Lebanon the coalition of the unwilling

The EU and the Promotion and Stabilisation of Conflict Settlements University of Nottingham, England, UK 22­23 November 2007 The EU as a Reluctant Conflict Manager The case of Lebanon 2006 Kajsa Ji Noe Oest University of Copenhagen
1 Content 1. Introduction.................................................................................................2 2. The argument: a unipolar alliance security dilemma..........................................4 3. Explaining the Lebanon case ..........................................................................9 France ....................................................................................................... 13 Germany ................................................................................................... 14 Italy .......................................................................................................... 15 4. Conclusion................................................................................................. 16 Reference List................................................................................................ 18 1. Introduction The 2006 UNIFIL peacekeeping coalition in Lebanon could be argued to have been an obvious operation for the ESDP. 1 The main ingredients were there. First, the European Security Strategy, ESS emphasizes regional conflict management as one out of three strategic objectives, while regional conflict is stated as one of the key security threats and “above all in the Middle East” 2 (ESS 2003: 4, 6). Second, there were explicit demands from the conflict partners ­ Israel and Lebanon ­ asking for third party intervention, 3 and a UN mandate was in place. Thus, the operation fulfilled the legitimacy demands to ESDP­led operations emphasized in the ESS. Third, there were willing contributors among non­European states and thereby the multilateral approach, which also is much emphasized as important to ESDP­led operations in the ESS. Fourth, a ceasefire was in place and it was thus, an operation that was at the relative uncontroversial end of the spectrum of international military operations. Finally, the U.S. generally took a withdrawn but positive stand towards the coalition, leaving more room of maneuver for the European states. I thus, find it puzzling that the major European states did not form an ESDP­led coalition. Especially, seen in the light that the heterogeneous approach the states chose in stead, made the EU stand out more as a reluctant and indecisive conflict manager, rather than the coherent and credible one aimed at in the ESS (ESS 2003: 4). 4 This paper analyses the heterogeneous choice of strategy in three major European states – Germany, France and Italy ­ in the formation of the 2006 UNIFIL coalition in Lebanon. I argue that by applying the logic of a neoclassical realist explanation – a unipolar alliance security dilemma ­ I can account for the heterogeneity. First, I argue that in coalition formation the major European states act with regard to the unipole more 1 By a ESDP­led operation I refer to a operation where the European states in the ESDP cooperation politically and formally have decided to lead a operation within the framework of ESDP. Thus for instance if France and Germany take a leading role in an operation without a prior political decision by the ESDP states to make it an ESDP­led operation, it is not an ESDP­led operation, but an operation led by to ESDP states. 2 Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula are the other regions mentioned (ESS 2003: 4). 3 Israel was for the first time, since 1956, positive towards the prospect of a UN coalition in the region and explicitly demanded a German participation and encouraged Italy to lead the operation. 4 “EU have made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management...but if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable” and a EU “which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight” (ESS 2003: 11).
2 than with regard to the conflict partners. Even if the unipole is not directly involved, the system the states act in is still unipolar. Second, I argue that the unipole’s systemic pressure is the main determinant for an ally’s choice of strategy, but this is filtered through domestic modifiers. Therefore focusing on the relative relation between the level of the unipole’s systemic pressure and the level of the domestic modifiers in the European states can explain the likelihood of one strategy chosen as opposed to another. Finally, I argue that this relation is dominated by an alliance dilemma, which varies across states and coalitions and thus gives a variation in the unipole’s systemic pressure on different states in different situations. The aim of this paper is to gain a greater insight into the background for the heterogeneity in European defense policy and why and when a major European state chooses one strategy as opposed to another. This is an important aim because the study thus, engages in the debate on the potential and value of the EU as a conflict manager. A debate on questions of why there is reluctance, difficulties and heterogeneity in the European integration and cooperation in the security and defense area. Further this paper contributes to the discussion of what might be the implications of the EU not acting unitary and taking the lead in a most likely obvious case, like Lebanon. Finally, even though the main aim of this paper is empirically focused, the study also on the theoretical side, engages in the realist debate on unipolarity and balance of power and alliance theory and coalition formation. I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the logic of my theoretical argument ­ a unipolar alliance security dilemma. Second, I use the theoretical argument to explain the heterogeneity of the foreign and security policy of three major players ­ France, Germany and Italy ­ in relation to the formation of the UNIFIL coalition in 2006 in Lebanon. Finally, I sum up the conclusion and discuss the implications of my findings for the perspectives for the EU as a conflict manager. Before moving on, I discuss a couple of caveats. First, this is a single case study. This paper only studies the conditions and reaction patterns in three states in relation to the formation of the coalition in Lebanon in 2006. Therefore, the conclusions of the paper are not generally theoretically applicable and only account for this case. Further, there cannot be drawn conclusions on allied cooperation in general or the unipole’s role and influence in relation to other states. Second, this is neither a test of different theories against each other, nor a test of the explanatory power of the theoretical argument presented. The overall aim in this paper is empirical. Thus, by applying the logic of my theoretical argument I argue, I can analyze the empirical puzzle in a different perspective than existing studies of European defense integration, and that this can shed light on empirical relations that would otherwise not be as apparent. I do therefore, not attempt to suggest that my neoclassical realist explanation ­ the unipolar alliance security dilemma ­ is the only explanation, or that it covers every aspect on the topic of the European states’ choice of strategy in coalition formation and European defense integration. The three states ­ France, Germany and Italy ­ are chosen because they all are major European states with dominating roles in the EU in general and the ESDP in specific. 5 They are part of the EU member states committed to the ESDP, ESS and 5 The UK would be an obvious case for a future study. The UK is at the current stages left out of this study as I initially did not find its behavior as puzzling as the other three states. The UK was not indecisive. On the contrary the UK from the beginning expressed that it was far too overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq to contribute considerably.
