j3D-FL - Samba
Transkript
j3D-FL - Samba
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HUdo ]dX]l]XkUbiWedjh]VkjYX je j\]i Veea, Dd UXX]j]edje j\Y cUdo Ukj\ehi UdX]dlYij][Ujehi m\eiY Ycf]h]WUb UdXWedWYfjkUb meha fhel]XYi j\Y ZekdXUj]edZehj\Y ikccUh]Yi UdXX]iWkii]edi WedjU]dYX \YhY]d'mY UhYUbie [hUjYZkb Zehj\Y WeccYdji UdX Wh]j]W]icihYWY]lYX Zhec j\Y hYl]YmYhieZ j\Y Veea$i Z]hijYX]j]edUdXZhec j\Y cUdo ijkXYdji UdX ]dijhkWjehim\e kiYX]j, N\]i YX]j]ed]dWbkXYi U Wedi]XYhUVbY Ucekdj eZ dYm cUjYh]Ub'YbY) cYdji eZm\]W\ \UlY UffYUhYX ]d WedZYhYdWY fUfYhi' _ekhdUbUhj]WbYi' UdX Veea W\UfjYhM, QY mekbX b]aYje j\Uda UbbeZ j\Y fkVb]WUj]edjYUci' hYl]YmYhi'UdXWedZYhYdWY fUhj]W]fUdjim\e \UlY WedijhkWj]lYbo Yd[U[YX m]j\ j\]i cUjYh]Ub, Q\]bY j\Y b]ij eZj\eiY je j\Uda ]i ZUhjee dkcYheki je ]dWbkXY \YhY'' mYmekbXb]aYje YnfhYiiekh [hUj]jkXYje iecY eZekh WbeiYijWebbYU[kYi UdXWebbUVehUjehi' m\eiY fYhiedUb]djYhlYdj]edi UjWh]j]WUb _kdWjkhYi lYho ckW\ \YbfYXje i\UfY j\Y X]hYWj]ed eZ ekh j\]da]d[ ed j\Y ikV_YWj eZ $ijkXo]d[ fkVb]W feb]Wo$, N\Yo ]dWbkXY EYhYcoLUodYh'>eb]d =YddYjj'E]c =hkjed' HYbeXoCYii]d[' =Yd >Ui\ehY' EYhYcoQ]bied' BYeh[YCeVYh[' @lYhjG]dXgk]ij' NYXKUhied' GUkhYdj?eVkp]dia]i' ?Ul]X GUoWeWa' GkW =Yhd]Yh'<bYnIYj\Yhjed' UdXFY]j\ =hemdiYo' Uced[ ej\Yhi, JZ WekhiY' dY]j\YhYX]j]edeZj\]i Veea mekbX\UlY VYYdfeii]VbYm]j\ekj j\Y Wed) j]dkYXikffehj eZekh XYfUhjcYdjiUdXkd]lYhi]j]YiUdXmYmekbXb]aYje j\Uda MjYf\YdHW=h]XY' KUXXoMc]j\' NYX>e\d' Dh]iBYlU)HUo'UdX HUkhYYd>elYbbZehj\Y]h \Ybf ed j\]i' UdXcUdo ej\Yh' hYbUjYX fhe_YWji, <j JnZehXOd]lYhi]joKhYii'mYmekbXb]aYje j\Uda j\Y cUdo ]dX]l]XkUbi m\e mehaYXed UdXikffehjYX j\]i lebkcY UdX]ji fhYXYWYiieh, N\YiY ]dWbkXY =h]Ud CYdXYhied'L]a F]jemia]' @kUdQ\]jY' HUha K]Yb'UdX GUkhUHUWbYeX' UdXYifYW]Ubbo K\obb]iQ]bied, MfYW]Ub j\Udai Ubie[e je L]W\UhX NUbbcUd Zeh\]i Wefo)YX]j]d[ia]bbi, $A]dUbbo' mYemYckW\ je ekh ZUc]b]YiZehj\Y]h iocfUj\o UdXkdXYh) ijUdX]d[ elYhj\Y oYUhi,MfYW]Ub j\Udai je =kddo LU[bed' Qeej <, B]cf' UdX<ddU CembYjjZehj\Y]h ijYUXZUij hYZkiUb je jUaYY]j\YheZki jee iYh]) ekibo, I]a]i\U' m\e ]i ij]bb jee oekd[ je mehho UVekj Veeai' m]bbde XekVjiecY XUoUbieWecYje i\UhY\Yh cej\Yh HUdXo$iiaYfj]W]ic, )7p ; 2\, _ k ))7p ; 9 8MJGBT 9BGDLBD ALC 8MJGBT 4TBJDP AaTSGgCGSM_GM E_I AaTSGg.gGTMd Mlif_vp_fbk_bfp \ obi\qfsbivob_bkqafp_fmifkb(bjbodfkd fk Kloqe >jbof_\ \ka Brolmb fk qeb mlpq)Tloia T\o FFbo\ \p pqrabkqplc mlifqf_ppb\o_eba clo kbt rkabopq\kafkdp lc qebobi\qflkpefm]bqtbbk dlsbokjbkqp \ka _fq) fwbkp,?bclob qe\q qfjb( pqrafbplc mlifqf_\iifcbqbkaba ql cl_rp lk qebklo) j\qfsb lo jlo\i afjbkpflkp lc dlsbokjbkq lo lk qeb jfkrqf\b lc qeb lmbo\qflk lc pmb_fcf_mlifqf_\i fkpqfqrqflkp,P_eli\op _lk_bokba tfqe qeb kloj\qfsb lo jlo\i afjbkpflkp lc dlsbokjbkq pqrafba qeb dob\qqbuqplc mlifqf_\imefilplmev( pbbhfkdfkpfdeqpfkql qeb mromlpblc dlsbokjbkq \ka qeb \_qfsfqfbpdlsbokjbkqp pelria rkaboq\hb fc qebfo _fqfwbkptbob ql \qq\fk qeb dlla ifcb( Qebpb fkni(igofbp dbkbo\qba \ of_e afp_rppflk lc qeb k\qrob lc pl_fbqv(,qeb olib lc qeb pq\qb(\ka qeb ofdeqp\ka obpmlkpf]fifqfbp¢ lc _fqfwbkp\ka dlsbokjbkqp, Eltbsbo( qeb d\m ]bqtbbk mobp_ofmqfsb mlifqf_\iqeblov \ka qeb mlifqf_\imo\_qf_bplc jlabok pq\qbpqe\q bjbodba ]bqtbbk qeb qtl tloia t\op \ka arofkd qeb bkprfkd @lia T\o iba j\kv ql pb\o_e clo \klqebo jbqela lc bu\jfkfkd mlifqf_p(lkb qe\q tlriaob_) lk_fib mlifqf_\iqeblov \ka mo\_qf_bqeolrde bjmfof_\i \k\ivpfp lc bufpqfkd mlifqfbp, @lksbopbiv(p_eli\op fkqbobpqbafk qeb fkpqfqrqflkplc dlsbokjbkq e\a ]bbk _lkar_qfkd abq\fiba bjmfof_\i bu\jfk\qflkp lc ibdfpi\qrobp(_lroqp( \ka ]rob\r_o\_fbp tefib dbkbo\iiv fdklofkd qeb kloj\qfsb \pmb_qplc qebpbfkpqfqrqflkp,Qebpb pqrafbp lc qeb cloj\i pqor_qroblc mlifqf_\ifkpqf) qrqflkp bu_biibafk \qqbkqflkql abq\fi \ka mol_barob]rq clo qeb jlpq m\oq obj\fkba abp_ofmqfsb(c\fifkd ql dbkbo\qb qeb ]\pfp clo bs\ir\qfkd qeb pqobkdqep(tb\hkbppbp( lo mromlpbplc pr_e pqor_qrobp,Fk qeb mlpq)t\o bu7\,l,f,"ab_liNi.fw\qflk, (%qNb7(olb\lkpqol7_qflk MQ.'t\o)qlok pq\qbp(\ka qeb ,,bpq\]ifpejbkq lc ,kbt fkpqfqrqflkplc fkqbok\qflk\i dlsbok\k_b( pqrabkqp lc mlifqf_pplrdeq \k \mmol\_e qe\q tlria ]ibka qebfopqrafbptfqe nrbp) qflkp lc grpqf_b(bnrfqv( \ka qeb mroprfqlc pl_f\i( b_lkljf_( \ka mlifqf_\i absbilmjbkq &Jb\a( .652', 0 Fkqefp_lkqbuqlc _e\kdb \ka ob\ppbppjbkq( pbsbo\i kbt \mmol\_ebp ql qeb pqrav lc mlifqf_\imebkljbk\ \mmb\oba, Pljb cl_rpba lk qeb jf_ol ibsbi lc erj\k ]be\sflro \ka qeb mpv_elildv lc _fqfwbkp(bib_qlop(ib\a) bop(\ka iba8 lqebop _lk_bkqo\qbalk qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc k\qflk\i pl_f) bqfbp\ka _riqrobp8pqfiilqebop cl_rpba lk qeb k\qrob lc k\qflk\i \ka dil]\i mlifqf_\ipvpqbjp, Jlpq lc qebpb\mmol\_ebp)]be\sflro\ifpj( bifqb pqrafbp(pqrafbplc mlifqf_\i_riqrob( \ka mlifqf_\i _v]bokbqf_p)e\sb _ljb \ka dlkb \p p_eli\op bumbofjbkqbatfqe b\_e ]bclob do\pmfkdfqpifjfq\) qflkp \ka \]\kalkfkd fqql pb\o_e clo pljbqefkd ]bqqbo&@\fokp( .641', Lkb \mmol\_e( eltbsbo( fp pqfiitfqe rp, Fqpcl_rp fp klq pl jr_e lk qeb pqor_qroblc dlsbokjbkqp lo qeb ]be\sflro lc mlifqf_\i \_qlop( lo lk te\q dlsbokjbkqp pelria lo lrdeq ql al( ]rq lk te\q dlsbokjbkqp \_qr\iiv al, Qefp \mmol\_e cl_rpbp lk mr]if_ mlif_fbp\ka mr]if_ mlif_v) j\hfkd( lo( \p fqp lofdfk\qlop abbjba fq( BA=;6G D78@68'Mflkbboba ]v E\olia I\pptbii \ka lqebopfk qeb Rkfqba Pq\qbp\ka qeb RkfqbaHfkdalj( mlif_v p_fbk_bt\p bumb_qbaql obmi\_bqo\afqflk\i mlifqf_\i pqrafbp(fkqb) do\qfkdqeb pqrav lc mlifqf_\iqeblov \ka mlifqf_\imo\_qf_btfqelrq c\iifkd fkql qeb pqbofifqvlc cloj\i( ibd\i pqrafbp &I\pptbii( .62.8 Qlodboplk( .66-', I\pptbii molmlpbaqe\q mlif_v p_fbk_be\a qeobbafpqfk_q_e\o\_qbofp) qf_pqe\q tlria pbqfq\m\oq colj b\oifbo \mmol\_ebp7 fqtlria ]b jriqf) afp_fmifk\ov( mol]ibj)plisfkd( \ka bumif_fqiv kloj\qfsb, ?v jriqfafp_fmifk\ov( I\pptbii jb\kq qe\q mlif_v p_fbk_b pelria ]ob\h \t\v colj qeb k\oolt pqrav lc mlifqf_\i fkpqfqrqflkp\ka pqor_qrobp\ka bj]o\_b qeb tloh \ka cfkafkdp lc pr_e cfbiap \p pl_flildv \ka b_l) kljf_p( i\t \ka mlifqf_p,?v mol]ibj(plisfkd( eb bksfpflkba \ mlif_v p_fbk_b \aebofkd pqof_qivql qeb _\klk lc obibs\k_b( lofbkqfkd fqpbic qlt\oap qeb plirqflk lc ob\i)tloia mol]ibjp \ka klq bkd\dfkd fk mrobiv \_\abjf_ ab]\qbp qe\q( clo bu\jmib( _e\o\_qbofwba,fkqbomobq\) qflk lc _i\ppf_\i \ka pljbqfjbp l]p_rob mlifqf_\i qbuqp,?v bumif_fqiv kloj\qfsb( I\pptbii jb\kq qe\q mlif_v p_fbk_b pelria klq ]b _il\hba fk qeb drfpb lc %p_fbkqfcf_ l]gb_qfsfqv%(]rq pelria ob_ldkfwbqeb fjmlp) pf]fifqvlc pbm\o\qfkddl\ip \ka jb\kp( lo s\irbp \ka qb_ekfnrbp( fk qeb pqrav lc dlsbokjbkq \_qflkp &Qlodboplk(.650', Eb bumb_qbamlif_v \k\ivpqp ql p\v _ib\oiv tef_e plirqflk t\p ]bqqboqe\k lqebop, Qeb dbkbo\i lofbkq\qflk qlt\oap qeb \_qfsfqfbplc dlsbokjbkqp prd) dbpqba]v I\pptbii obj\fkp tfqe rp \ka clojp qeb pr]gb_qj\qqbo lc qefp ]llh, Eltbsbo( qeb m\pp\db lc qfjb e\p iba ql pljb _e\kdbp fk qeb qeobb pmb_fcf__ljmlkbkqp lc qeb mlif_v lofbkq\qflk eb fabkqfcfba &D\oplk( .6538 AbIblk( .653( .6558 E\kpbk( .650', Cfopq(tefib qeb bjme\pfp lk jriqfafp_fmifk\ofqv obj\fkp( \ i\odb ]lav lc ifqbo\qrobklt cl_rpbp lk mr]if_ mlif_v fk dbkbo\i, Mlif_vp_fbk_bfp sbov jr_e \ %afp_fmifkb% fqpbic( tfqe \ rkfnrb pbqlc _lk_bmqp\ka _lk_bokp \ka \ sl_\]ri\ov \ka qbojf) klildv lc fqpltk &Cfpej\k( .66.', >iqelrde j\kv lc qebpb _lk_bmqp e\sb ]bbk ]looltba colj lqebo afp_fmifkbp(qebv e\sb \ pljbte\q 1 M>OQ F 6LQOMCRBQGML m\oqf_ri\ojb\kfkd tebk rpba fk qeb _lkqbuq lc¢pqravfkd mr]if_ mlif_v, Croqebojlob( qeb _lk_bmqlc jriqfafp_fmifk\ofqve\p _e\kdba fk qeb pbkpb qe\q mlif_v p_eli\op klt q\hb fqclo do\kqba qe\q qebv jrpq ]loolt colj lqebo afp_fmifkbp\ka jrpq ]b bumboqp fk \q ib\pq qtl cfbiap7qeb _lk_bmqp \ka _lk_bokp lc mlif_v p_fbk_b(\ka qeb efpqlov \ka fpprbpmobpbkqfk qeb pr]pq\kqfsb \ob\ lc mlif_v( lo qeb %mlif_vcfbia%rkabo bu\jfk\qflk &>kaboplk(.646\', Pb_lka( lsbo qeb m\pq1- vb\op qeb sfoqr\iiv bu_irpfsb _lk_bok lc j\kv mlif_vp_eli\op tfqe _lk_obqbmol]ibj)plisfkd e\p t\kba, >q qeb lrqpbq fq t\p elmba qe\q qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \ka fqp lrq_ljbp tlria vfbia _lk_irpflkp \ka ob_ljjbka\qflkp afob_qiv\mmif_\]ib ql bufpqfkdpl_f\i mol]ibjp, >iqelrde i\ra\]ib( qefp j\ufj clrkaboba lk qeb _ljmibufqv lc qeb mlif_v mol_bppfqpbic(fk tef_e dlsbokjbkqp lcqbk molsba obpfpq\kqql %bumboq% \asf_b lk pr]gb_qp tfqe tef_e qebv tbob ab\ifkd &Tfia\sphv( .6468 >p_ebo( .653', Fkqeb ob\i tloia lc mr]if_ mli) f_v(qb_ekf_\i prmboflofqvlc \k\ivpfp t\p lcqbk pr]loafk\qba ql mlifqf_\i kb_bppfqv, Cfk\iiv( qeb _\iip clo qeb mlif_v p_fbk_bpql obj\fk bumif_fqivkloj\qfsb \ipl _e\kdba lsbo qfjb( \iqelrde o\qeboibppqe\k e\sb ,qeblqebo clrka) fkd mofk_fmibp, Clo qeb jlpq m\oq(mlif_v p_eli\op e\sb obcrpbaql bu_irab s\irbp colj qebfo \k\ivpbp \ka e\sb fkpfpqba lk bs\ir\qfkd ]lqe qeb dl\ip \ka qeb jb\kp lc mlif_v( \p tbii \p qeb mol_bpplc mlif_v)j\hfkd fqpbic,Eltbsbo( \k\ivpqp%abpfob ql mobp_of]bpmb_fcf_dl\ip \ka klojp ab_ifkba tfqe \k fk_ob\pfkd ob\ifw\qflk lc qeb fkqo\_q\]fifqvlc j\kv mr]) if_ mol]ibjp, Ebk_b( j\kv fksbpqfd\qlopklt bfqebobs\ir\qb mlif_fbpfk qbojp lc pfjmib jb\probp pr_e \p bccf_fbk_v¢lobccbbqfsbkbpp( lo rpb qeb ob_loa lc mlif_v bccloqp¢ ql bpq\]ifpe tebqebo dlsbokjbkqp e\sb fk mo\_) qf_b ]bbk afob_qfkdqebfo \_qfsfqfbpqlt\oap qeb \_efbsbjbkq lc qebfo pq\qbadl\ip( fk bfqebo_\pb tfqelrq _lkpfabofkd qeb abpfo\]fifqv lo o\qfl) k\ifqv lc qebpbdl\ip qebjpbisbp &Dobbk]bodbq\F,( .6448 AbIblk( .661', >p qebpb _e\kdbp l__rooba( pljb l]pbosbop ]bd\k ql _\pqfd\qb qeb klqflk lc \ mlif_v %p_fbk_b% \ka ql bnr\qb fqpmoljlqflk tfqe \k bo\ lc rkob\ifwba elmbp \ka bumb_q\qflkpclo pl_f\i bkdfkbbofkd \ka¢ dlsbok) jbkq mi\kkfkd &iif]b( .64/', >iqelrde pljbqfjbp grpqfcfba ]v qeb fkci\qba _i\fjp lc fkafsfar\i pqrafbp( qefp _ofqf_fpj pelria pbosb \p \ t\okfkd \d\fkpq mobj\qrob lo fii)clrkaba mobp@ofmqflkp lo bu_bppfsb_lk) _bmqr\i plmefpqov(o\qeboqe\k \p \ obgb_qflklc qeb kbba ql rkaboq\hb qeb pvpqbj\qf_ pqrav lc dlsbokjbkq \_qflkp, Ql qeb buqbkqqe\q qeb mlif_v p_f) bk_bp e\sb absbilmba \ pfdkfcf_\kq]lav lc bjmfof_\i \ka qeblobqf_\i pqrafbp lc qeb \_qfsfqfbplc krjbolrp dlsbokjbkqp \olrka qeb dil]b( qeb b\oiv bccloqp\ka af_q\ lc I\pptbii \ka efp cliiltbop obj\fk s\ir\]ib \ka _lkqfkrb ql molsfab qeb clrka\qflk rmlk tef_e qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mli) f_v fp _lkar_qba &T\dkbo bq\i,( .66.', >jlkd qeb j\kv _ljmbqfkd abcfkfqflkplc %mr]if_mlif_v%(pljb \ob sbov _ljmibu( tefib lqebop \ob nrfqb pfjmib, Abpmfqbqebfos\of\qflkp( qebv \ii \dobb lk _boq\fkhbv \pmb_qp,Qebv \dobb qe\q mr]if_ mlif_fbpobpriq colj ab_fpflkp j\ab ]v dlsbokjbkqp \ka qe\q ab_fpflkp ]v dlsbokjbkqp ql obq\fk qeb pq\qrp nrl \ob grpq\p jr_e mlif_v \p \ob ab_fpflkp ql \iqbo fq, Fk lqebo obpmb_qp( eltbsbo( qeb _ljmbqfkd abcfkfqflkpafccbo_lkpfabo\]iv &?fohi\ka(/--.7 _e, .', Qeobb bu\jmibp lc tfabiv rpba abcfkfqflkp tfii prccf_bql _lksbv qeb _ljmibu jb\kfkd lc qeb qboj, Fk mol]\]iv qeb ]bpq hkltk( \ka peloqbpq(abcfkfqflk( Qelj\p Avb lccbop\ m\oqf_ri\oiv pr__fk_q clojri\qflk( abp_of]fkd mr]if_ mlif_v \p zkvqefkd \ dlsbokjbkq _ellpbp ql al lo klq ql al% &Avb(.64/7 /', Qefp clojri\qflk fp mboe\mpqll pfjmib( clo fq tlria qob\qbnr\iiv \p mr]if_ mlif_v bsbov \pmb_qlc dlsbokjbkq\i ]be\sflro( colj mro_e\pfkd lo c\fi) fkd ql mro_e\pb m\mbo_ifmpql t\dfkd lo c\fifkd ql t\db kr_ib\o t\o( \ka molsfabp kl jb\kp lc pbm\o\qfkdqeb qofsf\i colj qeb pfdkfcf_\kq \pmb_qplc dlsbokjbkq \_qfsfqfbp,Kbsboqebibpp(Avb%pabcfkfqflk fp klq tfqelrq jbofqp, Cfopq(Avb pmb_fcfbp _ib\oiv qe\q qeb \dbkq lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd fp \ dlsbokjbkq, Qefp jb\kp qe\q mofs\qb]rpfkbpp ab_fpflkp( ab_fpflkp ]v _e\ofq\]ib lod\kfw\qflkp( fkqbobpqdolrmp( lqebo pl_f\i dolrmp( lo fkafsfa) r\ip \ob klq fk qebjpbisbp mr]if_ mlif_fbp,Tebk tb q\ih \]lrq mr]if_ mlif_fbptb pmb\h lc qeb \_qflkp lc dlsbokjbkqp, >iqelrde qeb \_qfsfqfbp lc klk)dlsbokjbkq\i \_qlop j\v \ka _boq\fkival fkcirbk_b te\q dlsbok) jbkqp al(\ka,sf_b sbop\( qeb)ab_fpf\Cip¢)-C) \_qfsfqfbplc pr_e dolrmp al)) klq fk qebjpbisbp _lkpqfqrqbmr]if_ mlif_v, Elt qeb jbaf_\i molcbppflk fkqbomobqp qeb _\rpbp lc irkd _\k_bo \ka qeb plirqflkp fq molmlpbp clo obar_fkd fqpfk_fabk_b j\v e\sb \ ]b\ofkd lk te\q \ dlsbokjbkq bsbkqr) \iiv albp \]lrq qeb mol]ibj, Eltbsbo( qeb molcbppflk%p molmlpba plir) qflk ql qeb mol]ibj fp klq fqpbic\ mr]if_ mlif_v8lkiv jb\probp qe\q \ dlsbokjbkq \_qr\iiv \almqp lo bkalopbp _lkpqfqrqbpr_e \ mlif_v, Pb_lka( Avb efdeifdeqp qeb c\_q qe\q mr]if_ mlif_fbpfkslisb \ crka\) jbkq\i _elf_b lk qeb m\oqlc dlsbokjbkqp ql al pljbqefkd lo ql al klqe) fkd \ka qe\q qefpab_fpflk fp j\ab ]v fkafsfar\ip pq\ccfkdqeb pq\qb\ka fqp \dbk_fbp, Mr]if_ mlif_v% fp( \q fqppfjmibpq(\ _elf_b j\ab ]v dlsbokjbkq ql rkaboq\hb pljb _lropb lc \_qflk, > pifdeqivjlob afccf_riq_lk_bmqfp qe\q lc \ %kbd\qfsb% lo %klk)ab_fpflk%7 qe\q fp( \ dlsbokjbkq%p ab_fpflk ql al klqefkd( lo pfjmiv ql j\fkq\fk qeb pq\qrp nrl &@obkplk(.64.8 O,>, Pjfqe( .646', Bsbk qebpb pelria ]b abif]bo\qb ab_fpflkp( eltbsbo( pr_e \p tebk \ dlsbokjbkq ab_fabp klq ql fk_ob\pbq\ubp( lo ab_ifkbp ql j\hb \aafqflk\i crkap \s\fi\]ib clo \oqp(eb\iqe _\ob( lo pljb lqebo mlif_v \ob\, Qeb c\_q tb e\sb qeb cobbalj ql m\fkq qeb fkqbofloplc lro eljbp fk _lilrop lc lro _elf_b( clo bu\jmib( albp klq jb\k qe\q qefp fp \ mr]if_ mlif_v(]b_\rpb qeb dlsbokjbkq kbsbo abif]bo\qbiv ab_faba klq ql obpqof_q lro lmqflkp fk qefp\ob\, Tfiif\j Gbkhfkp%p _lk_bmqr\ifw\qflk lc mr]if_ mlif_vfp \ ]fq jlob mob) _fpbqe\k qeb lkb lccboba]v Avb]rq fiirpqo\qbpj\kv lc qebp\jb qebjbp, Eb abcfkbp mr]if_ mlif_v \p %\pbqlc fkqboobi\qbaab_fpflkp q\hbk ]v \ mlifqf_\i \_qlo lo, dolrm lc \_qlop _lk_bokfkd qeb pbib_qflklc dl\ip \ka qeb jb\kp lc \_efbsfkd qebj tfqefk \ pmb_fcfbapfqr\qflk tebob qelpb ab_fpflkp pelria( fk mofk_fmib( ]b tfqefk qeb mltbo lc qelpb \_qlop ql \_efbsb% &Gbkhfkp( .645', Qefp fp \ rpbcri abcfkfqflk( klq ib\pq ]b_\rpb Gbkhfkpbumif_fqivsfbtp mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \p \ mol_bpp(rkifhb Avb%p abcfkfkd fq \p \ _elf_b( tef_e mobprjbp qeb¢bufpqbk_blc \k rkaboivfkd% mol_bpp]rq albp klq pq\qbp3 bumif_fqiv,Gbkhfkp\ipl bumif_fqiv\_hklti) badbp qe\q mr]if_ mlif_v fp rpr\iiv %\pbq lc fkqboobi\qzaab_fpflkp%,Fk lqebo tloap( o\obiv albp \ dlsbokjbkq \aaobpp \ mol]ibj tfqe \ pfkdib ab_fpflk8jlpq mlif_fbpfkslisb \ pbofbplc ab_fpflkp( pljb lc tef_e j\v ]b fk\asboqbkq o\qebo qe\k abif]bo\qb( ]rq _rjri\qfsbiv qebpb ab_fpflkp _lkpqfqrqb\ mlif_v,Qerp \ eb\iqe mlif_v(clo¢bu\jmib( _lkpfpqplc \ pbofbp lc ab_fpflkp obi\qba ql _lkpqor_qflk lc eb\iqe c\_fifqfbp(_boqfcf_\qflklc mboplkkbi \ka jbaf_fkbp( \ka cfk\k_fkd qeb molsfpflk lc eb\iqe _\ob( \jlkd j\kv lqebo obi\qbafqbjp, Lcqbks\oflrp fkqboobi\qbaab_fpflkp \ob j\ab ]v afccbobkqfkafsfar\ip \ka \dbk_fbp tfqefk dlsbokjbkq( pr_e \p \ Abm\oqjbkq¢lcEb\iqe \p tbii \p Cfk\k_b lo Tbic\ob \ka ]v s\oflrp afsf) pflkp \ka pb_qflkptfqefk qebj, >p Gbkhfkpklqbp( ql rkabopq\ka criiv \ dlsbokjbkq%peb\iqe mlif_vtb kbba ql q\hb fkql \__lrkq \ii qeb ab_fpflkp lc \ii qeb dlsbokjbkq\i \_qlop fkslisba fk qeb cfk\k_fkd \ka \ajfkfpqo\) qflk lc fqpeb\iqe)obi\qba \_qfsfqfbp&Qelev(.666', Gbkhfkp\ipl fjmolsbp rmlk Avb ]v prddbpqfkdqe\q qeb nrbpqflk lc \ dlsbokjbkq%p _\m\_fqv ql fjmibjbkq fqp ab_fpflkp fp \ipl \ pfdkfcf_\kq _lkpfabo\qflk \ccb_qfkdqeb qvmbplc ab_fpflkp fqq\hbp, Efp abcfkfqflk ob_) ldkfwbp qe\q _boq\fk ifjfq\qflkp lk dlsbokjbkqp _lkpqo\fk qeb o\kdb lc lmqflkp \s\fi\]ib fk \ mlif_v\ob\, Qebpbfkqbok\i \ka buqbok\i_lkpqo\fkqp lk dlsbokjbkq j\hb mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( \ka bccloqpql rkabopq\ka fq( afccf_riqfkabba, > dlsbokjbkq%p _elf_b lc \ mlif_v j\v ]b ifjfqba( clo fkpq\k_b( ]v i\_h lc cfk\k_f\i( mboplkkbi(lo fkcloj\qflk\i obplro_bp(]v fkqbok\qflk\i qob\qv l]ifd\qflkp( lo ]v aljbpqf_ obpfpq\k_bql _boq\fk lmqflkp, Qerp( clo bu\jmib( tb tfii klq rkabopq\ka eb\iqe mlif_v fk j\kv _lrkqofbp tfqelrq ob\ifwfkdqeb mltbocri( pbic)pbosfkdlmmlpfqflk qe\q qeb jbaf_\i molcbppflkfp \]ib ql jlrkq \d\fkpq \kv dlsbokjbkq%p bccloq ql _rq eb\iqe)_\ob _lpqp ]v obar_fkd qeb molcbppflk%pfk_ljb %x%,>ijoa8..%6WN' ,£7Pfjfi\oiv(¢(rkabopq\kafkd,qeb\_qflkp lc aljbpqf_ dlsbok) ,(jbkq,p((j(qeb¢_roobifiq, bo\,,fk_ob\pfkdiv(obnrfobpabq\Fibarkabopq\kafkd ¢¢¢¢lc qeb ifjfqp \ka lmmloqrkfqfbpmolsfaba ]v fkqbok\qflk\i \dobbjbkqp( qob\qfbp(\ka _lksbkqflkp &Jfikbo \ka Hble\kb( .6638 Albok bq \i,( .663\', Gbkhfkp \ipl fkqolar_bp qeb fab\ lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \p dL\i) lofbkqba ]be\sflro lk qeb m\oqlc dlsbokjbkqp( \k fab\ qe\q molsfabp \ pq\ka\oa ]v tef_e ql bs\ir\qb mr]if_ mlif_fbp, Fk efp abcfkfqflk( mr]if_ mlif_fbp\ob ab_fpflkp q\hbk ]v dlsbokjbkqp qe\q abcfkb \ dl\i \ka pbq lrq \ jb\kp ql \_efbsb fq,>iqelrde qefpp\vp klqefkd \]lrq qeb k\qrob lc qeb dl\ip lo qeb jb\kp fkslisba( fqmolsfabp pbsbo\i \sbkrbp clo bs\ir\q) fkd mlif_fbpqe\q \ob jfppfkd colj Avb%pabcfkfqflk,Qebpbfk_irab qeb obi) bs\k_b lc qeb dl\i( qeb _lkdorbk_b lc dl\i \ka jb\kp( \ka qeb abdobb ql tef_e qeb jb\kp riqfj\qbiv pr__bba lo c\fi ql \_efbsb qeb fkfqf\idl\i, > qefoa(jfaaib)o\kdb abcfkfqflk fp molSfaba ]v G\jbp >kaboplk( tel abp_of]bp\ mlif_v \p %\mromlpfsb_lropb lc \_qflk cliiltba ]v \k \_qlo lo \ pbqlc \_qlop fk ab\ifkd tfqe \ mol]ibj lo j\qqbo lc _lk_bok%&>kabo) plk( .6517 z', Tefib sbov pfjfi\o ql qeb lqebo qtl( >kaboplk%pabcfkfqflk \aap lkb \aafqflk\i bibjbkq ql qelpb klqba ]v Avb \ka Gbkhfkp]v efde) ifdeqfkdqeb ifkh ]bqtbbk dlsbokjbkq \_qflk \ka qeb mbo_bmqflk(ob\i lo lqebotfpb( lc qeb bufpqbk_blc \ mol]ibj lo _lk_bok obnrfofkd\_qflk, Qefp mol]ibj)plisfkd mbopmb_qfsb fp \ m\oqf_ri\oivfjmloq\kq \pmb_qlc qeb abc) fkfqflk lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( tef_e tfii ]b obqrokbaql fk jlob abq\fi ]bilt, Tfqefk qebfoifjfq\qflkp( \kv lo \ii lc qebpbabcfkfqflkppbosbql lrqifkb fk \ dbkbo\i pbkpbte\q mr]if_ mlif_v fp, >ii fiirpqo\qbqe\q pqravfkd mr]if_ mlif_v fp \ _ljmibu \ka afccf_riqq\ph, Fq_\kklq ]b \__ljmifpeba pfjmiv ]v dlfkd qeolrde qeb lccf_f\i ob_loap lc dlsbokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hfkd clrka fk pr_e clojp \p i\tp( \_qp( obdri\qflkp( \ka moljrid\qflkp, >iqelrde qebpb\ob \ sfq\i plro_b lc fkcloj\qflk( mr]if_ mlif_fbpbuqbka ]bvlka qeb ob_loa lc _lk_obqb_elf_bp ql bk_ljm\pp qeb ob\ij lc mlqbk) qf\i _elf_bp( lo _elf_bp klq j\ab( \ka qeb \k\ivpfp lc pr_e(_elf_bp kb_bp) p\ofiv fkslisbp \k\ivpfp lc qeb _ljmibu \oo\v lc pq\qb\ka pl_fbq\i \_qlop fkslisba fk ab_fpflk)j\hfkd mol_bppbp\ka qebfo _\m\_fqfbpclo \_qflk &Eltibqq( .653', Ob_loap lc ab_fpflkp al klq obcib_qqeb rkbk_rj]boba tfii lc dlsbokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hbop pl jr_e \p qeb ob_loa bcqeb fkqbo\_) qflk lc qe\q tfii tfqe qeb _lkpqo\fkqprmlk fq\q dfsbk efpqlof_\i( mlifqf_\i( \ka pl_f\i _lkgrk_qrobp &Pe\oh\kphv(.64.', Pfjmiv abp_of]fkd \ dlsbokjbkq%p mlif_v fp kbsboqebibpp\ obi\qfsbiv b\pv¢q\ph _ljm\oba ql hkLTfkd tev qeb pq\qbafa te\q fqafa \ka \ppbpp) fkd qeb _lkpbnrbk_bp lc fqp \_qflkp, Pljbqfjbp \ dlsbokjbkq j\v \kklrk_b qeb ob\plkp clo j\hfkd \ ab_fpflk( \ka qe\q j\v fkabba ]b qeb qorqe, Eltbsbo( \ dlsbokjbkq lcqbk albp klq dfsb \kv ob\plk clo j\hfkd \ ab_fpflk8 lo tebk fqalbp qeb mr]if_iv \sltba ob\plk j\v klq ]b qeb \_qr\i ob\plk, Fkpr_e pfqr\qflkp fqfp ibcqql \k\ivpqp ql abqbojfkb tev \ m\oqf_ri\o\iqbok\qfsbt\p _elpbk \ka( sbov lcqbk( tev pljb lqebo pbbj) fkdiv jlob \qqo\_qfsblmqflk t\p klq pbib_qba,Qeb q\phplc rkabopq\kafkd tev \ mlif_v t\p klq fjmibjbkqba \p fkqbkaba \ka bs\ir\qfkd qeb lrq) _ljbp lc \ mlif_v \ob kl b\pfbo,>ka( ql \aa ql qeb _ljmibufqv( elt \k\) ivpqpbumi\fk mr]if_ mlif_v \ka qeb \pmb_qpqebv bjme\pfwb abmbka lk 5 M>OQ F 6LQOMCRBQGML qebfoco\jbp lc obcbobk_b&?l]olt \ka Aovwbh(.6548 O\afk( /---8 Ivkk( .666'( tef_e fk qrok abmbka lk qebfofkqbobpqp( fablildfbp( \ka bumbof) , bk_bp &A\kwfdbo( .6628 V\klt( .66/8 Mefiifmp(.663', Qefp i\qqbomlfkq e\p pfdkfcf_\kqfjmif_\qflkp clo qeb jbqelalildfbp rpba fk mlif_v \k\ivpfp \ka e\p _ljb ql afsfab \k\ivpqp fkql qtl _\jmp, Lk qeb lkb e\ka( qebob\ob qelpb tel ]bifbsb qe\q ob\plk\]iv l]gb_qfsb \k\ivpfp fp mlppf]ib tfqe pq\ka\oa( %mlpfqfsfpq%( lo nr\kqfq\qfsb pl_f\i p_f) bk_b jbqelalildfbp( tef_e( ]v abcfkfqflk( cl_rp lk \_qr\i dlsbokjbkq \_qfsfqfbp,Lqebopbj]o\_b jlob kr\k_ba \ka pr]qib %mlpq)mlpfqfsfpq% lo fkqbomobqfsb qb_ekfnrbp jlob _ljjlk fk qeb erj\kfqfbp( tef_e \ob rpba ql ebim afp_bok \ka _ofqfnrb ]lqe _lk_obqb \ka mlqbkqf\i dlsbokjbkq \fjp( fkqbkqflkp( \ka \_qflkp &Qlodboplk(.6638 Qeljmplk( /--.',% >iqelrde qebpb afccbobk_bppelria klq ]b lsbopq\qba &Eltibqq \ka O\jbpe( .665'( qebv pbosb ql rkabop_lob qeb j\kkbo fk tef_e lofbkq\) qflkp qlt\oap mlif_v)j\hfkd \p \ pl_f\i mebkljbklk _\k \ccb_q\k\ivqf) _\i qb_ekfnrbp \ka lrq_ljbp, >ii lc qeb abcfkfqflkpmolsfaba \]lsb mlpfqqe\q mr]if_ mlif_vfp \ _ljmibu mebkljbklk _lkpfpqfkdlc krjbolrp ab_fpflkp j\ab ]v krjbolrp fkaf) sfar\ip \ka lod\kfw\qflkp fk dlsbokjbkq, Qebpb ab_fpflkp \ob lcqbk pe\mba ]v b\oifbo mlif_fbp\ka cobnrbkqiv\ob ifkhba _ilpbiv tfqe lqebo pbbjfkdiv rkobi\qba ab_fpflkp, >p pr_e( pqravfkd mr]if_ mlif_vmlpbp\k\) ivqf_\i afccf_riqfbpclo tef_e mlif_v \k\ivpqp( klq promofpfkdiv(e\sb absbi) lmba krjbolrp plirqflkp, Qeb( pfkdibjlpq fjmloq\kq lc)qebpb¢e\p( ]bbk¢ql¢ obar_b qeb ibsbi lc _ljmibufqv lc qeb \k\ivpfp ]v bjme\pfwfkd lkiv \ ifj) fqbao\kdb lc obibs\kq _\rp\i lo bumi\k\qlov c\_qlop(zsbk tefib obfqbo\qfkd qeb dbkbo\i kbba clo \ jlob elifpqf_ \mmol\_e bk_ljm\ppfkd qeb bkqfob o\kdb lc mlppf]ibs\of\]ibp \ccb_qfkddlsbokjbkq\i ab_fpflk)j\hfkd, Lkb _ljjlk \mmol\_e e\p ]bbk ql \ppl_f\qb m\oqf_ri\oqvmbplc mlif) _fbplo %mlif_v lrq_ljbp% tfqe qeb k\qrob lc qeb mlifqf_\iobdfjb)abcfkba illpbiv \p qeb lod\kfw\qflk lc qeb mlifqf_\i pvpqbj &Tlicb(.6568 Mowb) tlophf \ka Ifjlkdf( .664', Fqe\p lcqbk ]bbk \odrba( clo bu\jmib( qe\q mr]if_ mlif_fbps\ov \__loafkd ql qeb k\qrob lc \ mlifqf_\i pvpqbj \ka fqp ifkhp tfqe pl_fbqv,Jr_e bccloqe\p dlkb fkql _i\ppfcvfkd\ka afccbobkqf\q) fkd ]bqtbbk obdfjb qvmbptfqe qeb bumb_q\qflkqe\q molmboivfabkqfcvfkd qeb obdfjb tfii dbkbo\qbfjmloq\kq fkpfdeqpfkql qeb k\qrob lc qeb mlif_fbp ifhbiv ql ]b \almqba ]v b\_e qvmb&Mbqbop bq\i,( .6448 @\pqibp(.6658 @\p) qibp\ka J_Hfki\v( .664', Eltbsbo( _i\ppfcvfkdobdfjb qvmbp_\k lkiv ]b \ pq\oqfkdmlfkq fk mr]if_ mlif_v \k\ivpfp ]b_\rpb fq qbiiprp ifqqib\]lrq , elt qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc qeb obdfjb j\kfcbpq qebjpbisbp fk fkafsfar\i mlif_v ab_fpflkp, Fqjbobiv qbiiprp tebob ql illh clo fkcirbk_bp lk dls) bokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hfkd \ka te\q dbkbo\i obi\qflkpefmptb _\k bumb_q ql cfka tefib pqravfkd \ dlsbokjbkq%p \_qfsfqfbp, 8MJGBT 9BGDLBDALC 8MJGBT 4TBJDP 1 >klqebo afob_qflk qe\q j\kv qeblofpqpe\sb q\hbk fp ql pb\o_e clo _\rp\i s\of\]ibp fk mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( lo clo te\q \ob pljbqfjbp obc)booba ql \p %mlif_vabqbojfk\kqp%&Jrkkp( .6428 E\k_l_h( .650', >k\i) vpbpfk qefpqo\afqflk qbka ql _lk_bkqo\qblk qeb nrbpqflk lc tebqebo mr]) if_ mlif_fbp\ob abqbojfkba ]v j\_ol)ibsbi pl_fl)b_lkljf_ c\_qlop lo ]v jf_ol)ibsbi ]be\sflro\i bibjbkqp( \ka \ dob\q ab\i lc _ljmbqfkd bsf) abk_b e\p ]bbk d\qeboba \]lrq qeb obi\qflkpefm]bqtbbk mr]if_ mlif_fbp( qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc aljbpqf_ pl_fbqfbp\ka qeb fkqbok\qflk\i pvpqbj &O\hlcc\ka P_e\bcbo(.64-'( \ka qeb ]be\sflro lc (mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hbop, Pr_e pqrafbp\ob i\odbiv bjmfof_\i( _ljm\o\qfsb( \ka lcqbk nr\kqfq\qfsb fk lofbkq\qflk, Tefib qebfo_ljm\o\qfsb bjmfof_\i cl_rp e\p bke\k_ba lro rkabopq\kafkd lc¢ mr]if_ mlif_fbp ]v afpmbiifkd _ljjlk jvqep \ka \pprjmqflkp \]lrq qeb ifkhp ]bqtbbk mlif_v \ka lqebo pl_f\i \ka pl_fl) b_lkljf_ mol_bppbp(ifhb pqrafbp lc mlifqf_\i obdfjbp qebv,qbka ql ib\k qlt\oap dbkbo\i j\_ol)ibsbi bumi\k\qflkp lc%mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \ka lcqbk c\fi ql pmb_fcvbu\_qivelt qebpbpqor_qro\i_e\o\_qbofpqf_p\ccb_qqeb pmb_fcf_ pb_qlo\i\ka qbjmlo\i _lkqbuqpfk tef_e mlif_fbpabsbilm &Tfibk) phv( .6428 Tfibkphv bq\i,( .6528 Tfibkphv \ka Qeokbo(.654', Vbq\klqebo ifqbo\qrobcl_rpbp lk %mlif_v_lkqbkq%,Qefp \mmol\_e fp \ppl_f\qba _ilpbiv tfqe qeb fab\ qe\q qeb k\qrob lc \ mlif_v mol]ibj \ka qeb plirqflkp absfpba ql \aaobpp fq lcqbk abqbojfkb elt fq tfii ]b mol) _bppba ]v qeb mlifqf_\i pvpqbj, Clo bu\jmib( tebqebo \ mol]ibj fp mof) j\ofiv obdri\qlov( afpqof]rqfsb(obafpqof]rqfsb(lo _lkpqfqrqfsbfk _e\o\_qbo( fq e\p ]bbk \odrba( abqbojfkbp elt fq fp ab\iq tfqe, Fk \ pfjfi\o sbfk( G\jbp N, Tfiplk &.641' \odrba qe\q qeb abdobb lc _lk_bkqo\qflk lc _lpqp \ka¢])bkbcfqpfjmlpb_!¢lk¢mlifqf_\i¢ \bqlop]v\ m\oqf_ri\omlif_v pe\mbp qeb qvmblc mlif_vmol_bppbpqe\q tfii \__ljm\kv fq,Ebk_b( \p Qeblalob Iltf &.64/' mrqfq(riqfj\qbiv %mlif_v j\v abqbojfkb mlifqf_p% \ka klq qeb lqebo t\v \olrka( \p jlpq \k\ivpqp _ljjlkiv prmmlpb, Ibpqbo P\i\jlk &.65.'( q\hfkd qefpfkpfdeqql eb\oq( \odrba qe\q cl_rpfkd lk qeb k\qrob lc qeb mlif_v qllip lo fkpqorjbkqp dlsbokjbkqp e\sb \q qebfo afpmlp\i ql fjmibjbkq mr]if_ mlif_fbp fp qebobclobqeb ]bpq jlab lc \k\ivpfp clo rkabopq\kafkd mr]if_ mlif_v,Eltbsbo( tefib qebobfp kl abkvfkd qe\q qeb k\qrob lc qeb mol]ibj e\p \k bccb_qlk te\q _\k ]b alkb \]lrq fq(fqfp lcqbk afccf_riqql _ljmobebka( lo ql \dobb rmlk( qeb mob_fpbk\qrob lc \ mlif_v mol]ibj \ka qeb m\qqbokplc _lpqp \ka ]bkbcfqpqe\q s\oflrp plir) qflkp ql fqfkslisb, O\qebo qe\k ]bfkd \ qb_ekf_\i bubo_fpb(qeb _elf_b lc mlif_v fkpqorjbkqp lo mlif_v _lkqbkq fp sbov jr_e \ccb_qba ]v i\odbo pl_f\i \ka mlifqf_\i_lkpqo\fkqp\ka _lkqbuqp&Tllapfab( .6538 Mbqbop \ka S\k Kfpmbk(.665', Qeb clroqe qo\afqflk _lk_bkqo\qbplk qeb bs\ir\qflk lc %mlif_vfjm\_qp% lo lrq_ljbp, Qefp ifqbo\qrobe\p fkslisba qeb \ppbppjbkq lc qeb afob_q \ka fkafob_qbccb_qplc pmb_fcf_mlif_fbp \ka fqp \k\ivpbp e\sb qbkaba ql fdklob ]lqe _\rp\i c\_qlop\ka qeb k\qrob lc qeb qllip \q qeb afpmlp\i lc dlsbokjbkqp &Tbfjbo \ka Sfkfkd( .66/', >k\ivpqp fkpqb\a rpb qb_ekfnrbp lc pq\qfpqf_\ifkcbobk_bql \k\ivwb qeb%ifkhp]bqtbbk pmb_fcf_( dlsbokjbkq moldo\jp \ka s\oflrp jb\probp lc mlif_v %pr__bpp%( pr_e \p fkaf_\qlop %lcpl_f\i _e\kdb \ka moldobpz,>jlkd b_lkljfpqp( pr_e pqra) fbp e\sb bu\jfkba \ tfab o\kdb lc qlmf_pfk b\pfiv nr\kqfcf\]ib ob\ijp pr_e \p cfp_\i \ka fkarpqof\i mlif_v)j\hfkd( fksbpqfd\qfkdqlmf_ppr_e \p qeb obi\qflkp ]bqtbbk dlsbokjbkq bumbkafqrobp\ka _lomlo\qb fksbpq) jbkq \_qfsfqvlo i\]lro jfdo\qflk, Qefp \mmol\_e cl_rpbp \ijlpq bu_ir) pfsbiv lk mlif_v lrqmrqp( eltbsbo( \ka p\vp sbov ifqqib\]lrq qeb mlif_v mol_bppbpqe\q iba ql qeb _ob\qflk lc qelpb lrqmrqp &Ivkk( .654', Qebpb afccbobkqifqbo\qrobp\ka \k\ivqf_\i qo\afqflkp e\sb bufpqba(fk m\oq(\p \ obpriqlc qeb afccbobkq_ljjrkfqfbp lc \k\ivpqp tlohfkd lk mr]) if_ mlif_v,%Dlsbokjbkqp qebjpbisbp( lc _lropb( e\sb \it\vp ]bbk fkslisba fk qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mlif_fbp(]lqe qebfoltk &Jbiqpkbo(.6438 Oldbopbq \i,( .65.' \ka qelpb lc lqebo _lrkqofbp &Olpb(.66.', Eltbsbo( jr_e lc qeb ifqbo\qroblk mr]if_ mlif_v e\p ]bbk dbkbo\qba ]v \k\ivpqp tlohfkd clo klk)dlsbokjbkq\i lod\oiiw\qflkp, Pljb lc qebpb \k\ivpqp tloh afob_qivclo dolrmp \ccb@qba ]v mr]if_ mlif_fbp(pr_e \z _lomlo\qflkp( _ero_ebp( i\]lro rkflkp( lo lqebo klk)dlsbokjbkq\i lod\kfw\qflkp, Qebob\ob \ipl \k\ivpqp tel tloh clo ibppafob_qiv\ccb_qbalod\kfw\qflkp( pr_e \p mofs\qbqefkh)q\khp lo obpb\o_e fkpqfqrqbp(pljb lc tef_e _\k e\sb _ilpb qfbptfqe dlsbokjbkq \dbk_fbp \ka mobpprobdolrmp, Cfk\iiv( pljb \k\ivpqp tloh fkabmbkabkqiv(j\kv lc qebj fk qeb rkfsbopfqv pvp) qbj &M\i(.66/', >k\ivpqp tlohfkd fk qebpbafccbobkqqvmbplc lod\kfw\qflkp qbka ql e\sb afccbobkqfkqbobpqp fk mroprfkd mlif_v \k\ivpfp &Al]rwfkphfp(.663', >k\) ivpqptlohfkd clo dlsbokjbkqp)\ka,flo, dolrmpafob_qiv,,\ccb_qba]v [[mr]if_[[ mlif_fbpqbka ql cl_rp qebfoobpb\o_elk mlif_v lrq_ljbp, Qebv lcqbk e\sb \ afob_qfkqbobpqfk _lkabjkfkd lo _lkalkfkd 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afsfaba qeb mlif_vmol_bppfkql pbsbk pq\dbp(tef_e( fii efp sfbt( ./ ,, abp_of]ba)klq lkiv elt mr]if_ mlif_fbptbob \_qr\iiv j\ab ]rq elt qebv ]b j\ab7 &.', fkzbiifdbk_b( &/', mozjlqflk(&0' mzbp_ofmqflk(&1' z fksl_\qflk( &2' \mmif_\qFLk(&3' qbojj\qflk( &4' \mmo\Fp\iGI\ppt,bii,,, Z,/,Wii, Qeb mlif_v mol_bpp]bd\k tfqe fkqbiifdbk_b)d\qebofkd(qe\q fp( qeb _liib_qflk( mol_bppfkd(\ka afppbjfk\qflk lc fkcloj\qflk clo qelpb tel m\oqf_fm\qbfk qeb ab_fpflk mol_bpp,Fqqebk jlsba ql qeb moljlqflk lc m\oqf_ri\o lmqflkp ]v qelpb fkslisba fk j\hfkd qeb ab_fpflk, Fkqeb qefoa pq\db qeb ab_fpflk)j\hbop \_qr\iiv mobp_of]ba\ _lropb lc \_qflk, Fk qeb clroqe pq\dbqeb mobp_of]ba_lropb lc \_qflk t\p fkslhba \p \ pbqlc p\k_) qflkp t\p absbilmba ql mbk\ifwbqelpb tel c\fiba ql _ljmiv tfqe qeb mob) p_ofmqflkplc qeb ab_fpflk)j\hbop, Qeb mlif_v t\p qebk \mmifba]v qeb _lroqp \ka qeb ]rob\r_o\_v \ka o\k fqp_lropb rkqfi fqt\p qbojfk\qba lo _\k_biiba, Cfk\iiv( qeb obpriqplc qeb mlif_v tbob \mmo\fpbalo bs\ir\qba \d\fkpq qeb 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It has outlined a five-stage model of the policy cycle and framed research ques" tions relevant to the analysis of each stage and to the workings of the overall model. Chapter 2 examines in more detail several. of the most commonly used approaches to studying public policy, emphasizing those employed by economists, political scientists, sociologists, and others who focus on the nature of general public policy processes. The potential and limitations of each approach are discussed along with the particular manner in which theorizing in the field has progressed over the past several decades. . Part II describes the institutional parameters within which policies are made, the nature of the actors who make them, and the instruments the actors have at their disposal for their implementation. Chapter 3 discusses the various state and societal actors and institutions that play a salient role in public policy-making. It uses the concept of a policy subsystem to capture the complex links between state and societal actors involved in public policy-maklng. Chapter 4 describes the characteristics of the general types of instruments available to government for implementing policies. It develops a taxonomy based on the range of possible means by which goods and services of any kind can be delivered, from the use of voluntary or community services to direct delivery by state employees. Each chapter in this part not only inventories the range of institutions, actors, and instruments that can affect policy-making, but also establishes the difficulties of assessing and predicting which institutions, actors, and instruments will actually be involved in specific policymaking instances. . Part III sets out a schema for conceptualizing the policy process in order to allow finer levels of analysis to be made. Each of Chapters 5 to 9 examines a critical componerit or sub-stage of the public policy process, including how and why public concerns make their way onto the government's agenda; how and why some individuals and groups enjoy special input into the formulation of governmental policy options; how and why governments typically decide on a specific course of action; why governments use the types of policy instruments they do; and how their actions and choices are typically evaluated. Finally, Part IV sets out the conclusions of the study in the context of the general relationships found to exist between ideas, interests, and institutions. Chapter 10 presents the general pattern of the evolution of policy-making in many pol~cy sectors, establishes a taxonomy of typical policy styles, and discusses the reasons why policies tend to develop and "Change~furotl:gh"a ".st:epp'ed:"Or·''''pttn'ctu8.ted:·~ilibria~>pre.cess. (Gerskk, ,·l991;·;..Bau.mgaIiaer . >.andJooes,1993;). Chaptetll ..1b.en,providesa brief commentary on the nature of contemporary policy science and the need for continued careful, systematic, empirical study if the field is to continue to develop in the way envisioned by its founders. DeLe?n, Peter. 1988. Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Saences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Garson, G. David. 1986. 'From Policy Science to Policy Analysis: A Quarter Century of Progress', in W.N. Dunn, ed., Policy Analysis: Perspectives, Concepts, and Methods. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 3-22. Jeriki~s-Smith, Hank C., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1993. 'The Study of the Public Pohcy. Processes', in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, eds, Policy Change and Leamlng: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1-9. Lasswell, Harold D. 1951. 'The Policy Orientation', in D. Lerner and Lasswell, eds, . The Policy Sdences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 3-15. Sabatier,. Paul A. 1999. 'The Need for Better Theories', in Sabatier, ed., Theones of the Policy Process. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 3-17. Torger~on, Douglas. 1986. 'Between Knowledge and Politics: Three Faces of PohcyAnalysis', Policy Sciences 19,1: 33-59. Tribe, Laurence H. 1972. 'Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?', Philosophy and Public Affairs 2,1: 66":'110. Wagner, Peter, et al. 1991. 'The Policy Orientation: Legacy and Promise' in Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock, and Helmut Wollman, eds, Sodal Sciences ~nd Modem States: National Experiences and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2-27. Theoretical Crossroads . Approaches to Public Policy Approaches to Public Policy As Peter DeLeon has noted, policy studies have a long history and a short past. That is, the actions of government have been a focus of i numerous critiques over the centuries, but their systematic analysis as a . \ policy science dates back only several decades !DeLe.oD.,--l994-;-fletefs, 1~_~~]·_ Thus one of the difficulties encountered in studying public policyi\ making is ~e range. of various approaches, originating in various schools (I of aca?errnc tho.ught, that have been ~rought to bear on the subject ~ (Sabatier,~999b! SchlageJ,1999). In thIS chapter we outline the main approaclles to the study of public policy in the academic disciplines most directly concerned with state behaviour, such as economic and political ~cien~e;point out t~eir strengths and weaknesses; and suggest how polIcy.sclence ha~ pr?fited from the insights offered by other sodal sciences whIle developmg ItS Own distinctive methodology and theories. LEVELS, METHODS, AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH Before beginning this survey, we should note that theories in the social sciences fall. into different types or orders, depending on the type and range of SOCIalphenomena they attempt to explain and the basic method they use to derive their insights and hypotheses. That is, social scientific theorie~ differ acc.ording to their level of analysis, method of analysis, and Unlt of an~lyslS (see Almond and Genco, 1977). With respect to their level of ~nalysls~.some social scientific theories are 'general' or macrolevel SOCIaltheones that attempt to explain all phenomena within: their purview. Others are less wide-ranging and focus orIly on a few very specific subsets of social life, either at a micro or meso level of analysis (Ray, 2001)..Similarly, SOcialtheories also differ according to their method of analySIS:some are deductive theories developed largely on the basis of 21 the application of general presuppositions, concepts, or principles to specific phenomena. Others are less deductive and more inductive, developing generalizations only on the basis of careful observation of empirical phenomena and subsequent testing of these generalizations against other cases (Lundquist, 1987; Przeworski, 1987; Hawkesworth, 1992). And, with respect to their units of analysis, some social theories focus attention on individuals as the basic social actor whose behaviour and actions must be explained, while some view aggregate collections of individuals, or groups, as the relevant analytical unit. Still others consider larger social structures to have an independent impact on individual and collective actions (Hay and Wincott, 1998; Clark, 1998; Tilly, 1984). If all the permutations within these three variations are considered, the list of social theories relevant to policy would be almost infinite. Even focusing orIly on examples of each of the different categories resulting from differentiating between level (macro,meso, micro), method (deductive, inductive), and unit of analysis (individual, collective, structure) would require the analysis of at least 18 representative cases. However, for our purposes, this task can be simplified somewhat by focusing only on general, or macro-level, social theories. This is acceptable because academic disciplines such as economics and political science are interested in all social behaviour and activities and tend to view public policy-making as only a subset of such behaviour. amenable to the general theories and explanations prevalent in each field. We will therefore restrict our comments to well-known general categories of social theory commonly applied in policy analysis. As such, only six representative cases will be examined, based on differences in the characteristic basic unit of analysis they employ and their method of theory construction (Dessler, 1999). The theories examined below differ according to whether they develop their insights about policy-making in a deductive or an inductive manner and whether they focus their attention on the activities of individuals, groups, or institutions in the policy process (Oliver, 1993). Representative examples of the basic types of general theory classified according to these differences in units of analysis and method are set out in Figure 2.1. There are many adherents to deductive approaches to social science theorization and many nuanced versions of its application to specific social phenomena. In regard to understanding public policy-making, three general sub-types of this approach are discernible, depending on the unit of analysis: rational choice theory, class analysis, or actor-centred neo-institutionalism. The representative examples of each general approach to be Figure 2.1 General Approaches to the Study of Political Phenomena and Illustrative Theoretical Examples Method of Theory Construction Deductive Rational Choice Theories (Public Choice) Collectivity Class Analysis (Marxism) Structure Actor-Centred Institutionalism (TI'ansactionCost Analysis) Individual rJJ i'; :s.;:= ;§ Inductive Sociological Individualism (Welfare Economics) Group Theories (Pluralism/Corporatism) Socio-Historical Neo-Institutionalism (Statism) examined below are, respectively, public choice theory, Marxist analysis, and transaction cost analysis. class Rational Choice Theory: Public Choice Rational choice theory has received a great deal of attention in recent years. One variant of this approach is often referred to as public chOIce theory, after the Institute for the Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic (now George Mason) University, where many scholars who developed the approach worked (Dryzek, 1992; Monroe, 1991). Rational choice theory generally.applies the principles of neo-cla,ssical ." economics to political behaviour: Its chief assumption is that political actors, like economic ones, act 'rationally', that is, in a calculating fashion, to maximize their 'utility' or 'satisfaction'. In this model, the only political actor that counts is the individual who acts on the basis of this ascribed characteristic psychological behaviour. Public choice theory is a 'strong' version of rational choice theory and is often used in policy analyses, primarily because the deductive application of its general principles easily generates a clear and consistent set of policy prescriptions, whether or not there is any actual merit to its fundamental axioms. As James Buchanan, one of the founders of public choice theory and the first among public choice theorists to win a Nobel Prize (for Economics), put it: 'In one sense, all public choice or the economic theory of politics may be summarized as the "discovering" or "re-discovering" that people should be treated as rational utility maximizers, in all of their >.,behaviouraJ,capacities.' In tht!public ·cnoice approach it is assumed that individual political actors (whether policy-makers or voters)are guided by self-interest in choosing the course of action to their best advantage (McLean, 1987; Van Winden, 1988). This simple assumption about the basis of human behaviour leads public choice theorists to a complex series of related propositions used to explain various aspects of politics and public policymaking. This approach has been applied, for example, to studies of voting behaviour (Downs, 1957), the relationship between political and economic systems (Becker, 1958), the nature of individual and collective decision-making behaviour (Coase, 1960), and the structure and institutions of government, including bureaucracies (Downs, 1967), legislatures (Niskanen, 1971), political parties (Riker, 1962), and constitutions (Buchanan, 1975). In these studies, each subject is analyzed in terms of individual selfinterest. Thus, for example, voters are deemed to vote for parties and candidates that will best serve their interest in terms of the rewards they expect to receive from governments. Politicians are seen as constantly vying for election in order to promote their interests in the income, power, and prestige derived from being in office, and offer policies that will win them voters' support. Political parties are seen to operate in much the same way as politicians, deVising policy packages that will appeal to voters. Bureaucrats' self-interest leads them to maximize their budgets because larger budgets are a source of power, prestige, perks, and higher salaries. They are largely successful in realizing their interest because, as monopoly suppliers of unpriced goods and services, they face no competition and because citizens and elected officials lack the expertise to monitor their activities. Peter Self (1985: 51) succinctly summarized the theory as follows: Following this approach, voters can be likened to consumers; pres... '·sure·'groups· can be seen as politicaI consumer associations' or sometimes as co-operatives; political parties become entrepreneurs who offer competing packages of services and taxes in exchange for votes; political propaganda equates with commercial advertising; and government agencies are public firms dependent upon receiving or drumming up adequate political support to cover their costs. With respect to public policy-making, public choice theorists view the policy process as one in which a variety of political actors engage in competitive rent-seeking behaviour. That is, each actor attempts to use the state to capture .some portion of the social surplus ('rents') that accrues from productive social labour. Each actor would prefer, if possible, to free ride, that is, to obtain a share in the surplus resulting from the action of other parties at no cost to themselves (Buchanan, 1980; Kreuger, 1974). This conception of the motivations and roles of voters, parties, and politicians in the policy process leads to the conclusion that voters will cbnstantly seek more programs from government, constrained only by their willingness to pay taxes, and that politicians, parties, and bureaucrats will be willing to supply the programs because of their own self-interest in power, prestige, and popularity. The result is a constant 24 PART I Introduction increase in the level of state intervention in the economy and society, often in the form of a political business cycle. In other words, democratic governments operate in a form of perpetual elect?ral campai.gn.in which the types of decisions they take will vary accordmg to t~e timmg of the electoral cycle, with popular decisions dispensing benefits taken before election and unpopular ones, attributing costs, afterwards (Boddy and Crotty, 1975; Frey, 1978; Locksley, 1980; Thfte, 1978). Public policy-making in this view is thus simply a process of the gradual extension of state provision of goods and services to the public. Public choice theorists oppose this pattern, arguing that it distorts the 'natural' operation of market-based societies and reduces overall levels of social welfare by encouraging free riders and other counterproductive forms of rent-seeking behaviour. The general conclusion of public choice theorists is that institutions must be developed tocurb destructive utilitymaximizing behaviour that serves the interests of particular indiv~duals while adversely affecting the society as a whole. Hence, accordmgto Buchanan, public choice theory does not lead to the conclusion that all collective action, all government action, is necessarily undesirable. It leads, instead, to an understanding that because people will tend to maximize their own utilities, institutions must be designed so that individual behaviour will further the interests of the group, small or large, local or national. The challenge, then, is to construct, or reconstruct, a political order that will channel the self-serving behaviour of participants towards the· common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to that described for us by Adam Smith with respect to the economic order (BuchananetaL, 1978: 17). - ..... .. - .... --- .In this view, the -same mechanism of individual utility maximization that promotes the general good in the market takes a decidedly harmful form in the political arena. This leads public choice theorists to reject most of the policy analyses and prescriptions generated by other analysts, which tend to take a more sanguine view of government activity (Rowley, 1983). They argue that government intervention in the affairs of society should be limited to supplementing the market by enforcing and creating property rights where these are weak or non-existent so that market forces can operate and allocate resources in a manner beneficial to the whole society. The simplicity and logical elegance of the theory, along with the impressive mathematical presentations that accompany studies wit~in this framework, mask its many holes (Jones, 2001; Green and Shaprro, 1994). First of all, the theory is based on an oversimplification of human psychology and behaviour that does not accord with ~eality._Ma~y political activities, for example, are undertaken for symbolIc or ntuallstic reasons; to treat them as goal-oriented behaviour directed at utility maximization is to underestimate the complexity of .politics that surrounds public policy-making (Zey, 1992). Second, because of this over- Approaches to Public Policy 25 simplification, the theory has poor predictive capacity. There is no empirical proof, for example, for its prediction that government functions will grow inexorably because of the competitive dynamics of democratic systems of representation. If anything, in most industrialized countries in recent times government expenditure has been cut back, or at least not expanded, and these fluctuations in patterns of government growth are not new: how and why this occurs is virtually inexplicable within a public choice framework of analysis (Dunleavy, 1986). Third, and again related to its faulty empirical dimension, most public choice theorization is heavily influenced by US experiences, relying, for example, on a pattern of partisan electoral competition between two parties that forces voters to choose between two clearly definable alternatives. In reality, of course, many democracies are multi-party systems in which parties have to form legislative coalitions. Such practices do not permit a neat dichotomy of choices for voters since electoral promises may be overridden by post-election legislative deal-making (Warwick, 2000). And, regardless of the public choice theorists' insistence that their analysis is 'positive' and 'value-free', the theory is explicitly normative. The notions that only social interactions in market-based exchange produce wealth and that the state exists as a kind of parasite extracting rents from the marketplace ignore the important role played by the state not only in securing the basis for the economy in property rights and defence, but also in organizing such key economic activities as education and technological innovation (Dosi et al., 1988). Thus public choice theory seeks, in effect, to promote a particular vision of orthodox liberalism (also called neo-conservatism or nea-liberalism)· that would promote markets wh-erever possible and severely restrict .the scope for government activity without any empirical justification for so doing (Hood, 1991, 1995, 1998). Recently, even public choice theorists have. realized that a gap exists between their deductive models and empirical reality. Although they are loath to drop any of their fundamental assumptions about human behaviour and psychology, they have come to realize that some modification.sin their fundamental units of analysis are required. That is, it has come to be recognized that public choice theory is institutionally constrained. It has little tp say, for example, about policy-making in nondemocratic systems that do not rely on free elections, a' central assUmption of the modeL Moreover, it also disregards or underestimates the effects of institutional factors in shaping actors' preferences, despite its pretensions towards institutional design (Ostrom, 1986a, 1986b). Pioneering public choice theorists tended to regard institutions themselves as changeable according to actors' preferences and were unwilling to recognize fully the durability of institutions and the pervasive impact they have on individual behaviour. The realization by many former public choice adherents of the effects of institutional structures on individual 26 PART I Introduction Approaches choices has moved many rational choice theorists, including many who had previously endorsed variants such as game theory (Harsanyi, 1977; Scharpf, 1990; Elster, 1986), to embrace a more subtle and supple approach to deductive social theory, a form of economistic 'neo-institutionalism' or 'actor-centred institutionalism', which will be discussed in more detail below. Class Analysis: Marxist Social Theory Class theories are essentially group theories, in that they accord primacy to collective entities in their analyses, but unlike inductive group theories such as pluralism or corporatism, which will be discussed in the next· section of this chapter, they tend to define their units of analysis in 'objective' terms and conduct their analysis in an explicitly deductive fashion. That is, class theories ascribe group membership on the basis of certain observable characteristics of individuals, whether or not the individuals involved see themselves in those terms, and they expect behaviour that maximizes group interest to flow from this attributed orientation. According to Stanislaw Ossowski, 'class' refers to: 'Groups differentiated in various ways within a more inclusive category, such as the category of social groups with common economic interests, or the category of groups whose members share economic conditions which are identical in a certain respect.' While there are several types of class analysis, 1 we shall concentrate on the 'Marxist' variety, which, because of its influence on the development and' spread of Enropeansocialism iathe nineteenth and twentieth Centuries, is by far the best known and theoretically developed. In this approach class membership is determined by the presence or absence of certain characteristics, usually; but not always, related to the economy. The various nineteenth-century writings of the German philosopher and political economist Karl Marx exhibited somewhat different notions of class. However, the one developed by Marx in his mid-nineteenth century Manifesto of the Communist Party is the best known. Here Marx argued that each society has two classes contesting political and economic power. In his material conception of history, human society has passed through a number of distinct stages ('modes of production'), each of which has a distinct set of technological conditions of production ('means of production') and a distinct manner in which the various actors in the production process relate with each other ('class structure' or 'relationscffprdtlucnun"'(Co'hen;"'1978). Each mode of production entailsa' partitU1ar"ctass-s)"Stem:'Which'is'ultimatelydetermined by ownership (or non-ownership) of the means of production. In the logic of this model, in theory, each mode of production develops a dichotomous class system consisting of those who own the means t to·Public Policy 27 of production and those who must work for the owners, and the relationship between the two groups is inherently conflictual. Slaves battled slave owners in slave societies; serfs struggled with landlords in feudal society; and workers struggle with owners in capitalist society.Continued class struggle leads to eventual collapse of modes of production and their replacement by another. mode, which in turn is eventually replaced by yet another system. In practice, Marx expected that a dichotomous class system would occur only for a brief period at the tail end of a mode of production, although it would be possible to see its gradual evolution over time as a mode of production matured and developed. At other points in time, modes of production would have more complex class structures in which multiple classes would exist (Nicolaus, 1967). At its most complex, a mode of production might exhibit a class structure composed of as many as six classes: the two dominant classes from each of three modes (that which immediately preceded it,. the mode itself, and the mode that would follow it). The term often used to capture the complexities of multiple class structures in mixed modes of production is a 'social formation' (Poulantzas, 1973b). Marxist class theory interprets public policies in capitalist societies as reflecting the interests of the capitalist class. The capitalists' dominance of the base-that is, the economy-affords them control over the state and what it does. Indeed, according to Marx, the state is merely an instrument in the hands of capitalists, who use it for the purposes of maintaining the capitalist system and increasing profits ('surplus value'), necessarily at the expense of labour. Given its deductive nature, analysis of public policy from a Marxist ..perspective usually took the form of demonstrating how.a particular policy. serves the interests of capital, which is assumed as a proof that the latter used the state to further its interest. This general set of assumptions about government is often referred to as the instrumental theory of the state. While a popular form of analysis in many countries and colonies around the globe in the 1930s and 1940s, by the late 1960s in Western Europe this instrumentalist line of analysis was beginning to be seen as problematic by Marxist analysts on two counts. First, even if it were true that a policy serves the interest of capital, it cannot be concluded ipso facto that the policy ~as enacted at the behest of capital. To show this, one would have to demonstrate that capitalists issued instructions that wet: faithfully carried out by state officials, proof of which is usually lac~~g. Second, and more importantly, this approach cannot explain poliCIes adopted over the opposition of capitalists. In most capitalist states, for instance, the. adoption of social welfare policies was vehemently opposed by many capitalists, something that cannot be explained from this perspective. The recognition of this theoretical problem forced a reappraisal of the role of the state in Marxist theory (Block, 1980; Foley, 1978; Gough, 1975; Poulantzas, 1978; Therborn, 1977, 1986). 28 PART I Introduction Second, much as was the case with public choice theory, in the traditional Marxist view the means of production constituted the basic structure shaping the state, law, and ideology. As we have seen, however, this conceptualization is problematic because the state has played a crucial role in organizing the economy and shaping the mode of production (Cox, 1987). The nineteenth-century promotion of natural resource sector production and the protection of inefficient import substitution industrialization in Canada, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Mexico, for example, had a decisive impact on those countries' economic structures and class relations and continue to shape the various classes' interests, the policy outcomes they desire, and the policy responses they elicit (Clarke-Jones, 1987; Duquette, 1999; Hirschman, 1958). Similarly, the proliferation of Keynesian policies in the 1950s and 1960s in many countries (Hall, 1989) occurred over the opposition of entrenched business interests and cannot be understood without reference to ideological factors influencing state behaviour, just as policies promoting privatization and deregulation in many of the same countries in the 1980s (Ikenberry, 1990) cannot be traced entirely or directly to the interests of capitalists (Arnariglio et al., 1988). Like rational choice theory, which in its later phases recognized to a much greater extent the independent effects of institutions and sotial structures on individual behaviour, class analy~is in the 1960s and 1970s placed an increased emphasis on institutionaf or structural factors to account for state activities and behaviour (Mclennan, 1989: 117-19). To account for the state devising policies opposed by capital, for example, the notion-'bf relative'autonomy of the state was developed. While numerous neo-Marxists' area.ssociated with this'line of reinterpretation, . the view offered by Nicos Poulantzas in the early 1970s was perhaps the most prominent (Poulantzas, 1973a; Althusser and Balibar, 1977). Poulantzas argued that conflicts among the various· fractions of capital, coupled with the existence of a bureaucracy staffed by individuals drawn . from non-capitalist classes, permitted the state some level of autonomy from capital. This autonomy, in turn, allowed the state' to adopt measures favourable to the subordinate classes if this was found to be politically unavoidable or necessary for promoting the long-term interests of capital in social stability. While such measures may adversely affect the short-term interests of capital, and may even be vehemently opposed by capitalists, Pouhmtzas argUed they were always in their long-term interest. This is because the structure of capitalism requires that certain essential functions be performed by the state if capitalism is to survive. Such functions include enforcing property rights, maintaining peace and order, and promoting conditions favourable to continued accumulation of profits. Hence, in this 'structural' version of neo-Marxism, policy-making was still viewed as serving the interest of capital, but not in the same instrumental sense Approaches to Public Policy 29 as conceived by early Marxists (Thompson, 1978). The rise of the welfare state, for example, is explained not as a direct response to the needs of capital, but as the result of political pressures exerted by the working class on the state (Esping-Andersen, 1981, 1985; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984). The structural imperatives of capitalism are not ignored, however, because they impose limits on what the state can do in response to working-class demands. Thus, it is argued, the welfare state established by capitalist governments in response to working-class demands was designed in a manner that did not undermine fundamental property rights or profits. Actor-Centred Institutionalism: Transaction Cost Analysis A third deductive approach explicitly recognizes the limits of similar individual and class-based theories to explain social behaviour and activity such as public policy-making. Like its inductive counterpart, 'statism', on which more information is provided below (Peters, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kato, 1996), this approach grew directly out of expressed concerns about the ability of deductive theories based on individual and collective action to deal with the question of why political, economic, and social institutions like governments, firms, or churches existed at all, and to help assess the impact they had in fashioning constraints and providing opportunities for those actors to emerge, evolve, . and interact (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1995). Many variants of this approach exist, under titles such as the 'New Economics of Organization' (Moe, 1984; Yarbrough and Yarbrou,gh, 1990; Williamson, 1996) or the 'Institutional Analysis and Development (lAD)" framework (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom et al., 1993). All, however, use a form of what Fritz Scharpf has termed 'actor-centred institutionalism' to understand social processes, including political and policy-oriented ones (Scharpf, 1997). Like recent class analysis, actor-centred institutionalism emphasizes the autonomy of political institutions from the society in which they exist. And, like public choice theory, it also begins with a simple idea about calculating human behaviour. But unlike that latter approach, it takes into account the facts that rules, norms, and symbols affect political behaviour; that the organization of governmental institutions affects what the state does; and that unique patterns of historical development constrain future choices.2 Institutions, hence, are defined to include not only formal organizations such as bureaucratic hierarchies and marketlike exchange networks but also legal and cUltural codes and rules that affect the calculations by individuals and groups of their optimal strategies and courses of action (Ostrom, 1999). These assumptions focus this approach on the effects of structure on . social actors and, as James March and Johan Olsen (1984: 738) put it: 30 PART I Approaches to Public Policy Introduction They deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they deemphasize the simple pri~acy of micro processes and efficient histories in favor of relatIvely complex processes and historical inefficiency; they deemphas~ze metaphors of choice and allocate outcomes in favor of other lOgICS of action and the centrality of meaning and symbolic action. One variant of this general approach is transaction cost analysis (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). This approach acknowledges the crucial role played by institutions in political life, and argues that these exist in society in order to overcome impediments caused by information asymmetries and other barriers to 'perfect' exchange in society. The basic unit of analysis in this appr~ach is related to the 'transaction' among individuals within the confines of an institutional order (Coase, 1937). Institutions of various kinds are significant to the extent that they increase or lower the costs of transactions. In this perspective institutions are 'the products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions by instrumentally oriented individuals' (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 8). In the transaction cost approach to social theory, the argument is not that institutions cause an action. It is rather that they affect actions, by shaping the interpretation of problems and possible solutions and by constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to which they can be implemented. While individuals, groups, classes, and states have their specific interests, they pursue them in the context of existing formal organizations and rules al1d norms that shape expectatioIJ.sand affect the possibilities of their realization (Williamson, 1985). In the political realm, in the transaction costs perspective, institutions are significant because they 'constitute and legitimize individual and collective political actors and provide them with consistent behavioural rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capaclty for purposeful action' (March and Olsen, 1994: 5). In the policy realm, as with public choice theory, this analysis leads to a distinct preference for market-based forms of government action and activity, but for different reasons, avoiding the reliance of public choice theory on ascribing inherently wasteful rentseeking behaviour to government actors. Focusing on the nature of economic transactions, a typology of goods and services has been developed to illustrate the appropriate roles played by governments, and markets in their provision. In this typology, all ,.,goods.oiID.d .sePlicesAn.so¢ety"can 1)e .divided..intO,fOl.lf ,types.according to the transactional criteria of '.exclusivity' and '.exhaustiv.eness', that is, whether a transaction involving a 'good of serViceis limited to a single consumer and whether it is completely consumed after an economic transaction. These criteria of exclusivity and exhaustiveness generate the four types of goods and services listed in Figure 2.2. 31 Figure 2.2 A General Taxonomy of Goods and Services Exhaustiveness High High Low Private Good Common-Pool Good Toll Good Public Good SOURCE:Adapted from E.S. Savas, Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977). In this view, pure private goods make up the bulk of goods and services produced in sOGiety.These are goods or services, such as food, that can be divided up for sale and are no longer available to others after their consumption by consumers. At the other extreme are pure public goods or services, such as street lighting, which cannot be parcelled out and can be consumed without diminishing the sum of the good available. Between the two are toll goods and common-pool goods. The former include semi-public goods such as bridges or highways, which do not diminish in quantity after use but for the use of which it is possible to charge. Common-pool goods are those, like fish in the ocean, whose usage cannot be directly charged to individuals but whose quantity is reduced after use. In the transaction costs perspective, the two types of social organizations considered to be the most effective in minimizing transaction costs are markets, on the one hand, and the hierarchical form of organization, or 'bureaucracy', on the Other.In the market forin, th'e costs of overcoming information and other needs are'largely externalized as multiple producers and consumers 'share the costs of acquiring and disseminating information and other goods and services. In a hierarchy these costs' are internalized, as occurs for example in large corporations in the modern era. In an optimal arrangement, it is argued, a government would seek to externalize costs onto citizens by enhancing market-based activities. Citizens would then be able to know the true price of government services and act rationally with' respect to their consumption, spending, and investment decisions (Horn, 1995). According to the prtnciples of transaction cost analysis, governments should not interfere in transactions and activities related to private goods and services. They should simply enforce basic property rights and prevent criminal behaviours (such as theft) undermining these types of transactions. Public goods, however, should be provided by the government because markets cannot provide goods or services for which businesses cannot charge or profit. Governments should also not allow toll goods tobe treated like public goods and so must charge for their usage. From this perspective, the costs of constructing and maintaining roads and bridges should not be charged to all taxpayers and then offered for 32 PART I Introduction 'free' to those using the facilities, which encourages the latter to treat these as public goods; rather, those using the facilities must pay for the costs. In the case of common-pool goods, the government should establish property regimes through licensing to prevent their depletion (Savas, 1977, 1987). The sale of fishing quotas through public auction, which gives the 'right' to a certain quantity of fish to those succeeding at the auction, is often cited as an example of this principle. This analysis of appropriate institutional behaviour based on the nature of economic transactions is replicated in many other areas of social and political life by adherents of this approach to policy studies. Policy-relevant activities such as the negotiation of international treaties, the operation of multi-level systems of government, and issues of regulatory enforcement are subject to similar\~nalyses in which the actions and decisions of policy actors are modelled as the outcomes of multiple, nested games occurring within the confines, costs, and payoffs established by institutional orders (Scharpf, 1997; Putnam, 1988; Scholz, 1984; Sproule-Jones, 1989). This generates a useful body of insights into appropriate and inappropriate behaviour within the fixed confines Qf a given institutional order and makes transaction cost analysis quite compatible with, and an extension of, earlier individualist and collectivist deductive approaches to policy theorization (Dowding, 1994). However, this approach is somewhat eclectic in the sense that it directs attention to a wide range of international and domestic norms, rules, and behaviour that affect actual and perceived transaction costs and hence may be relevant to explaining policy-making (Putnam, 1988; AtkinSC5tl,'1978);'This results in the tempering of its otherwise purely deductive orientation, le-aving it to'empirical investigations to determine the significance of specific variables on policy outcomes in specific circumstances. Its main problem, however, lies with its inability to provide a plausible coherent explanation of the origin of institutions, or their alteration, without resorting to functionalism. That is, since this approach argues that individual and collective preferences are shaped by institutions, it is unclear how institutions or rules themselves are created, and once in place, how they would change (Cammack, 1992; March et aI., 2000; Peters, 1999; Gorges, 2001). Actor-centred institutionalism hence tends to provide an excellent discussion of the constraints placed on policy actors and what is 'rational' for them to do in specific circumstances, but says very little about what causes those constraints to move in any particular direction (BroInley, 1989: ch. 1). While overcoming many of the problems associated with earlier individual and collective approaches such as public choice theory and class analysis by clearly acknowledging the need to take institutional orders into account in analyzing policy-making behaviour, transaction cost analysis is at once both limited and vague in its analysis of the history and evolution of policy~making activities. Unlike the deductive theories that attempt to apply universal maxims to the study of political phenomena, inductive theories are constructed not from e 'top down' but from the 'bottom up'. They depend on the accumulation of multiple empirical studies of any phenomenon for their raw data, ~om which theorists attempt to extract generalizable propositions. By theIr very nature these theories are less elegant and parsimonious t~an deductive theories. They often do not have a fully integrated or unified ~et of .theor~tical propositions that can be applied to any case under conSIderation, SIncethey are, by definition, always 'under construction'. Like deductive theories, several sub-types of inductive social theories exist. These, too, can be usefUlly distinguished according to whether they fo~~s on individuals, groups, or structures in their efforts to explain the political world and public policy-making. 0 Sociological Individualism: Welfare Economics Many inductive social theories are also based on the individual but usually the~ .do not contain the simplifying psychological aXioms df individual utIlIty self-maXimization characteristic of their deductive counterparts~ s~ch as public choice theory (Gerth and Mills, 1958). Welfare econonucs ISone such theory, and is perhaps the most widely used approach to the study of public policy. Indeed, much of what is called policy analysis in the literature is often only applied welfare economics even ~oughthis ~srarely statedexplidtly (Weimer and Vining;-1999). ' ThIS ~pproach ISbased on the notion that individuals, through market mechanIsms, should be expected to make most social decisions. Unlike .their deductive counterparts, however, welfare economists recognize that markets cannot always distribute resources efficiently or, to put it anoth~r way, carmot always aggregate individual utility-maximizing behavIOur so as to optimize overall social welfare. In such instances, . ~efe~e~ to as market failures, welfare economists argue that political Institutions can act to supplement or replace markets . .~he principl~s of welfare economics were first worked out by the Bntis? eco.n.onu~tAlfr~d Pigou (1932) during World War I. Although he only I~entifie.d Instances of market failures related to the tendency of some Indus~es to generate monopolies and the inability of both con~umers and Investors to receive information necessary for decision-makIn?, later analysts argued the existence of many more such· market failures (Bator, 1958; Zerbe and McCurdy, 1999). At minimum, these include the following: • Natural monopoly refers to the situation in certain industries with large capital requirements and disproportionate returns to scale that 34 • • • • PART I Approaches to Public Policy Introduction tends to promote a sIngle firm over its competitors. In industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and railways, the first company to establish the necessary infrastructure, if unregulated, enjoys cost advantages that make it difficult for other firms to compete. The lack of competition, when it occurs, leads to loss of the society's economic welfare. Imperfect information occurs when consumers and investors lack adequate information to make rational decisions. Unregulated pharmaceutical firms, for instance, have no incentive. to reveal adverse side effects of their products, nor do consumers have the expertise required to evaluate such products. Once again, decisions may be taken that do not serve the society as a whole. / In the presence of externalitieS, too, the market is deemed to fail. These involve situations in which production costs are not borne by producers ('internalized') but passed on to others outside (external to) the production process. The most often cited example of an externality relates to the costs of pollution that a company in pursuit of reduced costs and increased profits imposes on the society as a whole. The tragedy of the commons is a market failure that occurs when common property resources, such as fisheries, pastures, forests, or pools of oil, are exploited without the necessary regulation to maintain the resource. In these circumstances individual users often benefit from increasing their use of the resource in the short term although all users will suffer in the long term from the increased depletion of the resource. Destructive competition is a. controversial market failure resulting when aggressiVecoI11petition between-firms causes negative sideeffects im workers and society (Utton, 1986). It"isargued that excessive competition can drive down profit margins and lead to the unnecessary reduction of working conditions, adversely affecting overall social welfare. These are the core types of market failures; others have sought to broaden the concept by including other types within this schema. Thus education, industrial research and development, art and culture, and social peace and stability are argued by many as instances of activities with 'positive externalities' that the market does not supply adequately despite a social need, indicating the existence of market failure. Sustained criticisms of the vagueness of the criteria used to define market failures have led many welfare economists to attempt to recon" ceptuali;z;ethe qrigin~ noti~~. ~ecent critics have argued that market failures are in fact only one side'!of"an:equation and that there are also irtnate1inii:tations-'-'-govemmertt"failures-to government's ability to correct market failures. They posit that in several specific instances the state cannot improve on the market, despite the laUer's failings (Le Grand and 3S Robinson, 1984; Mayntz, 1993a; Bozeman, 2002). There are three commonly cited instances of such government failure: displacement is the situation in which an administrative agency charged with producing a particular good or service displaces public goals with its own 'private' or 'organizational' ones. These may extend to maximizing its budget or power or whatever else the organization values. In such circumstances, government action to correct market failure may simply increase inefficiency. • Rising costs, the supposed disparity between government revenues and costs, are cited as another instance of government failure. Governments receive tax revenues from general sources but have specific program costs. Without a method to match COl!tsto revenues, it is argued, governments often fail to control expenses. • Derived externalities are the third type of government failure. Certain government actions, such as health-care provision, have a broad impact on society and the economy and can have the effect of excluding viable market-produced goods and services, negatively affecting overall levels of social welfare (Wolf, 1979; Le Grand, 1991; Weimer and Vining, 1999: 194). • Organizational Although the exact status and causes of government and market failures remain controversial and largely inductively derived, welfare economists have developed a theory of public policy-making based on these concepts. They argue that governments have a responsibility to -correct market failures because· optimal social outcomes wiil·.not-result_ from unco-ordinated individual decision-making. In this view, govern-·· ments facing a demand for action should first determine if a market failure is causing a social problem; only if one is found should government intervene to correct the problem (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). However, even then, in order to avoid government failures, policy-makers must also carefully evaluate their· own capacity to correct the market before attempting to do so (Vining and Weimer, 1990; Weimer and Vining, 1992). Once it is agreed that a problem requires state intervention, the key public policy question for welfare economists is to find the most efficient way of doing so. The most efficient way, in this perspective, is the least costly one, and the technique used to determine it is cost-benefit analysis. Its objective is to find out how to achieve the same output for less input, or more output for the same input (Carley, 1980: 51). Such analy.sis involves evaluating all alternatives and their consequences in terms of their monetary costs and benefits and then choosing the alternative that maximizes benefits while minimiZing costs. Costs and benefits in this mode of analysis are determined by: 36 PART I Introduction 1. Enumerating all adverse and positive consequences arising from implementation of an option in monetary terms. 2. Estimating the probability of occurrence. 3. Estimating the cost or benefit to society should it occur. 4. Calculating the expected loss or gain related to each consequence by multiplying (2) and (3). 