counterfeit Cisco Card
Grim Reality of
the Counterfeit
Global
Distribution
Network
Life of a Counterfeit Component
• Created 1st week of August, 2010 in
Shantou China
• 10,000 Identical (lot/dc) parts
• All were Immediately put up for sale
• Over next 6-12 months the 10,000
Identical (lot/dc) parts have been split up
into smaller groups and found new homes
around the world
Before
After
UK
Canada
Beijing
Germany
NY
CA
FL
Shenzhen
Israel
Japan
Shantou
India
Philippines
This counterfeit lot has found
MANY homes Globally over a 612 month period
Life Span to Threaten Industry?
Indefinite!
Counterfeiting:
Not Just
Components
Counterfeit
factory box
LOGO AUTHENTICATION
FAKE
REAL
Moisture
Level
Inconsistency
On “Factory”
Labels
Spelling Errors
Dec
Date
John Doe??
Counterfeit
OCM
“Certificates of
Compliance”
(C of C)
Counterfeit OCM Cert Envelope
Over 20 Years of BlackTopping and Remarking
Original Date Code 8829
1 2
3
Remarked Date Code 9115
SLOPPY BLACK-TOPPING
Laser-Etch Remarking Still
Visible After Black-Topping
Has Been Removed
After Black-Top Removal
Laser-Etch Still Remains
Part 2:
The Threat is
Refined
New Threat!
(July 2009)
Highly-Engineered Black-Top
Material Designed to Evade
Detection on Counterfeited
Plastic Encapsulated
Microcircuits (PEMS)
Exemplar
Top
Surface
Suspect
Top
Surface
Exemplar
Top
Surface
Virtually
Identical Surface
Features
Suspect
Top
Surface
Exemplar
Pin-One
Cavity
Suspect
Pin-One
Cavity
Suspect Pin-One
Cavity
Suspect
Pure Acetone – No Affect
Pure Acetone – 7 Day Soak
7 Day Soak – Wipe Test Has No Affect
Suspect
New Blacktop Material
Could Only Be Removed
With an X-acto Knife
Suspect – scratch test
removes blacktop material
Scanning
Electron
Microscope
(2 Systems)
Exemplar
Device
Top
“Cornrow”
Etch Process
Suspect
Device
Top
Exemplar
Device
Side
Overspray
Visible
Suspect
Device
Side
Energy Dispersive X-Ray
(2 Systems)
Spectrum Analysis of
the Suspect Device
Top Surface Area
y
n
n
o
m
n
o
b
u
i
o
r
m
c
n
a
i
i
t
l
a
C
i
t
n
i
S
T
A
Suspect
Energy Dispersive
Spectroscopy (EDX)
Test Results on New
Blacktop Material
Spectrum Analysis of the
Exemplar Device Top
Surface
Exemplar
Spectrum Analysis of the
Suspect Device Top
Surface
m
u
n
i
m
u
l
A
Suspect
Scanning Acoustic
Microscopy
(SAM)
Internal Imaging
Results
Acoustic
Microscopy
(1 System)
Exemplar
Device
Topside
Internal
Image Scan
Suspect
Device
Exemplar
Suspect
Side by Side
Comparative
Image Analysis
would pass since
the bonding
layout and die
features are
identical.
Exemplar
Device Die
Identical Die
Suspect
Device Die
New Blacktop Threat- Recap
•
•
•
•
•
•
Identical visual surface characteristics
Impervious to Acetone (RTS)
Identical surface element makeup
Identical Real-Time X-Ray images
Authentic die
Will probably pass functionality
So how bad IS the
Counterfeit problem
we face?
Global Impact on Industry
Perception
of the
Counterfeit
Problem
Counterfeit Problem
Perception
Global Impact on Industry
Reality of the
Counterfeit
Problem
SMT
Purchase
Order Terms
&
Conditions
re:
Counterfeit
Product
Part 3:
Counterfeit Threat
Mitigation at SMT
SMT Overview
•
•
•
•
Established in 1995.
Independent Stocking Distributor
Woman Owned Small Business
Over 120,000 line items in-stock of obsolete
& DMS-type component products
• 72,000 sf. facility specifically engineered for
the proper storage, inspection, and
distribution of ESD and humidity sensitive
electronic components.