3 the Rapid Reaction Force 6 and can therefore be expected to generally be in favor of the defense integration and the ESDP and to have an interest in fulfilling the ambitions of the ESS. Moreover, all three states chose different strategies of participation in the 2006 UNIFIL coalition in Lebanon. Italy chose a major participation – being the main contributor to the coalition ­ and was willing and stable in their response, France was reluctant and indecisive and ended with a considerably smaller participation than first stated, and Germany was even more indecisive and reluctant and ended with semi­participation. 2. The argument: a unipolar alliance security dilemma In this section, I present my main theoretical argument and discuss its strengths and challenges. My overall argument is that by applying the logic of a unipolar alliance security dilemma I can account for the heterogeneity and the likelihood of a state chosen one strategy as opposed to another. My argument is based on a neoclassical realist theoretical framework. I apply a Gideon Rose (1998), Jeffrey Taliaferro (2006) inspired definition of neoclassical realism and define it as a theory of foreign policy. I therefore, argue that the competitive nature of the international system is the main determinant for states choice of strategy, but the domestic variables, however, limit the efficiency with, which states can respond to systemic imperatives (Taliaferro 2006: 467). Thus, systemic variables are filtered through the domestic variables, which might influence and constrain or facilitate a states reaction. This theoretical framework is chosen for two main reasons. First, using neoclassical realism allows me ­ in accordance with my research question ­ to study under what circumstances a given state will follow one strategy as opposed to another. Second, neoclassical realism not only integrates systemic level and unit level variables, but specifically account, for how systemic variables are filtered through unit­level intervening variables. Among the literature specifically trying to explain EU defense integration and the European states’ choice of strategies in relation to the ESDP, more policy oriented and empirical analyses such as diplomatic history and journalistic accounts are dominating (Forsberg 2007). Among the theoretical studies structural realists such as Posen (2004, 2006) argue that the ESDP could be seen as a weak form of balancing. Other structural realists such as Brooks & Wolforth (2005) argue that integration on the ESDP area is a reaction to decreased U.S. presence in the region. 7 A semi­structural 8 explanation is presented by Mouritzen and Wivel (2005) emphasizing the regional context such as geopolitics. Looking at the more general 6 France and Germany has been driving forces behind the cooperation and development of a common European Security and Defense Policy (Friis 2001: 114­115). France and Germany was also among the four European states that at a mini­summit April 29. 2003 attempted to lay the groundwork for an EU military alliance. 7 See also Waltz 1993 Mearshimer 1990 or Jones 2003, 2006, 2007. Structural realists generally, in this context, have a problem in accounting for why we, in the first place, could expect a coherent strategy from the states. Furthermore, they are challenged on explanations of why states would have a security interest in strengthening the EU as one actor or give up sovereignty in military matters or be able to act in a coherent way through the EU (Collard­Wexler 2006). 8 This emphasizes the systemic level, the regional meso­level and the unit­level.
4 EU integration literature, there are the classical integration theories; federalism 9 , functionalism 10 , transactionalism 11 and neofunctionalism 12 that argues that the EU integration should be explained by identity. These does not account for integration in the defense area. 13 Newer approaches that also emphasize identity, but differ on method can be found in the constructivist approach. 14 Other EU integration theories are Liberal intergovernmentalism 15 , where integration is seen as a great bargain with an emphasis on economic interests. 16 These does not directly relate to defense integration. Finally, there is a multi­level approach 17 , which emphasizes the importance of the supranational, national and supranational government levels in the decision­making. In sum, the explanations found in the EU integration literature are very much focused on either structural explanations or unit­level or have a hard time systematically accounting for the heterogeneity in the choice of state strategies. 18 Specifically this is the case when focusing on EU integration in the defense and security area. In spite of some discussions of a combination, an explanation does not exist, which in a systematic theoretical manner accounts for the relation between the influence of the systemic and domestic factors in the EU defense integration. Therefore, this is what I aim to present. 9 E.g. Pistone 1994. E.g. Mitrany 1966. 11 E.g. Deutsch et al 1957; Dosenrode 1993, Rosamond 2000. 12 E.g. Haas 1958, 1975, 1964, 1999, Nye 1971, Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, Schmitter 1996 or Tranholm­Mikkelsen 1991. 13 In the general classical EU integration militarization is an anomaly, as they did not asses military defense to be a part of the EU (Ojanen 2006a, 2006b). The spill­over integration from one field to another was not expected to include defense integration (Haas 1958). Newer developments in neofunctionalism has discerned different logics of spillover (Tranholm­Mikkelsen 1991, Niemann 2006) e.g. political spill­ over, social spill­over cultivated spill­over. 14 E.g. Adler & Barnett 1998, Wæver 1995, Wendt 1992, 1999, Risse­Kappen 1996, Obradovic 1996, Chirstiansen & Joergensen 1999, Risse et al 1999, Risse 2004, Smith 2000, Diez and Wiener 2003 or Walters 2002. Aspects of the ESDP and Common Foreign and Security Policy have been analyzed by constructivist approaches (E.g. Keane 2005, Jan Zielonka 1998) but there is not a clear explanatory account of the ESDP as a whole (Forsberg 2007). The constructivist studies have in general been criticized for being too vague to produce testable theories (Moravcsik 1999; Sjursen 2001). 15 E.g. Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2000; Garret and Weingast 1993. 16 Competing interest between EU’s long­term foreign policy agenda and its shorter­term economic interests could thus be argued to weaken the foreign and security policy (Aadal 2006). However, this is difficult to apply to the variation across major European states and in a broader perspective the variation in participation in international coalitions in general and when ESDP coalitions in specific have been launched. 17 E.g. Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996 or Bulmer 1995. 18 Except for Mouritzen and Wivel, who specifically tries to explain heterogeneity in states strategies (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005). Mouritzen and Wivel, however, argue that the U.S. and the EU could be seen as one pole. I argue that there is a dilemma inherent I the relation between the U.S. and the EU they do not account for.