5. Estimating the costs of such actions into the future to give a net present value (Fischoff, 1977; Bickers and Williams, 2001). Cost-benefit analysis is essentially a technique for making the government replicate market decision-making as closely as possible for the purpose of allocating resources. It has been described as 'an attempt to use economic technique, in place of formal market bargaining or price setting, to locate a Pareto-optimal policy alternative' (Gillroy and Wade, 1992: 7; Zeckhimser and Schaefer, 1968). The criterion of Pareto optimality requires that an action be undertaken only if it offers the possibility of making at least one person better off without worsening the situation of any other person. However, while Pareto optimality may be achievable in a competitive market (though that is disputable as well), it is impossible to apply in the public policy arena because all government actions make some better off at the expense of others. Social security for the poor makes the rich who pay for it worse off and is therefore not Pareto optimal; nor is putting criminals in jail, because it makes them worse off. The difficulties with the principle of Pareto optimality have resulted in its replacement in contemporary welfare economics by the so-called Kaldor cn1erion,which requires that policy alternatives· maximizing net benefits over cosfbe chosen. Under this criterion, a policy can be chosen even if some lose as long as the total gains are higher than the sum of losses. A cost-benefit analysis is employed to find out the Kaldor-efficient allocation, and the option offering the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is selected for adoption and implementation. While not without merits, cost-benefit analysis is often problematic. Despite numerous attempts to refine the model, there is no acceptable way of putting a dollar value on various intangible costs and consequences (Zeckhauser, 1975). There is no way, for instance, to calculate precisely the costs of social security programs in terms of their effects on the recipients' work incentive, or their benefits in terms of the social peace and tolerance they promote. Moreover, the costs and benefits of any policy are often not evenly distributed, for some pay more than others, while some benefit more. And there is often a severe problem of aggregating or summing up the various components of an option. Building a new airport involves disparate problems, such as increased noise for residents in adjoining areas, decreased travelling time for some and increased time for others, increased pollution, beneficial employment and savings effects, and so on, all of which affect different sections of the Approaches to Puqlic Policy 37 society differently and so need to be evaluated differently, yet there is no generally acceptable way of doing so (Carley, 1980: 51-5). Efforts to improve cost-benefit technique continue; however, so do criticisms. The main problem with the conception of public policy-making offered by welfare economists, however, is not related to their methods or to the elegance of their theoretical assumptions about reciprocal market and government failures. Rather, these theorists have failed to recognize that states almost never make their policies in the essentially technical manner assumed by the theory. Even if one could identify the most efficient and effective policy, which is difficult given the limitations innate to the social sciences, th.e actual policy choice is a political one, bound by political institutio!1s and made by political actors, often in response to political pressures. As such, the technical analyses generated by welfare economists are often merely anothe~ political resource used by proponents of one or another option for government action or inaction to further their claims (Weiss, 1977b3. Only in very specific circumstances when welfare economists happen to be policy-makers-as happens at times in some countries in' some sectors, such as taxation or fiscal management-would one expect political decisions to be based solely on welfare-maximizing criteria as defined by welfare economists (Markoff and Montecinos, 1993). The neglect of political variables by welfare economics has led its critics to describe it as 'a myth; a theoretical illusion' that promotes 'a false and naive view of the policy process' (Minogue, 1983: 76; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: SO-I). Group Th~ortes: Pluralism and Corporatism A second inductive approach to social theory that has been prominent in studies of policy-making,. especially in political science, focuses on groups and not individuals. The best-known examples of this approach are\'plJIralism', which originated in the United States and continues to be \(>--the 'dominant perspective in American political science, and 'corporatism', which is a similar group theory developed in Europe. While [~yic:le!1ce .9fpluralist tilinkiIlgcan be found in the works of one of the founding fathers' 6IThe United States, Ia,J:I!es.Madison (Madison and Hamilton, 1961), ~d a French observer of early nineteenth-century America, ~E!Xisde Tocqueville (1956), the doctrine received its first formal expression by Arthur Bentley in 1908. The theory has been considerably modified and refined over the years, but the fundamental tenets postulated by Bentley remain intact. Some prominent pluralist thinkers,!' responsible for a revival of Bentley's work in the US in the post-World War II era, include Robert Dahl (1956, 1961), NelsonPolsby (1963), and especially David Truman (1964). ' Pluralism is b.a.sed.onJ.beaS~ll[[lptionof the primacy of interest groups !E:the political process. In The Process of Government, Bentley argued that different interests in society found their concrete manifestation in different groups consisting of individuals with similar concerns and, ultimately, that 'society itself is nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it.' Truman modified Bentley's notion of a one-toone correspondence between interests and groups and argued that two kinds of interests-latent and manifest-resulted in the creation of two kinds of groups-potential and organized (Truman, 1964; also see Jordan, 200p). For Truman, latent interests in the process of emerging pro~ vided the underpinnings for potential groups, which over time led to the emergence of organized groups, allowing politics to be seen as a more dynamic process than Bentl~y seemed to be arguing. Groups in pluralist theory are not only many and free-forming, they are also characterized by overlapping membership and ,a lack of representational monopoly (Schmitter, 1977). That is, the same individual may belong to a number of groups for pursuing his or her different interests; a person, for instance, may belong at the same time to Greenpeace, the local Chamber of Commerce, and Ducks Unlimited, among others. Overlapping membership is said to be a key mechanism for reconciling conflicts and promoting co-operation among groups. In addition, the same interest may be represented by more than one group. Environmental causes, for example, are espoused by a large number of groups iIi every industrialized country. Politics, in the pluralist perspective, is the process by which various competing interests and groups are reconciled. Public policies are thus a result of competition and collaboration among groups working to further their members' collective interests (Self, 1985). . Contrary to the interpretation presented in many commentaries, pluralists do not believe that all groups are equally influential or that they have equal access to government (Smith, 1990: 303-4). In fact, they recognize that groups vary in terms of the financial or organizational (personnel, legitimacy, members' loyalty, or internal unity) resources they possess and the access to government they enjoy (Lindblom, 1968; Lowi, 1969; McConnell, 1966; Schattschneider, 1960). Neverthel~ss, as far as the policy process is concerned, as McLennan has observed, 'It is impossible to read the standard works without getting the sense that resources, information and the means of political communication are openly available to all citizens, that groups form an array of equivalent power centres in society, and that all legitimate voices can and will be heard.' As such, pluralist theories are to some extent justifiably criticized for not haVing a sufficiently developed notion of groups' varying capacity to affect gov'·ernmerrtda,"isron"-making. -,..,:Amore<8igI'rifkam,;P£(i)blem,with,the,GJ)plicaiion.;Qf".pluralism to public policy-making, however, is that the role of the government in making public policies is quite unclear (Smith, 1990). The early pluralists assumed that the government was a sort of 'transmission belt' registering and implementing the demands' of interest groups. The government was often thought of not actually as an entity but as a place, an 'arena' where competing groups met and bargained (Dahl, 1967). The recognition that this view did not accord with the reality of what governments actually did led to its reconceptualization as a 'referee' or 'umpire' of the group struggle. In this view, the state was still ultimately a place where competing groups met to work out their differences, but this time the government was considered a kind of neutral official setting out the rules of group conflict and ensuring that groups did not violate them with impunity (Berle, 1959). As Earl Latham (1952: 390) put it: The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records th~ terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form, of statutes. Every statute tends to represent compromise because the very process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation and consent. The legislative vote on any issue thus tends to represent the composition of strength, I.e., the balance of power among the con~ tending groups at the moment of voting. What may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their favor. This is an overly simplistic view of the government, as public choice critics of pluraltsm such as Mancur Olson (1965) were quick to point out; because it assumes that public officials do not have their own interests and ambitions, which they seek to realize through'their control of the governmental machinery. It also neglects the fact that states often maintain special ties with certain groups and may even sponsor establishment of groups where there are none or if those in existence are found to be difficult to co-opt or accommodate (Pal, 1993a). The pluralist notion of the government responding to group pressure is also misconceived because it assumes unity of purpose and action on the part of the government. As some critics have pointed out, 'bureaucratic.politics' is a pervasive phenomenon that has a critical impact on public policies (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Different departments and agencies have differe:r:tinterests and conflicting interpretations of the same problem, and how these differences are resolved has an impact on what policies are adopted-and how they are implemented. Recognition of these problems with pluralism (Connolly, 1969) led to the emergence of what is sometimes described as 'neo-pluralism' within the American political science community. The reformulation retained the significance attributed to competition among groups, but modified the idea of approximate equality among groups and explicitly acknowledged that some groups are more powerful than others. Charles lindblom, for example, has argued that business is more powerful than 40 PART I Introduction others for two reasons. First, government in a capitalist society needs a prosperous economy to serve as the basis for tax rev~nues to spend on programs and its own re-election. To promote e~onoIDlcgrowth, gove~ments must maintain business confidence, whICh often means paYIng special heed to the demands of the business community. Second, in capitalist societies there is a division betweeri public and private sectors, the former under the control of the state and the latter dominated by business. The private sector's dominance by business gives it a privileged position in comparison to other groups in that much employment an? associated social and economic activity are ultimately dependent on pnvate-sector investment behaviour (Lindblom, 1977). Unlike the classical pluralists, who seemed only to acknowledge but not incorporate the observation that some groups may be more powerful than others because of their superior organization and resources, Lindblom argued that the strength of business lay in the nature of capitalism and democracy itself. As such, business need not, though it may, exert pressure on the government to realize its interests; the government, in accordance with the imperatives of capitalism and the pursuit of its own self-interest, will ensure that business interests are not adversely affected by its actions. Other problems with pluralist analyses of public policy-making, however, rema.in. One concern, which led some early critics of pluralism to adopt a more deductive, rational choice orientation, involves the motivations individuals have for joining groups. Mancur Olson, for example, argued that a fundamental flaw in pluralist theory related to the ability of individuals to gain the advantages of group membership without actually joining a.ilroti.p~ This' ability'to 'free 'ride', Olson argued, meant,that group membership could not simply be taken for granted but had to' b: fostered by providing 'selective incentives' to individuals to 'make It worth their while' to join (Olson, 1965; McLean, 2000). Later studies revealed that groups form for a variety of reasons, and pointed to the role patrons played in providing start-up funding and organizational assistance to groups (Nownes and Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 1995; Nownes and Cigler, 1995). Such studies highlighted a second serious problem with pluralist theory: its excessive concentration on the role of interest groups themselves and its relative neglect of other equally important factors in the political and policy-making processes. While neo-pluralism was a significant improvement on its predecessor, it did not address all the problems innate to a concentrated focus on groups as collective social actors. The theory also continued to overlook the role of the international system in shaping public policies and their implementation. International economic interdependence makes states' policies increasingly subject to international pressures, regardless of domestic group pressures. It is difficult to understand, for example, the industrial and trade policies of industrialized countries without reference to the international economy Approaches to Public Policy 41 and the political pressures it places on policy-makers. The role of ideology was also unjustifiably neglected in the pluralist explanations of politics and public policy. The liberal tradition pre-eminent in Anglo-Saxon countries (including Canada, the US, and Australia), for example, has had a significant impact on their governments' hesitant and often contradictory intervention in the economy. As was the case with welfare economics, these lacunae have been filled by adding an institutional dimension to pluralist analysis, in which the state is viewed as an independent actor in its own right, which can and does affect the groups that contest political life and make policy (Nordlinger, 1981). This development is discussed in the next section. Pluralism's applicability to countries besides the United States has also been especially problematic because of differences in underlying political institutions and processes that challenge pluralist assumptions and precepts derived only from examination of the US experience (Zeigler, 1964). British parliamentary institutions found in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, or Sweden, for example, do not lend themselves to the kind of open access that groups enjoy in relation.to legislatures in the US and other countries with similar republican systems of government (Presthus, 1973).3 And many authoritarian countries simply lack the kinds of groups conceived by pluralists as being the basic building blocks of political analysis. Even if groups have the freedom to organize, the numbers actually formed are fewer than in the US and tend to be much more permanent and formalized. This finding led some group theorists, such as Phillipe Schmitter, to speculate that pluralism was only one form in which' group systems .could develop. Schmitter (1977) argued that, depending on a range of variables and historical factors, a corporatist form of political organization was much more likely than a pluralist one to emerge in many countries outside the US. In Europe, theories treating groups as their primary unit of analysis have tended to take a corporatist form. The roots of corporatism extend back to the Middle Ages when there were concerns about protecting the 'intermediate strata' of autonomous associations between the state and the family (Gierke, 1958a, 1958b).4 These included guilds and other forms of trade associations as well as, most importantly, religious organizations and churches ..Corporatist theory argues that these intermediate strata have a life of their own above ana. beyond their constituting individuals, and that their existence is part of the 'organic' or natural order of society. Much of political life and conflict in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries concerned efforts by emerging national states to control the operations of these 'autonomous strata' and the latter's efforts to resist state control (Cawson, 1986; Mann, 1984; Winkler, 1976). Corporatism can be best understood, as Schmitter has observed, in contrast to pluralism. The latter proposes that multiple groups exist to represent their respective members' interests, with membership being 42 PART I Introduction voluntary and groups associating freely with each other without state interference in their activities. In contrast, corporatism is: [A] system of interest intermediation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of ~ingular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (Schmitter, 1977: 9) The groups here are not thought of as free-forming, voluntary, or competitive, as in pluralism. Nor are they considered to be autonomous, for they depend on the state for recognition and support in return for a role in policy-making. Corporatism thus explicitly takes into account two problems endemic to pluralism: its neglect of the role of the state and its failure to recognize institutionalized patterns of relationships between the state and groups. In corporatist theory, public policy is shaped by the interaction between the state and the interest group or groups recognized by the state. Interaction among groups is institutionalized within and mediated by the state (McLennan, 1989: 245). Public policy towards a declining industry, for instance, would take the form of bargaining between and among the state and relevant industry associations and trade unions as to how best to rationalize the industry and make it competitive. The making of social-'welfare"policies" similarly involves negotiations .·with . business associations, socU~:I welfa.regroups, and possibly trade unionsif the proposed policies affect their' members, The outcome of these negotiations depends not only on the organizational characteristics of the groups but on the closeness of their relationship with the state. The state itself is not seen as a monolith, but as an organization with internal fissures that affect its actions. . Although this conception accords fairly well with political practices in many European countries, there are still problems with corporatism .as an approach to politics or the study of public policy. First, it is a descriptive category of a particular kind of political arrangement between states and societies (such as in Sweden or Austria), not a general explanation of what governments do, especially those in non-corporatist countries. Thus it has little to say about why countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States have the particular public policies that they do, except to pdiritout that th:e lack of institutionalized co-operaUon ""between'the state and groups in these countries often leads to fragmented and inconsistent policies (Panitch, 1977, 1979).. Second, the theory does little to further our understanding of public p()licyprpcesses,ev:eIl in ostensibly corporatist countries. While- it is Approaches to Public Policy 43 significant to know that not all countries have open-ended competition among groups as suggested by pluralism, this in itself does not say very much about why a policy is adopted or why it is implemented in a particular manner. The close links between governments and certain groups are certainly important, but these are also only one among many factors shaping policies and policy-making (Castles and Merrill, 1989; Kernan and Pennings, 1995). Third, the theory does not contain a clear notion of even its own fundamental unit of analysis, the 'interest' group. Contemporary societies contain myriad interests, and it is not clear which are or should be represented by the state. In some cases, the relevant groups are defined in terms of ethnicity, language, or religion (Lijphart, 1969), while in others they are defined with reference to their economic activities. The bulk of corporatist literature concentrates somewhat arbitrarily on producer groups, such as industry associations and trade unions, and on their role in specific sectors, such as labour market policy and wage bargaining (Siaroff, 1999). Fourth, the theory is vague about the relative significance of different groups in politics. Are we to treat all groups as equally influential? If not, then what determines their influence? The corporatist literature is silent on such questions. Finally, the theory has no clear conception of the nature of the state, its interests, and why it recognizes some groups. and not others as representatives of corporate interests. The answers to these questions vary dramatically among scholars working in the corporatist framework. Some argue that corporatism is a manifestation of an autonomous state desiring to managesocial-change or ensure social stability (Cawson, 1978). Others suggest it isa system sought by the major corporate actors and thus is simply put into place by the state at their behest (Schmitter, 1985). Despite its shortcomings, corporatist theory has played a significant role in the analysis of public policy, especially in Europe and Latin America. By highlighting the autonomous role of the state in politics, it paved the way for more sophisticated explanations of public policy-making than those provided by earlier inductive group theories such as pluralism (Smith, 1997). More significantly, by emphasizing the importance of institutionalized patter.ns of relationships between states and societies, it fostered the emergence of new inductive approaches such as 'statism', . which offer a more comprehensive explanation of public policy-making (Blom-Hansen, 2001). A third general type of inductive political theory has taken to heart the insights of critics of pluralism and corporatism and has emphasized organized social structures and political' institutions it its analyses. Many 44 PART I Introduction analyses in this mould focus solely on the state, seeing it as the leading institution in society and the key agent in the political process. Others, however, also attribute explanatory significance to organized social. actors in addition to the state. Both interpretations have their origin in the works of late nineteenthcentury German historical sociologists and legal theorists who highlighted the effects of the development of modern state institutions on the development of society. Rather than argue that the state reflected the nature of a nation's populace or social structure, theorists such as Max Weber and Otto Hintze noted how the state's monopoly on the use of force allowed it to reorder and structure social relations and institutions (Hintze, 1975; Nettl, 1968; Weber, 1978). Sociological or historical neo-institutionalism has been summarized by Stephen Krasner (1988: 67) as follows: An institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and political life. The preferences, capabilities, and basic self-identities of individuals are conditioned by these institutional structures. Historical developments are path dependent; once certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The range of options available to policymakers at any given.time is a function of institutional capabilities that were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in response to very different environmental pressures. This perspective explicitly' acknowledges that policy preferences and capacities are usually understood in the context of the-sotiety'in which the state isemtiedded (Nett!, 1968; Przeworski, 1990; Therborn, 1986). Like its more deductive counterpart, actor-centred institutionalism, Peter Hall described an 'institutionalist' analysis as one focused on the impact of large-scale structures on individuals and vice versa. As he put it: The concept of institutions ... refer[s] to the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as opposed to conventional, standing. Throughout the emphasis is on the relational character of institutions; that is to say, on the way in which they structure the interactions of individuals. In this sense it is the organizational qualities of institutions that are being emphasized. (Hall, 1986: 19) However, historical or sociological neo-institutionalism differs from its deductive counterpart in several critical areas. First, there is no effort made in this approach to reduce institutions to less organized forms of social interaction, such as norms, rules, or conventions. Second, there is Approaches to Public Policy 4S no attempt to reduce institUtlons to the level of individuals and individual activities, such as economic or social transactions. And, third, institutions are simply taken as 'givens', that is, as observable social entities in themselves, with little effort made to derive the reasons for their origins from a priori principles of human cognition or existence (March and Olsen, 1994). Using such a socio-historical line of analysis yields, to use Theda Skocpol's terms, a 'state-centric' as opposed to 'society-centric' explanation of political life, including public policy-making (Skocpol, 1985). In a 'strong' version of the statist approach, as Adam Przeworski (1990: 47-8) put it in a pioneering book: states create, organize and regulate societies. States dominate other organizations within a particular territory, they mould the culture and shape the economy. Thus the problem of the autonomy of the state with regard to society has no sense within this perspective. It should not even appear. The concept of 'autonomy' is a useful instrument of analysis only if the domination by the state over society is a contingent situation, that is, if the state derives its efficacy from private property, societal values, or some other sources located outside it. Within a true 'state-centric' approach this concept has nothing to contribute. In the statist version of neo-institutional analysis the state is viewed as an autonomous actor with the capacity to devise and implement its own objectives, not necessarily just to respond to pressure from dominant social groups or'classes:dts-autonomyand capacity are based on its staffing by officials with personal and' agency interests and ambitions and the fact that it is a sovereign organization with unparalleled financial, personnel, and-in the final instance-coercive resources. The proponents of this perspective claim that this emphasis on the centrality of the state as an explanatory variable enables it to offer more plausible explanations of long-term patterns of policy development in many countries than do other types of political theory (Krasner, 1984; Skowronek, 1982; .Orren and Skowronek, 1998-9). It is difficult to accept statism in the strong form described above, however. For one, it hilS difficulty accounting for the existence of social liberties and freedoms or explaining why states cannot always enforce their will, such as in times of rebellion, revolution, civil war, or civil disobedience. In fact, even the most autocratic governments make some attempt to respond to what they believe to be the population's preferences. It is, of course, especially impossible for a democratic state to be entirely autonomous from a society with voting rights. And, as Lindblom and others pointed out, in addition to efforts to maintain and nurture support for the regime among the population, capitalist states, both democratic and autocratic, need to accommodate the imperatives of the marketplace in their policies. Second, the statist view suggests implicitly that all 'strong' states respond to the same problem in the same manner because of their similar organizational features. This is obviously not the case, as different. states (both 'strong' and 'weak') often have different policies dealing with the same problem. To explain the differences, we need to take into account factors other than the features of the state (Przeworski, 1990). To be fair, however, few subscribe to statism in the 'strong' form described above. Instead of replacing the pluralist notion of the societal direction of the state with the statist notion of the state's direction of society, most inductively oriented institutionalist theorists merely want to point out the need to take both sets of factors into consideration in their analyses of political phenomena (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989; McLennan, 1989). As Skocpol herself has conceded: In this perspective, the state certainly does not become everything. Other organizations and agents also pattern social relationships and politics, and the analyst must explore the state's structure in reiation to them. But this Weberian view of the state does -require us to see it as much more than a mere arena in which social groups make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises. (Skocpol, 1985: 7-8) This milder version of statism thus concentrates on the links between the state and society in the context of the former's pre-eminence in pluralist group theory. To that extent, ~tatism complements rather. than replaces society-centredness and restores some bal-anceto soeial-and politiealtheorizing,·whieh, it can be argued; had lost its equilibrium (Orren and Skowronek, 1993; Almond, 1988; Cortell and Peterson, 2001). The first observation to emerge from this brief discussion of the manner in which broad approaches to the study of social phenomena have been applied to public policy-making is that there are many different, often contradictory, ways to approaching the subject of public policy. An extensive literature exists both promoting and denouncing the origins, assumptions, and application of each approach to the subject. Nevertheless, a few general conclusions can be gleaned from this literature. First, there is an overwhelming tendency in the deductive literature to apply preconceived theoretical insights to actual instances of public pol"icy-mmng.·'ThisUl''Ilot-neeessanly 'a' problem, as using this method ',.·allows'·>l.>bsE$\lat-ion..of.",.w¥ergencebetween actual and expected behaviour, which hopefully would lead to refinement of the initial assumptions. However, many deductive-oriented researchers often seem to forget the contingent nature of their hypotheses and the need to constantly test and refine their assumptions against empirical evidence. Consequently, instead of using the study of public policy to test the hypotheses and assess the explanatory capacity of their theories, analysts often simply read public policy~makingin terms of the theoretical framework, models, or metaphors they are using (Dobuzinskis, 1992). Application of inductive theories to the study of public policy-making has also revealed that the claim of any of these approaches to the status of a complete 'general theory' is suspect. There has been a distinct evolution of thinking away' from welfare ~cOP()~lics, pluralism, and corporatism towards neo-institutional analysis, which promotes more open-ended and empirically informed inquiry. Second, many approaches, both deductive and inductive, tend to explain the phenomena under consideration in incompatible monocausal terms. This temptation must be resisted if we are to understand public policy. Analysts working in different theoretical frameworks study the same case differently and, not surprisingly, arrive at different conclusions. While bringing different points of view to bear on a question furthers our understanding of a phenomenon, the exercise also involves the danger of turning into a verbal dialogue among the deaf, serving no useful purpose. On the other hand, while some of the problems associated with the general theories discussed above can be overcome by layering multiple units of analysisS and combining inductive and deductive methodologies, there are limits to the kinds of syntheses that can be developed at a general level of analysis. Third, the most widely used approaches in disciplines such as economics and political science, whether- they are inductive er·deductive in nature, tend to view human activity as part of the struggle to survive in a world in which wants are limitless and the resources available to satisfy them are limited. This view extends to all political phenomena, including public·policy-making.ln recent times, the policy sciences have begun to abandon this notion of all-pervasive conflict and have suggested that the lessons actors learn from their own and others' experiences are also significant determinants of their behaviour, including policy-making. That is, the objectives actors seek depend on what they believe to be desirable and achievable, which in turn depends on their previous achievements and disappointments., Discussion, arguments, and persuasion among actors are viewed as an integral part of the policy process conceived of as a process of learning by trial, error, and example.6 The present book is strongly influenced by these emerging trends towards broadening the analytical framework of policy studies to include both conflict and learning and towards a greater emphasis on incorporating the results of empirical analyses of many policy domains into the process of theory-building in policy science. What this overview reveals, then, is that the policy sciences cannot be furthered simply by applying existing general theoretical approaches, 48 PART I Introduction whether deductive ~r inductive. What is needed in policy analysis, as was suggested in Chapter 1, is an analytical fr~ework. that 'permits consideration of the entire range of factors affectmg public pohcy, and allows hypotheses to be tested through the empirical analysis of the reality analysts are attempting to describe and understand. Rather than seek a synthesis of general social, political, and economic theories that can explain policy-making, theoretical efforts in the policy sciences should remain firmly rooted in the middle or meso level. That is, policy theory cannot and should not· claim to be more than a part of the development of general theories of social and political phenomena whose contours remain to be discerned at some point in the future. However, careful empirical studies and careful generalization can provide a useful middle-range theory and understanding of public policy-making. This theory may be inelegant, but as the discussion of the six general theories presented above reveals, precision and adequacy should be more important meta-theoretical objectives in policy analysis than parsimony and aesthetics. To begin this process of middle-range theory construction, the nature of policy actors, institutions, and instruments will be considered in more detail in Part II. FURTHER READINGS Hale, M.Q. 1960. 'The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley', American Political Sdence Review 54, 4: 955-61. Kiser, Larry, and Elinor Ostrom. 1982. 'The Three Worlds of Action', in Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry. B.~verly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 179-222. .. Le Grand, Julian. 1991. 'The Theory of Government Failure', British Journal of Political Science 21, 4: 423-42. McLennan, Gregor. 1989. Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: Classic Debates and New Departures. Cambridge: Polity Press. March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', American Political Sdence Review 78: 734-49. Nordlinger; Eric A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press . . Pigou, A.C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan. Schmitter, Phillipe C. 1977. 'Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe', (;omparatiye Politic;aLStu4if!s 10, 1: 7-38. Skocpol, Theda. 1985. 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research' , in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press, 3-43. Stokey, Edith, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1978. A Primer for Policy Analysis. New York: W.w. Norton. Approaches to Public Policy 49 'Ii"uman, David R. 1964. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf. _ Van Winden,Frans A.A.M. 1988. 'The Economic Theory of Political DecisionMaking', in Julien van den Broeck, ed., Public Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 9-57. Winkler, J.T. 1976. 'Corporatism', European Journal of Sociology 17, 1: 100-36. 1. Ossowski (1963) has argued that over the course of history there have been four different types of class analysis used to explain political phenomena: dichotomous class systems; gradation schemes; functional conceptions; and the 'Marxian' synthesis of those other models. 2. Keohane (1989: 163) described them as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations'. 3. However, the use of a pluralist analysis in the examination of socialist oneparty states proved much more beneficial than earlier analysis based on notions of 'totalitarianism'. For example, see Hough (1972); Skilling (1966). 4. The term 'neo-corporatism' is often used simply to distance contemporary corporatist theory from the authoritarian practices of fascist governments throughout Europe and Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s, which claimed to be corporatist. Neo-corporatism is thought to be a term less likely to conjure up images of militarism, nationalism, or totalitarianism associated with fascism, but is otherwise identical to 'corporatism'. We will, however, use the terms 'corporatism' and 'neo-corporatism' interchangeably. See Malloy (1993); Schmitter (1982); von Beyme (1983). 5. See the efforts to accomplish this in the synthesis of deductive and inductive neo-institutionalisms in Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) and Hollingsworth (2000). On the limits of these efforts, see Hay and Wincott (1998) . 6. While the learning theories represent a major departure for policy analysis from political, economic, or sociological theorization, oilly recently have they started taking the insights of actor- and institution-centred theories into account. See, for example, Stewart (1992) and Livingston (1992). ___ ••• ••• _ ••••• ;;;;; __ s;;;iiiiil ••••• ~!!IJI!!l!!~!!\!I!IIII!I!!l!Il!!'!!!!I!Il!l!ll!li-·~~··""~.., .•~""'---~.--""""'~ -,... ::s ::s C. (I) ~ --c ::s -::s,..... ,...c,... (I) ~ 0 3 ~ (I) tI> :J> (I) 0 ::s n ,..... ,..... ~ (I) ~ ~ P-l I-j .-+ I-< I-< Policy Actors and Institutions Policy Actors and Institutions As the discussion in Chapter 2 has shown, there is a vibrant, though ultimately inconclusive, (iebate in the literature on the role of individuals, groups, and institutions in:the public policy process. The dispute hinges on the causal significance of the actors' interests and capabilities compared to the institutional context or structures in which they operate. Some analysts regard individual and collective actors as the only relevant categories of analysis, while others maintain that what actors seek and do depends on the political, economic, and social structures that surround them. Most of the approaches to public policy discussed in the preceding chapter treat individual and group actors as the key explanatory variables. Thus' the' welfare~economicsand--public' choice theories regard individuals as the agents who shape policy, whereas the theories built on group and class theory, such as pluralism and Marxism, attribute primacy to organized groups. While some of the more nuanced of these analyses do consider the institutional context within which these actors operate, their conceptual and methodological predisposition prevents them from dealing adequately with the institutional factors affecting public policy. , . Built on critiques of these early theories, the most recent outgrowths of the evolution of policy-relevant social theorization, such as statism and transaction cost analysis, attempt to take into account both actororiented and structural variables. A.).thoughtheir methodologies differ, both approaches treat state organizations as central institutional actors affecting the preferences and activities of other policy actors. Both attempt to explain public policy processes and outcomes in terms of the interacting effects of state objectives and capabilities and those of social actors. Hence, much recent theorizing reflects the understanding that both actors and institutions play a crucial role in the policy process, even though one may be more important than the other in specific instances 53 (Lundquist, 1987). Individuals, groups, and classes participating in the policy process no doubt have their own interests, but how they interpret and pursue their interests' and the outcomes of their efforts are shaped by . institutional factors. Even more significantly, some institutional arrangements are believed to be more conducive to effective policy-making and implementation than others (Stoker, 1989; May, 1993; Siedschlag, 2000). In this book we follow the statist tendency to define institutions narrowly as actual structures or organizations of the state, society, and the international system. Following this approach, we are less concerned, as opposed to transactions cost analysts and others, with the origins of these institutions,which are taken as empirically given. Rather we are concerned with the way institutions are organized internally and in relation to each other (March and Olsen, 1998). In addition to their formal organizational characteristics-membership, rules, and operating procedures-we do, however, recognize the insights of actor-centred institutionalists. who emphasize not just the structural components of organizations but also the principles, norms, and ideas they embody. These principles, in the form of formal or informal rules and conventions, as well as ethical, ideological, and epistemic concerns, help to' shape actors'behaviour by conditioning their perception of their interests and the probability of these interests being realized (March et al., 2000; Timmermans and Bleiklie, 1999). While not monolithic, omnipresent, or immutable, institutions cannot be avoided, modified, or replaced without considerable effort.1 INTEGRATING ACTORS AND INSflTUTIONS: tHE POllCY UNIVERSE AND THE POliCY SUBSYSTEM Since actors and institutions exist in a mutually defining relationship, it is useful to have a term that can encompass both elements of this fundame.ntal policy relationship. For this purpose, students of the policy sciences have developed the concept of aJ!!Jlicyun~J7e~~ thought of as a, fundamental unit containing all possible international, state, and social actors and institutions directly or indirectly affecting a specific policy area. Fr£m these poten~ members, a subset is drawn that comprises a \ sectoral(g()liGYsub~§.t.s~~.':~ (Freeman, 1955; Cater, 1964; Freeman and Stevens, 1987). The policy subsystem is a space where relevant actors discuss policy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests. During the course of their interaction with the other actors, they often give up or modify their objectives in return for concessions from others. These interactions, however, occur in the context of various institutional arrangements surrounding the policy process, which affect how the actors pursue their interests and ideas and the extent to which their efforts succ'eed (Knoke, 1993; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Sabatier and J enkins-Smith, 1993I)T~-----------------------' 'A policy subsystem includes both actors who are intimately invoived· in a policy process as well as others who are only marginally so. In Chapter 6 we will discuss additional terminology developed to describe the actors who participate more often and more directly in the policy process as belonging to interest networks and those involved to a lesser degree as , belonging to discourse communities.2 Ultimately, we will show how the nature of the relationship between these two components of a subsystem is a significant determinant of the nature of policy content and helps to explain much about fundamental policy dynamics (Peters, 1992a). Figure 3.1 diagrams the basic relationship between actors and institutions that typically exists in a policy subsystem. Almost an infinite variety of actors and institutions in the policy universe may actually or potentially constitute a policy subsystem. Composition varies by country, policy sector, or 'domain', and over time (Jordan and Maloney, 1997). The exact composition of a policy subsystem and the relative significance of its constituents is an empirical question that cannot be delineated a priori. All that we can say with certainty is that the policy institutions and actors come from within the machinery of the state and from the society at large. The following discussion is intended to convey a sense of the typical sources of key subsystem actors and institutions, which are drawn from the international system as well as from domestic state and social systems. A large body of literature argues that states are increasingly constrained and shaped by global forces (Ohmae, 1995; Falk, 1997). However, for the most part, the public policy literature has tended to focus on domestic state activities and to treat the international realm as an external condition to which domestic policy actors respond rather than as an integral part of the policy process. To the extent that scholars consider international institutions and actors, they usually focus on 'global' or 'transnational' policies, such as trade, environment, and telecommunications (Gummett, 1996; Reinicke, 1998). Moreover, the ,international realm is often understood in monolithic terms, such that the impact of the international is considered to be constant and not variable across sectors and time. The reality, however, is that the international realm is a differentiated entity in which different international actors have different impacts on domestic policy-making and policy outputs (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002). Recognition of the international system's influences on public policy is one of the more exciting recent developments in the discipline. The international system not only influences policy sectors that are obviously international-trade and defence, for example-but also sectors with no immediately apparent international connection, such as health care and old age pensions. The sources of influence lie in the overall structure of the international system, and a nation's place in it, and the specific 'regimes' that exist in many policy areas, about which we will say more shortly. While the international system has probably always affected public policy to some extent, its scope and intensity have increased greatly in recent times. This is the result of what is described as \globalization or, '. more precisely, \internationalization:' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). \ Although initially conceiVed in someWhat simplistic terms, the recent policy literature recognizes the highly complex character of internationalization, the different forms it takes across space and time, and the varying effects it has on different policy sectors and states (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000; Bennett, 1997; Brenner, 1999; Weiss, 1999). This recognition has led researchers to investigate more carefully the means, manner, and mechanisms through which domestic policy processes are linked to the international system (Coleman and Perl, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Such studies are still at an early stage and the challenge before scholars is to incorporate changes induced by. internationalization into existing conceptions of domestic policy processes and its outcomes (Hollingsworth, 1998). The Policy Effects of International Institutions Assessing the effects of international institutions is a lot more difficult than assessing those in the domestic arena. For one thing, states are sovereign entities with, in theory, the legal authority to close their borders to any and all foreign influences as and when they choose. In Policy Actorsand 56 PART II Institutions, Institutions 57 Actors, and Instruments reality, however, it is nearly impossible for states to stop foreign influences at the border because of constraints rooted in the international system (Held and McGrew, 1993; Walsh, 1994). The extent to which a state is able to assert its sovereignty depends on the severity of iriternational pressures and the nature of the issue in question, as well as features innate to the state itself (Knill and Lehinkuhl, 2002). To understand the disparate international factors affecting states' behaviour, scholars have developed the concept of 'international regimes' to describe institutionalized arrangements in a given policy area (Krasner, 1982; Haggard and Simmons, 1987). Regimes have been defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989: 19) as 'sets of governing arrangements' or 'networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects'. Regimes vary considerably in form, scope of coverage, level of adherence, and the instruments through which they are put into practice (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). Some regimes are based on explicit treaties whereas others are based simply on conventions that develop as a l,"esultof repeated international behaviour. Some cover a variety of related issues while others are' quite 'narrow in coverage. Some are closely adhered to and others often are flouted. Some are enforced through formal or informal penalties whereas others make no such provision. Some regimes are administered by formal organizations with large budgets and staffs, while some are more akin to moral codes (see Rittberger and Mayer, 1993). Regimes affect public policy by promoting certain options and constraining.others. Mor~ than that, they shape actors' preferences and the ease with which they Can be re'altzelf(Doern efci.l.,'1996b):Thus a government willing to assist domestic producers by offering' export· subsi- .. dies, for example, .may not be able to do so because of formal or informal international constraints. Regimes of varying scope and depth can be found in most, though not all, prominent policy areas. Mapping all the effects of all international regimes is clearly beyond the scope of this book. Here we will orily outline the regimes prominent in the areas of trade, finance, and production to illustrate' how they affect public policy. The International 1tade, Finance, and production Regimes The edifice on which the contemporary international trade regime is based is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1947 and succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Its membership includes alIIlost all states in the world and the vast majority of world exports are governed by its provisions. The WTO requires members to work towards lowering trade barriers \>y according 'national treatment' to unports3 and not subsidizing exports. These requirements are intended to assist internationally competitive producers,··at the expense oLproducerswho are n()tC:Olnp~titive. The agreement restricts governments' ability to support domestic industries, either through protection against imports or subsidy for exports, although tenacious governments do find ways of getting around the restrictions. The difficulties involved in protecting against imports create opportunities and wealth for successful exporters, and by implication the whole economy, but at the same time impose costs on uncompetitive industries and firms. These costs, again, are often borne by the whole society in the form of higher unemployment and greater public expenditure on social welfare (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995). The international monetary regime has even a greater impact on public policy, especially after the adoption of a flexible exchange rate system in 1976. The fact that exchange rates of currencies are determined by financial markets according to the demand and supply of a country's currency~instead ()f being fixed by international agreement, as was the case under the earlier, foundational, Bretton Woods agreement of 1944exposes governments to international financial pressures. Since the financial markets depend on dealers' interPretation of a country's present economic conditions and their expectations for the future, this system often results in unpredictable fluctuations in the value of national currencies. Governments are therefore under constant pressure not to do anything that may, rightly or wrongly, displease the foreign exchange market. , Even more important than the flexible exchange rate system are the effects of financial deregulation and technological 'improvements that enable the transfer of money around the globe at high speed. By the late 1990s,foreign exchange !Fading around· the -world ,amounted to more than $2,trillion per day. With such huge volumes at stake, international money markets have the ability to cause havoc for a country whose policies are viewed unfavourably by international capital. States must now be extremely careful .about the' effects of their policies, as these affect exchange rates, which in turn affect interest rates and export competitiveness, the repercussions of which are felt by the entire economy. A government's decision to .increase expenditure on social welfare, for instance, may be viewed unfavourably by mOriey traders, who may sell off the currency, thereby depreciating it, whichrp.ay in turn necessitate an increase in interest rates by the government, the result of which will be a slow-down in the economy and higher unemployment. The net result of all these actions and reactions would be negation of the original decision to increase spending. The expected adverse market reaction to budget deficits also limits the scope for using this vital fiscal policy instrument to boost economic activity and lower unemployment (Huber and Stephens, 1998). Similarly, the liberalization of rules restricting foreign investment, particularly since the 1980s, has led to a massive expansion of foreign direct investment and proliferation of transnational cOrPorations (TNCS), which in turn have affected states' policy options. In 1999, there were 63,000 TNCsthat owned 690,000 foreign affiliates with US$17.7 trillion in assets and annual sales exceeding US$13.6 trillion (UNCTAD, 2001). The TNCS not only control large pools of capital, but they are also major players in international trade and control much of the world's leadIng technology and management skills. Since their primary interest is profits, the TNCs have a motive to.locate production where they see the greatest opportunity for maximizing profits. Given their size and strength, TNCsare major players in the world economy and, by implication, in politics and public policy. They can cause serious damage to a country's economy by withholding investment or deciding to take their investment elsewhere, possibilities that policymakers can ignore only at great economic peril. There is also now a competition among countries to attract TNCSby offering conditions the latter would find appealing. This often takes the form of a state commitment to control labour costs, maintain tax levels comparable to those in other similar nations, and set rninimal restrictions on international trade and investment. All these pressures represent severe restrictions on states' policy options, not just in economic matters but in non-econqmic matters as well. The Effects of Internationalization That being said, international regimes do not affect all nations equally. The more powerful nations enjoy greater policy autonomy within the international system than their less powerful counterparts. This is not only because the powerful states have thecapactty to force other nations to change their behaviour but also because others often voluntarily alter their behaviour to match the expectations of the dominant powers (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002). Thus, for example, atthe present time any international trade or investment agreement opposed by a predominant trade and investment nation such as the United States is unlikely to be reached, and if it is achieved it is unlikely to be of much significance. The Chinese government is similarly able, for example; to negotiate terms with TNCsdesiring access to its gigantic domestic market that are unlikely to be available to most other nations. The internationalization of the world economy has accelerated the speed with which the effects of events elsewhere (natural calamities, wars, terrorist actions, financial crises, stock market gyrations, etc.) spread via the telecommunications media (Rosenau, 1969). This has expanded the scope for policy spillovers as previously isolated sectors '-eunYerge;' lWerlap,'and"ebUide;'Wrrat-were"Rl'fu-e'Past'seenas .discrete ,~tOfS":'7.sw:;h..as,.telecommW1il;atiD.ns",aD.d ,.,(l(;UDp,uters,."or agriculture and trade-are now increasingly viewed as elements of a single sector. Any international effort to reduce agricultural subsidies, for instance, has an effect on rural development, social welfare, and environment policies and, ultimately, overall government fiscal policy. Another example is the fear of capital flight, which haunts policy-makers when they are faced with major decisions involving large public expenditures that require tax increases or budget deficits. Traditional social poliey areas such as social security and health care have thus become apart of economic policymaking as a result (Unger and van Waarden, 1995; Coleman and Grant, 1998). Internationalization also creates new opportunities for learning from the policy experiences of others. This is the theme of much recent work on policy transfers, which especially highlights the role of transnational epistemic communities and no~-governmental organizations in promoting learning activities (Haas, 1992; Evans and Davies, 1999). The lessons of privatization of telecommunications in Britain and the deregulation of airlines in the United States in the 1980s rapidly spread around the world and across policy sectors because of the active role played by the associated policy communities (Ikenberry, 1990). Moreover, internationalization promotes new patterns of policy-making (Rittberger and Mayer, 1993). When a domestic policy actor loses out in a domestic setting~ it now may seek to have the policy transferred to the arena of international organizations if it expects its position to receive a more favourable reception in that venue. Powerful new international organizations and regimes such as the European Union (EU), the WTO, and the North American Free TI:ade Agreement (NAFfA)have opened up new action channels for domestic policy actors pursuing their interests (Howlett and Ramesh, 2002; Richardson, 1999; Cortell and Davis, 1996; Demaret, 1997). The role of the international actors in public policy-making is both interesting and sensitive, as only national governments and their citizens are usually expected to participate in most domestic policy processes. As the above discussion suggests, however, international actors play an increasingly significant role in many areas of domestic political life. These actors' may be individuals working as advisers or consultants to national governments or members of international organizations with the authority under international agreements to regulate their members' behaviour. Internati,onal actors vary considerably in their ability to influence domestic policies, and this, to a significant extent, is the result of differences in their resource endowments. One of the strongest resources determining their influence is whether an international regime facilitates their involvement. Such actors are likely to find it easier to intervene in policy sectors in which an international regime sanctioning their intervention already exists (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6; Coleman and Perl, 1999). The central place occupied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the international monetary regime, for example, enables its officers to 60 PART II Institutions, Policy Actors and Institutions Actors, and Instruments interfere in the intimate details of public policy-making in many nations facing serious financial or fiscal problems. An even more significant resource is the possession of theoretical and practical expertise in a policy sector (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Many international organizations-for example, the UN, World Ban.k, IMF,DEeD, World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Organization (ILO)~are repositories of immense expertise in policy issues, and governments often rely on this expertise when making policies, thus giving such international actors significant influence in the policy process. The financial resources that international organizations can dispense to governments are another source of influence. The differences with respect to levels of expertise and finance are thus often crucial determinants of the different impact that different international actors have on domestic polities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). However, the nature of the policy subsystem that exists at the national level also affects the international actors' role in the policy process. International actors can be expected to be influential in sectors with fragmented subsystems because such fragmentation alloW's them greater opportunity for intervention. Conversely, international actors find it difficult to influence policies where the associated subsystem is coherent and united in opposition to external intervention (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 25; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b). The most conducive situation for international actors is, of course, when the subsystem is coherent and in favour of external involvement-in such instances the international actors can be expected to be an integral part of the domestic policy process (Pappi atidHefimIig; 1999); .-.,-,- .. , 1\vo dimensions of the organization of domestic states have a profound effect on the ability of states to make and implement policies: autonomy and capacity. Autonomy refers to the extent of the state's independence from self-serving and conflicting social pressures. Observers of politics have long argued that the self-serving motives and actions of groups often benefit their members at the expense of the rest of the society (Olson, 1965, 1982). Consequently, policy-making institutions solely responsive to societal demands, as public choice theorists argue is supposed to be the case with democratic governments, can generate policies that benefit some groups but worsen the welfare of the society as a whole. The problem can be overcome, however, if the government is insulated from the need to respond to the societal pressures. While this may compromise some of the basic tenets of democracy, the trade-off is that it is often conducive to more effective collective welfare-enhancing policy-making (Haggard andMoon, 1990: 212). Thus it has been argued that corporatist regimes in Europe and some semi-authoritarian regimes r 61 in East Asia, for example, possess the political institutions necessary to resist group demands, and as a result have produced sound policies that, apparently paradoxically, can promote economic prosperity as well as equity (Olson, 1986; Weiss and Hobson, 1995). But, in addition to autonomy, the state must also have the capacity to make and implement effective policies. The capacity of the state, which is a function of its organizational coherence and expertise, is also a significant determinant of its success in performing policy functions. Unity within and among various levels, branches, and agencies of the government and high levels of bureaucratic expertise are regarded as crucial to enhance state capacity. An executive bogged down in constant bargaining xvith the legislature or government departments in constant conflict among themselves cannot be expected to perform policy functions ade.quately. Similarly, the society will not be well served by a bureaucracy .without the expertise necessary to tackle the complex problems it is required to address. States with political institutions that promote autonomy and capacity are sometimes described as strong states; those without such institutions are weak states (see Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a; Katzenstein, 1977; Nordlinger, 1987). Japan is often cited as a classic example of a strong state in the industrialized world, whereas the United States is described as a weak state; other industrialized countries fall somewhere in between (Katzenstein, 1977). States such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan in East Asia are often regarded as some of the strongest in the world. The executive-bureaucratic apparatus is the core of strong states; weak: states have legislatures at their core and interest'groups dominate policy-maJdrtg.The rea.son why some states are strong and others are weak is usually argued to be primarily historical and related to the conditions present at their origins (Dyson, 1980). Although describing states as strong or weak is intuitively appealing, it is not without its problems in terms of public policy analysis. First, there is no reason to believe that strong states will necessarily make policies that serve the interests of the society as a whole, rather than those of self-serving groups (Haggard and Moon, 1990: 215). It is just as possible that such states will make ill-conceived or predatory policies that will benefit state elites ansi lower the society's general welfare. Indeed, in such a situation, a strong state will be worse than a weak state, as far as the society-is concerned, because of its higher capacity to cause damage. Military and police governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America or many former Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are cases in point (see Migdal, 1988). Second, the overall characterization of states as strong or weak is too general to be of much analytical use in sectoral public policy analysis (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a). No state is strong in all sectors, nor is any state weak in every sector. Thus, even the socalled strong states have shown remarkable weakness in some areas- note the Japanese government's continued inability to 'rationalize' its agricultural policy-and the supposedly weak states may show remarkable strength in some areas, such as the US government's strong military capacity despite the fragmentation of the overall American state apparatus (Weaver and Rockman, 1993b). Rather than characterizing states as strong or weak, we must devote efforts to examining empirically the capacity and autonomy of governmental institutions in specific sectoral and subsectoral· policy processes. In this regard, whether a state has a federal or unitary form of government and whether its representative institutions are characterized by fusion or division of legislative and executive powers are two important factors affecting the sectoral role of the·state. All governments operate at multiple levels, spatially. In unitary systems, the existence oLa clear chain of command or hierarchy linking the different levels of government together in asup~rordinate/subordinate relationship reduces the complexity of multi-level governance and policy-making. Thus, in France or China, for example, the national government retains, in principle, all decision-making powers. It can choose to delegate these powers to lower levels of government or dictate to them, \is the case may be, but the role of the central, national government is essentially unchallenged at the top of the country's governmental hierarchy. The salient feature of federal political systems with respect to public policy is the existence of at least two autonomous levels or orders of government within a country. The two levels of govemment found in countries like AustraliaiCanada;lndia,· Brazil, Nigeria, and the US,.to name only a few (Burgess and Ga"8f\on;1993; Duchacek; 1970), are not bound together in a superordinate/subordinate relationship but, rather, enjoy more or less complete discretion in matters under their jurisdiction and guaranteed by the constitution. This is distinct from the unitary systems found in countries such as China, Britain, Japan, and New Zealand, where there is only one level of government and the local bodies (for example, regional, county, or municipalities) owe their existence to the national government rather than to the constitution. Federalism has been cited as a major reason for the weak policy capacity of governments in many policy sectors in Australia, Canada, and the United States. It has constrained these states' capacity to develop consistent and coherent sectoral policies. In these countries, national policies in most areas require intergovernmental agreement, which involves the federal and provincial or state governments in complex, ''eXtel'fsive,·'Bl1d·'tim~JconS'Urtiing''lIegOtia:ti.ons with no guarantee that these ''1l'l!gOtiations'·will'l3onalude.•in.the',.manner envisioned by the initiating government (Banting, 1982; Schultz and Alexandroff, 1985; Atkinson and Coleman, 1989b). Similarly, both levels of government are subject to unpredictable judicial review of their measures, which further restricts the ability of governments to realize their objectives. The existence of a federal system thus significantly affects the capacity of state officials to deal with pressing issues in a timely and consistent fashion because public policies are made and implemented by the national/central as well as state/provincial governments. It makes public policy-making a long, drawn-out, and often rancorous affair as the different governments wrangle over jurisdictiondl issues or are involved in extensive intergovernmental negotiations or constitutiondllitigation. Different governments within the same country may make contradictory decisions that may weaken or nullify the effects of a policy (see Grande, 1996; McRoberts, 1993). Another domestic'\'lnstitutional variable affecting public policy concernsthe links between the executive, legislature, and judiciary provided under a country's constitution. In parliamentary systems, the executive is chosen by the legislature from among its members and remains in office only as long as it enjoys majority support from legislators. In presidential systems, the executive is separate from the legislature, is usually elected directly by the voters, and need not enjoy majority support in the legislature (Stewart, 1974). The United States is the archetype of the presidential system, whereas most of the rest of the world has some version of a parliamentary system; other countries, such as France, have a hybrid of the two systems. The separation between the executive and legislative branches of the government in presidential systems, and the fusion of ~e two in parliamentary ones, has..-importantconsequencesfor the policy,process;4The division of powers promotes difficulties for policy-makers in presidential systems. The individual members and committees of the legislature play an active role in designing policies, including those proposed by the President. It matters only marginally if the party of the President's affiliation forms the majority in both houses of the legislature because of the local concerns thatof;ten motivate legislators. To ensure majority support for policy measures requiring legislative approval, it is common for the President to bargain with the members of the legislature, offering administrative and budgetary concessions in return for support, and thereby often changing the original iptent of a policy proposal. The active involvement of the members of the legislature in prafting bills promotes multiple points of conflict with the executive; it also opens up greater opportunities for interest groups and voters to influence the policy process, the result of which may be diluted or even conflicting policies. In parliamentary systems, in contrast, the executive can more often than not take legislative support for its measures for granted, thanks to the strict party discipline enforced on individual members of the parliament. While there may be some bargaining over a policy within a party caucus, there is little chance of changing a bill once it has been introduced in parliament. The only time when this may not be the case is when the governing party does not have an outright majority in the legislature and governs in coalition with other parties, who often demand modification to the policy in return for their support. In many countries, especially those with proportional systems of representation that allow for a proliferation of minor parties, coalition governments are routine, which complicates policy-making, though not as much as in the presidential system (Warwick, 2000). Generally speaking, however, policymaking in parliamentary systems is centralized in the executive, which usually enables the government to take decisive action if it so chooses. This is not entirely undesirable, insofar as a state's policy capability is concerned, because the adversarial politics characteristic of legislatures in presidential systems reduces the likelihood of generating coherent policies. The structure and role of the judiciary also affect the policy process. In federal systems, there is typically an autonomous judiciary entrusted with the task of adjudicating jurisdictional disputes arising from vague constitutional language setting out the respective areas of responsibility for each order of government. The same is true for countries with entrenched bills of civil or human rights, which typically give the courts the power to strike down laws inconsistent with the individual or collective rights guaranteed under the constitution. In these countries, the judiciary acts as another potential veto point that constrains what the executive can do in policy matters (Russell, 1982). In countries without federalism or bills of rights,' such as Great Britain, the courts playa more· limited role, which permits policy-makers -greater room for manoeuvre and latitude in their actions. However, the role of the judiciary in the policy process varies according to the nature of the country's political institutions. British practices of judicial review, for example, developed out of efforts on the part of central officials under the monarchy to control local officials. Many of these efforts were originally resisted by the local populace, bdth conuiloners and nobles, as unwarranted interference in local affairs. When Parliament replaced the monarchy as the source Of central political power, however, the same principles of central judicial review of local actions, which had been a symbol of despotism, became a symbol of democratic government. This differs substantially from judicial practices in the US, for example, where, following the American Revolution, the natural-law principles of sovereignty that had informed British legal thought were replaced by principles of natural rights and constitutional supremacy. One manifestation of this was the refusal of the American judiciary to subordinate itself to either Congress or the executive, and to insist on its own role in determining the legality of laws and regulations of all kinds. This has resulted in much more active judges in the US than in Britain, and ones who are much less likely to defer to legislative or executive desires (de Smith, 1973; Jaffe, 1965; Wade, 1965, 1966). Generally speaking, such judicial autonomy and assertiveness complicate policy-making and erode a state's policy capacity. . Elected Officials The elected officials participating in the policy process may be divided into two categories-members of the executive and legislators. The executive, also referred to as me cabinet in many countries, is one of the key players in any policy subsystem. Its central role derives from its constitutional authority to govern the country. While other actors also are involved in the process, the authority to make and implement policies ..rests ultimately with· the executive. There are indeed few checks on the executive in parliamentary systems (such as Japan, Canada, Australia, and Britain) as long as the government enjoys majority support in the legislature. It is somewhat different in republican or presidential systems (as in the United States or Brazil), where the executive often has a difficult task convincing the legislature to approve its measures. But even here, the executive usually has a wide area of discretion beyond legislative control in financial and regulatory matters, as well as in defence, national security, and issues related to international treaty obligations of different kinds. In addition to its prerogative in policy matters, the executive possesses a range of other resources that· strengthen its position. Control over infor: mation is one such critical resource: The executive has unmatched information that it withholds, releases, and manipulates in a manner to bolster its preferences and weaken the cases of those opposed to it. Control over fiscal resources is another asset favouring the executive because legislative approval of ,the budget usually permits wide areas of discre" tion for the government. The executive also has unparalleled access to mass media in publicizing its positions-the 'bully pulpit' as it is termed in the US-and undermining those of its opponents. Moreover, the executive has the bureaucracy at its disposal to provide advice and to carry out its preferences. It fan, and often does, use these resources to control and influence societal actors such as interest groups, mass media, and think-tanks. In many countries, as well, the government has important powers allowing it to control the timing of the introduction and passage of laws in the legislature. This confers· a great deal of control over the political agenda on the executive (Bakvis and MacDonald, 1993). Counteracting the executive's immense constitutional, informational, financial, and personnel resources are conditions that make their task difficult. The tremendous growth in the size, scope, and complexity of government functions over the years, for example, prevents generalist 66 PART II Institutions, Policy Actors and Institutions Actors, and Instruments politicians from controlling, or often even being aware of, the many specific activities of government nominally under their control (Adie and Thomas, 1987; Kernaghan, 1979, 1985a). Moreover, in democratic governments ministers are constantly bombarded with societal demands, many of which are mutually contradictory but which they often cannot ignore because of the need to maintain voters' support (Canes-Wrone et aI., 2001). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a government may not have the organizational capacity to make coherent policies and implement them effectively. Members of the legislature playa very different role in government. In parliamentary systems the task of the legislature is to hold governments accountable to the public rather than to make or implement policies. But the performance of this function permits opportunities for influencing policies. Legislatures are crucial forums where social problems are highlighted and policies to address them are demanded. Legislators also get to have their say during the process of approving government bills and governmental budgets to fund their implementation. In return for their consent, they are sometimes able to demand changes to the policies in question. Legislators may also raise and discuss problems of implementation and request changes. However, a legislature's policy potential often may not be realized in practice. This is because of the dominance enjoyed by the executive and its effects on the internal organization of the legislature and on the role played by legislative committees (Olson and Mezey, 1991). Most laws are proposed by the executive and more often than not sub.sequently ·adopted by the legislatur-e.This is-especi.ulyso in parliamentary systems where the majority party forms the· government and therefore is generally expected to support the passage of bills proposed by the executive. In presidential systems, on the other hand, the legislature is autonomous of the government constitutionally as well as in practice, which explains why presidents, irrespective of whether their party holds a legislative majority, must strike bargains with the legislature or risk defeat of their policy proposals. The internal organization of the legislature is also a significant determinant of its role in the policy process. Legislatures where the membership is tightly organized along party lines, and marked by a high degree of cohesion and discipline, permit little opportunity for legislators to take an independent stand. This is particularly true in parliamentary systems where the legislators belonging to the governing party are always expected to support the government. Similarly, the role of individual leg""i'si8:Hn~i5'1ower'inpai'lia:merits1n'which one party has a clear majority; ' •. tfle,<existenee"oE. several minor parties in coalition governments permits greater opportunity for legislators to express their opinion and force the government to compromise. 