SMT Corporation
Certifications & Memberships
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
AS9120:2002
ISO9001:2000
ISO14001:2004
OHSAS 18001:2007
ANSI/ESD-20.20:2007
WBENC
IDEA
ERAI
GIDEP
AIA
CERTIFIED
CERTIFIED
CERTIFIED
CERTIFIED
CERTIFIED
CERTIFIED
MEMBER
MEMBER
MEMBER
MEMBER
SMT 72,000 sq ft
Facility & Property
Holdings
12 Acre site
owned by
SMT –
Purchased in
2010 for
Future
Facility
Expansion
9 Acre site owned
by SMT Developed in 2003
Facility Relative Humidity
Environmental Controls
and Safeguards for
Component Storage at
SMT
Complete
Warehouse
Dehumidification
System
Dehumidification System
Networked 60-ton “Desert Aire”
System installed in critical
component storage / handling areas
– 45% Max RH allowed year-round.
Complete
Warehouse
Dehumidification
System
45% RH Year Round
Humidification Systems
Multiple networked units installed in
critical component handling /
inspection areas – 25% Min RH
allowed year-round.
All humidification systems are
integrated with the associated
facility HVAC systems.
Monitored
Humidification
Units (3 total)
Wall Humidistat
(On Network)
60,000 SF
ESD Floor
Treatments
ESD Test Point
all Employees
must pass thru to
reach component
work areas.
20,000 sf Blue Warehouse
30,000 sf Red Warehouse
Tape /
Reel
Lab Area
- Floor plan
S/R
Lab
Area
Data
Entry
Lab Area
Blue Warehouse
20,000 sq ft
Red Warehouse
30,000 sq ft
Office Areas
ESD treated floor area – 60,000 sq ft
Incoming
Order
Processing
Area
(10 Stations)
Outgoing
Order
Processing
Area
(12 Stations)
Tape & Reel
(9 Stations)
Baking &
Dry Packing
(4 Stations)
Analysis Labs
#1 & 2 -
(10 Stations)
X-Ray, SEM,
EDX & AM
Lab Area
Sample
Preparation
Lab Area
Minimum Inspection for
Open-Market Product
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Visual Inspection - 100%
X-Ray Inspection – 100%
XRF Inspection – 2 / lotdc
SEM Surface Inspection – 2 / lotdc
RTS Inspection – 2 / lotdc
Solderability – 2 / lotdc
Scratch Test – 2 / lotdc
Heated Solvent – 2 / lotdc
Decap - Die Verification – 2 / lotdc
Product Inspection
SMT’s In-House
Component Quality &
Authentication
Analysis Process
EMPLOYEE
TRAINING!
QC Lab Mgr: Jason Romano
QC Insp Mgr: Kimberly Costa
Documented
Visual Inspection
Packaging
Inspection
Package Verification & Condition
Marking Permanency (RTS)
Heated Solvent
Testing
(2 Systems)
Documented
Visual
Inspection
Checklist
Datasheet Comparison
Mechanical Verification
Documented
Datasheet
Comparison
Data
Documented
Component
Photos
FRONT IMAGE
REAR IMAGE
Documented
Photo
Inspection
Data
Documented
XRF RoHS Testing
X-Ray
Fluorescence
(2 Systems)
Documented
XRF-RoHS
Test Data
Documented
Real Time X-Ray
Imaging
Real-Time X-Ray
(2 Systems)
Match Pin-Out to Datasheet
Intel
Intersil
Harris
OKI
Automated
Real-Time X-Ray for
100% inspection of
parts on reels
Automated
Real-Time
X-Ray
(2 Systems)
Current X-Ray Field
of View (FOV)
Current
Pass/Fail/Review
Data
Reference Part
Current Part
Documented
X-Ray
Inspection
Data
Documented
Solderability
Testing
Automated
Solderability
(2 Systems)
Bath Test
Globule Test
PASS
Force
Wetting Curve
Minimum amount of
force required to pass
Time
Documented
Solderability
Test Data
Documented
Acid-Etch
Decapsulation &
Die Verification
Acid-Etch
Decapsulation
(4 Systems)
Documented
Die
Inspection
Data
Scanning Electron
Microscope
(2 Systems)
Energy
Dispersive
X-Ray
(2 Systems)
Acoustic
Microscopy
(1 System)
A copy of the
“Certificate of Analysis”
document is shipped with
order to verify quality and
authentication inspection
has taken place
Tom Sharpe
VP - SMT Corporation
[email protected]
203-270-4705 – DD
203-994-9772 - Mobile

Podobné dokumenty