10 5 Textbox 1 EU integration in the defense area 1992 The Maastricht Treaty framed a common defense policy as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 1997 The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the WEU's "Petersberg tasks" into the Treaty on the European Union. 1998 At the St Malo Summit the UK and France decided on the need for a European defense force. 1999At the Cologne Summit EU agreed on a common defense strategy. 2000 By the Marseilles Declaration the WEU was incorporated into the EU 2000 The Treaty of Nice reflected the operative development of the ESDP as an independent EU project. 2000 15 EU member states formally decided on the rapid reaction force (RRF) of 60,000 men 2003 The “European Security Strategy (EES) A secure Europe in a Better World” was adopted 2004 The European Defense Agency
My argument falls in three parts. First, I argue that in international coalition formation the major European states act with regard to the unipole 19 , more than with regard to the conflict partners. Even if the unipole is not directly involved – as in the case of the 2006 UNIFIL coalition in Lebanon 20 ­ the system the states act in is still unipolar. The basis for this argument is that in relation to coalition formation in a unipolar international system, the unipole is likely to be of major strategic importance to all other states. This is because of the dominating role the unipole has as an international agenda setter. Other states can not avoid relating to the unipole. Specifically this is true for an ally of the unipole, as it is the unipole an ally can gain or lose the most from cooperating with. This is due to the positive and negative sanctions a dominating pole have the possibility of using towards its allies (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005: 20). 21 Therefore, when an ally of the unipole, U.S. e.g. France or Denmark decides whether or not to participate in the 2006 UNFIL coalition a determining factor of this decision can be found in the relation to the U.S. rather than in the relation to conflict parties, Israel and Lebanon. Second, I, argue that the unipole’s systemic pressure is the main determinant for an ally’s choice of strategy, but that this is filtered through domestic modifiers. Therefore by focusing on the relative relation, between the level of the unipole’s 19 I define “Unipolarity” as when the distribution of capabilities in the international system favors one overall dominant super power, who possess a considerable relative capability advantage than those of the other states in the system, though not upholding a hegemonic position because of the lack of control or monopoly on nuclear weapons (Hansen 2000: 15, 52, 79­80). I define the current system as unipolar being aware of the discussions on the merits of this. But, I argue that, because “the specific assessment of the current distribution of power is an empirical question” (Hansen 2000: 50, Waltz 1979: 131) 19 , even if the concept of unipolarity is not accepted for the present state, the concept is important for analysis. 20 Here the unipole did not participate in the coalition formation as there was an expressed wish from Lebanon against U.S. participation. The U.S. was viewed as an ally of Israel, the other conflict part and thus biased. 21 There might be arguments that an ally can gain benefits from the conflict partners e.g. economical benefits, in securing first pick in regeneration of the state after the conflict. I, however, argue that in these cases in a unipolar international system the unipole will have a major say in this, and thus the benefit will still mainly be achieved in the relation between the unipole and an ally. 6 systemic pressure and the level of the domestic modifiers, the likelihood of one strategy being chosen as opposed to another can be explained. The third part of my argument is ­ based on Robert Jervis’ adversary security dilemma (Jervis 1978) and Glenn Snyder’s multipolar alliance security dilemma (Snyder 1997) –that the relation between the allies and the unipole is defined by an alliance dilemma. 22 In the perspective of the allies, the dilemma in cooperating with the unipole consists of the need to choose between two equally unattractive risks; the risk of being abandoned by the unipole in a single option system vs. the risk of being entrapped into costly conflicts. Allies might risk degrees of abandonment by the unipole ­ e.g. loss of security, influence 23 or being diplomatically and maybe also economically left in the cold could occur 24 ­ if they do not follow the main foreign and security political agenda of the unipole, but following might have high domestic costs economical, political 25 or public opposition or the loss of autonomy by having to let the unipole use bases, territory or air space. 26 Extreme abandoned i.e. dissolution of alliances is not likely in the current unipolar system. In the perspective of the unipole the dilemma consists of the need to choose between the risks of being abandoned by allies, it does need in spite of its immersive powers 27 and the risk of entrapment into costly conflicts and constraint of the allies. If the unipole does not meet some of the expectations from the allies it risk abandonment e.g. non­participation, non­cooperation or soft balancing but if it is too compliant this might constraint the unipole from acting. 28 I argue that the severity of a unipolar alliance security dilemma, that is the intensity 22 This unipolar alliance security dilemma differs from Snyder’s multipolar dilemma by a more narrow focus on the asymmetrical relation between the unipole and its allies inherent in a unipolar international system. I argue that there during unipolarity also is interconnectivity between alliance security dilemmas and adversary security dilemmas. The adversary security dilemma is present during unipolarity as other states worry about the unipole’s capabilities and intentions. However, I argue that the difference between how cooperative and competitive the adversary and the alliance security dilemma is during unipolarity is smaller because free riding does not only happen coincidentally, but is a preferred strategy of most states (Hansen 2000). Thus the integrative spiral is less visible during unipolarity, which is also seen in that alliances generally are less stable and explicit. 23 I define influence in terms of a state’s position in the international system and especially in relation to the unipolar agenda setter. Following, survival is not only defined as a question of surviving a substantial external danger, but also a question of surviving in terms of maintaining and improving a state’s influence. Specifically security is defined according to Birthe Hansen (2000) as one states position vis à vis others, an increase in a states relative capabilities implies that its position improves with an increased level of security as being the bi­product and vice versa (Hansen 2000: 55). 24 This, for instance, happened to Germany in 2003. Chancellor Schroeder was put in the dog house right after Schroeder against an alleged agreement with the U.S used the Iraq­issue in the German election campaign in 2002. In 2002/2003 Germany was not part of the negotiations in the build­up to the Iraq war and could do nothing much than sit back and anticipate, whether France would go along or not. Whether France would participate or not in the Iraq 2003 war was in spite of the French criticisms not entirely certain until the beginning of the war. 25 For instance, there was in a majority of European states a strong domestic political and public opposition to the war in Iraq in 2003 and with this also a strong opposition against participation in the coalition in Iraq. 26 This could be major conflicts such as Iraq 2003, Afghanistan 2001 etc. in which the allies might not necessarily have any direct relation or interest in or where they are not directly exposed to any threat. 27 A unipole need allies to add legitimacy to its actions, to avoid exhaustion and thereby counterbalancing but also resources wise a unipole can need allies in military operations. This could be the use of air space, bases and intelligence sharing. 28 The unipolar perspective is not extensively discussed in this paper, as it is the European allies’ perspective, which is in focus. For more on the unipolar side of the dilemma see Oest 2007.