67 In many contemporary legislatures, most important policy functions are performed not on the floor of the legislature but in the committees established along functional or sectoral lines to review proposed legislation. Committees often build considerable expertise in the area with which they deal, and the extent to which this happens enables the legislature to exercise influence over making and implementing policies. But to build expertise, the members need to serve on the committees over a relatively long period of time. Committee members must also not necessarily vote along party lines if their autonomy and assertiveness are to be maintained. The _nature of the problem being considered also affects legislative involvement in the policy. process. Technical issues are unlikely to involve legislators because they may not fully understand the problems or solutions, or they may see little political benefit in pursuing the matter. National security and foreign policy-making is also usually con.'ducted in a shroud of secrecy and outside the legislature. Similarly, policies dealing with a problem perceived to be a crisis are unlikely to involve the legislature very much because of the time it takes to introduce, debate; and pass a bill. Policies deal~ng with allocation OF redistribution of resources or income among components of the public generate the highest degree of passion and debate in legislatures, but usually do not have much effect on a government's overall policy orientation. However, other policies related to propagation and maintenance of certain symbolic values-such as the choice of a national flag, immigration, multiculturalism, praYers in schools, or the elimination of racism and sexism-are often so divisive that the executive may be ..somewhat more willing to-t-ake -the legislater-s'·views into account· in forming legislation. As a result of these limitatiops, legislatures generally play only a small role in the policy process in parliamentary systems. While individual legislators, on the basis of their expertise or special interest. in a particular issue, can be included in a policy subsystem, legislatures as a whole are not very significant actors in the making or implementing of public policies. In congressional or republican systems, on the other hand, where the legislativ.e agenda is less tightly controlled by the executive, individual legislators can and do play a much more significant role in policy processes and legislatjve committees are significant members of many policy subsystems. Appointed Officials The appointed officials dealing with public policy and administration are often collectively referred to as the 'bureaucracy'. Their function is to assist the executive in the performance of its tasks, as is suggested by the terms 'civil servants' and 'public servants'. However, the reality of modem government is such that their role goes well beyond what one would 68 PART II Institutions, Actors, and Instruments expect of a 'servant'. Indeed, bureaucrats are very often the keystone in the policy process and the central figures in many policy subsystems (Kaufman, 2001). The structure of the bureaucracy has perhaps the strongest effect on public policy processes, especially at the sectoral level. Atkinson and Coleman (l989a: 51) measure state strength in terms of the bureaucracy's strength at the sectoral level, and argue that: it is critical to determine, first, the degree to which ultimate decision-making power is cOncentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of officials and, secondly, the degree to which these officials are able to act autonomously. . . . the state is weak in a given sector when authority is dispersed and no one group of officials can take the lead in formulating policy. Concentration of power in only a few agencies reduces occasions for conflict and permits long-term policy planning. Diffusion of power, in contrast, fosters inter-agency conflicts and lack of co-ordination; d~13isions may be made on the basis of their acceptability to all concerned agencies rather than intrinsic merit. The bureaucracy's autonomy from politicians and societal groups also contributes to its strength and effectiveness in policy-making. Tobe strong, a bureaucracy must have a clear mandate, a professional ethos, and enjoy strong support, but not interference, from politicians in its day-to-day activities. Close ties with client groups are also to be avoided if a bureaucracy is to be effective. An ability to generate and process its own information is also important if reliance on irtterest groups is tobe avoided. The states in countries like France, Korea, Singapore, and Japan have bureaucracies that enjoy an exalted status in government and society (Katzenstein, 1977). They are said to constitute a homogeneous elite grouping that plays the most important role in the policy process. They undergo long professional training and pursue service in the govern. ment as a lifelong career. In other societies, bureaucracies enjoy relatively low status and lack the capacity to resist pressures trom legislators or social groups, which often promotes incoherence and short-sightedness in policies. The effective mobilization of bureaucratic expertise is rarer than commonly believed (Evans, 1992). Despite the massive expansion in bureaucracies throughout the world over the last several decades, weak bureaucracies in the sense understood here are the norm rather than the exception (Evans, 1995). In many countries with corruption, low wages, and poor working conditions, bureaucracies often do not have the capability to. deal with the complex problems they are asked to address. If these conditions obtain in a country, then it is quite likely that the state will have difficulty devising effective policies and implementing them in the manner intended. In many countries, even if bureaucratic expertise Policy Actors and Institutions 69 exists in a particular area, problems of organization and leadership prevent its effective marshalling (Desveaux et al., 1994). Most of the policy-making and implementation functions once performed by legislatures and the political executive are now performed by the bureaucracy because the functions of modern government are too complex and numerous to be performed by the cabinet alone (see Bourgault and Dion, 1989; Cairns, 1990b; Priest and Wohl, 1980). The bureaucracy's power and influence is based on its command of a wide range of important policy resources (see Hill, 1992: 1-11). First, the law itself provides for certain crucial functions to be performed by the bureaucracy, and may confer wide discretion on individual bureaucrats to make decisions on behalf of the state. Second, bureaucracies have unmatched access to material resources for pursuing their own organizational, even personal, objectives if they so wish. The government is the largest single spender in most (if not all) countries, a situation that gives its officials a powerful voice in many policy areas. Third, the bureaucracy is a repository of a wide range of skills and expertise, resources that make it a premier organization in society. It employs large numbers of just about every kind of professional, hired for their status as experts in their areas of specialization. That they deal with similar issues on a continuing basis endows them with unique insights into many problems. Fourth, modern bureaucracies have access to vast quantities of information on the different aspects of society. At times the information is deliberately gathered, but at other times the information comes to it simply as a part of its central location in the government. Fifth, the permanence of the bureaucracy and the long tenure of its members often give it an edge over its nominal superiors, the elected executive. Finally, the fact that policy deliberations for the most part occur in secret within the bureau" cracy denies other policy actors opportunities to mount opposition to its plans. However, we must avoid exaggerating the role of the bureaucracy. The political executive is ultimately responsible for all policies, an authority it does assert at times. High-profile political issues are also more likely to involve higher levels of executive control. Executive control is also likely to be higher if the bureaucracy consistently opposes a policy option preferred by politicians. ¥oreover, the bureaucracy itself is not a homogeneous organization but rather a collection of organizations, each with its own interests, perspectives, and standard operating procedures, which can make arriving at a unified position difficult. Even within the same department, there are often divisions along functional, personal, political, and technical lines. Thus it is not uncommon for the executive to have to intervene to resolve intra- and inter-bureaucratic conflicts and bureaucrats in democratic countries require the support of elected officials if they are to exercise their influence in any meaningful way (Sutherland, 1993). Political Economic Structures The capabilities of a state are determined not just by how it is situated in the international order and how it is organized internally, but also by how it is linked to the society whose problems it is supposed to resolve through appropriate policies. To be able to make and implement policies effectively, the state needs the support of prominent social actors for its actions. The extent to which these actors are able to offer the necessary level and form of support depends, among other things, on their own internal organization. Fragmentation within and among prominent social groups weakens the state's ability to mobilize them towards the resolution of societal problems. If the societal conflicts are particularly severe, the state may find itself paralyzed in performing many policy functions. On the other hand, unity within and among social groups makes for a stable policy environment that facilitates policy-making and promotes effective implementation. Strong organizations can bargain more effectively and need not make unreasonable demands for the sake of maintaining their members' support. And when they agree to a measure, they can enforce it upon their membership, through sanctions if necessary. Mancur Olson has argued that in societies characterized by 'encompassing' (that is, umbrella groups consisting of a variety of similar interests) rather than 'narrow' interest groups, the groups 'internalize much of the cost of inefficient policies and accordingly have an incentive to redistribute income to themselves with the least possible social cost, and to give.som~ weight t9.~col1omi.CgI'Q.wth. @dto the inte~~sJ~of.so.cietya~ a_. whole' (Olson, 1982: 92). The.e~$tence of Ilumerousnarrowintere~t groups, in contrast, promotes competition among groups that pressure the state toserve their members' interests only, regardless of the effects on others. The cumulative effect of such action often can be contradictory and ineffective policies that leave everyone worse off. The problem of societal fragmentation is particularly severe when narrow sectional groups are too strong to be ignored by even a strong state, or if the state is too weak to ignore societal pressures. However, the best situation, insofar as effective making and implementing of policies is concerned, is for both state and society to be strong, with close partnership between the two. Peter Evans (1992) calls this institutional arrangement 'embedded autonomy'. In contrast, policy effectiveness is lowest when the state is weak and the society fragmented. In the former scenario, states in partnership with social groups can be expected to devise ..clilbesiY.e;;md~loago.t.eIm~policiei.'~fr.the,;lat:ter,,,1he state can be expected to produce only,shorhlermand,usu.aUY.ineff~ctj:v~ policies. Business Actors As pointed out by both neo-pluralist and corporatist theorists, the organi- zation of business and labour is often most significant in determining a state's policy capabilities. This is because of the vital role each plays in the production process, which is, in every society, a fundamental activity that has effects far beyond the economy. Among interest groups, business is generally the most powerfuL with an unmatched capacity to affect public policy. To understand what is referred to as the 'structural power of capital', we need to comprehend the broader socio-economic context of a capitalist economy. Such an economy, by definition, entails a market form of economic organization in which ownership of the means of production is concentrated in the hands of the corporations. This fact lies at the root of business's unparalleled power (Lindblom, 1977). The increasing globalization of production and financial activities, due to improvements in modern means of communication and transportation and the gradual removal of controls on international economic transactions, has contributed tremendously to the power of capital in recent decades. It is possible for investors and managers to respond, if they so _ wish, to any unwanted government action by moving capital to another location. Although this theoretical mobility is limited by a variety of factors-including the availability of suitable investment opportunities in other countries-the potential loss of employment and revenues is a threat with which the state must contend in making decisions. Because of their potential to affect state revenues negatively, capitalists-both domestic and foreign-have the ability to 'punish' the state for any action it might take of which they disapprove (Hayes, 1978). The financial contributions that businesses make to political· parties also afford them an important resource for influencing -policy·makers. Elections can sometimes turn on relatively short-term issues and personalities, which necessitate large budgets to influence voters through extensive media advertising campaigns. In such situations, political parties supported by contributions from business are in a better position to run such campaigns and thus influence voting behaviour. This can lead political parties and candidates running for office to accommodate business interests more than they would those of other groups. Similarly, the financial contributions that businesses often make to .public policy research institutions and individual researchers serve to further entrench their power. The organizations and individuals receiving funds tend to be sympathetic towards business interests and can proVide business with the intellectual wherewithal often required to prevail in policy debates (McGann and Weaver, 1999; Abelson, 1999) . The structural strength of business has the potential to both promote and erode social welfare. The latter is likely to be the case when business lacks organizational coherence. The ability of individual firms and capitalists to pressure the government to serve their interests can lead, if the latter succumbs to the pressure, to incoherent and short-sighted policies. Endemic conflicts among various business groups only aggravate such situations. The problem may be offset if business has a central cohesive organization-or peak association-able to thrash out differences and come up with coherent policy proposals. If the government does accept such proposals, they are likely to serve the interest of the broader economy (though not all sections of the society equally) rather than the interests of particular firms or economic sectors. A strong business organization is therefore a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for coherent and effective policy-making. A strong business organization is able to adopt a bold position if necessary and convey it to the government, without incurring serious opposition from its rank and file. It usually takes the form of a peak association (a sort of federation of associations) with the authority to impose sanctions and discipline among its members, since the state must have confidence that once a commitment has been made by the association, it can expect adherence to it by individual businesses. Moreover, if the state is confident of the strength of the business association, then it can delegate. some business-related responsibilities to the business association itself. Generally speaking, the US is regarded as haVing the weakest business organizations in the industrialized world and Japan the strongest, with countries like Britain or Canada falling closer to the uS model. Other European countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Sweden, fall closer to the Japanese model (Katzenstein, 1977). The strength or weakness of business and the varying patterns of government-industry relations found in a country are usually shaped by a range of historicalfactors'-(Wilson, -1990a). Although the example of Japan cifed above is somewhat atypical, business is often strongly organized if it has been confronted with strong, persistent challenges from trade unions or socialist parties. The stronger the unions, the stronger will be the business influence. The threat does not 'necessarily have to be continuing, so long as such was the case in the past. Second, countries with strong states often have strong business organizations because, in order to pressure strong governments, business itself must be well organized. A strong state may also nurture a strong business association in order to avoid the problems arising from too many groups making conflicting demands on the same issue. The existence of strong business associations simplifies 'the government's job by aggregating their demands within the organization. Third, the organizational strength of business is affected by the structure of the economy. In national economies characterized by low industrial concentration or high levels of foreign ownership, it is difficult for the disparate elements to organize and devise a common position. Fourth, political culture, too, has an important bearing on the extent and nature of business involvement in politics. In countries such as the US and Canada with cultures highly supportive of business, corporations have seen few reasons to organize. Moreover, the degree to which social norms approve of functional representation affects the strength of business. Americans, and to a lesser extent citizens of Britain, Canada, Australia, and other Anglo-American democracies, are distrustful of business representing their interests on a regular basis behind closed doors. In the corporatist countries, on the other hand, functional representation is accepted and indeed is often encouraged (Siaroff, 1999). Labour Labour, too, occupies a powerful position among social groups, though not so powerful as business. Unlike business, which enjoys considerable weight with policy-makers even at the individual level of the firm, labour needs a collective organization, a trade union, to have its voice heard in the policy subsystem. In addition to bargaining with employers on behalf . of their members' wages and working conditions, which is their primary function, trade unions engage in political activities to shape government policies affecting them (Taylor, 1989: 1). The origin 6f the role of the trade unions in the public policy process is rooted in late nineteenth-century democratization, which enabled workers, who form a majority in every industrialized society, to have a say in the functioning of the government. Given the voting clout afforded them by democracy, it was sometimes easier for them to pressure the government to meet their needs than to bargain with their employers. The creation of labour or social democratic parties, which eventually formed governments in many countries, further reinforced labour's political power (Qualter, 1985). -The nature and effectiveness of the trade-unions' participation in the policy process depend on a variety of institutional and contextual factors. The structure of the state itself is an important determinant of union participation in the policy process. A weak and fragmented state will not be able to secure effective participation by unions, because the latter would see little certainty that the government would be able to keep its side of any bargain. Weak businesses can also inhibit the emergence of a powerful trade union organization because the need for it is less immediate. However, the most important determinant of labour's capacity to influence the policy process and its outcomes is its own internal organization. The level of u]J.ionmembership affects the extent to which states seek or even accept union participation in the policy process. The same is true for the structure of bargaining units: decentralized collective bargaining promotes a fragmented system of articulation of labour demands. Britain, Canada, and the United States, for example, have decentralized bargaining structures, whereas in Australia, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries bargaining takes place at the industry or even' countrywide level (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Hibbs, 1987). A union movement fragmented along any or all of possible regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or industrial versus craft, foreign versus domestic, or import-competing versus export-oriented lines will also experience difficulties in influencing the policy process. Fragmentation among labour ranks tends to promote local and sporadic industrial strife and incoherent articulation of labour's interest in the policy process (Hibbs, 1978; Lacroix, 1986). . Finally, to realize its policy potential labour needs a central organization, such as the Australian or British Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-cm), even more than does business. Collective action is the only tool labour has to influence the employers' or the government's behaviour, so the more united a front it is able to put up, the more successful it is likely to be. To be effective, the trade union central needs to enjoy comprehensive membership and have the organizational capacity to deal with conflicts among its members and maintain unity; Trade unions' role in the policy process tends to be the highest in corporatist political systems, such as in the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the Netherlands, where the state encourages the formation and maintenance of strong trade union centrals, anif the lowest in pluralist political systems such as the United States and Canada, where it does not.S The nature of a country's political economy, therefore, has an important structural impact on policy-making. In liberal capitalist, 'Western' societies, for example, this 'generates aHeast two important policy actors, bu.sinessand labou.r, which are involved in .many'policy deliberations and activities. However, other important policy actors, linked to the structures and institutions of representative democracy, also exist in these societies. The Public Surprising as it may appear, the 'public' plays a rather small direct role in the public policy process. This is .not to say that its role is inconsequen- . tial, as it provides the backdrop of norms, attitudes, and values against which the policy process is displayed. However, in most liberal democratic states policy decisions are taken by representative institutions that empower specialized actors to determine the scope and content of public policies, rather than the public per se determining policy. One important role played by members of the public in democratic 'poIitil:!s;'dfconrse; 1S'··voting..On the one hand, in democratic states vot··'ing-rs-the'me8t·basic'means of participating in the political and, by implication, policy processes. It not only ·affords citizens the opportunity to express their choice of government, but also empowers them to pressure political parties and candidates seeking their votes to offer them attrac- tive policy packages. On the other hand, the voters' policy capacity usually cannot be actualized, at least not directly, for various reasons. In modern democracies policies are made by representatives of voters who, once elected, are not required to heed the preferences of their constituents in their day-to-day functioning. Moreover, as was discussed above, most legislators participate very little in the policy process, which tends to be dominated by experts in specific sectoral areas rather than by legislative generalists (Edwards and Sharkansky, 1978: 23). More significantly, candidates and political parties often do not run in elections on the basis of their policy platforms; and even when they do, voters usually do not vote on the basis of proposed policies alone. Having said that, it is true that politicians do heed public opinion in a general sense while devising policies, even though they do not always respond to or accommodateit. The impact of public opinion on policy processes is more frequent and pervasive, although even less direct than voting. Despite .many works over the past decades that have consistently found the relation- . ship between public opinion and public policy-making in democratic societies to be a tenuous, complex one, there persists a tendency to view this relationship as simple, direct, and linear (see Luttbeg, 1981; Shapiro and Jacobs, 1989). That is, from at least the time of the early works on the subject by scholars such as V.O. Key (1967), E.E. Schattschneider (1960), and Bernard Berelson (1952) in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, prominent political scientists and others have repeatedly found little or no direct linkage between public opinion and policy outcomes. Nevertheless, in study after study this finding has·,been. made and remade, as investigators appear dissatisfied with it (Monroe, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1992). As Schattschneider suggested, this is no doubt due to the sincere but sometimes simplistic notions of democracy held by many analysts, who support the notion of 'government for the people' and feel uneasy that that this might not be accomplished through 'government by the people'.6 'But both the policy and democratic processes are much more complex thqnlinear linkage theories suggest. Democracy means more than mob rule, and political theorists from Edmund Burke onward hav~ noted the complex notions of.popular representation that democratic governments contain (Birch, 1972). Analyzing the role of public opinion in contempoc rary democratic governments requires a nuanced analysis of the realities of democratic governance and policy-making processes. While a concern for popular sovereignty is laudable, as Schattschneider has suggested, theoretical speculations must be tempered by empirical facts if the nature of the relationship existing between public opinion and public policy is to be adequately described and understood. The simplest model of the relationship between public opinion and public policy-making views government as a policy-making machine- directly processing popular sentiments into public policy decisions and implementation strategies. As has been pointed out repeatedly over the course of studies into the subject in the past half-century in the United States and elsewhere, however, this account is problematic (Erikson et al., 1980; Erikson et al., 1989). It assumes that public opinion has a concrete, quasi-permanent character that can be easily aggregated into coherent policy positions. Innumerable studies, however, have underlined the vague, abstract, and transitory nature of public opinion, and have emphasized the difficulties encountered in aggregating the 'babble of the collective will', as Rousseau put it, into universally endorsed policy prescriptions (Rousseau, 1973; also see Lowell, 1926). Moreover, many opinion researchers and policy scholars have noted how these difficulties have multiplied as scientific and complex legal issues have come to dominate policy-making in contemporary societies, further divorcing policy discourses from public ones (see Pollock etal., 1989; Torgerson, 1996; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). This is only the first of several major logical and empirical problems encountered by direct linear-linkage theories of democratic representation. Even assuming that public sentiments could be delivered directly and in a consistent form to policy-makers, the model encounters several other, terminal, problems. For one, it attributes very little autonomy to governments. Exactly how governments acquire and process information is not considered to be a major issue, except insofar as these process'es 'block' the transmission of popular sentiments into government action. But the processes by which government agendas are established and policy options formulatedare·by no means ,simple and: unproblematic.Numerous studies have underlined the complex nature of policy construction and the multiple competing interpretations of social reality and 'potential policy responses to social issues that governments face in contemplating action (Holzner and Marx, 1979; Schneider, 1985; Samuels, 1991; Livingston, 1992). Many others have underlined the complex nature of decision-making processes in government, which belie the simple machine-like formulations of the linear-linkage model. Finally, the model also sees as unproblematic the various linkages that exist between the implementation or execution of policy and the enactment of policy decisions and pronouncements. Once again, an enormous literature in public administration underlines the complexity of implementation processes and belies the notion that government officials simply execute decisions in a neutral and 'objective' way (see Forester, 1984; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979; Weiss, 1977a). Not surprisingly, these difficulties with simple models of direct public opinion effects led some students of the public opinion-public policy relationship to develop more sophisticated ones that took some of these concerns into account. However, while some proposed alternate general visions of the nature of the relationship between opinion and policy, many can be seen as attempts to rescue simple linear models by altering only secondary aspects of the general model. Anthony Downs's well-known model of the issue-attention cycle, for .instance, provides a good example of a linear-linkage model that takes into account the vague and transitory nature of public opinion on specific policy issues. As set out in his 1972 arti~le on environmental policymaking, public policy-making in many areas of social life tends to revolve around specific issues that momentarily capture public attention and demand government action. However, he also noted that many of . these problems soon fade from view as their complexity or intractability bec~e apparent. As he put it: public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon anyone domestic issue for very long-even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society. Instead, a systematic issueattention cycle seems strongly to influence public attitudes and behaviour concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then-though still largely unresolved-gradually fades from the center of public attention. (Downs, 1972: 38) The idea of a systematic issue-attention cycle in public policy-making gained a great deal of attention in subsequent years and Downs's work is often cited as an improved model for explaining the linkages between public opinion and public policy (see, e.g., Dearing and Rogers, 1996). A reasonable conclusion to reach on the basis of the above discussion is that whatever the policy effects'of public -opinion,they are not direct in nature. As many students of this relationship have noted, this raises several possibilities. One is that public opinion has no effect, a possibility ruled out by the many' empirical studies that have' found some general correspondence between the behaviour of public policy-makers and public opinion in some issue areas (see, e.g., Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Bennett, 1980). A second is that rather than directly affecting public policy-making in specific sectors, generalized public opinion-the policy mood or policy sentiment of a population at a particular time-makes up one element of the background conditions or environment in which the policy process unf9lds (Durr, 1993; Stimson, 1991; Adams, 1997; Best, 1999). Think-Tanks and Research Organizations Another significant set of societal actors in the policy process is composed of the researchers working at universities, research institutes, and think-tanks on particular policy issues and issue areas. University researchers often have theoretical and philosophical interests in public problems that may not lead to research results that can be translated directly into usable knowledge for policy purposes. To the extent that they do conduct research for the purpose of participating in policy debates, they often function in a manner similar to their counterparts in think-tanks. Indeed, in many instances academics undertaking directly relevant policy research are sponsored by think-tanks (Ricci, 1993; Stone et ai., 1998). The following discussion will therefore concentrate on the role of these private, ideologically based organizations. . A think-tank can be defined as 'an independent organization engaged in multidisciplinary research intended to influence public policy' (James, 1993: 492). Such organizations maintain an interest in a broad range of policy problems and employ, either full-time or on a contract basis, experts on various issue areas in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on the issues facing governments. Their research tends to be directed at proposing practical solutions to public problems or, in the case of some think-tanks, finding evidence to support the ideological or interest-driven positions they advocate. This sets them apart somewhat from academic researchers at universities, whose interests are more specialized and who do not necessarily seek practical solutions to policy problems. Explicitly partisan research is also generally eschewed in academia. However, while think-tanks are generally more partisan than their purely academic counterparts, they, too, must maintain an image of intellectual autonomy from the government or any political party if policy-makers are to take them seriously. Large prominent think-tanks In the United States include the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Urban Institute. Similar organizations in Canada' include the C.D. Ho~-Institute, ctheFraser Institute, the Canadian-Centre - . for Policy Alternatives, and' the Institute for Research on Public Policy.- . Major think-tanks in Britain include the Policy Studies Institute and the National Institute for Economic and Social Research. Literally hundreds of such institutes are active in the Western, developed countries, some with broad policy mandates, others that are more limited in their purview, such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association (Lindquist, "1993;Abelson, 1996). . Think-tanks target their research and recommendations to those politicians who may be expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas bei,ng espoused (Abelson, 2002). They also seek originality in their ideas and, unlike the researchers working in universities or the government, spend a great deal of effort publicizing their findings (Dobuzinskis, 2000; Stone, 1996; Weaver, 1989). The need for a quick response to policy issues and problems has forced many think-tanks to develop new 'prod"utt~lineif:1Shott:pfthY'reports~jbt:Irnaf,'<ri'ticles,'an'd policy briefs that can .',be.MluicklY,Jead.and,mgested:bave.replaced'book,,'1ength studies as the primary output of many think-tanks. In addition, a premium has been placed on writing articles and op-ed pieces for newspapers and making appearances on radio and television programs. This new brand of research and analysis is dependent on 'the public policy food chain', which includes a range of knowledge- and policy-oriented institutions. Over the last few decades, much of the work of think-tanks has been devoted to promoting economic efficiency, since this has been an important preoccupation of the governments in the industrialized world. A number of trends have become evident in recent years with respect to the functioning, operation, and influence of think-tanks in many countries. Some of the more prominent trends include: • The increasing complexity of policy debates. The twin movements of democracy and diversity have served to involve groups that, historically, have not been represented in domestic and international affairs. Women, indigenous groups, and non-governmental organizations are now playing a central role in developing and implementing foreign affairs policies and programs. These new entrants to the policy debates have created many new specialized think-tanks and public policy research organizations. • The transborder nature of many contemporary problems and the networking of think-tanks and policy institutes. At the international level, globalization/internationalization simultaneously unites and divides the countries of North/South and East/West. Thansnational problems such as AIDS,hunger, and global warming require a global response. Some think-tanks have responded by becoming transnational organizations in the effort to bridge the chasm between North/South and East/West. In addition, the emergence of regional or continental economic·alliaflee~·-suchas-·the··EU-'-andNAFFA has created .new· networks of regionally oriented policy institutions. • The downsizing of governments and the.increasing competition among think-tanks for funding. The proliferation of think-tanks has been accompanied by cutbacks in public funds available for research. In many countries, federal, provincial, and local governments have cut their funding for public policy research. This happened as policy units in governments were downsized or eliminated in budget-cutting exercises in the 1990s. At the same time, events occurring elsewhere, such as the end of the Cold War, had a profound impact on the funding of research organi4ations focused on areas such as international and security affairs since donors and governments no longer saw the need for such research. As a result, think-tanks have had to devote considerablE!resources to raising funds rather than conducting research and producing position papers (McGann and Weaver, 1999). Analysts working in universities or government tend to choose to work on problems determined by the public's or the government's interest, or by their own personal curiosity about a particular subject, and have largely avoided the specific problems facing think-tanks in the 80 PART II Institutions, Actors, and Instruments contemporary environment. Through sustained analysis and critique, however, these researchers can have a notable impact on public policy, largely through what Carol Weiss has termed their 'enlightenment function' (Weiss, 1977a, 1977b; Bryman, 1988). This. role can also be taken on by consultants, who can serve to carry the ideas and results of policy research directly to governments (Lapsley and Oldfield, 2001). Political Parties Political parties are an intermediating actor, like think-tanks, existing on the margins or border between state and societal actors. They have a significant impact on public policy, though in the modern era this usually has been only indirectly. They tend not to be represented in policy subsystems, though many of the actors in the subsystem may be influenced by the party to which they are affiliated. Political parties tend to influence public policy indirectly, primarily through their role in staffing the executive and, to a lesser degree, the legislature. Indeed, once in office, it is not uncommon for party members in government to ignore their official party platform while designing policies (Thomson, 2001). Political parties' impact on policy outcomes has been the subject of some limited, but specific, empirical research and commentary (Blais et al., 1996; Castles, 1982; Imbeau and Lachapelle, 1993; McAllister, 1989). Findings concerning the role of parties in public policy-making, for example, have included evidence that, historically,' European 'governments led by Christian and social democratic parties have been related positively to the development of welfare state programs (Wilensky, 1975; Korpi; 1983), and that 'le'ft-Wing"and'right-wiIlg' governments have had _.... differentfiscal p·olicy orientations towards, resp'ectively,unemployment and inflation reduction (Hibbs, 1977). Partisan differences have also been linked to different characteristic preferences for certain types of policy tools, such as public enterprises or market-based instruments (Chandler and Chandler, 1979; Chandler, 1982, 1983). However, the contemporary significance of parties has also been challenged by those who argue that government has become too complex for influence by partisan generalists, with day-to-day influence stemming more from policy specialists in government and those in the employ of interest groups and specialized policy research institutes (King and Laver, 1993; Pross, 1992). Similarly, other studies focusing on the extent of policy learning and emulation occurring between states or subnational units (Lutz, 1989; Poel, 1976; Erikson et ai., 1989) and those examining the impact of international influences on domestic policy-making have argued the case for the reduced importance of parties in contemporary policy processes (Johnson and Stritch, 1997; Doern et al., 1996a). The idea that political parties playa major role in public policy processes, of course, stems from their undeniable influence on elections and electoral outcomes in democratic states. While vote-seeking political par- Policy Actors and Institutions 81 ties and candidates attempt to offer packages of policies they hope will appeal to voters, the electoral system is not structured to allow voters a choice on specific policies. Likewise, as discussed above, the representational system also limits the public's ability to ensure that electorally salient policy issues actually move onto official government agendas (King, 1981; Butler et al., 1981). The official agenda of governments is, in fact, usually dominated by routine or institutionalized agenda-setting opportunities rather than by partisan political activity (Kingdon, 1984; Walker, 1977; Howlett, 1997a). Even when parties do manage to raise an issue and see it move from the public to the official agenda, they cannot control its evolution past that point. As Richard Rose (1980: 153) has put it: A party can create movement on a given issue, but it cannot ensure the direction it will lead. Just as defenders of the status quo may find it difficult to defend their position without adapting it, so too proponents of change face the need to modify their demands. Modifications are necessary to secure the agreement of diverse interests within a party. They will also be important in securing support, or at least grudging acceptance, by affected pressure groups. Finally, a governing party will also need to make changes to meet the weaknesses spotted by civil service advisors and parliamentary draftsmen responsible for turning a statement of intent into a bill to present to Parliament. While their direct influence may be muted, however, their indirect influence is not. The roleplayetlbypolmcalparties in staffing political executives and legislatures,of'cours'e, allows them considerable influence on the content of policy decisions taken by those individuals, including those related to the staffing of the senior public service. However, this power should not be overestimated. In modern governments, as we have seen, the degree of freedom enjoyed by each decision-maker is circumscribed by a host of factors that limit the conduct of each office and constrain the actions of each office-holder. These range from limitationsimposed by the country's constitution to the specific mandate conferred on individual decision-makers by various laws and regulations (Pal, 1988; Axworthy,,1988). Various rules set out not only which decisions can be made by which government agency or official, but also the procedures they must follow in doing so. Political parties tend to have only a diffuse, indirect effect on policymaking through their role in determining who actually staffs legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Their role in agenda-setting is very weak, while they playa stronger, but still indirect, role in policy formulation and decision-making due to the strong role played in these two stages of the policy cycle by members of the political executive. Their role in policy implementation is virtually nil, while they can have a more 82 PART II Institutions, Actors, and Instruments direct effect on policy evaluation undertaken by legislators and legislative committees (Minkenberg, 2001). The fact that the influence of parties on particular stages of the policy process may be muted, or that any such influence may be waning, does not neces~arily lead to the conclusion that 'parties don't matter'. That is, as Richard Rose argued almost a quarter-century ago in the case of Britain: Parties do make a difference in the way [a country] is governed~ but the differences are not as expected. The differences in office between one party and another are less likely to arise from contrasting intentions than from the exigencies of government. Much of a party's record in office will be stamped upon it from forces outside Its control. . . . parties are not the primary forces_shaping the destiny of ... society; it is shaped by something stronger than parties. (Rose, 1980: 141; also see Hockin, 1977) Mass Media The media consist of other important intermediating actors active in the policy-making process. Some regard the role of the mass media in the policy process as pivotal (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Parenti, 1986)7 while others describe it as marginal (Kingdon, 1984). There i~ no denying that theinass media are crucial links between the state and society, a position that allows for significant influence on the preferences of government and society in regard to the identification of public problems and their'solutions. Yetat the same time; like political-parties, their ,direct role in the various stages oithe policy process is often' sporadic and most often quite marginal. The role of the media in the policy process originates in the fact that in reporting problems they function both as passive reporters and as active analysts, as well as advocates of particular policy solutions. That is, news programs do not just report on a problem but often go to great lengths in locating a problem not otherwise obvious, defining its nature and scope, and suggesting or implying the availability of potential solutions. The media's role in agenda-setting is thus particularly significant (Spitzer, 1993; Pritchard, 1992). Media portrayal of public problems and proposed solutions often conditions how they are understood by the public and many members of government, thereby shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of others more likely. Questions in parliamentary question periods or at presidential press conferences are ','"often bcrsedon 'StOries inlhEi 'day'<s television news or newspapers. .This ts"ParticularIY"signiticant"eonsidering that news reporting is not an objective mirror of reality, undistorted by bias or inaccuracy. Reporters and editors are newsmakers, in the sense that they define what is worthy of reporting and the aspects of a situation that should be high- Policy Actors and Institutions 83 lighted. Thus, policy issues that can be translated into an interesting story tend to be viewed by the public as more important than those that do not lend themselves so easily to narrative structures and firsFperson accounts and sound bites. This partially explains why, for example, crime stories receive so much prominence in television news and, as a corollary, the public puts pressure on governments to appear to act tough on crime. Similarly, groups and individuals able to present problems to the media in a packaged form are more likely than their less succinct counterparts to have their views projected (Callaghan and Schnell, 2001; Lutz and Goldenberg, 1980; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Parenti, 1986). We must not, however, exaggerate the mass media's role in the policy process. Other policy actors have resources enabling them to counteract media influence, and policy-makers are for the most part intelligent and resourceful individuals who understand their own interests and have their own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy options. As a rule, they are not easily swayed by media portrayals of issues and preferred policy solutions or by the mere fact of media attention. Indeed, they often use the media to their own advantage. It is not uncommon for public officials and successful interest groups to provide selective information to the media to bolster their case (Lee, 2001). Indeed, very often the media are led by state opinion rather than vice versa (Howlett, 1997a, 1997b). Interest Groups A fourth significant intermediating actor, as pluralist political theorists recognized, is the organized special interest-group: While policy-making is a preserve of the government; and particularly of'the executive and bureaucracy, the realities of modern politics enable groups formed specifically to promote the interests or positions of specialized social groups to play a significant role in the process. One of the most important resources of such interest groups is knowledge, specifically information that may be unavailable or less available to others. The members of specialized groups often know the most about their area of concern. Since policy-making is a highly information-intensive process, those with information may normally expect to play an important role in it. Politicians and bureaucrats often find the information proVided by special interest groups indispensable for performing their tasks. Government and opposition politicians at times curry favour with such groups to secure the information required for effective policy-making or for attacking their opponents. Bureaucrats similarly often need these groups' help in developing and implementing many policies (Hayes, 1978; Baumgartner and Leech, 1998). The other resources possessed by interest or pressure groups are organizational and political. Special interest groups often make financial contributions ,to the campaign chests of sympathetic political parties and 84 PART II Institutions, Actors, and Instruments politicians. They also campaign for and deliver votes to sympathetic candidates who they think would support their cause in the government. However, interest groups' political impacts on the formulation and implementation of public policies vary considerably according to their access to differing levels of organizational resources (Pross, 1992; Baumgartner and Leech, 2001). First, interest groups differ tremendously in terms of size of membership. All other things being equal, larger groups can be expected to be taken· more seriously by the government.8Second, as discussed above in the context of business and labour associations, some groups may form a 'peak association' consisting of representatives from other groups with similar interests (Coleman, 1988). A coherent peak association may be expected to be more influential than those interest groups operating individually. Third, some groups are well funded, which enables them to hire permanent specialized staff and influence parties and candidates during electiOns. While the exact impact of interest group campaign expenditures on government policy is contentious, there is no doubt that differences in financial resources matter (Nownes and Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 1995, 2000; Nownes and Cigler, 1995) and that in democratic political systems the information and power resources of interest groups make them key members of policy subsystems. While this does not guarantee that their interests will be accommodated, they are unlikely to be entirely ignored except in rare circumstapces when executives make a high-level and deliberate decision to go ahead with a .policy despite opposition from concerned groups. CONCLUSION' The chapter began by noting that policy processes draw upon actors from a subset of members of the policy universe, increasingly at both the domestic and international levels. Policy subsystems are constructed from this universe, involving both state and societal actors in complex systems of interaction ..Constitutional and legal provisions are important determinants of subsystem membership, while the power and knowledge resources of subsystem actors critically affect the nature of their activities and interactions. In most sectors, given their central location and access to abundant organizational resources, the minister(s) and bureaucrcits in charge of a policy sector are usually the key governmental actors in policy processes affecting that area, with the legislators, particularly in parliamentary systems, playing a secondary role. Their societal counterparts are drawn mainly from among special interest groups and research organizations, and business and labour, because of their key role in many policy areas, often are major actors in many of these processes. All these actors have their own objectives, which they seek to achieve through . subsystem membership and participation in the policy process. :Sut what objectives theypurstl~, how tiley do so, and the extent to Policy Actors and Institutions 85 which they succeed in their efforts depend t9 a large extent on the domestic and international institutional context in which they operate. At the domestic level, the structure of political institutions affects the autonomy and capacity of the executive and bureaucracy, a situation paralleled at the international level by the structure of international regimes and the role played by state resources within them. These structures have a decisive effect on actors' interest and behaviour, and on the outcomes of the policy process. Atkinson, M., and W Coleman. 1989. The State, Business and Industrial Change in Canada. Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press. Cerny,Philip G. 1996. 'International Finance and the Erosion of State Policy Capacity', in P. Gummett, ed., Globalization and Public Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,83-104. Gourevitch, Peter. 1978 'The Second Image Reversed: The International Sourcesof Domestic Politics', International Organization 32: 881-912. Haggard, Stephen, and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. 'Theories of International Regimes', International Organization 41,3: 491-517. Hayes, Michael.T.1978. 'The Semi-SovereignPressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative 'JYpology', Journal of Politics 40, 1: 134-61. Held, David. 1991. 'Democracy,the Nation-State and the Global System', in Held, ed., Political Theory Tbday. Oxford:Polity Press, 197-235. James, Simon. 1993.'The Idea Brokers:The Impact of Think Tankson British -Government',.PublicAdministration .2'1:471-90. Kaufman, Herbert. 2001 'Major Players; Bureaucracies in American Government',Public Administration Review 61, 1: 18-42. King, Anthony. 1981.'What Do Elections Decide?', in D. Butler, H.R. I!enniman, and A. Ranney, eds, Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public PolicyResearch. . Olson, David M., and Michael L. Mezey,eds. 1991. Legislatures in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas of Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. ' Rose, Richard. 1980.Do Parties Make a Difference? London: Macmillan. Spitzer, Robert J., ed. ,1993. Media and Public policy. Westport, Conn.: PraegeL . Taylor, Andrew J. 1989. ITade Unions and Politic~: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke:Macmillan. Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. 'Assessing the Effects of Institutions', in Weaver and Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington: BrookingsInstitution, 1-41. Wilson, Graham K. 1990. Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan. Wilson, Graham K. 1990. Interest Groups.Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1. On the persistence of institutions and their effects, see Hoffman (1999); Keohane and Hoffman (1991); Zysman (1994); Cortell and Peterson (1999); Cammack (1992). 2. Grant Jordan, has spent much effort cataloguing and categorizing the images and metaphors used to describe policy subsystems. See Jordan (1981, 1990a, 1990b);Jordan and Schubert (1992). 3. That is to say, not discriminating against imports once they have crossed the border after meeting all legal requirements, including payment of applicable·tariffs. 4. For a detailed comparison of the policy consequences of parliamentary and,presidential systems, see Weaver and Rockman (1993a). 5. In Australia, however, trade unions play a significant role in the policy process when the Labour Party is in office, despite the generally pluralist character of the political system. 6. The normative and ideological nature of much discussion on this subject is apparent in the titles and terms used to describe many findings. Recently, this can be seen in the otherwise excellent comparative and historical studies of Joel Brooks, who, finding very little relationship between public opinion and policy-making, terms this phenomenon .democratic frustration', suggesting it results from a problem with the policy system failing to react properly to the democratic one. See Brooks (1985, 1987, 1990). More recently, see Petry (1999). 7. For good literature reviews on this subject, see Cook et al. (1983); Graber (1989). 8. The relative strength provided by ideologicaland organizational resources is a subject of some debate. See, for example,Burt (1990). J' Policy Instruments In the preceding chapter we discussed the principal actors and institutions that determine and comprise the membership of policy subsystems. Before elaborating in Chapters 5 to 9 on the role played by subsystems at each stage of the policy process, we will first discuss the policy instruments-also called policy tools or governing instruments-that governments use to put policies into effect. These are the actual means or devices governments have at their disposal for implementing policies, and among which they must select in formulating policy. Thus, a government not only decides whether or not to do something about deteriorating water quality, for example, but also whether it should implement its decision through mass campaigns urging people to refrain from polluting activiti~s, r~gulation prohibiting all activities causing· th~pollutiOh, th~ provision of a subsidy to the polluting firms encouraging thein to switch to safer production technologies, or some combination of these or other means (Gunningham et al., 1998; Gunningham and Young, 1997). The choice of which instrument to use to put a decision into effect is often no less contentious than the decision itself and is very much the subject of discussion, deliberation, and dispute among subsystem members active in the policy process. Like much else in the policy sciences, the study of policy instruments by scholars of public policy began with Harold Lasswell and his insights into the subject in his. 1936 work, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. Over the decades, efforts have moved from simple description of each tool, to the development of classification schemes for categories of tools, and then to attempts to understand the reasons behind their use by governments. In this chapter we will set out one method of classification of the. policy instruments available to policy-makers. We will then describe the main features of key instrument types and note the extent of their substitutability. Our intent at this stage is descriptive rather than prescriptive, because factors of context importantly determine the appropriateness of various instruments in specific circumstances (Peters and Van Nispen, 1998; Bemelmans et aI., 1998). The question of why governments tend to select a particular instrument and not some other technically equal or even more appealing instrument is addressed in Chapter 8. The variety of instruments available to policy-makers to address a policy problem is limited only by their imaginations. Scholars have made numerous attempts to identify such instruments and classify them into meaningful categories (see Salamon and Lund, 1989: 32-3; Lowi, 1985; Bemelmans etaI., 1998). Unfortunately, many such schemes are either pitched at a high level of abstraction, making them difficult to apply in practical circumstances, or dwell on the idiosyncrasies of particular tools, thereby limiting the range of the descriptions and explanations they provide. A scheme that is sufficiently abstract to encompass the various possibilities, yet concrete enough to correspond with the way policy-makers actually interpret their choices, is required. The origins of such a scheme stem from Lasswell's insight that gov.ernments use a variety of policy instruments to achieve a relatively limited number of political ends. Rather than face a choice among a huge number of policy tools, Lasswell (1958: 204) argued that governments had developed a limited pumber of 'strategies' that involved 'the management of value assets in order to influence outcomes'. Understanding these basic strategies and their component· instruments, according to Lasswell, involved understanding the nature and types of governing resources that governments have at their' disposal (see also French and . Raven, 1959). In the 1940s and 1950s, this insight was developed and elaborated upon by several American political scientists. In his 1941 study of federal r.egulatory commissions, for example, Robert Cushman developed a simple basic taxonomy of policy instruments by focusing on the insight that governments could either regulate or choose not to. regulate societal activities, and'that if they chose the former they could regulate either in a coercive or non-coercive manner (Cushman, 1941). In their work on governments and planning, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (1953) also developed a number of spectra, or continuous scales, which highlighted the almost infinite number of possible permutations of policy tools, but also the manner in which these tools relied for their effectiveness on a limited number of criteria, such as their intrusiveness, their dependence on state agencies or markets, and a number of other variables. In the 1960s, Theodore Lowi (1966, 1972) adopted these insights into the limited number of basic types or categories of policy tools involved in government activity. He observed that American governments had tended to favour certain' types of instruments for prolonged periods, allowing analysts the opportunity to identify major transitions in government activities on this basis. He argued that a four-cell matrix based on the specificity of the target of coercion and the likelihood of its actual application would suffice to distinguish the major types and eras of government activity. The original three policy types he identified included the weakly sanctioned and individually targeted 'distributive' policies; the individually targeted and strongly sanctioned 'regulatory' policy; and the strongly sanctioned and generally targeted 'redistributive' policy. To these three, Lowi later added the weakly sanctioned and generally targeted category of 'constituent' policy. Although widely read, Lowi's typology was difficult to operationalize and somewhat internally inconsistent, and as a result it was rarely applied. However,' the notion of 'policy determining politics' proved alluring and led to other efforts to classify and comprehend policy instruments. As Charles Anderson (1971: 122) stated: Politics is always a matter of making choices from the possibilities offered by a given historical situation and cultural context. From this vantage point, the institutions and procedures of the state to shape the course of economy and society become the equipment provided by a society to its leaders for the solution of public problems. They are the tools of the trade of statecraft . . . the skillful policy maker, then, is he who can find appropriate possibilities in the institutional equipment of his society. Instrument choice or 'statecraft', from this perspective, is public policy-making, and the role of the policy analyst is one of assisting 'in constructing an inventory of potential public capabilities and resources that might be pertinent in any problem-solving situation' (ibid.). In the 1970s, efforts were made to better understand the nature of these instruments and tools available to governments (see Rondinelli, 1976, 1983; Goggin et al., 1990). Anderson's suggestion that public policy analysis shift from the study of policy problems and inputs to the study of policy implements and outputs was endorsed by scholars such as Bardach (1980) and Salamon (1981), both of whom suggested that policy studies had 'gdne wrong' right at the start by defining policy in terms of 'areas' or 'fields' rather than in terms of tools. As Salamon (1981: 256) argued: The major shortcoming of current implementation research is that it focuses on the wrong unit of analysis, and the most important theoretical breakthrough would be to identify a more fruitful unit on which to focus analysis and research. In particular, rather than focusing on individual programs, as is now done, or even collections 90 PART II Institutions, Actors, and Instruments of programs grouped according to major 'purpose: as is fre~uently proposed, the suggestion here is that we,should conc,entrat~mst;ad on the generic tools of goverrunent actIOn, on the technIques of social intervention. Salamon also framed two important research questions to, be addressed in the analysis of the tools of government action: 'What consequences does the choice of tool of government action have for the effectiveness and operation of a ,government program?' and 'What factors influence the choice of pro~ram tools?' (ibid., 265). Throughout the 1980s these questions were taken up by the 'policy design' literature (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988; Linder and Peters, 1984). .' The first step in their answer was to inventory policy instruments (see Steinberger, 1980). One influential early attempt to develop an exhaustive catalogue of policy instruments was carried out by the Dutch economist E.S. Kirschen and his colleagues, who discovered that despite the almost infinite number of possible 'permutations and combinations of instruments, only a relatively small number of basic policy tools were typically used by European governments to carry out their economic policies. Kirschen nevertheless concluded that there were at least 64 general types of instruments in this sector alone, thus illustrating the dilemmas of attempting to provide a complete list of policy tools used in all policy fields (Kirschen et al., 1964). Rather than attempt to construct such lists, most analysts looked for ways to grOllP roughly similar types of instruments into a few general categories that could then be analyzed, to determine the answers to Salamon's questions. Most authors looked to Lasswell's early work oninstrument 'strategies' and tried to identify the basic 'governing resources' that different instruments relied on for their effectiveness (Balch, 1980). Bardach (1980), for instance, argued that government had three 'technologies' at its disposal-enforcement, inducement, and benefactionand that these required different combinations of four critical governmental resources: money, political support, administrative competency, and creative leadership. Rondinelli did much the same thing, arguing that all policy instruments depended on a limited set of 'methods of influence' that governments had at their disposal: in his case, persuasion, exchange, and authority (Rondinelli, 1983: 125). A simple and powerful taxonomy was offered by Christopher Hood (1986a), who proposed that all policy tools used one of four broad cate;~',!l'Jf'.pemi-ng~'resoarces~l'He"arguediliat governments confront ,,pubJ,ic,pr.IJblems1hraughilie:use,~Uhejnformation in their possession as a central policy actor ('nodality'), their legal powers ('authority'), their money ('treasure'), or the formal organizations available to them ('organization') or 'NATO'. Governments can use these resources to manipulate Policy Instruments 91 policy actors, for example, by withdrawing or making available information or money, by using their coercive powers to force other, actors to undertake activities they desire, or simply by undertaking the activity themselves using their own personnel and expertise. Other schemes existed, such as Elmore's and Schneider and Ingram's, which focused on the outputs associated with instruments, rather than their inputs, but these received less attention than did Hood's.2 This is because resource-based schemes like Hood's allowed a relatively small '. number of general categories of policy tools to be identified, and permitted the ready analysis of specific tools by grouping them together in very small number of general categories. Such schemes aid analysis by distinguishing clearly between policy choices involving changes in policy tools within categories and between them. In the first instance, for example, the parameters or 'settings' of a tool might be changed but not the basic category of the tool itself, as occurs, for example, when the amount or extent of a government subsidy is varied. In the second, rather than involving a change in the calibration of an instrument, changes might involve an alteration in overall tool category. An example of such a change would include one where privatization results in a government eliminating public corporations, choosing to use regulations or legal standards rather than bureaucratic forms of organization to achieve its ends. Using Hood's idea of governing resources, a basic taxonomy of instrument categories can be set out. Figure 4.1 presents such a classification scheme with illustrative examples of the types of policy tools found in each category. As Figure 4.1 shows, policy instruments tend to fall into two types: substantive instruments, such as public enterprises and user charges; designed to deliver or affect the delivery of goods and services in society; and procedural instruments, such as the creation of adVisory committees ~d government reorganizations, used to alter aspects of policy deliberations.This distinction will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 8 when we examine the reasons why governments use particular types of tools or what is sometimes referred to as 'the rationale for instrument choice'.3 Here, we will describe the general contours of the types of instruments found in each of the ca.tegoriesset out in Figure 4.1. Direct Provision In our effort to understand the more exotic instruments employed by governments, we tend to forget this basic and most Widely used public policy instrument. Instead of waiting for the private sector to do something it desires or regulating non-governmental performance of a task, a government can often perform the task itself, delivering goods and services - Figure 4.1 Policy Instruments, (Cells provide examples J1t<{~~iitY'kD>'-, by Principal Governing Resource of instruments-in each category) Authority Treasure Organization Information Monitoring and Release Command and Control Regulation Grants and Loans Direct Provision of Goods and SerVices and Public Enterprises Advice and Exhortation Self-Regulation User Charges StandardSetting and . Delegated Regulation Commissions and Inquiries Advisory Committees and Consultations Use of Family, Community, and Voluntary Organizations Taxes and Tax Market Creation Expenditures Interest Group Government Creation and Reorganization Funding Adapted from Christopher Hood, The Tools of Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1986), 124-5. SOURCE: directly by using government employees, funded from the public treasury, for a task (Leman, 1989: 54; Leman, 2002; Mayntz, 1979; Devas et al., 2001).'Much of what governments .do is done through this 'instrument, including activities such as national defence, diplomatic relations; policing, firefighting, social security, education, management of public lands, maintenance of parks and roads, and census and geological surveys. There are several advantages of using direct provision as a policy instrument (Leman, 1989: 60). First, direct provision is easy to establish because of low information requirements, unlike other instruments, which rely heavily on non-government actors and hence require constant monitoring and supervision of their activities. Second, the large size of the agencies usually involved in direct provision enables them to build resources, skills, and information necessary for efficient performance of their task. Third, direct provision avoids many problems associated with indirect provision-discussion, negotiations, and concerns with noncompliance-that can lead governments to pay more attention to enforcing terms of grants and contracts than to results. Fourth, direct provision permits internalization within government of many types of transactions, thus minimizing the costs involved in policy implementation. The disadvantages of direct provision, however, can be no less significant. While in theory a government can do everything that the private sector can, in practice this may not be the case. As theorists of govern- ment failures have noted, delivery of programs by the bureaucracy is often characterized by inflexibility, something that is unavoidable in liberal democratic societies, which value accountability and the rule of law and where governments must abide by formal operating procedures encoded in time-consuming legal budgeting and appointment requirements. Second, political control over the agencies and officials involved in providing goods and services may, and often does, promote political meddling to strengthen a government's re-election prospects or address, other specific contemporary political needs rather than to serve the public as a whole. Political control may also lead to incoherent directives to agencies delivering goods and services because of the contradictory pressures that beset governments. Third, since bureaucratic agencies are not subject to competition, they are often not sufficiently cost-conscious, for which the taxpayers ultimately pay. Fourth, the delivery of programs may suffer because of inter- and intra-agency conflicts within the government (Bovens et al., 2001). Public Enterprises Also known as state-owned enterprises (SOES),Crown corporations, or parastatal organizations, public enterprises are entitieS totally or partially owned by the state but yet enjoying some degree of autonomy from the government. There is no definitive way of identifying a public enterprise, which explains why gQvernments quite often do not publish a definitive list of the enterprises they own. The main problem is determining how public an enterprise must be in order to be called a 'public' enterprise. At oneextrem€, with only a small gevernment share of ownership, a firm mayreseIfible apnvate enterprise, and at the other, with close to 100 per cent government equity ownership, an enterprise may appear to be an ordinary bureaucratic agency (Stanton and Moe, 2002). However, three broad generalizations can be made about the basic features of public enterprises (Ahroni, 1986: 6). First, they involve a large degree of public ownership. Analysts often use an arbitrary figure of a minimum 51 per cent ownership of a firm by a government or government~ to call a firm a public enterprise, since this amount ensures government control of appointments to a company's board of directors. However, in large corporations with widely held stock, a much smaller percentage would be sufficient to control board appointments. The term 'mixed enterprise' is used to describe a second category of firms owned jointly by government and the private sector. Second, public enterprises entail some degree of control or direct management by the gov:ernment. Completely passive ownership of a firm operated entirely free from governinent control does not constitute a public enterprise. Hybrid 'special operating agencies' or 'public authorities' created in many countries in recent years to operate specific services such as airports, harbours, and water or electrical power utilities are not traditional public enterprises in that governments usually do not directly control their boards of directors (Advani and Borins, 2001; Kickert, 2001). Third, public enterprises produce goods and services that are sold, unlike public goods such as defence or street lighting for which those receiving the services are taxed. As a corollary, their sales revenues must bear some semblance to their costs, though generating profits is usually not the primary objective of these firms, as it is for their private-sector counterparts. Public enterprises as policy instruments offer a number of advantages to governments (Mitnick, 1980: 407). First, they are an efficient economic policy instrument in situations where a socially needed good or service is not produced by the private sector because of high capital outlays or low expected returns, for example, in providing rural electrification or high-speed Internet access. Second, as with direct provision, the information threshold required to establish public enterprises is in many instances lower than when using other kinds of instruments, such as voluntary instruments or regulation. It does not require information on 'the target activity or the goals and preferences of the targeted firms, because the government as owner can do whatever it wishes through the enterprise itself. Third, in terms of administration, public enterprises may actually simplify management if extensive regulation is already present. Instead of building additional layers of regulation to force firms to comply with government aims, for instance, it might be desirable simply to establish a company that does so without the need for the cumbersome processes and oversight provisions attending regulation. Finally, profits from public enterprises may accrue to public funds, any surplus in which can be used to pay for public .expenditures in othefareas.-Asignificantproportion of government revenue in Singapore; for example, comes from the profits of its public enterprises. The disadvantages of public enterprises are no less significant. First, governments often find them difficult to control because' managers can adopt various avoidance measures to evade government directives. Moreover, the ultimate shareholders (the voters themselves) are too diffuse, and their personal interest too distant, to exercise effective control over the company. Second, public enterprise can be inefficient in operation because continued losses do not lead. to bankruptcy, as would occur in the private sector. Indeed a large number consistently lose money, which is a major reason underlying efforts to privatize them in many countries in recent years (see Howlett and Ramesh, 1993; Ikenberry, 1988). Finally, ·many public enterprises, such as in the area of electricity and water supply, operate in a monopolistic environment enabling them to pass the ·'~ts·,gftheiT'inefficiency"to·conSUtIfers;·lQ'sttategy no different than that ".,a-f.a·,J,Yivate,irm-enja¥ingamoaopoly,position (Musolf, 1989). Family, Community, and Voluntary Organizations The characteristic feature of this type of instrument is that it entails no or little involvement by the government; the desired task is instead performed on a voluntary basis by non-governmental actors. In some cases, governments must create the conditions under which voluntary actors operate, while in others governments decide deliberately that they will do nothing ('non-decision') about a recognized public problem, because they believe a solution is already being, or will be, provided by some other actor, whether through existing private companies in the market or by family or voluntary organizations. These services are often provided by non-governmental organiz;:.~ioD"(NGOS) operating on a voluntary basis in that their members ate not compelled to perform a task by the government. If they do something that serves public policy goals, it is for reasons of self-interest, ethics, or emotional gratification (Salamon, 1995). The existence of such organizations is supported by government (in)action and they are an important tool for implementing many economic and social policies. Their usage has grown in recent decades because of increasing governmental retreat from direct provision and, extensive privatization of public enterprises. NGOS are preferred in many liberal democratic societies, especially, because of their cost-efficiency, consistency with the cultural norms of individual freedom, and the support they provide for family and community ties. However, they are also found in many other types of societies. In all societies, relatives, friends, and neighbours, or family and community organizations, such as churches and charities, provide numerous goods and services, and the government may take measures to expand their role in ways-that senreits.policy goals-.-ltmay do so either indirectly by cutting back on government services in the hope that the family or community will step in to fill the gap, or directly by promoting their involvement through preferential regulation or financial incentives such as tax deductions for charitable donations or expenses (Phillips et al., 2001). All societies regard looking after the needs of family members and others close to them as an essential responsibility of the individual. Children, the aged, and the sick are ordinarily looked after in this manner, mainly in terms of care, but financial assistance if necessary is also common: It has been calculated that in 1978 the total cost of the transfer of cash, food, and housing within families in the United States amounted to US$86 billion (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989: 281). Non-monetary transfers are almost impossible to estimate, however, because families provide a range of services whose value cannot be measured in monetary terms. It is estimated, for example, that about 80 per cent of home health-care services for the elderly are provided by family members (ibid., 19). Voluntary organizations involve 'activities that are indeed voluntary in the dual sense of being free of [state] coercion and being free of the economic constraints of profitability and the distribution of profits' 96 PART II Institutions, Policy Instruments Actors, and Instruments (Wuthnow, 1991: 7). Voluntary organizations providing health services, education, and food to the poor and temporary shelter for battered women and runaway children are prime examples of such organizations. Voluntary groups that form to clean up beaches, riverbanks, and highways are other examples. Although these functions could well be provided by the market or the government, they may also be left wholly or partially to volunteers. Charitable, not-for-profit groups, often church-based, used to be the primary means of fulfilling the basic needs of those who could not provide for themselves, but over the last century the expansion of the welfare state gradually diminished their importance. Even so, they are still a widely used means of addressing social ,problems today. In fact, in the US, often seen as the archetype of an individualist materialistic society, the non-profit voluntary sector delivers more services than the government itself (Salamon, 1987: 31). In recent years, because of the budgetary crises faced by governments, many countries have pressed to expand the role of the voluntary sector. In theory, voluntary organizations are an efficient means of delivering most economic and social services. If it were feasible, it wc>Uldobviously be cost-efficient to provide social security or health and education services or build dams and roads on the basis of voluntary efforts of individuals. Voluntary organizations also offer flexibility and speed of response and the opportunity for experimentation that would be difficult in governmental .organizations (Johnson, 1987: 114). They are often quicker than the government in providing relief to victims of natural disaster, for instance. Moreover, meeting ··social needs··in ·this ·manner· . decreases the need for government action, which appeals to those who believe that state intervention is inherently inimical to political freedom. Not-for-profit groups are also an equitable instrument because they are usually directed at only those in need. Another beneficial spillover is their positive contribution to promoting community spirit, social solidarity or cohesion, and political participation (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2000,2001). However, most practical circumstances severely limit the usefulness of voluntary organizations. Their efforts are largely inapplicable to many economic problems, for example, such as the promotion of technological innovation and enhanced productivity. And even in the social sphere, their efficiency and effectiveness may be compromised by the fact that large voluntary groups can be chaotic or may become bureaucratic and in practice become little different from government organizations. If they depend on the government for funds they also may not be cost-efficient; it might be cheaper for the state to perform the task directly. In the US, for example, the government prOVides40 per cent of total expenditure by voluntary organizations, a larger source of funds than private contributions (Salamon, 1987: 31). And the proportion of private funding would 97 have been even lower without the tax deductibility allowed for such contributions. Contemporary economic and social problems are simply too vast to be addressed adequately on the basis of voluntary efforts alone; most people have neither the time nor the resources to contribute to such activities in a substantive manner. Such organizations are therefore unlikely to work outside areas that give their active members satisfaction for religious, ethical, or political reasons. Consequently, voluntary organizations are not likely to undertake most tasks performed by modem governments. The primary advantage of promoting the family and community as an instrument of public policy is that it does not cost the government anything unless it chooses to provide grants or subsidies for these efforts. In many circumstances, as in the case of family or community care for the long-term disabled, this is much less expensive than their care in public institutions. Moreover, the functioning of non-profit community organizations, churches, co-operatives, and families enjoys widespread political support in most societies (Quarter, 1992). But pitted against these advantages are some serious disadvantages. Family- and community-based instruments, for example, are generally weak instruments for addressing complex economic problems~ Efficiency of scale may also warrant centralized provision by the government rather than decentralized provision by the family or community. Reliance on these types of instruments for solving public problems may also be inequitable because many individuals do not have anyone, or anyone with the financial resources or emotional commitment; to look after them. It is similarly inequitable for the caregivers. In most societies, for eXample,women tend to be the main .care providers, a role increasingly difficult to perform because of increasing female participation in the labour force. As such, family and community instruments can often only be relied upon as adjuncts to other instruments needed to address the pressing social problems of our times. Market Creation By far.the most important, and contentious, type of voluntary instrument is _the market organization. The voluntary interaction between consumers and producers I with the former seeking to buy as much as they can with the limited amount of money at their disposal and the latter searching for highest possible profits, can usually be expected to lead to outcomes that satisfy both. In theory at least, while the primary motive on the part of both sides is self-interest, the society as a whole gains from their interaction because whatever is wanted (backed by the ability to pay) by the society is provided at the lowest price. Theoretically, then, those wanting even such critical goods as health care or education can simply buy the services from hospitals and schools operating for profit. Markets exist when there is scarcity and a demand for particular goods or services. But government action is required both to create and to support market exchange. This is accomplished by securing the rights of buyers and sellers to receive and exchange property through the establishment and maintenance of property rights and contracts through the courts, police, and quasi-judicial systems of consumer and investor protection, such as securities and exchange commissions and competition tribunals. Even so-called 'black', 'grey', or other types of illegal or quasilegal markets for commodities or services, such as illegal drugs or prostitution, owe their existence to governments that attempt to ban the production and sale of these goods or services, thereby creating shortages that can provide high rates of return for those willing to risk punishment and imprisonment for their provision. Governments can use a variety of regulatory, financial, and information-based tools to affect market activities, and these will be discussed in the following sections. However, they use their organizational resources to create markets. One way this can be done is by the creation of a new set of property rights thrQugh government licensing schemes. On the basis of the assumption that the market is often the most efficient means of allocating resources, property-rights auctions by the government establish markets in situations where they do not exist. The market is created by setting a fixed quantity of transferable rights to consume a designated resource, which has the effect of creating an artificial scarcity ·and enabling the price mechanism to work. The resource can .be communal radio, television, or cell-phone frequencies, oil wells, or fish stocks, anything that would not be scarce unless made so by the government (Sunnevag, :1.O00) •. Those wishing. to consume the.resourcemust bid at.an auction for the limited amount available,PDtential buyers will bid according to the value they attribute to the resource, with those offering the most in return for the government securing their right. Many countries have proposed to control the use of dangerous pollutants in this manner (Bolom, 2000), and some such schemes exist in environmental agreements, such as the so-called Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases. In these schemes, typically, the government is expected to fix the total amount of the pollutant that can enter the market and then through periodic auctions sell the right to discharge the limited amount available. This means tpat firms intending to use a pollutant in their production process must buy the right to do so at an auction before they can buy the pollutant itself. Those with cheaper alternatives will avoid using the pollutant because of the extra cost of buying rights. Manufacturers for whom there is no cheap alternative continue to pay '''th'e''pridtl<Jr'tbe'rigltt4c 'USethe'poliutant;~However, ·~en'·theY"'M-e under ..xl;coD:$tant~es,sure,to i:SeaIch·.Jor,.allernatives,.}aecause,..oL theaxtra costs they must otherwise bear. The advantage of using an auction of rights in such cases is that it .restricts the use of specific types of goods while still making them avail- able to those without alternatives. Of course, the same could be done through r~gulation, but then the government would have to determine who should be allowed to use the limited amount available, a difficult task because of the high information costs involved. In the case of auctions, in theory at least the decision will be made by the market according to the forces of demand and (artificially limited) supply. Another example of the use of auctions of property rights is in controlling the number of motor vehicles on city roads. After experimenting with a number of instruments to control the rapidly increasing number of motor vehicles that were causing traffic congestion and posing an environmental hazard in the long run, the government of Singapore decided to resort to the auction of the right to vehicle ownership. The annual supply of new motor vehicles in the country is limited to about 4,000. But before one can buy a car, one must purchase a Certificate of Entitlement at an auction organized by the government. Since the annual demand for new cars is far in excess of 4,000, in recent years the successful bidders have had to pay in excess of Singapore $50,000 just to buy an entitlement (over and above the price of the car itself). This instrument has ensured that the government is able to control the number of vehicles on streets without determining which specific individuals or firms can own cars, the latter being determined by the market. Of course, the auction is also a highly lucrative source of revenue for the government. One advantage of auctions of property rights to establish markets is that they are easy to conduct (Cantor et aI., 1992). The government, based on what it considers the ..maxirnum a,ffiOuntofa· good or serviee.",,, that should be permitted, fixes the ceiling and then lets the market do the rest. Second, they are a flexible instrum~nt, which allows the government to vary the ceiling as and when it wants; the subjects must adjust their behaviour accordingly. Property-rights auctions also allow the subjects to adjust their behaviour according to other changes in their circumstances, such as with respect to development of cost-saving technology, without requiring a corresponding change in the government's policy or instrument. Third, auctions offer the certainty that only a fixed amount of undesired activity occurs, something not possible with other voluntary. or mixed instruments. One of the disadvantages of auctions is that they may encourage speculation, with speculators buying up and hoarding all rights by bidding high, thereby erecting entry barriers to small firms or consumers. Second, it is often the case that those who cannot buy the rights, because none may be available for sale, will be forced to cheat, whereas in the case of user charges or subsidies they would have an alternative, albeit often at a high price. This can result in high enforcement costs if grey or black markets are to be avoided. Third, auctions are inequitable to the extent they allocate resources according to ability to pay, rather than opposition in democratic societies otherwise structured along more egalitarian principles. A 'free market' in the true sense of the term is therefore almost never used as a policy instrument in practice. When a government does choose to resort to this instrument to address a public problem, it is usually accompanied by other instruments such as regulation to protect consumers, investors, and workers; it is also accompanied frequently by subsidies intended to further promote the desired activity (Cantor et ai., 1992). Thus the voluntarism of markets is relative rather than absolute. Government Reorganizations Unlike the instruments discussed so far, which are intended to alter the configuration of goods and services delivered in soCiety, there are also 'procedural' instruments that rely on the use of government organizational resources. The objective of these instruments is to alter policy processes in such a way that governments can retain their legitimacy or capacity to act (Howlett, 2000). The foremost example of such an instrument is institutional reorganization whereby governments seek to achieve an objective by reorganizing the structures or processes through which they perform a function (Peters, 1992b; Carver, 2001). These activities are sometimes referred to as 'network management', in which governments use their personnel and other organizational resources to alter or restructure how policy actors interact with each other (Klijn, 1996; Klijn et ai., 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Reorganizations can involve the creation of new agencies or the reconfiguration ofo.ld.ol}e~. One popular tech,I.ljque.fQJsuchpurpQ-ses is minis- _ terral reorganization. Some of these alterations can ,oc(;uraccidentally or as a by-product of organizational changes in government machinery brought about for other reasons, such as electoral or partisan ones. However, intentional organizational change to the basic structures or personnel of government departments and agencies has become an increasingly significant aspect of modem policy-making (lindqUist, 1992; Aucoin, 1997). This. can involve changes in the relationships between departments and central co-ordinating agencies, or between departments, or within ministries. In the first instance, ministries can be given greater autonomy and capacity to set their own direction, or they can be brought into tighter control by central executive agencies (Smith et ai., 1993). In the second case, government departments can be divided into more specialized units, as has happened in instances where, for example, specialized ."~pal!tment::s~deaJiRgi,,WittI;:particular'.industrial sectors have been created froni la.~erunits.or ;the:revers~,pro~s,:oftl,J.eamalgamation of specific purpose units into omnibus ministries has occurred. This has been the pattern in many countries recently, for example, where specific resource ministries such as forests and mines have been combined into depart- ments of the environment or sustainable development (Brown, 1992). Or new units. can be created to deal with new issues, as. has occurred in many countries over the last two decades, for example, with the creation of new human rights agencies (Howe and Johnson, 2000). In the final instance, the same kinds of interdepartmental reforms can be made at the intradepartmental level, reducing or augmenting the autonomy of subunits or reorganizing them to expand or retract their spheres of.activity. 'In the latter instance, this often involves the creation of specialized units within departments to enhance their planning capacity (Chenier, 1985; Prince, 1979). Reorganizing government structures can have a very dramatic impact on existing policy processes and on the types of interactions between and among state and societal actors (Peters, 1992b). However, it is also the case that there are limits to such reorganizations. First, they can be expensive and time-consuming. Second, if they occur too frequently, their impact can be much dissipated. And third, there can be constitutional or jurisdictional limits to the kinds of activities that specific governments can take on and the fashion in which they can do so (Gilmore and Krantz, 1991). Authority-Based Instruments Command and Control Regulation There are numerous definitions of regulation, but most tend to be quite restrictive in focus (Mitnick, 1978). A good general one is offered by Michael Reagan, who defines it as 'a process. or activity in which government .requires or proscribes certain activities cor behaviour on the part of individuals and institutions, mostly private but sometimes public; and does so through a continuing administrative process, generally through specially designated regulatory agencies' (Reagan, 1987: 17). Thus, regulation is a prescription by the government that must be complied with by the intended targets; failure to do so usually involves a penalty. This type of instrument is often referred to as 'command and control' regulation. Some regulations, such as those dealing with criminal behaviour, are laws and involve the police and judicial system in their enforcement. Most regulations, however, are administrative edicts created under the terms of enabling legislation and administered on a continuing basis by a government department or a specialized, quasi-judicial government agency (first called independent regulatory commissions in the US) that is more or less autonomous of government control in its day-to-day operations. Regulations take various forms and include rules, standards, permits, prohibitions, laws, and executive orders. Although we may not always be aware of their presence, among other things they govern the price and standards of a wide variety of goods and services we consume, need, and can generate fierce opposition from those affected because of the extra costs they must bear in buying the right (Woerdman, 2000; Kagel and Levin, 2002). Thus, in Singapore the rich buy more than one car, not least because shortage has turned car ownership into a status symbol, while those who really need one, for example, to start up a business, may not be able to buy a vehicle if they do not have the additional money required to buy the certificate of entitlement. Another way that governments can create markets is through the privatization of public enterprises, especially if those enterprises had previously exercised a state-sponsored monopoly on the production or distribution, or both, of a particular good or service. Privatization can be carried out in numerous ways, from issuing shares to all citizens, to the simple transfer of state shares to community organizations or their sale on public exchanges. In all cases, this amounts to the transfer of a public enterprise to the private sector and the transformation of the goal of the enterprise from public service provision to maximization of shareholder value. Moreover, though; it also usually involves the signal, either overt or covert, that new firms will be able to enter into the market formerly served by the state-owned company, allowing for the creation of a competitive market for that particular good or service. Although some scholars see privatization as a panacea, capable at one stroke of eliminating corrupt or inefficient public-sector providers and replacing them with more efficient private-sector ones, others point out that this is not always the case. In many Eastern European postsocialist countries, for example, large-scale and largely uncontrolled privatizations resulted in many instances of massive layoffs and plant closures, with' severe economic consequeIices' for affected families, communities, and regions. In others, like Russia, where securities markets were not well developed, plants were simply transferred to their managers, who in many cases were able to reap windfall profits from their sale. It is also the case, as welfare economists have argued, that some industries have economies of scale that allow large firms to maintain their monopolistic position, regardless of whether they are owned by governments or private investors. Privatization of such firms merely transfers monopoly profits from the public sector, where they can be used to finance additional public services, to the private sector, where they are often used for personal luxury consumption (Beesley, 1992; Bos, 1991; Donahue, 1989; Le Grand and Robinson, 1984; MacAvoy et aI., 1989; Starr, 1990a). In Western countries with much smaller numbers of public enterprises, a more co;nmon form of privatization has involved contracting out of government services, that is, the transfer of various kinds of goods and services formerly provided 'in-house' by government employees to 'outsourced' private firms (Kelman, 2002; DeHoog and Salamon, 2002). Again, while some see any transfer of service provision from the state to the private sector as an inherent welfare gain-, others note that in many cases the same employees end up being hired by the new service provider to provide the same service, but at less pay, while others have noted _that the costs to administrators of establishing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts often cancels out any cost savings (see Lane, 2001; Ascher, 1987; Grimshaw et aI., 2001). A much talked about but little used form of government market creation involves the use of vouchers. These are papers with a monetary face value offered by the government to consumers of a particular good or service, given by consumers to their preferred supplier, who in turn presents the voucher to the government for redemption. Vouchers allow consumers to exercise relatively free choice in the marketplace, but only for specific types or quantities of goods. They are common in wartime as a means to ration supplies of materials, and have also been used in peacetime in schemes such as food stamps for the poor. This promotes competition among suppliers, which arguably improves -quality and reduces costs to the government. However, vouchers can also disrupt established patterns of public service provision. Their proposed use in education, for example, may force schools to compete against each other for students, which can lead to greater inequities in service provision between wealthy and impoverished school districts (Valkama and Bailey, 2001; Steuerle and 'IWombly,2002). Establishing markets can be a highly recommended instrument in certain circumstances (Averch, 1990; OEeD, 1993; Hula, 1988). It is an effective and efficient means of providing most private goods and can ensure that resources are devoted only to those goods and services valued by the society, as reflected ia the individual's willingness to pay. It also ensures that if there is meaningful- competition among suppliers, then valued goods and services are supplied at the lowest possible price. Since most goods and services sought by the population are of a private nature, governments in capitalist societies rely extensively on the market instrument. In many situations, however, the market may be an inappropriate instrument to use (Kuttner, 1997). As we saw in Chapter 2, markets cannot adequately provide public goods, precisely the sort of things most public policies involve. Thus, markets cannot be used for providing defence, policing, stieet lights, and other similar goods and services valued by society. Markets also experience difficulties in providing various kinds of toll goods and common-pool goods (see Chapter 2 for definitions) due to difficulties involved in charging consumers for these kinds of products. The market is also a highly inequitable instrument, because it meets the needs of only those with the ability to pay. In a purely market-based system of health-care delivery, (or example, a rich person with money can have a wish for cosmetic surgery fulfilled, while a poor person suffering from kidney failure will not receive treatment. It is not surprising that the use of markets in such situations faces tough political from radio statio,ns to energy prices, as well as the quality of water we drink and the air we breathe, among other things. The nature of regulations varies somewhat depending on whether they are targeted towards economic or social spheres of human activity. Economic regulations control aspects of the production processes specific to particular goods and services, such as the prices and volumes of production, or return on investment, or the entry into or exit of firms from an industry. A good example of this type of regulation is that carried out by various kinds of marketing boards, regulatory bodies that are particularly prominent in the agricultural sector. The intent of such boards is to keep farm commodity prices high by restricting supply. Their objective is to correct perceived imbalances or inequities in economic relationships that may emerge as a result of the operation of market forces. Economic regulations' have been the traditional form of regulation; their social counterparts are or more recent origin. Social regulations refer to controls in matters of health, safety, and social practices such as civil rights and discrimination of various sorts. They have more to do with our physical and moral well-being than with our pocketbooks. Examples of social regulation include rules regarding liquor consumption and sales, gambling, consumer product safety, occu~ pational hazards, water-related hazards, air pollution, ,noise pollution, discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, or ethnicity, and pornography (Padberg, 1992). Many areas of regulation, such as environmental protection, liquor consumption, and gambling, exist as hybrids between pure economic and pure social regulation, because the problems may: 'have-economic origins but 1heit a.dverse·effects are mostly social. While there is a great deal of overlap between the tVITo,soCialregulations tend to be more general than economic ones and do, not focus on particular industries (for example, banks or telecommunications), as do economic regulations, but on broader problems or functions, such as pollution, safety, or morality. This has important implications for their administration and enforcement because social regulation tends to cut across several sectors and come under the jurisdiction of several government agencies (see May, 2002; Salamon, 2002b). There are several advantages of regulation as a policy instrument (see Mitnick, 1980: 401-4). First, the information needed to establish regulation is less than with many other tools because a government need not know in advance the subject's preferences, as it must in the case of voluntary instruments. It can simply establish a standard, for example, a permitted pollution level, and expect compliance. Second, where the concerned activity is deemed entirely undesirable, as is the case with films and, videos depicting pedophilia, it is easier to establish regulations prohibiting the possession of such products than to devise ways of encouraging the production and distribution of other types of more benign goods or seryices~ Third, regulations allow for better co-ordina- tion of government efforts and planning because 'of the greater predictability they entail. Fourth, their predictability makes them a more suitable instrument in times of crisis when an immediate response is needed. Fifth, regulations may be less costly than other instruments,' such as subsidies or tax incentives. Finally, regulations may also be politically appealing if the public or policy subsystem wants to see quick and definite action on the part of the government. The disadvantages of regulation are equally telling (see Anderson, 1976). First, regulations quite often distort voluntary or private-sector activities and can promote economic inefficiencies. Price regulations and direct allocation restrict the operation of the forces of demand and supply and affect the price mechanism in capitalist societies, thus causing sometimes unpredictable economic distortions in the market. Restrictions on entry to and exit from industrial sectors, for example, can reduce competition and thus have a negative impact on prices. Second, regulations can, at times, inhibit innovation and technological progress because of the market security they afford existing firms and the limited opportunities for experimentation they permit. Third, regulations are often inflexible and do not permit the consideration of individual circumstances, resulting in decisions and outcomes not intended by the regulation (Dyerson and Mueller, 1993). Social regulations are particularly problematic. It is almost impossible to specify in many instances exactly what is acceptable under regulation. The use of phrases such as 'safe and effective' drugs, for instance, allows for too much uncertainty. If regulations specify detailed standards, however, then they can become irrelevant in new circumstances. (Bardach, 1989: 203-4) . Foutth, in terms of. administration, it may simply not be possible to set regulations for.every , undesired activity. For example, there are millions of pollutants; a special regulation would be required for each if this instrument were chosen for , policy purposes. Finally, the cost of enforcement by regulatory commissions may be high because the costs of information, investigation, and prosecution make policy-making legalistic and adversarial (see Hahn and Hird,1991). or Delegated Self-Regulation Another form of regulatory instrument is delegated regulation. Unlikethe situation with command and control regulation, in this instance governments allow non-governmental actors to regulate themselves. This is sometimes referred to as 'self-regulation' although this latter term tends to portray the resulting regulatory arrangements as more 'voluntary' than is actually the case. That is, while non-governmental entities may, in effect, regulate themselves, they typically do so with the implicit or explicit permission of governments, which consciously refrain from regulating activities in a more directly coercive fashion (Donahue and Nye, 2001). These delegations can be explicit and direet,for example, when governments allow professions such as doctors, lawyers, or teachers to regulate themselves through the grant of a licensing monopoly to a bar association, a college of physicians and surgeons, or a teachers' college . (see Sinclair, 1997; Tuohy and Wolfson, 1978). However, they can also be much less explicit, as occurs in situations where manufacturing companies develop standards for products or where independent certification firms or associations certify that certain standards have been met in various kinds of private practices (see Andrews, 1998; Gunningham and Rees, 1997; Iannuzzi, 2001). While many standards are invoked by government command and control regulation, others can be developed in the private sphere. As long as these are not replaced by governmentenforced standards, they represent the acquiescence of a government to the private rules, a form of delegated regulation (see Haufier, 2000,2001; Knill, 2001). A major advantage of the use of voluntary standard-setting is cost, since governments do not have to pay for the creation, administration, and renewal of such standards, as would be the case with traditional command and control regulation. This is especially the case in areas such as professional regulation, where information asymmetries between those regulated and regulators mean public administration of standards is especially expensive and time-consuming. Such programs can also be effective in international settings, where establishment of effective governmental regimes, such as sustainable forestry practices, can be especially diffi·cult(Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001). However, possible savings in administrative costs. once again must be .balanced against additional costs to society that might result from ineffective orin€ffiGient administration of voluntary standards, especially those related to ·non-compliance.4 For example, the recent (2002) Enron scandal in the US involving the energy giant's auditing firm, Arthur Anderson, has undermined confidence in the accounting profession's ability or even willingness to police itself. Advisory Committees and Quangos Governments can also use their authority resources to affect policy processes. This involves alteration of the government's authority to elevate the views of some policy actors above others in formal and informal policy processes. It is based on preferential recognition extended by states to specific policy actors, enhancing their access to decision-makers and their voice in policy deliberations (Dion, 1973; Anderson, 1979b). '.A.}~dard.mo-V·,m:··ithi'S,;categGry··is'·lh.e··.·'t1dTJi:aory;ctJmmittee (Smith, ,197.7..;.~Gill,aQ40}.Some ofthes.e ..are.ionnalized..and more or less pennanent, while others tend to be more ad hoc, informal, and temporary (Brown, 1955, 1972; Balla and: Wright, 2001). Both involve governments selecting representatives to sit on these committees and the extension to those representatives of some special rights within the policy process. Many countries have created permanent bodies to provide advice to governments on particular ongoing issue areas, such as the economy, science and technology, and the environment (for Canada, see Phidd, 1975; Doern, 1971; Howlett, 1990). However, many other such bodies exist in almost every policy area. These range from general advisory committees and specialized clientele advisory committees to specific task-oriented committees and others (see Peters and Parker, 1993; Barker and Peters, 1993). Permanent bodies advise governments on particular issue areas on an ongoing basis, while others are formed for shorter periods of time to look into specific issue areas. Ad hoc task forces or inquiries, including some forms of Royal Commissions, are created by governments largely to fashion a consensus among interested parties on the nature of a policy problem and its solution (Wilson, 1971). They are usually quite specific in their focus and conduct different types of hearings and 'stakeholder' consultations aimed at developing such a consensus. These should not be confused with the more open-ended, research-oriented bodies that are created under these same titles (Sheriff, 1983). Ad hoc task forces and similar bodies are not intended to develop new knowledge or promulgate old, but rather to provide a venue for organized and unorganized interests to present their views and analyses on pressing contemporary problems, or to frame or reframe issues in such a way that they can be dealt with by governments (Owens and Rayner, 1999). A second tool in this category is a kind of public-private partnership , (Linder, 1999). There are numerous different types of Slichp.C\rtneJsh.ips. many of which are a form of contracting.ouLused ..to deliver goods and services and, therefore, exist as substantive rather than procedural instruments. However, some partnerships exist primarily to enhance the capacity and permanence of private-sector actors, usually non-governmental organizations (NGOS),which are delegated minor government tasks in order to receive funding, the main purpose of which is to maintain~these organizations' availability for consultations and the provision of advice to governments (Armstrong and Lenihan, 1999; Kernaghan, 1993). In some countries, such as Britain, governments have created an entire category of quasi-autonomous NGOsor QUANGOs, which fulfill an important role in poli"cy-makingprocesses (Hood, 1986b; Kickert, 2001). Various issues arise with respect to the use of this tool, including who is included or excluded, how broad is the range of interests represented among committee or QUANGO members, and how specific individuals are designated as 'representative'. Design issues also involve questions of size, as larger groups may be more representative of more views but will have greater difficulty arriving at uniform recommendations. These issues have taken on more salience in recent years as efforts to increase 'stakeholder' . consultations have occurred in many jurisdictions (see Glicken, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997). While these kinds of consultative partnerships are useful, they have some drawbacks, notably the potential to co-opt societal actors to the point where the advice they provide to governments merely reflects the aims and desires of the government itself (Phillips, 1991a; Saward, 1990, 1992). Also difficult is identifying exactly who is a 'stakeholder' and who is not, which can lead to difficulties if interested parties are missed or overlooked (Glicken, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997). And these processes can lead to cynicism on the part of participants if they feel their positions have been ignored, or that the purpose of a task force or committee is simply to impose a predetermined view on participants rather than the other way around (Riedel, 1972; Grima, 1985). A third general category of policy instruments relies not so much on government personnel or governmental authority for its effectiveness, but rather on government financial resources and the government's ability to raise and disburse funds. This refers to all forms of financial transfers to individuals, firms, and organizations from governments or from other individuals, firms, or organizations under government direction. These transfers can serve as incentives or disincentives for private actors to follow the wishes of government. As an incentive, the purpose of the transfer is to reward a desired activity, thereby affecting social actors' estimates of costs and benefits of the various alternatives. While the final choice is left·to individualsandfirm-s, the likelihood .of the desired choice being made is enhanced because of the financial subsidy it draws (Beam and Conlan, 2002). As a disincentive, the purpose is to penalize certain types of behaviour by raising the costs that individuals and other policy actors incur in following it (Cordes, 2002). Subsidies: Grants, Tax Incentives, andLoans One of the most prominent forms of treasure-based instrument is grants, which are 'expenditures made in support of some end worthy in itself, almost as a form of recognition, reward or encouragement, but not closely calibrated to the costs of achieving that end' (Pal, 1992: 152; Haider, 1989). Grants are usually offered to producers, with the objective of making them provide more of a desired good or service than they would otherwise. The expenditure comes out of the government's general tax revenues, which requires legislative approval. Examples of grants include government funds provided to schools, universities, and public transportation. Another prominent form of subsidy is the tax incentive involving 'remission of taxes in some form, such as deferrals, deductions, credits, exclusions, or preferred rates, contingent on some act (or the omission of some act)' (Mitnick, 1980: 365). Tax incentives or tax expenditures involve taxes or other forms of government revenues, such as royalties or licence fees, which are forgone. That is, a subsidy is provided since revenues that would normally have been collected are not. Governments find tax incentives appealing, not least because they are hidden in complex tax codes and so escape notice, which makes their establishment and continuation relatively easy (McDaniel, 1989; Leeuw, 1998). Moreover, in most countries they do not need legislative budgetary approval, for no money is actually spent; rather, revenues are forgone (Maslove, 1994). Nor is their use constrained by availability of funds, because they involve no direct expenditure. They are also easier to administer and enforce because no special bureaucracy needs to be created to administer them, as would be the case with many other instruments. The existing taxation bureaucracy is usually entrusted with the task. The amounts 'spent' in this manner are huge. For example, Christopher Howard has estimated that US federal tax expenditures alone accounted for $744.5 billion or 42 per cent of total federal direct expenditurE~S in the year 2000 (Howard, 2002: 417). Loans from the government at an interest rate below the market rate are also a form of subsidy. However, the entire amount of the loan should not be treated as a subsidy, only the difference between the interest charged andthe market rate (Lund, 1989). Other policy instruments not technically considered as subsidies may involve some component of subsidy. Thus, regulations that restrict the quantity of a particular good or service produced or sold also involve subsidy to the .produ{:ers-because they can often artificially increase prices. Dairy and poultry producers in many countries are subsidized in this manner. Regulations involving marketing boards that fix prices to protect competition from driving down prices and thus hurting other existing producers, for example, also involve subsidy from consumers. Restrictive licensing, such as that received by the taxicab industry in most places, is another example of this kind of subsidy through regulation. Government proCurement from local producers at a price higher than the market price is also a subsidy to these producers to the extent of the difference between the purchase price and the market price (Howard, 1997). Subsidies offer nUmerous advantages as policy instruments (see Mitnick, 1980: 350-3; Howard, 1993, 1995). First, they are easy to establish if there is a coincidence of preference between what the government wants someone to do and what the latter desires. If the target population believes an action to be desirable but for some reason does not carry it out, then a subsidy may make a difference in their behaviour. For instance, firms contemplating plant modernization or labour training may be swayed to act if tax incentives for these activities are provided; similarly, people are encouraged to put away money for their retirement rather than spend it right away if they are provided withgJax exemption for so doing. Second, subsidies are a flexible--instrument to administer because the individual participants decide for themselves how to respond to the subsidy in the light of changing circumstances. Likewise, they permit local and sectoral circumstances to be taken into account, as only those individuals and firms believing a subsidy to be beneficial would take it up. Third, by allowing individuals and firms to devise appropriate responses, subsidies may encourage innovation on their part. In contrast, directives, by establishing performance standards, normally discourage innovative responses from the public (it is, of course, also possible to make a subsidy contingent on innovation). Fourth, the costs of administering and enforcing.subsidies may be low because it is up to potential recipients to claim benefits. Finally, subsidies are often politically more acceptable because the benefits are concentrated on a few whereas the costs are spread across the population, with the result that they tend to be supported strongly by the beneficiaries and opposed only weakly by their opponents (Wilson, 1974). There are also disadvantages to the use of subsidies, of course. Since subsidies (except tax incentives) need financing, which must come from new or existing sources of revenues, their establishment through the formal budgetary process is often difficult. They must compete with other government programs needing funds, each backed by its own network of societal groups, politicians, and bureaucrats. Second, the cost of gathering information on how much subsidy would be required to induce a desired behaviour may also be high. Arriving at a correct amount of subsidy by trial and error can be an expensive.way.ofimplementinga.policy .. Third, since-subsidies work indirectly, there is also often a time lag before the desired effects are discernible. This makes them an inappropriate instrument to use in a time of crisis. Fourth, subsidies may be redundant in cases where the activity would have occurred even without the subsidy, thus causing a windfall for the recipients. At the same time, they are hard to eliminate because of the opposition from existing beneficiaries who stand to lose from their removal. Fifth, subsidies may be banned by international agreements, as they are in trading industries because of the pernicious effects that subsidized imports can have on local industries and employment. Financial Disincentives: Taxes and User Charges A tax is a legally prescribed compulsory payment to government by a person or firm (1tebilcock et al., 1982: 53). Th.emain purpose of a tax is z-nommliy,'ito .;~raise"TeYemres·.>.for·'the>·86Vemment's·financing of expendi.tures..,,Howev,er.,,,u.,GilD.,.,also.be, llSed,as a policy instrument to induce a desired behaviour or discourage an undesirable behaviour. Taxes can take a variety of forms and differ as to how they are put into effect. Payroll taxes of various sorts are used in most countries to fund social secunty programs. Under such schemes, the employer typically withholds a specified portion of the employee's salary (called the employee contribution), matches the amount by a proportion determined by the government (employer contribution), and then hands the amount thus collected to the government. The purpose of payroll taxes is often to build an insurance pool for designated risks such as unemployment, sickness, industrial injury, and old age pensions. When the specified contingency occurs, the insured is indemnified from the fund. In a sense this is no different from private insurance one can buy for various risks; except that some risks are regarded as crucial to the society and hence insurance against them is made compulsory by the government. Compulsory membership in an insurance fund expands the number of insured and thus reduces the cost of premiums by spreading the risk for specific individual activities among the general populace (Katzman, 1988; Feldman, 2002). Taxes can also be used to curb undesirable behaviour. In contrast to a subsidy, which is a positive incentive and works by rewarding a desired behaviour, taxes can be applied as a negative incentive (or sanction) that penalizes an undesired behaviour. By taxing a good, service, or activity, the government indirectly discourages its consumption or performance by making it more expensive to purchase or produce. Many governments' policy objectives of reducing smoking, drinking, and gambling because of their ill effects, for example, can be partially achieved through exceptionally high taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling revenues. Studies show that the high price of cigarettes caused by high taxes was a key reason for reduction in cigarette.consumption in Canada in the early 1990s,-for example, -although these taxes encouraged smuggling and other forms of tax-avoidance behaviour (Studlar, 2002). A particularly innovative use of a tax as a pollcy instrument is a user charge. Instead of inducing a behaviour by rewarding it through subsidy or requiring it through regulations, the government imposes a 'price' on certain behaviours that those undertaking them must pay. The price may be seen as a financial penalty intended to discourage the targeted behaviour. User charges, similar to auctions of property rights, are a combination of regulation and market instruments. The regulatory aspect has to do with the government setting the charge (tax) for an activity without prohibiting or limiting it. How much of the target activity is undertaken is determined by market forces responding to the level of charges. The extra cost involved leads firms and individuals to conduct formal or informal cost-benefit analysis, and so conclude that the activity must be ceased altogether or reduced to a level where benefits exceed costs. Efforts to reduce costs may encourage a search for (cheaper) alternatives that will reduce the chargeable activity. A firm can reap windfalls if it is able to implement technologies that do not involve the target behaviour or the charge associated with it. The success of a user charge 112. PART II Institutions, Policy Instruments Actors, and Instruments is contingent on setting optimal charges so that only an acceptable level of undesired activity occurs. User charges are most commonly used to control negative externalities. An example from the area of pollution control is that of user charges on pollution, known as effluent charges (Sproule-Jones, 1994; Zeckhauser, 1981). Reducing pollution has costs, the marginal rate of which tends to increase with each additional unit of reduction. If a charge is levied on effluent discharge, the polluter will keep reducing its level of pollution to the point at which it becomes more expensive to reduce pollution than simply to pay the effluent charge. In theory at least, the polluter will thus be constantly seeking to devise ways to minimize the charges it has to pay by cutting back on the level of pollution it discharges. The government would ideally set the effluent charge at the point where social benefits equal social costs, assuming that the society knows how much pollution it can live with given the costs of decreasing the level of pollution. Any other price would be inefficient; lower charges would yield excessive pollution and too high a charge would raise costs, and, ultimately, the price that consumers pay. Another innovative example of user charges is provided by Singapore's efforts to control downtown traffic congestion, discussed above. During peak hours, commuters are required to pay a set fee to enter the downtown area, which forces them to compare the costs of entering the area in their own vehicles with the cost of taking a bus or underground train, which are exempt from the . charge. Research shows that the charge has had a marked impact on reducing traffic inflow into the downtown area, and other cities, like London, England; have now· implemented-Ol"are--€Gnsidering- similar schemes; • Among the advantages of taxes·and user charges as policy instruments are the following. First, they are easy to establish from an administrative standpoint. Companies have few grounds to oppose such measures; they cannot claim that it is not possible to reduce the activity in question, as they can continue the existing level of activity by paying the charge. Second, taxes and user charges provide continuing financial' incentives to reduce undesirable activities. Since reducing the charges firms pay would enable them to reduce prices or increase profits, it is in their self-interest to minimize the target activity. Regulations, by contrast, provide no incentive to reduce the behaviour below a specified standard. Third, user charges promote innovation by making it in a firm's interest to search for cheaper alternatives. Fourth, they are a flexible instrument, as the government can continue to adjust rates until a point is reached where the desirable amount of the target activity occurs. Moreover, unlike regulation, where the discovery of new technology would require a change in regulations, subjects respond to user charges on their own. Finally, they are desirable on administrative grounds because the responsibility for 113 reducing the target activity is left to individuals and firms, which reduces the need for large bureaucratic enforcement machinery. There are some disadvaritages of taxes and user charges as well. First, they require precise and accurate information in order to set the correct level of taxes or charges to elicit desired behaviour. Second, during the process of experimentation to arrive at optimum charges, resources may be misallocated. The existing charges, for example, might encourage the installation of machineiy that would be unviable when rates are reduced. Third, they are not effective in times of crisis when an immediate response is required. Finally, they can involve cumbersome and possibly damaging administration costs if their rates are not set properly and they encourage evasive behaviour on the part of their targets, as occurred in the smoking example cited above. Interest Group Funding A prominent procedural tool in this category is interest group funding. As public choice theorists have pointed out, interest groups do not arise automatically to press for certain policy solutions to ongoing problems, but rather require active personnel, organizational competence, and, above all, funding if they are to becoIIie a policy force. While different countries have different patterns and sources oUnterest group funding, governments play a large role in this activity in all democratic states . (Maloneyet aI., 1994). In some countries, like the US, funding for interest group creation and ongoing expenses tends to come from private-sector actors, especially philanthropic trust funds and private-companies; butgevernments facilitate this through favourab~ tax treatmenr for-estates, charitable trusts, and corporate donations (Nownesand Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 1995). In other countries, like Canada, the state plays a much greater role in providing direct financing for interest groups in specific areas where the government wishes to see such groups become, or become more, active (Pal, 1993a; Phillips, 1991a; Pross and Stewart, 1993; Finkle et aI., 1994). And, of course, in corporatist countries in Europe,· Latin America, and parts of Asia, states not 9nly facilitate interest group activities through financial means, but also through the extension of special recognition and associational rights to specific groups, providing them with a monopoly or near monopoly on representation. This brings with it a greater ability to raise revenues through memberships (Jordan and Maloney, 1998; Schmitter, 1977, 1985). Like many other procedural instruments, alteration of the interest group system through the use of financial or treasure-based instruments involves some risks. Although it may be useful for government to build SOcial,capacity in these areas in order to obtain better information on social needs and Wants, this kind of 'boundary-spanning' activityS can 114 PART II Institutions, also result in the co-optation or even emasculation of bona fide interests. It can also result in a significant distortion of the overall interest articulation system if only those groups favourable to the government receive funding (Saward, 1990, 1992; Cardozo, 1996). Nodality or Information-Based Instruments The fourth category of policy tools involves the use of information . resources at the disposal of governments. Public Information Policy Instruments Actors, and Instruments Campaigns This is a passive instrument whereby the government puts out information with the expectation that individuals and firms will change their behaviour in a desired manner. The information is often of a general nature, intended to make the population more knowledgeable so that they can make informed choices. For instance, information on tourism, programs, and economic and social statistics is disseminated by the government through advertising campaigns, leaving it to the population to draw conclusions and respond accordingly (Salmon, 1989). However, the information may also be more precisely targeted to elicit a particular response, as in the case of publicizing information on the ill effects of smoking (Weiss and Tschirhart, 1994; Vedung and van der Doelen, 1998). In either case, there is no obligation on the public to respond in a particular manner (Adler and Pittle, 1984). In many countries this passive release of information may be mandated or facilitated by freedom of information or access to information laws. These,lawsaIlow access to specific types of gov'ernment information by members of the public (Relyea, 1977; Bennett, 1990, 1992). Such legislation is usually accompanied by privacy acts and official secrets acts, which balance open access with restrictions on the release of some types of information, the exact content of which varies from country to country (Qualter, 1985). Exhortation Exhortation, or suasion as it is also called, involves orily slightly more government activity than pure dissemination of information (Stanbury and Fulton, 1984). It entails a concerted effort to change the subjects' preferences and actions, rather than just informing them about a situation with the hope that they will change their behaviour in a desired manner. However, it does not include altering the attractiveness of the choice by offering rewards or imposing sanctions . .",·"Exam.ptes·'OfeXhlJrtatioti"i'rit1u.de''<lavemsements urging people to keep "fih.md,~alfuy;,·no1'J:1ll·,waste.,wateL~"energy, and to use public transportation. Consultations between government officials and financial, industry, or labour representatives are also often a form of exhortation because in these meetings governments often hope to alter these parties' 115 behaviour. This group of instruments assumes one or both of two things: . (1) that the realm of private behaviour in question must remain private and government cannot legitimately apply coercive instruments; (2) that motivations are strong enough that the subjects themselves can be relied on to achieve policy goals once apprised of new information. For example, to prevent the spread of AIDS, the government can do little to force safe sexual behaviour but must instead rely on dissemination of information, hoping that people will make informed choices to avoid activities that carry risks of infection. The use of information-based tools offers numerous advantages to governments (ibid., 297-301). It is a good starting point for a government dealing with problems to which definite solutions are unavailable. Second, it is easy to establish, and if the problem is solved through exhortation alone, then nothing more needs to be done. However, even if a better instrument is found, the policy of suasion can be changed or abandoned without much difficulty. Third, it is inexpensive in terms of both financial and personnel costs because it involves little financial commitment or enforcement by the bureaucracy. And finally, exhortation is consistent with the norms of liberal democracy, which value debate, persuasion, individual responsibility, and freedom. Bowever, exhortation. is too weak an instrument when immediate results are required, as in times of crisis. The government may use it merely to portray itself as doing something about a problem, rather than actually doing something meaningful (Edelman, 1964: 44-72). Thus, government exhortation against violence against women, in the absence of other instruments, may beaf littleuse . ..AsStanbury and Fulton conclude, 'In· the-absence of positive or negative inducements (or more bluntly, leverage), most efforts at suasion probably have either a low probability of success or have a relatively short shelf life: At best, it should be used in conjunction with other instruments when they are available. Research Inquiries, Investigative Commissions, and Freedom of Information Legislation Information resources can also be used for procedural purposes. These instruments are quite varied and range from the selective release or withholding of government information to the creation of specialized research bodies to compile existing information into a form usable by governments. All of these tools, however, have the same end in mind: to alter the nature of the perceptions held by actors in policy subsystems so as to alter the nature of existing and future policy processes (Termeerand Koppenjan, 1997). Governments may employ a range of temporary bodies to compile existing information into a usable form or sometimes just to procrastinate in making a decision, hoping that public pressure for action will ease over time. Foremost among these is the ad hoc inquiry, commission, or task force. These agencies exist in many forms in different countries and are often established to deal with new or particularly troubling policy problems. They attempt to provide a forum that combines specialized academic research and more generalized public input into the definition of and potential solution to policy problems, generating information that becomes available to all participants in the policy process and altering their knowledge, or epistemic, base as a result (Sheriff, 1983; Wraith and Lamb, 1971: 302-23; Chapman, 1973). These commissions have some advantages in terms of removing a subject from immediate partisan debate, although this can lead to· charges that they are merely delaying tactics and thereby undermine their legitimacy (Elliott and McGuinness, 2001). This often results in the use of important or respected figures to head Such inquiries to ensure that their creation and deliberations remain above partisan or public reproach. This is especially the case with high-profile investigations such as Royal Commissions and presidential commissions (McDowall and Robinson, 1969; Cairns, 1990a; d!Ombrain, 1997). In many jurisdictions, a system of formal reviews of ongoing policy areas is also evident. These reviews serve as 'institutionalized' task forces or investigations into ongoing issues and the efforts made by gov~ ernment bodies to deal with them (Bellehumeur, 1997; de la Mothe, 1996; Raboy, 1995; Banting, 1995). These reviews are usually done 'inhouse' but sometimes also involve the use of outside experts (Owens and Rayner, 1999). In both cases, they generate and disseminate information on government activities, which is then used by actors in the policy process to inform themselves about government actions and, as a result, toadjust their own actions within "policy subsystems accordingly. Discussion in this chapter indicates that aparsimonious scheme for categorizing policy instruments can be generated by examining the limited number of basic 'resources' that governments can emplby. While this discussion helps to. outline the types of decisions pqlicy-makers must make about exactly how they will attempt to achieve their policy goals, it tells us little about how or why those choices are made. In Chapter 8we will discuss several causal models of instrument choice. This chapter, however, like the preceding one outlining the principal actors and institutions affecting public policy-making, has merely inventoried an important element of the public policy process. How the process actually operates is discussed in Part III. Anderson, Charles W. 1977. Statecraft: An Introduction Judgem.ent.New York: John Wiley and SonS. to Political Choice and Balch,· George 1. 1980. 'The Stick, the Carrot, and Other Strategies: A Theoretical Analysis of Governmental Intervention', Law and Policy Quarterly 2, 1: 35-60.· Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung, eds. 1998. Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Gunningham, Neil, Peter Grabosky, and Darren Sinclair. 1998. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hood, Christopher. 1986. The Tools of Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.· ' __ . 1986. 'The Hidden Public Sector: The 'Quangocratiza:tion' of the World?', in F.-x. Kaufman, G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds, Guidance, Contro~ and Evaluation in the Public Sector. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 183-207. Lowi, Theodore J~ 1972. 'Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice', Public Administration Review 32, 4: 298-310. Mitnick, B.M. 1980. The Political Economy of Regulation. New York: Columbia University Press. Peters, B. Guy, and F.K.M. Van Nispen, eds. 1998. Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating the Thols of Public Administration. New York: Edward Elgar. Salamon, Lester M., ed. 1989. Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action. Washington: Urban Institute, 23-50. __ , ed. 2002. The TholsofGovernment: A Guide to the New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1990. 'Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools', Journal of Politics 52, 2: 510-29. Wolf, Charles, Jr. 1988. Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Woodside, K 1986. 'policy Instruments and the Study of Public Policy', Canadian Journal of Political Sc;ience 19: 775-94. 1. On earlier, or similar, resource-based schemes, see Lundquist (1987); Anderson (1977); Baldwin (1985). 2. McDonnell and Elmore also used a fourfold classification of instruments although they dassifiedinstruments according to the end desired rathe; than the resources used. For MCDonnell and Elmore, instruments could be categorized as 'mandates', 'inducements' ,'capacity-building', and .system-changing'. See McDonnell and Elmore (1987); Elmore (1987). Schneider and Ingram (1990a, 1990b) proposed a similar list of categories, which they called 'incentives', 'capacity-building', 'symbolic and hortatory', and 'learning'. 3. On the distinction between procedural and substantive instruments, see, generally, Howlett (2000). On the art of political manipulation or 'heresthetics', see Riker (1983, 1986). 4. Critical assessments of the effectiveness of these instruments can be found in Gibson (1999) and Karamanos (2001). S. On 'boundary-spanning' in interorganizational relations, see Cohen and Levinthal(1990) and Lane and Lubatkin (1998). -I :T tD -a c cr _. -a --. n 0 n '< ." -.;: '0 n tD U) U) ~ ~ .., .-+ ...... ...... ...... Agenda-Setting Agenda-Setting: Policy Determinants, Policy Ideas, and Policy Windows rI Why do some issues appear on the governmental agenda for action and . i n?t others? ,,:ltho.ugh often taken for granted, the means and mechaby which Issues and concerns are recognized as candidates for ! government action are by no means simple. Some demands for govern)ment resolution of some public problems come from international and I domestic actors, whereas others are initiated by the governments themI selves. These issues originate in a variety of ways and must undergo \complex pr?cesses ~efore they are seriously co?~idered for resolution. \1Agen~a-se~!!!!&, the first and perhaps the most cntical stage of the policy cycle, is-concerned with these processes. I ~()hIlI<il1gdon,in his path-breaking inquiry on the subject in the early 1980s, provided the .fQ.l1owing concise definition of this stage:. '. ! msms as I conceive of i( is the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people .outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time. . . . Out of the set of all conceivable subjects or problems to which officials could be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend to some rather than others. So the agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable'subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention. (Kingdon, 1984: 3-4) \ I~da, What happens at this early stage has a decisive impae;ton the entire policy process and its outcomes. The maniler an<:iform in whichpfobl€Jhsarerecognized, if they are recognized at all, are important determin~t~~fl:l0':Vth.ey will ultimately. beaddr~sse<:i .by_pQIicy~makers; As Cobb an-aElder (i912: 12) put it: Pre-political, or at least pre-decisional processes often play the most critical role in determining what issues and alternatives are to be considered by the polity and the probable choices that will be 121 made. What happens in the decision-making councils of the formal institutions of government may do little more than recognize, document and legalize, if not legitimize, the momentary results of a continuing struggle of forces in the larger social matrix, At its most,~~, a~~_nda-settin8is about the r~co.gnitiOI). of a problem \ on the Part of the government.' How a problelTIcQmesJo be.interpreted \ as a public problem requiring government .action raises deeper questions .~ ~ the nature of human knowledge and the social construction of that kiiowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Holzner and Marx, 1979), and the"'pJ)li'cysc:!~!lC_~~Jjter.e.tuIe has gone through significant c):1angesin its understanding of what constitutes a public problem. Early works assumed that pI.oblems.had an 'ot>i~,ctiYE(existencewaiting to be 'recognized' by governments. !J:.at~r.~2rksbegan to acknowledge that problem recognition is yeIT:}Iltl~hasociallY-Cons1ructedprocess. It involves defi- . nitions of normalcy and what constitutes an undesirable deviation from that status.'~e)1ce, J'roblemr~cognition is not a simple mechanical proJ cess, but' a -Sociologicalone in which the 'frames' within which governme?ts o:Qerate and think are of critical significance (Goffman, 1974; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Schon and Rein, 1994). In.this view, the 'problems' that are the subject of agenda-setting are consIdered to be constructed in the realm of public and private discourse (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1981; Holzner and Marx, 1979; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993; Spector and Kitsuse, 1987). As Murray Edelman (1988: 12-13) has argued: . Problems come into discourse and therefore into' existence as reinforcements of ideologies; not simply because they are there or b~cause they are important for well-being. They signify who are virtuous and useful and who are dangerous and inadequate, which actions will be rewarded and which penalized. They constitute people as subjects with particular kinds of aspirations, self-concepts, and fears, and they create beliefs about the relative importance of events and objects. They are critical in determining who exercise authority and who accept it. They construct areas of immunity from concern because those areas are not seen as problems. like leaders and enemie~, they define the contours of the social world, not in the same way for everyone, but in the light of the diverse situations from which people respond to the political spectacle. ~hese frames, ?f course, are not always widely, or as strongly, held by. all Important policy actors, meaning that the age.nda:se.tting process is very often one in which there is a clash of frames. (Bleich, 2002). The res- j ~1':;~ti~~-t~~o~i~~~~-ilil!t~1~g~~~:. ~~ ~:ri~:i~~~e a~~::st~U:}~:~1 ~ (Surel, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1992; Steinberg, 1998). In its original 122 J.. PART III The Public Policy I Process formulation by the French social philosopher Michel Foucault (1972), the notion ofa political disc.ourse was set out as a tool for understanding the historical evolution of society. The task of historical analysis, and social theory in general, was to understand the nature of the origin and evolution of discursive formations over time, and to situate current discourses into this overall conception of history.\FrO!!1thi.~_.Q_~!"SIJ~t::.ti.Ye>-the idea that agenda-setting is a process in whichpoUcy:mak.ePLreact to objective conditions in a rational manner is deceptive, if not completely misleading.Rather, policy-makers are involved in the same discourses as the public and in the manipulation of the signs, sets, ancl. scenes of a political play or theatre. According to the script of these ideological discourses, different groups of policy actors are involved, and different outcomes prescribed, in the agenda-setting process (Muntigl, 2002) . . In this view, then, t.he..agenaa of· politics_oLpolicy~makiI1g. is .created opt oLthehistory,traditions, atti_tl.:l4~s,aIl~ beli~fs_()LapJ~Qpleencapsulatedalldcodified in Jheterms of its political discourse (Jenson, 1991; Stark, 1992). Symbols and statistics;bofllreaIaniffaoncated, are used to back up one's preferred understanding of the causes' of the problem. AnciE:!IlLclUdc;oI1t~:rJ:lPQr.a.ry $ymbols are discovered or created to make one's case. Convenient statistics are put together to bolster that case. In these statistics, as policy-makers know all too well, one finds what one looks for. I HenCe, to understand agenda-setting we must comprehend how demands for a policy are made by individuals and/or groups and responded to by government, and vice versa. In addition, the conditions must be understood under which these demands emerge. and are. articu- .lated in prevailing policy discourses (Spector- and Kitsuse, 1987: 75-6). Towards this end, we need to understand the material interests of social and state actors as well as the institutional and ideological contexts in which they operate (Thompson, 1990). In order to understand this complex interplay at the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, students of policy-making over the years have developed several different theoretical models of agenda-setting behaviour. These have ranged from simple one-way models in which governments are seen as responding in a quasi-automatic fashion to large-scale changes in society, to those in which the relationship between the state and social actors is seen to be much more dialectical or interrelated in nature. <Mast ,.early,wo!iks .c,oo.ilie.s.uj)}ecLof .,agenda"setting began with the assumption that socio-economic conditions led to the emergen{;€ of.p~ticular sets of problems to which governmentseventuallyr.esporu;ledJna lagged, causal fashion. These include models based on the~~ea that the Agenda-Setting 123 issues facing all modern governments are converging towards the same set; that the interplay of economic and political cycles affect the nature of . issues that attain agenda status; that these same issues are determined by swings in public mood or sentiment; and that a more specific pattern of swings in government attention is a feature of agenda-setting in modern democracies. Each of these early models will be discussed in turn. Economic and Technological Determinism: The Convergence Theses Thei4ea that public policy problems and issues originate in the level of 'development' of a society, and that particular sets of problems are common to states at similar levels of development, was first broached by early observers of comparative public policy-making. By the mid-1960s Thomas Dye and others in the United States had concluded that cultural, political, and other factors were less significant for explaining the mix of public policies found in different jurisdictions than were factors related to the level of economic development of the society in question. In his study of policy development a( the state level in the US, for example, Ira Sharkansky concluded that 'high levels of economic development-measured by such variables as per cent urban per capita income, median educational level and industrial employment-are generally associated with high levels of expenditure and service outputs in the fields of education, welfare and health: This conclusion led him to argue that 'political characteristics long thought to affect policy-voter participation, the strength of each major .party.the degree oUnter-party competition, and the equity of legislative apportionment~have little influence which is .independent of economic development' (Sharkansky, 1971). This observation about the nature of public policy formation in the American states was soon expanded to the field of comparative public policy dealing with the different mixes of public policies found between and across nations. Authors such as Harold Wilensky (1975), Philip Cutright (1965), Henry Aaron (1967), and Frederick Pryor (1968) all developed the idea that the Structure of a nation's economy determined the types of public policies its government would adopt. In its extreme form, this line of analysis led to the emergence of the convergence thesis. The convergence thesis suggests that as countries industrialize, they tend to converge towards the same policy mix (Bennett, 1991; Kerr, 1983). The emergence of similar welfare states in industrialized countries, its proponents argue, is a direct result of their similar levels of economic wealth and technological development. Although early scholars indicated only a positive correlation between welfare policies and economic development, this relationship assumed causal status in the works of some later scholars. In this 'strong' view, high levels of economic development and wealth created similar problems and opportunities, 124 PART III The Public Policy Process which were dealt with in broadly the same manner in different countries, regardless of the differences in their social or political structures. Wilensky, for example, noted that 'social security effort', defined' as the percentage of a nation's GNP devoted to social security expenditures, varied positively with high levels of five key socio-economic and political variables. In a comparative study of 60 countries, he found that 83 per cent of the variance in levels of social security effort could be explained by examining differences in the age of the social security systems, the. age of the population, the level of economic development defined in terms of GNP per capita, and whether the state was 'totalitarian' or liberal democratic (Wilensky, 1975: 658-9). He found that the strongest correlation was between social security effort and the level of GNP per capita, a correlation leading him to argue that economic criteria were more significant than political ones in understanding why those public policies had emerged.' As he explained it, 'economic. growth makes countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy for constructing the floor below which no one sinks' (ibid.). i,\ IIlthis view, agendacsetting is thus a virtually automatic process occurring as a result of the stresses and strains placed on governments by industrialization and economic modernization. It mattered little, for example, whether issues were actually generated by social actors and placed on government agendas, or whether states and"state officials took the lead in policy development. What was instead significant was the fact that similar policies emerged in different countries irrespective of the differences in their social and political structures. . The convergence thesis- was-.quickly-disputedbY ..l::J,:igc:~·whoargued that it oversimplified the process. of policy development andTnaccurate1y portrayed the nature of the actual welfare policies found in different jurisdictions, policies characterized by significant divergence as well as convergence (Heidenheimer et al., 1975).'~!vv_ClsI}Q!.~d,for example, that in comparative studies of policy development in the American states, economic measures explained over one-half of the interstate variations in policies in only 4 per cent of the policy sectors examined. ~cond, the definition of 'political factors' used by investigators was reStrlcted to such things as voter turnout, party strength, and equity of legislative apportionment and did not include such obvious factors affecting program development as tax effort or the nature of intergovernmental grants, both significant factors in the US federal system. ~ it was intimated that the desire to· make a strong economic argument had led investigators to'overlook the manner in which economic factors varied in significance over time and by issue area (Sharkansky, 1971). 