7 of fears of abandonment and entrapment, is largely determined by the same three factors as Snyder applies to the multipolar alliance security dilemma. The three central components of alliance bargain power: interests, dependence and commitment (Snyder 1997). Further, the same dynamics apply here, the dilemma is mild, and when the allies have a high proportion of common interests, and the dilemma is server, when the allies have a high and symmetrical level of mutual dependence. I argue that the dilemma is generally less severe during unipolarity, than in multipolar or bipolar systems, because it is not likely that the mutual dependence between allies is symmetrical in unipolarity. Further, because the external security threat to most allies of the unipole is smaller, and extreme abandonment is not likely, the fear of being abandoned is smaller. Finally, I argue that the degree of the dilemma varies in different situations and for different states, even though the polarity in the international system is held constant as unipolar. This is mainly because the main determinant, the unipole’s systemic pressure varies over cases and states, as the unipole in different coalitions has different needs for allies and the strategically value of the allies differ. If a unipole is a conflict partner the need will be relatively high and thus also the pressure. Whereas, if the unipole is a third party the pressure is likely to be medium and if unipole is not a partner the pressure low. Thus, the unipole has a varying bargaining power in the relation to the allies. Further, it is argued that the payoffs of one country affect what other states do. If a state is strategically important the pressure is argued to be relatively high and if a strategically important state decline participation the pressure will be relatively higher on other states. In sum, my argument is that the heterogeneous strategy choices and when which strategy is preferred over the other of the European allies can be explained by assessing the degree and value of the relative relation between the unipole’s pressure and the domestic modifiers. This can be illustrated in my general hypothesis on what determines the choice of strategies in international coalition formation for allies from the perspective of the allies.
8 Research Hypothesis The unipole’s systemic pressure: ­ Degree of need for allies ­ Strategic importance of allies Domestic modifiers: ­ Loss autonomy ­ Resources ­ Historical heritage ­ Domestic political opinion ­ Public domestic opinion Allie’s strategy: ­ Participate ­ Oppose The domestic modifiers can both be constraints and facilitators, which influence a states national interest in choosing one strategy over another. The domestic modifiers are operationalized based on Glenn Snyder’s main determinants of a state’s intra­alliance bargaining power: dependence, military dependence, commitment and the bargaining range (Snyder 1997). I have, however, adapted this to specific unipolar terms. The unipole’s systemic pressure is the level of systemic constraints on an ally and determines what an ally can potentially gain from the unipole. This is based on Snyder’s dependence determinant. I argue this can be military, economical or political influence and direct as well as indirect benefits. From this follows the expected variations on my research hypothesis: a) If unipole’s pressure < domestic modifiers, states are not likely to participate b) If unipole’s pressure >domestic modifiers, states are likely to participate c) If unipole’s pressure = the domestic modifiers, but both high, states are likely to participate d) If unipole’s pressure = the domestic modifiers, but both low, states are not likely to participate 3. Explaining the Lebanon case In this section, I apply the logic of my theoretical argument ­ the unipolar alliance security dilemma ­ to reach an explanation of the European states’ heterogeneous strategies in the case of the formation of the coalition in Lebanon in 2006. It is here important to emphasize ­ as mentioned in the introduction under the caveats ­ that my theoretical argument is a theoretical simplification. I do thus, not expect to find an exact replica in the empirical findings. I merely use the logic of my argument to analyze the empirical dynamics. Firstly, I elaborate shortly on the background and the 2006 UNIFIL coalition formation in general. Second, I analyze the behavior of the
9 three states structured according to the variables in my hypothesis. I start by studying the potential domestic modifiers, then the potential systemic pressure from the unipole and hereafter other major potential gains or strains that have appeared in the debate. Third, for each state the findings are summed up. In July 13, 2006, Israel conducted an air strike on infrastructure in the capital of Lebanon, Beirut. 29 The armed conflict continued for 34 days. The war cost about 1.200 Lebanese live and about 160 Israeli (Ritzau 08/29/06). On August 11, 2006, the UN Resolution #1701, on a ceasefire, was agreed on. The UN general secretary at the time, Kofi Annan, expressed that the UN expected 9.000 of the 15.000 troops in the peacekeeping 2006 UNIFIL operation to come from the European states. The EU troops where considered vital for a quick deployment. The UN counted on a possible landing of troops in South Lebanon beginning on August 16, 2006 and that the first part of the 2006 UNIFIL force would be in place in two weeks time from that. However, a month after the agreement on Resolution #1701 not even 5.000 soldiers where sent to Lebanon. It took relatively long time from the Resolution #1701 ­ which in it self was subject to a long processing time ­ was agreed upon until the coalition was formed. 30 This was in spite of that the situation in Lebanon was critical and called for an urgent reaction. 31 29 Israel explained this as a retaliation for the July 12, 2006 kidnapping of two and killing of three Israeli soldiers in an attack on an Israeli border control post at the Israeli­Lebanese border conducted by Hezbollah. Israel demanded liberation of the three soldiers and a Lebanese commitment to UN resolution 1559 from 2004. Resolution 1559 includes Syrian withdrawal, Lebanese border control and disarming of Hezbollah. 30 Arguably this was not substantially longer than in other decision and bargaining processes for the EU on military operations. Traditionally, this kind of decisions take time to process through all the necessary channels in the European states as the right bargain needs to be in place and it takes time to gather the resources. It was, however, still puzzling as there in Lebanon was an urgent danger for the ceasefire being broken and the armed conflict restarting. 31 Commissioner Javier Solana argued that exactly this urgency was the reason why an EU­led operation did not take place, even though, it is an ambition in the ESS 2003 that ESDP should be able to respond to urgent operations. German government officials said that an EU­led operation was never on the table or even mentioned during the negotiations on the formation of the coalition (Interview Oct 2007).