'Similar criticisms were made against the more broadly cross-national compansClriiCThe"ineasuresused by Wilensky and others were criticized for failing to capture the nUItlerous different dimensions of social welfare programs (Miller, 1976). Instead of focusing on welfare efforts, which is a Agenda-Setting 125 measure of expenditure on social security as a percentage of GDP, it was argued that analysts needed to consider all the ways in which the state affects income distribution in society (Korpi, 1983). This broader approach was said to reveal a great deal of divergence in the social policies of similarly industrialized countries. It was suggested that subtle but significant differences in social welfare policies-such as whether bene- . fits were geared to wage levels or guaranteed basic incomes-were glossed over in the analyses arguing for convergence (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ramesh, 2000; Boychuk, 1997). Others argue<ithat the issue was not simply social security effort, but the overall level of public expenditures in different countries, a phenomenon felt to be inextricably linked to partisan politicar factors and the ideological complexion of the government in power (Castles,and McKinlay, 1979; Castles, 1982; Hibbs, 1977; King, 1981;von Beyme, 1984). I Interplay of Politics and Economics: Political Business Cycles In the mid~19.I?Os,a second explgnation_o.Lagenda-setting emerged that was less deterministic and tlfai treated politicaI -anaeconomtc factors as an integral whole. It argued that industrialization cr:~at~s a needior social security (because of aging of the population and urbanization) as well as the economic, resowces (because of increases in productivity) to address this need. It also creates a working class with a need for social security and the political resources (because of the number of voters who belong to this class) to exert pressure on the state to meet its needs. The ideology ef the.government in pewer-and-the-politicaHhreats it faces an: also 'important factors in the extent to which the state meets the demand for social welfare. While some issues, such as the role of iIiternational economic forces in domestic policy formation, were still debated (Cameron, 1984; Katzenstein, 1985), this view offered a reasonable synthesis of the political-economic explanations of public policy. However, it remained at a fairly high level of abstraction and was difficult to apply to specific instances of agenda-setting (see Uusitalo, 1984). One way that scholars sought to overcome this problem was by reintegrating political and economic variables in a new 'political economy of public policy' (Hancock, 1983). Here it was argued that both political and economic factors are important determinants of agenda-setting and should therefore be studied together, especially insofar as political-economic events can affect the timing of policy initiatives. One of the most important versions of this line of argument posited the idea of ~~> The economy, it was suggested, has I its own internal dynamics, which on occasion are altered by political ' 'interference'. The notion of a political business cycle grew out of the literature on business cycles, which found that the economy grew in fits and starts according to periodic flurries of investment and consumption I 126 PART III Agenda-Setting The Public Policy Process behaviour (see Schneider and Frey, 1988; Frey, 1978; Locksley, 1980). When applied to public policy-making, it was argued that in the modern era governments often intervened in markets to smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle. In democratic states, it followed that the nature of these interventions could be predicted. on the basis of the political ideo1- ogy of the governing party-either pro-state orpro-market-while the actual timing of interventions would depend on the proximity to elections. Policies that caused difficulties for the voting public were, according to observers, more likely to be developed when an election did not loom on the immediate horizon. As Edward Thfte (1978: 71) put it: Although the synchronization of economic fluctuations with the electoral cycle often preoccupies political leaders, the real force of political influence on macroeconomic performance comes in the determination of economic priorities. Here the ideology and platform of the political party in power dominate. Just as the electoral calendar helps set the timing of policy, so the ideology of political leaders shapes the substance of economic policy. i While few disagreed that partisan ideology could have an impact on the economy, this approach was critici?:~dfor its limited application to countries, such as the United States, where electoral cycles were fixed. In many other countries, the timing of elections is indeterminate and depends on events in parliaments or other branches of government, and detailed calculations of policy timing are much more difficult if not impossible for governments to make (Foot, 1979; Johnstori, 1986). It was also argued. that .the concept. of.the business cycle itselLwas Jundamentally flawed and that the model simply pointed. out the interdependence of politics and economics already acknowledged by most analysts (see McCallum, 1978; Nordhaus, 1975; Schneider and Frey, 1988; Boddy and Crotty, 1975). Ideas and Ideology: Policy Paradigms and Policy Moods Political-economic explanations were an improvement in studies hoping to identify policy determinants and helped underscore the contingent nature of agenda-setting and issue recognition. However, they did little to identify the actual content of policy initiatives. Problems with these early 'materialist' explanations of why governments dealt with certain social problems andnot others led in the 198Q$Jo stu,cf.iesthatfocused on the effects of social and political'ideas in definingJh~ ~orts'of problems with which governments werepreocc4pied (KiIlg 1973). It' had long been noted, of course, that the ideas in.dividuals hold on -an' eriauring'basishave'a "signific~t'lfflect -'art theae'Cisions they make. Although efforts have been made by economists, psychologists, and others to reduce these sets of ideas to a rational calculation of self-interest, it j 12 7 is apparent that traditions, beliefs, and attitudes about the world and society affect how individuals interpret their interests (Flathman, 1966). These sets of ideas or ideologies, therefore, can be construed to have a significant impact on public policy-making, for it is through these ideational prisms that individuals conceive of social or other problems that inspire their demands for government action and through which they construct various proposed solutions to these problems (Chadwick, 2000; George, 1969). ' However, it must be appreciated that there are different types of ideas and their effects on policy-making, and especially agenda-setting, vary quite dramatically. As [email protected]) have noted, at leasttlu:~gtypes of id.~S,Me-rele¥:ant1Q_p.Qlj.CY: IJUQrl!Lviews, 'principled .licliiis.. and[ca.li$aTideas (see Braun, 1999; Campbell, 19(8). These basic sets of ideas can InTIuence policy-making by serving as '[oad!!1_~p_s: for action, by affecting the strategic interactions that take place between policy actors, and, once institutionalized, by constraining the nature of policy options. [World views or ideologies, of course, had long been recognized as helping people make sense of complex realities by identifying, among other things, key actors in political processes and their motivations. These sets of ideas, however, tend to be very diffuse and do not necessarily translate easily into specific views on specific policy problems. While scholars recognized that the general/ppljcy mood or policy sentiment found in a jurisdiction could be an important componeiit of its poltey system, linking, for example, the election of representatives of a certain political persuasion te· key offices-in a democratic polity (Durr, 1993; Stimson, 1991; Stimson et al., 1995; Lewis-Beck, ,1988; Suzuki, 1992; Adams, 1997), this link to agenda-setting remained quite indirect ($tevenson, 2001; Elliott and Ewoh, 2000). principled beliefs andeausalstories, on the other hand, can exercise a much more direct influence on policy problem recognition and policy content. In the policy realm, this notion of ideas creating claims or demands on governments was taken up by Frank Fischer and John Forester (1993) and Paul Sabatier (1987, 1988), among others (see George, 1969). The concept of causal stories, in particular, has been applied to agenda-setting by Deborah Stone (1988, 1989). In Stone's view, agenda-setting 'usually involves constructing a 'story' of what caused the policy problem in question. As she has argued: C:ausal..theories., if they are successful, do more than convincingly demonstrate the possibility of human control over bad conditions. 'f-j.rS1J they can either challenge or protect an existing social order. S~~ond, by identifying causal agents, they can assign responsibility to particular political actors so that someone will have to stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims, or possibly face 128 PART III The Public Policy Process Agenda-Setting punishment. ,lrlti~ciJ they can legitimate and empower particular actors as 'fixers' of the problem. And fourth, they can create new political alliances among people who are shown to stand in the same victim relationship to the causal agent. (Stone, 1989: 295) In his work on policy change in Britain, feter~Hall referred to principled belief structures and causal ideas as constituting aLRolicyparadiE!!J:, and stressed its significance at all stages of the policy process, including agenda-setting. As Hall (1990: 59) has argued, a policy paradigm establishes: j the broad goals behind policy, the related problems or puzzles that policy-makers have to solve to get there, and, in large measure, the kind of instruments that can be used to attain these goals. Uke a gestalt, this framework is all the more powerful because it is largely taken for granted and rarely subject to scrutiny as a whole. It seems likely that policy-makers in all fields are guided by some such paradigm, even though the complexity and coherence of the parad~gm may vary considerably across fields. . !How-liWer.•.the influencuf causal ideas and beliefs is not automatic. Wijh9JJghJig_!I!~~~hQI~Lil!'8!1f..dthat sOiIleideas simply become fashion~ able at specific points in time, as 'ideas whose time has come' (Igngdon, 1984; Jacobsen, 1995), oth.-ers.-houre..noted that this process in fact is a complex one that requires successfully linking ideas to actors in the policy process and overcoming resistance of established actors to new ideas (Drezner, 2000; Legro; 2000). ,As Hansen and King (2001) have argued: ! !. I jdeas are more likely to b~-anslated into policy under..thr:ee...mndi,lli>ns: when there is ~ergyJ2~aF'anthnterests, when '.the. actors Pos~J~.~Uhe,.re.q.uisite.enJhttsias-m,-anQiI!§tiMiQ.[l~l.position, aodwlleil tinlingc()ntriplltesto a brQa.d_cons1ellatiQIloJ.preterences that reinforce theseideas;'iatnei'than detracting from them. ~~' 'That is, while ideas are an important independent variable in policymakitig, the links between ideas and interests, between ideas and actors, or between ideas and circumstances are-p.aramount in understanding ~!leir e!fect-Gn·agenda~~ttiIlgp'e_havjour (Blyth, '1997). Interest Groups and the Media: The Issue-Attention Cycle i The need to characterize more accurately the sets of actors and ideas \involved in agenda-setting drove other studies of this stage of the policy I cycle. Many of the early works on the subject were American and were deeply imbued with the pluralist sentiments prevalent in mainstream ! American political science of earlier eras, and consequently focused on interest groups and the role played by those groups in creating 'pressure' 129 on governments to consider certain policy actions. Thus, for example, in their classic work on the subject, Cobb, Ross, and Ross defined agenda- \ setting as 'the process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials' (Cobb et ai., 1976: 126). However, not all authors and studies focused on the role of interest o~ pressure groups, per se, in fO,clising government attention on certain\ issues. In the area of communications studies, for example, studies! attributing a central role to fuemedialrr'framtng' public debate and dis-' cussion were common (McCombs? 1981). Such studies usually examined the linkages between media' coverage of issues and its impact on public opinion in democratic polities, arguing that this linkage would spur governments to act on specific issues framed by the media as 'actionable', that is, as resolvable by government activity (Nelson and Oxley, 1999; Bosso, 1989). As was discussed in Chapter 3, one very influential.earLYlnodel of the agenda-settingIH".ocess._was developed by the British scholar Anthony, Rl:)~.E~)n tl!~--!2~Q.~!.based on this kind of analysis. In Downs's view, public policy-making in many areas of social life tended to revolve around specific issues that momentarily captured public attention, resulting in demands for government action. These problems would soon fade from view as the complexity or intractability of the problem became apparent to members of the public. As he put it: Public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon anyone , do.mes~c.~s~ueJor_v.ery 10Il:~::-:-~vel1}f i.tillvolyes a cl?.IltiIluing problem of crucial iIJJ,ponan,ce to society. Instead, a systematic issueattention cycle seeins strongly to influence public attitudes and behaviour concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then~though still largely unresolved~gradually fades from the center of public attention. (Downs, 1972: 38) , In a democracy, where politicians ignore public demands at their peril, Downs argued, waxing and waning public attention would result in a characteristic cyclical pattern of agenda-setting and public policy-making: \theissue=attennoncycle" This idea of a systematic pattern of agenda-setting gained a great deal of ' attention in subsequent years and Downs'-s-worl<js one of the most often <Qtedin the.agenda-settingJiterature. Nevertheless, hi;' 'original hypothesis was rather vague. It was not clear, for example, whether this cycle was expected to apply to 'most key domestic problems', as the above quotation :~;~~~~:~~:;: ~o ~s :=e~~~:2.r:~~~:~t:~~}:~s~;b~.,~~~. sugIn that article, Downs noted that not all problems would follow the same kind of cycle. The problems most likely to be affected by the issue- I~ 130 PARTIII Agenda-Setting The Public Policy Process 'attentionsyndrome, he argued, were only those that shar~~asic ~haracteristics. ~r~t,)he~ us?ally were problems that adversely affected a minority of the populatlon'l~ec:QIld!these problems usually were generated as the side effects of arrangements that benefited the majority of the population. !TlIirdJ the problems were capable of generating 'dramatic' moments, bUt not sustained periods, of media attention. Together these three characteristics would ensure that: I most people will not be continually reminded of the problem by their own suffering from it ... solving the problem requires sustained attention and effort, plus fundamental changes in social 'institutions and behaviour; ... the media's sustained focus on this problem soon bores a majority of the public. (Ibid., 42) ' This discussion, of course, suggests that other types. of agenda-setting \,behaviour would be expected whenever a problem falls to meet any of ithese three conditions. That is, numerous problems exist that have, at minimum, one of the following characteristics: (1) the problem directly affects the majority of the population; (2) the problem is simple to understand and resolve; and/or (3) the problem, at some point in time, could generate continuing, sustained, 'dramatic' media coverage. Downs did not elaborate on these types of issues, however, or on the likely typical patterns of policy developmeIit and change, if any, that might characterize them (Howlett, 1997a). \ Despite its frequent citation in the policy literature over the past three decades, the idea of Downsian-type issue-attention cycles has rarely been made an \ subject to empirical,evaluation.l~~qHggwood efforttooperationalizetheirQY'lItJlerS:tQILOLDoWUS:S-cyele; attempting to assess the relationship between waves of public interest as measured in Gallup polls and periodic waves of organizational change or institutionbuilding in the US federal government. Although they found evidence of major periods of administrative consolidation and change over the course of recent US history, they noted that only seven of 12 instances of administrative reorganization met the expectations of' the Downsian model. That is, they exhibited such changes during the same decade as the peak of public interest as measured by Gallup survey questions. In another four, however, changes occurred in the decade following peak public interest, while in one area-social welfare policy-change occurred prior to peak public interest. The, evidence was even weaker when organizational initiations were examined. They found only four organizational initiations coincided with the same decade as peak public '.i'intere5t",lWhiie,,,four:':()ccur:redin'the'following decade and three,,,economicJ)Olic¥.•Jlousing, ,.,andsocial welfare-occurred prior to peak public interest (Peters and Hogwood, 1985b: 250). On the basis of these results, Peters and Hogwood offered only partial support for Downs's hypothesis. As they argued: 'Our evidence supports 131 Downs' contention that problems which have been' through the issueattention cycle will receive a higher level of attention after rather than before the peak' (ibid., 251). However, ~ey were also careful to note that there appeared to be at least two patterns or cycles at work in the issueattention process in addition to what Downs first identified. In the first type, cycles were initiated by external or exogenous events such as war or an energy crisis and then were mediated by public attention. In this type of 'crisis' cycle, the problem would not 'fade away' as Downs hypothesized. In the second type of 'political' cycle, issue initiation originated in the political leadership and then, too, was mediated by public att~ntion (ibid., 252; see also Hogwood, 1992). 1NhilE!~tudi~_§:t!Ehas Jhat by Downs were useful in adding the systematic evaluation of the role of policy actors into discussions of agendasetting, they tE!nde~to_i.8Q.<:J.r:~.pr downplay. t!J.i!. LQI.e ...<:J.Lthe_s!ate,jIL this :p!<?~~_s(Sharp, 1994b; Yishai, -1993). Forexample, they failed to note how officially scheduled political events, such as annual budgets, speeches from the throne, or presidential press conferences, could spark media attention, reversing the causal linkages originally attributed to these actors in the agenda-setting process (Cook et al., 1983; Howlett, 1997; Erbring and Goldenberg, 1980; Flemming et aI., 1999). Empirical i evidence gathered in many other case studies revealed that critical! dimensions of interest group success and failure in gaining agendal access tended to be linked to state institutional structures and the avail-\ ability of access points, orj1:Jolicyv~ue~~ from which these groups could access government officials ana decision-makers (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Boockmann, 1995;PFOSS,1992);- J ~9ne of these_early.appro_ac~~sgenera.!elim9d_~s_QrlheQtiesofag~nda- 'I i setting·that withstood testiI1ggUdexamination. At best they provided I some linkages between the emergence of certain general types of issues on policy agendas and certain sets of general social, political, and economi<;:variables. The problems associated with each of the early efforts to identify a single cause or factor driving public policy agenda-setting( led to the dev:loPlllept of more, compleX>Plllltiy~rt~t~__ !I!Q~~l§,.which\ attempted .sY~fematicallY-,1QcQml;>iIl.£~()I!1E!QLthe..central'laf.iatJ-les.jni -I ti~ly ident.!fie~ in these early studies into a more accurate theory of ': agenda-setting. ~. ..•. "., The Funnel of Causality , In the 1970s Anthony King (1973) in Great Britain, Richard Hofferbert (1974) in the United States, and Richard Simeon, (1976a) in Canada each developed models that sought to capture the general relationships 132 PART III jexisting among interests, institutions, ideas, politics, and economic conditions in the process of agenda-setting. These models were ?as:d on ~e notion that the vari~bl~s existed within a /t!rj].rlf!l~E!:~S!!~y!j m which \,each was 'nested' wIthin another. \ The funnel-of-causality approach reviewed and synthesiz,ed much of the existing literature on agenda-setting. Rather than viewing material, ideational, institutional, and actor-related variables as dichotomous or. zero-sum, this approach argued that all these factors are involved in the creation and recognition of social or policy problems. More specifically, a series of causal variables were identified, including those related to the socio-economic and physical environment, the distribution of power in society, the prevailing ideas and ideologies, the institutional frameworks of government, and the process of decision-making within governments (King, 1973). Hofferbert and Simeon suggested that these variables were intertwined in a nested pattern of mutual interaction in which policymaking occurs within institutions, institutions exist within prevailing sets of ideas and ideologies, ideologies within relations of power in society, and relations of power within a larger social and material environment. This synthetic model helped delineate the relations existing between the multiple material and ideational variables identified in previous studies without bogging down in attempts to specify their exact relationship or causal significance. Wh!!ethiajSJ)J.~_!TI0del'sj\I'.~~t~~!_s!J:E:!Il~}1, ~QY'l~_~r,-jtJs..-al~Q_ it~~atest weakness-=-V=:a:Itr~e it allows some discussion between alterilate viewpoints to take place, while leaving it to empirical studies to determine the exact relationship between' the central variables. Ilt- is-also· a ~es~ though, because it does little toexpiainthe differ~ces--foiilid in specific cases according to the actual causative agent at work. }Vhyone issue might be influenced by ideas and another, for example; 'by environmental. factors is not broached, let ~one resolved. §imi.larlY..,-thefunnel-of-causality model says very little about how multiply-mediated general forces such as the environmental context, ideas, and economic interests are actually manifested by policy actors in the agenda-setting process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980). l Agenda-Setting Patterns A ~~n agenda-setting studies occurred in the early 1970s when scholars such as c:;obbJoss. ~d~Jl~.~~Q..ciateJidiiL:r.eI}.L . \ mncar.Q.genda..::-~~ting patterns or 'styl~f wlth diff~~~.!l!W~S_Qtp-ol~ 1 Agenda-Setting The Public Policy Process munity as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority' (Cobb and ~~~;e:: :~~:~~~~. ~; e~.: C1 ~~b~ ;eal.s. °th. . a:.:.~a.so.f.O.c~.e~.i,S~~S~~:~s~~I. ..~!'...alJ.y thousanl~~Q.LisS-u.es...tllat_3()}J).e_j;jt1z~S_!!~d_ t9.ne.matters of • ~oncern an..AwQW~L)J.ay:e!he gov~rnII1ent~osornething about. .' "~owever, only a small proportion of the problems on the systemic or! informal agenda are taken up by the government for s~rious considera- 'i tion. Only once a government has accepted that something needs to be, done about a problem can the issue be said to have entered the institu- : tional agenda. These are issues to which the government has agreed to give serious attention. In other words, the public agenda is an agenda for discussion while the institutional agenda is an agenda for action, indicating that the .policy process dealing with the problem in question has begun. Cobb, Ross, and Ross identified four major phases of agenda-setting that occur as issues moved between the systemic and institutional agendas.Ig;§J!gs...are-fusti-nffiated,~~ir~()l1JtiQn_:L~.!: sp~9.fied,~lljlportfor the is.s.ue...i5.-~n4.~, and 'g_!ll.1c.cessfui;-the-i-ss.lli'~Tl:t~rs the institutional i!8~_da (Cobb et al., 1976: 127).1 In earlier studies,-willcfi--wereiriflu- \ enced--strongly by pluralism, public problems were viewed as always\ . moving from the systemic to the institutional agenda. However, investigation of actual cases of agenda-building revealed difficulties with such a conception, and Cobb and his colleagues developed several different models of agenda-setting to describe how issues actually moved from society to state or from state to"thesaciety 'as-they proceeded onto the official-agenda. Cobb, Ross, and Ross first developed these different models after having undertaken studies of the agenda-setting process in different countries. According to them, there were tQ!~~J?~~i~-.£.~:t!~I1lS or models, of I ag~:nda-setting:the outside initiation model, the mobilization model, and \ the iiisilleTrlitiation model, each associated with a particular type of political regime. They identified lth:~QJJ.tsig~iTl:~t!:E:..tionJ1lQd.elwith liberal ;\ plura1j.stsocieties. In this model, 'issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are then expanded sufficiently to reach, first, the public. [systemic] agenda and, finally, tile formal [institutional] agenda.' In this model the key role is played by social groups. Issues are initiated when a group articulates a grievance and demands its resolution by the government. Those same groups attempt to expand support for their demand, a process that may involve submerging the specific complaint within a more general one and the formation of alliances across groups. Finally, these groups lobby, contest, and join with others in attempting to get the expanded issue onto the formal agenda. If they have the requisite political resources and skills and can outmanoeuvre their opponents or advocates of other issues and actions, they will succeed in having their issue ~~~=~.Si~!%~~::ddi~;{~T:~~~:~:;;~:'~~~~ whodis.ti-p...guishedbetween! th~~st@ic _qIJI}f9.Il!l:<l.U?~?!~.~~~.d.a and \th:eJrrsti.tlItiQJlaJ or f9J]!!.~!_~t~t~~;nd.Q.The systemic agenda '~?nsists of all issues that are commonly perceIved by members of the pohtical com- 133 enter the formal agenda. Thus, as Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976: 132) summarize it: The outside initiative model applies to the situation in which a group outside the government structure 1) articulates a grievance, 2) tries to expand interest in the issue to enough other groups in the population to gain a place on the public agenda, in order to 3) create sufficient pressure on decision makers to force the issue onto the formal agenda for their serious consideration. Successful entrance onto the formal agenda does not necessarily mean a favourable government decision will ultimately result. It simply means that the item has been singled out from among a mass of others for more detailed consideration. : [hemOlJilizationTTlQdel is quite different and was attributed' by Cobb, Ross, and Ross to 'totalitarian' regimes. This model describes 'decisionmakers trying to expand an issue from a formal [institutional] to a public [systemic] agenda' (ibid.). In the mobilization model, issues are simply placed on the formal agenda by the government with no necessary preliminary expansion from a publicly.recognized grievance. There may be considerable debate Within government over the issue, but the public may well be kept in the dark about the policy and its development until its formal announcement. The policy maybe specified in some detail or it may establish only general principles whose specification Will be worked out later. Expansion of support for the new policy is important, however, as successful implementation depends on a favourable public reaction to the polity. Towards this' end~-government leMers 'hold meet· ings and engage iripublicrelations campaigns aimed a'tmobiliiing public support for their decisions. As the authors put it, 'The mobilization model describes the process of agenda building in situations where politicalleaders initiate a policy but require the support of the mass public for its implementation ... the crucial problem is to move the issue from the formal agenda to the public agenda.' i In the inside initiati.()r1. 7T/.Qdel, influential groups with special access to decision-makers initiate a policy and do not necessarily want it to be expanded and contested in public. This can be due to technical as well as political reasons and is a pattern of agenda-setting one would expect to find in corporatist regimes. In this model, initiation and specification occur simultaneously as a group or government agency enunciates a grievance and specifies some potential solution to the problem. Expansion is restricted tospecialized,groups or agencies with some knowledge or interestln the 5ubjec:CEntrance on the agendaisV1rtually automatic ..due t6~the"ptivtleged''Pta'ce' of those"'desiring'a "decision. According to Cobb, Ross, and Ross: Proposals arise Within governmental units or in groups close to the government. The issue is then expanded to identification and attention groups in order to"create sufficient pressure on decision makers to place the item on the formal agenda. At no point is the public greatly involved, and the initiators make no effort to get the issue on the public agenda. On the contrary, they try to keep it off. (Ibid., 136) / ThiLUneQf analysis identifies several typical patterns or styles of ~geiid~-setting~-Whlleit does soon the basis of an (unstated) notion of a relatively crude policy subsystem-one in which state and societal actors are clearly separated-the most important variable in this analysis is regime type. That is, in this mogel the type of agenda-setting process I likely to be found in any sector is ultiInalelyciet~I:J:!lined!Jy the_general " nature of the political system; outside initiation is argue-crtobe typical of I llbefaIaemocraCi{;, m.obilization·typical of one-party states, and inside inipation typical of authoritarian bureaucratic regimes. .iH()\Vever,itwassoon recogIlized that the~e d!ffeLelJ,t~1Yt~~_gfag~nda-: ,setting vaiiea~i1onbmijdifiYiegllne-~s_~ys~c~or'. as examples of each,.: type of agenda-setting behaviour-could be found within each regime' type. This led to additional studies attempting to be more specific about exactly what processes were followed within political regimes, especially complex democratic polities like the United States. Policy Windows and Policy Streams [1~~:_~~~Q§,_!_qllllKingg.Q.p .. (1984). developed a sophisticated app~oac~1i -to -agenda-settingbased on his detaIled study ,of agenda proce.sses lD tb~ Ii US federal legislative system. His model deals with the question of stat~{ and non-state. influences on agenda-setting by focusing on the role played by policy entrepreneurs both inside and outside of government in taking. advantage of agenda-setting opportunities~~licy. wi~d9WS\-to move Items onto formal government agendas. It suggests that the characteristics of issues combine with the characteristics of political institutions and circumstances, and the development of policy solutions, in a fashion that. can lea.d to the opening and closing of windows of opportunity for agenda entrance. Such opportunities can be seized upon or not, as the case may be, by poli0' entrepreneurs who are able to recognize and act on them. In Kingdon's study of agenda-setting in the pnited States, t):lreeset§oH yariables-~!!~~~S?! 1?J,:Q1:>l.ems, [>QU!;k~,and \J2oli_!ic~-aresalaTo inter- \ act. the problem stTJ!a.mJ.~ff;rsto the perceptions of problems as public problems reqUiring government action and past government efforts to resolve them. People come to see a condition as a 'problem' with reference to their conception of some desired state of affairs. In Kingdon's 136 PART III The Public Policy Process Agenda-Setting view problems typically come to the attention of policy-makers either because of sudden events, such as crises, or through feedback from the operation of existing programs (ibid., 2o).LrJ].~poliC}L..sm~~TTl.consists of experts and analysts examining problems and proposing solutions to them. In this stream, the various possibilities are explored and narrowed down. Finally, :the political streq.JTI. 'is composed of such factors as swings of national mood;-· adIDIni~trative or legislative turnover, and interest group pressure campaigns' (ibid., 21). In.~iqgdoIl's~~"Y, these!hree streams operate on diffE!rent paths an.d.p_ursue-coursesmor-e.orlessjndependent of one another until at speciftc.poJnts intime->_Orpolicy windows, their paths intersect.' -. - TiitIienghfdicll.mstances, policy windows can be seized upon by key players in the political process to gain entrance for particular issues. Policy entrepreneurs play the chief role in this process by linking or 'coupling' policy solutions and policy problems together with political opportunities (ibid., chs 7-8). As Kingdon argues, 'The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces.' At that point an item enters the official (or institutional) agenda and the public policy process begins. h . It is important to note, however, that linking the three policy streams \1!together is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for issue entrance. IlSomething else is required for these three streams to come together and secure issue entrance-the opening of a policy window. Kingdon suggested that while window openings were sometimes governed by certain fortuitous happenings-including seemingly- unrelatedextemal 'focusing events', crises,· or·· accidents; or the· presence or absenee of policy entrepreneurs both within and outside of governments-at other times they were affected by institutionalized events such as periodic elections or budgetary cycles (Birkland, 1997, 1998). As he argued: windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream.. . . Policy entrepreneurs, people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solu~ tions to politics. (Kingdon, 1984: 21) 'pjJfe~-typ.es .. 0Lwindows ..were identified implicit in his work. As Kingdon stated: by Kingdon and are Sometimes, windows open quite predictably. Legislation comes up for renewal on schedule, for instance, creating opportunities to . change, expand or abolish certain programs. At other times, windows open quite unpredictably, as when an airliner crashes or a 13 7 fluky election produces unexpected turno\fer in key decision-makers. Predictable or unpredictable, open windows are small and scarce. Opportunities come, but they also pass: Windows do not stay open long. If a chance is: missed, another must be awaited. (Ibid., 213) Ultimately, Kingdon suggested that two principle types of window exist: th~"':PIQplem' and 'political' windows: .. . Basically a window opens because of change in the political stream (e.g. a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats ... or a shift in national mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the attention of governmental officials and those close to them. (Ibid., 176) To this initial distinction Kingdon added the idea that windows would also vary in terms of their predictability. While arguing that random events are occasionally significant, he stressed the manner in which institutionalized windows dominate the US agenda-setting process.2 As he put it, 'There remains some degree of unpredictability. Yet it would be a grave mistake to conclude that the processes . . . are essentially random. Some degree of pattern is evident' (ibid., 216). In fact, he argued that many windows open on a more or less predictable, cyclical, pattern: 'Windows sometimes open with great predictability. Regular cycles of various kinds open and close windows on a schedule. That schedule varies in its precision and hence its predictability, but the cyclical nature ... oLmany windows is nonetheles.s e.vident (ibid., 193). Hence the general model established. by Kingdon suggests the existence of atleastfour possible window typesbased on the relationship betwee.n.the oligin of . the' window.~political. or problem-and their degree of institutionalization or routinization. Although Kingdon did not provide a specific nomenclature to describe the four window types, the general outline of each type is discernible from an examination of his work and several of his principal sources.3 Thus, thefour principal window.tYPes are: • routini:z.ed political win,doUJs,in which institutionalized procedural events diCtate predictable window openings; • disqetionary political windows, in which th.e behaviour of individual political actors leads to less predictable window openings; i. spillover problem windows, in which related issues are drawn into an already open window; and • random problem windows, in which random events or crises open unpredictable windows. These basic types of windows and their relationship 5.1. In this model, the level of institutionalization are set out in Figure of a window type 138 PART III Agenda-Setting The Public Policy Process Figure 5.1 A Model of Policy Window Types 139 19~~>_12~1)developed a model that modifies Kingabn's work and helps explain the typical patterns of agenda-setting behaviour found in democratic polities. For Baumgartner and Jones, !tlJ.e.'im.,!ge'of a policy problem\,is signi~cant because of how iUIlfluen!:~smel1).b~rshipin rele--v§tj'-Qg<;f~~~-sy~eIils.Hence,-ilieyargue that: .- fo When they are portrayed as technical problems rather than as social questions, experts can dominate the decision-making process. When the ethical, social or political implications of such policies assume center stage, a much broader range of participants can suddenly become involved. (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991: 1047) determines its frequency of appearance and hence its predictability (Boin and Otten, 1996; Howlett, 1997b). Kingd.0n's mOcl~1ha~ 1:J~eIlused to describe and assess the nature of US foreign polley agenda-setting (Woods and Peake, 1998); the politics of privatization in Britain, France, and Germany (Zahariadis, 1995; Zahariadis and Allen, 1995); the nature of US domestic anti-drug policy (Sharp, 1994a); the collaborative behaviour of business and environmental groups in certain anti-pollution initiatives in the US and Europe (Lober, 1997); and· the overall· nature of the reform' processin'-EssternEurope (Keeler, 1993). While a major improvement on earlier models, however, it has been criticized. for presenting a view of ,the agenda-setting process that is too contingent on unforeseen circumstances, ignoring the fact that in most policy sectors, as Downs had noted, activities tend to occur in spurts and then congeal for lengthy periods of time. (In other words, while Kingdon's model provided anexcellent.di~<:.tlSsioriof agenda~!ietting dynamics, it failed to address adequately brageada, setting stability noted by Cobb and his colleagues (see Dodge and Hood, th~~:;g:stence The key element in the process of agenda-setting, Baumgartner and. Jones argue, revolves around the creation of~CJl-llUlrtOPOlies7' in which' specific subsystems gain the ability to control the interpretation of a . problem and thus the manner in which it is conceived and discussed. ! Both governments and members of the public are located in policy subsystems, and the primary relationship upon which Baumgartner and Jones focus their analysis of US agenda-setting is that between individuals and groups represented in existing subsystems and those who would like to be. In their model,/su,bsystem members s~ek to alter policy ima~es through a number of tkctlcs related to altenng the venue of polley debate, or other aspects of the prevailing policy discourse, and thereby undermine the complacency or stability of an existing policy subsystem. IThe strategies adopted by groups, Baumgartner and Jones argue, generWIyfall into two types. fInthe Downsianstrategy, groups can publicize a problem in order to alter its venue by encoufagmgthe public to tall upon govemmentstoresolve it (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 88). In a l_s~Q.Q!l.9_typic~.3~oach,which they term a '.?c:l1att!iclmeider'mobilization, groups involved in the policy subsystem that do not like the policies being developed or discussed by governments seek to alter the institutional arrangements within which the subsystem operates in order to expand or contract its membership (ibid., 89). 2002). Policy Monopoly Models in the 1990s, beginning from the observation that the process of agendasetting involves both periods of stability and periods of dynamism, schol·.m;''f.trcuse.dw,the 'adi~ifres"of·agerida,:,s-,,~1ting~etors'1n·tryingto .explain :ilills;pattem~,:oRarticulM"attention~,~paid.>to·:the":jrOOesses of discussion, debate, and persuasion among actors interested in the policy, each actor presenting a variety of evidence and argument in support of a particular position (Majone, 1989). On this basis Baumgartner and Jones (1991, This brief overview of studies into agenda-setting has shown how these have moved from simple univariate models to more sophisticated ones linking numerous variables in complex multivariate relationships. It has also shown how contemporary studies have centred on the elaboration of a basic set of agenda-setting patterns or styles, revealing much about the timing of agenda-setting activity and the overall nature of the policy dynamics that result from it. Building on earlier univariate studies that focused on the impact on agenda-setting of such variables as the nature of the economy, the political system, policy-relevant ideas and beliefs, and the activities of central 140 PARTIII Agenda-Setting The Public Policy Process ,political actors, currentstudiesh~ve sho~nh.owthese variables. combine number cifagenda-settinK styles and-h0w- for\~i.toUS.and. ex.pected political eventscan draw-state and soCiaIaIfention Ito particular issues in fairly predictable ways'. , As Cobb, Ross, and Ross first realized, !the most significap.tvarlClbles related to the identification ..of typical agE!nda~setrtng:-sty1eS haveta .,.do with the nature of the actOrsinitiating policy discussions and the manner in which the government is involved intl}is initiation. Instead of emphasizing the nature of the political regime in determining these patterns, however, a more fruitful avenue, as Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones i\. suggested, is to conceptualize the agenda-setting process, interrns of the i\\interac~ioIl,of the nature of the policy subsysteIIl iIl,v6lY~d,iil'the ..issue \area WIth.the n~tUI'eof the problem i~self. In this latter dimension; in a tlemocratlc SOCIetythe level of publIc support for the resolution of a ~roblem is cri~cal (Soroka, 2002)."?ome probleIIls have a."Yide~ranging Impact on SOCIetyand therefore the demands for their resolution are likely to be initiated by the public. pthersare of~ignificaIl~eonlY to particular groups, which, depending on the closeness of their relations with the government of the day, may be able to undertake inside initiation. Government officials may engage in eitherqIob.Uizatipn 9Iinsid€,initiation, depending on theleveLofptlblic stlPportfor solving the problem in question: if support is forthcoming, then we are likely to see its COnsolidation; otherwise, the government will have to resort to mobilization. rhus" the central questiQIlin agenda::~etting is not the type of regime i~volved, but rather, as both Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones recogmzed,Jl).the.natureof the policy subsystemjnY-Qlvedwith theprohlem~ which, cieterrttines whether 'the state or societal actors imtiate tlie pro~' ; cess, and (2) the Jevel of public support forit~uesolution (May, 1991). \ That is, the mode of agenda-setting is determined by the nature of'public support for the issue and by the nature of the initiating actor(s).4 The three typical patternsidentif:ieci by Cobb, Ross, and Ross fill in three of the four possible ba~ic agenda-setting styles generated in this way (see Figure 5.2). . i \~?create a relativelysmall FigureS.2 Models of Agenda-Setting by Policy Type Nature I- ~ B.o .g Q :g "0 Societal Actors State of Public Involvement High Low Outside Initiation Consolidation Inside Initiation Mobilization , SOURCE: Adapted from Peter J. May,'ReconsideringPolicyDesign:Policiesand Publics', Journal of Public Policy 11,2 (1991):187-206. 141 iThe four::t .type of agenda-setting, consolidation, occurs when the government Inltlates the process of solving a public problem for which there is already extensive popular support. In such instances the issue does not have to be 'initiated', nor does public support have to be 'mobilized'. It is enough for the state to 'consolidate' the existing support and go ahead with making policy (Dye, 2001). ' CONCLUSION While the exact timing of the emergence of an issue onto the systemic or formal policy agenda depends, as Kingdon showed, on the existence of a policy window, the nature of the reception an issue receives, and, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the types of solutions put forward to it, all of these aspects of the agenda-setting process depend very much on the nature of the policy subsystem found in the area concerned. Whether or not sub~ystem me~bers are capable of creating and retaining a monopoly on the mterpretatIOn and understanding of a policy issue, as Baumgartner and Jones highlighted in their work, largely determines whether the matching of problems and solutions found in the agenda-setting and subsequent policy formulation stages of the policy process will result in consideration of the issue within an existing policy paradigm or ill more novel approaches to the subject (Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Jeon and Halder-Markel, 2001). Agenda-setting is not automatic. Policy monopolies not only contro! how an issue is considered, but also whether or not it is given any coni sideration at all (David, 2000; Gent, 2000). Many studies in the 1950 and 1960s into problems of race in America, and other studies in the 1970s and 1980s into such issues as gender discrimination, attest to the fact that 'non-decisions' or decisions not to consider an issue as a social problem worthy of action are very typical results of entrenched policy actors content with the status quo (see Yanow, 1992; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Debnam, 1975; Frey, 1971; R.A. Smith, 1979). In addition, governments, in particular, can practise different strategies not only of a?enda-setting but of f!8eTlIiadenial, That is, as the discussion in the preVIOUSchapter revealed, governments have different procedural tools at their disposal that allow them to control many aspects of policy subsystem behaviour, inclu'tlingits membership and the relations among those members, which can help them channel policy discourses in directions they would like them to go (Cobb and Ross, 1997b). FuRTHER READINGS Baumgartner,Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and American Politics. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Instability in 142 PART III The Public Policy Process Bennett, Colin J. 1991. 'What is Policy Convergence and What CausesIt?', British Journal of Political Science 21: 215-34. Cobb, Roger w., J.K. Ross, and M.H. Ross. 1976. 'Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process'., American Political Science Review 70, 1: 126-38. __ and Marc Howard Ross, eds. 1997. Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial: Avoidance, Attack and Redefinition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Downs, Anthony. 1972. 'Up and Down with Ecology-the 'Issue-Attention Cycle', The Public Interest 28: 38-50. Dye, Thomas R. 1978. 'Politics Versus Economics: The Development of the Literature on Policy Determination', Policy Studies Journal 7: 652-62. Kingdon, John W. 1995 [1984]. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: HarperCollins. May, Peter J. 1991. 'Reconsidering Policy Design: Policies and Publics', . Journal of Public Policy 11: 187-206. Simeon, Richard. 1976. 'Studying Public Policy', Canadian Journal of. Political Science 9: 548-80. Spector, Malcolm, and John I. Kitsuse. 1987. Constructing Social Problems. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Stone, Deborah A. 1988. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman. Wilensky, H.L. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yanow, Dvora. 1992. 'Silences in Public Policy Discourse: Organizational and Policy Myths', Joumal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2,4: 399-423. 1. Kingdon (1984: 4) further differentiates within the institutional agenda, locating the specialized agendas of government agencies, the legislative agenda of government, and the decision agenda of the executive. 2. Other authors, of course, argue that American agenda-setting is a much less random process. See Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 1'3. Much of Kingdon'sapalysis islJa.s..E!90.I).~arlierwork undertaken by Jack I \yaII<er (1977) into the agenda-set!i!1sprocess-fOllowediniiieUs Senate. An examination of Walker's work makes-If CTeaiUiafl<:mgctoo's principal h~othesis, related to the frequency of predictable and unpredictable wmdows, was derived from the application of Walker's observation that US Senate agenda items varied widely in terms of their level of institutionalization or 'routinization'. Kingdon also made use of Walker's ...distinction between .:.disgetionary' ..,and ,'l1<lnr.di.s.l;:IetipI}aly' issues. 4. For empirical case. studies ,<lLtheseeffects, see Druckman (2001) and "JacOby (2000). Policy Formulation: )1 Policy Communities and Policy Networks After a government has acknowledged the existence of a public problem and the need to do something about it, policy-makers need to decide on some course of action. Formulating such a course of action is the second major stage in the policy cycle: /E!?lJ.9!JC!!JJ1.Ulatien. As Charles Jones (1984: 7) has observed, the distinguishing characteristic of policy formulation is simply that me.aillU!r~JH'9..Q0seQ1QJ:~QJy~sOIIlebody'sper.c..ep: gon of the needs U1at exi~tin society; Policy formulation hence involves I assessing possible solutions 'to policy problems or, to putit another way, exploring the various options available for addressing a problem. {fhe\ proposals Jllay originatefin the ageIlda-settiogPE~c~~§ itself, as a problem and its solution are placed simultaneously on the government agend,a (Kiiigd6n~'1984J;\6rtheyma.YQg<i.ey~lc:Jpedaft~i a.I\1t~b} p.aS:.ifiovedontci the, qfficiai (lgeilaa.~ii all ca~es, aV@<3,l:>ltf§iJHoris'~aE~c:Qosideredand,nar-( r~wedgQ\V!l t()JM§~,tI;1(lt_PQU?:~ak=~s (;~,acc~pt. !his proc=~~ of \ qefiniIlg, considering, and accepting or rejecting optIOns IS the suDstanceii. oftlie sec6nd'sta~::QfthepQllcYCYcle. ,: '~ Lesfirts'i:iiisunderstood, it needs to be emphasized that choosing a solution to a public problem or fulfilling a societal need does not even remotely resemble the orderly process proposed by some analysts. We , saw in the preceding chapter on agenda-setting that defining and interpreting a problem is a highly nebulous process that does not always lead to clear or agreed-upon definitions of problems. Even if policy-makers agree on the, existence of a problem, they may not share the same understanding of its causes or ramifications. It is therefore to be expected that 'the search for a solutiont()?,pmblem will be contentious and subject to Wide variety of preSsures, often defeating efforts to consider policy options in a rational or systematic manner. l,The essence of the search for solutions to a problem entail.s,disco.veriIJ.~riot oIlly which actions are considered totle ..technic.al1YJ:;i!P~ of I 'a' addressing or correcting a problem but also which among these is considered to be possible, or feasible, to put into place (Majone, 1975, 1989; Huitt, 1968; Meltsner, 1972; Dror, 1969; Webber, 1986). )Atthis stage, optionsthatar~believed will not work or will for some reason be unacceptable tQ Inajor. actors in the policy process are eliIlliI!S!,ted.Thus, for example, those policy-makers involved in devising health policy to contain health-care costs in the industrialized countries do not usually cone sider a British-style nationalized health service, which is rated highly for its cost-efficiency, because of the opposition it would provoke from the medical profession fearing reduced income. Nor do they consider denying health services to the aged, who account for a disproportionately large proportion of health-care costs, because of the moral and political outrage this would cause (see Alford, 1972, 1975). 'How options are excludedJ~oIll~Qnside-r.ationby policycmakers at this stage of policy formulationtel)sus a lot about the policy options ultimately chosen for jIllpl~lllentation at thedecision..maldng stag~ of the -policy process. Among other things, certain players in the policy process can be advantaged over others if they are··granted some authoritative voice in the diagnosis of a policy ill or the establishment of the feasibility of a particular proposed policy solutfon. This is the case, for example, with scientists or government specialists in many policy areas, but this may not be the case if there are disagreements over the ability of experts to deal with an issue in a competent or neutral manner (see Nathanson, 2000; Heikkila, 1999; Doern and Reed, 2001; Harrison, 2001; Callaghan and Schnell, 2001). Jones (1984: 78) describes-other broad characteristics of poliLyfOnIlU-· lation: 1. Formulation need not be limited toon~·-seLoLac.tQ):s.Thus there may well be two or more formulation groups producing competing (or complementary) proposals, 2. Formulation rnay proceed without cleCl.fd~fiJJ.i1:iQn_oJ the problem, or without formulators ever haVing much contact with the affected . groups .... O~There is no necessary coincidence betweenJoI'IllWation and particular institutions, though it is a frequent activity of bureaucratic agencies. ! 4. Formulation and reformulation may occur over a long period of time without ever building sufficient support for anyone proposal. 5. There are often several appeal points for those who lose in the formulation process at anyone level. 6. The process itself never has neutral effects. Somebcidywins and somebody loses even in the workings of science. The picture of policy form:ulation this characterization presents is that it IS a highly diffuse and complex process that varies by ca,se.Like agendasetting, the nuances of policy formulation in particular instances. can be ..-~J gJ:fl~pedQnlythroughempirical case studies. Nevertheless, most policy formulation processes do share some common characteristics. 'First, policy formulation involves the recognition of technical and politica,l.<::onstraintson state action. It involves recognizing limitations, which reveals what is infeasible and, by implication, what is feasible. This may seem obvious, but it is yet to be reflected in many of the voluminous writings proposing what policy-makers ought to be doing without reference to the limitations that constrain the choice of any proposed action. For instance, the public .choice theorists' key assumption-that politicians choose policies that best promote their electoral appealpresumes more. room for manoeuvre than is actually the case (Majone, 1989: 76). Politicians simply cannot do everything they consider would appeal to voters. Before we consider the limitations that policy-makers typically encounter that lead them to reject certain types of options, it is worth mentioning that the constraints neednot be.bas.edon facts (Merton, 1948). If significant actors in the policy subsystem believe that something is unworkable or unacceptable, this is sufficient for its exclusion from further consideration in the policy process. As we have seen with the discussion of agenda-setting in the previous chapter, perception is just as real as reality itself in the policy process. 'The constraints the members of policy subsystems encounter may be substantive or procedural. .Substantive constraints are innate to the. ~fthe problem itself. Policy-makers Wishing to eliminate poverty thus do not have the option of printing money and distributing it to the poor because inflation will offset any gains, and so they must necessarily address the problem in more indirect ways. Similarly, the goal of promoting excellence in arts or sports cannot be accomplished simply by ordering people to be the best artist or sportswoman in the world; the pursuit of these goals requires far more delicate, expensive, and time-consuming' measures. The problem of global wanning cannot be entirely eliminated because there is no known effective solution that can be employed without causing tremendous economic and social dislocations, which leaves' policy-makers to tinker with options that barely .scratch the surface of the problem. Substantive problems are thus 'objective' in the sense that redefining them does not make them go away, and their resolution or partial resolution requires the use of state resources and capacities such as money, information, and personnel, and/or the exercise of state authority, Procedural constraints have to do with procedures involved in adopting an OPtiOIl or carrying it out. These constraints may be either institutional or tactical. Institutional constraints, as discussed in Chapter 3, \ ihcllldeconstitutional provisions, the organization of the state and society, and established patterns of ideas and beliefs. They inhibit the choice of some policy options and promote others (Yee, 1996). Efforts to contlol Policy' Formulation 146 PART III ~. - .. .. handguns in the United States, for example, run up against constraints imposed by the constitutional right to bear arms. Federalism imposes similar constraints on German, American, Mexican, Australian, and Canadian policy-makers, among others, in many areas of public policy where two levels of government must agree before anything can be done. How the main social groups are organized internally and are linked with the state also affects what can or cannot be done, especially the nature of political party and electoral systems, which can create ,'policy horizons' or limited sets of acceptable choices for specific actors in the policy process (Warwick, 2000; Bradford, 1999). In a similar vein, the predominance of specific sets of philosophical or religious ideas in many societies can lead to difficulties with potential policy solutions that might seem routine in others (DeLeon, 1992). . I TYPES OF POllCY 147 The Public Policy Process ALTERNATIVES iA.llsefuLWg)'tocthin~ about the nature of the policy options that are developed in the policy formulation process is in terms of the extent to which they propose solutions to problellls that depart from the policy status quo. Some options call for new, substantial, or dramatic policy change, while others involve only minor tinkering with existing policies and programs (Majone, 1991). In his work on economic policy change in Britain, Peter-HalUdentified three different types of change:/{irst-order change in which only the settings of policy instruments varied; 'second-order change in which change . occurred in the basic types or categories of instruments used to effect policy; and 'third-order change in which the goalsbf policy are altered (Hall, 1993).1 While useful, some of this terminology is confusing and should be altered,' while the logic of the model also suggests that there should be four basic types of change, not three. With respect to terminology, the use of the teflll 'settings' to describe first-order change can be confusing, since most uses of the term would lead one to consider this to refer to the location of a policy instrument within a policy environment, when Hall means to describe the calibration or fine-tuning of an instrument's content or component parts. More significantly, Hall's model, as shown in Figure 6.1, is based'on-distinguishing between the means and ends of policy-ma,king andbetw:e~n abstract and concrete aspects of policy outputs (see Campbell, 1998). Given these two dimensions, four distinct categories of policy change are pQSsib}f...ooHhr€€.These can be described as changes related to abstract (:poLicygoals or more concretej:Jrogram specifications, referring to the ends /'6f1ici1icy-tria1ting;'aIld"t6basic poliCy[instrument type or genus, as , opposed to alterations of existing linstru.l!J..fJJ:t., c.ornponents, when discussing changes in policy means.2 Figure 6.1 Types of Policy Options by Level of Generality and Policy Component Affected Level of Generality of Policy Content 'd .•.• Q.l I:: ~ .~ SEnds' <: ~ -- Q.l 'ii3 Means Conceptual/Policy Practical/Program Policy Goals Instrument Types Program Specifications Instrument Components SOURCE:Adapted from Peter A. Hall, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain', Comparative Politics 25, 3 (19'93): 275-96. ;Options that address policy goals and instrument types require the injection of some new ideas and thinking into policy deliberations. More specific options dealing with program specifications and instrument 'settings' or components, on the other hand, are much more status quooriented, involving relatively minor alterations in existing policies. Proposals for policy and program changes tend to arise from new actors in exJ.sting policy processes, while changes relating to instrument types and components tend to develop among existing actors as their preferences change (Krause, 1997). This general situation is set out in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2 A Model of the Effects of the Presence or Absence of New Actors and Ideas on 1'yJ>es,of Policy Options Considered Presence Presence of New Ideas Continuity Old Ideas of of New Actors Continuity. of Old ActC?rs Options relating to changes in policy goals Options relating to changes in program specifications Options relating to changes in instrument types Options relating 'to changes in instrument components POLICY SUBSYSTEMS AND POllCY FORMULATION The preceding dis·cussion highlights the significance for policy formulat~!lQtQ1e nature of the policy actors present at this stage of the policy Cycle,and of the ideas and knowledge they hold about the technical and political feasibility of possible courses of action. This raises several important questions about the process of policy formulation. Among the mosffffiportantare: \Who is actually involved in this process? What are th~quaJ.ificap:()ns for participation? (Timrnermans and Bleiklie, 1999). While we will.need separate empirical analysis of each specific instance of policy formulation to answer these questions, we can nevertheless set out broad parameters to assist such analyses. As we have seen in our discussion of agenda-setting, the notion of a '~QU~.J.P.-Jl§ygen:diS a powerful concept in policy analysis~ Rec~:ntstudies 'of policy formulation especially emphasize the importance of policys'Ubsystem structure and behaviour at the formulation stage of the policy "cYCle' (see Howlett, 2002; Nyland, 1995; Marin and Mayntz, 1991: ,297-330; Le Gales and Thatcher, 1995; Kingdon, 1984; Milward and Walmsley, 1984; Goldfinch, 2000). Unlike agenda-setting, where members of the entire policy universe theoretically can be involved in policy delib, erations and actions,'in policy formulation the relevant actors are usually restricted to members of policy subsystems, since arequirement ofparticipation at this stage of the process is sOmemillimall~YeLoLi{nowledgein . tl:J.esubject area, allowing an actor to comment, at least hypothetically, on the feasibility of options put forward to resolve policy problems. Not surprisingly,idelltifying the key actors in policy subsystems, !what pringsthem together, how they interact, and what effect their interaction has on the policy has' attracted the attention of many students of policy formulation (Heclo, 1994; Hall, 1997). Over the years scholars have developed a variety of models, many of which were mutually contradictory and unnecessarily elaborate, to address these questions.3 In the following pages, we will examine several of these models, highlight the points of agreement, and offer a model that is useful for conceptualizing the nature of policy subsystems and the role they play in the process of policy formulation. Models of Policy Subsystems , Subgovernments, Iron 1Hangles, and Issue Networks t The oldest conception of a policy subsystem was developed in the United , ,'States by early critics of pluralism. They developed the notion of the fJ::s.uQgQy-emment!~ understood as g:r:oupillgsof societal and state actors in ,,4 tb\ltinizedpatterns of interaction (deHaven-Smith and Van Horn, 1984). This concept was based on the observation that interest groups, congressional' committees, and government agencies in the US had developed a system of mutual support in the course of constant interaction over legislative and regulatory matters. These three-sided relationships in areas such as agriculture, transportation, and education were often dubbed iron triangleS{ to capture the essence of their ironclad' control over many aspects of the policy process (Cater, 1964). Such groupings were condemned for having 'captured' the policy process, thus' subverting the principles of popular democracy by ensuring that their own self-interests prevailed over those of the general public.4 In the 1960s and 1970s, further research into the American case revealed that many subgovernments were not all-powerful, and that in fact their influence on policy-making varied across issues and over time (Hayes, 1978; Ripley and Franklin, 1980r Soon a more flexible and less rigid notion of a policy subsystem evolved, called by Hugh Hecla the lissge networR (Heclo, 1978). Building'on his earlier work comparing social policy-making in Britain and Sweden (Heclo, 1974: 308-10), Hecloargued that while some areas of American political life were organized in an institutionalized system of interest representation, other were not. As he put it: Preoccupied with trying to find the few truly powerful actors, observers tend to overlook the power and influence that arise out of the configurations through which leading policy makers move and do business with each other. Looking for the closed triangles of control, we tend to mis,s the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge upon government. He was not denying the existence of iron triangles, of course, but merely pointing out that their membership and functioning were often not as closed or rigid as was suggested by some commentators. Heclo. conceived of policy subsystems as existing upon a, spectrum, with iron triangles at one end and issue networks at the other. He \ explained the q.ifferences between iron triangles and issue networks in the following ways: The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes small . __l:;ir<;lesof participllnts who have succeeded In becoming largely autonomous ..Issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on others in their environment; in fact it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins. Iron triangles and subgovernments suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow public programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance. Issue networks are almost the reverse image in each respect. (Heclo, 1978: 102) Issue netw:orks were .thus larger, much less stable, had a constant turnover of participants, and were much less institutionalized than iron triangles. Heclo's alternative interpretation of the nature of the policy subsystems involved in policy formulation fostered several studies in Europe and North America intended to refine the concept. These studies led to the identification of a large variety of subsystems that necessitated the development of alternate. taxonomies to Heclo's simple spectrum of issue networks and iron triangles. Policy Networks and Policy Communities Comparative work on subsystems led tothe clarification of the variables differentiating subgovernments from issue networks and to their renaming asrpolicy network~ and policy communities. In his comparative study of foreign economic policy, Peter Katzenstein (1977) referred to policy ni:!!YJorks: as those links joining the state and societal actors together in a policy process. Although he no more than mentioned the term, other writers combined earlier discussions of policy subsystems with elements of organizational and anthropological analyses to flesh out the concept (Milward and Walmsley, 1984).5 One such application was made in Britain by R.i\.W. Rhodes, who argued throughout the early 1980s that interactions within and among government agencies and social organizations constituted policy networks that were instrumental in formulating and developing policy. , Rhodes suggested that networks varied according to their level of 'integration', which was a function of their stability of membership, restrictiveness of membership, degree of insulation from other networks and the public, and the nature of the resources they controlled (Rhodes, 1984: 14-15). In the United States similar attributes were specified QY Hamm, who argued that subgovernments could be differentiated according to their 'internal complexity, functional autonomy, and (levels of internal and external) cooperation or conflict' (Hamm, 1983: 415). In a major study of European industrial policy-making,' Will<s and Wright endorsed Rhodes's typology, arguing that networks varied along five important dimensions: 'the interests of the members of the network, the membership, the. extent of members', interdependence, .the ext-ent.ta,· which-the network is isolated ffollother networks, and the variations in the distribution of resources between the members: Refining the iron triangle-issue network spectrum developed by Heclo, they argued that this conception 3.J.loweda 'high-low' scale to be developed in which highly integrated networks would be characterized by stability of membership and inter-membership relations, interdependence within the network, and network insulation from other networks. At the other extreme, weakly integrated networks would be large and loosely structured, with multiple and often inchoate links with other groups and actors (Wilks and Wright, 1987: 301-2). In.1he-llnited States empirical efforts to clarify and reformulate the concept of policy'networks also were undertaken. Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson, for example, argued that networks tended to have 'hollow cores' in that even the most institutionalized networks appeared .;,0. k.w:e·flo'clear:.readel'ship':{Heinz·''et,a1.,·~!l'99(};Salisbury et al., 1987). ,.·"Others.argued.thatJU!twOIks.COl.ild.he.,cl~ifi~d:.accQfdiogto whether or not state and societal members shared the same goals and agreed on the same means to achieve those goals. Still others suggested that the num- ber of discernible interests participating was the crucial variable defining different types of networks (McFarland, 1987). lUs important to note-tfla.h3Jl-of-t-hese-di.fierent.conceptionsconstrued, policy networks as ~~SS~!)Ji~_inleLest~h<1~~d. That is, participants wer-e-as-SUfuea:roparticipatein these networks to further their 9wn ends, which were seen as essentially material and 'objectively recognizable' from outside the network. This emphasis on common material interests set studies of policy networks apart from those that focused on a second type of subsystem, the policy community .. In their early work on British policy subsystems, Richardson and Jor-,; dap bad identifieQ,1i.gbtgx:oupsQfJ,1o!icy actors, which they termed lpol-ii 'icy COmlIll,!J)jtii:!~'t\Although most observers would later term these policyl: 'networks' (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1984), the two terms continued to be used interchangeably for several more..years (see Milward and Francisco, 1983; Sharpe, 1985). 'Later, Wilks and Wright (1987: 296) sought to make :community' referto a more inclusivecateg()ry of all those involved in policy formulation andJorestrict 'network' to a subset of community members who interacted with. eachoth~~'Qll a regular basis .. In their view, 'Policy community identifies actors and potential actors drawn from the policy universe who share a common policy focus. Network is the linking process within a policy community or between two or more communities: Although some European scholars continued to use the term 'community' to refer to tight-knit sets of policy actors (see Rhodes, 1996, 1997a; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992), the use of 'community' in a broad sense to describe policyact9rs who share a common .ideg.·set"or.outJ,9Qkfit,welL with·the e~!ierdistinctiQndrg.Wl1jn the US by Beclo and others between small, closed 'subgovernments' and larger issue networks (Walker, 1981; Berry, 1989; Jordan and Maloney, 1997). While some scholars continued to use the two terms to refer to the two ends of a spectrum of subsystems, much as Heclo had in his initial discussion, others began to think of the two as coexisting in a 'nested' fashion in the sense that interestdriven policy networks existed as a subset of the membership of ideadriven policy communities (Chadwick, 2000; Singer, 1990; Torgerson, 1996; Rein and Schon, 1996; Dudley and Richardson, 1999). those Advocacy Coalitions This insight, that a policy subsystem might consist of a number of subcomponents, wg.s developed at length in the 1980s in the works of Paul Sabatier and his colleagues. They developed a sophisticated scheme for studying ,the activities of policy actors in policy subsystems. In their work; anLadvocacycoa.litiQn~~fersto a subset of actors in the policy sub!!ystem (Sa'bi'l:tlerand Jenkins-Smith, 1993b). According to Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier: 152 PART III Policy Formulation The Public Policy Process 'AnadvQcacy coalition consists of actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other percep.tions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier argued that advocacy coalitions include both state and societal actors at the national, subnational, and local levels of government. Their schemedeverly combines the role otlglowledge and interest in the policy process as policy actors are seen to come together for reasons of common beliefs, often based on their shared knowledge of a public problem and their common interest in pursuing certain solutions to it. 'D1e..CS)r~_9itheirJ:>!ili~t~s.tem, consisting of views on the nature of humankind and the ultimate desired state of affairs, is quite stable and holds the coalition togetheLAlI those inanacivocacy \.coalitionparticipate in the policy process,inQici~Lto llse tJ:!!=_gQY~rrunent {machinery to pursue th~ir(s.elf7serving)goals...-... "-While belief systems and interests determine the policies an advocacy coalition will seek to have adopted, its ability to succeed in this endeavour is affected by a host of factors. These include the coalition's res"our~es such as 'money, expertise, number of supporters, and legal authority' (Sabatier, 1987: 664). Externalf<iGtofs also affect what it can achieve by making some objectfves"e"as{erto accomplish than others (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993: 5). Some of these external factorsthe nature of the problem, natural resource endowments, cultural values, and constitutional provisions-are relatively"stable over long periods "of time and are therefore fairly predictable. Others are subject to a greater degree of change, including public opinion, technology, level ofintlation or unemployment, and change of political party in government. Sabatier and his colleagues advanced the discussion of policy subsystems in many ways, not least by arguing that they are not unified wholes, but usually have more than one component part. That is, in their scheme, in most cases there will be at least two advocacy coalitions in a subsystem-one supporting the status quo and one proposing changes-but there may be more. Taxonomies of Policy Subsystems and Subsystem Components ; By the end of the 1980s, it was clear from these works and others in many different countries that a variety of different types of subsystems existed, depending on the structural interrelationships existing among their component parts. Efforts then turned to developing a more consistent method of classifying these components so that the different types of subsystems could be better understood (see McCool, 1989; Ouimet and Lemieux, 2000). 153 I III one early effort at classifying policy networks, Atkinson and Cole-' man developed a scheme based on the organization of state and society, 'and the links between the two, identifying eight basic types of subsystem. In their view, the two critical questions were whether societal interests are centrally organized and whether the state has the capacity to develop policies independent of them-in other words, the level of state autonomy from societal actors. Although initially clear, this taxonomy was muddied by the addition of a concern for the level of concentration of property owners in affected sectors, generating an eightfold system of policy subsystems. These ranged from a type of pluralism said to describe situations when all three variables were low, to the 'concertation' network, which was said to exist when the interests were centrally organized, capital was concentrated, and the state enj6yed high capacity and autonomy (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a: 54). ,'.Other eff\'lrts resulted in even more complex, and confusing, tax-\ onomies. Thus, for example, FfaI).sVil"I:L-YJ~~rdeIlJ1992) attempted to\ combine Rhodes's analysis withnfafof Atkinson and Coleman, arguing that networks varied according to seven criteria: number and type of actors; function of networks; structure; institutionalization; rules of conduct; power relations; and actor strategies. Ultimately, the typology he developed included 12 types of subsystems depending on the number and type of actors and the nature of the functions they performed. Like Atkinson and Coleman's initial effort, it proved difficult to apply in practice. Part of the problem with these classification systems had to do with the purposes for which they were developed.( Some, like Atkinson and Coleman's model, were developed to understand the politics of public policy-making in a specific sector, such as industrial policy, and added a level of detail concerning a specific industrial actor (business), which is not required in the analysis of other subsystems. ,Others, like van Waarden, represented attempts to synthesize disparate schemes, all inductively developed from specific sectoral and issue-level case studies, without first attempting to eliminate idiosyncratic sectoral elements such as those found in Atkinson and Coleman's scheme. (Adopting a different approach to the .classification of subsystems can help simplify theiran¥ysis and clarify the role they play in policy formulation. Usingt.h-e. an.alytical_~ep,!!ation of community and network, in particular, helps to clarify the' conceptualization of policy development and the various factors behind it (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Carlsson, 2000). This conceptual distinction helps us understand the significant difference between the two different sets of motivations guiding the action.~LQLtho.se involved in policy formulation: ~oWleclgeorexpertise, and materialjn!erest .•V\ discourse community dennes its membership by V reference to a specific knowledge base whereas an'interest network is ( based on some common material interest. Viewed this way, two different I, 154 PART III p'0licy Formulation The Public Policy Process aspects of the process of policy formulation came into sharper focus. (Some ql~grs of policy subsystems are linked tQKether1;>yepistemic , cQJ;lcerns-a shared knowledge base-while Pth.flIIlii!ib.ers:~must have not only this base, but a!sO--some1ype of.IDaierialinter~s.L~lQ~ing or encouraging .regularized contact (Pappi and Henning, 1999). Although the policy subsystem itself contains elements of both ideas and interests, these can be distinguished from each other and their impacts on policy formulation can be analyzed separately (see Hoberg, 1996). \ IDisc01lIsecommun:ities·share some common level of understanding of \a problem, its definition, and its causes,6 although disagreements will rsually be present not only over how to translate these understandings into policy solutions: but often also over aspects of these basic elements (see Hajer, 1993; Fischer, 1993). Hence, a Wleful distinction can be drawn between cOllliIlunitiesin which there iSf~.Q..QIillnant.knQ:wJedg~b~~~ and those in which ithere iSOQt.f,. second critical dimension of policy community structure is the nUl"J::lRer of relatively distinct 'idea sets' that exist in the community (see Schulman, 1988) and if,aIld to what extent, a consensus exists on any particular set (see Haas, 1992; MacRae, 1993; Smith, 1993). Utilffiing these two dimensions allows us to construct a simplewatrix of common discourse community types (see Figure 6:3). 155 and Jenkins-Smith noted, ~Jbi.r£Uyp.e.ofcOJlteste.d..l;;Ommunity may form; for example, in many countries in areas 'such as environmental protection, concepts of biodiversity and sustainable development contest ,equally well-entrenched ones of resource exploitation and utilitarianism. lEinaJ1Y, where one idea set is dominant but faces challenges from less popular ideas, aJgcti9JJ~J:ll~~!y'i.s likely to be found. This is a type of community found at present in trade and development policy subsys- \( terns, for example, where a dominant free trade globalism faces a challenge from less popular but still compelling sets of ideas promoting more autarkic local or national forms of economic exchange and development. .With respect toHnterest networks, or more structured forms of subsystem interactions, many'c)bServers hav~ highlighted the significance of S~() k~y..Ycrr.!~1Jl~~,!? shaping the s~cture and b~haviour of policy networks: \!hemunber and t)'p.~_QJ.Jh~lL.ill~bershlE and'the._.qu.estlOn-of wh~ther state ors-ocie't31memper$ dominatejhefr activities and .interac.jiguscsiniih, 1~i9'3;'C'oie~~~~dP~rl; i·~:i99).AreasoIlable classification of issue networks can be developed using these variables, as shown in Figure 6.4 (see Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a, 1989b; Coleman and Skogstad, 1990). Figure 6.4 A Taxonomy of Interest Networks Figure 6.3 A Taxonomy of Discourse Communities Number of Members Number of Idea Sets Dominant Idea Set Yes Hegemonic Conimunity FractiOus Community No Contested Community Chaotic Community , SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the , Politics of the Policy Process', Poli9l.5t.udigsJaum.aL.26,.3Cl9911):466-82. In a situation where one idea set is dominant and unchallenged-slich as is presently the case in the area of fiscal policy, where there is virtually no opposition to the balanced budget orthodoxy-a '(prm OfOlgnopplistic or '!:tegemoaic'communityrnay develop. io~JJt.her bapd, where multiple sets of ideas circulate with no single idea in a dominant position, a much more!~haotic community will exist. A good example of this at pre. "'Semroncems"fue"sitti1cition'\Vith'''biogen~CsptmCy, wHere ideas ranging 'i~from;(he'~tmre"8cience'" Gf.genome ~arch-to'Teligious, superstitious, and conspiratorial industrial power theories coexist in the subsystem. Where several major idea sets exist and contest dominance, as Sabatier Few State Corporatist NetworKS Societal Social Corporatist Networks Many State Pluralist '.N.etWprks Social Pluralist Networks SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the Politics oithe Policy Process" Policy Studies Joumal26, 3 (1998): 466-82. 'InJ!llSJJlQQ,el,.small networks doIIlinated by government actors-as are commonly found in highly technical issue areas such as nuclear, chemical, or toxic substance regulation-can be distinguished from those in which many societal actors are included, as might be the case with education or other areas of state-led social policy-making. Otherdistinet network types exist where a few societal actors dominate 'a small network, as in many areas of industrial policy, or where they dominate large networks, as is the case in many countries in areas such as transportation and health-care delivery.7 While these types of classification schemes help to clarify the possible structure of discourse communities and interest networks in policy the subsystem greatly. affects its propensity to develop certain types of policy options.' As was suggested.Q.bQve, this isbecause the options developed-whether they affect policy goals,program specifi,cations, instrument types, or instrument components-are affected by the presence or absence of new actors and new ideas at the policy formulation stage (see Menahem, 2001; Montpetit, 2002; Bulkley, 2000). Ihee.xistence of subsystems open to new ideas and new actors is required if options pertaining to policy goals are to emerge from the policy formulation stage. If a subsystem is openonlytQ either ideas or actors, but not both, options that emerge are likely to relate only to alterations in program specifications or instrument types, 'In the case of closed subsystems, a fairly typical type, as Baumgartner and Jones suggested, options will tend to be restricted to the calibration of existing policy instruments. The relationship of .subsystem.structure to JJ.oli.9'.Qptions and th~..resulting policy formulation styles are set out in Figure6.6.-·_·· .. · ... Figure 6.6 A Model of Policy Formulation Styles Entrance of New Actors Yes Entrance of New Ideas No Yes No Policy Renewal (Open Subsystems) Program Reform (Contested Subsystem) Policy Experimentation (Resistant Subsystems) Instrument Tinkering (Closed Subsystem) , Although the development of these concepts is relatively recent, tlJ.ey have been put to good use in dealing with a number of policy sectors (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a; Pross, 1992). Studies based on the J.1Otirnrof -policy. communities and policynetworksh<lveJeYe<:lle~.A..~eat d~aLahQllt policy fOIlJ),ulatjon in such areas as fisheries policy (Pross and McCorquodale, 1990), women's issues (Phillips, 1991b), environmental policy (Bruton and Howlett, 1992: 25), pharmaceuticals (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989b), information policy (Bennett, 1992), and many others . (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990). The developmentofthe concept of comIplex policy subsystems composed ofknowledge-basec!. discourse commuI nities and interest-based networks has had a significant impact on recent studies of public policy formulation. ' These studies have also pointed to the need to understand the process ,of cha.pges insUlJsyst~ ifth~,&eAfr.alprQcess,.qt.poliCY."change and developmenLis to .beunderstood .(see Jenkins,Smlfh,etal., 1991; Baum"gattner:a:nd'JOnes;'1'91r'Whattyp'e'ofsubsystemeXists in a given sector or issue area is of major significance in understanding the dynamics of . policy 'formulation within that area. Which policy options on the institu- tional agenda will be considered seriously for adoption, and the types of .' solutions or options considered to be feasible for resolving policy problems, is largely function of the nature and motivation of key actors arrayed in policy subsystems (Howlett, 2002). a Atkinson, Michael, and William Coleman. 1992. 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance', Governance 5,2: 154-80. Daugbjerg, Carsten, and David Marsh. 1998. 'Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-LeveL?-nd MicroLevel Analysis', in Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Press, 52-71. ' DeLeon, Peter. 1992. 'Policy Formulation: Where Ignorant Armies Clash By Night', Policy Studies Review 11, 3/4: 389-405. Hall, Peter A. 1993. 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain', Comparative Politics 25, 3: 275-96. Hecla, Hugh. 1978. 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in A. King,ed., The New American Political System. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 87-124. Heinz, John P;, et al. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Jordan, A. Grant. 1981. 'Iron lliangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process', Journal of Public Policy 1, 1: 95-123. Knoke, David. 1993. 'Networks as Political Glue: Explaining Public PolicyMaking', in w'J. Wilson, ed., Sociology andthe Public Agenda. llondon: Sage, 164-84. .. '" lindquist, Evert A. 1992. 'Public Managers and Policy CommunIties: Learning to Meet New Challenges', Canadian Public Administration 35, 2: 127-59. Majone, Giandomenico. 1975. 'On the Notion of Political Feasibility', European Journal of Political Research 3: 259-74. Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz, eds. 1991. Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Milward, H. Brinton, and Gary 1. Walmsley. 1984. 'Policy Subsystems, 'Networks and the Tools of Public Management', in Robert Eyestone, ed., Public Policy Formation. Greenwich, Conn.: JAr Press, 3-25. Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity, and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Sabatier, Paul. 1988. 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein', Policy Sciences 21, 2/3: 129-68. . 156 PART III Policy Formulation The Public Policy Process subsystems, and give us ageneraljde_ClClQQlJ.tthenatureofJ:lLe_~i~~rative processes -folloWedat th~ JQImuJ!lt!Q.!Lstage.QUhepglicycyde, they do not in themselves generate specific hypotheses or indications of the propensities of specific types of subsystems towards specific types of options. To get a better sense of that issue, it is necessary to discuss not only the separate components of subsystems, but how those components come together into specific configurations of actors and ideas, or policy subsystem types, and how those types tend to promote or inhibit consideration of certain types of policy options (Richardson, 1995). In-this.regard, the insights of au¢ors like Baumgartner and Jones with respect to agenda-setting are equally appropriate to policy formulation. That is, subsystems that are 'monopolistic', involving hegemonic policy communities, and that feature networks with fewer members will tend to promote policy options that reinforce the status quo. Those that are larger and more chaotic will be more likely to suggest alternative courses of action. ;That subsystems playa significant role in the process of policy formula'tion has been hinted at by several authors (Zijlstra, 1978-9; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). Sabatier, for example, has argued that the nature of the policy subsystem responsible for policy formulation is an important element in the analysis of policy change as coalition members mediate the exchange of interests and ideas in public policy-making. Although they focused their analysis on the role of'external,per.turbations' such as elections, wars, accidents, or crises that can disrupt established subsystems, they also recognized that 'internalsubsYsJem behaviour must be such that the opportunities presented by external 'shocks' actually lead to internal change.8 More specifically, authors such as Marsh and Rhodes (1992b), Bressers and O'Toole (1998), andZahariadis and Allen (1995) have suggested that the 'cohesiveness' or'closedness~ofpQUcysubsystems is an important factorarlecuiii(the propensity for new or innovative policy solutions to emerge from the policy formulation process.9 Hence, one of Jhe most significant aspects of subsystem structure involves the nature of the relationship, or the configuration, that exists between the two component parts of the subsystem: the discourse community and interest network (see Bulkley, 2000; Schaap and van Twist, 1997). This is l;Jecause subsystems featuring closely integrated communities and networks will be more cohesive and better able to resist the entrance of new ideas and actors into policy processes than will those with sizable intellectual and psychological distances between the two subsets of actors. This suggests that the principal factor that can be used to identify the propensity of a policy subsystem to promote innovative policy options involving substa.ntial changes to' existIDgpOlicya.rrarigements· is' a 157 subsystem structure that allows new actors and new ideas to enter into policy deliberations (Schmidt, 2001). C::Q.I1yer.s_el¥. the predominance of status quo policy options can be explained by reference to the fact that the same sets of actors and ideas are involved in the policy process over a long period of time.lO Observers have often noted how policy-makers, in the course of interaction among themselves and in their day-to-day dealings with a public problem, tend to develop a common way of looking at and dealing with ~ problem (Kenis, 1991; Haas, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). Slight adaptation ana N adjustment of views on the basis of experience and new information is II .~ndemic to the policy process, but most studies have found that understandings of.the nature of public problems and the acceptable or feasible solutions to them are often remarkably durable and, once in place, difficult to change (Pierson, 2000; Sabatier, 1988). This common understand, ing within a policy subsystem, however, can at times break down, setting the stage for the emergence of new and different policy actors and dis-\ courses, consideration of new policy options, and, ultimately, innovative policy outcomes. 11 iThis suggests that the relevant general types of policy subsystems that determine the outcomes of the policy formulation process are as set out in Figure 6.5. Figure 6.5 Basic Policy Subsystem Configurations Receptive to New Actors Receptive to New Ideas No Yes No Closed Subsystem (Integrated Policy Community and Network) Resistant Subsystem (Closed Policy Community and Open Network) Yes Contested Subsystem (Open Policy Community and Closed Network) Open Subsystem (Unintegrated Policy Community and Network) SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the Politics of the Policy Process', Policy Studies Joumal26, 3 (1998): 466-82. As Hanspeter Kriesi and Maya Jegen (2001: 251) put it, 'to know the actor constellation is to know the parameters determining the choices among the substantive policy options: In other words, the structure Of 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. include altering staffing levels in hospitals or altering physician fee schedules. Second-order changes would involve changing the type of instrument used to deliver health care, such as moving from user fees to mandatory insurance arrangements. Third-order change would involve a shift in policy goals, such as moving away from a biomedical focus on the individual to a more holistic goal of collective, social, or community wellbeing. For similar models based on a similar critique of Hall, see Daugbjerg (1997); Smith (2000). Grant Jordan has spent much effort cataloguing and categorizing the images and metaphors used to describe policy subsystems involved in policy formulation. See Jordan (1981, 1990a, 1990b); Jordan and Schubert (1992). More recently, see Borzel (1998); Thatcher (1998). For early studies in this vein, see Bernstein (1955); Huntington (1952); Lowi (1969). Aldrich and Whetton (1980), for example, talked about 'action sets' and 'networks', the former referring to a group of organizations created for a specific purpose and the latter to the more general forms of interorganizational co-ordination in which organizations were bound together by common relationship. See also Benson (1982). At this point, it is worth noting that· a similar conception of a policy community has emerged in the international relations literature in which loose groupings of knowledge actors are said to underlie international institutions and regimes. These epistemic communities are defined, in the words of Peter Haas (1992: 3), as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area', He.elaborates:· 'Althoughan.epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multlple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity-that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise-that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence: This is a clear elucidation of the knowledge base that binds communities of actors together and how it affects their behaviour. The emphasis on 'professionalism'; however, means the concept refers to only a specific subset of policy communities. To avoid confusion, we use the term 'discourse community' in this book to refer to both 'epistemic' and other types of policy communities. See also E. Haas (1975); Keohane (1990). On the links between these types and traditional corporatist and pluralist conceptions of interest intermediation, see Sciarini (1986). 8. See also the modifications to this position contained in Sabatier (1993b). External changes affect the resources-money, expertise, number of supporters, .and legal authority-available to subsystem members and thereby lead to alterations in their behaviour and in policy outcomes. Sabatier (1987: 664). See also Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991). 9. Although this insight is similar to that used to generate a simple spectrum or continuum of subsystem types-ranging from integrated to unintegrated and usually related to a single variable such as subsystem size-this does not fully capture the complexity of subsystem structure. See Marsh and Rhodes (1992b). While it is common to associate small subsystems with integration and large ones with incohesiveness, many studies have shown that small subsystems can exhibit unintegrated communities and networks, while being large, similarly, does not prevent subsystems from being unified and cohesive. See, for example, Giuliani (1999); Kriesi and Jegen (2001). 10. The analysis of incremental decision-making, for example, attributes a propensity for policy change to occur as a result of analysis of the marginal differences between existing and proposed policy options to the fact that the same sets of policy-makers must bargain among themselves to arrive at a decision, and therefore are unlikely to overturn agreements based on past negotiations and compromises. See Hayes (1992). 11. Much as was argued by Thomas Kuhn and others in the case of the advance of scientific knowledge. See Kuhn (1962, 1974). In his early works Kuhn was unclear about what exactly· constituted a 'scientific paradigm'. However, in his later works he was more specific, arguing that a paradigm was synonymous with the notion of a 'disciplinary matrix'. It was 'what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share'. See Kuhn (1974: 463); Masterman (l970). Public Policy Decision-Making create 'winners' and 'losers', even if the decision is to do nothing and to retain the status quo. Brewer and DeLeon's definition, of course, says nothing about the actors involved in this process, or the desirability, likely direction, or scope of public decision-making. To deal with these issues, different theories have been developed to describe how decisions are made in government as well as to prescribe how decisions ought to be made. The nature of public policy decision-makers, the different types of decisions that they make, and the development and evolution of decision-making models designed to help understand the relationship between the two are described below. Public Policy Decision-Making: Beyond Rationalism and Incrementalism AUTHORITATIVE AND NON-AUTHORITATIVE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS The decision-making stage of.the policy process is the one from which emerges some formal or informal statement of intent on the part of authorized public actors to undertake, or refrain from undertaking, some action (O'Sullivan and Down, 2001). Actually undertaklng that course of action remains the subject of the. next stage of the policy cycle, policy implementation, discussed in Chapter 8. Gary Brewer and Peter DeLeon (1983: 179) characterize the decisionmaking stage of the public policy process as: the choice among policy alternatives that have been generated and their likely effects on the problem estimated . . . . It is the most overtly political stage in so far as the many potential solutions to a given, pr'oblein'mu~t'-soIl:le~owbe Winnowed'. down and p~iifone or a' select few picked and readied for use.. Obviously most possible choices will not be realized and deciding not to take particular courses of action is as much a part of selection as finally settling on the best course. 163 i -~ This definition makes several important points about the decision-making stage of the policy cycle. First, decision-making is nbt a self-contained stage, nor is it synonymous with the entire public policy-making process. Rather, it is a specific stage rooted firmly in the previous stages of the policy cycle. It involves choosing from among a relatively small number of alternative policy options, as identified in the process of policy formulation, to resolve a public problem. Second, this definition highlights the fact that different kinds of decisions can result from c1 decision-making process. That is, decisions can be 'positive' in the sense ,>'that>they,'atter1the''StatustFI0'in''some way, or they can be 'negative' in ,. ,the,S6lse,that.,the¥failto ...do ,so.·<Third, this definition underlines the point that public policy decision-making is not a technical exercise but an inherently political process. It recognizes that public policy decisions ACTORS -. With the exception of usually infrequent exercises in direct democracy such as referenda (Wagschal, 1997; Butler and Ranney, 1994), the number of relevant policy actors decreases substantially with the progress of the public policy process to the decision-making stage. Thus, agenda-setting involves a wide variety of state and societal actors; theoretically at least, virtually any member of the policy universe could become active and involved in the agenda-setting process. At the stage of policy formulation, the number of actors remains potentially large, but in practice tends to include only,those state and societal actors who are members of a specific policy subsystem. -.When it comes time to decide on a particular option, however, the relevant group of policy actors is almost invariably restricted to those with the capacity and authority to make binding public decisions. In other words, the public policy decision-making stage normally involves only those who occupy formal offices in government. Excluded are virtually all non-state actors, including those from other levels of governments, both domestically and internationally. Only those politicians, judges, and government officials actually empowered to make authoritative decisions in the area in question can participate with both 'voice' and 'vote' at this stage of the policy cycle (Aberbach et ai., 1981).1 This is not to say that other actors, including non-state ones as well as those belonging to other governments, are not active at this stage of the policy process. These actors can and do, of course, engage in various kinds of 'lobbying' activities aimed at persuading, encouraging, and sometimes even coercing authoritative office-holders to adopt options of which they approve. However, unlike .office-holders, those other actors have, at best, a 'voice' in the decision-making process, but they do not have a 'vote' per se (see Pal, 1993b; Richardson et al., 1978; Sarpkaya, 1988). This is also not to say that decision-makers, given their occupancy of rsq_sdfhbneehbdr)b_m_cnos vg_sdudq onkhbxsgdx vhrg- @r g_r addm chrbtrrdc hmd_qkhdqbg_osdqr)sgd cdfqdd ne eqddcnl dminxdcax d_bg cdbhrhnm-l_jdq hr hme_bsbhqbtlrbqhadc ax _ gnrs ne qtkdr fnudqmhmfonkhshb_k _mc _clhmhrsq_shudneehbdr_mc bnmrsq_hmhmf sgd _bshnmrne d_bg neehbdgnkcdq-@r vd g_ud rddm)sgdrd qtkdr q_mfdeqnl sgd bntmsqx&rbnmrshstshnmsn sgd rodbhehbl_mc_sdr bnmedqqdcnm hmchuhct_kcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr rtbg _r itcfdr _mc bhuhkrdqu_msr ax u_qhntr k_vr¥ _mc qdftk_shnmr 'L_qjnee) 0864: O_fd) 0874_(@r v_r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq2) _s sgd l_bqn kdudk)cheedqdms bntmsqhdr g_ud cheedqdms bnmrshstshnm_k _qq_mfdldmsr_mccheedqdms rdsr ne qtkdr fnudqmhmfsgd rsqtbstqd ne fnudqmldms_k_fdmbhdr_mc sgd bnmctbs ne neehbh_kr-Rnld onkhshb_k rxrsdlr bnmbdmsq_sd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf _tsgnqhsx hm sgd dkdbsdcdwdbtshud_mcsgd atqd_tbq_bx) vghkd nsgdqrodqlhs sgd kdfhrk_stqd_mc itchbh_qxsn ok_x_ fqd_sdqqnkd-O_qkh_ldms_qx rxrsdlr sdmc sn e_kkhmsgd enqldq b_sdfnqx_mcoqdrhcdmsh_k rxrsdlr hmsgd k_ssdq-Sgtr) hm @trsq_kh_)Aqhs_hm) _mc B_m_c__mc nsgdqo_qkh_ldms_qxcdlnbq_bhdr) sgd b_ahmds_mc atqd_tbq_bx _qd nesdmrnkdkxqdronmrhakdenq l_jhmf l_mx onkhbxcdbhrhnmr-Sgdx l_x _s shldr g_ud cdbhrhnmrhlonrdc nmsgdl ax sgd kdfhrk_stqdhmrhst_shnmrvgdm sgd fnudqmldms cndr mnsdminx_ o_qkh_ldms_qxl_inqhsx) nqax sgd itchbh_qxhmhsrqnkd_r sgd hmsdqoqdsdq nesgd bnmrshstshnm) ats sgdrd _qdmnsqntshmdnbbtqqdmbdr-Hmsgd TmhsdcRs_sdr _mc nsgdqoqdrhcdmsh_k rxrsdlr) _ksgntfg sgd _tsgnqhsxsn l_jd lnrs onkhbxcdbhrhnmrqdrsr vhsg sgd dwdbtshud'_mc sgd b_ahmds_mc atqd_tbq_bx _bshmfnm sgd Oqdrhcdms&r nq Fnudqmnq&r adg_ke()sgnrd qdpthqhmfkdfhrk_shud_ooqnu_knesdmhmunkud hmsdmrhud mdfnsh_shnm vhsg sgd ldladqr ne sgd kdfhrk_skhsd: vghkd rnld _sd kkknchehdc nq nudqstqmdc&nm _9"sdf!hk-_s a_Rhrax sgd itchbh_qxnm bnmrshstshnm_k Nensgdq fqntmcr 'Vd_udq _mc¥Qnbjl_m: 0882a(@ssgd lhbqn kdudk)u_qhntr qtkdr trt_kkx rds ats mnsnmkxvghbg cdbhrhnmrb_mad l_cd ax vghbg fnudqmldms _fdmbxnq neehbh_k) ats _krn sgd oqnbdctqdr sg_s ltrs ad enkknvdchmd_bg b_rd- @r @kkhrnm _mc G_kodqhm g_ud mnsdc)nudqshld rtbg qtkdr _mc nodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr nesdmoqnuhcd cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vhsg &_bshnm bg_mmdkr&-_qdftk_qhydcrds ne rs_mc_qc nodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr enq oqnctbhmf bdqs_hmsxodr ne cdbhrhnmr'@kkhrnm _mc G_kodqhm) 0861(- Sgdrd qtkdr _mc rs_mc_qcnodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr gdko dwok_hm vgx rn ltbg ne sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmfnudqmldms hr ne _ qntshmd_mc qdodshshudm_stqd-0 Mdudqsgdkdrr)vghkd sgdx bhqbtlrbqhad sgd eqddcnl _u_hk_akdsn cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr) drodbh_kkxsgnrd hm_clhmhrsq_shud nq itchbh_konrhshnmr)bnmrhcdq_akdchrbqdshnm_kv_xr qdl_hmr vhsg hmchuhct_k cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn _qqhud_s sgdhqnvm itcfdldms ne sgd &adrs& bntqrd ne _bshnmsn enkknvhmrodbhehbbhqbtlrs_mbdr- Rhmbdcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sgdlrdkudr u_qx fqd_skxhmsdqlr ne a_bjfqntmc) jmnvkdcfd) _mc oqdchkdbshnmr sg_s _eedbsgnv sgdx hmsdqoqds _ oqnakdl _mc sgd rnktshnmr sn hs'Gthss) 0857() cheedqdms cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr nodq_shmfhmrhlhk_qhmrshstshnm_k dmuhqnmldmsrb_mqdronmc cheedqdmskx vgdm cd_khmfvhsg sgd r_ld E nq rhlhk_qoqnakdlr- Gdmbd)dudmvhsg rs_mc_qcnodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr hm ok_bd)dw_bskxvg_s oqnbdrr hr enkknvdc_mc vghbg cdbhrhnmhr bnmrhcdqdc &adrs& u_qhdr- Qdf_qckdrrne vgn hr l_jhmf _ cdbhrhnm)vgdsgdq _ qdk_shudkx k_qfdfqnto ne kdfhrk_snqrhm_ o_qshr_monkhshb_k rdsshmfnq _ rhmfkdbhuhkrdqu_mshm_ lnqd hmrtk_sdcatqd_tbq_shb nmd)nmkx_ qdk_shudkx edv fdmdq_ksxodr ne cdbhrhnmrb_mdldqfd eqnl sghroqnbdrr- Sg_s hr) _ksgntfg sgd _bst_k rtars_mbdne hmchuhct_kcdbhrhnmrb_mad hmehmhsdkx u_qhdc)sgdrd cdbhrhnmr b_mdhsgdqodqodst_sd sgd onkhbxrs_str ptn nq _ksdqhsSH9_chshnm_k &onrhshud& cdbhrhnmrsg_s _ksdqsgd rs_str ptn _qdsgd rtaidbs ne lnrs ne sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfkhsdq_stqd _mc ne lnrs nesgd chrbtrrhnm hm sghr bg_osdq-Gnvdudq) hs hr hlonqs_ms sn mnsd _s sgd ntsrds sg_s nsgdq jhmcr ne cdbhrhnmrtognkc sgd rs_str ptn- Gdqd vd b_m chrshmfthrg adsvddm &mdf_shud& cdbhrhnmr)hmvghbg _ bnmrbhntr cdbhrhnmhr s_jdm sn oqdrdqudsgd rs_str ptn) _mcvg_s _qdrnldshldr sdqldc &mnm-cdbhrhnmr&) chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq4) hmvghbg noshnmrsn cduh_sdeqnl sgd rs_str ptn _qdrxrsdl_shb_kkxdwbktcdceqnl bnmrhcdq_shnm 'rdd Ydkchsbgds _H-)0872: Q-@-Rlhsg) 0868(Mnm-cdbhrhnmr g_ud addm sgd rtaidbs ne l_mx hmpthqhdr_mc rstchdr 'rdd A_bgq_bg_mc A_q_sy)0851) 086/9 bg- 2: Cdam_l) 0864: A_bgq_bg _mc A_q_sy)0864: Ydkchsbg_mcEnqc)0883: Roq_mb_ds _k-)0880(-Udqx khsskdqdrd_qbghmsnmdf_shudcdbhrhnmr)gnvdudq) dwhrsr-Sghr hr o_qskxctd sn sgd cheehbtkshdr_rrnbh_sdc vhsg hcdmshexhmf hmrs_mbdrhmvghbg onkhbx aoshnmrsn _ksdqsgd rs_str ptn _qddwokhbhskx qdidbsdchme_untq nehsrl_hmsdm_mbd'rdd Gnvkdss) 0875(- Mdudqsgdkdrr)sgd dkdldmsr ne sgdrd cdbhrhnmr b_m ad chrbdqmdceqnl _m dw_lhm_shnmne gnv sgdx _eedbs sgd nodq_shnmne sgd onkhbxbxbkd-Sg_s hr) mdf_shudcdbhrhnmr_qdhmrs_mbdrne _qqdrsdconkhbxbxbkdr-Tmkhjdsgd rhst_shnmvhsg mnm-cdbhrhnmr) hmvghbg bdqs_hm noshnmr_qdehksdqdc nts _ssgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfnqonkhbxenqltk_shnm rs_fdr _mc l_x mdudqdudmdmsdqhmsnonkhbxcdkhadq_shnmr) vhsg mdf_shud cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) _fdmc_-rdsshmf_mc onkhbxenqltk_shnm cn nbbtq _mc _ksdqm_shud bntqrdr ne _bshnmsn sgnrd oqdrdmskxhmok_bd_qdots enqv_qc sn _tsgnqhs_shudcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr-Gnvdudq) tmkhjdsgd rhst_shnmvhsg onrhshudcdbhrhnmr)sgd oNkkbxoqnbdrr cndr¥mnslnud nmsnsgd onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmrs_fd- Vhsg_ mdf_shudcdbhrhnm)sgd onkhbxbxbkdadfhmr)lnudr sgqntfg _fdmc_-rdsshmf_mc onkhbxenqltk_shnm)ats cndr mnslnud o_rs sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rs_fd) vgdqd _ cdbhrhnmsn qds_hmsgd rs_str ptn hr l_cd 'u_m cdq Dhij_mc Jnj) 0864(" cdudknoldms _mc dwoqdrrhnmne _ rs_sdldms ne hmsdmsnm sgd o_qs ne _tsgnqhs_shudcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn tmcdqs_jd rnld bntqrd ne _bshnmnq hm_bshnmSgd oqnbdrrdr sgqntfg vghbg sgdrd cdbhrhnmrdldqfd _qd) ne bntqrd) ne fqd_shmsdqdrs sn rstcdmsr ne fnudqmldms)_r vdkk_r sn sgnrd ne oqhu_sd-rdbsnql_m_fdldms) orxbgnknfx) _mc l_mx nsgdqehdkcrne rstcxHmvg_s enkknvr)vd stqm sn _m nudquhdv ne sgd lncdkr cdudknodc hm sgdrd ehdkcrsn gdkocdrbqhad)bnmbdost_khyd) _mc_m_kxydcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr hmansg rhlokd _mc bnlokdw rhst_shnmr-Vd vhkkrds nts sgd dkdldmsr ne sgdrd lncdkr _mc chrbtrr sgdhqrtbbdrr _mc e_hktqdhmcd_khmf vhsg cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrrdr hmfnudqmldmsr-@ksgntfg mtldqntr cheedqdmslncdkr dwhrshmsgd k_qfdkhsdq_stqdrnmsgd rtaidbs hmsgdrd chudqrd ehdkcr)vd rg_kkrdd sg_s sgdx _kkrtffdrs sg_s _ u_qhdsxne cheedqdms cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr dwhrs)_mc sg_s sgd khjdkhgnncne nmd adhmf enkknvdc b_mad _rbdqs_hmdcvhsg rnld bdqs_hmsx ax dw_lhmhmfsgd m_stqd sgd _bsnqrhmunkudchmsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr _mcsgd bnmrsq_hmsr tmcdq vghbg sgdx nodq_sd- ns D_qkxLncdkr9 Q_shnm_khrl_mc Hmbqdldms_khrl Sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkdqdbdhudc_ fqd_s cd_k ne _ssdmshnm hmsgd d_qkxxd_qr ne sgd cdudknoldms ne sgd onkhbxrbhdmbdr) vgdm _m_kxrsranqqnvdc gd_uhkxeqnl lncdkr _mc rstchdr ne cdbhrhnml_jhmf hmbnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnmr cdudknodcax rstcdmsr ne otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm _mcatrhmdrr nqf_mhy_shnmAx sgd lhc-085/r) chrbtrrhnmr _ants otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf g_c nrrhehdchmsnsvn otqonqsdckx hmbnlo_shakdlncdkr) nmdne vghbgsgdq_shnm_k lncdk-_rrdqsdc sg_s otakhbonkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmfv_r udqx ltbg _ rd_qbg enql_whlhyhmf rnktshnmrsn bnlokdw oqnakdlr hmvghbg onkhbx-qdkdu_ms hmenql_shnmv_r f_sgdqdc _mcsgdmenbtrdc hm_ rbhdmshehb e_rghnmnm sgd _rrdrrldms ne onkhbxnoshnmr-Sgd nsgdq lncdk-nesdm sdqldc sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk-cdrbqhadr! otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf _r _ kdrr sdbgmhb_k _mc lnqd onkhshb_k _bshuhsx) hmvghbg _m_kxrhrok_xdc_ ltbg rl_kkdq qnkdhmcdsdqlhmhmfntsbnldr sg_m chc a_qf_hmhmf_mc nsgdq enqlr ne hmsdq_bshnm _mc mdfnsh_shnm adsvddm jdx cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr 'rdd Lnrradqfdq) 1///9 bg- 1(- Sgd l_hmrsqd_l onrhshnmsgqntfgnts ltbg nesghrodqhncv_r sg_s vghkdsgd &q_shnm_k& lncdk v_r lnqd oqdedq_akd enq rgnvhmf gnv cdbhrhnmrntfgs sn ad s_jdm) sgd &hmbqdldms_k& lncdk adrs cdrbqhadc sgd _bst_k oq_bshbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hmfnudqmldmsr 'Cqnq)0857: Dsyhnmh) 0856: Gnv_qc) 0860(Gnvdudq) ax sgd qmh}-086/rhsv_r _oo_qdmssn l_mx nardqudqr sg_s -mdhsgdqlncdk]_bbtq_sdKX&}IkHdrdmsdc-)_kk-)hmrs_-mbdr ne --cdbhrhnml_jhmf -_mcsg_s-cheedqdmscdbhrhnm-l_jhmf noonqstmhshdre-d_stqdc -cheedqdms ldsgncr _mcrsxkdrnecdbhrhnm-l_jhmf: _qhcsg_s sgd q_mfdne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdru_qhdcadxnmc sgd svn &hcd_k sxodr&qdoqdrdmsdcax sgd q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_k lncdkr 'Rlhsg _mc L_x) 087/: @kkhrnm) 0858) 0860(-Sghr kdc sn deenqsrsn cdudkno _ksdqm_shud lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmbnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnmrRnld _ssdlosdc sn rxmsgdrhydsgd q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr- Nsgdqr-hmbktchmfsgd rn-b_kkdc&f_qa_fdb_m& lncdk ne cdbhrhnHk-l_jhmf-enbtrdc nm sgd hqq_shnm_k dkdldmsr ne nqf_mhy_shnm_k adg_uhntq hmnqcdqsn _qqhud_s _ sghqco_sg adxnmc q_shnm_khrl_mchmbqdldms_khrl 'Bngdmds _k-)0861: L_qbg _mc Nkrdm)0868_(- Nmkxqdbdmskx g_ud deenqsraddml_cd sn lnud adxnmc sgdrd cda_sdr adsvddm q_shnm_khrsr) hqq_shnm_khrsr) _mc hmbqdldms_khrsr_mc cdudkno _ lnqd mt_mbdc tmcdqrs_mchmfne sgd bnlokdw oqnbdrrdr _rrnbh_sdc vhsg otakhb onkhbx cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfTgd R_shnm_kMncdk _mc Isr Cqhshbr Ehqrscdudknodc hmsgd _qd_ ne dbnmnlhb _m_kxrhr)_mc drodbh_kkxhmsgd _m_kxrhrne oqnctbdq _mc bnmrtldq bgnhbdr)sgd &q_shnm_k& sgdnqxne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf onrstk_sdc sg_s hmcdudknohmf_mc dwoqdrrhmf_ oqdedqdmbd enqnmdbntqrd ne _bshnmnudq_mnsgdq)cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vntkc _ssdlos sn _ooqnwhl_sd hmoq_bshbd_ rsq_sdfx sg_s) hmsgdnqx)vntkc l_whlhyd sgd dwodbsdcntsbnldr ne sgd bgnhbdr sgdx bntkc l_jd 'Dcv_qcr) 0843(Cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmsgd otakhb onkhbx_qdm_v_r rddm_r _jhmsn sgd oqnbdrr hmsgd l_qjdsok_bd vgdqd atxdqr _mc rdkkdqrrddj sn l_whlhyd &tshkhsx& eqnl sgdhqkhlhsdcqdrntqbdrSgd hcd_khydclncdk neq_shnm_k cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)vghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vdqd dwodbsdcsn enkknv_r bknrdkx_r onrrhakd hm_kkbhqbtlrs_mbdr) v_r nmdhmvghbg sgdx vntkc tmcdqs_jd sgd enkknvhmfrdqhdrne rdptdmsh_k_bshuhshdr9 0- @fn_k enqrnk&khH0 _ oqPk9=kdhm _ Zrdrs_akhrgdc-1- @kk_ksdqm_shud rsq_sdfhdrne _bghduhmfsgd fn_k _qd dwoknqdc_mc khrsdc2- @kkrhfmhehb_ms bnmrdptdmbdr ne d_bg _ksdqm_shud rsq_sdfx _qd oqdchbsdc_mc sgd oqna_ahkhsxne sgnrd bnmrdptdmbdrnbbtqqhmfhr drshl_sdc3- Ehm_kkx) sgd rsq_sdfxsg_slnrs md_qkxrnkudr sgd oqnakdl nq rnkudr hs _s kd_rsbnrs hr rdkdbsdc-'B_qkdx)087/9 00( Sgd q_shnm_k lncdk hr &q_shnm_k& hmsgd rdmrd sg_s hsoqdrbqhadroqnbdctqdr enq cdbhrhnm-l;0jhmfsg_s) hmsgdnqx)vhkkkd_c sn sgd bgnhbdne sgd lnrs deehbhdms onrrhakd ld_mr ne _bghduhmfonkhbx fn_kr- Qnnsdc hm Dmkhfgsdmldmsq_shnm_khrl_mc onrhshuhrl) rbgnnkr ne sgntfgs sg_s rntfgs sn cdudknocds_bgdc) rbhdmshehb jmnvkdcfd sn hloqnud gtl_m bnmchshnmr'Idmmhmfr)0876: Snqfdqrnm)0875() sghrlncdk _rrtldr sg_s l_whl_k ntsbnldr b_mad _bghdudcsgqntfg sgd nqcdqdcf_sgdqhmfne qdkdu_ms hmenql_shnm_kknvhmfsgd &adrs& _ksdqm_shud sn ad hcdmshehdc _mc rdkdbsdc 'Vdhrr) 0866a(- Cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _qd _rrtldc sn nodq_sd_r sdbgmhbh_mr nq atrhmdrr l_m_fdqr) vgn bnkkdbs_mc _m_kxydhmenql_shnmsg_s _kknvr sgdl sn _cnos sgd lnrs deedbshud nq deehbhdms v_x ne rnkuhmf_mxoqnakdl sgdx bnmeqnms-Hshr enq hsr &mdtsq_k&) sdbgmhb_k_ooqn_bg sn oqnakdlrnkuhmfsg_s sghr _ooqn_bg hr _krn jmnvm _r &rbhdmshehb&) &dmfhmddqhmf&) nq &l_m_fdqh_khrs& hmm_stqd'Dkrsdq)08809004(D_qkx_ssdlosr sn drs_akhrg_ rbhdmbdne nqf_mhy_shnm_k adg_uhntq¥_mc atrhmdrr _mc otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm_kked_stqdc deenqsrsn oqnlnsd sgd hmbqd_rdc_ookhb_shnm _mc trd ne sgd q_shnm_k lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfDkdldmsr ne sgd lncdk b_mad entmc hmsgd vnqj ne d_qkxrstcdmsr ne otakhb_clhmhrsq_shnmrtbg _r GdmqhE_xnkhmEq_mbd_mc Ktsgdq Ftkhbj _mc Kxmc_kTqvhbj hmAqhs_hm _mc sgd TmhsdcRs_sdr-Cq_vhmfnmsgd hmrhfgsr fkd_mdc ax E_xnk '0838( eqnl ghr rstchdr ne sgd stqm-ne-sgd-bdmstqx Eqdmbgbn_khmctrsqx)hmsgd 082/r Ftkhbj _mc Tqvhbj)enq dw_lokd) oqnlnsdc vg_s sgdx sdqldc sgd &ONRCBNQA&lncdk ne l_m_fdldms hm&vghbg sgdx tqfdc nqf_mhy_shnmr sn l_whlhyd sgdhqodqenql_mbd ax rxrsdl_shb_kkxok_mmhmf) nqf_mhyhmf)rs_eehmf)chqdbshmf)bn-nqchm_shmf) qdonqshmf) _mc atcfdshmf sgdhq_bshuhshdr'Ftkhbj) 0826(- &Chqdbshmf& _ o_qshbtk_q bntqrd ne _bshnm)enq Ftkhbj _mc Tqvhbj _mc sgd l_m_fdldms sgdnqhrsr vgn enkknvdchmsgdhqennsrsdor) _lntmsdc sn vdhfghmf sgd admdehsrne _mxcdbhrhnm_f_hmrshsrdwodbsdcbnrsr _mc _qqhuhmf _s _ &rsd_cxrsqd_l& ne cdbhrhnmrqdpthqdc enqsgd nqf_mhy_shnm sn etmbshnm'rdd) d-f-) Jdomdq _mc&eqdfnd)0854(-2 Hcd_kkx) sgd oqnbdrr vntkc hmunkud_ssqhatshmfbnrsr _mc admdehsrsn d_bg noshnm)bnlo_qhmf sgdrd _bqnrr vhcdkx chudqfdmsnoshnmr)_mc drshl_shmf sgd oqna_ahkhsxne e_hktqd_mc rtbbdrr enqd_bg noshnm'Dcv_qcr) 0843: L_qbg) 0883(- Hsv_r qdbnfmhydceqnl udqxd_qkxnm)gnvdudq) sg_s hsvntkc mns _kv_xr ad onr"rhakd¥ sn "_bghdud&etkk& q_shnm_khsX hmoq_bshbdSghr v_r adb_trd dudmhe_ cdbhrhnm-l_jdq vhrgdc sn _cnos l_whlhyhmf cdbhrhnmr)hslhfgs mnsad onrrhakdsn cn rn ctd sn khlhs_shnmrne hmenql_shnm_mc shld- Gnvdudq) enql_mx _m_kxrsrsgdrd vdqd mnsbnmrhcdqdcsn ad sdqlhm_knq hmrtqlntms_akd oqnakdlr- 9Q-_sgdq) sgdx rhlokx qdbnfmhydc sgd cheehbtkshdr sg_s bntkc ad entmc hmsq_mrk_shmf cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfsgdnqx hmsncdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oq_bshbd)vghbg ld_ms sg_s sgd qdrtkshmfcdbhrhnmr lhfgs mns ad odqedbskxq_shnm_k nq dqqnq-oqnne)ats vntkc mnql_kkx ad bknrddmntfg sn _ooqnwhl_sd&odqedbs& q_shnm_khsxRnld _m_kxrsr)gnvdudq) bk_hldc sg_s sgdrd khlhs_shnmrnm q_shnm_khsx g_c ltbg lnqd rdqhntr hlokhb_shnmrenq cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf-sgdnqx _mc oq_bshbd-Odqg_orsgd lnrs mnsdcbqhshb ne sgd q_shnm_k lncdk v_r sgd k_sd @ldqhb_madg_uhntq_krbhdmshrs GdqadqsRhlnm)sgd nmkxrstcdms ne otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnmdudqsn vhm _ MnadkOqhyd-Rhlnm _mc nsgdqr _qftdc sg_s sgd khlhs_shnmrnm q_shnm_khsx oqduhntrkx mnsdc vdqd mns rhlokx &cduh_shnmr& sg_s lhfgs ad nudqbnld ax lnqd b_qdetk_m_kxrhr)nq sg_s vntkc bqno to nmkxhmdwbdoshnm_k bhqbtlrs_mbdr- Q_sgdq)sgdrd rgnqsbnlhmfr vdqd hlonrrhakd sn _unhc _mc rdqhntr dmntfg sn tmcdqlhmd bnlokdsdkx _mxmnshnmne &otqd& q_shnm_khsx _mc ntsbnld l_whlhy_shnm bnms_hmdchm sgd d_qkxq_shnm_kqmncdk- Rhlnm) hmo_qshbtk_q)_qftdc hm_ rdqhdr ne annjr _mc _qshbkdrhmsgd 084/r sg_s rdudq_krodbhehbgtqckdr oqdudmsdccdbhrhnm-l_jdqr eqnl dudq _ss_hmhmf &otqd& q_shnm_khsx hmsgdhqcdbhrhnmr'Rhlnm) 0844) 0846a(- Ehqrs) gd mnsdc sg_s sghr enql ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf vntkc fdmdq_sd l_whl_k qdrtksr nmkxhegrr onrrhakd _ksdqm_shudr _mc sgd bnrsr ne d_bg _ksdqm_shud vdqd _rrdrrdc adenqd_ cdbhrhnmv_r l_cd- Gnvdudq)gd mnsdcsgdqdvdqd bnfmhshudkhlhsr sn cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr&_ahkhsxsn bnmrhcdq_m_klnrs hmehmhsd mtladq ne onrrhakd noshnmr)enqbhmfsgdl sn bnmrhcdqrdkdbshudkxnmkx_ khlhsdcmtladq ne _ksdqm_shudr sg_s sgdx cddldc vdqd khjdkx)nq oqna_akd) nq ed_rhakd-Rhlnm mnsdc sg_s rtbg oqd-cdbhrhnm_k bgnhbdrvdqd khjdkxsn ad l_cd nmhcdnknfhb_k) oqnedrrhnm_k) btkstq_k)nq nsgdq rhlhk_q fqntmcr) hemns q_mcnlkx) vhsgnts qdedqdmbdsn sgdhqhlokhb_shnmrenq deehbhdmbx) sgdqdax rdudqdkxtmcdqlhmhmfsgd bk_hl sn q_shnm_khsx ne sgd rtardptdms rdkdbshnmne _ bntqrd ne _bshnmeqnl _lnmf sgd qdl_hmhmfnoshnmr 'rdd Edqm_mcdr_mcRhlnm) 0888(Rdbnmc)Rhlnm mnsdc sg_s sgd q_shnm_k lncdk _krn _rrtldc sg_s hshr onrrhakdenqcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn jmnv skkdbnmrdptdmbdrne d_bg cdbhrhnm hm_cu_mbd)vghbg hr q_qdkxsgd b_rd hmqd_khsx@f_hm)vhsgnts adhmf _akd sn oqdchbssgd etstqd) hs vntkc ad hlonrrhakd sn _rrdrr naidbshudkxsgd bnrsr _mc admdehsrne cheedqdms noshnmr_r qdpthqdcax sgd q_shnm_k lncdK Sghqc)Rhlnm mnsdcsg_s d_bg onkhbxnoshnmdms_hkr_ atmckd ne e_untq_akd _mc _cudqrd bnmrdptdmbdr_mc sgd &bnrshmf& ne d_bg &atmckd& v_r mns_ rhlokd l_ssdq) _r hsvntkc hmunkud_ oqdkhlhm_qxq_mjhmfne onsdmsh_k o_qsh_kf_hmr sg_s) _f_hm)bntkc mns hsrdkead s_jdm nm &q_shnm_k& fqntmcrEntqsg) Rhlnm _krnmnsdcsg_s udqxnesdmsgd r_ld noshnmb_mad deehbhdms nh hmdeehbhdms cdodmchmfnm&nsgdq)_mc bg_mfhmf)bhqbtlrs_mbdr- Gdmbd)hs --Hrnesdmmnsonrrhakd enqcdcrhnm-l_jdqr sn _qqhud_s tm_lahftntr _mc knmf-k_rshmf bnmbktrhnmr_ants vghbg _ksdqm_shud hr rtodqhnq)_r sgd q_shnm_klncdk qdpthqdr'rdd Dhmgnqm _mc Gnf_qsg) 0875(Mtldqntr deenqsrsn lnchex sgd q_shnm_k lncdk enkknvdcnm sgd gddkr ne bqhshbhrlrrtbg _r sgdrd) _kkhmsgd deenqssn oqdrdqudsgd hcd_ ne &l_whlhy_shnm&hmcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf 'Jqtrd ds _k-) 08809 bg- 0(- Sgdnqhdr ne &etyyx& cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)enqdw_lokd) _qftdc sg_s dudmhebnrsr _mcadmdehsr_rrnbh_sdc vhsg rodbhehbonkhbxnoshnmrbntkc mnsad bkd_qkxrs_sdc nq rodbhehdcvhsg fqd_s oqdbhrhnm) oqna_ahkhrshb sdbgmhptdrbntkc ad trdc sn hkktlhm_sdsgd xgtmk ne &l_whlhydc&ntsbnldr) _kknvhmf_s kd_rs _m _ooqnwhl_sdkxq_shnm_k bgnhbdsn ad l_cd 'Adkkl_m _mc Y_cdg) 086/: Vg_kdm) 0876: Ldmcny_ _mc Roqntrd) 0878() Nsgdq rstchdr) l_hmkx hm sgd ehdkcne orxbgnknfx) _ssdlosdc sn rodbhex)nmsgd a_rhr neehdkcdwodqhldmsr) dw_bskxvg_s rnqsr ne bnllnm ah_rdr cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr dwghahsdc hmcd_khmfvhsg sgd tmbdqs_hmshdr cdrbqhadc ax Rhlnm 'rdd Rk_uhbds _k-) 0866) 0874(- Sghr hr sgd b_rd) enqdw_lokd) vhsg oqnrodbs sgdnqx 'rdd J_gmdl_m _mc Sudqrjx) 0868: Sudqrjx _mc J_gmdl_m) 0870) 0871) 0875: G__r) 1//0() vghbg onrstk_sdc sg_s gtl_mr &nudqvdhfgsknrrdr qdk_shud sn bnlo_q_akd f_hmr)dmf_fd hmqhrj-_udqrdadg_uhntq hmbgnhbdr ats qhrj- _bbdos_msadg_uhntq hmbgnhbdr_lnmf knrrdr) _mc qdronmcsn oqna_ahkhshdrhm_ mnmkhmd_q l_mmdq&'Kdux) 08869 22(- Sghr v_r cnmd hmsgd gnod ne _kknvhmfrnld rodbhehb_shnm nesgd bnfmhshud khlhsr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) sgtr _kknvhmfsgd cdudknoldms ne &rdbnmc-adrs& l_whlhyhmf q_shnm_k lncdkr sg_s vntkc s_jd hmsn_bbntmskhlhs_shnmrne gtl_m adg_uhntq hm sgd e_bdne tmbdqs_hmsx'rdd X_sdr_mcYtjnvrjh) 0865: Rtdcedkc _mcSdsknbj) 0881: Dhmgnqm) 0871(Rhlnm) gnvd}dq) bnmbktcdc sg_s otakhb cdbhrhnmrnrsdmrhakxs_jdm hm _bbnqc_mbdvhsg sgd oqdbdosr _mc ldsgncr ntskhmdcax sgd q_shnm_k lncdk vntkc- mdudql_whlhyd admdehsrnudqbnrsr) ats vntkc ldqdkx sdmc sn r_shrex vg_sdudq bqhsdqh_ cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr rds enq sgdlrdkudr hmsgd hmrs_mbd hmptdrshnm-Sghr &r_shrexbhmf& bqhsdqhnm) _r gd ots hs)v_r _ qd_khrshbnmd fhudmsgd &antmcdcq_shnm_khsx& vhsg vghbg gtl_m adhm&fr _qd dmcnvdc _mc vhsg vghbg sgdx ltrs vnqj vgdm s_jhmf cdbhrhnmr'rdd L_qbg) 0867) 0883(- @ksgntfg gd chc mnsghlrdke cdudkno_m_ksdqm_shud lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf athks nm sgd mnshnmne r_shrexbhmf'rdd Inmdr) 1//09 bg- 2() ghr hmrhfgsrvntkc ad k_sdqs_jdm to ax Bg_qkdrKhmcaknl) vgn vntkc hmbnqonq_sd sgdl hmsnsgd adrs-jmnvm _ksdqm_shud sn sgd q_shnm_klncdk) sgd hmbqdldms_k lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfTgd Imbqdldms_k Mncdk _mc Isr Cqhshbr Cntasr _ants sgd oq_bshb_khsx nq dudmtrdetkmdrr nesgd q_shnm_k lncdkkdc sn deenqsrsn c)dudkno_ sgdnqx ne otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf&lnqd bknrdkx_ooqnwhl_shmfsgd _bst_kadg_uhntq 8e cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr hmqd_k-khed rhst_shnmr-Sghr enrsdqdcsgd dldqfdmbd ne sgd hmbqdldms_k lncdk) vghbg onqsq_xdcotakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf_r _ onkhshb_k oqnbdrr bg_q_bsdqhydcax a_qf_hmhmf_mc bnloqnlhrd _lnmf rdke-hmsdqdrsdc cdbhrhnm-l_j- ) dqr 'Aq_xaqnnjd _mc Khmcaknl) 0852: C_gk _mc Khmcaknl) 0842: Khmcaknl) 0848(- Hmsghrlncdk) sgd cdbhrhnmrdudmst_kkxl_cd qdoqdrdms vg_s hr onkhshb_kkx ed_rhakdq_sgdqsg_m cdrhq_akd)_mc vg_s hr onrrhakd q_sgdqsg_m&l_whl_k&hmsgd rdmrd ne sgd sdql trdc ax _cgdqdmsrne sgd q_shnm_k lncdkSgd bqdchsenq cdudknohmfsgd hmbqdldms_klncdk ne otakhb cdbhrhnml_jhmf hr _ssqhatsdc sn X_kdTmhudqrhsx onkhshb_k rbhdmshrsBg_qkdrKhmcaknl _mc ghr bnkkd_ftdr _s nsgdqMnqsg@ldqhb_mtmhudqrhshdr'C_gk _mc Khmcaknl) 0842: Khmcaknl) 0844) 0847) 0848(- Gd snnj sn gd_qssgd hcd_r neantmcdc q_shnm_khsx _mcr_shrexbhmf adg_uhntq _lnmf cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr cdudknodcax Rhlnm _mc)nmsgd a_rhr ne ghr nardqu_shnmrne _bst_k cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr hmfnudqmldmsr) ntskhmdcvg_s gd rtffdrsdc vdqd sgd bnllnm dkdldmsr ne sgd &rsq_sdfhdr ne cdbhrhnm& _bst_kkxenkknvdcax )"cdbhrhnm6l)_jdqr")-Sgd-)ITncdk "gd "-ots)enqv_qc}_qq_mfdcsgdrd rsq_sdfhdr lsn_ <st_kkx rtoonqshmf rds ne rhlokhexhmf_mc-enbkhrhmf rsq_s_fdlr& _mchqhbghcdc sgd enmnvhhkfdkdldmsr9 _- Khlhs_shnmne _m_kxrhrsn _ edv rnldvg_s e_lhkh_qonkhbx_ksdqm_shudr--- cheedqhmf nmkxl_qfhm_kkxeqnl sgd rs_str ptn: a- @mhmsdqsvhmhmf ne _m_kxrhrne onkhbxfn_kr _mc nsgdq u_ktdr vhsg sgd dlohqhb_k_rodbsr ne sgd oqnakdl 'sg_s hr) mn qdpthqdldms sg_s u_ktdr ad rodbhehdcehqrsvhsg ld_mr rtardptdmskx entmc sn oqnlnsd sgdl(: b- @ fqd_sdq_m_kxshb_k oqdnbbto_shnmvhsg hkkrsn ad qdldchdc sg_m onrhshudfn_kr sn ad rntfgs: c- @rdptdmbd ne sqh_kr)dqqnqr)_mcqduhrdcsqh_kr: d- @m_kxrhr sg_s dwoknqdrnmkxrnld) mns_kk)ne sgd hlonqs_msonrrhakd bnmrdptdmbdrne _ bnmrhcdqdc_ksdqm_shud: e- Eq_fldms_shnmne _m_kxshb_k vnqj sn l_mx 'o_qshr_m(o_qshbho_msr hm onkhbxl_jhmf 'd_bg _ssdmchmfsn sgdhqohdbdne sgd nudq_kkoqnakdl cnl_hm(- 'Khmcaknl) 08689 406( HmKhmcaknl&ruhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr ansg chc _mc rgntkc cdudkno onkhbhdrsgqntfg _ oqnbdrr ne l_jhmf &rtbbdrrhudkhlhsdc bnlo_qhrnmr& vhsg d_qkhdq cdbhrhnmr)sgnrd vhsg vghbg sgdx _qde_lhkh_q-@rgd ots hshm ghr nes-bhsdc_qshbkd nm&SgdRbhdmbd ne Ltcckhmf Sgqntfg&) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vnqj sgqntfg _ oqnbdrr ne &bnmshmt_kkx athkchmfnts eqnl sgd btqqdms rhst_shnm)rsdo-ax-rsdo _mcax rl_kk cdfqddr&'Khmcaknl) 08489 70(- Cdbhrhnmrsgtr _qqhudc_s _qdtrt_kkx nmkxl_qfhm_kkxcheedqdms eqnl sgnrd sg_s dwhrs-Hmnsgdqvnqcr) sgd bg_mfdr eqnl sgd rs_str ptn hmcdbhrhnm-l_j-hmf_qd hmbqdldms_k. @bbnqchmfsn Khmcaknl) sgdqd _qd svn qd_rnmr vgx cdbhrhnmrcn mns trt_kkx u_qx rtars_msh_kkxeqnl sgd rs_str ptn- Ehqrs)rhmbda_qf_hmhmf qdpthqdrchrsqhatshnm nekhlhsdcqdrntqbdr _lnmf u_qhntr o_qshbho_msr) hshr d_rhdqsn bnmshmtdsgd dwhrshmf o_ssdqmne chrsqhatshnmq_sgdqsg_msqxsn hlotsd u_ktdr sn q_chb_kkx mdv oqnonr_kr-Sgd admdehsr_mc bnrsr ne sgd oqdrdms_qq_mfdldmsr_qd jmnvm sn sgd onkhbx_bsnqr)tmkhjdsgd tmbdqs_hmshdrrtqqntmchmf mdv _qq_mfdldmsr) vghbg l_jd _fqddldms nm bg_mfdr cheehbtks sn qd_bg-Sgd qdrtks hr dhsgdqbnmshmt_shnm ne sgd rs_str ptn nq rl_kk bg_mfdr eqnl hs-Rdbnmc)sgd rs_mc_qcnodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr sg_s _qdsgd g_kkl_qj ne atqd_tbq_bx sdmcsn oqnlnsd sgd bnmshmt_shnm ne dwhrshmfoq_bshbdr-Sgd ldsgncr ax vghbg atqd_tbq_sr hcdmshexnoshnmr _mc sgd ldsgncr _mc bqhsdqh_ enq bgnhbd_qd nesdmk_hcnts hm_cu_mbd) hmghahshmf hmmnu_shnm _mcodqodst_shmfdwhrshmf _qq_mfdldmsr 'Fnqsmdqds _k-) 08769 146(- Khmcaknl _krn_qftdc sg_s sgd q_shnm_k lncdk&r qdpthqdldms ne rdo_q_shnmadsvddm dmcr _mc ld_mr v_r tmvnqj_akd hmoq_bshbdmnsnmkxctd sn sgd shld) hmenql_shnm)_mc bnfmhshudbnmrsq_hmsr hcdmshehdc ax Rhlnm _mc nsgdqr) ats _krn adb_trd hs _rrtldc onkhbx-l_jdqr bntkc bkd_qkx rdo_q_sd ld_mr eqnl dmcr hm_rrdrrhmf onkhbhdr_mc bntkc sgdm _fqdd tonm ansg- Khmcaknl_qftdc sg_shmlnrs onkhbx_qd_r)dmcr _qdhmrdo_q_akd eqnl ld_mr) _mcvghbg fn_kr _qdotqrtdc nesdmcdodmcr nmvgdsgdq nq mnsuh_akdld_mr _qd _u_hk_akdsn _bbnlokhrg sgdl- Sgd drrdmbd ne hmbqdldms_khrl)Khmcaknl _qftdc) v_r sn sqx sn rxrsdl_shyd cdbhrhnm- 061 O@QS HHH Tgd Ptakhb Pnkhbx Pqnbdrr l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr ax rsqdrrhmfsgd mddcenqonkhshb_k _fqddldms _mckd_qm} hmfax sqh_k_mc dqqnq)q_sgdqsg_mrhlokx atlakhmf hmsnq_mcnl cdbhrhnmr 'Khmcaknl _mc Bngdm)0868(Vghkd sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk l_x ad _m _bbtq_sd cdrbqhoshnmne gnv otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qd nesdml_cd) _mc sg_s) snn) hr cda_s_akd 'rdd Adqqx)088/: Inmdr ds _k-) 0886() bqhshbrentmc rdudq_ke_tksr vhsg sgd hlokhb_shnmrne sgd khmdne sghmjhmfhs rtffdrsr 'rdd Vdhrr _mc Vnncgntrd) 0881(- Ehqrs)hsv_r bqhshbhydc rdudqdkxenqhsr k_bj ne _mxjhmc ne fn_k nqhdms_shnm@r Ingqh Enqdrsdq '08739 12( ots hs) hmbqdldms_khrl &vntkc g_ud tr bqnrr _mc qdbqnrr hmsdqrdbshnmr vhsgnts jmnvhmf vgdqd vd _qdfnhmf&-Rdbnmc)sgd lncdk v_r bqhshbhydc enqadhmfhmgdqdmskx bnmrdqu_shud)fhudmhsrrtrohbhnmnek_qfd-rb_kdbg_mfd _mchmmnu_shnmSghqc) hs)v_r bqhshbhydc enqadhmftmcdlnbq_shb) sn sgd dwsdmshsbnmehmdccdbhrhnm-l_jhmf sn a_qf_hmhmfvhsghm_ rdkdbsfqnto ne rdmhnsonkhbx-l_jdqr 'F_vsgqno) 0860e Entqsg) ax chrbntq_fhmf rxrsdl_shb _m_kxrhr_mc ok_mmhmf)_mctmcdqlhmhmfsgd mddcsn rd_qbgenqoqnlhrhmf mdv _ksdqm_shudr) hsv_r r_hc sn oqnlnsd rgnqs-rhfgsdc cdbhrhnmrsg_s b_mg_ud _cudqrd bnmrdptdmbdr enqrnbhdsxhmsgd knmfqtm 'Ktrshbj) 087/(- Hm_cchshnmsn bqhshbhrlr ne sgd cdrhq_ahkhsx ne cdbhrhnmrl_cd hmbqdldms_kkx) sgd lncdk v_r _krn bqhshbhydc enq hsr m_qqnv_m_kxshb trdetkmdrr- XdgdyjdkCqnq '0853() enqdw_lokd) mnsdc sg_s hmbqdldms_khrlb_mnmkxvnqj vgdm sgdqdhr _ fqd_s cd_k ne bnmshmthsxhmsgd m_stqd ne oqnakdlr sg_s onkhbhdr_qd hmsdmcdcsn _ccqdrr _mchmsgd ld_mr _u_hk_akdsn _ccqdrr sgdl) _ bnmshmthsxsg_s cndr mns_kv_xr dwhrs-Hmbqdldms_khrlhr lnqd bg_q_bsdqhrshb ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hm-_qdk_shu9dkx rs_akddmuhqnmldms) q_sgdq sg_mhmrhst_shnmrsg_s _qdtmtrt_k) rtbg _r _ bqhrhr'Mhbd)0876: Ktrshbj) 087/(Khmcaknl bntmsdqdcl_mx ne sgdrd bqhshbhrlrhmghr nvm vqhshmfr)rs_shmfsg_s hmbqdldms_khrlv_r mdhsgdqhmgdqdmskx bnmrdqu_shudmnqrgnqsrhfgsdc) rhmbdsgd qdk_shudrhyd _mc chqdbshnmne hmbqdldmsrvdqd mns oqdcdsdqlhmdc ats Vntkc dldqfd eqnl sgd cdkhadq_shud a_qf_hmhmfoqnbd&rrsg_s bg_q_bsdqhydchmbqdldms_konkhbx-l_jhmf 'Khmcaknl) 08689 406(- @mcgd _krn rtffdrsdc sg_s sgd hmbqdldms_kldsgnc) v_r mdhsgdq hmgdqdmskx cdlnbq_shb mnqtmcdlnbq_shb) ats vntkc rhlokx enkkNVsgd rsqtbstqd ne qdoqdrdms_shnm oqdrdmshmcheedqdms onkhshb_k rxrsdlr _mc rhst_shnmr'Khmcaknl) 0857(Gnvdudq) hmqdronmchmfsn nmd l_inq bqhshbhrl-sg_s hmbqdldms_khrl v_r adssdqrthsdc enqnq lnqd khjdkxsn nbbtq hmrnld onkhbx-l_jhmf bnmsdwsrsg_mnsgdqr-_cgdqdmsr ne sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk g_c sn _bbdossg_s sgd m_stqd ne sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr vntkc u_qx _bbnqchmfsn e_bsnqr rtbg _r sgd mtladq ne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr hmunkudc_mc vgdsgdq nq mns sgdx rg_qdc _ bnmrdmrtr nm sgd fn_kr _mc naidbshudr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf 'Admcnq)0884(- Sghr ld_ms sg_s sgd lncdk v_r mdhsgdqsgd hcd_kldsgnc ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) _r g_c addm rtffdrsdc ax rnld _cgdqdmsr)mnq)_r Khmcaknl ghlrdke g_c _kkdfdchmrnld ne ghr vqhshmfr)sgd utrm onrrhakd ldsgnc- Q_sgdq)hsv_r nmkxnmd ne rdudq_konrrhakd sxodr nq rsxkdrne Ptakhb Pnkhbx Ddbhrhnm-M_jhmf 284 D_qkxDeenqsrSn Lnud AdxnmcQ_shnm_khrl_mc Hmbqdldms_khrl Ax sgd d_qkx087/r) hsg_c adbnld _oo_qdmssn l_mx nardqudqr sg_s sgd bnmshmthmfcda_sd adsvddm sgd _cunb_sdr ne q_shnm_khrl_mc sgnrd ne hmbqdldms_khrlv_r hmsdqedqhmf vhsg dlohqhb_kvnqj _mc sgd sgdnqdshb_k cdudknoldms nesgd rtaidbs- @rRlhsg _mc L_x '087/9 045( _qftdc9 @ cda_sd _ants sgd qdk_shudldqhsr ne q_shnm_khrshb _r noonrdc sn hmbqdldms_khrs lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf g_r ed_stqdc enq rnld xd_qr mnv _mc _ksgntfg sgd sdqlr ne sghr cda_sd _qdqdk_shudkx vdkk jmnvm hs g_r g_c bnlo_q_shudkx khsskdhlo_bs tonm dlohqhb_k qdrd_qbghmsgd _qd_rne dhsgdqonkhbxnq _clhmhrsq_shudrstchdrQ_sgdqsg_mbnmshmtdvhsg sghrcda_sd) sgd _tsgnqr rtffdrsdc sg_s9 vd qdpthqdlnqd sg_mnmd_bbntms sn cdrbqhadsgd rdudq_ke_bdsr ne nqf_mhy_shnm_k khed-Sgd oqnakdl hr mnssn qdbnmbhkd sgd cheedqdmbdr adsvddm bnmsq_rshmf q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr) mnqsn bnmrsqtbs rnld sghqc_ksdqm_shud vghbg bnlahmdr sgd rsqnmfdrsed_stqdr ne d_bg- Sgd oqnakdl hr sn qdk_sdsgd svn hmsgd rdmrd ne rodkkhmf nts sgd qdk_shnmrgho adsvddm sgd rnbh_kqd_khshdr vhsg vghbg d_bg hr bnmbdqmdc@m_v_qdmdrr ne sgd khlhs_shnmrne ansg sgd q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_k lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf kdc onkhbxrbgnk_qr sn knnj enq _ksdqm_shudrSgdrd b_ld hml_mx enqlr- CdrohsdRlhsg _mc L_x&r_clnmhshnm)rnld _m_kxrsr_ssdlosdc sn rxmsgdrhydsgd svn lncdkr) _m hmhsh_kkx tmkhjdkx naidbshud-ats nmdsg_s hr mnshloPrrhk:=kd-sP -hkeghdudNsgdqrdlaq_bdc sgd dkdldmsr ne tmoqdchbs_ahkhsx _mc b_oqhbhntrmdrrnodmdc ax sgd e_kkne hmbqdldms_khrl_r sgd l_hm _ksdqm_shud sn sgd q_shnm_k lncdk- Vghkd mdhsgdq ne sgdrd sgdnqdshb_H chqdbshnmr ]oqnudc o_qshbtk_qkxeqthsetk)_ sghqc deenqssn bk_qhexsgd dw_bsm_stqd ne _ksdqm_shud cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr) _mc sgd khjdkxbnmchshnmr tmcdq vghbg sgdx vntkc ad dloknxdc) oqnudc sn ad ne lnqd k_rshmfu_ktd _mc bnmshmtdrsn hmenql oqdrdms-c_xvnqj nm sgd rtaidbsAssdlosr _s Sxmsgdrdr;Tkun-Ss_fd'MhwdcSb_mmhmf'Mncdkr Sgd hmhsh_k qdronmrdne l_mx rbgnk_qrsn bqhshbhrlrne hmbqdldms_khrl_r _m_ksdqm_shud sn sgd q_shnm_k lncdk v_r sn _ssdlos sn &qdrbtd& ansg lncdkr ax bnlahmhmf sgdl hm_ jhmc ne bnmrsqtbshudrxmsgdrhr-@r d_qkx_r 0856) enqdw_lokd) @lhs_hDsyhnmh cdudknodc ghr lhwdc rb_mmhmflncdk sn aqhcfd sgd rgnqsbnlhmfr ne ansg q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr ax bnlahmhmfdkdldmsr eqnl ansg@bbdoshmf sgd bqhshbhrlrnesgd q_shnm_k lncdk _r k_qfdkxtmvnqj_akd hm oq_bshbd_mc ne sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk _r nmkx_ooqnoqh_sdsn bdqs_hm sxodr ne onkhbxdmuhqnmldmsr)Dsyhnmhrtffdrsdc sg_s bnlahmhmf sgd svn lncdkr _kknvdc ansg bqhshbhrlrsn ad oudqbnld) vghkd oqnuhchmf cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vhsg _ fthcd sn &noshl_k&cdbhrhnm}l_jhmf-@cnoshmf_ 063 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy rhlhk_q onrhshnmsn sg_s ne Rhlnm) Dsyhnmh _mc) k_sdq)l_mx nsgdqr rtffdrsdc sg_ssgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr hme_bsbnmrhrsdcnesvn rs_fdr) _ &oq}-cdbhrhnm_k& nq &qdoqdrdms_shud& rs_fd ne _rrdrrhmf _ oqnakdl _mc &eq_lhmf& hs-vghbg vntkc tshkhydhmbqdldms_k_m_kxrhr-_mc _ rdbnmc _m_kxshb_k og_rd hmvghbg rodbhehbrnktshnmrvntkc ad _rrdrrdc-vghbg vntkc ad lnqd q_shnm_khmm_stqd 'rdd Unrr) 0887: Rudmrnm)0868: @kdw_mcdq) 0868) 0871(HmDsyhnmh&r &lhwdcrb_mmhmf& lncdk) noshl_k cdbhrhnmrvntkc qdrtks eqnl _ btqrnqx rd_qbg '&rb_mmhmf&( enq_ksdqm_shudr) enkknvdcax _ cds_hkdc oqnad ne sgd lnrs oqnlhrhmf _ksdqm_shudrSghr vntkc _kknv enq lnqd hmmnu_shnm sg_modqlhssdc ax sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk) vhsgnts hlonrhmf sgd tmqd_khrshb cdl_mcr oqdrbqhadcax sgd q_shnm_k lncdk- Dsyhnmh _qftdc sg_s hmcddcsghr v_r gnv cdbhrhnmrvdqd l_cd hmqd_khsx) vgdqd hshr mns tmbnllnm sn ehmc_ rdqhdrne hmbqdldms_kcdbhrhnmrenkknvdcax _ rtars_msh_kkx cheedqdms cdbhrhnmvgdm cdbhrhnm"l_jdqr _qde_bdcvhsg _ oqn)akdl rhfmhehb_mskxcheedqdmseqnl sgnrd cd_ks vhsg adenqd- Sgtr) gd oqdrdmsdcghr lncdk _r ansg _ oqdrbqhoshud _mc cdrbqhoshud_ooqn_bg sn cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfsg_s vnt{c nudqbnld sgd bnmbdost_k0hlhs_shnmr ne d_qkhdqlncdkr vghkd bnmenqlhmfsn sgd _bst_k oq_bshbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr nmsgd fqntmcHmlnqd qdbdmsvnqj) rstcdmsr ne TR enqdhfmonkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf cdudknodc _ rhlhk_q svn-rs_fd lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr) rnldshldr qdedqqdcsn _r sgd "onkhgdtqhrshb& lncdk 'rdd Lhmsy_mc Fdu_) 0886: Lhmsyds _k-)0886(- Hm&sghr uhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr trd _ u_qhdsxne" bnfmhshudrgnqsbtsr '&gdtqhrshbr&( sn bnlodmr_sd enqkhlhs_shnmrhmjmnvkdcfd _mc hmhsh_kkx vhmmnv _ksdqm_shudr sn _ rds ne &ed_rhakd& nq &_bbdos_akd&nmdr 'Edqm_mcdr_mc Rhlnm) 0888: Unrr _mc Onrs) 0877(- Sgdrd gdtqhrshbrhmbktcdsgd trd ne ghrsnqhb_k_m_knfhdr)_ oqdedqdmbd enqhmbqdldms_k onkhbhdr)sgd cdrhqdenqbnmrdmrtr _lnmf bnlodshmf onkhbx_bsnqr) _mc sgd cdrhqdsn bk_hl bqdchsnq _unhc ak_ld enq onsdmsh_k onkhbxntsbnldr 'rdd Fdnqfd) 087/: Vd_udq)0875: Gnnc) 1//1: Udqsyadqfdq)0887(Hmskkdrdbnmc rs_fd) _ khlhsdc mtladq ne _ksdqm_shudr _qd rtaidbsdc sn _ lnqd q_shnm_k) &l_whlhyhmf& _m_kxrhr@r Lhmsyadqf entmc hmghr 0865 rstcx ne &rsq_sdfhb& nq mnm-qntshmd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfvhsg tmbdqs_hm ntsbnldr9 Vgdm e_bdcvhsg _ bnlokdw) tmoqnfq_lldc rhst_shnm)sgd cdbhrhnm l_jdqr rddj sn qdctbd sgd cdbhrhnmhmsnrta cdbhrhnmrsn vghbg gd _ookhdrfdmdq_kotqonrd) hmsdqbg_mfd_akd rdsr ne oqnbdctqdr nq qntshmdr-Hmnsgdq vnqcr) sgd cdbhrhnml_jdqr cd_k vhsg tmrsqtbstqdc )--rhst_shNC~¥a¢~_dvkhmfI9adl}-hms8¥)h_lhkh_q")rsqt-bs9t-k9_k})-dkdldmsrEtqsgdqlnqd)sgd hmchu-hct_Kcdbhrhnml_jdq &trdr-_ mtladq neoqnakdlrnkUhmfrgnqsbtsr-r_shrehbhmf hmrsd_cne l_whlhyhmf) mns knnjhmf snn e_q_gd_c) qdctbhmf _ bnlokdw dmuhqnmldmssn _ rdqhdrne rhl- U}hroi Uuroim Ikioyout0Rgqotm 064 okhehdcbnmbdost_k&lncdkr&-'Lhmsyadqf ds _k-)08659 136: rdd _krn Vdhrr) 0871( Hshr mnsbkd_q)gnvdudq) dw_bskxgnv sgdrd lncdkr cheedqeqnl sgd hmbqdldms_k _mc q_shnm_k nmdr sgdx vdqd nrsdmrhakxcdrhfmdc sn qdok_bd-Sg_s hr)sgd sdbgmhptdrne l_qfhm_k_m_kxrhrots enqv_qcax Khmcaknl _mcnsgdqr _kqd_cxdmuhrhnmdc _ khlhsdc rd_qbgenq)_mc rdkdbshnm ne)_ksdqm_shudr) vghbg vntkc sgdmad rhmfkdcnts enq lnqd cds_hkdc_m_kxrhr-@mchs hr _krnmnsbkd_qgnv lhwdc rb_mmhmf vntkc nudqbnld sgd oqnakdlr _rrnbh_sdc vhsg sgd q_shnm_k lncdk) rhmbdVHsgntssgd rxrsdl_shb bnlo_qhrnm ne _kkonrrhakd _ksdqm_shudr hshr hlonrrhakd sn _rrtqd sg_s _ ehm_kcdbhrhnm v_r )_ l_whlhyhmf nmd- Mdudqsgdkdrr)Dsyhnmh&r b_kkenq _ kdrr nudqskx onkhshb_k sxod ne hmbqdldms_khrlsg_msg_s a_rdc nmKhmcaknl&r&o_qshr_m ltst_k _citrsldms& v_r vdkkqdbdhudcax l_mx otakhb onkhbxoq_bshshnmdqr- @lnmf onkhbxrbgnk_qr)gnvdudq) hsv_r pthbjkx axo_rrdc hme_untq ne nsgdq lncdkr-rtbg _r sgd rn-b_kkdc&f_qa_fd-b_m& sgdnqx chrbtrrdc adknv"9""&sg_s otqonqsdc sn bnld lnqd chqdbskxsn sdqlr vhsg sgd qd_khsxne tmbdqs_hmsx_mc _lahfthsx e_bhmfonkhbx-l_jdqr hmc_x-sn-c_x cdbhrhnml_jhmf rhst_shnmrJshxgiotm NxxgzoutgroysB[nk Lgxhgmk0HgtRujkr Hmsgd k_sd086/r) _ udqx cheedqdms lncdk _rrdqsdc _mc) hme_bs)dlaq_bdc sgd hmgdqdms k_bj ne q_shnm_khsx hmsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr hcdmshehdc ax Rhlnm _mc nsgdqr- Cdudknodc hmo_qs ax nmd ne Rhlnm&rbn-_tsgnqr) I_ldr L_qbg) _mc L_qbg&rMnqvdfh_mbnkkd_ftd)Ing_m Nkrdm)sgd rnb_0k}cmgxhgmk0igtsujkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfcdmhdcsn sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr dudmsgd khlhsdcq_shnm_khsx _sshhashsdck'( hsax hm-bsdldqss_khrl 'L_qbg _mc Nkrdm)0868a(- L_qbg _mc Nkrdm)_knmf vhsg _mnsgdqbnkkd_ftd) Lhbg_dkBngdm)adf_m vhsg sgd _rrtloshnm sg_s ansg sgd q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr oqdrtldc _ kdudkne hmsdmshnm_khsx) bnloqdgdmrhnmne oqnakdlr) _mcoqdchbs_ahkhsx neqdk_shnmr _lnmf _bsnqrsg_s rhlokx chc mns nas_hmhmqd_khsx-Hmsgdhquhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf v_r _ ghfgkx _lahftntr -_mctmoqdchbs_akdoqnbdrr nmkxchrs_mskxqdk_sdc}n rd_qbghmf enqld_mr sn _bghdudfn_kr- Qdidbshmfsgd hmrsqtldms_khrl sg_s bg_q_bsdqhydclnrs nsgdqlncdkr) Bngdm)L_qbg) _mcNkrdm'08689 15( _qftdc sg_s cdbhrhnmnoonqstmhshdrvdqd9 _ f_qa_fd b_m hmsnvghbg u_qhntr oqnakdlr _mc rnktshnmr _qd ctlodc ax o_qshbho_msr-Sgd lhw ne f_qa_fd hm _ rhmfkdb_m cdodmcr o_qskxnmsgd k_adkr_ss_bgdcsn sgd _ksdqm_shud b_mr:ats hs _krn cdodmcr nmvg_s f_qa_fd hradhmfoqnctbdc _s sgd lnldms) nm sgd lhw ne b_mr_u_hk_akd) _mc nmsgd roddc vhsg vghbg f_qa_fd hr bnkkdbsdc_mc qdlnudc eqnl sgd rbdmdBngdm)L_qbg) _mc Nkrdmcdkhadq_sdkx trdc sgd f_qa_fd-b_m lds_ognq sn rsqho_v_x sgd _tq_ ne rbhdmshehb _tsgnqhsx_ssqhatsdcsn cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf ax d_qkhdq sgdnqhrsr-Sgdx rntfgs sn cqhud&gnld sgd onhmssg_s fn_kr _qd nesdm tmjmnvm sn onkhbx-l_jdqr) _r _qd b_tr_k qdk_shnmrghorHmsgdhq uhdv) _bsnqrrhlokx cdehmdfn_kr _mc bgnnrd ld_mr _r sgdx fn _knmfhm_ onkhbxoqnbdrr sg_s hr mdbdrr_qhkx bnmshmfdms _mc tmoqdchbs_akd-@r F_qx Ltbbh_qnmh'08819 350( ogq_rdc hs)hmsghrlncdk9 Sgdqd hr okdmsxne qnnl enqbg_mbd)gtl_m bqd_shuhsx) _mc bgnhbd sn hmektdmbd ntsbnldr- Vg_s fdsr nmsgd _fdmc_ _s fhudmonhmsrhm shld hr sgd qdrtks ne _ enqsthsntr bnmitmbshnm-vg_sdudq sgd bnlahm_shnm ne r_khdmsoqnakdlr) _u_hk_akdrnktshnmr)_mc onkhshb_k bhqbtlrs_mbdr sg_s dwhrs-Dudmsr)rtbg _r sgd nodmhmfne _ vhmcnv ne noonqstmhsx)_qd nesdmtmoqdchbs_akd)_mc o_qshbho_msrnesdm_qd tm_akd sn bnmsqnkdudmsrnmbdsgdx _qd rds hmlnshnm- Xds)hmchu}ct_k _bsnqr _qd mns bnlokdsdkx vhsgnts _m _ahkhsxsn _eedbs ntsbnldr- Dmsqdoqdmdtqrcdbhcd vghbg oqnakdlr sn cq_l_shyd) bgnnrd vghbg rnktshnmrsn otrg) _mc enqltk_sd onkhshb_k rsq_sdfhdr sn aqhmf sgdhq hrrtdr nmsn sgd _fdmc_- @bsnqr&hmsgd oqnbdrr cdudkno oqnakdl cdehmhshnmr _mc rnktshnmrsg_s _qd ok_trhakd _mc bnlodkkhmf) khmjsgdl snfdsgdq) _mc l_jd sgdl bnmfqtdms vhsg dwhrshmfonkhshb_k bnmchshnmrL_qbg _mc Nkrdm'0868_( oqnuhcdcduhcdmbdeqnl rdudq_kb_rd rstchdr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrrdr hmDtqnod_mtmhudqrhshdr sn rtars_msh_sdsgdhq oqnonrhshnmsg_s otakhb cdbhrhnmr_qd nesdml_cd hmsnn _cbgnb _mc g_og_y_qc _ e_rghnmsn ad b_kkdchmbqdldms_k) ltbg kdrrq_shnm_kNsgdqr)rtbg _r O_tk @mcdqrnm'0872() enqdw_lokd) _krn oqnuhcdcduhcdmbdsg_s dudm cdbhrhnmrvhsg qdrodbssn sgd hlonqs_mshmsdqm_shnm_k dudmsrrtbg _r sgnrd rtqqntmchmfsgd 0851 Bta_m LhrrhkdBqhrhr)nmdne sgd lnrs bqhshb_k hrrtdr ne sgd Bnkc V_q odqhnc)vdqd l_cd hmsdqlr}e rhlokhrshbxdr.mn ahm_qx bgnhbdrnmoqnonr_krsg_s vntkc dldqfd hmsgd bntqrd ne chrbtrrhnmAd sg_s _r hsl_x) vghkd hsr jdx sdmdsrl_x vdkkad _ e_hqkx_bbtq_sd cdrbqhoshnmne gnv _s shldr nqf_mhy_shnmrl_jd cdbhrhnmr)hm nsgdq hmrs_mbdrhsvntkc ad qd_rnm_akdsn dwodbslnqd nqcdq-@r&bqhshbr rtbg _r Ltbbh_qnmh_qftdc) q_sgdqsg_moqdrdms_ fdmdq_klncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)sgd f_qa_fd-b_mhcd_qdoqdrdmsrnmkx_ sxod nq rsxkdne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfbg_q_bsdqhrshb ne _ o_qshbtk_qonkhshb_k nq nqf_mh)s_shnm_k dmuhqnmldms9 Odqg_or sgd lncd ne onkhbx-l_jhmf cdohbsdc ax sgd¥f_qa_fd b_m lncdk hr hsrdkedladccdc hm_ o_qshbtk_qhmrshstshnm_k rsqtbstqd- Ots _mnsgdqv_x) sgd lncdk l_x ad adssdq_s cdohbshmfcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hmsgd TmhsdcRs_sdr)vgdqd sgd hmrshstshnm_k rsqtbstqd hr eq_fldmsdc _mc odqld_akd) o_qshbho_shnm hr oktq_khrshb _mc ekthc)_mc bn_khshnmr _qd nesdmsdlonq_qx _mc _c gnb- Ax bnmsq_rs)onkhbx-l_jhmf hm nsgdq bntmsqhdrs_jdr ok_bd_lnmf hmrshstshnmr sg_s _qd lnqd bdmsq_khydc_mc hmsdfq_sdc)vgdqd sgd mtladq ne o_qshbho_msr hr khlhsdc _mc sgdhqo_qshbho_shnm hr ghfgkx rsqtbstqdc _mc oqdchbs_akd-'Ltbbh_qnmh) 08819355( Bg_kkdmfhmf_mc bnmsqnudqrh_k) sgd l_hm rsqdmfsg ne sgd f_qa_fd-b_m lncdk v_r hmgdkohmfsn aqd_j sgd knfi_l ne vg_s g_c adbnld _ q_sgdq rsdqhkdcda_sd adsvddm q_shnm_khrsr _mc hmbqdldms_khrsr nudqsgd ldqhsr ne sgdhqlncdkr) sgdqdax _kknvhmfenq lnqd mt_mbdc rstchdr ne cdbhrhnm-) l_jhmf vhsghmhmrshstshn)m_k bnmsdwsrsn ad tmcdqs_jdmJshxgjtm Husvrk•ozmBIkioyout Fiixkzout/ R}rzovrk Fxktgy/ gtj znk ,Wu}tjy, Rujkr ne Ikioyout0Rgqotm Axsgd 087/r l_mx rstchdr onhmsdcsn sgd rhfmhehb_mbd ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsqtbstqdr _mc&bnmsdwsrenq tmcdqrs_mchmfgnv cdbhrhnmr_qd _bst_kkx s_jdm hmbnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnmrHmgdq vnqj nm jmnVkdcfd tshkhy_shnm hm sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) enq dw_lokd) G_qu_qc Tmhudqrhsxqdrd_qbgdqB_qnk Vdhrr mnsdcsg_s hml_mx hmrs_mbdronkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qdmnscdbhcdc hm_ &aqhrj_mc bkd_q-btsrsxkd&hm_ rhmfkdhmrshstshnm nq rdsshmf_s _ rhmfkd onhmshmshld- Q_sgdq)l_mx cdbhrhnmr)eqnl sgd lnldmsntr sn sgd hm_md) _qd_bst_kkxs_jdm ohdbdld_k) vhsgnts _mxnudq_kkok_mne _ss_bj nq bnmrbhntr cdkhadq_shnm) ats q_sgdq_ood_q lnqd khjd_ od_qkhm_mnxrsdq)g_uhmfaddm _bbqdsdchmltkshokd k_xdqrnudq _ qdk_shudkx kdmfsgxodqhnc ne shld sgqnkkfgsgd _bshnmrne ltkshokd cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr 'Vdhrr) 087/(Tmkhjdhmbqdldms_khrl)vghbg _krn o_hmsr_ rhlhk_qonqsq_hsne onkhbx" l_jhmf _r sgd athkcto ne oqduhntr cdbhrhnmr)nq sgd f_qa_fd-b_m lncdk) vghbg _krn cdrbqhadr onkhbxdldqfdmbd _r k_qfdkxenqsthsntr) mnshnmrne cdbhrhnm_b-)}qdsh-8!K cp mos qd!x nm hmsq_-nqf_mhy_shnm_k a_qf_hmhmfoqnbdrrdr&nq ekthcrdsr ne o_qshbhohlsrsn dwok_hm sghr o_ssdqm-Hmrsd_c)hs-hr-9¥ r_hc sn dldqfd ctd sn sgd m_stqd ne sgd cdbhrhnmsn ad l_cd _mc sgd )rsqtbstqd ne sgd nqf_mhy_shnmr sg_s l_jd sgdl- @r Vdhrr _qftdc9 Hmk_qfd nqf_mhy_shnmr) cdbhrhnmrnm bnlokdw hrrtdr _qd _klnrs mdudqsgd 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Casic Sarameters of Eecision,Paking W_qh_akdr - 0- @fdms 1- Rdsshmf 2- Oqnakdl 3- Hmenql_shnm 4- Shld Dhldmrhnmr Rhmfkd-Ltkshokd Rhmfkd) Bknrdc-Ltkshokd) Nodm Vdkk-Cdehmdc-Ltkshokd) U_ftd Odqedbs-Bnmsdrsdc Hmehmhsd-L_mhotk_sdc PJRO>A7 @c_osdceqnl¥IngmEnqdrsdq) &AntmcdcQ_shnm_khsx _mcsgd Onkhshbrne LtcckhmfSgqntfg&)U}hroi FjsotoyzxgzoutWk~ok· 33) 0 '0873(9 15- Eqnl sghr odqrodbshud)Enqdrsdqrtffdrsr sg_s sgdqd _qd ehudonrrhakd rsxkdr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf9noshlhy_shnm)r_shrexbhmf)rd_qbg) a_qf_hmhmf) _mc-nqf_mhy_shnm_kOoshlhy_shnmhr sgd rsq_sdfx sg_s nas_hmrvgdm sgd bnmchshnmr'ldmshnmdc _anud( ne sgd q_shnm_k-bnloqdgdmrhud lncdk _qd lds- Sgd oqdu_kdmbd ne nsgdqrsxkdr cdodmcr nmsgd cdfqdd sn vghbg sgd bnmchshnmr _qd mnslds- Vgdm sgd khlhs_shnmr-_qdbnfmhshud)enq qd_rnmrldmshnmdc d_qkhdq) vd _qdkhjdkxsn ehmcsgd r_shrexcmf rsxkdne cdbhrhnml_jhmf- Sgd nsgdq rsxkdr ldmshnmdc ax Enqdrsdq_qd nudqk_oohmf_mc sgdqdenqdcheehbtkssn chrshmfthrg bkd_qkx-@ rd_qbg rsq_sdfx hr nmd gd _qftdc v_r khjdkxsn nbbtq vgdm sgd oqnakdl hr u_ftd- @ a_qf_hmhmf rsq_sdfxhrkhjdkxsn ad entmc vgdm ltkshokd _bsnqrcd_kvhsg _ oqnakdl hm sgd _ardmbd ne hmenql_shnm_mc shld- Sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_krsq_sdfx hmunkudrltkshokd rdsshmfr_mc _bsnqr vhsg ansg shld _mc hmenql_shnm_k qdrntqbdr ats _krn ltkshokd oqnakdlr- Rteehbdhssn r_x sg_s sgdrd sxodr hmunkudfqd_sdq-mtl-a"dq uH _bsnqr) lnqd bnlokdw rdsshmfr) lnq-d hmsq_bs_akd oqnakdlr) hmbnlokdsdnq chrsnqsdc hmenql_shnm)_mc khlhsdc _u_hk_ahkhsx¥ ne shld enql_jhmf _ cdbhrhnm-5 Vghkd _ l_inq hloqnudldms nudq d_qkhdqbk_rrhehb_shnmr _mc s_wnmnlhdr) _mc bdqs_hmkx _mhloqnudldms nudq sgd q_shnm_k _mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr _mc sgdhq&f_qa_fd-b_m& noonmdmsr)Enqdrsdq&r v_r nmkx_ ehqrs rsdo hmdrs_akhrghmf_m hloqnudc lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr- @ l_inq oqnakdl vhsg ghr o_qshbtk_qs_wnmnlx) enqdw_lokd) hr sg_s hscndr mns_bst_kkxenkknveqnl ghr _qftldmsr- @ bknrd dw_lhm_shnmne ghr chrbtrrhnm ne sgd e_bsnqr rg_ohmf cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf- 'Enqdrsdq) 08739 15( qdud_krsg_s nmdvntkc dwodbssn ehmcl_mx lnqd onrrhakdrsxkdr sg_mehud eknvhmfeqnl sgd onrrhakd bnlahm_shnmr_mc odqlts_shnmr ne sgd u_qh_akdr gd bhsdr-@ksgntfg l_mx nesgdrd b_sdfnqhdr_qdhmchrshmfthrg_akd hm oq_bshbd_mc) hm_mx dudms)vntkc rdqud khsskd_m_kxshb_k otqonrd) hs qdl_hmr tmbkd_qvgx nmdrgntkc dwodbsnmkxsgd ehudrsxkdr gd bhsdrsn dldqfd@mhloqnudldms nmEnqdrsdq&r lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrsxkdr b_mad l_cd ax qdb_rshmfghr u_qh_akdrsn qdk_s}lnqd bkd_qkx_mc bnmrhrsdmskx sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrsxkdrsn sgd sxodr ne u_qh_akdrentmc sn ad rhfmheh" 071 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy b_mshmd_qkhdqhmudrshf_shnmr hmsnotakhb cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf- Bnlahmhmf Enqdrsdq&r bnmbdosrne &_fdms& _mc &rdsshmf&) enq dw_lokd) ghfgkhfgsrsgd qnkdok_xdc ax cheedqdmsjhmcr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr-sg_s hr) cheedqdms mtladqr _mc sxodr ne _bsnqrrhst_sdc hmcheedqdms mtladqr _mc sxodr ne hmrshstshnm_k rdsshmfr6-hmsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrr 'L_qbg) &0883(Sgd bnlokdwhsxne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _eedbsrsgd mtladq ne udmtdr) sgd m_stqdne cnlhm_ms onkhbxhcd_r _mchmsdqdrsr) _mcsgd kdudkne _fqddldms nq noonrhshnmsn _mnoshnmvhsghmsgd rtarxrsdl _mc _lnmf cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr'rdd Admcnq_mc G_llnmc) 0881(- Rnld noshnmr_bbnqc vhsg sgd bnqd u_ktdr ne sgd rtarxrsdl ldladqr vghkd nsgdq cn mns) sgdqdax rsqtbstqhmf cdbhrhnmrhmsng_qc _mc rnes bgnhbdr 'Onkknbjds _k-) 0878(- Rhlhk_qkx) hshr onrrhakdsn bnlahmd Enqdrsdq&r mnshnmrne &oqnakdl&) &hmenql_shnm&) _mc &shld& qdrntqbdr) vghbg b_m_kkad rddm_r qdk_shmf sn sgd sxodr ne bnmrsq_hmsr hcdmshehdc ax Rhlnm _mcKhmcaknl _mc nsgdqr _r ok_bdc nm cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr hmsgdhq_bshuhshdr'rdd O_xmd)0871: Rhlnm) 0862(- Sg_s hr)sgd l_jhmf ne cdbhrhnmrhr bkd_qkxbnmrsq_hmdc sn u_qxhmf cdfqddr ax hmenql_shnm_mc shld khlhs_shnmr'Qnbgdenqs_mc Bnaa) 0882: Vdaadq) 0881: O_ooh_mc Gdmmhmf) 0887() _r vdkk_r ax sgd hmsq_bs_ahkhsx nq &vhbjdcmdrr& ne sgd oqnakdl 'Qhssdk_mc Vdaadq) 0862: Rg_qj_mrjx) 08869)bg- 1(- Ats hshr nesdmsgd b_rd sg_s sgdrd bnmrsq_hmsr qtm snfdsgdq adb_trd o_qsnesgd hrrtd ne oqnakdl sq_bs_ahkhsx hr qdk_sdcsn k_bj nehmenql_shnm nmsgd rtaidbs _mc _ k_bj ne shld qdpthqdcsn f_sgdq nq cdudknohs 'Q_cenqc) 0866(Sgtr) svn rhfmhehb_ms u_qh_akdrsg_s b_mad trdc sn bnmrsqtbs_ rhlokd s_wnmnlx ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr_qd 'k( sgd bnlokdwhsxne sgd onkhbx rtarxrsdl hmunkudchmsgd cdbhrhnm_mc& '1(-sgd&rdudqhsx ne sgd bnmrsq_hmsr cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr e_bd hml_jhmf sgdhqbgnhbdr'rdd Khmcpthrs)-0877:L_qshm)08879bg- 1(- Ehftqd 6-3 ntskhmdrsgd entq a_rhb cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrsxkdr sg_s dldqfd nmsgd a_rhr ne sgdrd svn chldmrhnmrHmsghr lncdk) cdbhrhnmrhmunkuhmfbnlokdw onkhbxrtarxrsdlr-)-enq dw_lokd) vhsg ltkshokd _bsnqrhmltkshokd rdsshmfr-_qd lnqd khjdkxsn ad hmunkudchm_citrsldms rsq_sdfhdrsg_mhmrd_qbgdr)_ onhmsl_cd ax ansg hmbqdldms_khrsr _mc oqnonmdmsrne cdbhrhnmqntmc sgdnqx-@r hmbqdldms_khrsr_krn rtffdrs) rhst_shnmrne ghfg bnmrsq_hms _qd khjdkxsn qdrtks hm_ a_qf_hmhmf_ooqn_bg sn cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfvghkd knv bnmrsq_hms rhst_shnmr _qd lnqd khjdkxsn fdmdq_sdq_shnm_k nq noshlhyhmf_bshuhsx's&G_qs_mc Jkdhandq)0884: cd Aqthim_mc sdmGdtudkgne)1///(Entq a_rhb cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr dldqfd eqnl sghr _m_kxrhr-Khmcaknl-rsxkd otixksktzgr gjp}yzsktzy _qdkhjdkxsn nbbtq vgdqd onkhbxrtarxrsdlr _qd bnlokdw _mc bnmrsq_hmsr nm cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _qd ghfg- Hm "&RTbkq&Rhl_shnmr "&'ld&vTskkc¥dwodbs sgd&_cnoshnm& &nek_qfd-rb_kd)ghfg-qhrj ))/i(shnmr'zu"ad)b_kkd-"kk9:asgdnoo_r-hsd)rbdm_qhn) vgdqd sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl hr rhlokd _mc bnmrsq_hmsr _qdknv) lnqd sq_chshnm_k xgzoutgr ykgxinky l_x qdrtks hmsgd _cnoshnmne mdv noshnmr_mc l_inq bg_mfdr- Vgdm _ bnlokdwrtarxrsdl dwhrsr_mc bnmrsq_hmsr _qdknv) _m_citrsldms rsq_sdfx hr @mHloqnudc Lncdk ne A_rhb Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf Rsxkdr Bnlokdwhsxne sgd OnkhbxRtarxrsdl Momn Qu· Momn Hmbqdldms_k @citrsldms Lnv Noshlhyhmf @citrsldms RNTQBD9 Lncdkkdc_esdqL_qshm I- Rlhsg)&Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr_mcRs_sd@ts>mNlx&) hmR-Aqnnjr_mc@--F-F_fmnm)dcr) [nk UurozoigrNtlr}ktik ul NjkgyBUurrkm HusB s}tozoky gtj znk Yujgr Yioktiky 'Mdv Xnqj9Oq_dfdq) 0883(khjdkx)ats nmd sg_s l_x sdmc snv_qcr uvzosongzout/ _r oqnonm}msrne svn-rs_fd) lhwdc rb_mmhmf lncdk} rtf-fdrs- Eh}}GX) vgdq} bnmrsq_l}r _qd ghfg ats rtarxrsdlr rhlokd) r_shrexblf -cdbkRkn}r_qd gjd}x) _r R-kl}m rtffdrsdc) rhmbdlnqd l_whlhyhmf rsq_sdfkdr_qdgjdkx sn ad ldeedbskUdl rtbg rhst_shnmrBNMBKTRHNM Sghr chrbtrrhnm cdlnmrsq_sdr sg_s sgd drrdmsh_kbg_q_bsdqne sgd otakhb cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrr hr udqx ltbg sgd r_ld _r sg_s ne sgd nsgdq rs_fdr vd g_ud dw_lhmdc-Sg_s hr) khjdsgd d}qkhdqrs_f}r ne _fdmc_-rdsshmf_mconkhbx) enqltk_shnm)sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrs_fd HR_!!d}sdcax sgd m_stqd ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl hmunkudc_mc-ax sgd-9nmrsq_lsr tmcdq vghbg jdx onkhbx_bsnqr)hmsghr b_rd _tsgnqhs_shudcdbkRknm-l}jdqr)nod-q_sd-Sghr qdrtksr hm_ rhst_shnmvgdqd) _r Ingm Enqdrsdq'0873- 12( ots Hs) vg_s hr q_shnm_k enq_clhmhrsq_snqr_mconkhshbh_mr sn cn9 cdodmcr nm sgd rhst_shnmrhmvghbg sgdx vnq}- Oqdrrdc e}q pthbj qdbnlldmc_shnmr) sgdx b_mmnsadfhmknmfrstckdr- E_bdcVks}nq}}mhy_shnm_k qhu_kqhdr) bnlodshshnm_mcstqe rsqtffkdr) sgdx l_x Itrsheh_akxad kdrr sg_mb_mchc_ants sgdhqok_mr--Vg_s }r qd_rnm_akdsn }n cdodmcr nm sgd bnmsdwsnmd hr hm)hmnqcl_qx ged mn kdrr sg_m l otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnmETQSGDQQD@CHMFR @khh Fq_g_l S- _mcLnqsnmG- G_kodqhm0861- &Atqd_tbq_shb Onkhshbr9 @ :}}chfl _mcr}ld Onkhbx Hlokhb_shnmr&) auxrj Uurozoiy 13 'Rtookdldms(9 3/-68c -) A_bgq_bg)Odsdq)_mcLnqsnmR-A_q_sy-0851- &-}dbhrh/H09r _mcMn} dBkRknmr9 @m@m_kxshb_k Eq_ldvnqj&) Fskxoigt vurzzr1igr Yizktik Wk~zk· 45) 1521-31- 073 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy B_ghkk) @msgnmx) _mcD-R_l Nudql_m-088/- &SgdDunktshnm neQ_shnm_khsx hm Onkhbx@m_kxrhr&) hm Rst_qs R- M_fdk) dc-) Uuroim [nkuxm gtj Uuroim J~gr}gzout1 Mdv Xnqj9Fqddmvnnc)00-16Bngdm) L-) I- L_qbg) _mc I- Nkrdm-0861- &@F_qa_fd B_m Lncdk ne Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Bgnhbd&) Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Yioktik V}gxzkxrm 06) 090-14Dsyhnmh) @lhs_h-0856- &Lhwdc-Rb_mmhmf9 @ "Sghqc"@ooqn_bgsn CdbhrhnmL_jhmf&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 169274-81Enqdrsdq)Ingm- 0873- &AntmcdcQ_shnm_khsx _mc sgd Onkhshbr ne Ltcckhmf Sgqntfg&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 33912-2/Khmcaknl) Bg_qkdr- 0848- &SgdRbhdmbdne Ltcckhmf Sgqntfg&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 08968-77L_qbg)I_ldr F- 0883-F Uxoskx ut Ikioyout0RgqotmB Mu· Ikioyouty Mgvvkt1 Mdv Xnqj9EqddOqdrrLtbbh_qnmh)F_qx- 0881- &SgdF_qa_fd B_mLncdk _mc sgd Rstcx ne Onkhbx L_jhmf9@Bqhshptd&) Uurozm13) 2935/-71Rhlnm) Gdqadqs-0844- &@ Adg_uhnq_k Lncdk ne Q_shnm_k Bgnhbd&) V}gxzkxrm Ou}xtgr ul Jiutusoiy 58) 0988-007Rlhsg) Fhkadqs)_mc C_uhc L_x- 087/- &Sgd@qshehbh_k Cda_sd adsvddm Q_shnm_khrs _mc Hmbqdldms_khrs Lncdkr ne Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf&) Uuroim gtj Uurozoiy79036-50Sdhrl_m) Fddqs Q- 1///- &Lncdkr enq Qdrd_qbg hmsn Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf Oqnbdrrdr9Nm Og_rdr) Rsqd_lr _mc Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmfQntmcr&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 67) 39826-45Vdhrr)B_qnkG- 087/- &JmnvkdcfdBqddo_mcCdbhrhnm @bbqdshnm9 Ptu·rkjmkB Hxkgzout/ Ioll}yout/ \zorongzout 0) 29270-3/3MNSDR 0- Nmsgd nqhfhmrne kdfhshqqh_sd _tsgnqhsxsmfnudqhhldms)rddVdadq '0867(1- Enq_mdwbdkkdms qduhdvne sgd khsdq_stqd) rdd¥Khmcpthrs'k877(2- Enq _ bqhshptdne sghr onrhshnmeqnl vhsghmsgd q_mjr ne l_m_fdldms sgdnqhrsr)rdd V_fmdq'0880(3- Nmsgd _ookhb_shnm ne sghrlncdk sn sgdTR_mcDTb_rdr) rdd Inmdr '0883( _mcOdsdqrnm'0884(4- Nsgdqr)ne bntqrd) _krn chrbtrrdc sgdrd dkdldmsr-Nmsgd rhfmhehb_mbd ne oqnakdl bnmrsq_hmsr) rdd Vdhbj '0865( _mc Ghrrbgdlnkkdq_mc Gnood '0884(- Nm shld bnmrsq_hmsr_mc sgdhq deedbsr nm cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf adg_uhntq)rdd L_tkd _mcRudmrnm'0882( _mcO_xmdds _k-'0877(5- Nmsgdrd cheedqdms rsq_sdfhdr)rdd L_qbg '0870(6- Nmsgdrhfmhehb_mbd nesgdnqf_mhy_shnm_k bnmsdws _mcsgd hcd_shnm_k eq_ldr bnmrsqtbsdc ax cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vhsghmsgdrd bnmsdwsrenq cdbhrhnml_jhmf) rdd Ak_bj'0886(: G_llnmc _mcJmnss '0888(: Ldsb_ked'0867(: Lhmsy'0882(- Solicx MmplementationA Solicx Eesign and Mmplementation Wtxles @esdq_ otakhb oqnakdl g_r l_cd hsr v_x sn sgd onkhbx_fdmc_) u_qhntr noshnmrg_ud addm oqnonrdc sn qdrnkudhs)_mc _ fnudqmldms g_r l_cd rnld bgnhbd_lnmf sgnrd noshnmr)vg_s qdl_hmr hr otsshmf sgd cdbhrhnm] hmsnoq_bshbd-Sghr hr sgd onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmrs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd) vgdqd onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qdsq_mrk_sdchmsn_bshnm-Hshr cdehmdc_r sgd oqnbdrr vgdqdax oqnfqB!IkkR nq onkhbhdr_qd b_qqhdcnts) sgd sq_mrk_shnm ne ok_mrhmsnoq_bshbdVghkdrnld cdbhrhnmrg_ud addml_cd nmsgd fdmdq_k rg_od ne _ onkhbx)rshkknsgdqr _qd qdpthqdc enq hssn ad rds hmsnlnshnmEtmchmfltrs ad _kknb_sdc)odqrnmmdk_rrhfmdc) _mc qtkdr ne oqnbdctqd cdudknodc)_lnmf nsgdql_ssdqrTmshksgd d_qkx086/r) hlokdldms_shnmv_r nesdmqdf_qcdc _r tmoqnakdl_shb hm_onkhbxrdmrd-@0sgntfg-_ 079efd:bdmstqx-nkc khsdq_stqddwhrsdchmehdkcrrtbg _r otakhb _cethmhrsq_shnm)-nqf_mhy_shnm_k adg_uhntq) _mc l_m_fdldms bnmbdqmdcvhsg deedbshuddwdbtshnmne fnudqmldms cdbhrhnmr 'Vhkrnm)0776: Fnncmnv) 08//: F_tr) 0820() l_mx otakhb onkhbx rbgnk_qrhfmnqdcnq cnvmok_xdc sgd oqnakdl_shb _rodbsr ne sghr rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd)_rrtlhmf sg_s nmbd_ onkhbxcdbhrhnmv_r l_cd) sgd _clhmhrsq_shud_ql ne fnudqmldms vntkc rhlokx b_qqxhsnts 'G_qfqnud) ¥0864(-Vhsghmsgd onkhbxrbhdmbdr)sghr uhdv adf_m sn bg_mfd vhsg sgd otakhb_shnmne Oqdrrl_m _mc Vhkc_urjx&r0862 vnqj nmoqnfq_l hlokdldms_shnm-Sgdhq rstcx ne edcdq_koqnfq_lr enq tmdloknxdc hmmdq-bhsx qdrhcdmsrne N_jk_mc)B_khenqmh_) rgnvdc sg_s ina bqd_shnm oqnfq_lr vdqd mns_bst_kkxadhmfb_qqhdcnts hmsgd l_mmdq _mshbho_sdc ax onkhbx-l_jdqr- Nsgdqrstchdr bnmehqldc sg_s sgd Fqd_s Rnbhdsxoqnfq_lr hmrshstsdc ax sgd Ingmrnm _clhmhrsq_shnm'0852-7( hmsgd TR vdqd mns _bghduhmf sgdhqhmsdmcdcnaidbshudr_mc _qftdc sg_s sgd oqnakdl v_r qnnsdc hmsgd l_mmdq hmvghbg sgdx vdqd adhmfhlokdldmsdc 'rdd u_mLdsdq _mc u_m Gnqm)0864: A_qc_bg)0866(- Qdrd_qbghmnsgdq bntmsqhdr_qqhudc_s rhlhk_qbnmbktrhnmr'Gidqm) 0871: L_xmsy) 0868(- Sgd torgns ne _kksgdrd sgd bg_osdq vhkkdwo_mcnm sgd cdrbqhoshnmne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr bnm} rstchdr v_r _ lnqd rxrsdl_shb deenqshmsgd 087/r sn tmcdqrs_mcsgd e_bs_hmdchmBg_osdq3 _mc _rrdrr sgd e_bsnqrhcdmshehdc hmsgd khsdq_stqd_r snqr -sg_s e_bhkhs_sdc nq bnmrsq_hmdchlokdldms_shnm ne otakhb onkhbhdr _eedbshmf sgd bgnhbdne hmrsqtldmsr enqhhmokdldmshmf onkhbx-Ehm_kkx)sgd 'R_a_shdq_mc L_yl_mh_m) 0870(l_mmdq hmvghbg sgd oqnbdctq_k _mc rtars_mshud hmrsqtldmsr ntskHmdc Sghr &rdbnmcfdmdq_shnm& ne hlokdldms_shnmqdrd_qbghmsgd onkhbxrbhhmBg_osdq3 bnlahmd sn bqd_sdchrshmbshud hlokdldms_shnmrsxkdrvhkkad dmbdr v_r pthbjkx dlaqnhkdc hm _ chrotsd -nudq sgd _m_kxshb_k enbtr qdpthqdc sn cdrbqhad _mc _m_kxydhsr rtaidbs l_ssdq9 sgd rn¥b_kkdc&snochrbtrrdccnvm&udqrtr &anssnl-to&cda_sd-cRnld rstchdr fdmdq_sdc_m_kxrdr_mc oqdrbqhoshnmr sg_s odqbdhudcdeedbshud onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmsn ad _ &sno@BSNQR @MC @BSHUHSHDR HMoNKHBX HLOKDLDMS@SHNM cnvm&oqnbdrr bnmbdqmdc vhsg cdrhfmhmfldbg_mhrlr sn dmrtqd sg_s sgd Atqd_tbq_bx)_mcsgd hmsq__mchmsdq-nqf_mhy_shnm_k bnmekhbsr dmcdlhb }n hlokdldmshmf neehbh_kr bntkc ad l_cd sn cn sgdhqina lnqd deedbshudkxhs)hr _ rhfmhehb_ms _bsnqhm_mccdsdqlhm_msne onkhbxhlokdldms_shn}}-P!K Sghr _ooqn_bg v_r noonrdc ax sgnrd vgn rtarbqhadc sn _ &anssnl-to& edqdmsatqd_tbq_shbI!