10 Textbox 2 ESDP­led operations 2003­2003EUFOR Concordia FYROM with NATO military operation 2003­ European Union Police Mission EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) 2003­2003 Operation Artemis DRC without NATO military operation 2003­ EUPOL Kinshasa DRC EU monitors and mentors the Integrated Police Unit 2003­2004 EUPOL Proxima police mission in RYROM 2005 2004­ EUJUST Themis Georgia 2004, EU Rule of Law Mission 2006 ­> European Border Support Team (BST) Georgia 2004­ EUFOR Althea EU military operation in BIH 2005­ EUJUST Lex judicial mission Iraq 2005­ EUSEC DR Congo (DRC) advice and assistance for security sector reform 2005­2006 EU Police Advisory Team in FYROM 2005­ EU support AMIS II mission of African Union in Dafur 2005­ Aceh Monitoring Mission EU, ASEAN, Norway, Switzerland monitoring implementation of peace agreement 2006­ EU COPPS support to Palestinian Civil Police, security sector reform and criminal justice 2005­ EU BAM Rafah border monitoring mission at the Rafah border­crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt 2005 EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine assist against illegal trade, trafficking, smuggling, organized crime and corruption 2006 EUFOR DR Congo supplement to UN Force (MONUC) during electoral process
(www.zif­berlin.org) The European decision process on participation in the 2006 UNIFIL coalition was not characterized by decisiveness and consensus. On the contrary, a majority of the European states, which had initially stated an interest in participating in a coalition, were reluctant and changed their minds several times during the process. The final EU contribution on 7.625 soldiers was far from the considerable amount of troops first stated. Table 1 Stated and actual contributions Aug Aug 15. 16. Aug 18. Aug 20. European states Consider Belgium s Likely Conside Denmark rs Fleet 3 ships Finland 200 200 250 250 France 5000 200 200 Greece Ireland 2000­ 2000­ Italy 3000 3000 3000 3000 Luxembo urg Poland Conside Portugal rs Consider Spain 700 700 s 700 Aug Aug 22. 23. Positive 300­ 400 Actual contribution 368 80 3 Ships 200 250 1600 3000 3000 203 1608 225 163 2068 2 250 321 143 1290 Positive 800 11 41 1113 Sweden Conside Germany rs Fleet Fleet Fleet 1 frigate, 2 surveillance planes and 6 reconnaissa UK nce planes In total European states’ contributions 7625 Other states Conside Australia rs Considers, denies having Banglade Land promised sh troops 2000 2000 Brunei 200 130 Bulgaria 300 661 Ghana 670 India 1 360 battalion + 1 engineer Indonesi Land ing a 850 troops 1000 Unit 190 Kina Land Malaysia 1000 troops 1000 Morocco 1500­2000 Land 1 226 Nepal troops battalion 4 torpedo 134 boats + Conside 100 Norway rs soldiers Pakistan Considers 850­ 5000 494 Turkey 1200 1000 maybe Positive US planning and logistical support In total contribution UN 10490 (UN www.un.org, European media, France http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/, Germany http://www.auswaertiges­amt.de/diplo/de/Startseite.html, Italy http://www.esteri.it, insert further references) Set a side from the reasons mentioned in the introduction ­ on why the 2006 UNIFIL coalition could be argued to be an obvious operation for the ESDP (See p. 3) ­ there were mainly three reasons, why the EU was expected to take a dominating role. First, France had been the driving force behind the ceasefire UN Resolution #1701
12 and had stated an interest in leading the coalition in addition to contributing considerably. Second, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, and even the UK had also stated an interest in contributing to the coalition. 32 Third, the major European states had the capacity and possibility of contributing with a reasonably large amount of troops to the coalition. Furthermore, especially the resources from the European NATO members could be argued to be vital for an urgent response. France France was reluctant and indecisive in the formation of the 2006 UNFIL coalition and ended with a considerably smaller participation than first stated. At first and until mid August 2006 France had offered to lead the coalition and send up to 5000 soldiers (August 18. 2006 New York Ritzau). France went roughly from offering 5.000 to 200 to 1.400 soldiers in two weeks time and ended up by with an actual contribution of 1.608 soldiers and a shared leadership with Italy. After the Resolution #1701 negotiations, there was an expectation from the UN that France would be the main European contributor. In relation to the potential U.S. systemic pressure, there are no real indications of bilateral coordination between France and the U.S. in relation to the formation of the UNIFIL coalition. France and the U.S. worked together on making the UN Resolution #1701. During this process, France was as its most optimistic regarding its contribution. The U.S. though, repeatedly stated public dissatisfaction with the French reluctance and indecisiveness. 33 There was thus, some negative U.S. systemic pressure, even though it was small. In relation to potential domestic modifiers, the UNIFIL coalition did not involve any giving up of French autonomy in relation to the U.S. or American use of French bases of air space, as the U.S. did not participate in the coalition. Moreover, France is a military great power and had the capacity to provide a headquarter and a considerable amount of the troops. Especially, considering that France did not have troops in Iraq. Six days after the decision on the UN Resolution #1701, which France had written major parts of, a French domestic political discussion arose on the mandate of the resolution. The mandate was argued to be unclear. Specifically, the question of disarming of Hezbollah and to what extend the troops were allowed defending themselves. 34 The concern of the UN acting as the prolonged arm of the West was also raised, and thereby the importance of the coalition having involvement from the entire international systems. 35 70% of the French population supported an international coalition in Lebanon and 53% supported a French participation in the coalition. 36 Historically France has had strong ties to Lebanon, as Lebanon was a French protectorate until 1943. A considerable number of French soldiers thus, have a thorough knowledge of Lebanon. France though, also carries negative experiences from former peacekeeping missions in general. In Bosnia in the early 1990s, France lost 84 soldiers and 58 soldiers in the civil war in Lebanon in the 32 The UK, though only in a limited non­military measure. August 18 2006 the U.S. accused France for hesitating excessively. Bush criticized Chirac for sending out contradicting signals and expressed a hope that Paris would send more soldiers. August 20 2006 the critique was increased. 34 This France could have considered earlier as they were the driving force behind the resolution. Further Italy did have the same concerns but did however not follow the same pattern of reluctance and indecisiveness. 35 The main part of the first commitments to the coalition had however been given by Muslim countries. 36 (reference to be inserted)
33 13 1980s. The mission of the 2006 UNIFIL coalition was, however, surveillance of the ceasefire and border control and thus the risk of causalities was relatively smaller. Of other major factors that might have influenced the decision of French participation in the 2006 UNIFIL coalition is that France regionally has close relations to the Arabic world. France has, however, since their opposing of the Iraq war 2003 lost influence in the Middle East. Thus, an active role in Lebanon could be seen as a chance for France to recapture influence in the Middle East. Furthermore this was a chance for France as Europeanist to step into character in an ESDP­led operation without the Americans and thereby show the EU as a credible and coherent conflict manager. France did urge the European colleagues to contribute with troops and on a French initiative EU diplomats gathered to an extraordinary meeting in the EU security committee on August 23, 2006 to coordinate a European contribution. An ESDP­led coalition was, however, not on the table. Finally, this could for France ­ on a more global level ­ have been a possibility of consolidating French influence in the UN, by carrying a resolution ­ they had been the driving force behind ­ through the implementing phase. In sum, in France the domestic modifiers were low. There was some domestic constrain in the form of historical baggage i.e. bad experiences from former peacekeeping missions, but the domestic political opposition was limited and there were facilitating elements like general public support, available resources and no given up of autonomy. There was some U.S. systemic pressure, as there was American public expression of dissatisfaction with the French reluctance. Thus, the U.S. pressure was averagely on level with the domestic modifiers but both relatively low, and participation should ­ in relation to my general hypothesis in this paper ­ not be likely. It is thus not surprising that France were reluctant and indecisive. The reason that France in the end contributed to the coalition might partly be found in external regional benefits, which were relatively large. Germany Germany was even more indecisive and reluctant than France and ended with semi­ participation. There was a German decision on postponing the decision on the German contribution indefinitely on September 3, 2006. Further, Germany emphasized early on that they did not want to contribute with land troops. Germany stated a promise of a fleet contribution on the August 18 2006 (See table 1) but did not put specific numbers on until just before the coalition was formed. The actual contribution from Germany was 1.113 soldiers to coastal guarding. In relation to potential U.S. systemic pressure, it has not been possible to find sources confirming that Germany and the U.S. had any form of bilateral coordination on the formation of the coalition. Thus there is nothing to indicate that Germany could expect any direct or indirect gains from the U.S. by choosing a specific foreign and security policy strategy on the subject of the UNIFIL coalition in 2006. When looking at the potential domestic modifiers, participation in the coalition did not involve giving up any German autonomy to the U.S. Neither did it involve extended American use of German air space nor bases, as the U.S. did not participate in the coalition. However, Germany was to some extent tied up in Afghanistan resource wise. Further, in the domestic political debate the German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Jung, faced strong opposition, because he repeatedly changed the estimate of the number of German soldiers being deployed. Jung also got unpopular on stating that the first mentioned 1.200 was far too few. The
14 opposition and the soldiers union opposed a German participation, while the ruling parties, the CDU and the SPD, were internally split on the issue. In the public debate there was a major discussion on whether German participation even with a fleet could be considered a war action or not. Furthermore, there were opposition in the German population based on historical heritage from WWII and Holocaust. This was the ethical issue of the risk of German soldiers opening fire against Israeli soldiers. The participation was in the German population a far more sensitive issue, than it had been in the case of participation in Afghanistan or Kosovo. Generally, of other major factors that might have influenced the German decision on participation this could have been an opportunity for Germany to show German influence in an ESDP­led operation in general and German influence in the Middle East in specific and to promote EU’s role as a credible and coherent conflict manager. Especially, considering that Israel explicitly had demanded German presence and participation. In sum, Germany’s domestic modifiers were much higher compared to France. The domestic constraints were relatively high for Germany as it had limited resources. But mainly, there was a significant historical heritage. This resulted in a major political and public opposition. The determining U.S. systemic pressure and potential influence benefit was absent. The U.S. pressure was thus lower than domestic modifiers and participation should not be likely in relation to my general hypothesis in this paper. German reluctance and semi­participating is thus not surprising. Italy Italy was ­ as opposed to France and Germany ­ willing and stable in their statements on participation and the Italian contribution. Italy maintained during the entire period that they would contribute with 2000­3000 troops, and that Italy was willing to lead the coalition. This was in spite of Italy having expressed the same concerns as France ­ regarding the mandate of the coalition ­ but this did not affect the stated Italian contribution. Italy was with its shared leadership with France and its contribution of 2.068 soldiers the country, which contributed the most to the coalition. In relation to the potential U.S. systemic pressure, Italy and the U.S. had some extent of bilateral coordination on the issue of the formation of the coalition. Italy and the U.S. send out a common declaration on the issue. In the declaration they opted for a more precise wording of the UN resolution on the mandate of the coalition. Thus, there is in the case of Italy indications of some coordination of their foreign and security policy strategy in relation to the U.S. In relation to potential domestic modifiers, participation in the coalition did not involve giving up of Italian autonomy in relation to the U.S. or American use of Italian bases or air space, as the U.S did not participate in the coalition. Furthermore, Italy had as a NATO state, the resources vital to the coalition. This might even be more so, than was the case with Germany and France. Germany has been limited by its peace constitution in rebuilding its military capabilities and France has been opting out of central parts of the NATO cooperation. Italy had at the time troops in both Iraq 37 and Afghanistan but had available military resources. In the domestic political opposition, the Italian right­wing was pro­Israeli while the left wing was pro­Arabic. In the Italian government the more radical left wing sympathized 37 The Italian troops in Iraq were withdrawn in the end of November 2006.
15 with Hezbollah while the center­right supported Prodi’s engagement. The center­right though expressed a concern that Italy would end up alone in Lebanon. The Italian contribution to Lebanon was accepted in the public, in spite of that military force as a mean 38 in general is not popular among the Italian population. Historically, Italy has had peacekeeping troops in Lebanon 1983­4, Mozambique, Somalia, Balkan etc., but heritage from this did not seem to have a great impact on the political or public debate. In relation to other major factors that might have influenced the Italian decision on participation, Italy was directly requested by Israel to take the responsibility of leading the UNIFIL coalition. 39 Thereby, this was also an opportunity for Italy to enhance its relatively small position and influence in the Middle East. Further, it can be argued that the participation and active role of Italy could be seen as a mean to strengthen Italian influence in the EU. This, by again making Italy a central player in the EU, after a more one­sided pro­American foreign and security policy, during the leadership of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. In sum, Italian domestic modifiers were low as the domestic constraints were low. There were in spite of some domestic political differences a general public support, the historical heritage did not seem to have a major impact on the public of political debate, there was no given up of autonomy and available resources. There were indications of bilateral coordination between Italy and the U.S. in the process of the formation of the coalition. It can, thus, be argued that the role of the unipole was more present in the case of Italy, as compared to that of Germany and France and thus a presence of some U.S. systemic pressure. The U.S. systemic pressure was thus higher than the domestic modifiers and participation should be likely in relation to my general hypothesis in this paper. It is thus not surprising that Italy chose a decisive and positive strategy. 4. Conclusion I have now analyzed three major European players and their choices of foreign and security political strategy in the formation of the 2006 UNIFIL coalition in Lebanon. I conclude that applying the logic of my unipolar alliance security dilemma argument did provide a plausible explanation for the heterogeneous behavior of these three allies of the unipole. I found that the heterogeneous behavior can be explained by that the relative relations between the U.S. systemic pressure and the domestic modifiers varied across the states. The general absence of the determining U.S. systemic pressure together with the character of the domestic modifiers can explain why the participation was reluctant and indecisive in France and why Germany only semi­participated. While the Italian willingness and stable statements can be explained by that the U.S. systemic pressure was present to some extent here. The logic has some value in explaining the puzzling variation and reluctance as it draws attention to that states to some extent still are acting according to the U.S. systemic pressure or that the lack of this might have an impact. It is of course necessary to keep in mind that this is a single case study of the formation of the 2006 UNIFIL coalition in Lebanon. In this paper I only studied to 38 Independent of what kind of military means is in question even in relation to peacekeeping. August 20. 2006 Ehud Olmert wrote in a declaration that he had put this request forward himself to Romano Prodi in a phone conversation.
39 16 which extend the unipolar alliances security dilemma argument is useful to explain the heterogeneous behavior of three major European states. Further research could engage in the study of other coalitions, states, non­European states or a comparison of allied cooperation before and after the end of the Cold War. The Lebanon case is, however, a representative case as it can be argued to be a most likely case for European coordination and a ESDP­led operation. The findings thus, constitute a solid basis for further studies of both the EU as a conflict manager and allied cooperation on coalition formation. Finally, in relation to the perspectives for future ESDP­led international military operations and EU’s role as a credible and coherent conflict manager, I argue the perspectives for a coherent and credible ESDP are very long­term. The formation of the UNIFIL coalition does not necessarily have to be seen as a showdown between American and European conflict managing resources. The European states saved their reputation by after some reluctance to provide 7.625 troops, but the EU has yet again shown its weakness in agreeing and acting as a unitary actor on foreign and security policy issues. The Lebanon case does not show that the EU is by now a decisive co­player in the field of conflict management, even though it has been eight years since the ESDP was declared operational. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether the EU during the current unipolar international system, at all has a genuine interest in taken on a more autonomous role as a conflict manager. I argue that one of the main factors for the reluctance in the formation of the coalition in Lebanon in 2006 was that the U.S. was not a direct partner in the conflict or the coalition. Thus, the U.S. allies were lacking a major external incitement to participate, which they have had in other various ESDP­led coalitions e.g. the Balkans, Afghanistan and the DRC. These were all ESDP­led operations with clear American involvement and U.S. systemic pressure for European involvement.
17 References Aadal Rasmussen, Niels: “EU Global Power? Reflections on the European Security and Defence Policy after the Failure of the 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty” DIIS Report 2006:8, September 2006. Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett: Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998. Bulmer, Simon: “Four Faces of European Union Governance: A New Institutional Research Agenda”, Manchester, European Policy Research Unit, Paper No. 2, 1995. Brooks S. and W. Wohlforth: “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International Security vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 72­108, 2005. Christensen, Thomas and Knud Erik Jørgensen: “Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances”, American Political Science Review, vol 91, no. 4, December, pp.919­922, 1999 Collard­Wexler, Simon: “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union”, European Journal of International Relations (12):3, 397­432, 2006. Deutsch et al: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957 Diez, T. and Wiener A.: “Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory”. In Diez and Wiener (eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004. Dosenrode, Søren Z. von: Westeuropäische Kleinstaaten in der EG und EPZ, Zürich, Verlag Rüegger 1993. Friis, Lykke: Den europæiske byggeplads. Fra fælles mønt til europæisk forfatning. Forlaget Centrum. 2001. Forsberg, Tuomas: “Explaining the Emergence of the ESDP: Setting the Research Agenda”, Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland, Paper Presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Conference, Turin, September 12­15, 2007. Garret, Geoffrey and Barry Weingast: “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas & Foreign Policy, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, pp.173­206, 1993 Haas, Ernst B.: The uniting of Europe ­ Political, Social and Economic Forces, London: Stevens and Sons Limited 1958. Haas, Ernst B.: Beyond the Nation­State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press 1964. Haas, Ernst B.: The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Research Series, No. 25, San Francisco, University of California, Berkley 1975 Haas, Ernst B.: “Acceptance Remarks”, ECSA Review, vol. XII, No. 3, p.2, 1999. Hansen, Birthe: Unipolarity and the Middle East, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2000. Jervis, Robert: “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics 30 (2): 167­214, 1978 Jones, Seth: ‘The European Union and the Security Dilemma”, Security Studies (12): 3,114­156, 2003. Jones, Seth: “The Rise of a European Defence”, Political Science Quarterly. (121): 2, 241­267, 2006. Jones, Seth: The Rise of European Defence Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007. Marks, Gary, Lisbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank: “European Integration from the 1980s: State­Centric v. Multi­level Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 34, no. 3, pp. 341­377, 1996. Mearsheimer, John J.: “Back to the Future – Instability in Europe After the Cold War”, International Security, vol 15, no. 1, pp. 5­56, 1990. Mitraney, David: A Working Peace System, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966.
18 Moravcsik, Andrew: “Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community”, International Organization, pp. 19­56, 1991. Moravcsik, Andrew: “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no 4, pp.473­524, 1993. Moravcsik, Andrew: The Choice for Europe, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1998. Moravcsik, Andrew: “Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark. Constructivism and European Integration”, Journal of European Public Policy (6):4, 669­81, 1999. Moravcsik, Andrew: The Choice for Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000. Mouritzen, Hans & Anders Wivel (ed.): The Geopolitics of Euro­Atlantic Integration, Routledge, London, 2005. Niemann, Arne: Explaining Decisions in the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006. Nye, Joseph: ”Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo­functionalist Model” in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (eds.): Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, pp.192­231, 1971. Oest, Kajsa Ji Noe: “Not Bound to Follow?”, Working Paper , Copenhagen University, 2007/02. Obradovic, Daniela: “Political Legitimacy and the European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 191­221, 1996. Ojanen, Hanna: “Explaining the ESDP: Theoretical Grips on Recent Developments”, In Bo Huldt, Mika Kerttunen, Jan Mörtberg and Ylva Ericsson (eds), European Security and Defence Policy. A European Challenge. Stockholm: National Defence College 2006a. Ojanen Hanna: “The EU and Nato: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies (44):1, 57­76, 2006b. Pistone, Sergio: “Altiero Spinelli and the strategy for the United States of Europe” in Brent F. Nielsen and Alexander C­G. Stubb (eds.): The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Boulder, lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 69­75, 1994. Posen, Barry: “ESDP and Structure of World Politics”, International Spectator (39):1, 5­17, 2004. Posen, Barry: “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity”, Security Studies (15):2, 149­186, 2006. Risse et al, Thomas: To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and identity politics in the European Union”, European Journal of International relations, vol 5, no 2, pp.147­ 187, 1999. Risse­Kappen, Thomas: ”Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International relations Theory and Comparative policy Analysis Meet the European Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 34, no 1, pp.53­80, 1996. Risse T.: “Social Constructivism and European Integration”. In T. Diez – A. Wiener (eds.) European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2004. Rosamund, B.: Theories of European Integration (London: MacMillan), 2000. Rose, Gideon: “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics 51, no. 1, October, pp.144­72 1998. Sandholtz, Wayne and John Zysman: “1992: Recasting the European Bargain”, World Politics, vol. 41, no.1, pp.95­128, 1989. Schmitter, Phillipe: “Examining the Present Euro­Polity with the Help of Past Theories” in Gary Marks et al.: Governance in the European Union, London: Sage, pp. 1­14, 1996.
19 Sjursen, Helen: “The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Limits of Internationalism and the Search for a Global Role”, in Andersen Eliassen (eds), Making Policy in Europe. London: Sage, 2001. Smith, Steve: “Integration Theory and European Integration”, in Morten Kelstrup – Michael C. Williams, International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. London: Routledge, 2000. Snyder, Glenn H: Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1997. Taliaferro, Jeffrey: ”State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Ressource­Extractive State”, Security Studies 15, no.3, July­September, pp.464­495, 2006. Tranholm­Mikkelsen, Jeppe: “Neo­functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC”, Millennium (20):1, 1­22, 1991. Walters, William: ‘The Power of Inscription: Beyond Social Construction and Deconstruction in European Integration Studies’, Millennium (31):1, 83­101, 2002. Waltz, Kenneth: ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security (18):2, 44­79, 1993. Wendt, Alexander: ”Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 391­425, 1992. Wendt, Alexander: Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Wæver, Ole: ”Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty puzzle in E.U. Studies”, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 389­431, 1995. Zielonka, Jan: Explaining Euro­Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics. London: MacMillan, 1998. Media Ritzau Reuters Danish newspapers (Berlingske Tidende, Jyllands Posten, Politiken) Wall Street Journal Middle East Reporter Weekly Le Monde Diplomatique Economist RUSI Journal World Today Washington Report on Middle East Affairs Webpages France http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/ Germany http://www.auswaertiges­amt.de/diplo/de/Startseite.html Italy http://www.esteri.it UN www.un.org German website on the ESDP www.zif­berlin.org Documents UN Resolution #1701, 2006 UN Resolution #1559, 2004 European Security Strategy (EES) A secure Europe in a Better World, adopted in 2003.
20