}bh-e}]_s- cheedq-}fs kdudkrne fnudqmldms ]'m_skNm_k) _ooqn_bg) vghbg enbtrdc nmrstcxhmf lnqd b_qdetkkxsgd _bshnmrne sgnrd &rs_sdnq oqnuhmbh_k) _mcknb_kK}}]KHkxn!xdbh hmhHHkokdldmshmf onkhbx9d_b} _eedbsdcax _mc hmunkudchmsgd hlokdldms_shnmne _ onkhbx'R_a_shdq) vhsg hsr nvm hmsdqdrsr)_Hkkk(}shnmr) _mc sq_chsh/-Hkr sg_s _eedbssgd klokd0875(- Vghkd ansg ne sgdrd _ooqn_bgdr fdmdq_sdcu_kt_akdhmrhfgsr)khjd qqh}hf_sh}sP}-}H}}}}q)rkk-}odhs} ntsbn}dr -'rdd A_qc_bg)0869: Dklnq}) l_mx nsgdqrhlhk_qchbgnsnlntr cda_sdr hmsgd ehdkc)sgdx sdmcdcsn nrrhex 0867(- Hlokdldms_shnmax otakHb_fdmBHdrHRnesdm_m dwodmrHUd)lTks}hmsng_qcdmdconrhshnmrsg_srshekdcbnmbdost_kcdudknoldms _mcqdrd_qbg) xd_qdeenqs) l d_mhmf sg_s bnmshmtdc etmchmfenqoqnfq_lr _-mc oqnId}sr HR kd_chmfsn b_kkrhmsgd k_sd 087/r _mc 088/r enq mdv _ooqn_bgdr sg_s trt_kkx mdhsgdqodql_mdmsmnqft_q_msddc ats q_sgdqqdpTHqdr -b}msl}_k ] vntkc qdoqdrdms_ &sghqc fdmdq_shnm& ne lnqd &rbhdmshehb& hlokdldms_shnm mdfnsh_shnm_mc chrbtrrhnmr adsvddm sgd onkhshb_k _mc _clkl-rsq_skud qdrd_qbg'rdd Kdrsdqds _k-)0876: Fnffhm ds _k-)088/: CdKdnm)0888_(_qlr ne sgd rs_sd-Sghr bqd_sdrnoonqshkmhshdr enqonkhshbh_mr) _fdmBHdr) _mc Rbgnk_qrhml_mx bntmsqhdr_mrvdqdc sghrb_kk_mcsgd 088/r oqnudc sn nsgdq ldladqr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr sn trd sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr ad _ udqx edqshkd cdb_cd enqhlokdldms_shnmqdrd_qbg'Kdrsdq_mc Fnffhm) _r rhlokx _mnsgdqnoonqstmhsxenq bnmshmthmfrsqtffkdr sgdx l_x g_ud 0887: N&Snnkd) 1///a(- Hm_cchshnmsn rstchdr trhmf sgd hmrhfgsrne f_ld knrs _s d_qkhdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) rtbg _r onkhbxenqltk_shnmnq) sgdnqx _mcoqhmbho_k-_fdms lncdkr neadg_uhntq 'd-f-) Rbgnky)0873) 0880: lnqd nesdm) c dbhrhnm-l_jhmf)hesgdhqoqdedqqdc rnktshnmsn _ oqnakdl v_r G_vjhmr _mc Sgnl_r) 0878_(-vghbg enbtrdc nmptdrshnmr rtbg _r sgd m_stqd ne dmenqbdldmshmunkudchmsgd trd ne sq_chshnm_k _clhmhrsq_shud mnsrdkdbsdcVghkd onkhshbh_mr _qd rhfmhehb_ms-_bsnqrhm]cdbhrh}} --_eedbshmf9g} sdbgmhptdr-"---_ sghqc_ooqn_bg dldqfdc- -Q_sgdqsg_m rstcxhmf ¥sgdotqdkx hlokdldms_shnm oqnbdrr) lnrs ne sgd c_x-sn-c_x _bskuH9Hdr ne q>tsld _clhmhrsq_shudbnmbdqmrneotsshmf_ oqnfq_l hmsnoq_bshdd) sghr _ooqn_bg _clhmhrsq_shnmsxohb_kkxe_kkvhsghmsgd otquhdv ne r_k_mdc"-s!tggb-----rdk9& knnjdc _s sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr _r nmdhmvghbg sgd u_qhntr snnkr u_msr-Hmlnrs bntmsqhdrsgdqdhr _ rds ne sq_chshnm_k nq io~orux iussut ne fnudqmldms cdrbqhadc hmBg_osdq 3 vdqd _ookhdcsn bnmbqdsdb_rdr y_vrvghbg enql _ &cde_tks& n q a_rhb rds ne oqhmbhokdr fnudqmhmfgnv sgqntfg _ oqnbdrr ne onkhbxcdrhfm 'rdd R_k_lnm) 0870: L_xmsy)0872(-1 hmch}hct_kr v hkkhmsdq_bs vhsg d_bg nsgdq _mc vhsg sgd rs_sdhmsgdhqc_xRhmbd)_r vd g_ud rddmhmBg_osdq3) sgd fdmdq_kbnmsntqr ne _u_hk_akd sn-c_x khudr-Sgdrd k_vr _qd nesdmbnchehdchmvqhshmf-_r hr sgd b_rd }m onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _qd qd_rnm_akxvdkk jmnvm) rstchdr hmsghr lntkc l_mx bnmshmdms_k Dtqnod_mbntmsqhdr-ats sgdx l_x _krn ad en-tm}-l sdmcdc sn bnmbdmsq_sd nmsgd qd_rnmrnq q_shnm_kdr enqsgd& bgnhbdne o_qkdrr rxrsdl_shb enql hmsgd nudq_kkqdbnqc ne oqdbdcdmsrrds ax ITcHBH_k shbtk_qsnnkr ax sgd fnudqmldms _mc sgd onsdmsh_k enqsgdhqtrd hmetstqd anchdr) _r hr sgd b_rd hmAqhs_hm _mchsrenqldq bnknmhdrDudmhmbnllnmbhqbtlrs_mbdr 'rdd Gnnc) 0875_: Khmcdq_mc Odsdqr)0878(- Qdbdmsvnqj k_v bntmsqhdr)rs_stsnqx k_vr _qdo_rrdc ax o_qkh_ldmsrsn qdok_bdnq rtohmsghr _qd_ g_r lnudc adxnmc sgd ptdrshnm ne hmchuhct_khmrsqtldms okdldms sgd bhuhknq bnllnm k_v 'F_kk)0872: Anf_qs)1//1(bgnhbdr _mc g_r cdkudc hmsnsgd cdrbqhoshnmne hmrsqtldms &lhwdr& _mc Sgdrd &rs_stsdr& s_jd sgd enql ne @bsrvghbg) _lnmf nsgdqsghmfr)trt&hlokdldms_shnmrsxkdr&)sg_s hr) qdk_shudkx knmf-k_rshmf) pt_rh-odql_mdms _kkxcdrhfm_sd_ rodbhehb_clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbx _r dlonvdqdc sn l_jd oqdedqdmbdrdwghahsdc_s sgd hrrtd) rdbsnq_k)_mc rnldshldr sgd m_shnm_k vg_sdudq &qdftk_shnmr& _qdqdpthqdcsn dmrtqd sgd rtbbdrretk hlokdldms__mchmsdqm_shnm_k kdudkrenqrodbhehbsxodr nq bnlahm_shnmrne hmrsqtldmsr shnmne-sgd oqhmbhokdr _mc _hlr ne sgd dm_akhmfkdfhrk_shnm@bsrtrt_kkx -z}dK&FVhh&h}4:L_xds¥_K: &&0&8869&&bg9(&4:-W0hhkk:&0&887e&J_f_m=_Qc=i[wdkq_c) _krnbqd_sd_ rdqhdrne qtkdr sn ad enkknvdchmsgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr) 0886(_r vdkk_r _ q_mfdne odqlhrrhakd needmbdr_mc odm_kshdrenqmnm-bnlokhHmsghr bg_osdqvd rds nts sgd e_bsnqrsg_s l_jd sgd oq_bshbd_qhc_m_k_mbdvhsg sgd k_v- Qdftk_shnmrsn fhud deedbssn sgdrd fdmdq_koqhmbhokdr hm xrhr ne onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_ cheehbtkss_rj) _mc chrbtrr sgd dunktshnm rodbhehbBhqbtlrs_mbdr _qd sgdmoqdo_qdcax bhuhkrdqu_msrdloknxdc ax ne sghmjhmfnmsgd rtaidbs eqnl &ehqrs& sn &sghqc& fdmdq_shnmHmo_qshbtk_q) 077 O@QSHHH Tgd Ptakhb PnkhbxPqnbdrr _clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdr)nesdmhmbnmitmbshnm vhsg s_qfdsfqntor 'J_f_m) 0883(- Qdftk_shnmrbnudq rtbg hsdlr _r sgd rs_mc_qcr ne adg_uhntq nq odqenql_mbd sg_s ltrs ad lds ax s_qfds fqntor _mc sgd bqhsdqh_ sn ad trdc sn _clhmhrsdq onkhbx-Sgdrd rdqud _r sgd a_rhr enq khbdmrhmfnq _ooqnu_k_mc)_ksgntfg tmkdfhrk_sdc)oqnuhcdsgd cd e_bsnrntqbd ne chqdbshnm_mca_bjfqntmc sn sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr hmlncdqm rs_sdr-@r v_r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq3) sghrfdmdq_kenql ne hlokdldms_shnmhr rnldshldr qdedqqdcsn _r ,iussgtj gtj iutzxur, qdftk_shnmvgdqdax _ bnll_mc hr fhudmax _m_tsgnqhydc ancx _mc sgd _clhmhrsq_shnmhr bg_qfdc vhsg bnmsqnkkhmf sgd s_qfds fqnto sn dmrtqd bnlokh_mbd 'Rhmbk_hq) 0886: Jdqvhm)0883)0888(Hmsgd lncdqm dq_)rtbg kdf_koqnbdrrdr enql sgd a_rhr enqhlokdldms_shnmhm_kkats sgd vnqrs hmrs_mbdrne chbs_snqrghonq odqrnm_kqtkd-Sghr hr adb_trd kdf_koqnbdrrdr _qd_ mdbdrr_qxo_qsne _c_oshmffdmdq_krs_sdldmsr ne hmsdms) vghbg trt_kkx qdrtks eqnl sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rs_fd) sn sgd rodbhehbbhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc rhst_shnmrsg_s-_clhmhrsq_snqre_bdnmsgd fqntmc- Sgd _bst_k oq_bshbdne _clhmhrsdqhmfonkhbxhmsghr rhst_shnmhr odqenqldc nudqvgdklhmfkxax bhuhk rdqu_msrnodq_shmfhmu_qhntr jhmcr ne _clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdr)rtbg _r lhmhrsqhdr)cdo_qsldmsr) aq_mbgdr)_mc _fdmbhdr)_mc ax ldladqr ne _oonhmsdcan_qcr _mc sqhatm_krbqd_sdc rodbhehb_kkx enqqdftk_snqxotqonrdrSgd trt_k enql ne rtbg _clhmhrsq_shududmtdr) sgd sotoyzxm nq jkvgxz0 sktz/ g_r addm chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq3- [xoh}tgry _qd bqd_sdcax rs_stsd _mcodqenql l_mx pt_rh-itchbh_ket)mbshnmr) hmbktchmf_ood_kr bnmbdqmhmf khbdmrhmf) bdqshehb_shnm ne odqrnmmdknq oqnfq_lr) _mc hrrtd ne odqlhsr@oonhmsdcax fnudqmldms) sgdx trt_kkx qdoqdrdms)nq otqonqs sn qdoqdrdms)rnld chudqrhsxne hmsdqdrsr_mc dwodqshrdFjsotoyzxgzo~k nkgxotmy _qd bnmctbsdc ax sqhatm_krhm_ pt_rh-itchbh_ke_rghnmhmnqcdq sn _hc sgdl hmsgdhq_bshuhshdrGd_qhmfr_qd antmc ax qtkdr ne m_stq_kitrshbd) _mcsgdhqoqnbdctqdr l_x _krnad chbs_sdcax rs_stsnqx oqnuhrhnmr'vghbg l_x ad fdmdq_k_mcchrbqdshnm_qx(Gd_qhmfr_qdcdrhfmdc sn kd_csn ahmchmfcdbhrhnmrnm sgd _fdmbx hmptdrshnm ats l_x ad r}aidbs sn u_qhntr jhmcr ne onkhshb_k) _clhmhrsq_shud)_mc itchbh_k_ood_kr- U}hroi nkgttmy l_x ad rs_stsnqhkxcdehmdc_r _ bnlonmdms ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shudoqnbdrr _mc chqdbsdcsnv_qcr rdbtqhmf qdftk_snqx bnlokh_mbd- Hmlnrs b_rdr) gnvdudq) gd_qhmfr_qdgdkc _s sgd chrbqdshnm ne _ cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf_tsgnqhsx_mc _qd nesdm&_esdq sgd e_bs&otakhb hmenql_shnmrdrrhnmrq_sgdqsg_m sqtd bnmrtks_shudcduhbdr 'S_kadqsds _k-)0884: Fqhl_) 0874(Vghkd _tsgnqhs_shudcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr) ansg onkhshb_k _mc _clhmhrsq_shud)qdl_hm _ rhfmhehb_ms enqbdhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmrs_fd ne sgd onkhbx oqnbdrr) sgdx _qdinhmdc_s sghr rs_fd ax _cchshnm_k ldladqr ne sgd qdkdu_msonkhbxrtarxrsdlr) _r sgd mtladq _mc sxod ne onkhbx_bsnqr bnldr lnqd _mc lnqd sn qdrdlakd sg_s entmc _s sgd enqltk_shnmrs_fd 'Admmdss _mc LbOg_hk)0881(- [gxmkzmxu}vy/ sg_s hr) fq;0tor vgnrd adg_uhntq hr hmsdmcdcnq dwodbsdcsn ad _ksdqdcax fnudqmldms _bshnm)ok_x _ l_inq PnkhbxIlokdldms_shnm 29: chqdbs_mc hmchqdbs qnkdhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr- Sgd onkhshb_k _mc dbnmnlhb qdrntqbdr ne s_qfdsfqntor) drodbh_kkx) g_ud _ l_inq deedbsnm sgd hlokdldms_shnm ne onkhbhdr'Lnmsfnldqx) 1///(- Onvdqetk fqntor _eedbsdcax _ onkhbxb_mbnmchshnm sgd bg_q_bsdqne hlokdldms_shnm ax rtoonqshmf nq noonrhmf hs-Hshr sgdqdenqdpthsd bnllnm enqqdftk_snqr sn rsqhjd bnloqnlhrdr vhsg fqntor) nq _ssdlos sn trd sgd fqntor& nvm qdrntqbdr hmrnld b_rdr) sn l_jd sgd s_rj ne hlokdldms_shnmrhlokdq nq kdrr dwodmrhud@ksgntfg sghrhr sxohb_kkx cnmd hmenql_kkx) hmrnld itqhrchbshnmrkhjdsgd TR) lnqd enql_k deenqsrg_ud addml_cd hml_mx rdbsnqr sn hmbnqonq_sdqdftk_snq-qdftk_sddmdfnsh_shnmrhm& sgd cdudknoldms ne _clhmhrsq_shudrs_mc_qcr _mc nsgdq _rodbsr ne sgd qdftk_snqx oqnbdrr 'Bnfkh_mdrd)0886(- Bg_mfhmfkdudkrne otakhb rtoonqs enq _ onkhbxb_m _krn _eedbshlokdldms_shnm-L_mx onkhbhdrvhsmdrr _ cdbkhmdhmrtoonqs _esdq_ onkhbxcdbhrhnm& g_r addm l_cd) fhuhmf fqd_sdq noonqstmhsx sn _clhmhrsq_snqrsn u_qx sgd nqhfhm_k hmsdms ne _ cdbhrhnm'rdd Gnnc) 0872) 0875_(- Rbhdmshehb @clhmhrsq_shnm _mc Rsqdds-Kdudk Atqd_tbq_sr9Sgd Sno-Cnvm ur Anssnl-To Cda_sd Lnrs d_qkxrstchdr nm onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm enbtrdc nm ptdrshnmr ne l_m_fdldms _mc hmrshstshnm_k cdrhfm) vghbg hmsgd 086/r b_qmdsn ad jmnvm _r sgd zuv0ju·t _ooqn_bg sn sgd rtaidbs 'Mxd) 1//1(- Sghr _ooqn_bg ¥&_r¥rtldrsg_s vd b_m t-rdeshkkxuhdv&sgd¥onkhbx oqnbdrr _r _ rdqhdr ne bg_hmr&nebnhml_mc vgdqd onkhshb_k kd_cdqr _qshbtk_sd_ bkd_q onkhbxoqdedqdmbd vghbg hr sgdmb_qqhdcnts _s hmbqd_rhmf kdudkrne rodbhehbhsx_r hs fndr sgqntfg sgd _clhmhrsq_shudl_bghmdqx sg_s rdqudr sgd fnudqmldms&'Bk_qjd)08819111(- Sghr _ooqn_bg v_r pthsd trdetk hmrdsshmfots _ u_qhdsxne l_m_fdqh_k_mc nqf_mhy_shnm_k cdrhfmoqhmbhokdr) nq l_whlr ne _clhmhrsq_shnm) vghbg vdqd dwodbsdcsn fdmdq_sd_m noshl_k nq l_whlhyhmf }_sbg adsvddm onkhshb_k hmsdms _mc _clhmhrsq_shud_bshnmTmcdqsgd fthrd &nerbhdmshehb _clhmhrsq_shnm) sgdrd oqhmbhokdr-vghbg)enq dw_lokd) hmbktcdcdmsqd_shdrenq l_m_fdqr sn khlhs sgd ro_m ne bnmsqnk entmc hmnqf_mhy_shnmr _mc qdctbd sgd mtladq ne kdudkrhm_clhmhrsq_shud ghdq_qbghdr-vdqd dwodbsdcsn _kknv sgdl sn ehmc_mc dwdbtsd sgd nmdadrs-v_x enq_clhmhrsq_snqrsn hlokdldms onkhbhdr-2 Hmsgd 084/r _mc 085/r) gnvdudq) sgd rbhdmshehb m_stqdne sgdrd oqhmbhokdr b_ld tmcdq _ss_bj _r bqhshbrkhjdGdqadqsRhlnm '0835( onhmsdcnts sgdhqnesdmbnmsq_chbsnqx _mc oqnudqah_k-q_sgdqsg_mrbhdmshehb-m_stqdHsv_r _krn mnsdc sg_s sghr _ooqn_bg _rrtldr sg_s cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr oqnuhcdhlokdldmsdqr vhsg bkd_qfn_kr _mc chqdbshnm vgdm) _r vd g_ud rddm hmBg_osdq 6) hmqd_khsxfnudqmldms hmsdmshnmr b_m dldqfd eqnl a_qf_hmhmfoq'(bdrrdr- _mc sgtr qdrtks hmnesdmu_ftd) tmbkd_q)nq dudm bnmsq_chbsnqx fn_kr _mc chqdbshnmSgd lnrs rdqhntr rgnqsbnlhmf ne sghr _ooqn_bg)gnvdudq) v_r hsrenbtr nmrdmhnqonkhshbh_mr _mc neehbh_kr) vgn nesdmok_x nmkx_ l_qfhm_k qnkdhmc_x-sn-c_x hlokdldms_shnmbnlo_qdc sn knvdq-kdudkneehbh_kr _mcldladqr nesgd otakhbSghr bqhshbhrlne sgd sno-cnvm _ooqn_bg&rmdfkdbsne knvdq-kdudkneehbh_krkdc hmsgd 087/r sn sgd cdudknoldms ne sgd rn-b_kkdchuzzus0}v nq &rsqdds-kdudk& _ooqn_bg sn sgd rstcx ne otakhb onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm'rdd Gidqm_mc Onqsdq)0882: Gidqm)0871: A_qqdss_mcEtcfd) 0870(-Sghr lnqd dlohqhb_k_ooqn_bg sn sgd rtaidbs tqfdc _m_kxrsrsn adfhm vhsg _kk¥ sgd otakhb _mc oqhu_sd_bsnqr hmunkudchmhlokdldmshmf oqnfq_lr _mc rxrsdl_shb_kkxdw_lhmd sgqntfg hmsdquhdvr_mc rtqudx qdrd_qbgsgdhqodqrnm_k_mc nqf_mhy_shnm_k fn_kr) sgdhqhlokdldms_shnmrsq_sdfhdr)_mc sgd mdsvnqj ne bnms_bsrsgdx athkc- Rstchdr bnmctbsdc hmanssnl-to e_rghnm g_ud rgnvm sg_s sgd rtbbdrr nq e_hktqdne l_mx oqnfq_lr nesdmcdodmcr nm sgd bnllhsldms _mc rjhkkrne sgd _bsnqr chqdbskxhmunkudchmhlokdldmshmf oqnfq_lr 'Khorjx) 087/(Sgd jdx _cu_ms_fdnesgd anssnl-to odqrodbshudhrsg_shschqdbsr_ssdmshnmsn sgd enql_k _mc hmenql_kqdk_shnmrghor bnmrshstshmfsgd onkhbxrtarxrsdlr hmunkudchml_jhmf _mchlokdldmshmf onkhbhdr-@rvd g_ud rddm) onkhbxrtarxrsdlr bnmrhrshmfne jdx oqhu_sd_mc otakhb _bsnqrhm_ onkhbx rdbsnqok_x_ bqtbh_kqnkd_s _kkrs_fdr nesgd onkhbxoqnbdrr- Sghr hr itrs _r sqtd ne onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_r hshr ne _fdmc_-rdsshmf)onkhbxenqltk_shnm)cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) _mc nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd'G_kk_mc N&Snnkd) 1///: Jhuhmhdlh)0875(9 Cdrohsdrnld qgdsnqhbsn sgd bnmsq_qx) gnvdudq) hsv_r nauhntr sn lnrs )nardqudqr sg_s sgdrd svn _ooqn_bgdrvdqd mnsbnmsq_chbsnqx atsbnlokdldms_qx 'R_a_shdq)0882_(- Sg_s hr) sgd snobcnvm _ooqn_bg-rs_qsr-Vhsg sgd cdbhrhnmrne sgd fnudqmldms) dw_lhmdrsgd dwsdmssn vghbg _clhmhrsq_snqrb_qqxnts nq e_hksn b_qqxnts sgdrd cdbhrhnmr)_mc rddjr sn ehmcsgd qd_rnmr tmcdqkxhmfsgd dwsdmsne sgd hlokdldms_shnm-Sgd anssnl-to _ooqn_bg ldqdkx adfhmr _s sgd nsgdq dmcne sgd hlokdldms_shFmbg_hmne bnll_mc _mc tqfdr sg_s sgd _bshuhshdrne rn-b_kkdcrsqdds-kdudk hlokdldmsdqr ad etkkx s_jdm hmsn_bbntms- Lnqdnudq) ltbg ne sgd cda_sd adsvddm sgdrd _ooqn_bgdr hr eC-dsgncnknfhb_k) nudq sgd adrs v_x sn _m_kxydhlokdldms_shnm _bshuhshdr) nudq sgd adrs ld_mr sn cdudkno sdrs_akd gxonsgdrdr _ants sgd m_stqdne sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr _mc sgd e_bsnqr sg_s hmektdmbd rtbbdrr _mce_hktqd-S_jdm snfdsgdq)sgd sno-cnvm _mc anssnl-to _ooqn_bgdr oqnuhcdadssdqhmrhfgsrhmsnonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm sg_mdhsgdqcndr nmhsrnvm 'Enw)088/: R_a_shdq)0875(Gdmbd)sn etqsgdq sgd rstcx ne hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrrdr hm_ e_rghnm &sg_svntkc &rgdc0hfgs&amksr&nodqBkehnm 'a\ rodbhehb& &bhqbtlrs_mbdr_mc _hc -h&hm&ksgd&¥lqdq_kg99nmbdoskk_khy_shnmne&&sgd&onkhbx oqnbdrr) l_mx rstcdmsr ne otakhbonkhbxstqmdc _v_x eqnl sgd sno}cnvm udqrtr anssnl-to cda_sd sn dw_lhmdonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_r _ ptdrshnmne bnlokh_mbd_mc bnmsqnkSgdx adf_m sn enbtr nmsgd qd_rnmrvgx ansg ghfg-kdudk_mc rsqdds-kdudk hlokdldmsdqr nesdmsnnj sgd bntqrd ne _bshnmsgdx chc) q_sgdqsg_mvg_s v_r dwodbsdcne sgdl ax cdbhrhnm-l_jdqrOqhmbho_k-@fdms Sgdnqx Hmansg sno-cnvm _mc anssnl-to b_rd rstchdr) f_or adsvddm kdfhrk_shud nq onkhshb_k hmsdms _mc_clhmhrsq_shudoq_bshbdvdqd eqdptdmskxgdkc to _r _ l_inq qd_rnmenq onkhbxe_hktqd'rdd Jdqq) 0865: Hmfq_l _mc L_mm) 087/a: Ltkenqc) 0867(- Hmsgd vxotjvgr0gmktz sgdnqx sg_s v_r rtardptdmskxcdudknodcsn dwok_hm sghrogdmnldmnm) sgdrd f_or vdqd uhdvdc _r sgd hmduhs_akd qdrtksr ne sgd rsqtbstqd ne onkhshbn-_clhmhrsq_shud hmrshstshnmrhmlncdqm rs_sdr)hmvghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr ltrs cdkdf_sdqdronmrhahkhsxenq hlokdldms_shnmsn neehbh_kr sgdx nmkxhmchqdbskx bnmsqnk-Sgd dwhrsdmbdne rsqtbstq_k chrbqdshnmnm sgd o_qs ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shud &_fdmsr& ne onkhshb_k &oqhmbho_kr& hmsqnctbdcsgd onsdmsh_k enqhmdeehbhdms nq hmdeedbshud sq_mrk_shnm ne fnudqmldms hmsdms hmsnqd_khsx-3 Sgd oqhmbho_k-_fdms oqnakdl hmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)hmsghruhdv) hr rddmsn _qhrdeqnl sgd bnllnm oq_bshbdhmlnrs bntmsqhdr)rds nts _anud) vgdqdax fdmdq_kk_vr o_rrdc ax sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdrne fnudqmldms _qd ots hmsndeedbssgqntfg cds_hkdcqdftk_shnmrbqd_sdc ax _clhmhrsq_shud _fdmbhdr bg_qfdc vhsg hlokdldmshmf sgd k_v- Sghr kdf_k eq_ldvnqj drs_akhrgdr _ o_qshbtk_qjhmc ne oqhmbho_k-_fdms qdk_shnmrgho adsvddm onkhshbh_mr _mc _clhmhrsq_snqrhmvghbg sgdqdhr _mhmgdqdms oqnakdl ne rdbtqhmf sgd k_ssdq&r bnlokh_mbd 'rdd Bnnj _mc Vnnc) 0878: Fnqlkdx) 0878(- Sgd _clhmhrsq_snqrg_ud sgdhqnvm tmcdqrs_mchmf)_lahshnmr) _mc ehrb_k_mc jmnvkdcfd qdrntqbdr sg_s l_x bnld hmsgd v_x ne onkhbhdr adhmfhlokdldmsdc _r nqhfhm_kkx bnmbdhudcax cdbhrhnm-l_jdqrSghr rsqtbstq_k oqnakdl hr bnlontmcdc ax rdudq_knsgdq cheehbtkshdr athks hmsnrtbg rxrsdlr- Ehqrs)hshr nesdmsgd b_rd sg_s hlokdldms_shnm hmunkudrmnsnmdats _ mtladq ne fnudqmldms _fdmbhdr-Sghr ld_mr sg_s hlokdldms_shnm hmbqd_rhmfkx s_jdr ok_bd hm bnlokdw &hmsdq-nqf_mhy_shnm_k& bnmsdwsrhmvghbg hrrtdr ne bn-nqchm_shmf hlokdldms_shnmdeenqsr _qd mns sqhuh_k ats qdpthqdsgd bqd_shnmne _mnsgdqk_xdqne rodbh_khydc _clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdrcdrhfmdc rodbhehb_kkx enq sg_s otqonrd) rtbg _r hmsdqcdo_qsldms_k nq hmsdqfnudqmldms_k bnllhssddr) nq rn-b_kkdc&rs_ee& nq &bdmsq_k _fdmbhdr&) )dw_bdqa_shmf oqhmbho_k-_fdms chkdll_r 'rdd Rlhsg ds _k-)0882:B_lo}dkk _mc Ry_aknvrjh) 0868: L_xmsy) 0882a: Qnfdqr _mc Vgdssnm) 0871(- Nsgdqeqdptdmskxdmbntmsdqdccheehbtkshdr qdk_sdsn sgd m_stqd ne hlokdldms_shnm oqnakdlr) sgd bhqbtlrs_mbdr rtqqntmchmf sgdl) nq sgd nqf_mhy_shnm ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shudl_bghmdqx hmbg_qfd ne sgd oqnfq_l- Enq oqhmbho_k-_fdms sgdnqhrsr) sgdrd _qd sgd qd_khshdrne hlokdldms_shnm)_r chrshmbs eqnl sgd rs_sdc naidbshudrne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _mcsgd enql_k oqnbdctqdr oqdrbqhadcenq_bghduhmfsgnrd naidbshudr-r Sgd m_stqd ne sgd oqnakdlr sgdlrdkudr _eedbsrsgd hlokdldms_shnm ne oqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr sgdl hm rdudq_kv_xr- Ehqrs)onkhbx 081 O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy cdbhrhnmrhmunkudu_qxhmfcdfqddr ne sdbgmhb_k cheehbtkshdr ctqhmf hlokdldms_shnm)rnld ne vghbg _qdlnqd hmsq_bs_akd sg_m nsgdqr-Hlokdldmshmfrnld oqnfq_lr b_mad dwodbsdcsn ad tmoqnakdl_shb) _r hmsgd b_rd ne bknrhmfcnvm _m hkkdf_kb_rhmnnq nodmhmf_- mdv rbgnnk hm_ mdv mdhfgantqgnnc) adb_trd sgdrd _qdrodbhehbrhmfkdcdbhrhnmrvgnrd sq_mrk_shnm hmsnoq_bshbdhr trt_kkx q_sgdqqntshmd-Sgd r_ld hr mnssqtd enqoqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr knmf-sdql) bgqnmhb)nq hkk-cdehmdc oqnakdlr rtbg _r dkhlhm_shmfbnlotkrhud f_lakhmf nq hloqnuhmf otohkr&dctb_} shnm_krs_mc_qcr- Otakhboqnakdlr rtbg _r cnldrshb uhnkdmbdnq dctb_} shnm_ktmcdq-_bghdudldms _qd qnnsdc hmrn l_mx b_trdr sg_s oqnfq_lr¥ cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr rhmfkdnq dudm ltkshokd b_trdr b_m mnql_kkx ad dwodbsdcsn e_kkrgnqs ne sgdhqnaidbshudr-Sgd oqnakdl ne roddchmfnmbhsx rsqddsrg_r lnqd rhlokd nqhfhmr_mc b_msgdqdenqdad _ccqdrrdc lnqd d_rhkx)dudmsgntfg hshr tmkhjdkxsn ad dq_chb_sdcdmshqdkxRhlhk_qkx)oqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn dkhlhm_sdonkktshnmnq s_w _mc vdke_qdeq_tcr ltrs e_bdsgd qd_khsxsg_s mn _u_hk_akdsdbgmnknfxvhkk_kknvbnlokdsd _bghdudldms ne sgdrd naidbshudr-Dudmhesgd sdbgmnknfxhr _u_hk_akd) hsl_x ad lnqd dwodmrhudsg_msgd rnbhdsxhr vhkkhmfsn o_x- @r v_r chrbtrrdc hm Bg_osdq6) &vhbjdc&oqnakdlr _qdrhlokx lnqd cheehbtkssn s_bjkdadb_trd ne sgdhq bnlokdw) mnudk)nq hmsdqcdodmcdms m_stqd _mc adb_trd sgdx hmunkudmns_ rhmfkdcdbhrhnmats _ rdqhdrne cdbhrhnmrnmgnv sn b_qqxnts sgd fnudqmldms&ronkhbx'Bgtqbgl_m) 0856: Qhssdk_mc Vdaadq) 0862(Cd_khmfvhsg rtbg oqnakdlr dmg_mbdr_clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnmhm_rltbg _r sgd lnqd bnlokdw _mc cheehbtkssgd oqnakdl) sgd fqd_sdqsgd q_mfd ne chrbqdshnm _clhmhrsq_snqrvhkkg_ud hmcd_khmfvhsg hs-- Sgd m_stqdne sgd _eedbsdcs_qfdsfqnto hr _krn_mhrrtd- Sgd rhydne sgd s_qfds fqnto) enq dw_lokd) hr _ e_bsnq_eedbshmf_clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnm hmrne_q_r sgd k_qfdq_mc lnqd chudqrdsgd fqnto) sgd lnqd cheehbtks hshrsn _eedbshsradg_uhntq hm_ cdrhqdce_rghnm-Sgtr) adb_trd ne sgd rl_kk mtladq ne l_mte_bstqdqr hmunkudc)enqdw_lokd) onkhbxcdrhfmdc sn hloqnud sgd r_edsx ed_stqdr ne _tsnlnahkdr hr d_rhdqsn hlokdldms sg_m _ onkhbx cdrhfmdc sn l_jd sgntr_mcr ne b_qdkdrrcqhudqrnardqud sq_eehbr_edsx qtkdr 'Gnnc) 0875_(- Sgd dwsdmsne sgd adg_uhntq_k bg_mfd sgd onkhbx qdpthqdrne sgd s_qfdsfqnto gdmbdhr _ jdx cdsdqlhm_msne sgd kdudkne cheehbtksxe_bdc hm hsr hlokdldms_shnm- @ onkhbx ne dq_chb_shmfrdwhrl) q_bhrl) nq qdkhfhntrhmsnkdq_mbd hr lnqd cheehbtks sn hlokdldms) adb_trd ne sgd cddo qnnsr ne sgdrd _sshstcdr hmrnbhdshdr& btkstq_kadkhderxrsdlr- Ax bnmsq_rs)hmbqd_rhmf sgd dkdbsqhbhsx rtookx qdpthqdr _klnrs mn bg_mfd hm adg_uhntq nm sgd o_qs ne bnmrtldqr 'Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 088/) 0882_(Hm_cchshnmsn sgd m_stqdne sgd oqnakdl adhmf_ccqdrrdc ax sgd onkhbx) _clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnmhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr hr _krn _eedbsdc ax hsrrnbh_k)dbnmnlhb) sdbgmnknfhb_k) _mc onkhshb_k bnmsdwsr'Gtssdq _mc L_mmhmf)088/(- Bg_mfdr hmrnbh_kbnmchshnmr l_x _eedbssgd hmsdqoqds_shnmne sgd oqnakdl _mc sgtr sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg nmfnhmfoqnfq_lr _qd hSSkS00olomedbk- Sgtr- l_mu ne sgd nqnakdlr bkkqqdmskx adhmf e_bdc ax )H Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout 4A6 rnbh_krdbtqhsx oqnfq_lr hmhmctrsqh_khydcbntmsqhdr_qhrdeqnl sgd e_bs sg_s sgdx vdqd mnscdrhfmdc sn bnod vhsg sgd dudq-hmbqd_rhmf oqnonqshnm ne sgd _fdc nq bnmshmtntr ghfg q_sdr ne tmdloknxldms sg_s hlonrd _ udqx gd_ux atqcdm nm otakhb ehm_mbdBg_mfdr hmdbnmnlhb bnmchshnmr b_mg_ud _ rhlhk_qhlo_bs nmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm-@oqnfq_l s_qfdshmf sgd onnq _mc tmdloknxdc) enq hmrs_mbd)b_m ad dwodbsdcsn tmcdqfn bg_mfdr _esdq_m dbnmnlhb tostqm nq cnvmstqm- Dbnmnlhb bnmchshnmr _krn u_qx ax qdfhnm)mdbdrrhs_shmf fqd_sdq ekdwhahkhsx _mc-chrbqdshnmhm hlokdldms_shnm-Sghqc)¥¥ sgd _u_hk_ahkhsx ne mdv sdbgmnknfxb_m _krn ad dwodbsdcsn b_trd bg_mfdr hmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm-Onkhbhdrsnv_qcr onkktshnmbnmsqnk) enqdw_lokd) nesdmbg_mfd hmsgd bntqrd nehlokdldms_shnm_esdq_ lnqd deedbshudnq bgd_odq sdbgmnknfxg_r addm chrbnudqdcEntqsg"u_qh_shnmr hmonkhshb_k bhqbtlrs_mbdr _qd_krnhlonqs_ms-@ bg_mfd ne fnudqmldms l_x kd_csn bg_mfdr hmsgd v_x onkhbhdr_qdhlokdldmsdcL_mx bnmrdqu_shudfnudqmldmsr) enq dw_lokd) g_ud addm jmnvm sn shfgsdmsgd _u_hk_ahkhsx ne rnbh_krdbtqhsxoqnfq_lr drs_akhrgdcax k_antq nq rnbh_khrsfnudqmldmsr vhsgnts mdbdrr_qhkxbg_mfhmfsgd onkhbxhsrdke 'L_yl_mh_m _mcR_a_shdq)0872920(Adb_trd ne sgdrd _rodbsr ne sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr _mc dmuhqnmldms) _ fqd_s cd_kne chrbqdshnm hr nesdmok_bdc hmsgd g_mcr ne bhuhkrdqu_msr vgn pthbjkx adbnld lnqd dwodqshm_m _clhmhrsq_shud_qd_ sg_m sgd fdmdq_khrsrvgn sdmc sn rs_ee onkhshb_kneehbdr-Bhuhkrdqu_msr b_m cdbhcd gnv _mc sn vgnl sgd k_vr vhkkad _ookhdc'B_kudqsds _H-)0878: LbBtaahmr ds _H-)0876) 0878()ok_bhmfonkhshbh_mr _mc_clhmhrsq_snqrhm_ o_qshbtk_qjhmc ne oqhmbho_k-_fdms qdk_shnmrgho) rtbg _r sgnrd bnllnmkx - entmc hmqdk_shnmrghor adsvddm k_vxdq_mc chdms)ogxrhbh_m_mc o_shdms) nq atxdq-aqnjdq-rdkkdq)hmvghbg sgd oqhmbho_k hr cdodmcdmsnm sgd fnnc-¥ vhkkne sgd _fdmssn etqsgdqghr nq gdq hmsdqdrsrvgdm hsl_x mnsad hmsgd hmsdqdrsrne sgd _fdms sn cn rn 'Dkkhf_mc K_unhd)0884: Eq_mbhr)0882: A_mjr) 0884(- Sgd o_qshbtk_qcxm_lhbr ne sghr qdk_shnmrgho _eedbsrsgd sdmnq_mc pt_khsxne sgdhqhmsdq_bshnmr _mc khlhsr sgd _ahkhsxne onkhshb_k &oqhmbho_kr& sn bhqbtlrbqhad deedbshudkx sgd adg_uhntq ne sgdhqdqrsvghkd &_fdmsr& 'Anydl_m) 0882: Lhkv_qc _mc Oqnu_m)0887(Oqhmbho_k-_fdms sgdnqhrsr_qftd sg_s l_mx mnakddeenqsrnmsgd o_qs ne fnudqmldmsr _mc bhshydmrsn bqd_sd adssdq _mc r_edq vnqkcr g_ud entmcdqdc nm sgdrd &qd_khshdr& ne hlokdldms_shnm_mc hsrathks-hmoqhmbho_k-_fdmsoqnakdl- Sghr g_r kdc mnsnmkxsn _ fqd_sdq_ooqdbh_shnm ne sgd cheehbtkshdr dmbntmsdqdchmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)ats _krnsn _ssdlosr sn cdrhfm onkhbhdrhm_ l_mmdq needqhmf_ qd_rnm_akdbg_mbdne rtbbdrr hm hlokdldms_shnm-Vghkdl_mx fnudqmldms cdbhrhnmrbnmshmtdsn ad s_jdm vhsgnts _cdpt_sd _ssdmshnm sn sgd cheehbtkshdr ne hlokdldms_shnm)sgdqdhr _ aqn_c qdbnfmhshnm mnv ne sgd mddcsn s_jd sgdrd bnmbdqmrhmsn_bbntms _s d_qkhdqrs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx oqnbdrr) rtbg _r onkhbxenqltk_shnm 'Rodmbd)0888(- Hshr d_rhdq_mc lnqd deedbshudenqonkhbx-l_jdqr sn s_jd sgdrd khlhs_shnmr hmsn_bbntms_mc cduhrd _m_ooqnoqh_sdqdronmrd dw _msd q_sgdqsg_mk• onrs 'Khmcdq_mc Odsdqr)0873) 0877) 088/(- 083 Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy HLOKDLDMS@SHNM@R ONKHBXCDRHFM9 SGDNQHDR NE ONKHBX HMRSQTLDMS BGNHBD Oqhmbho_k-_fdms sgdnqx onhmsdcsn&sgd hlokhb_shnm}ne sgd cdrhf} ne _clhmhrsq_shudrsqtbstqdr enq deedbshudhlokdldms_skNm_mc tmcdqkldc sgd hlonqs_mbdne ldbg_mhrlr sn dmrtqd bnmshmthmf nudqrhfgsne _clhmhrsq_shud_bsnqr ax sgdhqonkhshb_k&l_rsdqr&-Sghr ]enbtr dwsdmcdcsgd hmrhfgsne &anssnl-to&hlokdldms_shnmrstchdr ne sgd m}dcenqr-sqtbstqdr _kknvhmfrdmhnqneehbh_kr sn bnmsqnkrsqdds-kdudk nmdrvgHkdfq_mslf sgnrd nm sgd fqntmc dmntfg _tsnmnlx sn odqenql sgdhq vnqj deedbshudkx 'LbBtaahmr _mc LbBtaahmr) 0883: LbBtaahmr _m} R}gv_qsy)-0873(Sghr qdmdvdc dlog_rhr nm sgd rhfmhehb_mbd ne hmrshstskNm_k cdrHfmenq deedbshud onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmcnuds_hkdchmsgd 088/r vhsg nsgdqdeenqsr sn rstcx sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr ne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _mc sgd qd_rnmr enq sgdhqrdkdbshnmax fnudqmldmsr) tmcdqs_jdm vhsg sgd _hl ne hloqnuhmf sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr sgqntfg sgd rdkdbshnm ne _ooqnoqh_sdsnnkrenq sgd ina sn ad cnmdSgd hmrsqtldms-bgnhbd_ooqn_bgsn onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmadf_m eqnl sgd nardqu_shnmsg_s) sn _ fqd_s dwsdms)onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmhmunkudr _ookxhmfnmdnq lnqd nesgd a_rhbsdbgmhptdrne fnudqmldms chrbtrrdc hm Bg_osdq3-u_qhntrkx jmnvm _r onkhbxsnnkr,onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr, nq fnudqmhmfhmrsqtldmsr-sn sgd qdrnktshnmne onkhbxoqnakdlr 'rdd Aqdrrdqr _mc Jknj) 0877: Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 088/_9 402-03: LbCnmmdkk_mc Dklnqd) 0876: Dklnqd) 0867) 0876(- Sghr _ooqn_bg adfhmr eqnl sgd oqdlhrd sg_s qdf_qckdrrne vgdsgdq vd rstcx sgd hlokd-}dms_shnm oqnbdrr hm_ sno-cnvm nq anssPl-toe_rghnm)-sgd-oqnbd}r ne fkUkmfenql nq 2.F-!E7;, rs_mbdsn _ fnudqmldms cdbhrhnmnq rs_sdldms ne hmsdms _kv_xr hmunkudr bgnnrhmfnmdnq rdudq_ksnnkreqnl sgnrd _u_hk_akdhmsgd fnudqmldmssnnk anw 'Gnnc) 0875_: Tmcdq _mc Odsdqr)0880(- @esdqg_uhmf cdudknodc a_rhbhmudmsnqhdr ne sgdrd snnkr)_r cdrbqhadc hmBg_osdq3) sgd hmrsqtldms bgnhbd odqrodbshudsgdm]_ccqdrrdc sgd ptdrshnm ne vgx hlokdldmsdqr rgntkc bgnnrd _ o_qshbtk_qhmrsqtldms eqnl _lnmf sgd l_mx _u_hk_akdK_sdq)sgdrd rstchdr stqmdc sn sgd ptdrshnm ne vgdsgdq sgdrd bgnhbdr qdrtksdc hm_mxchrshmbshlokdldms_shnmo_ssdqmrnq rsxkdrsg_s bntkc ad chrbdqmdchmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrrdr entmc hmcheedqdms itqhrchbshnmr'Qnsgl_xqds _H-)0886(@mrvdqhmfsgdrd ptdrshnmrlnudc hlokdldms_shnm-_m_kxrhr _v_x eqnl hsr qnnsr hmsgd rstcx ne otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm_mc gdkodc sn hmsdfq_sd hlokdldms_shnmqdrd_qbgvhsg sgd fdmdq_khmpthqhdr_mc bnmbdqmrne-sgd onkhbxrbhdmbdr-Rodbhehb_kkx) -sgdrd rstchdr ghfgkhfgsdc sgd bknrd Hljr 9kk0dsvddm9:onsh&bx 9enqltk_shl0}zcd_h%hn}l_jhmf:[__c}hlokdldms_shnm¥--Rx-rsdqn_s9hb _m-_I)xrdr -nehmr-0mkldms-bgnhb}r-I0Rt_kkx adfhm vhsg sgd _ssdlos sn hcdmshex _ rhmfkdnqkhlhsdcmtladq ne chldmrhnmr_knmfvghbg b_sdfnqhdrne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _qdr_hc sn u_qx-Enqsghrotqonrd) _r vd mnsdchmBg_osdq3) _ trdetk chrshmbshnm b_mad cq_vm adsvddm &rtars_-m- 084 shud&_mc &oqnbdctq_k& hmrsqtldmsr) sg_s hr) adsvddm sgnrd _eedbshmfsgd rtars_mbd ne onkhbxntsotsr _mc sgnrd chqdbsdchmrsd_c snv_qcr sgd l_mhotk_shnmne onkhbxoqnbdrrdr- Hmsgd b_rd ne rtars_mshudhmrsqtldmsr) nq sgnrd dwodbsdcsn rnldgn)v _ksdqsgd m_stqdnq bnmehftq_shnm ne fnncr _mc rdquhbdrhmrnbhdsx)s_wnmnlhdr vdqd dkdu_sdceqnl otqd cdrbqhoshnm _mc bk_rrhehb_shnm sn _ lnqd sgdnqdshb_k nq bnmbdost_kkdudksgqntfg sgd bnmrsqtbshnmne lncdkr sg_s enbtrdc nm rtbg dkdldmsr _r &sgddwsdmsne kdfhshl_sd bndqbhnm& hmgdqdms hmsgd trd ne cheedqdms onkhbxsnnkr- Sghr _rodbs ne onkhbxsnnkrbntkc ad trdc _r _ a_rhb bqhsdqhnm enqdwok_hmhmf sgd qdk_shnmrgho dwhrshmf adsvddm fdmdq_kb_sdfnqhdrne hmrsqtldmsr _mc sgd qd_rnmrvgx nmdvntkcad trdc q_sgdqsg_m_mnsgdq-5 Lnqd qdbdmsrstchdr dwo_mcdcsghr _m_kxrhr)enbtrhmf nmnsgdq_rodbsr rtbg _r sgd kdudkne chqdbsrs_sd hmunkudldmshmsgd oqnuhrhnmne fnncr _mc rdquhbdr_r sgd bghdebqhsdqhnm enqchrshmfthrghmfadsvddm b_sdfnqhdr ne &deedbsnq& hmrsqtldmsr 'rdd A_wsdq-Lnnqd)0876(- Hmnsgdqvnqcr) cheedqdmsrtars_mshud onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr bntkc ad rddm _r _eedbshmfcheedqdms mtladqr _mc sxodr ne _bsnqrhmunkudchmoqnctbshud _bshuhshdr hmrnbhdsxHmrtbg rbgdldr) &unktms_qx& hmrsqtldmsr qdpthqhmf lhmhl_k rs_sd hmunkudldms_qd ok_bdc _s nmd dmc ne _ bnmshmttl) vhsg &bnlotkrnqx& hmrsqtldmsr hmunkuhmf uhqst_kkxdwbktrhudrs_sd _bshuhsx_s sgd noonrhsd dmc-Adsvddmsgd svn onkdr) _r rgnvm hmEhftqd 7-0) khd_ vhcd q_mfdne &lhwdc& hmrsqtldmsr hmunkuhmf u_qxhmfkdudkrne rs_sd _mcoqhu_sdhmunkudldms hmsgd nodq_shnmne lhwdc l_qjdsr 'Gtk_) 0877(-- -+-, ]- - - }-]--- ---r--r--r -E7 9f/ ;Hk r--=- - &R 77E R R / E7 / s9 / '-97c q_ I ----r E7 sha r--- r-- 'H(- oq_ R k / n;k r--E7 r-7c U=----R o o q_ 'H( -o E,: o k9k-- Unktms_qx Lnv ;Hk 'H( o n;k E7 E,: 'H( ;Hk / q_ o ----r !,r----E7 'b77 R '-97c £ 'H( ;Hk o q_ --r99 ;Hk -b 77E // Lhwdc 77E n;k ;: o E7 -R 0hk ''1 o " [, r--E7 'H( E7 / --------r =/ ;Hk E,: -o r--k 77E k9k-- _ 'H( , -b /-- o Bnlotkrnqx Momn Kdudkne Rs_sd@bshuhsx Hmunkudc hmFnncr _mc RdquhbdOqnctbshnm _mcCdkhudqx RNTQBD9 @c_osdceqnl Lhbg_dk Gnvkdss)&L_m_fhmf sgd"GnkknvRs_sd"9 Oqnbdctq_kOnkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr _mcLncdqmFnudqm_mbd&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 32)3 '1///(9 301-20- Vhsg qdrodbssn oqnbdctq_khmrsqtldmsr) vgnrd etmc_ldms_k otqonrd hr sn _ksdq nq l_mhotk_sd _rodbsr ne onkhbx rtarxrsdl nq mdsvnqj adg_uhntq hm_ onkhbxoqnbdrr) sgdrd rhHHhhk_qkx bntkc ad rddm_r _eedbshmf sgd m_stqd)mtladq) _mc _bshuhshdr ne cheedqdms rdsr ne _bsnqr hm_ onkhbx oqnbdrr- Sgdrd snnkr l_mhotk_sd sgd khmjr_mc mncdr ne sgd mdsvnqjr ne _bsnqr hmunkudchmonkhbx-l_jhmf 'rdd Jkhim)0885: cd Aqthim_mc sdm Gdtudkgne) 0884) 0886()6 itrs _r rtars_mshud hmrsqtldmsr l_mhotk_sd l_qjds qdk_shnmr@ vhcd q_mfd ne mdsvnqj nq rtarxrsdl l_mhotk_shnmr _qd onrrhakd) q_mfhmfeqnl khlhsdc unktms_qx&mdsvnqjl_m_fdldms& sn lnqd etmc_ldms_k _mc bndqbhud&rtarxrsdl qdrsqtbstqhmf& 'cd Aqthim_mc sdm Gdtudkgne) 0880) 0884: N&Snnkd)1///_: Jkhim_mc Sdhrl_m) 0880: Jkhim_mc Jnoodmi_m)1///(- Hmbnqonq_shmf sghrhmrhfgs_krn _kknvr oqnbdctq_k onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr sn ad _qq_xdchm_ rhmfkdrodbsqtl _bbnqchmfsn sgd kdudkne rs_sd l_mhotk_)shnmne rtarxrsdl ldladqrgho _mc _bshuhshdr sgdx sxohb_kkx hmunkud'rdd Ehftqd 7-1(- Qdrsqtbstqhmf Qu· Momn Kdudkne Rs_sdL_mhotk_shnmne Rtarxrsdl Ldladqrgho _mc Rsqtbstqd RNTQBD9 @c_osdceqnl Lhbg_dkGnvkdss)&L_m_fhmf sgd"GnkknvRs_sd"9 Oqnbdctq_kOnkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr _mcLncdqmFnudqm_mbd&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 32)3 '1///(9 301-20- Hmsghr rodbsqtl) oqnbdctq_k onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr b_mad rddm sn q_mfd eqnl khlhsdchmenql_shnmrtooqdrrhnm nq qdkd_rdcdrhfmdcsn lhkckx _eedbs rtarxrsdl adg_uhntq sgqntfg &unktms_qhrshb& qdronmrdr eqnl s_qfdsdc _bsnqr) sn hmrshstshnm_k qdenqlr cdrhfmdc sn qdrsqtbstqd dwhrshmfrtarxrsdlr ax lnqd nq kdrr bnlotkrnqx ld_mr-7 Sgd Q_shnm_kd enqHmrsqtldmsBgnhbd9 D_qkx&Sdbgmhb_k& ur &Onkhshb_k& Lncdkr Sn r_x _mxsghmfld_mhmfetk _ants onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)gnvdudq) sgd hmrsqtldms bgnhbdodqrodbshudqdpthqdr _ lncdk khmjhmfrodbhehbbgnhbdr ne hmrsqtldmsr sn rodbhehbq_shnm_kdrSvn cheedqdmsfqntor ne rbgnk_qr g_ud vnqjdc nmsghr ptdrshnmne sgd &q_shnm_kd ne hmrsqtldmsbgnhbd&) _mc sgd rnktshnmrsgdx g_ud ots enqv_qc sn _mrvdq sghr ptdrshnmg_ud u_qhdc cq_l_shb_kkx-Dbnmnlhrsr g_ud enqsgd lnrs o_qs sdmcdc sn hmsdqoqds sgd bgnhbdne onkhbxhmrsqtldms _r) _s kd_rshmsgdnqx)_ sdbgmhb_k dwdqbhrdne l_sbghmf sgd _ssqhatsdrne rodbhehbsnnkr sn sgd ina _s g_mc- Onkhshb_k rbhdmshrsr)nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) g_ud sdmcdc sn _qftd sg_s hmrsqtldmsr _qd lnqd nq kdrr rtarshsts_akd nm_ otqdkx sdbgmhb_k a_rhr) _mc g_ud hmrsd_c enbtrdc nm sgd onkhshb_k enqbdrsgdx adkhdudfnudqm hmrsqtldms rdkdbshnm 'rdd Odsdqr_mc U_mMhrodm)0887(Rstchdr ax dbnmnlhrsr g_ud addm rg_odc ax sgd sgdnqdshb_kcda_sdr) chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq1) adsvddm mdn-bk_rrhb_k _mc vdke_qddbnmnlhrsr nm sgd oqnodq qnkdne sgd rs_sd hmsgd dbnmnlx- Vghkd _kkoqdedqunktms_qx hmrsqtldmsr) rnld dbnmnlhrsr odqlhs fqd_sdqrbnod enqsgd trd ne bnlotkrnqx _mc lhwdc hmrsqtldmsr sn bnqqdbsl_qjds e_hktqdr'A_snq) 0847: Dbnmnlhb Bntmbhkne B_m_c_) 0868: Cssnm) 0875(- Hmbnmsq_rs)nsgdqr _ooqnud sgd trd ne rtbg hmrsqtldmsr nmkxenq oqnuhchmfotqd otakhb fnncr: sgdhqtrd enq _mxnsgdqqd_rnmhr uhdvdc _r chrsnqshmfsgd l_qjds oqnbdrr _mc kd_chmfsn rtanoshl_k _ffqdf_sd rnbh_kntsbnldr 'Aqdxdq) 0868)0871: Onrmdq)0863: Rshfkdq) 0864: Vnke)0876(- Vdke_qddbnmnlhrsr& -fqd}sdqsgdnqdshb_K_bbdos_mbd ne rs_sdhmsdqud-mshnm kd_cr-sgdl sn lnqd rxrsdl_shbhhm_kxrdr-ne hmrsqtldmsbgnhbd-Gnvdudq)sgdx rshkksdmcsn sqd_s sgd bgnhbdne hmrsqtldms _r _ rsqhbskxsdbgmhb_kdwdqbhrdsg_s bnmrhrsrne du_kt_shmfsgd ed_stqdr ne u_qhntr hmrsqtldmsr) l_sbghmf sgdl sn cheedqdos sxodr ne l_qjds e_hktqdr)drshl_shmfsgdhqqdk_shudbnrsr) _mc bgnnrhmf sgd hmrsqtldms sg_s lnrs deehbhdmskx nudqbnldr sgd l_qjds e_hktqdhm ptdrshnm 'Lhsmhbj)087/: Rsnjdx _mc Ydbjg_trdq) 0867: Vdhldq _mc Uhmhmf)0881(Nsgdq dbnmnlhrsr fdmdq_kkxqdkxnm otakhb bgnhbdsgdnqx sn dwok_hm o_ssdqmrne hmrsqtldms trd- @r vd r_v hmBg_osdq1) sgdx _qftd sg_s hm_ cdlnbq_bx sgd cxm_lhbr ne rdke-rdquhmf adg_uhntq ax unsdqr)onkhshbh_mr) _mc atqd_tbq_sr oqnlnsdr _mhmbqd_rhmf sdmcdmbxsn s_w_mc rodmc) _mc sn qdftk_sd _mc m_shnm_khyd oqhu_sd_bshuhsx-Hshr _qftdc sg_s cdlnbq_shb onkhshbrkd_cr rs_sdr sn bgnnrd hmrsqtldmsr sg_s oqnuhcdbnmbdmsq_sdc admdehsrsn l_qfhm_kunsdqrvghkdroqd_chmfsgd bnrsr sn sgd dmshqd onotk_shnm 'rdd Atbg_m_m)087/: ksdahkbnbj_mcG_qskd)0871(- Enqdkdbsnq_k qd_rnmr) fnudqmldmsr l_jd deenqsrsn bgnnrd hmrsqtldmsr sg_s cn mnsqdud_ksgdhq sqtd bnrsr sn sgd unsdqrvgn tkshl_sdkxo_x enqsgdl- 087 O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy Vghkd sgd hmbnqonq_shnm ne rnld onkhshb_k e_bsnqrhmsnsgd _m_kxrhrhr _mhloqnudldms nm d_qkhdq otqdkx dbnmnlhb _ooqn_bgdr) rtbg _m_kxrdr cn khsskd sn etqsgdq sgd dwok_m_shnm ne rxrsdl_shb o_ssdqmrne hmrsqtldms bgnhbdr-Hshr udqx cheehbtks)enq dw_lokd) sn l_sbg sxodr ne hmrsqtldmsr vhsg o_ssdqmrne sgd chrsqhatshnmne bnrsr _mc admdehsr'Vhkrnm) 0863( rhmbdnmdltrs ehqrsjmnv vgdsgdq fnudqmldmsr v_ms sn bk_hl bqdchsnq _unhcak_ld enqsgd _bshnmsn ad tmcdqs_jdm'Vd_udq) 0875: Gnnc) 1//1(Lnrs hmrsqtldmsr b_mad trdc enqansg otqonrdr) _mc vghbg otqonrd hr bgnrdmcdodmcr nmghfgkxhchnrxmbq_shb _mcbnmsdwst_ke_bsnqr-Rhlhk_qkx) sgd dbnmnlhb sgdnqhdrne hmrsqtldmsbgnhbdk_bj _ rnkhcdlohqhb_ka_rd hm rstchdr ne _bst_k hmrsqtldms bgnhbdrax fnudqmldmsr- Sgd q_shnm_kdr enq onkhbxhmrsqtldms bgnhbdsgdx oqnuhcd_qda_rdc nmsgdnqdshb_k _rrtlosh;:=mr bnmbdqmhmf vg_s fnudqmldmsr cn nq ntfgs sn cn) q_sgdqsg_mnm dlohqhb_khmudrshf_shnmr hmsnvg_s sgdx _bst_kkxcn 'Gnv_qc) 0884: Angl _mcQtrrdkk)0874: Odsdqr)1//1(Rstchdr ax onkhshb_k rbhdmshrsr)_r sgd enkknvhmfchrbtrrhnm vhkkrgnv) sdmc sn chrok_x _ vhcdq u_qhdsx_mc _qd fdmdq_kkxlnqd dlohqhb_khm m_stqd-Sn sgnrd knnjhmfenqsgdnqdshb_k o_qrhlnmx) sgdx l_x mns_ood_q& _r dkdf_ms_r sgd rstchdr fdmdq_sdcax dbnmnlhrsr) ats sgdx gdkosn fq_ookdvhsg sgd bnlokdwhsxne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _mchmctbshudkxcdudkno_ ok_trhakd sgdnqx ne hmrsqtldms bgnhbd 'rdd Gnvkdss) 0880( _mc onkhbx hlokdldms_shnmNmdnes-bhsdconkhshb_k rbhdmbd_ooqn_bgsn sgdnqhyhmf sgd ptdrshnmneonkhbxhmrsqtldmsbgnhbdv_r cdudknodchmsgd 086/r ax AqtbdCndqm_mcrdudq_kne ghr B_m_ch_m_rrnbh_sdr 'Cndqm)0870: Oghcc _mc Cndqm)0872: Sgoodq _mc¥Cndl) 0870( @rrtlhmf sg_s _kkhmrsqtldmsr _qd sdbgmhb_kkx rtarshsts_akd-sg_s hr: sg_s _s kd_rshmsgdnqx_mxhmrsqtldmsbntkc ad adms) rg_odc) _mc svhrsdc sn odqenql _mxs_rj-sgdx _qftdc sg_s hm_ khadq_k cdlnbq_shb rnbhdsxfnudqmldmsr vntkc rhlokx vxklkx sn trd sgd kd_rsbndqbhudhmrsqtldmsr _u_hk_akd_mc vntkc &lnud to sgd rb_kd&ne bndqbhnm _r mdbdrr_qxsn nudqbnld _mx rnbhds_kqdrhrs_mbdsgdx dmbntmsdqdcsn sgd _bghdudldmsnesgdhq_hlr- Hmnsgdqvnqcr) _mxhmrsqtldmsb_msgdnqdshb_kkx _bbnlokhrg _mx bgnrdm _hl) ats fnudqmldmsr bgnnrd sgd kd_rs bndqbhud hmrsqtldmsronrrhakdenqsgd s_rj _s g_mc)fhudmsgd rs_sdne rnbhds_kqdrhrs_mbdsgdx dmbntmsdqsn sgdhq_bshnmr-Nudq_kk) sghr bnmbdoshnm kdc Cndqm _mc ghr bnkkd_ftdr sn rtffdrs sg_s _ sxohb_ko_ssdqmne hmrsqtldmstrd hm l_mx rs_sdr v_r enqfnudqmldmsrsn adfhmvhsg lhmhl_k _bshuhshdr rtbg _r dwgnqs_shnm _mclnud rknvkx)_r mdbdrr_qx)snv_qcr chqdbsoqnuhrhnmSgdqd _qdrdqhntr oqnakdlr vhsg sghr tmcdqrs_mchmfne rtarshsts_ahkhsx _lnmf hmrsqtldmsr _mc vhsg sghr lncdk ne sgd q_shnm_kd enqhmrsqtldms ¥"dgnhdd-&" Ehqrs)mn-fnudsmldqsO0q_r"et9d[&dnlokdsd q_mfd ne hmrsqtldmsr -°)_unn_akd39n&hs9--rnc_k¥_mc¥onGshb_k "bnQrsk&_hms&R e_untq sgd bgnhbdne rnld hmrsqtldmsr _mc hmghahs sgd bgnhbdne nsgdqr 'Vnncrhcd) 0875(- Rdbnmc) sgd bnmbdoshpmne bg_mfdr hmhmrsqtldms bgnhbd bnmrhrshmfne _ rknv lnudldms to sgd bndqbhnmrb_kdcndr mnsbnmenql sn sgd dlohqhb_kduh- Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout 4AA cdmbd f_sgdqdc ax l_mx rbgnk_qr vnqjhmf hmsghr ehdkc-L_mx fnudqmldmsr) enqdw_lokd) g_ud adftm snv_qcr sgd sno ne sgd rb_kdhmbqd_shmf otakhb dmsdqoqhrdr sn cd_kvhsg dkdldmsr ne dldqfhmf sdbgmnknfhdrvhsgnts dudqg_uhmfdwodqhldmsdcvhsg kdrr bndqbhudsnnkr 'rdd Sgoodq)0868: K_tw _mc Lnkns) 0877(- Sghqc) sgd hcd_ ne rnbh_kqdrhrs_mbdoqnunjhmf fnudqHhldmsrsn lnud snv_qcr lnqd bndqbhudhmrsqtldmsr hr _krn oqnakdl_shb- Vghkd hmrnld onkhbx_qd_r-mns_akx sgd dbnmnlx-hs l_x ad sqtd sg_s sgdqdhr nesdmrnbhds_kqdrhrs_mbdsn etqsgdq fnudqmldms _bshnm) hml_mx nsgdqehdkcrsghrhr mnssgd b_rd- Hmsgd _qd_ne rnbh_konkhbx)enq dw_lokd) rnbh_koqdrrtqd nesdmqtmr sgd nsgdqv_x) tqfhmf fqd_sdqqdftk_shnm_mcdwodmchstqdrsg_mfnudqmldmsr) enqehrb_k)hcdnknfhb_k) _mcnsgdq qd_rnmr)l_x ad vhkkhmf sn oqnuhcd@ rdbnmc vhcdkx bhsdconkhshb_k rbhdmbdlncdk ne hmrsqtldms bgnhbd v_r cdudknodcax BgqhrsnogdqGnnc hmsgd 087/r- Khjd Cndqmds _H-)gd adf_m vhsg sgd nardqu_shnmsg_s hmrsqtldms bgnhbdv_r mns_ sdbgmhb_k dwdqbhrd ats &_l_ssdq ne e_hsg_mc onkhshbr& 'Gnnc) 0875_98(- Gd onrhsdc sg_s sgd bgnhbdhr rg_odc ax qdrntqbd bnmrsq_hmsr) onkhshb_k oqdrrtqdr) kdf_kbnmrsq_hmsr) _mc sgd kdrrnmrkd_qmdceqnl o_rs hmrsqtldms e_hktqdr 'hahc-)007-1/) 030-2(- @ksgntfg gd chc mnsrodkknts sgd dw_bsm_stqd ne sgdrd enqbdr)Gnnc chc chrbtrr _ mtladq ne &mnql_k& o_ssdqmrne fnudqmldms &qdsnnkhmf& nudq shld- sgdrd hmbktcd9&0-@ rgheseqnl hmenql_shnma_rdc hmrsqtldmsr sn sgnrd a_rdc nmnsgdqqdrntqbdr: _mc 1- @rgheseqnl qdkh_mbd nm bndqbhnm_knmdsn sgd trd ne ehm_mbh_k _mc nqf_mhy_shnm_k qdrntqbdr-&Etqsgdqlnqd) gd _qftdc sg_s sdbgmnknfhb_k bg_mfd l_x dqncd sgd trdetkmdrr ne nkc hmrsqtldmsr _mc kd_c sn sgd _ookhb_shnm ne mdv -nmdr)nesdmnmsgd a_rhr ne _m_knfhdradsvddm ghrsnqhb_k _mc oqdrdmsbhqbtlrs_mbdRbcq_vmax-onkhbx-l_jdqrVghkdGnnc _clhssdc sgd drrdmsh_kkx bnmshmfdms m_stqdne sgd oqnbdrr ne hmrsqtldms bgnhbd)gd _qftdc sg_s sgd oqnbdrr v_r cqhudmax hcdmsheh_akd enqbdra_rdc nm sgd fnudqmldms&rhlokdldms_shnmdwodqhdmbd vhsg u_qhntr hmrsqtldmsr _mcsgdhqdeedbsrnmrnbh_k_bsnqr-@bbnqchmfsn ghl) cheedqdms hmrsqtldmsr u_qxhmdeedbshudmdrr _bbnqchmfsn sgd m_stqdne sgd rnbh_kfqntor sgdx _qd hmsdmcdcsn hmektdmbd:enq dw_lokd) hek_qfd _mc vdkk-nqf_mhydcrnbh_kfqntor dwhrs)fnudqmldmsr vhkktrd odqrt_rhnm _mc dwodmchstqdhmrsqtldmsr-Sgd rhydne sgd s_qfds fqnto hr rhfmhehb_ms rhmbd sgd k_qfdqsgd fqnto sn-ad _eedbsdc)sgd lnqd khjdkxhshr sg_s fnudqmldmsr vhkktrd o_rrhud 'unktms_qx(q_sgdqsg_m_bshud'bnlotkrnqx( hmrsqtldmsr adb_trd&ne bnmbdqmr_ants bnrs _mc deedbshudmdrr-Gnvdudq) gd _krn _qftdc sg_s) qdf_qckdrrne sgd rhyd ne sgd rnbh_kfqnto _eedbsdc)fnudqmldmsr vhkkmnsdloknx bndqbhudhmrsqtldmsr hesgdx v_ms unktms_qxbnlokh_mbd eqnl _ rnbh_kfqnto- Nmsgd nsgdqg_mc) he_ fnudqmldms v_msr sn qdchrsqhatsdqdrntqbdr _lnmf sgnrd fqntor) hs vhkk trd sgdl 'hahc-) 027-8(Sgtr) enqGnnc) hmrsqtldms bgnhbdhr _ etmbshnmne sgd m_stqd ne sgd rs_sd&rfn_kr _mc qdrntqbdr _mc sgd nqf_mhy_shnm _mc b_o_bhsxne s_qfdsdc rnbhds_k_bsnqr-Nudq_kk) gd _qftdc) sgdrd kdc khadq_kcdlnbq_shb fnudqmldmsr sn oq_bshrdsgd dsgnr ne &trhmfatqd_tbq_bx ro_qhmfkx&9 sg_s hr) snv_qcr _ chrshmbs oqdedqdmbd enqtrd ne hmenql_shnm_mc_tsgnqhsxhmrsqtldmsr rhmbdsgnrd hmrsqtldmsr _qd&mnm-cdokds_akd& 'Gnnc) 0872(- Hme_bs) gd _qftdc) sgd lnrs oqdedqqdcqdrntqbd hr mnc_khsxnq hmenql_shnm-a_rdc hmektdmbd) rhmbdnmkxhmrsqtldmsr a_rdc nmsghr qdrntqbd ansg- _qd mnmcdokds_akd_mc ok_bdlhmhltl bnmrsq_hmsr nmbhshydmrVgdm bndqbhnmhr qdpthqdc)hshr oqhl_qhkxctd sn sgd cdrhqdsn s_qfdslnqd bknrdkxo_qshbtk_q rnbhds_kfqntor enq_bshnm-Dudmsgdm)_tsgnqhsxhr oqdedqqdcsn nqf_mhy_shnmadb_trd sgd enqldq hr kdrr qdrntqbd-hmsdmrhudGnnc&r lncdk hloqnudc nm rnld dkdldmsr ne Cndqm&renqltk_shnmr ats _krn g_r hsr nvm oqnakdlr- Vgx rgntkc fnudqmldmsr hmgdqdmskx cdrhqdsn trd atqd_tbq_bx ro_qhmfkx> Vgx rgntkc qdrntqbdr khjdsqd_rtqd _mc nqf_mhy_shnm ad bnmrhcdqdckdrr qdokdmhrg_akd sg_mqdrntqbdr rtbg _r hmenql_shnmnq _tsgnqhsx)vgdm hshr _oo_qdmssn lnrs nardqudqr sg_s sgd dwsdmcdctrd ne dhsgdqoqno_f_mc_ nq enqbdg_r chlhmhrghmfqdstqmr> Sgdrd ptdrshnmr qdl_hmdc tm_mrvdqdc hmGnnc&r_m_kxrhrSgd Q_shnm_kd enqHmrsqtldmsBgnhbd9Rtarxrsdl Lncdkr Hmnmdne sgd lnrs rnoghrshb_sdcd_qkxvnqjr nmsgd rtaidbs ne hmrsqtldms bgnhbd)Khmcdq_mc Odsdqrcdudknodc _ sghqclncdk hmsdfq_shmf l_mx ne sgd u_qhntr bnmbdoshnmr ots enqv_qc hmansg sgd dbnmnlhbr _mc onkhshb_k rbhdmbdkhsdq_stqdr'Khmcdq_mc Odsdqr)0878(- Rxmsgdrhyhmf l_mx ne sgd hmrhfgsr_mc nardqu_shnmrl_cd ax Cndqm)Gnnc) _mc nsgdqr)sgdx khrsdc sgd enkknvhmfe_bsnqr_r ok_xhmf_-bqhshb_k0&Nkd-hm-rg_ohmf rtbg bgnhbdr-- Ehqrs)khjdl_mx dbnmnlhrsr) sgdx _fqddc sg_s sgd ed_stqdrne sgdonkhbx hmrsqtldmsr _qd hlonqs_ms enq rdkdbshnmotqonrdr) adb_trd rnld hmrsqtldmsr _qd lnqd rthsdc enq _ s_rj _s g_mc sg_m _qd nsgdqr- Sgdx _qftdc sg_s hmrsqtldmsr u_qx _bbnqchmfsn entq fdmdq_kb_sdfnqhdrne ed_stqdr) d_bg q_mfhmfnm_ rb_kdeqnl knv sn ghfg9 0- qdrntqbdhmsdmrhudmdrr, hmbktchmf_clhmhrsq_shudbnrs -_mcnodq_shnm_krhlokhbhsx: 3. s_qfdshmf,hmbktchmfoqdbhrhnm _mc rdkdbshuhsx: 4. onkhshb_k qhrj, hmbktchmfm_stqdne rtoonqs _mc noonrhshnm)otakhb uhrhahkhsx) _mc bg_mbdrne e_hktqd:_mc 5. bnmrsq_hmsr nm rs_sd_bshuhsx,hmbktchmfcheehbtkshdr vhsg bndqbhudmdrr _mc hcdnknfhb_koqhmbhokdrkhlhshmffnudqmldms _bshuhsx'Hahc-)36( Rdbnmc)khjdl_mx onkhshb_k rbhdmshrsr)sgdx _qftdc sg_s _ m_shnm&r onkhbx rsxkd_mc onkhshb_k btkstqd, _mc sgd cdosg ne hsr rnbh_kbkd_u_fdr)g_ud _ bqhshb_k ad_qhmfnmsgd bgnhbdne _mhmrsqtldms- D_bg m_shnmg_r _ odbtkh_qrsxkd)btkstqd) _mc o_ssdqmne rnbh_kbnmekhbsr sg_s oqdchronrd hsrcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn bgnnrd o_qshbtk_qhmrsqtldmsr-Sghqc)sgdx _qftdc sg_ssgd bgnjd ne _mhmrsqtldms hr bhqbtlrbqhadc ax sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_k btkstqd ne sgd bnmbdqmdchlokdldmshmf _fdmbhdr_mc sgd m_stqdne sgdhqkhmjr vhsg bkhdmsr_mc nsgdq _fdmbhdr-Entqsg) sgdx _qftdc sg_s sgd bnmsdwsne sgd oqnakdl rhst_shnm,hsrshlhmf _mc sgd rbnod ne _bsnqrhshmbktcdr)vhkk_krn _eedbssgd bgnhbd ne hmrsqtldms- Tkshl_sdkx)gnvdudq) enq Khmcdq_mc Odsdqrhmrsqtldms bgnhbdhr _ l_ssdq ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shudcdcrhnm-l_jdqr'rtaidbshudoqdedqdmbdr, a_rdc nmsgdhqoqnedrrhnm_k a_bjfqntoc) hmrshstshnm_k_eehkh_shnm) _mc bnfmhshud l_jdto- Sgdx _qdsgd nmdrvgn cdehmd sgd rhst_shnm_kbnmsdwsbnmrsq_hmhmf bgnhbd_mc) hmsgd oqnbdrr) hlok_ms sgdhqoqnedrrhnm_k _mc odqrnm_koqdedqdmbdrnmhmrsqtldmsbgnhbdSghr _m_kxrhrrtffdrsr sg_s sgd bgnhbdne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr hr rg_odc ax sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr ne sgd hmrsqtldmsr) sgd m_stqd ne sgd oqnakdl _s g_mc) fnudqmldmsr&o_rs dwodqhdmbdr hmcd_khmfvhsg sgd r_ld nq rhlhk_q oqnakdlr) sgd rtaidbshud oqdedqdmbd ne sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr)_mc sgd khjdkx qd_bshnm sn sgd bgnhbdax _eedbsdcrnbh_kfqntor- Hsghfgkhfgsrsgd rhfmhehb_mbdne svn hmsdqkhmjdc fdmdq_ku_qh_akdrsg_s b_mgdko dwok_hm hmrsqtldms bgnhbdr-Sgdrd _qd)ehqrs)sgd dwsdmsne rs_sdok_mmhmfb_o_bhsx,nq sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_k _ahkhsxne rs_sdr sn _eedbsrnbhds_k_bsnqr:_mc rdbnmc) rtarxrsdl bnlokdwhsx,drodbh_kkxsgd mtladq _mc sxod ne _bsnqrfnudqmldmsr ltrs e_bd hmhlokdldmshmf sgdhqoqnfq_lr _mc onkhbhdr'hahc-: Aqdrrdqr _mcN&Snnkd) 0887: Rbgmdhcdq _mcHmfq_l) 088/_9 402-03: Fq_anrjx) 0884: Fq_msg_l) 1//0(- Sgtr) hmsgd b_rd ne rtars_mshudhmrsqtldmsr)sgd sxod ne hmrsqtldms bgnrdmax fnudqmldmsr sn hlokdldms onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_eedbshmfdbnmnlhb _mc rnbh_k_bshuhsxvhkkcdodmc nmsgd hmsdqrdbshnm ne rs_sd b_o_bhsxenqhmsdqudmshnm _mcsgd bnlokdwhsxne sgd _bsnqrsg_s rs_sdr vhrg sn hmektdmbd 'rdd Jqhdrh_m_Idfdm)1///:B_msnq ds_k-:08819bg- 1: U_qnmd) 1///(- Hmsghruhdv) nqf_mhy_shnm_k hmrsqtldmsr sg_s bqd_sdnq qdrsqtbstqd l_qjdsr rgntkc nmkx¥adtrdc) nq b_mnmkxad trdc deedbshudkx) vgdm ghfg kdudkr ne rs_sd b_o_bhsxbndwhrsvhsg bnlokdw rtarxrsdlr) _r hr sgd b_rd) enq dw_lokd) vhsg oqnlnshmf sdbgmnknfhb_k hmmnu_shnmNmkx_ rs_sd vhsg _ ghfg kdudkne nqf_mhy_shnm_k b_o_bhsxvnqjhmf vhsghm_ bnlokdw hlokdldms_shnmrtarxrsdl b_mdeedbshudkx hlokdldms) enq dw_lokd) _m dwsdmrhud hmctrsqh_konkhbxs_qfdshmfsgd bqd_shnmne &rtmqhrd& hmctrsqhdr-He_ rs_sd e_bdr _ bnlokdw rds ne hlokdldms_shnm_bsnqrats g_r nmkxkhlhsdc b_o_bhsx)nqhsgd nsgd\:g_mc) hshr lnqd khjdkxsn dloknx sqd_rtqd-a_rdc hmrsqtldmsr sn l_mhotk_sd dwhrshmf oqnctbshnmqdk_shnmrghorSghr nbbtqr hml_mx rhst_shnmrhmvghbg fnudqmldmsr l_x mns g_ud _bbdrr sn sgd hmenql_shnmnq dwodqshrdqdpthqdcsn g_ud _ lnqd chqdbshlo_bs nm fnncr _mc rdquhbdrcdkhudqxax l_qjds _bsnqr)_r hr sgd b_rd) enqdw_lokd) vhsg qdftk_shnmne sgd nhk_mc f_r hmctrsqxVgdm _ rs_sd g_r ghfg b_o_bhsxats e_bdr _ qdk_shudkx rhlokd rnbh_knq onkhbxdmuhqnmldmsbg_q_bsdqhydcax edv _bsnqr _mc& _ rl_kk mtladq ne rhfmhehb_ms hmsdq-nqf_mhy_shnm_k qdk_shnmrghor) hsb_mtrd _tsgnqhsx-a_rdc hmrsqtldmsr sn qdftk_sdl_qjdsr- Sghr hr _ e_hqkxbnllnm rhst_shnmentmc Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout hml_stqd hmctrsqhdr_mc _bshuhshdr) rtbg _r sdkdognmdnq dkdbsqhbhsx oqnctbshnm_mcchrsqhatshnmrxrsdlr cnlhm_sdc ax nmkx_ edv _bsnqr-Ehm}kkx) vgdm rs_sdb_o_bhsxhr knv _mcsgd onkhbxdmuhqnmldmsmnsudqx bnlokdw) qdkh_mbd nmdwhrshmf l_qjdsr nq sgd trd ne unktms_qxhmrsqtldmsr hr bnllnm) _r v_r sgd b_rd oqhnqsn sgd svdmshdsgbdmstqx hml_mx _qd_r ne rnbh_krdbtqhsx _mc gd_ksg b_qd-Hmsgd oqdrdmsdq_) dw_lokdr ne rtbg hlokdldms_shnm_bshuhshdr _qdhmenql_shnm-a_rdcfnudqmldms b_lo_hfmr chqdbsdc_s oqdudmshmf _tsn sgdesnq chrbntq_fhmfcqhmjhmf_mc cqhuhmf-8 Sgdrd e_bsnqr _krn _eedbs sgd bgnhbd ne oqnbdctq_k hmrsqtldmsr 'R_v_qc) 0881: Qgncdr) 0886a: Gnvrd ds _k-)088/: Admmdss) 0881_(- Fnudqmldmsr vhsg _ ghfg b_o_bhsxe_bhmfbnlokdw onkhbxdmuhqnmldmsr_qd _akdsn trd &chqdbshud& oqnbdctq_khmrsqtldmsr rtbg _r fnudqmldms qdnqf_m-&hy_shnm sn bqd_sdmdv nq qdrsqtbstqd dwhrshmf onkhbxrtarxrsdlr 'rdd Rtbgl_m) 0884: Gdqhshdq) 0886) 0888(- Knvdq-b_o_bhsxfnudqmldmsr e_bhmfonkhbxdmuhqnmldmsrne knvdq bnlokdwhsxtrd hmrsqtldmsr rtbg _r hmenql_shnm l_mhotk_shnH9[) enqdw_lokd)ax qdkd_rhmfnq vhsggnkchmfcnbtldmsr sn _eedbssgd adg_uhntq ne onkhbx_bsnqr'LbFthqd) 1//1(Vgdqd knv-b_o_bhsxfnudqmldmsr e_bdbnlokdw hlokdldms_shnmdmuhqnmldmsr sgdx _qdmns_akdsn qdkxnmhmenql_shnm oqnuhrhnmsn _ksdq_bsnq adg_uhntq ats b_m trd rdkdbshud¥ etmchmf sn rtoonqs rodbhehbhmsdqdrs ) fqntor nq bqd_sdmdv nmdr sn ldds sgdhqmddcr 'rdd Jhmf _mc V_kjdq) 0880: Aqnvmd) 0880: O_k)0882_(- Hmknv-bnlokdwhsx rhst_shnmr)ghfgb_o_bhsxfnudqmldmsr b_m lnqd chqdbskx_ksdqrtarxrsdl rsqtbstqdr ax qdbnfmhyhmfmdv _bsnqr nq oqhuhkdfhmf nkc nmdr sgqntfg _tsgnqhs_shud ld_mr) enqdw_lokd) ax drs_akhrghmfrodbh_khydcpt_rh-hmcdodmcdms _cuhrnqx bnllhssddr _mc.nq PT@MFNr'rdd Gnnc: 0875ac877: Aqnvm)0861: Rlhsg) 0866:Chnm)0862(Deedbshud trd ne oqnbdctq_khmrsqtldmsr)khjdsg_s hmunkuhmf rtars_mshud hmrsqtldmsr)gdmbdqdpthqdrsg_s _ fnudqmldms g_r sgd b_o_bhsxsn deedbs bg_mfdr vghkd sgd _bst_k dwsdmsne qdrntqbd trd qdpthqdc vhkku_qx vhsg sgd rhyd_mc bnlokdwhsxne sgd onkhbx_bsnqrhshr _ssdloshmf sn hmektdmbd 'rdd R_v_qc) 088/: Aqxrnm_mc Bqnrax) 0882: L_knmdx)1//0(Sghr lncdk cndr mnscdkudhmsnsgd cds_hkne ehmdfq_c_shnmrne hmrsqtldms trd vhsghmd_bg fdmdq_kb_sdfnqx)ne bntqrd) mnqcndr hscd_kvhsg sgd rodbhehbbnmsdwsrne hmchuhct_kcdbhrhnmr)vghbg b_mqdrtks hmdqqnqr adhmf l_cd hmhmrsqtldms bgnhbdr 'rdd U_qnmd_mc K_mcqx)0886() mnq cndr hs _ccqdrr sgd ptdrshnm _ants noshl_k _mc rtanoshl_k hmrsqtldms lhwdr hmo_qshbtk_qonkhbx_qd_r nq rdbsnqr-kN Gnvdudq) hs rtffdrsr sg_s _ksgntfg hmrsqtldms bgnhbdr enq onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm _qd bnlokdw) fdmdq_ko_ssdqmrne rtbg bgnhbdr b_m mdudqsgdkdrrad chrbdqmdc_mc dwi9kk_hm9dc)&;qhhs9k&a_rhb_cuhbd qdmcdqdcsn otakhb l_m_fdqr _ants vghbg )sxodr&&Ne9hmrsqnldmsr&&_qd& _ooqnoqh_sdhm rodbhehbbhqbtlrs_mbdr 'rdd Aqdrrdqr)0887: Aqdrrdqr_mc N&Snnkd) 0887: L_mcdkk)1///(- BNMBKTRHNM9LNCDKR NE HLOKDLDMS@SHNMRSXKDR Hlokdldms_shnmrstchdr nudq sgd o_rs 2/ xd_qr g_ud fdmdq_sdchmrhfgsr hmsnhlokdldms_shnm_bshuhshdr _mc hmrsqtldms trd) vghbg rgdc khfgs nm sgd onrrhahkhshdr _mc bnmrsq_hmsr _eedbshmf sghr rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _mcsgd _ahkhsx ne oq_bshshnmdqr sn cdrhfm_mc hloqnud onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm-Vghkd rnld rstchdr tmcdqs_jdm hmsghr udhmg_ud addm) _mc bnmshmtd sn ad) hmektdmbdcax sgd hcd_ sg_s hlokdldms_shnm hr otqdkx sdbgmhb_k hmm_stqd)_mc gdmbdnodmsn q_ohcbg_mfd_mc qdbnmehftq_shnm) lnrs rstchdr g_ud khmjdchlokdldms_shnm-_bshuhshdr sn k_qfdq-rb_kd_mc lnqd odql_mdms_qq_mfdldmsrne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr) nq hlokdldms_shnm rsxkdr.Cdrohsdrnldvg_s cheedqdms ldsgncnknfhdr _mc eq_ldvnqjr) sgdrd _ooqn_bgdr rg_qd sgd uhdv sg_s hlokdldms_shnm hmunkudrltbg lnqd sg_mrhlokx dwdbtshmfoqduhntr cdbhrhnmrnq l_sbghmf fn_kr vhsg ld_mrSgdx dmcnqrdsgd mnshnmsg_s onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmb_mnmkxad ld_mhmfetkkxtmcdqrsnnc _mc du_kt_sdc hmsdqlr ne sgd dwhrshmf q_mfdne _bsnqr _mchmrshstshnmr vhsghmvghbg hlokdldmsdqr l_jd sgdhqcdbhrhnmr'Khmcdq _mcOdsdqr)08809020(Sgd bdmsq_koqdbdosne sgdrd _ooqn_bgdr hr sg_s sgd hlokdldms_shnm oqnbdrr _mc hsrntsbnldr _qdrg_odc ax onkhshb_k e_bsnqrqdk_sdcsn rs_sd b_o_bhsx_mc rtarxrsdl bnlokdwhsx '@sjhmrnm_mc Mhfnk)08789 003(Rhmbd sgdrd u_qh_akdrsdmcsn bg_mfd nmkxudqxrknvkx)sgtr hsenkknvrsg_s hlokdldms_shnm_bshuhshdr sdmcsn dwghahs_ rtqoqhrhmf_lntms ne rhlhk_qhsx_bqnrr onkhbxrdbsnqr_mcnudqshld- Vg_s Aqhshrgonkhbx-l_jdqr lhfgs _bbnlokhrg sgqntfg otakhb dmsdqoqhrdr)enq dw_lokd) lhfgs sdmc sn ad )hlokdldmsdc hm sgd TR sgqntfg qdftk_shnmr)-¥ Sghr hr rnldsghmf dbnmnlhrsr) enqdw_lokd) qdod_sdckxehmc)sn sgdhqchrokd_rtqd)vgdm sgdhq "oqnonr_kr enq tshkhyhmfmdv sxodr ne dbnmnlhb hmrsqtldmsr sn bnmsqnk rnbh_khkkrrtbg _r onkktshnm_qdqdidbsdchme_untq nesgd bnmshmthmf trd ne qdftk_shnm)_r g_r adbnld _klnrs g_ahst_k hml_mx bntmsqhdrcd_khmf vhsg sghrsxod ne oqnakdl 'Cndqm)0887: Cndqm_mcVhkjr) 0887(@ksgntfg mtldqntr odqlts_shnmr _mc bnlahm_shnmr_qdonrrhakd)sgd lncdk nea_rhbhlokdldms_shnmrsxkdrentmc hmEhftqd 7-2 rdsr nts sgd sxohb_klhwdr neoqnbdctq_k_mcrtars_mshudonkhbxhmrsqtldmsrentmc hml_mx itqhrchbshnmrFnudqmldmsre_bhmf_ u_qhdsxne khlhs_shnmr _mccd_khmfvhsg aqn_c onkhbxs_qfdsrvhk{sdmcsn trd knv-bnrs hmrsqtldmsrrtbg _r dwgnqs_shnmvghkd qdrsqtbstqhmfnq qdenqlhmfa_rhb onkhbxhmrshstshnmr sn _ksdqsgd etmc_ldms_k mdsvnqj rsqtbstqd ne rodbhehbrdbsnqr _mc hrrtd _qd_r- Sghr qdrtksr hm_m hlokdldms_shnmrsxkd ne hmrshstshnm_khydc unktms_qhrl. @m dw_lokd ne sghr rsxkdhr vgdm sgd B_m_ch_mfnudqmldms drs_akhrgdcmdv rsqtbstqdr sn cd_k vhsg neehbh_k k_mft_fd onkhbx_mc ahkhmft_khrlvghkd cdunshmfrtars_msh_krtlr sn _cudqshrhmfctqhmf sgd dwsdmcdcm_shnm_k tmhsxbqhrhrnesgd 086/9-8/ odqhnc'rdd Qnrd) 0882: Qx_m)0884(- Ehftqd 7-2 @ Lncdk ne A_rhb Hlokdldms_shnm Rsxkdr M_stqd ne sgd OnkhbxS_qfds Gxugj Sgxxu· Hmrshstshnm_khydc Unktms_qhrl Qdoqdrdms_shudKdf_khrl -Ntluxsgzout0hgykj y}hyzgtzo~k zuury gtj otyzoz}zoutgr xkuzmgtongzout. -Wkm}rgzout0hgykj y}hyzgtzo~k zuury gtj lotgtiogr sgtov}rgzout. 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sn cd_k vhsg rodbhehbhrrtdr hmsgdrd _qd_r vghkd d&Wsdmchmf etmchmf sn ltkshbtkstq_k) gtl_m qhfgsr) _mc vnldm&r fqntor 'rdd Atqs) 088/: O_k)0882_: Ehmjkdds _H-)0883(Ehm_kkx)hmrhst_shnmr vgdqd sgdx e_bd knv bnmrsq_hmsr_mc m_qqnv s_qfdsr) fnudqmldmsr sdmc sn trd rtars_mshud nqf_mhy_shnm_ksnnkr rtbg _r fnudqmldms bnqonq_shnmr) otakhb dmsdqoqhrdr) _mc chqdbskx_clhmhrsdqdc otahb rdquhbd cdkhudqx) bnlahmdc vhsg oqnbdctq_k snnkr rtbg _r otakhb gd_qhmfr) qduhdvr) _mc du_kt_shnmr- Dw_lokdr ne sghr entqsg hlokdldms_shnmrsxkd ne joxkizkj vxu~oyout _qd _krn entmc hml_mx bntmsqhdr _mc hm l_mx _qd_r) rtbg _r q_chn _mc sdkduhrhnmaqn_cb_rshmf _mc) hmsgd o_rs) q_hkv_x _mc _hqkhmdsq_mronqs_shnm hm B_m_c_ _mc dkrdvgdqd 'rdd Cvhudch) 0871: Gncfdssr) 0862: cd k_Lnsgd) 0885(- ; A_qc_bg) Dtfdmd- 0866- [nk Nsvrksktzgzout LgskB angz Mgvvkty Flzkx g GorrGkiusky g Qg·1 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 LHS OqdrrAqdrrdqr) G_mr Sg-@- 0887- &Sgd Bgnhbd ne OnkhbxHmrsqtldmsr hm Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr&) hm A-F- Odsdqr _mc E-J-L-U- Mhrodm) dcr) U}hroi Uuroim Ntyzx}sktzyB J~gr}gzotm znk [uury ul U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout1 Mdv Xnqj9 Dcv_qc Dkf_q)74-0/4] Cndqm)F- Aqtbd) _mc Qhbg_qcV- Oghcc- 0881- Hgtgjogt U}hroi UuroimBNjkgy/ Yzx}iz}xk/ Uxuikyy/ 1mc dcm- Snqnmsn9MdkrnmDkkhf)Idqqx) _mc Cnm K_unhd- 0884- &Sgd Oqhmbhokd-@fdms Qdk_shnmrghohm Nqf_mhy_shnmr&) hmO-Enrr) dc-) Jiutusoi Fvvxuginky zu Txmgtongzouty gtj Ntyzoz}zoutyBFt Ntzxuj}izout1 @kcdqrgns9C_qslntsgFnffhm) L_kbnkl K-)ds _k-088/- Nsvrksktzgzout [nkuxm gtj UxgizoikB [h·gxj g [noxj Lktkxgzout1 Fkdmuhdv)Hkk-9 Rbnss)Enqdrl_m.Khsskd)AqnvmFtmmhmfg_l) Mdhk) _mc C_qqdm Rhmbk_hq-0888- &Qdftk_snqx Oktq_khrl9 CdrhfmhmfOnkhbxLhwdr enqDmuhqnmldms_kOqnsdbshnm&) Qg· gtj Uuroim 54/ 0938-65Gidqm) Admmx-0871-" &Hlokdldms_shnmQdrd_qbg-Sgd Khmj Fnmd Lhrrhmf&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 1)29 2/0-7Gnnc) Bgqhrsnogdq-[nk [uury ul Lu~kxtsktz1 Bg_sg_l) MI9Bg_sg_l GntrdGnvkdss) Lhbg_dk- 1///- &L_m_fhmfsgd "Gnkknv Rs_sd": Oqnbdctq_k Onkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr _mc Lncdqm Fnudqm_mbd&)Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 32) 3: 301-20J_f_m) Qnadqs @- 0880- &@cudqr_qh_k Kdf_khrl _mc @ldqhb_m Fnudqmldms&) Ou}xtgr ul vuroHmFtgrmyoy gtj Rgtgmksktz 0/) 29 258-3/5Jkhim) Dqhj-G_mr)Inno Jnoodmi_m) _mc J_sqhdm Sdqlddq- 0884- &L_m_fhmf Mdsvnqjr- hm sgd Otakhb Rdbsnq: @ Sgdnqdshb_k Rstcx ne L_m_fdldms Rsq_sdfhdrhmOnkhbxMdsvnqjr&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 629326-43Khmcdq)RsdogdmG-) _mc A- Ftx Odsdqr- 0878- &Hmrsqtldmsrne Fnudqmldms9 Odqbdoshnmr_mc Bnmsdwsr&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 8) 0924-47N&Snnkd)K_tqdmbdI- 1///- &Qdrd_qbgnm OnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm9@rrdrrldms _mc Oqnrodbsr&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wkykgxin gtj [nkuxm 43/ 19 152-77Oqdrrl_m) Ideeqdx .-+ _mc @_qnmA- Vhkc_urjx- 0873- NsvrksktzgzoutB Mu· Lxkgz J•vkizgzouty ot agynotmzut gxk Igynkj ot Tgqrgtj/ 2qc dcmAdI9jdkdx9Tmhudqrhsxne B_khenqmh_ OqdrrR_a_shdq) O_tk @- 0882- &Sno-cnvm _mc Anssnl-to @ooqn_bgdr sn Hlokdldms_shnm Qdrd_qbg&-) hmLhbg_dk Ghkk)dc-) [nk U}hroi Uuroim UxuikyyB F Wkgjkx1 Knmcnm:e!_qudrsdqVgd_srgd_e) 155-82- Ehqrsotakhrgdc hm0875 hmOu}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim1 Rbgmdhcdq)@mmd)_mc GdkdmHmfq_l- 0882- &Rnbh_k Bnmrsqtbshnmne S_qfds Onotk_shnmr9 Hlokhb_shnmrenq Onkhshbr_mc Onkhbx&)Fskxoigt Uurozoigr Yioktik Wk~ok· 76) 19 223-36Rhlnm) G-@- 0835- &SgdOqnudqar ne @clhmhrsq_shnm&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 59 42-56- 1/5 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy Vnncrhcd) J- 0875- &Onkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr_mc sgd Rstcx ne OtakhbOnkhbx&) Hgtgjogt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 08)39664-82- 0- Nmsgd &fdmdq_shnmr& nehlokdldms_shnm qdrd_qbg)rdd Fnffhmds_h-'088/(1- Enq_ qduhdvne_ rhlhk_qkhsdq_stqd hmsgdenqdhfm onkhbxehdkc)rdd Gdql_mm '0871(2- Sgd ONRCBnQA oqhmbhokdr rds nts ax Ftkhbj _mc Tqvhbj hmsgdhq0836 rstcx) chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq6 _anud) rdqud _r sgd &ghfgonhms& ne sghr lnudldms3- Nm&_fdmbx knrr&_r _ &fnudqmhmf e_hktqd&) rdd Vdhldq _mcUhmhmf '0888(4- Sgd enkknvhmfchrbtrrhnm cq_vr gd_uhkxnm L_yl_mh_m _mc R_a_shdq '0872910-4(5- @o_sg-aqd_jhmfdeenqshmsghroqnbdrrv_r entmchmsgdvnqj neCndqm_mc ghr bnkk_anq_snqr hmsgd 086/r _mc 087/r- RddCndqm_mc@tbnhm'0860(: Cndqm_mcVhkrnm'0863_) 0863a(: Stoodq _mcCndqm'0870(6- Nmsgd l_mhotk_shnmne mdsvnqjr)rdd Kdhj'0881(7- Nmsghr k_ssdqonhms_mcsgd qnkdok_xdcax fnudqmldms_fdmbhdrhmsghr oqnbdrr)rdd Rlhsg ds _k-'0882(: R_unhd'0888(8- Enqdw_lokdr ne d_bgsxod nehmrsqtldmsbgnhbd)rdd Unfdk'0885(: Dhrmdq '0883a(: Stoodq '0868(: K_tw_mcLnkns'0877(: G_kk_mcA_mshmf '1///(0/- D_qkxrstchdr ne hmrsqtldmsbgnhbdsdmcdcsn knnj _s hmrs_mbdr ne rhmfkd hmrsqtldmsrdkdbshnm _mc)nmsgda_rhr nertbg b_rdr)_ssdlosdc sn chrbdqm sgd qd_rnmrvgx fnudqmldmsr vntkc bgnnrd nmd fdmdq_kb_sdfnqxne hmrsqtldms nudq _mnsgdq-Hsadb_ld pthbjkx duhcdmssn hmudrshf_snqr) gnvdudq)sg_slnrs oqnfq_lr sdmcdcsn hmunkud &atmckdr& ne hmrsqtldmsr q_sgdq sg_m rhmfkd snnkr 'rdd Ftmmhmfg_l _mc Rhmbk_hq)-) 0-888: Ftmmhmfg_l_mcXntmf)0886:Qgnc}r)0886a(-Rnoghrshb_sdc rstcdmsr ne onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmstqmdcsgdhq_ssdmshnm sn cdrbqhahmf sgdrd o_bj_fdr ne hlokdldms_shnm sdbgmhptdr) vhsg sgd&_hl ne chrbdqmhmfvg_s bnlahm_shnmr ne hmrsqtldmsr vdqd rdke-qdhmenqbhmf) vghbg vdqd qdctmc_ms)_mcvghbg vdqd _bst_kkxbntmsdqoqnctbshud 'rdd Ftmmhmfg_l ds _H-)0887: Ftmmhmfg_l _mc Rhmbk_hq) 0888: Ftmmhmfg_l _mc Xntmf) 0886:Rhmbk_hq) 0886(- Solicx FvaluationA Onkhbx@m_kxrhrand Solicx Nearning Nmbdsgd mddcsn _ccqdrr _ otakhb oqnakdl g_r addm _bjmnvkdcfdc) u_qhntr onrrhakd rnktshnmrg_ud addm bnmrhcdqdc)_mc rnld _lnmf sgdl g_ud addm rdkdbsdc_mc ots hmsnoq_bshbd)_ fnudqmldms nesdm_rrdrrdr gnv sgd onkhbxhr vnqjhmf- @ssgd r_ld shld) u_qhntr hmsdqdrsdcldladqr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr _mc ne sgd otakhb _qd dmf_fdc hmsgdhqnvm _rrdrrldms nesgd vnqjhmfr _mcdeedbsrne sgd onkhbxhmnqcdqsn dwoqdrrrtoonqs enqnq noonrhshnmsn sgd onkhbx)nq sn cdl_mc bg_mfdr sn hs-Sgd bnmbdos ne vuroim k~gr}gzout,zn}y qdedqraqn_ckxsn sgd rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _s vghbg hs)hr cdsdqlhmdc gnv _ otakhb onkhbxg_r _bst_kkx e_qdc hm _bshnm-Hshmunkudrsgd du_kt_shnmne sgd ld_mr adhmf dloknxdc _mc sgd naidbshudradhmf rdqudc- @rK_qqx FdqrsnmB0886901/( g_r cdehmdchs) &onkhbx du_kt_shnm_rrdrrdr&sgddeedbshudmdrrne_otgkhb-onkhBX¥sm sdqlr ne ] hsr odqbdhudchmsdmshnmr _mc qdrtksr-&Gnv cddo nq sgnqntfg sgd du_kt_shnmhr cdodmcr nmsgnrd nqcdqhmfhsrhmhsh_shnm _mc.nq sgnrd tmcdqs_jhmf hs)_mc vg_s sgdx hmsdmcsn cn vhsg sgd ehmchmfr@esdq_ onkhbxg_r addm du_kt_sdc) sgd oqnakdl _mc rnktshnmr hs hmunkudrl_x ad qdsgntfgs bnlokdsdkx) hmvghbg b_rd sgd bxbkd l_x rvhmf a_bj sn _fdmc_-rdsshmfnqrnld nsgdqrs_fd ne sgd bxbkd)nq sgd rs_str ptn l_x ad l_hms_hmdc-Qdbnmbdost_khy_shnm l_x bnmrhrsne lhmnq bg_mfdr nq etmc_ldms_k qdenqltk_shnmne sgd oqnakdl) hmbktchmfsdqlhm_shmfsgd onkhbx_ksnfdsgdq'CdKdnm) 0872(- Gnv du_kt_shnmhr bnmctbsdc) sgd oqnakdlR&sgd dwdqbhrddms_hkr)_mc sgd q_mfd ne qdrtksr sn vghbg hssxohb_kkx kd_cr _qdsgd bnmbdqmrne sghr bg_osdq-Hssgdmntskhmdr sgd o_ssdqmrne onkhbxbg_mfd sn vghbg cheedqdms sxodr ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmsxohb_kkx kd_c- 1/7 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy enq rtbbdrr _mc e_hktqd)vghbg _ookx qdf_qckdrr ne shld _mc ok_bd)hr _ rdqhntr oqnakdl&enq_mxnmdvgn v_msr sn tmcdqrs_mconkhbxdu_kt_shnmOnkhbhdr b_mrtbbddc nq e_hkhmmtldqntr v_xr- Rnldshldr _mdmshqd onkhbxqdfhld b_me_hk)vghkd lnqd nesdmrodbhehboqnfq_lr vhsghm_ onkhbx ehdkcl_x ad cdrhfm_sdc _r rtbbdrretk nq tmrtbbdrretk 'Ltbbh_qnmh) 088/(- @mcansg onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr b_mrtbbddc nq e_hkdhsgdqhmrtars_mshudsdqlr-sg_s hr) _r naidbshudkxnq odqbdhudcsn ad cdkhudqhmfnq e_hkhmf sn cdkhudqsgd fnncr-nq hmoqnbdctq_ksdqlr-_r adhmfkdfhshl_sd nq hkkdfhshl_sd)e_hqnq tme_hq)itrs nq tmitrs 'Anudmr _mc sG_qs) 0884: Vd_udq)0875: LbFq_v) 088/: Gnnc) 1//1(&Rtbbdrr& hr _kv_xr cheehbtks sn cdehmd-Hmrnld e_hqkxrhlokd hmrs_mbdr) drodbh_kkxsgnrd cd_khmfvhsg rodbs_btk_qe_hktqdrrtbg _r _hqkhmd bq_rgdr nq mtbkd_qqd_bsnqldkscnvmr) _m_kxrdrb_m ohmonhms rtbg vdkk-jmnvm e_bsnqr_r sdbgmhb_ke_hktqdr)l_m_fdqh_k hmbnlodsdmbd)_mc bnqqtoshnm 'Anudmr _mc s&G_qs)0885: Fq_x _mc s&G_qs) 0887( nq kdrrdq-jmnvmnmdr rtbg _r &oq_bshb_k cqhes& _r adhmf qdronmrhakdenq _ b_k_lhsx-! @ksgntfg rnld ne sgd kdrrnmr ne sgdrd hmchuhct_k_bbhcdmsr-rtbg _r sgd rhfmhehb_mbdenqsgd onsdmsh_k enqe_hktqdne sgd knnrdkxnq shfgskxbntokdc m_stqd ne sgd bnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnm_k rxrsdlr sg_soqnctbdc _ oqnakdl 'Odqqnv) 0873(-b_m ad b_qqhdcnudq hmsnonkhbxrstchdr) hml_mx bhqbtlrs_mbdr sgd nodq_shnmne _ onkhbxrxrsdl hr snn hchnrxmbq_shb) sgd mtladq ne _bsnqr snn mtldqntr) _mcsgd mtladq ne ntsbnldr snn rl_kk sn odqlhs bkd_q_mc tm_lahftntr onrs-lnqsdlr- Mdudqsgdkdrr)rtbg deenqsr_qdl_cd _mc sgd qdrtksr ne sgdrd hmudrshf_shnmr) vgdsgdq _bbtq_sdnq mns)_qdedc a_bj hmsn sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) hmektdmbhmf sgd chqdbshnm _mc bnmsdmsne etqsgdqhsdq_shnmrne ja[ onkhBX bXcd9 Itcfdldmsr _ants onkhbxrtbbdrr _mc e_hktqdnesdmcdodmc hmo_qs nm sgd hlots_shnm ne mnshnmrne hmsdmshnm_khsx sn fnudqmldms _bsnqr-rn sg_s sgd qdrtksr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf b_mad _rrdrrdc _f_hmrsdwodbs_shnmrGnvdudq)sghr hr mns_ rhlokd s_rj 'rdd Rhdadq)08709bg- 1(- Ehqrs)_r vd g_ud rddm) fnudqmldms hmsdmshnmr l_x ad u_ftd _mc _lahftntr) nq dudm onsdmsh_kkx bnmsq_chbsnqx nq ltst_kkx dwbktrhud-Rdbnmc)k_adkr rtbg _r &rtbbdrr&_mc &e_hktqd& _qdhmgdqdmskx qdk_shud_mc vhkkad hmsdqoqdsdc cheedqdmskx ax _heedqdms onkhbx_bsnqr-Lnqdnudq)rtbg cdrhfm_shnmr_qd _krn rdl_mshb snnkr sgdlrdkudr trdc hmotakhb cda_sd _mc onkhbxbnmsdrs_shnm hmnqcdq sn rddj onkhshb_k _cu_ms_fd- Sg_s hr) onkhbxdu_kt_shnmr_eedbs bnmrhcdq_shnmr _mc bnmrdptdmbdrqdk_sdcsn _rrdrrhmf ak_ld _mc s_jhmf bqdchsenqfnudqmldms _bshuhshdr _s _kkrs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) _kkne vghbg b_m g_ud dkdbsnq_k)_clhmhrsq_shud)_mc nsgdq bnmrdptdmbdr enq onkhbx_bsnqr 'Anudmr _mc s&G_qs)088598(- @r Anudmr_mc s&G_qs'hahc-) 10( mnsd)&itcfdldmsr _ants sgd e_hktqdnq rtbbdrr ne otakhb onkhbhdrnq oqnfq_lr _qd ghfgkx l_kkd_akd- E_hktqdhr mns hmgdqdms hmonkhbxdudmsr sgdlrdkudr- "E_hktqd"hr _ itcfdldms _ants dudmsr9Rtbg itcfdldmsr) ax m_stqd)_qd _s kd_rso_qsh_kkx khmjdcsn e_bsnqrrtbg _r sgd m_stqd ne sgd b_tr_k shkdnqhdr trdc sn eq_ld onkhbxoqnakdlr _s sgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfrs_fd Uuroim J~gr}gzout 53A _mc sgd bnmbdost_krnktshnmrcdudknodc _s sgd enqltk_shnmrs_fd) _r vdkk _r sgd dwodbs_shnmr cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr g_ud _ants khjdkxoqnfq_l nq onkhbx qdrtksr _mc sgd dwsdmsne shld _kknvdc) _mc bnmrhcdqdcqd_rnm_akd sn dk_ordadenqddu_kt_snqrl_jd sgdhq_rrdrrldmsr 'hahc-)26(- Onkhbxdu}t_shnmoqnbdrrdr) qdbnfmhyhmf sgdrd athks-hmah_rdr) nesdmrhlokx _hl sn --oqnuhcdonkhbx&itcfdr&vhsg dmntfg hmenql_shnmsn ad _akdsn l_jd qd_rnm_akxhmsdkkhfdms) cdedmrhakd) _mc qdokhb_akd _rrdrrldmsr- Onkhbxdu_kt_shnm_klnrs _kv_xr hmunkudratqd_tbq_sr _mc onkhshbh_mr vhsghmfnudqmldms cd_khmfvhsg sgd onkhbxhm-ptdrshnm) _mc hs trt_kkx _krn hmunkudrnqf_mhydcmnm-fnudqmldms_kldladqr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr _r vdkk- Hm_cchshnm:-hs l_x _krn hmunkudldladqr ne sgd otakhb) vgn nesdmvhkkg_ud sgd tkshl_sd r_x nm _ fnudqmldms&ronkhbxqdbnqc vgdm sgdx unsd _s dkdbshnmr'Aqdvdq _mc CdKdnm)08729208-15(- Sgtr sgd rhsdr ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qdaqn_cdq sg_mnesdmoqdrdmsdchmsgd khsdq_stqd)vghbg sdmcr sn bnmbdmsq_sd nudqvgdklhmfkx nm du_kt_shnmax atqd_tbq_sr _mc &ntsrhcd&oqhu_sdbnmrtks_msr_mc sghmj-s_mjr- Onkhbx du_kt_shnmhr mns_mdwbktrhudoqdrdqudne sgd fnudqmldms-Hme_bs)onkhbx du_kt_shnmhmunkudrlnrs ne sgd jdx _bsnqr _qq_xdchmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr hm_ u_qhdsxne enql_k _mc hmenql_kudmtdr enq _rrdrrhmf _mc bqhshpthmf onkhbxntsbnldr _mcoqnbdrrdr@snmddwsqdld)onkhbx_m_kxrsrvnqjhmf hmcdo_qsldmsr nq rodbh_khydc tmhsr hmsgd _clhmhrsq_shnm qntshmdkx_ookx enql_k sdbgmhptdr rtbg _r --bnrs}admdehs _m_kxrhrnq u_qhntr jhmcr ne odqenql_mbd ld_rtqdr hmnq_desn sqxsn pt_mshexoqnfq_latsotsr_m_ _bbtq_sdkx_rrdrr oqnfq_l qdrtksr 'rdd Ldksrkkdq)0865: Eqhdcl_m) 1//1(- Sgdrd _m_kxrsrb_mg_ud _ rtars_msh_khlo_bs nm rtardptdms qntmcr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf adb_trd ne rdudq_kcheedqdms qnkdr¥sgdx b_mok_x hmsgd du_kt_shnmoqnbdrr- Sgdx b_m _eedbssgd &eq_lhmf& _mc _rrdrrldms ne onkhbxrtbbdrr _mce_hktqdax gnv sgdx cdudkno_mc _ookxu_qhntr ld_rtqdr) hmchb_snqr) _mcadmbgl_qjr sn oqnfq_l ntsotsr) rnldshldr rdquhmf_r bqhshbrnq &_cunb_sdr& ne o_qshbtk_q _ooqn_bgdr sn oqnakdlr 'rdd C_uhdr)0888: cd k_Onqsdds _H-)1//0: Kdux) 1//0(- Sgdx b_m_krn rdqud _r &aqnjdqr& khmjhmfonkhbx-l_jdqr sn hlokdldmsdqr) nq sn sgnrd)ntsrhcd sgd enql_k hmrshstshnmr ne fnudqmldms vgn _qdfdmdq_shmfmdv jmnvkdcfd nmrnbh_koqnakdlr _mc sgd sdbgmhptdrenq qdrnkuhmfnq _ssdloshmf sn qdrnkudsgdrd oqnakdlr 'rdd Ldksrmdq)0865: Ftdrr _mc E_qmg_l) 1///(@ssgd nsgdq dwsqdld)otakhb oqnsdrsr ax _eedbsdchmsdqdrs fqntor _krn qdoqdrdms_m du_kt_shnmne dwhrshmf onkhbx)_ksgntfg sghr jhmc ne du_kt_shnmhr onrs gnb) hmenql_k)_mc dwsdqm_k sn sgd onkhbx&knno&Rtbg du_kt_shnml_x hmunkudbqhshptdrne ansg sgd rtars_mbd _mc oqnbdrr ne onkhbx) _mc b_mkd_csn bg_mfdr hm_clhmhrsq_shudnqf_mhy_shnmr _mcoqnbdctqdr) rtbg _r _m hmbqd_rdnq cdbqd_rd hm_bbdrr sn hmenql_shnmax sgd otakhb 'rdd Rmnv _mc Admenqc)0881(- Hmadsvddm sgdrd svn onkdr khd_ u_qhdsx ne nsgdqudmtdr _mc ld_mr neonkhbxdu_kt_shnmsg_shmunkudhmrshstshnm_khydckhmjradsvddm enql_k _mc hmenql_konkhbxdu_kt_snqr& hmfnudqmldms _mcbhuhk rnbhdsx-Sgdrd hmbktcdsgd itchbh_qx)vghbg hr _akdsn qduhdvkdfhrk_shud _mc _clhmhrsq_shud_bshnmrsn cdsdqlhmdsgd dwsdmssn vghbg onkhbhdr l_sbg to sn k_qfdq)nesdmbnmrshstshnm_kkx drs_akhrgdcoqhmbhokdr ne rnbh_kitrshbd _mc bnmctbs 'rdd cd Rlhsg) 0862: Dckdx)088/: Gtlogqhdr _mc Rnmfdq)0888: I_eed)0854(- Hs_krnhmbktcdrlnqd qdbdmsdeenqsrnmsgd o_qs ne _clhmhrsq_snqrsn aqhmfotakhb uhdvr hmsnsgd du_kt_shudoqnbdrr sgqntfg sgd trd ne rtbg oqnbdctq_khmrsqtldmsr _r enbtr fqntor) rtqudxr) hmpthqhdr)_mc s_rj enqbdr 'rdd G_rs_j ds _k-)1//0: Odsdqr_mc O_qjdq) 0882: Rbgv_qsy)0886: Vq_hsg_mcK_la) 0860(Du_kt_shnmsgtr hmbktcdransg hmenql_k_mc ronms_mdntr qdronmrdrsn onkhbxld_rtqdr _mc) _r rtbg) hmunkudrmnsnmkx_tsgnqhs_shudcdbhrhnml_jdqr _mc ldladqr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr _bshud_s sgd enqltk_shnm_mc hlokdldms_shnmrs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) ats) khjdsgd _fdmc_-rdsshmf rs_fd) b_m_krn onsdmsh_kkx hmunkudldladqr eqnl sgd dmshqdonkhbxtmhudqrd- Sgd oqdrdmbdne chrshmbssxodr ne onkhbxdu_kt_snqrqdrtksr hmrdudq_kchrshmbssxodr ne onkhbx_m_kxrhr_mc du_kt_shnm-@s_ fdmdq_kkdudk)onkhbx du_kt_shnmrb_mad bk_rrhehdchmsnsgqddaqn_c b_sdfnqhdr-_clhmhrsq_shud k~gr}gzout/ p}jojgr k~gr}gzout/ _mc vurozoigrk~gr}gzout0·noin cheedqhm sgd v_x sgdx _qdbnmctbsdc)sgd _bsnqrsgdx hmunkud:_mc sgdhqdeedbsr-&Hm-¥ vg_s enkknvr)sgd jdx udmtdr enqsgdrd jhmcr ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qdrds nts) _knmfvhsg _ cdrbqhoshnmne sgd _bsnqrhmunkudchmsgdrd oqnbdrrdr _mcsgdhq_bshuhshdr@clhmhrsq_shud Du_kt_shnm9 L_m_fdqh_kOdqenql_mbd_mc Atcfdshmf Rxrsdlr @clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnmhr sgd enbtr ne l_mx otakhrgdc _b_cdlhb rstchdrnmonkhbxdu_kt_shnm-Hshr trt_kkx tmcdqs_jdmvhsghmsgd fnudqmldms) nbb_rhnm_kkx ax rodbh_khrs_fdmbhdrvgnrd nmkxs_rj hr du_kt_shnmne onkhbhdr)ats lnqd nesdmax ehm_mbh_k) kdf_k)_mc onkhshb_k nudqrddqr_ss_bgdc sn dwhrshmf fnudqmldms cdo_qsldmsr) rodbh_khydcdwdbtshud_fdmbhdr)kdfhrk_stqdr)_mc itchbh_qhdr-Oqhu_sdbnmrtks_msrl_x _krn gd ghqdcax sgd u_qhntr aq_mbgdr_mc _fdmbhdrne sgd fnudqmldms sn bnmctbs du_kt_shnm &enq_ edd&@clhmhrsqlhud&du_kt_shnm hr trt_kkx) sgntfg mns_kv_xr) qdrsqhbsdcsn dw_lhmhmfsgd deehbhdms cdkhudqxne fnudqmldms rdquhbdr_mc _ssdloshmf sn cdsdqlhmd vgdsgdq nq mns&u_ktdenqlnmdx&hr adhmf _bghdudcvghkd rshkkqdrodbshmfoqhmbhokdrne itrshbd _mc cdlnbq_bx- Hshr hmsdmcdcsn dmrtqd sg_s onTbhdr_qd_bbnlokhrghmf sgdhqdwodbsdcfn_kr _s sgd kd_rs onrrhakd bnrs _mc vhsg sgd kd_rsonrrhakd atqcdm nmhmchuhct_kbhshydmr) Sghr bnmbdqmenqdeehbhdmbx khdradghmcmtldqntr enql_k du_kt_shudrxrsdlr) rtbg _r l_m_fdqh_kodqenql_mbd _mc odqrnmmdkqduhdvr) _r vdkk _r sgd bnmctbs ne _mmt_k_tchsr _mc sgd bqd_shnmne atcfdshmf rxrsdlr sg_s _ssdlos sn l_sbg fn_kr _mc dwodmchstqdr-@clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmqdpthqdr bnkkdbshnm ne oqdbhrdhmenql_shnmnmoqnfq_l cdkhudqx_mc hsrbnlohk_shnmhm_ rs_mc_qchydce_rghnmsn _kknvbnlo_qhrnmr ne bnrsr _mc ntsbnldr nudq shld _mc _bqnrr onkhbx rdbsnqr- @r rtbg) sgdrd deenqsr_qd pthsd sdbgmhb_k _mc hmbqd_rhmfkx rnoghrshb_sdc)_ksgntfg sgd hmbqd_rdhmbnlokdwhsxhr mnsmdbdrr_qhkxl_sbgdc ax _ rhlhk_qhmbqd_rd hmtrdetkmdrr 'Eqhdcl_m) 1//1(@clhmhrsq_shud onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrbnld hm_ u_qhdsxne enqlr _mc cheedq vhcdkx hmkdudkrne&rnoghrshb_shnm _mc enql_khsx-Sgnrd tmcdqs_jdm ax fnudqmldms _fdmbhdrhmsgd deenqssn lhmhlhyd bnrsr _qdfdmdq_kkx ne ehud cheedqdms sxodr9 '0( deenqsdu_kt_shnm:'1( odqenql_mbd du_kt_shnm:'2( _cdpt_bx ne odqenql_mbddu_kt_shnm:'3( deehbhdmbx du_kt_shnm:_mc '4( oqnbdrr du_kt_shnm'Rtbgl_m) 0856(Jlluxz k~gr}gzout _ssdlosr sn ld_rtqd sgd pt_mshsxne oqnfq_l hmotsr) sg_s hr) sgd _lntms ne deenqsfnudqmldmsr ots hmsn_bbnlokhrghmf sgdhq fn_kr- Sgd hmotsl_x ad odqrnmmdk)neehbdro_bd) bnlltmhb_shnm) sq_mronqs_shnm)_mc rn nm-_kk ne vghbg _qd b_kbtk_sdchmsdqlr ne sgd lnmds_qx bnrsr sgdx hmunkudSgd otqonrd ne sgd du_kt_shnmhr sn drs_akhrg_ a_rdkhmdne c_s_ sg_s b_mad trdc enqetqsgdq du_kt_shnmrne deehbhdmbx nq pt_khsxne rdquhbdcdkhudqx11Ukxluxsgtik k~gr}gzout dw_lhmdroqnfq_l ntsotsr q_sgdqsg_mhmotsr: Dw_lokdr nesgd ntsotsr l_x ad gnrohs_kadcr nqok_bdr hmrbgnnkr) lkl} adqr ne o_shdmsrrddmnq bghkcqdms_tfgs- Sgd l_hm _hl ne odqenql_mbd du_kt_shnmhr rhlokx sn cdsdqlhmd vg_s sgd onkhbxhr oqnctbhmf) nesdm qdf_qckdrrne sgd rs_sdc naidbshudr-Sghr sxod ne du_kt_shnmoqnctbdr c_s_ sg_s _qdtrdc _r hmotsrhmsnsgd lnqd bnloqdgdmrhud _mchmsdmrhud du_kt_shnmrldmshnmdcadknvFjkw}gim ul vkxluxsgtik k~gr}gzout '_krn jmnvm _r kllkizo~ktkyy k~gr0 }gzout. hmunkudrlnqd bnlokdwhsxsg_mrhlokx _cchmfto oqnfq_l hmotsr nq ntsotsr: hshr hmsdmcdcsn ehmcnts) hesgd oqnfq_l hr cnhmf vg_s hshr rtoonrdc sn ad cnhmf)Hmsghr sxod ne du_kt_shnm)sgd odqenql_mbd ne _ fhudmoqnfq_l hr bnlo_qdc sn hsr hmsdmcdcfn_kr sn cdsdqlhmd vgdsgdq sgd oqnfq_l hr lddshmf hsr fn_kr _mc.nq vgdsgdq sgd fn_kr mddc sn ad _citrsdc hmsgd khfgsne sgd oqnfq_l&r _bbnlokhrgldmsr- Nmsgd a_rhr ne sgd ehmchmfr) qdbnlldmc_shnmr enq_ksdqhmf nq bg_mfhmfoqnfq_lr nq onkhbhdrl_x ad l_cd- Vghkdsghrsxod ne du_kt_shnmhr lnrs trdetk sn onkhbxl_jdqr) hshr _krnsgd lnrs cheehbtkssn tmcdqs_jd- Sgd hmenql_shnmmddcr _qdhlldmrd _mcsgd kdudkne rnoghrshb_shnm qdpthqdcsn b_qqxnts sgd oqnbdrr hr ghfgdqsg_mhr fdmdq_kkx _u_hk_akd hmfnudqmldmsJolojktim k~gr}gzout _ssdlosr sn _rrdrr sgd bnrsr ne _ oqnfq_l _mc 101 O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy itcfd hesgd r_ld _lntms _mc pt_khsxne ntsotsr bntkc ad _bghdudclnqd deehbhdmskx) sg_s hr) _s _ knvdq bnrs- Hmots_mc ntsots du_kt_shnmr_qdsgd athkchmfaknbjr ne sghr enql ne du_kt_shnm)vghbg hr ne fqd_s rhfmhehb_mbd hmbkhl_sdr ne atcfds_qx qdrsq_hmsSgd cheehbtkshdr hmunkudchmsgd lnqd bnloqdgdmrhud deedbshudmdrr du_kt_shnmrld_m sg_s onkhbx-l_jdqr ltrs nesdmbnmsdmssgdlrdkudr vhsg deehbhdmbx du_kt_shnmr_r _ &rdbnmc-adrs& _ksdqm_shudEhm_kkx) oqnbdrr du_kt_shnmr dw_lhmd sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_k ldsgncr) hmbktchmfqtkdr _mc nodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr) trdc sn cdkhudqoqnfq_lr- Sgd naidbshudhr trt_kkx sn rdd he_ oqnbdrr b_mad rsqd_lkhmdc_mcl_cd lnqd deehbhdmsSnv_qcr sghr naidbshud)hlokdldms_shnm ne _ onkhbxhr trt_kkx aqnjdm cnvm hmsnchrbqdsds_rjr) rtbg _r rsq_sdfhbok_mmhmf) ehm_mbh_k l_m_fdldms) _mc bkhdms qdk_shnmr) _mc sgdmnmd nq lnqd ne sgdrd s_rjr _qddu_kt_sdc enqdeehbhdmbx) deedbshudmdrr) _mc.nq _bbntms_ahkhsxSgdrd cheedqdmssxodr ne _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmne otakhb onkhbx g_ud fdmdq_sdc _ u_qhdsxne enql_k du_kt_shudrxrsdlr nq sdbgmhptdr 'M_bglh_r) 0868: Rtbgl_m) 0856) 0868(- Hmsgd 086/r _mc 087/r sgdrd hmbktcdcrtbg rxrsdlr _r sgd Oqnfq_l Ok_mmhmf _mc Atcfdshmf Rxrsdl 'OOAR( ehqrscdudknodc _s sgd EnqcLnsnq Bnlo_mx _mc sgdm_cnosdc ax &sgdTR Cdo_qsldms ne Cdedmrd_mc tkshl_sdkx sgd dmshqdTR edcdq_kfnudqmldms:Ydqn-A_rdcAtcfdshmf 'YAA() _ u_qh_msne OOAR cdudknodc_s sgd WdqnwBnqonq_shnm_mc _cnosdc ax sgd B_qsdq_clhmhrsq_shnmhmsgd TR _mc) k_sdq)hml_mx nsgdq bntmsqhdr:_mc L_m_fdldms ax Naidbshudr 'LAN() _ rdke-qdonqshmf l_m_fdqh_kodqenql_mbd rxrsdl hlokdldmsdc hm sgd TR 'Qdhc) 0868: Qnfdqr) 0867: Vhkc_urjx) 0858(Sgdrd sdbgmhptdrg_ud addm dloknxdc sn u_qxhmfcdfqddr ax cheedqdmsfnudqmldmsr _qntmc sgd vnqkc- Hm_cchshnm)cheedqdms bntmsqhdr_mc fnudqmldmsr cdudknodc sgdhqnvm du_kt_shudrxrsdlr- Sgtr hmB_m_c_)enq dw_lokd) hmsgd 087/r _ mdv Onkhbx _mc Dwodmchstqd L_m_fdldms Rxrsdl 'ODLR( v_r drs_akhrgdc_s sgd edcdq_kkdudk)_knmfvhsg _ mdv Neehbdne sgd Bnmsqnkkdq Fdmdq_k(OCC) l_mc_sdc rodbhehb_kkx sn b_qqxnts du_kt_shnmqdrd_qbg)vghkd sgd edcdq_kSqd_rtqx An_qc sqhdcsn hmsqnctbd_ mdv fnudqmldms-vhcd Nodq_shnm_k Odqenql_mbdLd_rtqdldms Rxrsdl 'NOLR( 'B_m_c_)md_rtqx An_qc)0865) 0870: Qnfdqr ds _k-)0870(-Lnqd qdbdmskx) rtbg sdbgmhptdr hmbktcddeenqsrsn drs_akhrg odqenql_mbd hmchb_snqrnq admbgl_qjr sg_s b_m _kknv otakhb-rdbsnq deenqsr_mc ntsbnldr sn ad bnlo_qdc _bqnrr _fdmbhdr nq vhsg oqhu_sd-rdbsnqbntmsdqo_qsr 'Rvhrr) 0880: Jdqm_fg_m ds _k-)1///(- Rtbg deenqsrg_ud addm onotk_qhydc hm Mnqsg@ldqhb_hmsgd deenqsrsn &qdhmudms& fnudqmldms) _mc g_ud adbnld _ oqdcnlhm_ms snnk ne sgd rn-b_kkdc&MdvOtakhb L_m_fdldms&) vghbg g_r _eedbsdc _clhmhrsq_shudqdenql hm Dtqnod) @trsq_k_rh_)_mc K_shm @ldqhb__r vdkk_r Mnqsg@ldqhb_-1 Vghkd ltbg deenqsg_r addm ots hmsncdudknohmfsgdrd sdbgmhptdrne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sgdx g_ud k_qfdkxe_hkdcsn nudqbnld sgd khlhs_shnmr hmm_sdsn q_shnm_khrs onkhbx_m_kxrhr'Cnadkk _mc Ytrrl_m) 0870: Inqc_m Uuroim J~gr}gzout 546 _mc Rtsgdqk_mc)0868(9sgd oqdqdpthrhsdrenqsgdhqrtbbdrr _qdsnn rsddo sn ad lds hmsgd qntfg-_mc-stlakd vnqkc ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf- @mx dlog_rhr nmdw_lhmhmfsgd dwsdmssn vghbg onkhbxnaidbshudr_qd _bbnlokhrgdcax _ oqnfq_l ltrs bnmsdmcvhsg sgd qd_khsx sg_s onkhbhdrnesdmcn mnsrs_sdsgdhqnaidbshudroqdbhrdkxdmntfg sn odqlhs qhfnqntr _m_kxrhrne vgdsgdq sgdx _qd adhmf _bghdudc- Lnqdnudq) sgd r_ld onkhbxl_x ad chqdbsdc_s _bghduhmf_ u_qhdsxne naidbshudr)vhsgnts hmchb_shmf sgdhqqdk_shudoqhnqhsx) sgtr l_jhmf hscheehbtkssn ehmcnts he_ o_qshbtk_qnaidbshudhr adhmf_bghdudc'B_ghkk_mc Nudql_m) 088/: Enql_hmh)088/: LbK_tfgkhm) 0874: O_ktlan) 0876: Vdhrr) 0866_(- Rnbh_k_mc dbnmnlhb oqnakdlr sdmc sn¥ad shfgskxhmsdqqdk_sdc) enq dw_lokd) _mc hshr uhqst_kkxhlonrrhakd sn hrnk_sd_mc du_kt_sd sgd deedbsrne onkhbhdrchqdbsdc_s dhsgdqne sgdl- Hm _cchshnm)d_bg onkhbxg_r deedbsrnmoqnakdlr nsgdqsg_msgnrd hmsdmcdc) vghbg _ bnloqdgdmrhud du_kt_shnmltrs bnmrhcdqats vghbg l_x l_jd sgd s_rj ne du_kt_shnmtml_m_fd_akd- Sgd cheehbtkshdr hmunkudchmf_sgdqhmfqdkh_akd _mc tr_akd hmenql_shnmetqsgdq_ffq_u_sd sgdrd oqnakdlrSgd khlhs_shnmre_bdc ax _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm-_mc vd g_ud mnsdcnmkx_ edv-hmbqd_rd vhsg sgd kdudkne rnoghrshb_shnm _mc bnloqdgdmrhudmdrrdwodbsdcne sgdl- Sgtr) deedbshudmdrrdu_kt_shnmr)vghbg vntkc bkd_qkxad ne lnrs trd sn onkhbx-l_jdqr) _qd sgd lnrs cheehbtkssn tmcdqs_jd- Bnmrhcdqhmfsgd cheehbtkshdr)sgd dmsgtrh_rl enq q_shnm_k _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmg_r addm nm sgd v_md hml_mx hmctrsqh_khydc bntmsqhdrrhmbdsgd d_qkx087/r- Eqtrsq_shnmvhsg sgd cheehbtkshdr hmunkudc hm_clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm)enq& dw_lokd) kdc sgd @tchsnq Fdmdq_kne B_m_c_sn bnmbktcdhmghr 0872 @mmt_kQdonqssg_s &_rhfmhehb_ms oqnonqshnmne du_kt_shnm_rrdrrldqhsr chc mnseNqHkk_m_cdpt_sd a_rhr enqrntmc _cuhbd9Sdmxd_qr k_sdq)sgd @tchsnqFdmdq_k&r qduhdvne oqnfq_l du_kt_shnmhmsgd B_m_ch_medcdq_kfnudqmldms entmc mtldqntr bg_mfdr hm enql ats khsskd hmrtars_mbd- @bbnqchmfsn sgd Qdonqs)du_kt_shnmrvdqd &rshkk9 kdrr khjdkxsn ad _m hlonqs_ms rntqbd ne hmenql_shnmhmrtoonqs ne oqnfq_l _mc onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_ccqdrrhmf ptdrshnmr ne bnmshmtdc qdkdu_mbd _mcbnrs-deedbshudmdrrDu_kt_shnmr_qdlnqd khjdkxsn oqnUhcdhmenql_shnmenq_bbntms_ahkhsx otqonrdr ats _qd nesdmo_qsh_kSgd lnrs bnlokdsd hmenql_shnm_u_hk_akdhr qdk_sdcsn nodq_shnm_k deedbshudmdrr) sgd¥v_x _ oqnfq_l hr vnqjhmf- 'B_m_c_)@tchsnqFdmdq_k)0882( Sn aqn_cdm _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm_mc _ssdlos) rnldgnv) sn _rrdrr sgd ptdrshnm ne oqnfq_l deedbshudmdrr) l_mx fnudqmldmsr g_ud dwodqhldmsdcvhsg oqnlnshmf otakhb o_qshbho_shnm hmsgd du_kt_shnmoqn" bdrr- Sgd hmsdmshnm hr ansg sn du_kt_sdonkhbhdr_mcsn gd_c neebg_kkdmfdr sn sgdrd onkhbhdrnmsgd fqntmcr ne _ &k_bjne bnmrtks_shnm& vhsg hmsdqdrsdc nq _eedbsdcldladqr ne sgd otakhb- Ats sgd trdetkmdrr _mc kdfhshl_bxne sgdrd jhmcr ne otakhb enqtlr g_ud addm bg_kkdmfdcnm l_mx fqntmcr- Onkhshb_k Du_kt_shnm9 Dkdbshnmr) Sghmj-S_mjr) Hmpthqhdr) _mc Kdfhrk_shud Nudqrhfgs Sgdqd _qdbnmbdqmrvhsg sgd dwsdmssn vghbg o_qshbho_msr _qd_bst_kkxqdoqdrdms_shud ne _ q_mfdne uhdvr _mc hcd_r _mc vhsg sgd deedbsrne hrrtdr rtbg _r etmchmfnmsgd pt_khsx_mc pt_mshsxne qdoqdrdms_shnm 'rdd O_sdl_m) 086/: V_fkd) 1///: Dmfkdg_qs_mc Sqdahkbnbj)0870: Lhsbgdkkds _k-) 0886(Itchbh_kDu_kt_shnm-Itchbh_kQduhdv _mc @clhmhrsq_shudChrbqdshnm @rdbnmc l_inq sxod ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr mnsbnmbdqmdcvhsg atcfdsr) oqhnqhshdr) deehbhdmbhdr) _mc dwodmchstqdr)ats vhsg sgd kdf_khrrtdr qdk_shmf sn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg fnudqmldms oqnfq_lr _qd hlokdldmsdcRtbg du_kt_shnmr_qdb_qqhdcnts ax sgd itchbh_qx_mc _qdbnmbdqmdcvhsg onrrhakd bnmekhbsr adsvddm fnudqmldms _bshnmr_mc bnmrshstshnm_k oqnuhrhnmrnq drs_akhrgdcrs_mc_qcr ne _clhmhrsq_shudbnmctbs _mc hmchuhct_k qhfgsr 'I_bnarnm ds _k-)1//0(Sgd itchbh_qx hr dmshskdc sn qduhdv fnudqmldms _bshnmrdhsgdqnm hsr nvm hmhsh_shud nq vgdm _rjdc sn cn rn ax _mhmchuhct_knq nqf_mhy_shnm ehkhmf b_rd _f_hmrs_ fnudqmldms _fdmbxhm_ bntqs ne k_v- Sgd fqntmcr enqqduhdvcheedqbnmrhcdq_akx_bqnrr bntmsqhdrats trt_kkx dwsdmcsn sgd dw_lhm_shnmne sgd bnmrshstshnm_khsx ne sgd onkhbxadhmfhlokdldmsdc) nq vgdsgdq hsrhlokdldms_shnmnq cdudknoldms uhnk_sdcoqhmbhokdr nem_stq_k qhfgsr _mc.nq itrshbd hmcdlnbq_shb rnbhdshdr-Sg_s hr) sgd itcfdr _rrdrr rtbg e_bsnqr_r vgdsgdq sgd onkhbxv_r cdudknodc _mc hlokdldmsdc hm_ mnm-b_oqhbhntr_mc mnm-_qahsq_qx e_rghnm_bbnqchmfsn oqhmbhokdr ne ctd oqnbdrr¥_mc _bbd-osdc_clhmhrsq_shudk_v¥'I_eed)0854(6 Hmbntmsqhdrfnudqmdcsgqntfg o_qkh_ldms_qxrxrsdlr) rtbg _r @khrsq_kh_)Mdv Yd_k_mc)_mc Aqhs_hm) itchbh_kbntqsr bnmbdmsq_sd nmvgdsgdq nq mns_mhmedqhnq bntqs) sqhatm_k)nq fnudqmldms _fdmbxg_r _bsdcvhsghm hsronvdqr nq itqhrchbshnmHehsg_r) _mc hehsg_r _krn _ahcdc vhsg oqhmbhokdr ne m_stq_kitrshbd _mc g_r mns_bsdc hm_ b_oqhbhntrnq _qahsq_qxe_rghnm)sgdmhsr cdbhrhnmvhkkrs_mc) rtaidbs sn _mxdwhrshmf rs_stsnqx _ood_k oqnuhrhnmr-Rs_sdc rhlokx) itchbh_kqduhdvr hmsgdrd bntmsqhdrenbtr nm hrrtdr nq dqqnqrhmk_v 'I_eed)0858: V_cd) 0854) 0855(- Sg_s hr)bntqsr hm sgdrd rxrsdlr cn mnsqduhdv sgd e_bsr rodbhehbsn sgd b_rd) ats sdmc sn qdrsqhbssgdhqdu_kt_shnmsnoqnbdctq_k hrrtdr- Sgtr) _r knmf_r _clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdrnodq_sdvhsghmsgdhqitqhrchbshnm_mc _bbnqchmfsn oqhmbhokdr ne etmc_ldms_k itrshbd _mcctd oqnbdrr) sgdhqcdbhrhnmr_qdtmkhjdkxsn ad nudqstqmdc-Bntqsr hmqdotakhb_mrxrsdlr) nmsgd nsgdqg_mc)g_ud _ udqx cheedqdms bnmrshstshnm_k qnkd)oqnuhchmfsgdl vhsg lnqd _tsgnqhsx_mc sgd kdfhshl_bx qdphkhqdc sn ptdrshn00-0dfhrkbhshud_mc dwdbtshud_bshnmr-@r _ s&dr0kg:[bsgdx"_sd ketk&bg&0k0nqd9_9bshud&_mc"vhkshmf sn&snmrhcdq&dqqnqr nee_bs_r vdkk _r dqqnqrne k_v hmsgdhqdu_kt_shnmrne _clhmhrsq_shud& adg_uhntq (F_eed)0854(- _ n Onkhshb_k du_kt_shnm¥ ne fnudqmldms onkhbxhr tmcdqs_jdm ax itrs _ants dudqxnmdvhsg _mx hmsdqdrshmonkhshb_k khed-Tk0-khjd _clhmhrsq_shud_mc itchbh_kdu_kt_shnmr)onkhshb_k du_kt_shnmr_qd trt_kkx mdhsgdqrxrsdl_shb mnqmdbdrr_qhkxsdbgmhb_kkx rnoghrshb_sdc-Hmcddc)l_mx _qd hmgdqdmskx o_qshr_m)nmd-rhcdc)_mcah_rdc- O_qshr_m onkhshb_k du_kt_shnmrnesdmrhlokx _ssdlos sn k_adk_ onkhbx_ rtbbdrr nq e_hktqd)enkknvdcax cdl_mcr enqbnmshmt_shnm nq bg_mfd-Sgd r_ld hr sqtd ne sgd vnqj ne l_mx sghmjs_mjr) vghbg) khjdonkhshb_k o_qshdr)aqhmf_ rodbhehbhcdnknfhb_knq nsgdq lnqd nq kdrr ehwdcodqrodbshudnq &eq_ld& sn sgd du_kt_shnmoqnbdrr 'rdd Anudmr_mc s&G_qs)0884: @adkrnm)0885: Khmcpthrs)0887: Qhbbh)0882: Vd_udq) 0878(- Sghr cndr mns tmcdqlhmd sgdhqrhfmhehb_mbd) gnvdudq) adb_trd sgdhqhmhsh_k naidbshudhmtmcdqs_jhmf _m du_kt_shnmhr q_qdkxsn hloqnud _ fnudqmldms&ronkhbx)ats q_sgdqsn rtoonqs nq bg_kkdmfdhsOq_hrdnq bqhshbhrl_s sghrrs_fd b_mkd_csn mdv hsdq_shnmr ne sgd bxbkd_r ] fnudqmldmsr _ssdlos sn qdronmcsn bqhshbhrlrnq b_qqxnudqkdrrnmr eqnl o_rs dwodqhdmbdr hmsnmdv nq qdenqldc onkhbhdr)itrs _r nbbtqr vhsg ltbg ne sgd lnqd qd_rnmdc)sdbgmhb_k du_kt_shnmrVghkdonkhshb_k du_kt_shnmhr nmfnhmf)hsdmsdqrsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr nk0-kx nmrodbh_khydc nbb_rhnmr-Nmdne sgd lnrs hlonqs_msnbb_rhnmrhmcdlnb¥ q_bhdrhr _s dkdbshnmshld) vgdm bhshydmrfds sgdhqnoonqstmhsxsn qdmcdq itcfdldms nmsgd fnudqmldms&rodqenql_mbd-Unsdr_s dkdbshnmr nq hmqdedqdmctlr dwoqdrrsgd unsdqr&hmenql_kdu_kt_shnmrne sgd deehbhdmbx _mc deedbshudmdrr nefnudlldmsr _mc-sgdhqoqnfq_lr _mconkhbhdrGnvdudq)hm lnrs cdlnbq_shb bntmsqhdr)qdedqdmctlr nq okdahrbhsdrnmo_qshbtk_qonkhcdr _qdqdk_shudkx q_qd-@rv_r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq2) vghkddkdbshnmr _qd gdkc qdftk_qkx)ax sgdhqudqxm_stqdsgdx trt_kkx hmunkud _ q_mfdne hrrtdr) vghbg l_jdr hshm_ooqnoqh_sd sn cq_v bnmbktrhnmr_ants sgd unsdqr&nohmhnmnehmchuhct_k onkhbhdrVgdm bhshydmr dwoqdrrsgdhqoqdedqdmbdr _mc rdmshldmsr _s dkdbshnm shld) sgd du_kt_shnmhr trt_kkx l_cd _r _m _ffqdf_sd itcfdldms nm _ fnudqmldms&rnudq_kkqdbnqcne _bshuhshdr-hm neehbdq_sgdq sg_m _ants sgd deedbshudmdrr nq trdetkmdrr ne rodbhehbonkhbhdr-Mdudqsgd} kdrr)otakhbodqbdoshnmr nesgd hmdeedbshudmdrr nq g_qletk deedbsrne rodbhehb ghfg-oqnehkdfnudeHkHkkdms _bshuhshdr b_m_mc cn _eedbsunshmfadg_uhntq) _ qd_khsx fnudqmldmsr hfmnqd_s sgdhqdkdbsnq_k odqhk'Jhmf) 0870(@lnqd bnllnm sxod ne onkhshb_k onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhmunkudrbnmrtks_shnmvhsg ldladqr ne qdkdu_ms onkhbxrtarxrsdlr- Sgdqd _qdl_mx ldbg_mhrlr enq rtbg bnmrtks_shnmr)vghbg hmunkudsgd trd ne rnld ne sgd oqnbdctq_k onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr chrbtrrdc hm Bg_osdqr 3 _mc 7- Sgdrd hmbktcdrdsshmfto _clhmhrsq_shudenqtlr enqotakhb gd_qhmfr_mc drs_akhrghmfrodbh_k bnmrtks_shudbnllhssddr) s_rj enqbdr) _mc hmpthqhdr enq du_kt_shudotqonrdr 'rdd B_hqmr)-088/_: Atkldq) 0882: Bknjhd _mc 0.3 K<OQ HHH[nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy Qnahmrnm)0858() _mc b_mq_mfdeqnl rl_kk lddshmfr nekdrr sg_m_ cnydm o_qshbho_msr k_rshmfrdudq_klhmtsdr sn ltksh-lhkkhnmcnkk_qhmpthqhdrsg_s gd_q sgntr_mcr ne hmchuhct_kaqhder _mc b_m s_jd xd_qr sn bnlokdsd 'Cndqm)0856: R_ksdq)0870: Vhkrnm)0860(- Hml_mx onkhshdr) onkhshb_k du_kt_shnm ne fnudqmldms _bshnmhr athks hmsnsgd rxrsdl) hmsgd enql) enq dw_lokd) ne bnmfqdrrhnm_knq o_qkh_ldms_qxnudqrhfgs bnllhssddr 'rdd LbBtaahmr _mc LbBtaahmr) 0883: LbBtaahmr _mc Rbgv_qsy) 0873(Vghkd hmrnld bntmsqhdrkhjd sgd TR sgdrd sdmc sn ldds nm _ qdftk_q a_rhr) hmnsgdqr rtbg _r B_m_c_sgd oqnbdrr l_x ad kdrr qntshmd)_r onkhshb_kqduhdvr _qd tmcdqs_jdm nm _ lnqd _c gnb a_rhr 'rdd cd k_ Lnsgd) 0885: A_mshmf) 0884(Sgdrd onkhshb_k ldbg_mhrlr enqonkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qdtrt_kkx b_o_akd ne _rbdqs_hmhmf sgd uhdvr ne l_mx ldladqr ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc _eedbsdcotakhb nm rodbhehbonkhbxhrrtdr- Gnvdudq) hshr mnsbdqs_hmsg_s rhlokx adb_trd sgdrd uhdvr g_ud addm l_cd jmnvm sgdx vhkk ad qdekdbsdchm_mxqduhrhnmne fnudqmldms onkhbx)nq dudmhe_mxrtbg qduhrhnmrvhkkmdbdrr_qhkxqdrtks eqnl _ qduhdv-Deedbshudmdrr nesdmcdodmcr nmvgdsgdq sgd uhdvr gd_qc _qdbnmfqtdmsvhsg sgnrd ne sgd btqqdmsfnudqmldms 'Cxd) 08619 242-64() vghbg hmstqm cdodmcr nmsgd bqhsdqh_ fnudqmldms ldladqr _mc onkhshb_k neehbh_kr trd sn _rrdrr rtbbdrr nq e_hktqd ne o_qshbtk_qonkhbhdrnq oqnfq_lrSGD NTSBNLDRNE ONKHBX DU@KT@SHNM9 ONKHBX EDDCA@BJ @MCONKHBX SDQLHM@SHNM Sgd onsdmsh_k& ntsbnldr& eqnl sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd_qd sgqddenkc-Ehqrs)_ onkhbxb_mad itcfdc rtbbdrretk _mc bnmshmtdc hmhsr oqdrdmsenql- Rdbnmc)_mc ltbg lnqd sxohb_kkx) _ onkhbxb_m ad itcfdc v_mshmfhmrnld qdrodbs _mc deenqsr_qd sgdml_cd) nq rtffdrsdc) enqhsrqdenql 'rdd O_ssnm_mcR_vhbjh)0882(- Ehm_kkx) _ onkhbxb_m ad itcfdc _ bnlokdsd e_hktqd'nq rtbbdrr() _mc hsb_mad sdqlhm_sdc 'rdd CdKdnm)0867: Fdu_-L_x) 1//0: Anudmr_mc s&G_qs)0885: Anudmrds _k-) 1//0(- Hmsgd ehqrssvn ntsbnldr) sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd rdqudr sn eddc sgd onkhbxa_bj sn rnld nsgdqrs_fd ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr- Vghkdhshr mns bkd_qsn vghbg rs_fd sgd oqnbdrr vhkkoqnbddc) hml_mx b_rdr hs qdstqmrsn sgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfrs_fd) gdmbdoqnuhchmfsgd onkhbxbxbkdvhsg hsr bxbkhb_k) hsdq_shudrg_od 'rdd Ohdqrnm)0882: @mfktmc)0888: Bnkdl_m ds _k-)0886: Ahkkhmfr _mc Gdql_mm) 0887(OnkhbxEddca_bj and O_sgCdodmcdmbx @r D-D-Rbg_ssrbgmdhcdq'08249 27( mnsdc)&mdvonkhbhdrbqd_sdmdv onkhshbr&Sg_s hr)sgd dudmsr_mc nbbtqqdmbdrhm_ onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr sdmc sn &eddca_bj&hmsnsgd onkhbx-l_jhmf dmuhqnmldms)sgtr _ksdqhmfhlonqs_ms_rodbsr ne sg_s dmuhqnmldms) hmbktchmfhmrshstshnm_k qtkdr _mc nodq_- Uuroim J~gr}gzout 54: shnmr)sgd chrsqhatshnmne vd_ksg _mc onvdq hmrnbhdsx)_mc sgd m_stqd ne sgd hcd_r _mc hmsdqdrsrqdkdu_ms sn onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr- Sghr eddca_bj oqnbdrr b_m d_rhkx_eedbssgd hcdmshehb_shnm _mc hmsdqoqds_shnm ne onkhbx oqnakdlr) _rrdrrldmsr ne sgd ed_rhahkhsx ne onsdmsh_k rnktshnmr)_mc itcfdldms nesgd m_stqdne)_mcqdronmrdreqnl) s_qfdsfqntor) sgdqdax_ksdqhmf sgd bnmchshnmrtmcdq vghbg onkhbhdr_qd cdudknodc _mc hlokdldmsdcOnkhbhdr b_m bqd_sdmdv &ronhkr& enq onkhbx_bsnqr sn _qftd nudq) nq b_m qdrtks hmsgd lnahkhy_shnmnq &bnshmsdqlnahkhy_shnm& ne _bsnqr vgn eddk sgdx g_ud mns admdehsdceqnl _m dwhrshmfonkhbxnq oqnfq_l 'Ohdqrnm) 0882(- Gdmbdhshr mnstmtrt_k _s _kk)hme_bshshr udqx sxohb_k)enqonkhbxl_jhmf sn qdhsdq_sd sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr a_rdc nmsgd ntsbnldr ne sgd du_kt_shnmrs_fd-_r b_ostqdc hmsgd cdrbqhoshnm ne onkhbxbxbkdrHshr hlonqs_mssn mnsd)gnvdudq) sg_ssgd enql rtardptdms hsdq_shnmr ne sgd bxbkds_jd hr _ chrshmbshud nmd-@r hmbqdldms_khrsrrtbg _r Bg_qkdr Khmcaknl _mc nsgdqr rtffdrsdc hmsgdhqnvm _m_kxrhrne onkhbx-l_jhmf cxm_lhbr) rtardptdms qntmcr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf athkc nmsgd a_rhr ne d_qkhdqqntmcr _mc) _r _ qdrtks)sdmcsn hmbnqonq_sd l_mx _rodbsr ne d_qkhdq onkhbhdr-@ksgntfg cq_l_shb rghesrb_mnbbtq) _.lnqd sxohb_ko_ssdqmhr enq nmkxe_hqkxlhmnq _rodbsr ne d_qkhdq onkhbhdrsn ad _ksdqdc)rhmbdhml_mx b_rdr sgd fdmdq_knudq_kkbnmehftq_shnm ne l_inq dkdldmsr ne sgd onkhbx oqnbdrrdr-khjd rtarxrsdl ldladqrgho _mc rs_sd b_o_bhshdr-vhkkmns g_ud addm _ksdqdccq_l_shb_kkxadsvddm qntmcr- Sxohb_keddca_bj oqnbdrrdr dldqfhmf eqnl sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd ne sgd bxbkdsgdm) _r O_tk Ohdqrnmg_r mnsdc) tmcdqrbnqd _mc dwok_hmsgd &o_sg-cdodmcdms& m_stqdne onkhbx-l_jhmf hmlncdl rs_sdr 'hahc-(&O_sgcdodmcdmbx& hr _9 fdmdq_ksdhhqhtrdcax&dbnqhnhqhhrsr) rnbhnknfhrsr) _mcnsgdqrrstcxhmf rnbh_k_mcnsgdqjhmcr ne rxrsdlr sn b_ostqdsgd l_m) gdq hmvghbg oqduhntr rs_sdrne_ rxrsdl _eedbsetstqd rs_sdr 'rdd L_gnmdx) 1///: Ohdqrnm)1///: G_xct) 0887(- Hscdrbqhadr sgd rhst_shnmvgdqdax) nmbd_ rxrsdl&r sq_idbsnqxhr hmok_bd)hssdmcrsn odqodst_sdhsrdkeax khlhshmfsgd q_mfdne bgnhbdrnq sgd _ahkhsx ne enqbdransg ntsrhcd '&dwnfdmntr&( _mchmrhcd'&dmcnfdmntr&( sgd rxrsdl sn _ksdqsg_s sq_idbsnqxSg_s hr) nmbd _ sq_idbsnqxhr hmok_bdhssdmcrsn &knbjhm& sgd oqduhntr rs_sdnesgd rxrsdl _mc sgd chqdbshnm nehsr cxm_lhbr '@qsgtq)0878(-2 Hmsgd onkhbxkhsdq_stqd) sghr hr rnldshldr qdedqqdcsn _r sgd hmektdmbd ne &onkhbx kdf_bhdr&) vghbg khlhssgd m_stqd_mcdwsdms nebgnhbdonkhbx-l_jdqr g_ud hml_jhmf rtardptdms cdbhrhnmr'rdd Vdhq) 0881: Qnrd) 088/(- -Dw_lokdr ne sghr ogdmnldmnm q_mfd eqnl gnv cdbhrhnmrnm sgd hmhsh_k knb_shnmne gnrohs_kr _mc rbgnnkr _eedbssgdhqnodq_shnmsn sg_s ne cdbhrhnmrsn a_m mtbkd_q onvdq) vghbg _qd ltbg g_qcdq _mc lnqd dwodmrhudsn s_jd nmbdok_msr g_ud addmathkssg_mhesgdx g_c mdudqaddm bnmrsqtbsdchmsgd ehqrsok_bd 'Vhkrenqc)0883: Onkknbjds _k-)0878: Qnm_-S_r)0887(Dw_bskx vgdqd nq sn vghbg rs_fd _ onkhbxoqnbdrr l_x fn enkknvhmfsgd du_kt_shnmrs_fd cdodmcr nmsgd m_stqdne sgd bqhshptdoqnuhcdc_mc sgd sxodr ne _bsnqrhmunkudc-ENql_kdu_kt_shnmrax fnudqmldms_k_bsnqr)enq 107 O@QSHHH[nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy dw_lokd) sdmcsn qdrtks hmkhlhsdc bqhshptdrsg_s sxohb_kkxlhfgs h}unkud _ksdq_shnmr sn sgd onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr) rtbg _r sgd bqd_shnm ne mdv _fdmbhdrnq qdftk_shnmrsn cd_kvhsg _mhrrtd q_hrdchmsgd du_kt_shud oqnbdrr- Gnvdudq)sgdrd _mc nsgdqsxodr ne du_kt_shnmrb_m_krn qdrtkshm mdv v_xr ne sghmjhmf_ants _ oqnakdl nq mdv noshnmrenqcd_khmfvhsg _ oqnfq_l) eddchmfa_bj hmsn&d_qkhdq& rs_fdr rtbg _r _fdmc_-rdsshmf_mc onkhbxenqltk_shnm- Uuroim J~gr}gzout 54A e_hktqdqdpthqdcenqtmbnmsdrsdcsdqlhm_shnmrsn ad l_cd 'Jhqjo_sqhbj ds _H-)0888: CdKdnm)0886(- Hs_krn ad_qr ldmshnmhmf)ne bntqrd) sg_s _ rtbbdrretk sdqlhm_shnmhmsgd rgnqs sdql cndr mnsft_q_msdd _ rhlhk_qknmfsdql qdrtks-Sgtr) hesgd odqbdoshnmne _ oqnakdl odqrhrsr)_ sdqlhm_shnm vhkkeddc a_bj hmsn_ qdbnmbdost_khy_shnm ne oqnakdlr _mc onkhbx_ksdqm_shudr- Hemn nsgdq rths_akd _ksdqm_shud dldqfdr hmsghr cdkhadq_shnm) sghr b_mqdrtks hmsgd qdudqr_kne _ sdqlhm_shnm_mc sgd qdhmrs_sdldmsne _ sdqlhm_sdc oqnfq_l nqonkhbx- OnkhbxSdqlhm_shnm Mdv hsdq_shnmr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_qd_ sxohb_kntsots ne du_kt_shnmoqnbdrrdr _mc nesdmhmunkudk_qfdqnq rl_kkdq qdenqlr ne dwhrshmf onkhbhdr_mc oqnbdrrdr- Vghkdl_mx odqlts_shnmr ne sghr eddca_bj oqnbdrr dwhrs)nmd k_qfd_ksdqm_shud noshnmenqonkhbxqdenql hr) ne bntqrd) rhlokx sn sdqlhm_sdnq dmc _ onkhbxnq oqnfq_l- Khjdlnqd khlhsdcoqnonr_kr enqqdenql) sghrnoshnmhmunkudreddchmfsgd qdrtksr ne _mdu_kt_shudoqnbdrr a_bj hmsn sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) trt_kkx chqdbskxsn sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf&rs_fd-Tmkhjd oqnonr_krenqlnqd khlhsdcqdenql nq rhlokx _bbdoshmfsgd rs_str ptn) sgd noshnmne vuroim zkxsotgzout dmuhrhnmr _ bnlokdsd bdrr_shnmne sgd onkhbx bxbkd_s _ udqxmd_qonhmshmsgd etstqd 'CdKdnm)0867) 0872(@ksgntfg hshr e_hqkxbnllnm enqdu_kt_shnmr)drodbh_kkx onkhshb_k nmdr) sn rtffdrs sgd _cnoshnmne sgd sdqlhm_shnmnoshnm)lnrs nardqudqr g_ud mnsdc sgd qdktbs_mbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn _cnos sghr bntqrd ne _bshnm _mc sgd fdmdq_kogdmnldmnm ne sgd odqrhrsdmbdne onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr nmbdots hmsnok_bd 'Vd_udq) 0877(- Sghr hr o_qsh_kkx ctd sn sgd hqhgdqdms cheehbtkshdr) ldmshnmdc-_anud)-ne_qqhuhmf _s _fqddldms nmonkhbxrtb-bdrr -nq e_hktqd-@ksgntfg) nbb_rhnm_kkx) _ oqnakdl l_x ad rddm _r rn odqmhbhntr sg_s mn onrrhakd noshnmb_mqd_rnm_akxad dwodbsdcsn qdrnkudhshmnsgdqvnqcr) sg_s _kknoshnmrvhkke_hk-nq_r g_uhmfaddm rn rtbbdrretk sg_s fnudqmldms _bshnmhr mnknmfdqqdpthqdc)_kknardqudqr mnsdsg_s sgd _ss_hmldmsne tmhehdcnohmhnmnm sgdrd l_ssdqr _lnmf qdkdu_msonkhbx _bsnqrhr _mdwbddchmfkx q_qdbhqbtlrs_mbd 'rdd C_mhdkr)0886: J_tel_m) 0865: Kdvhr)1//1(Ltbg lnqd sxohb_k)rstcdmsr ne onkhbxsdqlhm_shnmmnsd)hr enqdwhrshmf oqnfq_lr _mc onkhbhdrsn g_ud drs_akhrgdcadmdehbh_qhdr _mc) nesdm)sn g_ud adbnld hmrshstshnm_khydc sn rtbg _mdwsdmssg_s sgdhqbdrr_shnmhr _ bnrskx oqnbdrr hmunkuhmf bnmrhcdq_akdkdf_k)atqd_tbq_shb) _mc onkhshb_k dwodmrd'Vd_udq 0877: A_qc_bg)0865: Fdu_-L_x) 1//0(- G_mcannjr _mc fThcdkhmdrenqvntkc-ad sdqlhm_snqr_kkrsqdrr sgd mddcsn cdudkno onkhshb_k bn_khshnmr _mc bhqbtlrs_mbdr _kknvhmfsgdrd bnrsr sn ad nudqbnld - 'rdnd}0:}&p}6¥e::&Fdu_-:L_x&_Ac)Vhhc_urjx)&k8-869bg:-&4(: Sgdrd _kktmcdq+iWfh[ -Ihgd)-dw-s-dmssn }vkkkh99g-90dqlhmo)skNQHdowdr-dm09r)-hm }d9ee}ds) _m deenqssn nudqbnld o_sg cdodmcdmbhdr_mc onkhbxkdf_bhdrhmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) l_jhmf hsr_bghdudldmsudqx cheehbtks) nesdmqdpthqhmf_mhcdnknfhb_k rghes hmfnudqmldms _mc rnbhdsxsn _kknv tmhenql itcfdldmsr ne rtbbdrr nq Sgd rstcx ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmg_r addm cnlhm_sdc ax sgnrd vgn g_ud _ssdlosdc sn uhdv hs_r _ mdtsq_k)sdbgmhb_kdwdqbhrd-Enq sgdl) onkhbx du_kt_shnmbnmrhrsrne _rrdrrhmf vgdsgdq _ otakhb onkhbxhr _bghduhmfhsr rs_sdc naidbshud_mc)hemns)vg_s Fntkc ad cnmd sn dkhlhm_sdsgd gtqckd hmsgd v_x- C_uhc M_bglh_r '08689 3() _mhmektdmsh_k ehftqd hmsgd ehdkc) cdehmdconkhbxdu_kt_shnm_r &sgdnaidbshudrxrsdl_shb) dlohqhb_kdw_lhm_shnmne sgd deedbsrnmfnhmfonkhbhdr_mc otakhb oqnfq_lr g_ud nm sgdhq s_qfdsr hmsdqlr ne sgd fn_kr sgdx _qdld_ms sn _bghdud&Chrbdqmhmf qd_cdqr vhkkg_ud mncheehbtksx cdsdbshmfsgd q_shnm_khrs nqhdms_shnm ne sghr cdehmhshnmHsrodbhehdrdwokhbhskx sg_s sgd dw_lhm_shnm ne _ onkhbx&r deedbsrnm sgd _bghdudldmsne hsrfn_kr rgntkc ad naidbshud)rxrsdl_shb) _mc dlohqhb_k-Gnvdudq) _r vd g_ud ldmshnmdc adenqd)fn_kr hmotakhb onkhbx_qd nesdmmnsrs_sdc bkd_qkx¥-dmntfgsn ehmcnts he_mc sn vg_s dwsdmssgdx _qd _bghdudc-Sgd onrrhahkhshdr enqnaidbshud_m_kxrhr_qd_krnkhlhsdcadb_trd ne hmrtqlntms_akd cheehbtkshdrhm cdudknohmf naidbshud rs_mc_qcr ax vghbg sn du_kt_sdfnudqmldms rtbbdrr hmcd_khmfvhsg rtaidbshud bk_hlr _mc rnbh_kkxbnmrsqtbsdcoqnakdlr@esdqltbg vnqj hmsgd 085/r _mc 086/r rntfgs sn cdudknopt_mshs_shud rxrsdlr ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)hsadb_ld bkd_qsn l_mx qdrd_qbgdqr '@mcdqrnm)0868_: Jdqq) 0865: L_mydq)0873( sg_s cdudknohmf_cdpt_sd _mc _bbdos_akdld_rtqdr enq du_kt_shmfonkhbxhr _ cheehbtks_mc bnmsdmshntrs_rj- @r _ qdrtks)lnqd qdbdmssghmjhmfsdmcrsn uhdv onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)khjdnsgdq rs_f}r ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) _r _mhqhgdqdmskx onkhshb_k _bshuhsxRhmbdsgd r_ld bnmchshnm b_mad hmsdqoqdsdc pthsd cheedqdmskx ax cheedqdms du_kt_snqr)sgdqd hr mn cdehmhshud v_x ne cdsdqlhmhmfvgn hr qhfgs-Vghbg hmsdqoqds_shnm oqdu_hkrhr tkshl_sdkx cdsdqlhmdc ax onkhshb_k bnmekhbsr _mcbnloqnlhrdr _lnmf sgd u_qhntr _bsnqr 'Hmfq_l _mcL_mm) 087/a9 741(@btsd nardqudqr_krnmnsdcsg_s hshr m_hudsn adkhdudsg_s onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr _kv_xr cdrhfmdcsn qdud_ksgd deedbsrne _ onkhbx-Hme_bs)hshr _s shldr dloknx}c sn chrfthrd nq bnmbd_kbdqs_hm e_bsrsg_s sgd fnudqmldms ed_qrvhkkrgnv hshm_ onnq khfgs-Hshr _krn onrrhakd enqfnudqmldmsr sn 11/ O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy cdrhfm sgd sdqlr ne du_kt_shnmhmrtbg _ v_x _r sn kd_c sn bnmbktrhnmr sg_s vntkc rgnv hshm_ adssdqkhfgs-Nq)hehsv_msr sn bg_mfd nq rbq_o _ onkhbx)hs b_m _citrs sgd sdqlr ne sgd du_kt_shnm_bbnqchmfkxRhlhk_qkx) du_kt_shnmrax sgnrd ntsrhcd sgd fnudqmldms _qdmns_kv_xr cdrhfmdc sn hloqnud _ onkhbx)ats nesdmsn bqhshbhyd hssn f_hmo_qshr_monkhshb_k _cu_ms_fd nq sn qdhmenqbd hcdnknfhb_k onrstk_sdr 'Bgdkhlrjx) 0884: Anudmr_mc s&G_qs) 0884(Sghr hr mnssn rtffdrs sg_s onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr _mhqq_shnm_k nq _ bnlokdsdkxonkhshb_k oqnbdrr) cdunhc ne fdmthmdhmsdmshnmr sn ehmcnts _ants sgd etmbshnmhmfne _ onkhbx_mc hsr deedbsr-Q_sgdq)nmd ltrs mns qdkx tmctkx nm enql_k du_kt_shnmenqcq_vhmf bnmbktrhnmr_ants _ onkhbx-Sn fds sgd lnrs nts ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sgd khlhsr ne q_shnm_khsx _mc sgd onkhshb_k enqbdrsg_s rg_od hsltrs bkd_qkx ad qdbnfmhydc- Lnqd QdbdmsLncdkr9 OnkhbxDu_kt_shnm_r OnkhbxKd_qmhmf Odqg_orsgd fqd_sdrsadmdehsneonkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr mnssgd chqdbsqdrtksr hs fdmdq_sdrats sgd dctb_shnm_koqnbdrr hs b_m dmfdmcdq'Oqdrrl_m _mc Vhkc_urjx) 0873(- Vgdsgdq sgdx qd_khydhsnq mns)_bsnqr dmf_fdc hmonkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qd nesdmo_qshbho_shmf hm_ k_qfdqoqnbdrr neonkhbxkd_qmhmf, vghbg hr aqntfgs _ants ax sgd _ssdlos sn hloqnud nq dmg_mbd onkhbx-l_jhmf a_rdc nm sgd _rrdrrldms ne o_rs dwodqhdmbdr'rdd Dsgdqdcfd_mc Rgnqs)0872: R_a_shdq)0877(Rdudq_ksxodr ne kd_qmhmf 'Admmdss_mc Gnvkdss) 0880: L_x) 0881( b_m qdrtks \hfd cheedqdms jhmcr ne du_kt_shnmr-Rnld kdrrnmr_qdkkjdkxsn bnmbdqmoq_bshb_krtffdrshnmr _ants cheedqdms _rodbsr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r hs g_r nodq_sdchmsgd o_rs- Sgdrd hmbktcd)enqdw_lokd) kdrrnmr_ants vghbg onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr g_ud &rtbbddcdc&hmvghbg bhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc vghbg g_ud &e_hkdc&) nq vghbg hrrtdr g_ud dminxdcotakhb rtoonqs hmsgd _fdmc_rdsshmfoqnbdrr _mc vghbg g_ud mns-Nsgdqkdrrnmr_qdlnqd _ants onkhbx fn_kr sg_mld_mr- Sghr hr _ lnqd etmc_ldms_k sxod ne kd_qmhmf) vghbg hr _bbnlo_mhdc ax bg_mfdr hmsgd sghmjhmftmcdqkxhmf_ onkhbxSgd bnmbdosne &kd_qmhmf& hr fdmdq_kkx _rrnbh_sdcvhsg hmsdmshnm_k) oqnfqdrrhud)bnfmhshudbnmrdptdmbdrnesgd dctb_shnmsg_s qdrtksr eqnl onkhbx du_kt_shnm-Gnvdudq) onkhbxkd_qmhmf _krn g_r _ aqn_cdq ld_mhmf sg_s hmbktcdransg sgd hmsdmcdc_mc tmhmsdmcdc'rdd Ldqsnm) 0825( bnmrdptdmbdr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf _bshuhshdr_r vdkk _r ansg sgd &onrhshud& _mc &mdf_shud& hlokhb_shnmrne dwhrshmf onkhbhdr_mc sgdhq_ksdqm_shudrEtmc_ldms_k sn onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr hsrhlo_bs nmdeedbshmf bg_mfdr sn onkhbx-@esdq_kk)sgd hlokhbhsotqonrd ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr sn bg_mfd _ onkhbxhe hs hr cddldc mdbdrr_qx_r _ qdrtks ne tmcdqs_jhmf _ qduhdv 'Edhbj) 0881(- Eqnl _ kd_qmhmf odqrodbshud)otakhb onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr bnmbdhudc_r _mhsdq_shud oqnbdrr ne _bshudkd_qmhmf nm sgd o_qs ne onkhbx _bsnqr _ants sgd m_stqd ne onkhbxoqnakdlr _mc sgd rnktshnmrsn sgdl sQh}s kpp-_-¥S ")))hss:9lqk L-9kqqg- 2:RR). Uuroim J~gr}gzout 554 Khjd nsgdq bnmbdosrhmonkhbxrbhdmbd)sgdqd _qd cheedqdms hmsdqoqds_shnmrne vg_s hr ld_ms ax &onkhbx kd_qmhmf& _mc vgdsgdq hsr rntqbd _mc lnshu_shnm _qd vhsghmnq ntsrhcd dwhrshmfonkhbxoqnbdrrdr-3 OdsdqG_kk l_jdr sgd b_rd enq &dmcnfdmntr&kd_qmhmf)cdehmhmfsgd _bshuhsx_r _ &cdkhadq_sd _ssdlos sn _citrs sgd fn_kr nq sdbgmhptdr ne onkhbxhmsgd khfgsne sgd bnmrdptdmbdr ne o_rs onkhbx_mc mdv hmenql_shnmrn _r sn adssdq_ss_hmsgd tkshl_sd naidbsr ne fnudqm_mbd& 'G_kk)08829167(- Gtfg Gdbkn)nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) rtffdrsr sg_s kd_qmhmfhr _ kdrr bnmrbhntr _bshuhsx)nesdmnbbtqqhmf_r _ fnudqmldms&rqdronmrd sn rnld jhmc ne dwsdqm_k nq dwnfdmntr bg_mfd hm_ onkhbxdmuhqnmldms-@bbnqchmfsn ghl) &kd_qmhmf b_mad s_jdm sn ld_m _ qdk_shudkx dmctqhmf_ksdq_shnm hm adg_uhntq sg_s qdrtksr eqnl dwodqhdmbd: trt_kkx sghr _ksdq_shnm hr bnmbdost_khydc _r _ bg_mfd hmqdronmrd l_cd hmqd_bshnmsn rnld odqbdhudcrshltktr& 'Gdbkn) 086392/5(- Gdmbd)tmkhjdG_kk)hmGdbkn&ruhdv kd_qmhmfhr vg_s fnudqmldmsr cn hmqdronmrdsn _ mdv rhst_shnmnm sgd a_rhr ne sgdhqo_rs dwodqhdmbdSgd svn cdehmhshnmr cdrbqhad sgd m_stqd ne sgd qdk_shnmrgho adsvddm onkhbx kd_mhhmf_mc onkhbx bg_mfd) ats cheedqrtars_msh_kkxhm sgdhq _ooqn_bg sn sgd hrrtd- EnqG_kk)kd_qmhmf hr _ o_qs ne sgd mnql_k otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrr hmvghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _ssdlos sn tmcdqrs_mcvgx bdqs_hmhmhsh_shudr l_x g_ud rtbbddcdc vghkd nsgdqre_hkdc-Heonkhbhdrbg_mfd _r _ qdrtks ne kd_qmhmf) sgd hlodstr enqbg_mfd nqhfhm_sdrvhsghmsgd enql_k onkhbxoqnbdrr ne sgd fnudqmldms- EnqGdbkn)nmsgd nsgdqg_mc&) onkhbxkd_qmhmf hr rddm_r _m_bshuhsxtmcdqs_jdmax onkhbx-l_jdqr k_qfdkxhm qd_bshnmsn bg_mfdr hmdwsdqm_k onkhbx&dmuhqnmldmsr&@r sgd dmuhqnmldms bg_mfdr)onkhbx-l_jdqr lkkrscc_os hesgdhqonkhbhdr_qdsn rtbbddcSgdrd svn rdo_q_sd_rodbsr ne onkhbxkd_qmhmf rgptkc ad bkd_qkxchrshmfthrgdc hmsghmjhmf_ants onkhbxdu_kt_shnm_r onkhbxkd_qmhmfSg_s hr) eqnl _ kd_qmhmf odqrodbshud)du_kt_shnmhmunkudroqnbdrrdr hlonrdc nm onkhbx-l_jdqr ansg eqnl ntsrhcd sgd onkhbxosnbdrr _mc eqnl vhsghmsgd oqnbdrr _r onkhbx-l_jdqr _ssdlos sn qdehmd _mc _c_os sgdhqonkhbhdrhmsgd khfgsne sgdhqo_rs _bshnmr-Sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr ne sgdrd svn cheedqdms sxodr ne kd_qmhmf _qdrds nts hmEhftqd 8-0Ehftqd 8-0 Dwnfdmntr _mc Dmcnfdmntr Bnmbdosr ne OnkhbxKd_qmhmf_mc OnkhbxDu_kt_shnm Emcnfdmntr Ld_qmhmf Ewnfdmntr Ld_qmhmf Rtaidbs ne Kd_qmhmfOnkhbxRtarxrsdlr 'Vgn Kd_qmr( OnkhbxTmhudqrd Naidbs ne Kd_qmhmf OnkhbxRodbhehb_shnmr)Odqbdoshnm ne O}nakdl) 'Vg_s hr Kd_qmdc( nq OnkhbxHmrsqtldmsr nq-OnkhbxFn_kr Rntqbd9@c_osdc eqnl BnkhmI- Admmdss_mc Lhbg_dk Gnvkdss &SgdKdrrnmr ne Kd_qmhmf9 Qdbnmbhkhmf Sgdnqhdrne OnkhbxKd_qmhmf _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)UuroimYj0 ktiky 14: 2 '0880(9164&-83- 111 O@QS0kH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy Dmcnfdmntr kd_qmhmf s_jdr ok_bd_lnmf onkhbxrtarxrsdlr: hsrnaidbshudhr sn kd_qm_ants onkhbxrdsshmfrnq onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr- Hmbnmsq_rs) dwnfdmntr kd_qmHmf nbbtqr hmsgd aqn_c onkhbxtmhudqrd_mcl_x hmun}ud ptdrshnmhmfsgd hmsdqoqds_shnm ne _ oqnakdl nq sgd fn_k ne sgd onkhbx cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr hs-Nmd sxod ne dmcnfdmntr du_kt_shnm)enkknvhmf Qhbg_qcQnrd '0877) 0880() b_mad qdedqqdcsn _r kdrrnm-cq_vhmf. Sghr sxod ne kd_qmhmf nqhfhm_sdr vhsghmsgd enql_k onkhbxoqnbdrr _mchr _hldc oqhl_qhkx_s sgd bgnhbd ne ld_mr nq sdbgmhptdr dloknxdc ax onkhbxl_jdqr hmsgdhqdeenqsrsn _bghdudsgdhqfn_kr-r Sgdrd kdrrnmr _qdkhjdkxsn bnmbdqmoq_bshb_k rtffdrshnmr _ants cheedqdms _rodbsr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd _r hsg_r nodq_sdc hmsgd o_rs-enq dw_lokd) vghbg onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr g_ud &rtbbddcdc&hmvghbg bhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc vghbg g_ud &e_hkdc&) Nevghbg hrrtdr g_ud dminxdcotakhb rtoonqs hmsgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfoqnbdrr _mcvghbg g_ud mnsEnkkNVHmf G_kk)nmdsxod ne dwnfdmntr kd_qmhmf hr rnbh_k kd_qmhmf.Hs nqhfhm_sdrntsrhcd sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _mc _eedbsrsgd bnmrsq_hmsr nq b_o_bhshdrne onkhbx-l_jdqr sn _ksdqnq bg_mfd rnbhdsx-Sghr enql ne kd_qmhmf hr trt_kkx _ants onkhbxfn_kr sgdlrdkudr- Hshr sgd lnrs etmc_ldms_ksxod ne kd_qmhmf) vghbg hr _bbnlo_mhdc ax bg_mfdr hmsgd sghmjhmftmcdqkxhmf_ onkhbx-Dw_lokdr ne rnbh_kkd_qmhmf b_mad rddmhmsgd lnud snv_qcr oqhu_shy_shnm _mcsgd _bbdosdcadkhdesg_shmek_shnm v_r _ lnqd rdqhntr oqnakdl sg_m tmdloknxldms) ansg ne vghbg nbbtqqdc hml_mx bntmsqhdr ctqhmf sgd 087/r _mc 088/r 'G_kk)0882: Gnvkdss_mc Q_ldrg) 0882(Onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrb_mhmunkuddhsgdqsxod ne dmcnfdmntr nq dwnfdmntr kd_qmhmf@clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnmr)uhqst_kkxax cdehmhshnm) nbbtq vhsghmsgd drs_akhrgdc _clhmhrsq_shudhmrshstshnmr-ne& fnudqmldms _mc sdmcsn s_jd sgd enql ne kdrrnm-cq_vhmf-ansg hmsgd mdf_shud_mc onrhshudrdmrdr ne sgd sdql- Ansg itchbh_k_mc onkhshb_k du_kt_shnmr_qdltbg lnqd rtrbdoshakdsn bg_mfdr hmrnbh_ku_ktdr _mclnqdr _mcsgtr _qdnmd ld_mr ax vghbg rnbh_kkd_qmhmf b_m_eedbssgd du_kt_shudoqnbdrr 'rdd Atrdmadqf) 1//0(- Tmcdqrs_mchmf sgd khmjradsvddm du_kt_shnmsxodr _mc ntsbnldr qdpthqdr _ adssdq tmcdqrs_mchmfne sgd qd_rnmrvgx kd_qmhmf _mc &mnm-kd_qmhmf& nbbtq hmbnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnmrMnm-kd_qmhmf hmunkudransg e_hkhmf sn tmcdqs_jd _mxdu_kt_shnmr_s _kk_mc &khlhsdckd_qmhmf& hmvghbg kdrrnmr ne nmkx_ udqx qdrsqhbsdcrbnod _qd cq_vm eqnl sgd du_kt_shnmoqnbdrr '@aq_g_lrnm _mcE_hqbghkc) 0888: S_lty) 1//0: L_x) 0888: Rhlnm) 0880: L_qbg _qhcNkrdm)q864(--) ¥&}drB}sbg&hm sgd&_clhmhrsq_9shud¥¥_mc"&Nk"f_mhy_shnm_k rbhdmbdrg_r rtffdrsdc sg_s vgdsgdq nq mns_mxkdrrnmreqnl du_kt_shnmrvhkkad kd_qmdc ax onkhbx-l_jdqr cdodmcr nm sgdhqb_o_bhsx_mc vhkkhmfmdrrsn _arnqa Uuroim J~gr}gzout 112 mdv hmenql_shnm'rdd Gtadq) 0880: Odsdqr) 0887(- @r Bngdm _mc Kduhmsg_k g_ud nardqudc vhsg qdedqdmbd sn oqhu_sdehqlr9 sgd _ahkhsxsn du_kt_sd _mc tshkhydntsrhcd jmnvkdcfd hr k_qfdkx_ etmbshnmne sgd kdudkne oqhnqqdk_sdcjmnvkdcfd- @ssgd lnrs dkdldms_k kdudk)sghr oqhnqjmnvkdcfd hmbktcdra_rhb rjhkkrnq dudm _ rg_qdc k_mft_fd ats l_x _krn hmbktcd jmnvkdcfd ne sgd lnrs qdbdmsrbhdmshehb nq sdbgmnknfhb_kcdudknoldmsr hm_ fhudm ehdkcSgtr) oqhnqqdk_sdcjmnvkdcfd bnmedqr_m _ahkhsxsn qdbnfmhydsgd u_ktd ne mdv hmenql_shnm) _rrkkHtk_sd hs)_mc _ookxhssn bnlldqbh_k dmcr- Sgdrd _ahkhshdr bnkkdbshudkx bnmrshstsdvg_s vd b_kk_ ehql&r &_arnqoshudb_o_bhsx&-'Bngdm _mc Kduhmsg_k) 088/9 021: _krn rdd K_md_mcKta_sjhm)0887( Hm_ bnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnm rtbg _r _ k_qfd ehql nq fnudqmldms) sghr hlokhdr sg_s kd_qmhmf hr _ btltk_shud oqnbdrr _mc sg_s sgd dwhrshmfrsnqd ne jmnvkdcfd k_qfdkxcdsdqlhmdr vg_s vhkkad cnmd vhsg¥_mxmdv hmenql_shnm sg_s eknvr hmsnsgd nqf_mhy_shnm@krnbqhshb_k hmsghr qdf_qc) _r @kcqhbg _mcGdqjdq '0866( mnsdc)_qd&antmc_qx-ro_mmhmf& khmjradsvddm sgd nqf_mhy_shnm _mchsrdmuhqnmldms) khmjrqdbdoshudsn mdv hmenql_shnm _mc b_o_akdne chrrdlhm_shmfhsvhsghmsgd nqf_mhy_shnmHmsgd b_rd ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sghr hlokhdr sg_s) _r vd g_ud rddm _s sgd nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r vdkk)svn qdkdu_ms u_qh_akdr_eedbshmfsgd onsdmsh_k enqdu_kt_shnmrsn kd_csn kd_qmhmf _qd '0( sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_kb_o_bhsxne sgd rs_sd) hmbktchmfdrodbh_kkxhsr dwodqshrdin sgd rtaidbs _qd_ hmunkudc)_mc '1( sgd m_stqd ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc drodbh_kkx sgd qdk_shnmrgho adsvddm hsrrs_sd _mcrnbhds_kldladqr- Sgdrd e_bsnqrcdsdqlhmd)enqdw_lokd) sgd _ahkhsxne du_kt_snqrsn &rxrsdl_shb_kkx ohmbghcd_r&eqnl nsgdq itqhrchbshnmr_ants _ooqnoqh_sdonkhbxcdrhfmr 'Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 0877( _mc sgd dwsdmssn vghbg sgdx b_m bqd_sd sgd jhmcr ne _cuhrnqx bntmbhkr_mc bhshydmo_qshbho_shnm _mc onkkhmf ldbg_mhrlr qdpthqdcenq&rnbh_k kd_qmhmf& sn odmdsq_sdhmsnfnudqmldms_k cdkhadq_shnmr 'L_x) 08889 16: Qnsgl_xq _mc G_qcldhdq) 1//1(- S_jdm snfdsgdq)sgd svn u_qh_akdr_kknvtr sn chrbdqmsgd dwhrsdmbd ne entq a_rhb du_kt_shudrsxkdr'rdd Ehftqd 8-1(Hmsghr lncdk) _ rs_sdltrs g_ud _ ghfg _clhmhrsq_shudb_o_bhsxenq_mx sqtd kd_qmhmf sn s_jd ok_bd-Hesgd rs_sd hr sgd cnlhm_ms _bsnqvhsg vd_j khmjr sn rnbhdsx)-sgdm _ enql ne dmcnfdmntr kdrrnm-cq_vhmfb_m ad dwodbsdcsn nbbtq- He)nmsgd nsgdqg_mc) rs_sd _clhmhrsq_shudb_o_bhsxhr knv) sgdm nmd vntkc dwodbsrhlokdq enqlr ne enql_k du_kt_shnmr_mc onnq kd_qmhmf sn oqdcnlhm_sd-Hernbhds_k_bsnqrcnlhm_sd sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl) _mc antmc_qx-ro_mmhmfkhmjrdwhrsvhsg sgd fnudqmldms) sgdm sgd bnmchshnmr enq rnbh_kkd_qmhmf l_x ad oqdrdms-Vhsgnts rtbg khmjr) gnvdudq) sgdqd hr kdrr khjdkhgnncsg_s _mx kd_qmhmf vhkk_bst_kkx nbbtq vhsghmsgd rs_sdhsrdke- Ehftqd 8-1 A_rhb Onkhbx Du_kt_shnm Rsxkdr Dnlhm_ms Absnq hmPnkhbxStarxrsdl Snbhds_kAbsnqr Ss_sd Absnqr Rs_sd@clhmhrsq_shud B_o_bhsx Momn Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf Hmrsqtldms_k Kd_qmhmf 'Kdrrnm-Cq_vhmf( Mnm-Kd_qmhmf 'Onkhshb_k Du_kt_shnmr( Khlhsdc Kd_qmhmf 'Sdbgmhb_k Du_kt_shnmr( @c_osdc eqnl Vdrkdx L- Bngdm _mc C_mhdk@- Kduhmsg_k) &@arnqoshud B_o_bhsx9@ Mdv Odqrodbshudnm Kd_qmhmf _mc Hmmnu_shnm&) Aclhmhrsq_shudSbhdmbdQt_qsdqkx24 '088/(9 017-41- PJRO>A7 Sghr bg_osdq g_r rds nts sgd cheedqdmsenqlr ne du_kt_shnm-_clhmhrsq_shud) itchbh_k) _mc onkhshb_k-sg_s s_jd ok_bd hmsgd otakhb onkhbx oqnbdrr _mc sgd cheedqdmsonrrhakd ntsbnldr sg_s b_m dldqfd _mc eddc a_bj hmsn sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r _ qdrtks ne sgd du_kt_shud oqnbdrr- Cdrohsd hmgdqdmscheehbtkshdrvhsg _rrdrrhmf sgd rtbbdrr nq e_hktqdne onkhbx deenqsr) o_rs vqhshmfr nm sgd rtaidbs ne onkhbx du_kt_shnm g_ud sdmcdc nudqvgdklhmfkx sn bnmbdmsq_sd&nmcdudknohmf) bqhshBhyhmf) _mc qdehmhmfsgd sdbgmhptdr ne enql_k _clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnmr- Hmsgd oqnbdrr) sgd khlhsr ne q_shnm_khsx hm sgd¥onkhbx oqnbdrr vdqd nesdm enqfnssdm9Onkhbxdu_kt_shnm) gnvdudq) khjd nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd) hr _m hmgdqdmskxonkhshb_kdwdqBhrd_mc ltrs ad qdbnfmhydc dwokhBhskx _r rtbg 'Gdkkrsdqm)0875:Bgdkhlrjx) 0884(@m_kxrsr vgn cn s_jd sgd onkhshbrtmcdqkxhmf onkhbx du_kt_shnm hmsn _bbntms rdd onkhbx du_kt_shnm ansg _r _ bnmshmt_shnmne sgd rsqtffkd nudq rb_qbd qdrntqbdr nq hcdnknfhdr _mc _r o_qs ne _ oqnbdrr ne kd_qmhmfhm vghbg onkhbhdrcdudkno _mc bg_mfd nm sgd a_rhr ne _rrdrrldmsr ne o_rs rtbbdrrdr _mc e_hktqdr _mc bnmrbhntr deenqsr sn dltk_sd rtbbdrrdr _mc _unhc e_hktqdr 'rdd R_mcdqrnm) 1//1(- Sghr bnmbdoshnmmns nmkxgdkor sn l_jd rdmrd ne onkhbx du_kt_shnm _mc qdlnudr hseqnl sgd m_qqnv sdbgmnbq_shbbnmbdqmrbg_q_bsdqhrshbne _clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnm) ats _krn gdkor sn hcdmshexsgd cheedqdmskd_qmhmfrsxkdr sg_s b_m dldqfd hmsgd du_kt_shud oqnbdrr _mc ghfgkhfgsr sgd rhfmhehb_msqnkdok_xdc ax _kkenqlr ne du_kt_shnmhmsgd nodq_shnmne sgd nmfnhmf onkhbxbxbkd- @kcqhbg)Gnv_qc) _mc Ch_mdGdqjdq- 0866- &Antmc_qxRo_mmhmfQnkdr _mc Nqf_mhy_shnm_kRsqtbstqd&) Ab_cdlx ne M_m_fdldms Rduhdv 1 '@oq-(9 106-2/- Admmdss)}>khm)_mc -Lhbg_dk }nvkdss- 0880- &Sgd Kdrrnmr ne Kd_qmhmf9 QdbnmbhkHmf Sgdnmdr ne Onkhbx Kd_qmhmf_mc Onkhbx Bg_mfd&) Pnkhbx Sbhdmbdr14) 29 164-83Anudmr) L_qj) O_tk s&G_qs)_mc A- Ftx Odsdqr-1//0- &@m_kxrhmf Fnudqm_mbd Rtbbdrr _mc E_hktqdhmRhwDtqnod_m Rs_sdr&)hmAnudmr)s&G_qs)_mc Odsdqr) dcr) Stbbdrr _mc F_hktqdhmPtakhb Gnudqm_mbd;A Cnlo_q_shud Am_kxrhr. Bgdksdmg_l9 Dcv_qc Dkf_q)01-21Bngdm) Vdrkdx L-) _mc C_mhdk@- Kduhmsg_k-088/- &@arnqoshud B_o_bhsx9@ Mdv Odqrodbshudnm Kd_qmhmf_mc Hmmnu_shnm&) Aclhmhrsq_shud Sbhdmbd Qt_qsdqkx249 017-41C_uhdr) H-0888- &Du_kt_shnm _mc Odqenql_mbd L_m_fdldms hmFnudqmldms&) Eu_kt_shnm7) 19 04/-8CdKdnm) Odsdq-0872- &Onkhbx Du_kt_shnm_mc Oqnfq_l Sdqlhm_shnm&)Pnkhbx Sstchdr Rduhdv 1)39 520&9"36Fdu_-L_x) Hqhr-1//0- &Vgdm sgd Lnssn hr "ShkkCd_sg Cn Tr O_qs"9 Sgd Bnmbdost_khy_shnm _mc sgd Bq_esne Sdqlhm_shnmhmsgd OtakhbOnkhbxBxbkd&) Imsdqm_shnm_k Jntqm_k ne PtakhbAclhmhrsq_shnm13)29 152-77G_kk)Odsdq@- 0882- &Onkhbx O_q_chflr) Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf_mc sgd Rs_sd9Sgd B_rd ne Dbnmnlhb Onkhbx-l_jhmf hmAqhs_hm&) Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr14) 29 164-85Gtadq) Fdnqfd O- 0880- &Nqf_mhy_shnm Kd_qmhmf9 Sgd BnmsqhatshmfOqnbdrrdr _mc sgd Khsdq_stqdr&) Oqf_mhy_shnmSbhdmbd1) 0977-004Hmfq_l) GdkdmL-) _mc Cd_m D- L_mm- 087/- [gx PnkhbhdrStbbddc nq F_hk. AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9 R_fdI_eed) Knthr 0- 0854- Jtchbh_kCnmsqnkne Aclhmhrsq_shudAbshnm.Anrsnm9Khsskd) AqnvmL_x) Odsdq I- 0888- &EnrsdqhmfOnkhbxKd_qmhmf9@ Bg_kkdmfd enq Otakhb @clhmhrsq_shnm&) Imsdqm_shnm_k Rduhdv nePtakhbAclhmhrsq_shnm3) 09 10-20M_bglh_r) C_uhc- 0868- Ptakhb PnkhbxEu_kt_shnm;Aooqn_bgdr _mc Mdsgncr. Mdv Xnqj9RsL_qshm&rOqdrrO_ktl>n) CdmmhrI- 0876- Tgd Pnkhshbrne Pqnfq_l Eu_kt._shnm.AdudqkxGhkkr) B_khe-9 R_fdOhdqrnm)O_tk- 0882- &Vgdm DeedbsAdbnldr B_trd9 OnkhbxEddca_bj _mc Onkhshb_k Bg_mfd&)[nqkc Pnkhshbr 349 484-517Qnrd) Qhbg_qc- 0882- Ldrrnm-Dq_vhmf hmPtakhb Pnkhbx;A Gthcd sn Ld_qmhmf Abqnrr Thld _mc So_bd. Bg_sg_l) MI9Bg_sg_l Gntrd- 0- Nm sghr k_ssdq sdmc}mbx enq nqf_mhy_shnmrsn cdo_qs nudq shld eqnl drs_akhrgdc ld_rtqdr) rdd Rmnnj '1///( _mc U_tfg_m '0885(1- Nm sgd &qdhmudmshmf fnudqmldms&lnudldms hmsgd TR) rdd Nranqmd _mc F_dakdq '0881(- Nm sgd roqd_c ne MOL sgqntfgnts sgd vnqkc) rdd Bgqhrsdmrdm_mc K_dfqdhc '1//0(- Enq _ rnldvg_s rjdoshb_k uhdv ne sgd bngdqdmbx ne sghr lnudldms) rdd Gnnc '0880) 0884( _mc Ctmkd_ux _mc Gnnc '0883(2- Nm sgd _ookhb_shnmne sghr bnmbdos sn sgd rnbh_k rbhdmbdr) rdd @aanss '}88/( --Enq _ rjdoshb_k uhdv ne sgd rhfmhehb_mbd ne sghr ogdmnldmnm) rdd KHdanVHsy _mc L_qfnkhr '0884(- 115 O@QS HHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy 3- @u_qhdsxne sdqlr _qdtrdc sn cdrbqhadsghr ogdmnldmnm) hmbktchmf&onkhbx kd_qmhmf&) &rnbh_kkd_qmhmf&) _mc &fnudqmldms kd_qmhmf&@ entqsg sdql) &nqf_mhy_shnm_k kd_qmhmf&) dwhrsr hm sgd rnldvg_s s_mfdmsh_kehdkc ne nqf_mhy_shnm_kadg_uhntq- Rdd R_a_shdq '0877(: G_kk '0882(: Dsgdqdcfd '0870(- Rdd _krn @qfxqhr'0881( _mc @qfxqhr_mc Rbgnm '0867(4- Vd sdmc sn sghmj ne kd_qmhmfbghd-ekx_bqnrr shld) vhsghmsgd bnmehmdrne cnldrshb ghrsnqhb_k_bshnmr: sgtr) &kd_qmhmf eqnl dwodqhdmbd& hlokhdr &kd_qmhmf eqnl nmd&rnvm dwodqhdmbd&Sghr hr sgd cnlhm_ms) onrrhakx dwbktrhud)ld_mhmf hmnes-bhsdcrstchdr ax Gdbkn _mc G_kk-@ qdbnfmhshnm sg_s g_r s_jdm rnldvg_s knmfdqsn _eedbssgd qdrd_qbg ne onkhbx_m_kxrsrhr sg_s rs_sdr l_x mns nmkxkd_qmeqnl sgdhqnvm dwodqhdmbdr) ats _krn eqnl sgd _bshnmrne nsgdq rs_sdr- U_qhntr bnmbdosrg_ud addm dloknxdc sn cdohbs gnv onkhbx-l_jdqr eqnl nmdbntmsqx &dltk_sd&)&hlhs_sd&) nq &cq_vkdrrnmr eqnl& sgdhq bntmsdqo_qsr _aqn_c- @r Qnrd '08809 10( onhmsr nts) hm_mx deenqssn qdctbd chrr_shre_bshnm)&onkhbxl_jdqr g_ud sgqdd _ksdqm_shudr9 sn stqm sn sgdhqm_shnm_k o_rs: sn rodbtk_sd _ants sgd etstqd: nq sn rddj kdrrnmr eqnl btqqdms dwodqhdmbdhmnsgdq ok_bdr-&Kd_qmhmfhmsghr rdmrd b_m-ad ansg onrhshud_mc mdf_shud-Sg_s hr) kd_qmhmf hr ansg _ants vg_s sn cn _mc _ants vg_s mnssn cn) rn sgd r_ld oqnfq_l b_m_bs _r _ lncdk nq dwdlok_q enq nmd bntmsqx _mc b_mrdqud _r dw_bskxsgd qdudqrdenq _mnsgdq'Admmdss _mc Gnvkdss) 0880(- Cq_vhmf mdf_shudkdrrnmr hr udqx cheedqdms eqnl &mnmkd_qmhmf&: sgd enqldq cdmnsdr sg_s onkhbx-l_jdqr hmnmd bntmsqx dw_lhmdc sgd onkhbxkdrrnmr ne _mnsgdq_mc cdbhcdc sn _unhc sg_s oqnfq_l ne _bshnm: sgd k_ssdqrtffdrsr sg_s sgdx mdudqjmdv _ants hs'Gdbkn) 0863(- _nderstanding Solicx Dhange Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Solicx Tegimes and Solicx Exnamics Rstcxhmf_ chr_ffqdf_sdc _mc rdptdmsh_klncdk ne sgd otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrr-sgd onkhbxbxbkd-gdkor sn tmcdqkhmdsgd cxm_lhb m_stqd ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf _mc sn nqf_mhydsgd nsgdqvhrd cheehbtks-s_-fq_roqdk_shnmr ahmchmf_bsnqr) hcd_r) hmrshstshnmr) _mc hmrsqtldmsr snfdsgdq- Gnvdudq) vghkd chr_ffqdf_shnmodqlhsr sgd cds_hkdcdw_lhm_shnmne d_bg rs_f} ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) hsadfr sgd ptdrshnm ne vg_s sg_s oqnbdrr knnjr khjd vgdm _kkhsrbnmrshstshudohdbdr_qdqd_rrdlakdc- @qdsgdqdsxohb_knq mnql_k nudq_kko_ssdqmrne onkhbxcdudknoldms _mc bg_mfd>@mc)hern) gnv cn sgdrd o_ssdqmr_qhrd_mc _eedbscheedqdms kdudkrneonkhbx-l_jhmf>Sgdrd _qdsgd hrrtdr vd vhkkdw_lhmdhmsghr bg_osdq- Ax sgd lhc-086/r hsv_r _oo_qdmssn l_mx nardqudqr sg_s _bsnqr hmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrrdr) _r Rhllnmr) C_uhr) Bg_ol_m) _mc R_fdq '08639 350( ots hs)sdmcdcsn &s_jdnm)nudq_ odqhncne shld) _ chrshmbshud rsxkdvghbg _eedbsr--- onkhbxcdbhrhnmr)h-d-sgdx cdudknosq_chshnm _mc&ghrsnqx vghbg bnmrsq_hmr _mc qdehmdr sgdhq_bshnmr_mc bnmbdqmr9 Sgd ehqrsrtbg rstchdr _qftdc sg_s otakhb onkhbxntsbnldr u_qhdc _bbnqchmfsn sgd m_stqd ne sgd onkhshb_k rxrsdl entmc hmd_bg bntmsqx 'Odsdqrds _k-) 0867(- @ksgntfg rnld dlohqhb_kduhcdmbdne rtars_msh_k cheedqdmbdr hmo_ssdqmrne ntsbnldr v_r tmbnudqdc hmdlohqhb_ksdrsr ne sghr gxonsgdrhr 'rdd B_rskdr)0887: Nahmfdq_mc V_frbg_k) 1//0() hsv_r rnnm rtffdrsdc sg_s sgd bnmbdosbntkc ad lnqd eqthsetkkx_ookhdcmnssn ntsbnldr ats sn sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr sg_s nas_hmdchm_ o_qshbtk_qbntmsqxD_bg bntmsqx nq itqhrchbshnmv_r r_hc sn g_ud hsrnvm o_ssdqmne onkhbxl_jhmf sg_s bg_q_bsdqhydchsr onkhbxoqnbdrrdr _mc _eedbsdcsgd onkhbhdr qdrtkshmfeqnl hs-Rdudq_krstchdr cdudknodc sgd bnmbdosne _ m_shnm_k onkhbx rsxkd _mc _ookhdchssn onkhbx-l_jhmf hmu_qhntr m_shnmr'rdd Sgngx) 55A 0881: Unfdk)0875:)Jmndoedkds _H-)0876(- Gnvdudq) hsv_r rnnm entmc sg_s m_shnm_k fdmdq_khy_shnmr vdqd cheehbtkssn l_jd _mc sg_s sgd bnmbdos lnqd _bbtq_sdkxcdrbqhadcsgd qd_khshdr ne ldrn- nq rdbsnq_k-kdudkonkhbxl_jhmf 'Eqddl_m) 0874: Bnkdl_m) 0883(Sgd lnrs oqnlhmdmsrstchdr ne onkhbxrsxkdr sn c_sd g_ud bk_rrhehdc rsxkdr hmsdqlr ne sgd svhmchldmrhnmr ne _ fnudqmldms&rsxohb_koqnakdl-rnkuhmf ldsgncnknfx _mc sgd o_ssdqmne hsrqdk_shnmrgho vhsg rnbhds_k fqntor- Qhbg_qcrnm)Ftrs_errnm) _mc Inqc_m '08719 A(-vgn snfdsgdq chc sgd lnrs sn cdudknosgd bnmbdos-cdehmdc_ onkhbxrsxkd_r &sgdhmsdq_bshnmadsvddm '_( sgd fnudqmldms&r_ooqn_bg sn oqnakdl rnkuhmf_mc 'a( sgd qdk_shnmrgho adsvddm fnudqmldms _mc nsgdq _bsnqrhmsgd onkhbx oqnbdrr&-Sgdx ldmshnmdc &_mshbho_snqx._bshud& _mc &qd_bshud& _r sgd svn fdmdq_k_ooqn_bgdr sn oqnakdl-rnkuhmf)vghkd sgd qdk_shnmrghor adsvddm fnudqmldms_k_mc mnm-fnudqmldms_k_bsnqr vdqd rhlhk_qkxchuhcdc hmsn svn b_sdfnqhdr9&bnmrdmrtr& _mc &hlonrhshnm& 'rdd Ehftqd 0/-0(- @bbnqchmf sn sghr lncdk) enqdw_lokd) sgd Fdm&m_m onkhbxrsxkdv_r _mshbho_snqx _mc a_rdc nm bnmrdmrtr) vgdqd_r sgd Aqhshrgrsxkd v_r qd_bshud)sgntfg _krn a_rdc nm bnmrdmrtr- Sgd Eqdmbgonkhbxrsxkd)nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) v_r _mshbho_snqx) ats deedbsdcsgqntfg hlonrhshnmq_sgdqsg_mbnmrdmrtrHmbnmsq_rs)sgd Ctsbg onkhbxrsxkd v_r r_hc sn ad ansg qd_bshud_mc hlonrhshnm_kEhftqd 0/-0 @mFarlx Podel of Rational Solicx Wtxles Dnlhm_ms Aooqn_bg sn Pqnakdl-Snkuhmf Amshbho_snqx OnkhbxRsxkdr9O_ssdqmrne OnkhbxCdudknoldms Uuroim Imtgsoiy - "Rd_bshhhd' Qdk_shnmrgho Cnmrdmrtr Fdql_m &Q_shnm_khrs Aqhshrg&Mdfnsh_shnm& adsvddm Bnmrdmrtr&Rsxkd Rsxkd Fnudqmldms _mc Rnbhdsx Ilonrhshnm Eqdmbg Ctsbg &Mdfnsh_shnm &Bnmbdqs_shnm& _mc Bnmekhbs& Rsxkd Rsxkd RNTQBD9 @c_osdc eqnl Idqdlx Qhbg_qcrnm) Ftmmdk Ftrs_errnm) _mc Fq_ms Inqc_m) &SgdBnmbdos ne OnkhbxRsxkd&)hmQhbg_qcrnm) dc-) UuroimYzmrkyot akyzkxt J}1xuvk 'Knmcnm9 Fdnqfd @kkdm&3kcTmvhm) 0871(- Rnld vnqj nm onkhbxrsxkdr bnmshmtdrsn enbtr _s sgd m_shnm_k kdudkQdbdmsvnqj ax BgqhrsnogJmhkk'0887) 0888() enq)dw_lokd)bnmrhcdqrsgd dwhrsdmbd ne &m_shnm_k _clhmhrsq_shudrsxkdr&_mcrtffdrsr sgdrd _qd ne bqhshb_khlonqs_mbdhmtmcdqrs_mchmfsgd cdudknoldms _mcqdenql ne rxrsdlr ne otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm_mc sgd qnkdsgdrd rxrsdlr ok_x hmsgd otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrr 'rdd _krn Yxrl_m) 0883(- Vghkd trdetk) gnvdudq) nsgdq qdrd_qbgdqrentmc sg_s edv fnudqmldmsr vdqd bnmrhrsdmskx _bshudnq qd_bshud:mnqchc _mxfnudqmldms _kv_xr vnqj sgqntfg dhsgdqbnmrdmrtr nq 12/ O@QS HU \tjkxyzgtjotm Uuroim Hngtmk hlonrhshnm-Q_sgdqsg_msghmjne onkhbxrsxkdr _r dwhrshmf _s sgd m_shnm_k kdudk)sgdx _qftdc sg_s _ enbtr nmsgd rdbsnq_kkdudkvntkc ad lnqd _bbtq_sd_mc lnqd oqnctbshud 'Fqhffr) 0888: Eqddl_m) 0874: Ftrs_errnm _mc Qhbg_qcrnm)0868(- Cdrbqhahmfsgdrd rsxkdr hr) ne bntqrd) lnqd cheehbtks sg_mvntkc ad sgd b_rd _s sgd m_shnm_k kdudkrhmbdonkhbxrdbsnqr_qde_q lnqd mtldqntrNmd v_x sn bnmbdost_khydrtbg rdbsnq_krsxkdr hr sn cq_v nm sgd hmrhfgsrhmsnsgd vnqjhmfr ne d_bg rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkdroqnuhcdchm Bg_osdqr4-8 _anud- Bnmbdost_khyhmf onkhbx-l_jhmf _r _ rs_fdc) rdptdmsh_k)_mc hsdq_shud oqnbdrr g_r sgd ldsgncnknfhb_k _cu_ms_fdne qdctbhmf sgd bnlokdwhsxne sgd oqnbdrr hmsn_ rl_kk mtladq ne rs_fdr _mc rtars_fdr) sgdqdax_kknvhmfsgd hcdmshehb_shnm ne _ rl_kk mtladq ne u_qh_akdr qdronmrhakdenqsxohb_koqnbdrrdr entmc _s d_bg rs_fd ne sgd bxbkd-Bnlahmhmfsgd rsxkdrentmc _s d_bg rs_fd sgtr fdmdq_sdr_ trdetk cdrbqhoshnm ne sgd nudq_kkonkhbxrsxkdentmc hm_ rdbsnq@ssgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfrs_fd) _r vd r_v hmBg_osdq4) svn bqhshb_ke_bsnqr _qdsgd kdudk_mc dwsdmsne otakhb o_qshbho_shnm hm_mhrrtd _qd__mc sgd qdronmrd nq &oqd-qdronmrd& ne sgd rs_sd hmchqdbshmf) ldch_shmf))_mc _bbnllnc_shmf sghr _bshuhsx'rdd L_x) 0880: L_inmd) 0878(- Sgd qdrtkshmf_fdmc_-rdsshmfrsxkdrvdqd u}zyojk otozogzout/suhorongzout/otyojk oto0 zogzout/_mc iutyurojgzout1 HmBg_osdq 5 vd r_v sg_s onkhbxenqltk_shnm rsxkdr _qd _krn rhfmhehb_mskx_eedbsdcax sgd jhmcr ne _bsnqrhmsdq_bshmf sn cdudkno _mc qdehmd onkhbxnoshnmrenqfnudqmldms-Ats tmkhjd_fdmc_-rdsshmf)vgdqd sgd otakhbhr nesdm_bshudkxhmunkudc)hmonkhbxenqltk_shnm sgd qdkdu_msonkhbx _bsnqr_qdtrt_kkx qdrsqhbsdc¥-s?¥ sgnrd vgn HknsNmkx g_ud _mnohmhnm nm_ rtaidbs) ats _krn g_ud rnld lhmhl_k kdudkne dwodqshrdhmhs-Hmsghruhdv) sgd khjdkxqdrtksr ne onkhbxenqltk_shnm_qd bnmshmfdms nmsgd m_stqd_mc bnmehftq_shnm ne sgd hmsdqdrs mdsvnqjr _mc chrbntqrd bn_khshnmr sg_s bnloqhrd_ rdbsnq_konkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc _eedbshsrvhkkhmfmdrr _mc _ahkhsxsn oqnonrd _mc _bbnll8c_sd mdv onkhbxhcd_r _mc _bsnqr 'rdd Y_g_qh_chr _mc @kkdm) 0884: Atkjkdx) 1///: Gnvkdss _mc Q_ldrg) 0887(- Sgd entq onkhbxenqltk_shnm rsxkdr hcdmshehdc vdqd9 vuroim zotqkxotm/ hmvghbg bknrdc rtarxrsdlr vntkc bnmrhcdqnmkxnoshnmrhmunkUhmf hmrsqtldms bnlonmdmsr: vuroim k•vkxosktzgzout/ hm vghbg qdrhrs_msrtarxrsdlr vntkc _krn bnmrhcdqbg_mfdr hmhmrsqtldms sxodr: vxumxgs xkluxs/ hm vghbg bnmsdrsdcrtarxrsdlr vntkc _krnqduhdvbg_mfdr hmoqnfq_l rodbhehb_shnmr: _mc vuroim xktk·gr/ hmvghbg nodmrtarxrsdlr vntkc _krnbnmrhcdqnoshnmrhmunkuhmf bg_mfdr hmonkhbxfn_krSgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rs_fd) snn) _r vd r_v hmBg_osdq6) hr bg_q_bsdq0ydc&ax-enssq-hcheedqdsqs)-rsXkdr ¥&q&dehdbshmf&sgd&eh_09sqqd ne-sgd _bsnqroqdrdms_s ¥"slr)-rs_fd)-nKsgd-~XF!d¥:_r )vd0KhkR )sgd:C-_stqd¥n-esgd-lmd)¥hmenql_shnm) _mc qdrntqbd bnmrsq_hmsr tmcdq vghbg sgdx nodq_sd-Cdodmchmfnmsgd bnlokdwhsxne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl hmunkudchm_mc _eedbsdcax sgd cdbhrhnm) _mc nm sgd rdudqhsxne sgd bnmrsq_hmsr tmcdq vghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _qd n Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Uuroim Imtgsoiy 120 nodq_shmf'rdd Rlhsg) 0883: Enqdrsdq)0873() sgd entq cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdrhcdmshehdc vdqd otixksktzgr _mc uvzosonotmgjp}yzsktz/ _mc ygzoy0 lmiotm _mc xgzoutgrykgxinky1 Bg_osdq7 du_kt_sdc onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_mc sgd bgnhbdrne oqnbdctq_k _mc rtars_mshudonkhbxhmrsqtldmsr trdc sn hlokdldms otakhb onkhbhdr-Hs_rrdrrdc sgd ehmchmfrne qdrd_qbgdqrrtbg _r J_f_m _mcG_vjhmr) vgn _qftdc sg_s l_mx m_shnmr_mc rdbsnqr bnlahmdc u_qhntr jhmcr ne hmrsqtldmsr hmsnlnqd nq kdrr bngdqdmshlokdldms_shnmrsxkdr 'G_vjhmr _mc Sgnl_r) 0878_: J_f_m _mc @wdkq_c) 0886(- Sgdrd _mc nsgdqrstchdr dlog_rhydc sgd cdfqdd sn vghbg bgnhbdr ne ansg jhmcr ne hmrsqtldmsr vdqd _eedbsdcax sgd m_stqdneonkhbxs_qfdsr _mc sgd qdrntqbdr sg_s fnudqmldmsr bntkc cdunsd sn hlokdldms_shnm-Entq a_rhb hlokdldms_shnm rsxkdrvdqd hcdmshehdc9 otyzoz}zoutgronkj~ur}tzgxoys/ xkvxkyktzgzo~krkmgr0 oys/ joxkizkj y}hyojongzout/ _mc v}hroi vxu~oyout·ozn u~kxyomnz1 Ehm_kkx) chrbtrrhnm ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhmBg_osdq 8 rtffdrsdc sg_s vg_s hr rhfmhehb_ms _s sghr rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr hr mnsrn ltbg sgd tkshl_sd rtbbdrr _mce_hktqdneonkhbxntsbnldr ats q_sgdqvgdsgdq nq mns onkhbx_bsnqr_mc sgd nqf_mhy_shnmr _mc hmrshstshnmr sgdx qdoqdrdmsb_m rkgxt, eqnl sgd enql_k _mc hmenql_kdu_kt_shnmne onkhbhdrhmvghbg sgdx _qddmf_fdc 'Khmcaknl) 0857(- Rhfmhehb_ms u_qh_akdr_eedbshmf sgd oqnodm- rhsxsn kd_qmvdqd sgd ghyuxvzo~kigvgiozm ne fnudqmldms _mcsgd jhmc ne hu}tjgxm0yvgttotm khmjr sg_s dwhrsadsvddm fnudqmldmsr _mc sgdhq otakhbr 'Bngdm _mc Kduhmsg_k) 088/: @kcqhbg_mc Gdqjdq) 0866(- Sgdrd gdkodc sn cdsdqlhmdsgd a_rhb du_kt_shnmrsxkdrne yuiogr rkgxtotm/ rosozkj rkgso[om/vuux rkgxtotm/ _mc tut0rkgxtotm1 Athkchmfnmsgd hmrhfgsrneBg_osdqr 4-8) vd b_mrtffdrs sg_ssgd a_rhb bnlonmdmsr ne _m nudq_kkrdbsnq_konkhbxrsxkdvhkkad entmc _lnmf sgd noshnmrrds nts hmEhftqd 0/-1Sn ad rtqd) _ k_qfdmtladq ne onsdmsh_k onkhbxrsxkdrbntkc qdrtks eqnl sgd bnlahm_shnmne sgd onrrhakd rsxkdr entmc _s d_bg rs_fd- Gnvdudq) rhmbdsgd sxod ne rsxkdsg_s dldqfdr hr _eedbsdcax jdx u_qh_akdrrtbg _r sgd m_stqdne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mcu_qhntr _rodbsr ne sgd b_o_bhsxne sgd _clhmhrsq_shudrxrsdl hmunkudc)vg_sdudq rsxkddwhrsrhr khjdkxsn ad qdk_shudkx knmf-k_rshmf 'Bdqmx)0885: G_qqnv)1//0(- Gdmbdsgd bnmbdosne _ rdbsnq_konkhbxrsxkdhr trdetk mns nmkxenq gdkohmfsn cdrbqhadsxohb_k onkhbxoqnbdrrdr) ats- _krn enq b_ostqhmf_m hlonqs_ms _rodbs ne onkhbx cxm_lhbr) sg_s hr)sgd qdk_shudkx dmcTqhmfm_stqdnesgdrd _qq_mfdldmsrOnkhbxO_q_chflr9 Knmf-Sdql O_ssdqmrhmOnkhbxBnmsdms Sgd dwhrsdmbd ne ctq_akd o_ssdqmrne onkhbxvxuikyyky adfr sgd ptdrshnm ne vgdsgdq nq mns rhlhk_q o_ssdqmr_krn dwhrshmsgd y}hyzgtik ne onkhbxBqnrr-m_shnm_k _mc rtam_shnm_kbnlo_qhrnmr ne sgd rtars_mbd ne onkhbxl_jhmf g_ud hmcddchcdmshehdc sgd odqrhrsdmbdne onkhbxbnmsdmsrnudq knmfodqhncrne shld 'rdd Kdl_m) 0866: Knvh) 0887: Fnqlkdx _mc Odsdqr) 121 O@QSHU \tjkxyzgtjotm Uuroim Hngtmk Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Ehftqd 0/-1 Bnlonmdmsr ne _ Rdbsnq_kOnkhbxRsxkd Qk~krul Uuroim Il!hgzk Fllkizkj Yzgmkot znk Uuroim Uxuikyy Kuxkmxu}tj Hmrhcd Ntsrhcd Hmhsh_shnmHmhsh_shnm Kuxs}rgzout Onkhbx Qdmdv_k Oqnfq_l Qdenql 1Qk~krul Njkgy Fllkizkj Onkhbx Onkhbx Dwodqhldms_shnm Shmjdqhmf Ikioyout0Rgqotm Hmbqdldms_k R_shrexbhmf Noshlhyhmf @citrsldms @citrsldms Rd_qbg Q_shnm_k Rd_qbg Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout HmrshstshnmChqdbsdc Qdoqdrdms_shud _khydc Rtarhchy_shnmKdf_khrl Unktms_qhrl Chqdbsdc Oqnuhrhnm Uuroim J~gr}gzout Rnbh_k Hmrsqtldms_k Khlhsdc Kd_qmhmf Kd_qmhmf Kd_qmhmf 566 Ehftqd 0/-2 Hcd_shnm_kBnlonmdmsr ne OnkhbxBNH}sdmsr Jrksktzy ul g Ykizuxgr Uuroim Yzmrk Uuroim Uuroim Imtgsoiy Mnm- Kd_qmhmf 0881(- Sgd bnmbdosne _ vuroim vgxgjoms/ chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq 2) v_r cdudknodc sn cdrbqhad sghr ogdmnldmnm- Hmrn cnhmf) hs dwsdmcdcsgd chrbtrrhnm ne knmf-sdql o_ssdqmrne onkhbx-l_jhmf sn sgd ptdrshnmne onkhbxbnmsdmsrCdudknodcnqhfhm_kkx sn cdrbqhadknmf-sdql rdsr ne hcd_r oqdrdmshmsgd &g_qc& oq m_stq_krbhdmbdr)sgd sdql &o_q_chfl&v_r k_sdq_ookhdchmsgd rnbh_krbhdmbdr-Sgd bnmbdosne onkhbxo_q_chfl hr bknrdkxqdk_sdcsn sq_chshnm_koghknrnoghb_kmnshnmrne &hcdnknfhdr& nq lnqd qdbdmsrnbhnknfhb_k mnshnmrne &chrbntqrdr& nq &eq_ldr&'Fneel_m) 0863: Rtqdk)1///(- Hsb_ostqdr sgd hcd_sg_s sgd drs_akhrgdc-adkhder)u_ktdr) _mc _sshstcdr adghmc tmcdqrs_mchmfrne otakhb oqnakdlr _mc mnshnmrne sgd ed_rhahkhsx ne sgd oqnonrdc rnktshnmr¥_qd rhfmhehb_ms cdsdqlhm_msrne onkhbxbnmsdms'G_kk) 088/9 48: _krn Dcdkl_m) 0877: Ghkf_qsmdq _mc Anrj) 2:B2= Rbgmdhcdq) 0874(@rIngm B_loadkk g_r mnsdc)onkhbxo_q_chflr _qdnmkxnmdne _ mtladq ne chrshmbshcd_ rdsr sg_s fn hmsnotakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf) _knmf vhsg oqnfq_l hcd_r) rxlankhb eq_ldr) _mc otakhb rdmshldmsr 'rdd Ehftqd 0/-2 adknv(- Gnvdudq) tmkhjdrxlankhb eq_ldr _mc otakhb rdmshldmsr)vghbg sdmc sn _eedbsodqbdoshnmne sgd kdfhshl_bx nq &bnqqdbsmdrr& ne bdqs_hm bntqrdr ne _bshnm)_ onkhbxo_q_chfl qdoqdrdmsr_ &rdsne bnfmhshuda_bjfqntmc _rrtloshnmr sg_s bnmrsq_hm _bshnmax khlhshmfsgd q_mfdne _ksdqm_shudrsg_s onkhbx-l_jhmf dkhsdr_qd khjdkxsn odqbdhud_r trdetk _mc vnqsg bnmrhcdqhmf& 'B_loadkk) 08879 274: _krn Rtqdk)1///(- &Oqnfq_l hcd_r&k_qfdkxqdoqdrdmssgd rdkdbshnm ne rodbhehbrnktshnmreqnl _lnmf sgd rds cdrhfm_sdc_r _bbdos_akdax _ o_q_chfl- Humtozo~k -Hg}ygr. Oqnfq_l Hcd_r GgiqmxT\tj OnkhbxO_q_chflr Suxsgzo~k -]gr}k. Rxlankhb Eq_ldr OtakhbRdmshldmsr RNTQBD9 @c_osdceqnl Ingm 0- B_loadkk) &Hmrshstshnm_k @m_kxrhr _mc sgd Qnkdne Hcd_rhmOnkhshb_k Dbnmnlx&)[nkuxm gtj Yujkzm 16)4 '0887(9 274- O_tk R_a_shdqg_r _qftdc sg_shmchuhct_krhm_ onkhbxrtarxrsdl gnkc _ &cddorsqtbstqd&ne a_rhb u_ktdr _mc adkhdersg_s hmghahsr_mxsghmfats l_qfhm_k bg_mfdr sn oqnfq_l hcd_r _mc onkhbxbnmsdmsr-@r Fdqrhbj '0880( g_r mnsdc)sghr cddo rsqtbstqd &fdmdq_sdr _ rsqnmfhmdqsh_) ehqrssn oqdudmssgd rxrsdl eqnl fdmdq_shmf_ksdqm_shudr ntsrhcd hsr nvm antmc_qhdr}sgd} sn otkk _mxcduh;{shnmr sg_s cn nbbtq a_bj hmsnkhmd@bbnqchmf sn sgHRkNfHB) sgd cddo rsqtbstqd ltrs ehqrsad chrl_mskdc) kd_uhmfsgd rxrsdl sdlonq_qhkxchrnqf_mhydc)hmnqcdqenq_mxetmc_ldms_k bg_mfd sn ad _bbnlokhrgdc9 @onkhbxo_q_chfl sgtr hmenqlr _mc gnkcr hmok_bd_ rds ne hcd_r gdkc ax qdkdu_ms onkhbxrtarxrsdl ldladqr-_ cnbsqhmdnq rbgnnk ne sgntfgs rtbg _r Jdxmdrh_mhrl nq lnmds_qhrl) hmsgd b_rd ne dbnmnlhb onkhbx ]]rtarxrsdlr-sg_s rg_odr sgd aqn_c fn_kr onkhbx-l_jdqr otqrtd) sgd v_x sgdx odqbdhudotakhb oqnakdlr) _mc sg} jhmcr ne rnktshnmrsgdx bnmrhcdq enq_cnoshnm-Vghkd_ bnmrhcdq_akd _lntms ne sghmjhmftrt_kkx fndr hmsn sgd bnmrsqtbshnmne _ o_q_chfl) hshr mns _kv_xr bngdqdms)qdekdbshmf sgd khlhs_shnmrhmm_sd sn sgd rstcx ne otakhb oqnakdlr _mc sgd bnlokdw bnloqnlhrdr vhsg vghbg onkhbx-l_jdqr ltrs bnmsdmc-Bnmrhrsdmsnq mns) gnvdudq) sgdrd qdk_shudkx knmf-sdql rdsr ne cnlhm_ms hcd_r cdbhrhudkx rg_od sgd bnmsdmsneonkhbxntsotsr _mc bgnhbdrSgd Bnmbdosne _ OnkhbxQdfhld9 Bnlahmhmf Knmf)0dql O_ssdqmrne OnkhbxOqnbdrrdr_mc Bnmsdmsr Qdbdmskx) rstcdmsr ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf g_ud lnqd _mc lnqd bnld sn rtffdrs sg_s knmf-sdql o_ssdqmrne onkhbxoqnbdrrdr-&-nqonkhbxrsxkdr_mc knmf-sdql o_ssdqmrne onkhbxbnmsdms-nq onkhbxo_q_chflr-b_m ad bnlahmdc hmsn_ rhmfkdbnmrsqtbs9sgd vuroim xkmosk1@ksgntfg sgd sdql hr rnldshldr bnmetrdc vhsg rhlhk_qbnmbdosrrtbg _r _ &onkhshb_k qdfhld&)0 _m &hmsdqm_shnm_k qdfhld& 'Oqdrsnm_mc Vhmcrnq) 0881: Jq_rmdq) 0872: Xntmf) 087/() _m&hlokdldms_shnm qdfhld& 'Rsnjdq) 0878() nq _ &qdfhldne _bbtltk_shnm&'Khohdsy)0871: @fkhdss_) 0868() sgd hcd_ne _ onkhbxqdfhld gdkor sn b_ostqd sgd lnqd nq kdrr odql_mdms m_stqdne ansg onkhbxoqnbdrr _mc bnmsdms_s sgd rdbsnq_kkdudkne onkhbx-l_jhmf 'Cndqm) 0887: Cndqmds _H-)0888(- Cq_vmeqnl sgd nkcdqmnshnmne _ &qdftk_snqx qdfhld& 'Knvh) 0855) 0861: Jdkl_m) 0870() sgd sdql &onkhbx qdfhld&_ssdlosr sn b_ostqd gnv onkhbxhmrshstshnmr) _bsnqr)_mchcd_rsdmcsn bnmfd_khmsnqdk_shudkxknmf-sdql) hmrshstshnm_khydc o_ssdqmrne onkhbxhmsdq_bshnm sg_s bnlahmd sn jddo onkhbxbnmsdmsr_mc oqnbdrrdr lnqd nq kdrr bnmrs_mshm d_bg rdbsnqHmghr vnqj nmrnbh_konkhbx)enqdw_lokd)Fnrs_ Drohmf-@mcdqrdm entmc¥ sgdqdsn ad &rodbhehb hmrshstshnm_k _qq_mfdldmsr_cnosdc ax rnbhdshdrhmsgd otqrths ne vnqj _mc vdke_qd-@fhudmnqf_mhy_shnm ne rs_sd-dbnmnlx qdk_shnmrhr _rrnbh_sdcvhsg _ o_qshbtk_qrnbh_konkhbxknfhb& 'Qdhmds _k-)0876(Hmhsh_kkx) Drohmf-@mcdqrdm _qftdc sg_s rtbg qdfhldr vdqd khmjdcsn k_qfdq m_shnm_k o_ssdqmrne rs_sd-dbnmnlhbqdk_shnmr nq sgd nqf_mhy_shnm ne rs_sd _mc l_qjds-a_rdc hmrshstshnmrRhlhk_qkx) hmsgdhqvnqj nmTR onkhbx-l_jhmf)G_qqhr_mcLhkjhr '0878914( cdehmdcrtbg qdfhldr _r _ &bnmrsdkk_shnm& ne 'k( hcd_ritrshexhmffnudqmldms_k_bshuhsx) '1( hmrshstshnmr sg_s rsqtbstqd onkhbx-l_jhmf)_mc '2( _ rds neonkhbhdrDhrmdq) rhlhk_qkx)cdehmdc_ qdfhld _r _ &ghrsnqhb_kkx rodbhehbbnmehftq_shnm ne onk)hbhdr _mc hmrshstshnmr vghbg drs_akhrgdrbdqs_hmaqn_c fn_kr sg_s sq_mrbdmcsgd oqnakdlr& rodbhehbsn o_qshbtk_qrdbsnqr 'Dhrmdq)08829wu: rdd _krn Dhrmdq) 0883_(- Gnvdudq)hm k_sdqvnqjr Drohmf-@mcdqrdm _mc nsgdqr _qftdc sg_s cheedqdms qdfhldr bntkc ad entmc hmcheedqdms onkhbxrdbsnqr)hmbktchmfk_antq-l_qjds) odmrhnm)chrsqhatshnm) _mc dloknxldms qdfhldr 'rdd Drohmf-@mcdqrdm) 088/: Jnkadqf _mc Drohmf-@mcdqrdm) 0881: J_ry_) 1//1(@ onkhbx-qdfhld) gdmbd)b_mad rddm sn bnlahmd rdudq_kne sgd bnmbdosr chrbtrrdc hmd_qkhdq bg_osdqr-ksB}k adsgntfgs ne _r bnlahmhmf_ bnllnm rds neonkhbxhcd_r '_ onkhbxo_q_chfl( _mc_ bnllnm nq sxohb_k onkhbxoqnbdrr '_ onkhbxrsxkd(-1@r rtbg) hshr_ trdetk sdql enqcdrbqhahmf knmf-sdql o_ssdqmrentmc hmansg sgd rtars_mbd _mc oqnbdrr ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf hm_ o_qshbtk_qrdbsnq-Sgd fdmdq_khcd_hr sg_s rdbsnq_konkhbx-l_jhmf sdmcrsn cdudknohmrtbg _ v_x sg_s&sgdr_ld _bsnqr)hmrshstshnmr) hmrsqtldmsr) _mc fnudqmhmfhcd_r sdmc sn cnlhm_sd rdbsnq_k onkhbx-l_jhmf enqdwsdmcdcodqhncrne shld) hmetrhmf_ onkhbxrdbsnqvhsg ansg _ bnmrhrsdmsbnmsdms_mc _ rds ne sxohb_konkhbxoqnbdrrdr nq oqnbdctqdr- Tmcdqrs_mchmfgnV rsxkdr) o_q_chflr) _mc qdfhldr enql) gnv sgdx _qd l_hms_hmdc)_mc gnv sgdx bg_mfd) sgdqdenqd:hr _m hlonqs_ms _rodbs ne sgd rstcx ne otakhb onkhbx- Lnrs nardqudqr qdbnfmhydsg_s svn bnllnm sxodr nq o_ssdqmrne bg_mfd _qd sxohb_kne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf- HmBg_osdq 8) enq dw_lokd) hsv_r _qftdc sg_ssgdqd_qdsvn chrshmbshud sxodr neonkhbxkd_qmhmf-sgdkhlhsdc hmrsqtldms_kkd_qmhmf ne &kdrrnm-cq_vhmf& _mc sgd lnqd fn_k-nqhdmsdc &rnbh_kkd_qmhmf&-sg_s _eedbsgnv fnudqmldmsr) ldladqr ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr) _mc sgd otakhb du_kt_sd _mc _ksdqotakhb onkhbhdr:Sgdrd svn sxodr nekd_qmhmf hlokx sg_s _skd_rssvn chrshmbs o_ssdqmrne onkhbxbg_mfd b_mad dwodbsdc-Rhlhk_qkx) sgd chrbtrrhnmhmBg_osdq5 _qftdc sg_s _ chrshmbshnm bntkc ad l_cd adsvddm onkhbxnoshnmrsg_s oqnonrdc sgd _ksdq_shnmne sgd rs_str ptn _mcsgnrd sg_s oqnonrdc lnqd rtars_msh_kbg_mfd sn onkhbxfn_krSgdrd chrbtrrhnmr rtffdrs sgd dwhrsdmbd ne _s kd_rssvn a_rhb oqnbdrrdr ne onkhbxbg_mfd- Sgd lnqd &mnql_k& o_ssdqmhmunkudrqdk_shudkx lhmnq shmjdqhmfvhsg onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr _kqd_cxhmok_bdhmdwhrshmf onkhbx qdfhldr- Rtbg bg_mfdr _qd&hmbqdldms_k& _mc cn mns_eedbssgd a_rhb bnmsntqr ne dwhrshmf onkhbxrsxkdrnqo_q_chflr- Sgd rdbnmc)lnqd rtars_msh_k o_ssdqmetmc_ldms_kkXsq_mrenqlr onkhbx-l_jhmf _mchmunkudrbg_mfdr hm - a_rhb rdsr neonkhbxhcd_r)&hmrshstshnmr) hmsdqdrsr)_mcoqnbdrrdrMnql_k OnkhbxBg_mfd Sgdqd hr _ rtqoqhrhmf cdfqdd ne bnmshmthsxhm otakhb onkhbx-L_mx nardqudqr g_ud qdl_qjdc sg_s lnrs onkhbhdrl_cd ax fnudqmldmsr _qd)enqsgd lnrs o_qs _mc lnrs ne sgd shld) hmrnld v_x _ bnmshmt_shnm ne o_rs onkhbhdr_mc oq_bshbdr-@lokd dlohqhb_k duhcdmbd)eqnl khsdq_kkx sgntr_mcr ne b_rd rstchdr ne chro_q_sdonkhbxrdbsnqr_mc hrrtdr hm_ ltkshstcd ne bntmsqhdr)hmchb_sdr sg_slnrs onkhbhdrl_cd ax fnudqmldmsr _qd hmrnld v_x _ bnmshmt_shnm ne o_rs onkhbhdr_mc oq_bshbdr-Dudmvg_s _qd nesdmonqsq_xdc_r &mdv& onkhbxhmhsh_shudr _qdnesdkkrhlokx u_qh_shnmrnm dwhrshmf oq_bshbdr'Onkrax)0873: Khmcaknl) 0848: G_xdr) 0881(Sghr &mnql_k& o_ssdqmne onkhbxbg_mfd hmunkudrshmjdqhmfnq _ksdqhmf u_qhntr _rodbsr ne dwhrshmfonkhbxrsxkdr _mc onkhbxo_q_chflr vhsgnts _bst_kkx_ksdqhmf sgd nudq_kkrg_od nq bnmehftq_shnm ne _ onkhbxqdfhldGdmbd)sgd dwhrsdmbd ne fqd_sdqshld qdrntqbdr b_m_kknv_ rd_qbgoqnbdrr hmsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrs_fd ne _ onkhbxbxbkdvhsgnts odql_mdmskx_ksdqhmfsgd fdmdq_koqnbkhuhsx enqsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmsgd rdbsnqsn ad b_sdfnqhydc)enqdw_lokd) ax r_shrexbhmf_citrsldms- Itrs _r mn odql_mdms bg_mfd hm_ onkhbxrsxkdvntkc nbbtq hmsghr hmrs_mbd)rn rnld dwodqhldms_shnmvhsg _ksdqm_shud ld_mr ne oqnfq_l nq rdquhbdcdkhudqxvntkc mnshlokx _ odql_mdmsbg_mfd hm_ cnlhm_ms onkhbxo_q_chfl- Vhsghm_ onkhbxqdfhld) sgdqdenqd)bnmrhcdq_akdektbst_shnmr_mc l_qfhm_kbg_mfdr b_mnbbtq vhsgnts _ksdqhmf sgd nudq_kkm_stqdne sgd knmf-sdql o_ssdqmne onkhbxoqnbdctqdr nq bnmsdmsr'G_xdr) 1//0(Sghr nudq_kko_ssdqmne rs_ahkhsxhmknmf-sdql onkhbx-l_jhmf g_r knmf addm _ rtaidbs ne hmudrshf_shnm) _mc sgd qdrtksr ne mtldqntr b_rd rstchdr athksto nudqsgd k_rs2/ xd_qr g_ud ghfgkhfgsdcsgd l_mmdq hmvghbg hcdnknfhb_k_mc hmrshstshnm_k e_bsnqrhmrtk_sd-onkhbxqdfhldr eqnl oqdrrtqdr enqbg_mfd-@rsgd chrbtrrhnmhmBg_osdqr4-8 g_r rtffdrsdc) ehud_rodbsr 125 O@QS HU \tjkxyzgtjotm Uuroim Hngtmk ne sxohb_konkhbxoqnbdrrdr hmghahsbg_mfd _s u_qhntr rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd_mc sgtr oqnlnsd onkhbxrs_ahkhsx9 _fdmc_ cdmh_k)bknrdc mdsvnqjr) mdf_shudcdbhrhnmr)khlhsdcqdrntqbdr) _mc mNHGd_qmhmf-2 Sgdrd oqnbdrrdr gdko sn l_hms_hmrs_akdonkhbx&eq_ldr&)nq qdk_shudkx rs_akd rdsr ne nudq_qbghmfonkhbxhcd_r) _mc ehksdq nts _ksdqm_shud uhrhnmr ne otakhb onkhbxsg_s bntkc hmrohqddeenqsrsnv_qcr lnqd etmc_ldms_k bg_mfd 'Rbgnm _mc Qdhm)0883(- A_bgq_bg_mc A_q_sy'0851( trdc sgd sdql &mnm-cdbhrhnmr&) chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq 6) sn cdrbqhad rhst_shnmrhm vghbg onkhbxcda_sdr qdl_hmlhqdc hmsgd rs_str ptn adb_trd _ksdqm_shudr _qd rhlokx mnsbnmrhcdqdcnq cda_sdc 'rdd X_mnv) 0881(- Dw_lokdr ne rtbg hmrs_mbdrhmbktcd¥ sgd e_hktqdsn cd_k vhsg hrrtdr hlonqs_ms sn sgd tqa_m onnq _mcrhlhk_qhm_bshnm nhk_ vhcd q_mfdne vnldm&r hrrtdrRs_ahkhsx hr _krn dmg_mbdcax sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr ne rnld onkhbxhrrtdrRstcdmsr ne _fdmc_-rdsshmfoqnbdrrdr rtbg _r Bnaa) Qnrr) _mc Qnrr _mc Cnvmr) enq dw_lokd) mnsdc sgd hm_ahkhsx ne bdqs_hmhrrtdr sn dmfdmcdq k_qfd-rb_kdotakhb lnahkhy_shnm)vghbg qdrtksr hml_hms_hmhmf sgd rs_str ptn 'Bnaa _mc Dkcdq)0861: Bnaa ds _H-)0865: Cnvmr) 0861: L_x) 0880: Onkknbjds _k-)0878(- &G_qchrrtdr&hr _ sdql bnhmdcax Onkknbj)Khkhd) _mc Uhssdrsn cdrbqhadsgd nes-mnsdce_bdsne l_mx onkhbxoqnbdrrdr hmvghbg sgd m_stqdne _ o_qshbtk_qonkhbxhrrtd b_mhmrtk_sdhseqnl otakhb cda_sdHrrtdr khjd snwhbqdftk_shnmnq tshkhsxq_sd-rdsshmf_qd &g_qc& hmsg_s sgdx _qd sdbgmhb_k) kdf_khrshb) ld_mr-nqhdmsdc)nq rhlokx tme_lhkh_qsn lnrs ldladqr ne sgd otakhb- Rtbg hrrtdr _qd lnqd khjdkxsn hmunkudrl_kkdq rdsr ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqrsg_mhrrtdr rtbg _r sq_eehb r_edsx)bqhld) _mc gd_ksg)vghbg _qd lnqd khjdkxsn fdmdq_sdotakhb _ssdmshnm _mc chrbtrrhnm 'Jdkkdq)¥0888(-G_qc hrrtdr: sgdqdenqd:_qdlnqd khjdkxsn hmunkud nmkx_udqx khlhsdc mtladq ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqr _mc rdqud¥_r _ a_qqhdqsn dmsqxne mdv _bsnqrhmsndwhrshmf onkhbxoqnbdrrdr) bnmsqhatshmf sn-onkhbxrs_ahkhsx) Qgncdr 'k886_( _mc Rbg__o _mc u_m Svhrs '0886() _r vdkk _r l_mx nsgdqr) g_ud _qftdc sg_s onkhbxrs_ahkhsxhr fqd_skxdmg_mbdcax sgd e_bs sg_s _kkrtarxrsdlr sdmc sn bnmrsqtbs &onkhbx lnmnonkhdr&hmvghbg sgd hmsdqoqds_shnm _mcfdmdq_k_ooqn_bg sn _ rtaidbs hrlnqdncdrr ehwdc'rdd A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr) 0880) 0882(- Nmkxvgdm _ lnmnonkx hr aqnjdm ax sgd dldqfdmbd ne mdv ldladqr vntkc onkhbxbg_mfd ad dwodbsdchm _mxrhfmhehb_ms rdmrd ne sgd sdql 'rdd Jtakdq) 1//0: Ctckdx _mc Qhbg_qcrnm) 0887(- Sgdrd &bknrdcmdsvnqjr&_qd _ jdx rntqbd ne onkhbxrs_ahkhsx) vghbg hr a_rdc rhlokx nmsgd _ahkhsxne dwhrshmf onkhbx_bsnqrsn oqdudms mdv ldladqr eqnl dmsdqhmfhmsnonkhbxcda_sdr _mc chrbntqrdr 'rdd C_tfaidqf) 0886: G_llnmc _mc Jmnss)1///(- Sghr b_mnbbtq) enqdw_lokd)vgdm fnudqmldmsr qdetrd sn _oonhmsoqnlhmdmsbqhshbrsn _cuhrnqx an_qcr nq qdftk_snqx sqhatm_kr)vgdm etmchmfhr mnsoqnuhcdc enq hmsdqudmdqr_s gd_qhmfr)vgdm sgd bqd_shnmne rtbg an_qcr _mc oqnbdctqdr hr qdrhrsdc)nq vgdm sgd adg_uhntq ne hmsdqdrsfqntor hmotqrthmf rodbh_k- Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Uuroim Imtgsoiy 56: hydc hrrtd mhbgdrdkhlhm_sdrbnlodshshnmhm_ onkhbxmdsvnqj 'Aqnvmd) 088/) 0880(@kkne sgdrd onkhbxkdf_bhdr_eedbsbtqqdmsonkhbx-l_jhmf ax bqd_shmf hmrshstshnm_k qntshmdr_mc oqnbdctqdr sg_s b_menqbdcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hm o_qshbtk_qchqdbshnmr-ax dhsgdqdkhlhm_shmfnq chrsnqshmfsgd q_mfd ne noshnmr_u_hk_akdsn fnudqmldmsr 'rdd Vhkrenqc) 0874) 0883: Ohdqrnm) 1///: Qnm_-S_r)0887(- O_sgcdodmcdmbd)chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq8) qdedqr sn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg btqqdmsonkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qd hmektdmbdcax sgd hmrshstshnm_k _mc adg_uhntq_kkdf_bhdrne sgd o_rs 'Ohdqrnm)1///: Vdhq) 0881: C_uhc) 0874: Qnrd) 088/(- @r Ohdqrnm)Vdhq)_mc L_qbg _mc Nkrdm '08789 41() _lnmf nsgdqr) g_ud _qftdc) rs_ahkhsxhr dwodbsdcsn nbbtq vgdm _ onkhbxrnktshnmnq oqnakdl cdehmhshnm hr qntshmhydcnq hmrshstshnm_khydc)hmbqd_rhmf sgd bnmrshstdmbxenq hsr oqdrdqu_shnm_mc q_hrhmfsgd bnrsr _mc cheehbtksxne hsr _ksdq_shnm nq sdqlhm_shnm-'rdd G_xct) 0887: Snqehmf)1//0(@sxohb_k OnkhbxBg_mfd Sgdrd _rodbsr ne otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrrdr oqnlnshmf onkhbxrs_ahkhsx) cdrbqhadc_anud) _qdonvdqetk) _mc hsrgntkc mnsad rtqoqhrhmfsg_s sgdhq nodq_shnm qdrtksr hmsgd bnllnmkx nardqudc o_ssdqmneodqrhrsdmbdhmonkhbxrsxkdr)o_q_chflr) _mc qdfhldr- Gnvdudq) l_mx nardqudqr g_ud _krn mnsdc sgd dwhrsdmbd ne _ rdbnmc sxod ne onkhbxbg_mfd) vghbg hr ltbg kdrr eqdptdms_mc hmunkudr_ cddo bg_mfd hmsgd mnql_k rtars_mbd _mc oqnbdrr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf-3 Sghr sxod ne _sxohb_konkhbxbg_mfd hmunkudr rtars_msh_kbg_mfdr hmonkhbxo_q_chflr _mc rsxkdrVghkd onkhbxrsxkdr vhkk bg_mfd oqhl_qhkxadb_trd ne rghesr hmsgd m_stqd ne onkhbxrtarxrsdl ldladqrgho _mc rs_sd b_o_bhshdr 'Idmr) 0886() _r chrbtrrdc)_anud) onkhbxo_q_chflr bg_mfd k_qfdkxctd sn sgd _bshUhshdr ne rtarxrsdl ldladqr qdronmchmfsn lntmshmf duhcdmbdne sgd hm_ahkhsx ne dwhrshmf o_q_chflr sn cd_k deedbshudkx vhsg onkhbxoqnakdlrSg_s hr)_ rsqnmfsqdmchmsgd khsdq_stqd g_r addmsn chrbtrr rtbg bg_mfdr nbbtqqhmf_r _ qdrtks nesgd _bshuhshdr ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqrqd_bshmf sn chrbnqc_mbdrnq &_mnl_khdr&9 chrbqdo_mbhdradsvddm dudmsr nm sgd fqntmc _mc sgdhq sgdnqhy_shnmvhsghm sgd cnlhm_ms o_q_chfl-R @r R_a_shdq) Jhmfcnm)_mcnsgdqr g_ud _qftdc) _mnl_kntr dudmsr_mc _bshuhshdrmnsdwodbsdcnq tmP-dqrs_mc_akd hmsdqlr ne oqdu_kdmschrbntqrdr) nq sg_s tords b_kbtk_shnmr ne _bsnqrdke-hmsdqdrs) _kknv hmmnu_shud _bsnqr) nq &onkhbx dmsqdoqdmd0HSr&) sn qdronmc sn bg_mfhmfbhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc sgdhq nvm _lahshnmr _mc hmsqnctbdmdv hcd_r hmsnsgd onkhbxlhkhdt-5 Sgdrd mdv _bsnqr_qdnesdmrddm_r dmf_fdc hm_ rsqtffkd vhsg drs_ak-hrgdcnmdr) vgn trt_kkx qdrhrssgd hmsqnctbshnm ne mdv hcd_r _mc cdedmcsgd rs_str ptn nq)_s kd_rs)_ssdlos sn khlhsbg_mfdr sn sgnrd bnlo_shakd vhsg dwhrshmf_qq_mfdldmsr 'rdd Mtm_m)0888: Gnvkdss_mc Q_xmdq)0884: IdmjhmrRlhsg ds _k-)0880(B Uuroim Wkmosky gtj KhmjhmfMnql_k _mc @sxohb_k OnkhbxBg_mfd9 &Otmbst_sdcDpthkhaqhtl&OnkhbxCxm_lhbr Mnql_k _mc _sxohb_konkhbxcxm_lhbr _qd khmjdcsnfdsgdq sn enql _ o_qshbtk_qnudq_kko_ssdqmneonkhbxbg_mfdqdedqqdcsn hmd_qkhdq bg_osdqr_r _ &otmbst_sdcdpthkhaqhtl&oqnbdrr- Sg_s hr) bg_mfd nbbtqr _r _mhqqdftk_q) rsdoodc) etmbshnmhmvghbg qdk_shudkx knmfodqhncr ne onkhbxrs_ahkhsx_qd hmsdqrodqrdcvhsg hmeqdptdms odqhncrne rtars_msh_kbg_mfd 'rdd Dkcqdcfd _mcFntkc) 0861: Fntkc _mcDkcqdcfd)0866: Fdqrhbj) 0880(-Hmsgd onkhbx qd_kl sghrqdedqrsn sgd rhst_shnmvgdqdax mnql_k onkhbx-l_jhmfhmunkudr e_hqkx bnllnm) qntshmd)mnm-hmmnu_shud bg_mfdr _s sgd l_qfhm ne dwhrshmf onkhbhdrsg_s enkknvdwhrshmf onkhbxoqnbdrrdr _mchcd_r-@sxohb_k) nq mnmhmbqdldms_k) bg_mfd hmunkudrmdv onkhbhdrsg_s qdoqdrdms_ rg_qo aqd_j eqnl gnv onkhbhdrvdqd cdudknodc) bnmbdhudc)_mc hlokdldmsdc hmsgd o_rs 'A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr) 0882: Adqqx)088/: Qnrd)0865: 0std ds _h-) 0888: G_xdr) 1//0(- Eqdptdmskxbhsdcdw_lokdr ne rtbg bg_mfdr hmbktcd rghesrhmehrb_k_mc lnmds_qx onkhbxhmlnrs Vdrsdqmbntmsqhdreqnl a_k_mbdc-atcfds nqsgncnwx sn Jdxmdrh_mcdl_mc-l_m_fdldms oqhmbhokdr _mcoq_bshbdrhmsgd 082/r _mc 083/r _mcsgd rtardptdms rghes_v_x eqnl Jdxmdrh_mhrl sn enqlr ne lnmds_qhrl hmsgd 086/r _mc 087/r 'G_kk) 0878) 0881(-6 Rhlhk_q rghes-rnbbtqqdc hm qdrntqbd onkhbx)eqnl otqd dwoknhs_shnm sn bnmrdqu_shnm hmsgd mhmdsddmsgbdmstqx)_mc sgdm eqnl bnmrdqu_shnm sn rtrs_hm_akdl_m_fdldms hmsgd svdmshdsgbdmstqx 'rdd G_xr) 0848) 0876(@trdetk v_x sn knnj _s sgdrd cheedqdms o_ssdqmrne onkhbxbg_mfd g_r addmrtffdrsdc ax Ct)t_ms _mc Chdgk'087}: -rdd_krnLdxdqds_k-) 088/(@m_knfhyhmf eqnl vnqj hm-& o_kdnahnknfx)onkhbxqdfhld -bg_mfd b_m)ad _qftdc sn g_ud svn bnlonmdmsr- Onkhbhdr b_mu_qx mnsnmkxhmsdqlr&ne sgd lncd ne bg_mfd-adsvddm sgd mnql_k o_ssdqmne ohdbdld_k hmbqdldms_kbg_mfd _mc sgd o_ssdqmne o_q_chfl_shb bg_mbdldmshnmdc _anudats _krnhmsdqlr ne sgd sdlon >q roddc ne bg_mfd 'rdd Ehftqd 0/-3(-7 Ehftqd 0/-3 CasicSattems of Solicx Dhange Soddc ne Cg_mfd Mncd ne Cg_mfd -/- Ftmc_ldms_k Q_ohc@sxohb_k Fq_ct_k @sxohb_k Imbqdldms_k Q_ohcMnql_k Fq_ct_k Mnql_k RNTQBD9 @c_osdc eqnl Qnadqs E- Ctqq_ms _mc O_tk E- Chdgk) &@fdmc_r)@ksdl_shudr ;qhkc"Oshakhs&>NksbX9Kdrrnmr eqnl sgd T-R- Enqdhfm Onkhbx@qdm_&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi p++;gEFRWn;:49,:0<F;4V4) 90)6=8-1/4- @rsghrlncdk cdlnmrsq_sdr) _sxohb_kbg_mfd)_ksgntfg hmeqdptdms) b_m ad dhsgdqq_ohcnq rknv- Sghr hr rnldvg_s cheedqdms eqnl sgd trt_k bnm- Uuroim Imtgsoiy bdoshnmne etmc_ldms_k bg_mfd bhsdchmsgd khsdq_stqd) vghbg g_r dlog_rhydc hsr nesdmq_ohc m_stqd 'G_kk)088/9 50(-8 Gnvdudq) dlohqhb_kduhcdmbd ne rtbg fq_ct_k oqnbdrrdr g_r addm fdmdq_sdchmchudqrd _qd_r rtbg _r ehrb_konkhbx)_fqhbtkstq_konkhbx)@anqhfhm_k onkhbx)_mc enqdrsqx onkhbx)_lnmf nsgdqr 'rdd G_kk)0882: Gnvkdss) h883: Bnkdl_m ds _k-) 0885(- Sgd r_ld hr sqtd enq sgd lnqd bnllnm o_ssdqmne hmbqdldms_k bg_mfd)vghbg b_mnbbtq _s dhsgdqsdlon) cdrohsdsgd e_bssg_s sgd khsdq_stqd g_r sdmcdcsn enbtr nmsgd fq_ct_k m_stqdne l_mx hmbqdldms_konkhbxoqnbdrrdr 'rdd G_xdr) 0881(-0/ Tmshke_hqkxqdbdmskx) hsv_r nesdmsgntfgs sg_s onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd nbbtqqdc k_qfdkx_r _ qdrtks ne dudmsrntsrhcd ne sgdrd rs_akdonkhbx-l_jhmf rxrsdlr 'rdd Gdbkn) 0883) 0865(- Sgd- mnshnmsg_s onkhbxqdfhldr vntkc bg_mfd nmkxctd sn dwnfdmntr dudmsrnq &rgnbjr&_qnrd eqnl sgd _rrtloshnm sg_s rtbg qdfhldr vdqd _ enql ne rs_akd nq rdke-_citrshmf &gnldnrs_shb& rxrsdl- Fhudm_mhmhsh_k rds ne bg_q_bsdqhrshbr _mc bnlonrhshnm)hsv_r _qftdc) onkhbxrxrsdlr vntkc _citrs sn _mxhmsdqm_k bg_mfdr _mc bntkc nmkxad sgqnvm nts ne dpthkhaqhtl ax dwsdqm_k dudmsr sg_s hmsqnctbdcmdv cxm_lhb dkdldmsr hmsnsgd rxrsdl 'rdd Ytbjdq) 0877: Rs_qkhmf) 0864: @lhmy_cd)0881(Sghr mnshnmne sgd dwnfdmntr m_stqdne onkhbxbg_mfd enbtrdc _ssdmshnmnmsgd u_qhntr sxodr ne dwsdqm_k bqhrdrsg_s bntkc oqnunjd _ fnudqmldms qdronmrd nq onkhbx bg_mfd- Svn ne sgdrd qdbdhudc cds_hkdc dw_lhm_shnm hmsgd khsdq_stqd9 rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr _mconkhbxrohkknudqr. O_tk R_a_shdq)enq dw_lokd) g_r _qftdc sg_s &bg_mfdrhmsgd bnqd _rodbsr ne _ onkhbx_qdtrt_kkx sgd qdrtksr ne odqstqa_shnmrhmmnm-bnfmhshude_bsnqrdwsdqm_k sn sgd rtarxrsdl rtbg _r l_bqn-dbnmnlhb bnmchshnmrnq sgd qhrdne _ mdv rxrsdlhb fnudqmhmfbn_khshnm&'R_a_shdq) 08779 03/: rdd _krn R_a_shdq)0876: R_a_shdq_mc Idmjhmr-Rlhsg- 0882_(- &Rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr& hr _ sgtr _ sdql trdc sn cdrbqhadnmdne sgd nkcdrs jmnvm enqlr sgqntfg vghbg onkhbxbg_mfdr-dwsdqm_kbqhrdrsg_s tords drs_akhrgdconkhbxqntshmdr 'Ldxdq) 0871(- Sgdrd b_m hmbktcdhchn}xmbq_shbogdmnldm_ rtbg _r v_qr nq chr_rsdqr)nq qdod_shmfdudmsrrtbg _r bqhshb_k dkdbshnmr _mc kd_cdqrghoqns_shnmr-Sgd oqhmbho_k ldbg_mhrl axvghbg bg_mfd nbbtqr hr sgqntfg sgd hmsqnctbshnm ne mdv _bsnqrhmsnonkhbxoqnbdrrdr) udqx nesdmhmsgd enql ne dmg_mbdcotakhb _ssdmshnm adhmf o)_hcsn _ onkhbxhrrtd _r _ qdrtksne _ odqbdhudcbqhrhrrhst_shnm&Rtarxrsdl rohkkn}dqr& qdedqrsn _ lnqd qdbdmskxcdrbqhadc dwnfdmntr bg_mfd oqnbdrr sg_s nbbtqr vgdm _bshuhshdr hmnsgdqvhrd chrshmbsrtarxrsdlr sq_mrbdmcnkc&onkhbx antmc_qhdr _mc _eedbs sgd rsqtbstqd nq adg_uhntq ne nsgdq rtarxrsdlr 'Cdqx) 0888: Kxmff__qc) 1//0(-00 Hmrs_mbdr rkk-bg_r sgnrd sg_s g_ud nbbtqqdc vgdm Hmsdqmds-a_rdc bnlotshmfbnkkhcdcvhsg dwhrshmf sdkdbnlltmhb_shnmr qdfhldr _mc vgdm knmfdrs_akhrgdcm_stq_kqdrntqbd onkhbx_bsnqrehmchsmdbdrr_qxsn cd_k vhsg @anqhfhm_k k_mcbk_hlr hrrtdr dwdlokhexsghr ogdmnldmnm 'Gnadqf _mc Lnq_v_rjh) 0886: Fq_ms_mc L_bM_l_q_) 0884: Qnrdmc_k)1///: Fdgqhmf 13/ O@QSHU \tjkxyzgtjotm Uuroim Hngtmk _mc Nadqsgtq) 1///: L_qhnm)0888: Q_xmdqds _H-)1//0(- @ksgntfg sghr o_qshbtk_qoqnbdrr ne qdfhld bg_mfd g_r itrs adftm sn ad dw_lhmdc) hs vntkc _ood_qsg_srohkknudqrb_mnbbtq hmrodbhehbhrrtdr vhsgnts _mxodql_mdms bg_mfd hmrtarxrsdl ldladqrgho-rtarxrsdl hmsdqrdbshnm-nq sgdx b_m ad lnqd knmf-sdql hmm_stqd-rtarxrsdl bnmudqfdmbd-Sghr fdmdq_koqnbdrr) khjd rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr)_eedbsronkhbxoqnbdrrdr k_qfdkxsgqntfg sgd hmsqnctbshnm ne mdv _bsnqrhmsnnsgdqvhrd rs_akdrtarxrsdlr- Tmkhjdrxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr)gnvdudq) sgd mdv _bsnqrsdmcsn ad onkhbxrodbh_khrsr_mc hmsdqdrsdco_qshdr)q_sgdqsg_mrhlokx ldladqr ne sgd _qntrdc otakhbLnqd qdbdmsbnmbdoshnmr ne onkhbxrxrsdlr) gnvdudq) _qdlnqd bg_nshb) _a_mcnmhmfmnshnmrne cxm_lhb dpthkhaqh_hme_untq ne _c_oshudbnmbdosr hmvghbg sgdrd rxrsdlr _qd sgntfgs sn _eedbssgdhqdmuhqnmldmsr_mc sgdqdenqd_ksdqsgd m_stqd ne sgdhqnvm bnmrsq_hmsr'rdd C_mdjd) 0881: Idquhr)0886: Atbjkdx) 0857(- Hmsgd onkhbxrbhdmbdr)sghr rghesg_r l_mhedrsdc hsrdkehmsgd _bjmnvkdcfdldms sg_s bqhrdr_qdmnssgd nmkxrntqbd ne onkhbxbg_mfd _mc sg_s e_bsnqrhmsdqm_k nq dmcnfdmntr sn onkhbx-l_jhmfrxrsdlr _mc rtarxrsdlr b_m_krn kd_c sn onkhbxbg_mfd)dhsgdqhmcdodmcdmskxnq hmbnmitmbshnmvhsg dwsdqm_k e_bsnqr 'rdd Odsdqr)0881_: Mtm_m)0888(- Svn oqnbdrrdr hmo_qshbtk_qg_ud addmkhmjdcsn hlonqs_ms onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfdr _mc vdqd chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdqr 4 _mc 89 ~kt}k ingtmk _mc vuroim rkgxtotm1 &Udmtdbg_mfd&qdedqrsn bg_mfdr hmsgd rsq_sdfhdronkhbx_bsnqrenkknv hmotqrthmf sgdhqhmsdqdrsr-01Hmsgdhqvnqj nm onkhbxenql_shnm hmsgd TmhsdcRs_sdr)A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr '08829 15) 128-30( mnsdc rdudq_k rsq_sdfhdrdloknxdc ax _bsnqroqdrdmskxdwbktcdceqnl onkhbxrtarxrsdlr sn f_hm_bbdrr sn onkhbxcdkhadq_shnmr _mc-_eedbso_khbxntsbnldr- Sghr& trt_kkx hmunkudcldladqr ne chrbntqrd bnlltmhshdr _ssdloshmf sn &aqd_jhmsn& lnqd qdrsqhbsdchmsdqdrs mdsvnqjr ne bdmsq_k onkhbx_bsnqr)ats _krn b_mhmunkudinbjdxhmf enq _cu_ms_fd _lnmf mdsvnqj _bsnqr sgdlrdkudr-Udmtd-rgheshmf rsq_sdfhdrtrt_kkx hmunkudsgd qdcdehmhshnm ne _ onkhbx hrrtd sn e_bhkhs_sd sgd _ksdq_shnm ne sgd knb_shnmhm vghbg onkhbx enqltk_shnmnbbtqr- Sgdrd hmbktcdmns_akdhmrs_mbdrrtbg _r vgdm dmuhqnmldms_kfqntor _ssdlos sn qdcdehmdsgd hl_fd ne _m hrrtd khjd v_rsd chronr_k eqnl _ sdbgmhb_k qdftk_snqxhrrtd sn _ otakhb gd_ksgnq oqnodqsx qhfgsr nmdrtrbdoshakdsn k_vrthsr _mcqdbntqrd sn sgd bntqsr 'rdd Inqc_m) 0887: Gnadqf) 0887: Qhbg_qcrnm)0888(- Mns_kkonkhbxhrrtdr _qdrtrbdoshakd) nq _r rtrbdoshakd)sn qdeq_lhmf nq hl_fd l_mhotk_shnm)_mc mns_kk onkhshb_k rxrsdlr bnms_hm _mx)nq _r l_mx) _ksdqm_sd onkhbxudmtdr- Gnvdudq)A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr _qftd sg_s _bsnqr ntsrhcd ne enql_k onkhbx oqnbdrrdr) drodbh_kkx) vhkk_ssdlos sn _ksdqdwhrshmf onkhbxhl_fdr hmsgd gnod sg_s _m_ksdqm_shud udmtd b_mad rtbbdrretkkx knb_sdchmvghbg sgdhq hrrtdr _mc bnmbdqmrvhkkad _bbnqcdc _ e_untq_akdqdbdoshnmSgd hmsdqm_shnm_khy_shnm ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf _mc hsr hlo_bs nm onkhbx bg_mfd-nesdm _ccqdrrdc hmrgnqs-g_mc_r fkna_khy_shnm nq hmsdqm_shnm_k- Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Uuroim Imtgsoiy 574 hy_shnm-qdrtksrhmonkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd k_qfdkxsgqntfg sgd oqnkhedq_shnm ne mdv udmtdr enq_bsnqrsn dwoknhs'Dorsdhm)0886: Bdqmx)1//0: Cndqmds _k" 0885_(&Onkhbx kd_qmhmf& hr _ rdbnmc dmcnfdmntr bg_mfd-dmg_mbhmf oqnbdrr@r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq8) hs qdedqrsn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg) _r Gtfg Gdbkn'0863( g_r mnsdc)_ qdk_shudkx dmctqhmf_ksdq_shnm hmonkhbxqdrtksr eqnl onkhbx-l_jdqr _mco_qshbho_msr kd_qmhmf eqnl sgdhqnvm _mc nsgdqr& dwodqhdmbd vhsg rhlhk_qonkhbhdr-Vghkdrnld sxodr nekd_qmhmf _qdkhlhsdc sn qdekdbshnmr nm dwhrshmf oq_bshbdr)nsgdqr _qd ltbg lnqd e_q-qd_bghmf _mc b_m_eedbs_ vhcd q_mfdne onkhbxdkdldmsr 'rdd Admmdss _mc Gnvkdss) 0880: L_x) 0881(- @kkhmunkudsgd cdudknoldms _mc cheetrhnmne mdv hcd_r hmsndwhrshmf onkhbxoqnbdrrdr- Sgdrd cheedqdms bnmbdoshnmrne kd_qmhmf_mc hsrqnkdhmotakhb onkhbxenql_shnm_qd trdc ax l_mx _m_kxrsrsn cdrbqhad_ bnsmlnm sdmcdmbxenqonkhbhdrsn bg_mfd _r sgd qdrtks ne _ksdq_shnmrhmonkhbxhcd_r bhqbtk_shmf hmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr) _r jmnvkdcfd ne o_rs dwodqhdmbdr hmektdmbdr ldladq itcfdldmsr _r sn sgd ed_rhahkhsx nq cdrhq_ahkhsx ne bdqs_hmoqdrdmsbntqrdr ne _bshnm'Jmndoedk_mc Jhrrkhmf-M_e)0887(Rtbg _m_kxrdrrtffdrs sg_s sgd oqnbdrr ne onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd b_m g_ud ansg dwnfdmntr _mc dmcnfdmntr b_trdr) sg_s hr) b_mhmunkudansg sgd dldqfdmbd ne mdv oqnakdlr _mc hrrtdr) _mc sgd adg_uhntq _mc _sshstcd ne rtarxrsdl ldladqr snv_qcr sgdl- Sgd fdmdq_k_qftldms sn dwok_hm otmbst_sdc dpthkhaqhtl o_ssdqmrne onkhbxcxm_lhbr hr sg_s _sxohb_kbg_mfd tkshl_sdkx nbbtqr adb_trd _mnl_khdr athkc to adsvddm sgd onkhbxqdfhld _mc sgd qd_khsx hs&qdftk_sdr&) qdrtkshmfhm_ bqhrhrvhsghmsgd dwhrshmfqdfhld 'Khmy)0867(- Sgd bg_mfd hr oq-dcohs_sdcax hmmnu_shud hmchuhct_krvhsghmsgd rtarxrsdl qdronmchmfsn bg_mfdc bhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc sn sgdhqnvm _lahshnmr- Sgd oqnbdrr ne qdfhld bg_mfd hr hmhsh_kkx -pthsd tmrs_akd _r bnmekhbshmf icd_r dldqfd _mc bnlodsd enq cnlhm_mbdSgd oqnbdrr hr bnlokdsd) _s kd_rstmshksgd mdwstogd_u_k) vgdm _ mdv rds ne hcd_r vhmr nts nudqsgd nsgdqr _mc hr _bbdosdcax lnrs) nq _s kd_rssgd lnrs onvdqetk) ldladqr ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl- Sgd gdfdlnmx ne sgd mdv qdfhld hr dudmst_kkxdrs_akhrgdcvgdm hshr hmrshstshnm_khydc _mc hsr kdfhshl_bxhr qdbnfmhydcsn sgd onhmssg_s hs_ood_qr mnql_k _mc _ksdqm_shudrsg_s cn mnsehs_ood_q tmtrt_k 'rdd Vhkrnm)1///: Rjnfrs_c) 0887: Idmrnm)0878: Kdfq})1///(- @fdmdq_klncdk ne sghroqnbdrr ne bg_mfdhm _ onkhbxqdfhld hr rds nts hmEhftqd 0/-4- Onkhbxcxm_lhbr _qd bnlokdw _mc bg_q_bsdqhydcax cheedqdms enqbdr_mc oqnbdrrdr dmg_mbhmf onkhbxrs_ahkhsx_mc stqatkdmbd- Oqnbdrrdr rtbg _r onkhbxhd_qmhmf _mc o_sg-cdodmcdmbdnesdmnudqk_o_mc sgdhqhmsdq_bshud deedbsrb_mkd_csn lhmnq nq l_inq bg_mfd)cdodmchmfnmsgd oqdrdmbdnq _ardmbd ne nsgdq bnmchshnmr dmg_mbhmf sgd noonqstmhshdrenqmdv _bsnqr 131 O@QSHU \tjkxyzgtjotm Ehftqd 0/-4 Uuroim Hngtmk @ Ieneral Podel of the Srocess of Solicx Tegime Dhange Yzgmk Hngxi}Czkxoyzoiy Qdhfmhmfnqsgncnwx hr hmrshstshnm_khydc_mc onkhbx_citrsldmsr l_cd k_qfdkxax _ bknrdc fqnto ne dwodqsr _mc neehbh_kr&Qd_k-vnqkc& cdudknoldmsr _qd mdhsgdq 1- @bbtltk_shnm ne _mshbho_sdcmnqetkkx dwokhb_akdhmsd-qlr ne @mnl_khdr sgd qdhfmhmfnqsgncnwxDeenqsr_qd l_cd sn rsqdsbg sgd dwhrshmf qdfhld sn &_bbntmsenq sgd _mnl_khdrDwodqsr_mc neehbh_kr_qd chrbqdchsdc _mc mdv 3- Eq_fldms_shnm ne o_qshbho_msrbg_kkdmfdsgd dwhrshmfqdfhld@tsgnqhsx Cda_sd rohkkrhmsnsgd otakhb _qdm__mc 4- Bnmsdrs_shnm hmunkudrsgd k_qfdqonhhshb_koqnbdrr) hmbktchmfdkdbsnq_k_mc o_qshr_m bnmrhcdq_shnmr5- Hmrshstshnm_khy_shnm @esdq_ odqhnc ne shld) sgd _cunb_sdr ne _ mdv qdfhld rdbtqd onrhshnmr ne _tsgnqhsx _mc ne _Mdv Qdfhld _ksdqdwhrshmfnqf_mhy_shnm_k_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf _qq_mfdldmsr hmnqcdq sn hmrshstshnm_khyd sgd mdv qdfhld- 0- Qdfhld Rs_ahkhsx RNTQBD9 @c_osdceqnl Odsdq@-G_kk)&Onkhbx O_q_chflr) Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf _mcsgd Rs_sd9Sgd B_rd ne DbnmnlhbOnkhbxL_jhmf hmAqhs_hm&) Husvgxgzo~kUurozoiy14) 2 '0882(9 164-85_mc hcd_r sn odmdsq_sd dwhrshmfonkhbx qdfhldr 'rdd Sgnl_r) 0888: @khmj ds _H-)1//0: Mhrads) 0861(@m_kxyhmfsgd onkhbx oqnbdrr hmsdmtr ne onkhbx bxbkdr _mc onkhbx rtarxrsdlr _hcr ansg sgd bnmbdost_khy_shnmne sgdrd etmc_ldms_k onkhbx cxm_lhbr _r vdkk _r sgdhq hcdmshehb_shnm _mc hmudrshf_shnm-Hcdmshexhmf bg_q_bsdqhrshbonkhbx rsxkdr _mc onkhbx o_q_chflr sgqntfg sgd _m_kxrhr ne sgd rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd gdkor sn drs_akhrg _ a_rdkhmd _f_hmrs vghbg sn ld_rtqd bg_mfd) vghkd b_qdetk nardqu_shnm _mc hmudrshf_shnmne rtarxrsdl adg_uhntq& gdkor sn bk_qhexsdmcdmbhdr snv_qcr _sxohb_k onkhbx bg_mfdHmsgd bntqrd ne mnql_k onkhbxcdudknoldms) sgd bqhshb_k_bshuhsxtmcdqs_jdm ax _ rtarxrsdl hr _ enql ne onkhbxkd_qmhmfhmvghbg sgd ntsbnldr ne oqduhntr onkhbxbxbkdr _mc bxbkdrs_fdr eddc a_bj hmsnmdv hsdq_shnmrne -"sgdsXW.[ "'&Bnkdl_m&-de-_k9:&&088&5(&&9&&&Skqhr _kknvr&c0_mfdr¥sn&NBbme vhsghm _m -¥)-¥drs_akhk:gdc"ONketx -°}lc&O5khdX&o_q-_lfl&k;Vhsansks_ks-dqhmf sgd etmc_ldms_k dkdldmsr ne _ onkhbxqdfhld- Bg_mfd) hmsghr rdmrd) hr& dunktshnm_qx _mc o_sg-cdodmcdms- Uuroim Wkmosky gtj Uuroim Imtgsoiy 132 @sxohb_konkhbxbg_mfdr qdoqdrdms_ rhfmhehb_ms) sgntfg mns mdbdrr_qhkx sns_k)aqd_j eqnl sgd o_rs hmsdqlr ne sgd nudq_kkonkhbx fn_kr) sgd tmcdqrs_mchmf ne otakhb oqnakdlr _mc sgdhq rnktshnmr) _mc sgd onkhbx hmrsqtldmsr trdc sn ots cdbhrhnmr hmsn deedbs 'Jdmhr) 0880: Ldm_gdl) 0887) 1//0(- Rtbg cddo bg_mfdr nbbtq hmbhqbtlrs_mbdr vgdm mnqmh_kbg_mfdr sn sgd onkhbxbnld sn ad qdf_qcdc _r hmrteehbhdmsenq sgd s_rj _s k:k_mc-Ax sgdhq udqx m_stqd sgdhq nbbtqqdmbd hr hmeqdptdms)ats vgdm sgdx cn s_jd ok_bd) sgdhq deedbsr_qd edkssgqntfgnts sgd onkhbx rdbsnq- A_tlf_qsmdq) Eq_mj Q-) _mc Aqx_mC- Inmdr- 0880- &@fdmc_Cxm_lhbr _mc OnkhbxRtarxrsdlr&) Ou}xtgr ne Uurozoiy42) 39 0/33-63B_loadkk) Ingm K- 0887- &Hmrshstshnm_k @m_kxrhr_mn-sgd Qnkd ne Hcd_r hm Onkhshb_k Dbnmnlx&) [nkuxm gtj Yuiokzm 16) 49 266-3/8Bnkdl_m) Vhkkh_l C-) Fq_bd C- Rjnfrs_c: _mc Lhbg_dk @sjhmrnm-0885&O_q_chflRghesr_mc OnkhbxMdsvnqjr9 Btltk_shud Bg_mfd hm@fqhbtkstqd&) Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 05) 29 162--2/1Dhrmdq)L_qb @kkdm-0883- &ChrbnudqhmfO_ssdqmr hm Qdftk_snqx Ghrsnqx9 Bnmshmthsx)Bg_mfd _mc Qdftk_snqx Qdfhldr&) Intqm_k ne Uuroim Moyzuxm9/ 19 046-76Drohmf"@mcdqrdm) Fnrs_- 0874- &Onvdq_mc Chrsqhatshnm_kQdfhldr&) Uurozoiy gtj Yuiokzm 03) 19 112-45Fdqrhbj) BnmmhdI-F- 0880- &Qdunktshnm_qx Bg_mfd Sgdnqhdr9 @ Ltkshkdudk Dwoknq_shnmne sgd Otmbst_sdc Dpthkhaqhtl O_q_chfl&) Figjksm ne Rgtgmksktz Wk~ok· 05) 09 0/-25G_kk)Odsdq@- 0882)-&-Onkhbx O_q_chflr:¥ Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf_m_-sgd&Rs_sd9 Sgd-& B_rd ne Dbnmnlhb Onkhbx-l_jhmf&¥hm Gxozgot,/s0Husvgxgzo~kUurozoiy 14) 29 164-85G_qqhr)Qhbg_qc)_mc RhcmdxLhkjhr- 0878- [nk Uurozoiyne Wkm}rgzuxmHngtmk1 Mdv Xnqj9NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrrGdldr) Ftcltmc0865) &Rsqtbstq_kBg_mfd -hmRnbh_kOqnbdrrdr&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ne Yuiourumm71) 29 402-36Ldm_gdl) Fhk_-0887- &Onkhbx O_q_chflr) OnkhbxMdsvnqjr _mc V_sdq Onkhbx hmHrq_dk&) Intqm_k ne U}hroi Uuroim 07) 29 172-20/Qhbg_qcrnm) Idqdlx) Ftmmdk Ftrs_errnm) _mc Fq_ms Inqc_m- 0871- &Sgd Bnmbdos ne OnkhbxRsxkd&)hm Qhbg_qcrnm) dc-) Uuroim Yzmrky ot akyzkxt J}xuvk1 Knmcnm9FdPqfd @kkdm _mc Tmvhm) 0-05Sgnl_r) Fdq_kc A- 0888- &Dwsdqm_k Rgnbjr) Bnmekhbs_mc Kd_qmhmf _r Hmsdq_bshud Rntqbdr ne Bg_mfd hmT-R- Rdbtqhsx Onkhbx&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 08) 19 1/8-20Sqtd) I_ldr K-) Aqx_m C- Inmdr) _mc Eq_mj Q- A_tlf_qsmdq- 0888&Otmbst_sdc-Dpthkhaqhtl Sgdnqx9 Dwok_hmhmfRs_ahkhsx_mc Bg_mfd hm @ldqhb_m Onkhbxl_jhmf&)hm O-@-R_a_shdq)dc-) [nkuxoky ne znk Uuroim Oqnbdrr-Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv Oqdrr) 86-004Vhkrnm)B_qsdq@-1///- &Onkhbx Qdfhldr _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 1/) 29 136-60- 0- Dudm sghr sdql g_r g_c svn rdmrdr- Nmd qdedqr sn sgd hmrshstshnm_k _qq_mfdldmsr entmc hm_ bntmsqx- Rdd)eNedw_lokd) Ftmsgdq '0885(- Sgd rdbnmc qdedqr sn sgd u_ktdr _mc fdmdq_k hcdnknfhb_knqhdms_shnmne _ bntmsqx- Rdd) enq dw_lokd) Dkjhm'k875(1- Sghr hr rhlhk_q sn sgd hcd_ ne _ onkhbx&oqnehkd& ots enqv_qc ax Edhbj 'k881(2- Enq rhlhk_q chrbtrrhnmr ne _bshuhshdr_s d_bg rs_fd ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd oqnlnshmf rs_ahkhsx_mc bg_mfd) rdd Vdaadq '0875(: Sgnl_r _mc Fqhmckd '088/(: Gnvkdss _mc Q_ldrg '1//1(-3- Nm sgd cdehmhshnmne mnm-hmbqdldms_k bg_mfd _r lmnu_sHud nq &aqd_jsgqntfg&bg_mfd) rdd G_xdr '08819 dro- bg- HN(- 4- Sghr lncdk ne bg_mfd hr _jhm sn sg_s ots enqv_qc ax Sgnl_r Jtgm l gHR vnqj nm o_q_chfl rghesr hmrbhdmshehb hmpthqx-Rdd Jtgm '08519- mN(- Nm sgd qnkdne _mnl_khdr hmonkhbx-l_jhmf) rdd G_kk'0882(: K_tfgkhm '0880(Nmsgd qnkdne onkhbxdmsqdoqdmdtqr)rdd Jhmfcnm '0873(: Lhmsqnm'0886(: Qnadqsr _mc Jhmf '0880(5- Cq_vhmf nm vnqj hmsgd rnbhnknfx ne rbhdmbdtmcdqs_jdm ax Qnadqs JLdqsnm) V_kjdq '08639 7-8( g_r rtffdrsdc sg_s sgd hmchuhct_kbnlltmhsx ldladqr& odqrnm_k lnshu_shnmr) tmqdk_sdc sn sgd otqrths ne &naidbshud& jmnvkdcfd) l_x _bbntms enqsgd u_qh_shnmr-Gd _qftdr sg_s sgd ldladqr& cdrhqd enq oqdrshfd _mc qdbnfmhshnm vhsghmsgd rbhdmshehb bnlltmhsx ok_xr _ k_qfd o_qs hmsghr oqnbdrr6- Sghr v_r mns sgd ehqrstrd ne rtbg _ lncdk ne bg_mfd) ne bntqrd- Hs bnqqdronmcr pthsd bknrdkxvhsg sgd mnshnmne ch_kdbshb_k bg_mfd entmc hm sgd vnqjr ne Gdfdk _mc ghr enkknvdqr)hmbktchmf)lnrs nauhntrkx) J_qk L_qw- Rdd Gdqmdr '0865(7- Nm sgd -o_kdnahnknfhb_kqnnsrne sghr _qftldms) rdd Fntkc _mc Dkcqdcfd '0866( : 8- @ksgntfg Jtgm _qftdc hmghr d_qkhdqvnqj sg_s _ o_q_chfl vntkc bg_mfd pthbjkx eqnl sgd nkc sn mdv o_q_chfl) hmghr k_sdqvnqjr gd rtffdrsdc sg_s sgdqd v_r _ sq_mrhsnqxodqhnc adsvddm sgd svn og_rdr- Rdd Jtgm '0863(0/- Sgd nqhfhm_snqne sgd bnmbdos) Bg_qkdr Khmcaknl) g_c mnsdc sg_s hmbqdldms_kbg_mfd b_mnbbtq _s ansg roddcr- Rdd Khmcaknl 'k868(e- Nmd_qkhdqtrdr ne sgd sdql sn dwok_hmsgd oqnbdrr ne Dtqnod_m hmsdfq_shnm) rdd G__r 'k847( _mc Jdng_md _mc Gneel_m '0880(01- Nm sgd ehqrstrdr ne sghr bnmbdos) rdd R-bg_ssrbgmdhcdq'085/(- Nm hsr qdk_shnmrghosn ltksh-kdudk fnudqm_mbd rxrsdlr) rdd Qhbg_qcrnm '0888) 1///(- BfterwordA WtillWtudxing Sublic Solicx Sgd chrbtrrhnm hm sghr annj g_r rgnvm sg_s otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf hr _ ghfgkx bnlokdw l_ssdq) bnmrhrshmf ne _ rdqhdr ne cdbhrhnmr) hmunkuhmf_ k_qfd mtladq ne _bsnqr nodq_shmf vhsghm sgd bnmehmdrne _m _lnqogntr) xds hmdrb_o_akd) hcd_shnm_k_mc hmrshstshnm_kbnmsdws) _mc dloknxhmf _ u_qhdsx ne chudqrd _mc ltksh-e_bdsdc onkhbx hmrsqtldmsr- Sghr bnlokdwhsx onrdr fq_ud cheehbtkshdrenq sgnrd rddjhmf _ bnloqdgdmrhud tmcdqrs_mchmf ne sgd rtaidbs@r sgd bg_osdqr hmsghr unktld g_ud rgnvm) nmd ne sgd rhlokdrs _mc lnrs deedbshudv_xr sn cd_k vhsg sghr bnlokdwhsx hr sn aqd_j cnvm sgd otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr hmsnrdqhdr ne chrbqdsd ats qdk_sdc rta-oqnbdrrdr) snfdsgdq enqlhmf _ bnmshmthmfvuroim Hmirk1 Sgd rs_fdr hmsgd bxbkd bnqqdronskc sn sgd-ehud rs_fdr hm_ookhdc oqnakdl-rnkUhmf) vgdqdaxoqna}&" kdqmr _qd qdbnfmhydc) rnktshnmr _qd oqnonrdc) _ rnktshnm hr bgnrdm) sgd bgnrdm rnktshnm hr ots hmsndeedbs)_mc ehm_kkx sgd ntsbnldr _qd lnmhsnqdc _mc du_kt_sdc- H9o- sgd onkhbx oqnbdrr) sgdrd rs_fdr _qd l_mhedrsdc _r _fdmc_-rdsshmf) onkhbx enqltk_shnm) cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)_mc onkhbxdu_kt_shnmNe bntqrd) sgd otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrr hr mns md_qkx_r shfgskx rdptdmsh_k nq fn_k}cqhudm_r sgd lncdk l_jdr hs_ood_q- Onkhbx_bsnqr) hshr itrsheh_akx _qftdc) cn mns fn _ants l_jhmf _mc hlokdldmshmf onkhbhdrhm sgd rxrsdl_shb l_mmdq sgd lncdk rddlr sn rtffdrs- Vghkd sghr hr mn cntas _ kdfhshl_sd bnlok_hms _f_hmrs sgd bnmbdoshnmne otakhb onkhbx_r adhmf b_qqhdc nts hm_ rdqhdr ne rs_fdr) hshr _krn&sqtdsg_s sgd khlhs_shnmb_m ad lhshf_sdc sn _ k_qfd dwsdmsvhsg b_tshnm _mc chkhfdmbdhmhsr _ookhb_shnm-Sgd _cu_ms_fd ne dloknxhmf sgd bxbkdlncdk khdrhmhsr qnkd_r _ ldsgncnknfhb_k gdtqhrshb; e_bhkhs_shmf sgd tmcdqrs_mchmf ne sgd otakhb onkhbx oqnbdrr ax aqd_jhmf hshmsno_qsr) d_bg ne vghbg b_m ad hmudrshf_sdc _knmd nq hm sdqlr ne hsr qdk_shnmrghosn sgd nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd bxbkd-Sghr _kknvr sgd hmsdfq_shnmne sgd rstcx ne hmchuhct_k b_rdr) bnlo_q_shud rstchdr ne _ 135 O@QS HU \tjkxyzgtjotm Uuroim Hngtmk rdqhdrne b_rdr) _mc sgd rstcx ne nmdnq l_mx rs_fdr ne nmd nq rdudq_k b_rdr) ne vghbg sgd onkhbxkhsdq_stqd) enqsgd lnrs o_qs)hr bnlonrdc- . Sgd lncdk&r fqd_sdrs uhqstd) gnvdudq) hr hsr dlohqhb_knqhdms_shnm) vghbg dm_akdrsgd rxrsdl_shb du_kt_shnmne _ vhcd q_mfdne cheedqdms e_bsnqr cqhuhmfotakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf _s sgd u_qhntr rs_fdr nesgd onkhbx-l_jhmfoqnbdrr- Vghkd _arsq_bsbnmbdost_khy_shnm hr mdbdrr_qxsn cdudkno _ aqn_c ohbstqdne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) _m_m_kxshb_k eq_ldvnqj sg_s s_jdr hmsn_bbntms sgd cds_hkrne sgd rta-oqnbdrrdr hmcdudknohmf_ ohbstqdne sgd dmshqd oqnbdrr hr drrdmsh_k& Sgd e_bsnqrbnmrhcdqdc_s d_bg rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkdg_ud addmsgd _bsnqr)hmrshstshnmr) _mc hcd_r hmunkudchmcdudknohmfsgd bnmsdms_mc oqnbdrr ne sgd bqd_shnmne sgd onkhbxhmptdrshnm) _mc sgd hmrsqtldmsr _u_hk_akd sn b_qqxhsnts- D_bg ne sgdrd _rodbsr ne sgd onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr hr hmhsrdke_ bnlokdw ogdmnldmnm) _mc sgd fdmdq_km_stqdne d_bg g_r addmrjdsbgdc nts hmsgd annj@r vd g_ud _qftdc) hm_rrdrrhmf gnv _bsnqr_mchmrshstshnmr bnlahmd hmsgd onkhbxbxbkdsn _eedbssgd hcd_r _mchmrsqtldmsr sg_s enql sgd fn_kr _mc ld_mr ne otakhb onkhbx)hshr trdetk sn sghmj_ants sgdl _r lnqd nq kdrr bngdqdmsonkhbx rtarxrsdlr. Sgdrd rtarxrsdlr g_ud rodbhehboqnodqshdr_mc rsqtbstq_kbg_q_bsdqhrshbr sg_s _eedbssgd sxodr neonkhbxfn_kr sgdx drontrd _mc sgd jhmcr ne hmrsqtldmsr ed_rhakdnq _bbdos_akdenqotsshmf sgdhqonkhbxhcd_r hmsnoq_bshbd-Lnqd rodbhehb_kkx) sgd annj rgnvr gnv otakhb onkhbhdrdldqfd eqnl _ bnlokdw hmsdqok_x ne enqlr ne fnudqmldms) sxodr ne hrrtdr)_mc sgd nqf_mhy_shnm ne rs_sdr _mc rnbhdshdrhmsno_qshbtk_qsxodr ne rdbsnq_konkhbxrtarxrsdlr- D_bg rdbsnq_krtarxrsdl sdmcrsn cdudkno_-o_q-shbtk_qrsxkd ne onkhbx-l_jhmf _mc _ o_qshbtk_q )rdsne onkhbx hcd_r sg_s l_mhedrs sgdlrdkudr hm_ chrshmbsrds ne oqd-drs_akhrgdcoqdedqdmbdr enq o_qshbtk_qsxodr ne-hmrsqtldmsr _mc rdsr ne onkhbxbk_hlr nq oqnakdlr rg_qdc ax rtarxrsdl ldladqrSgd annj rgnvr gnv sgd _bsnqr o_qshbho_shmf hmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr hmbktcdhmchuhct_kr_mc fqntor cq_vm ansg eqnl vhsghm_mceqnl ntsrhcd sgd enql_k hmrshstshnmr ne fnudqmldms _mc bhuhkrnbhdsx-Sgd fnudqmldms _bsnqr ok_xhmf_ bqhshb_k qnkdhmsgd oqnbdrr _qd sgd dwdbtshud)atqd_tbq_bx)_mc kdfhrk_stqd-Hmlars hmrs_mbdr) sgd atqd_tbq_bx ok_xr sgd l_hm qnkd)sgntfg ghfg-oqnehkdhrrtdr nq sgd s_kdmsr_mc cdsdqlhm_shnmne hmchuhct_k lhmhrsdqr_qd khjdkxsn dmbntq_fd _ fqd_sdqqnkdenqsgd dwdbtshudNmkxhm_ khlhsdc mtladq ne bhqbtlrs_mbdr) vgdqd bnmrshstshnm_k nqcdqr _kknvhs)_qdkdfhrk_stqdr_akdsn hmektdmbd rhfmhehb_mskx sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _mchsrntsbnldrSgd rnbhds_k_bsnqrhmunkudcsn _ rhfmhehb_ms dwsdmshmsgd otakhb onkhbx ¥kkI&[&(bdesR&hmctc}&hmsdqdrs&fqntor:))-drd_qbg¥&Nk&f_mhybh9shnmr) sgd l_rr ldch_) ICagxhrsr):--_mc:["nn¥)qdk_sh9u9d0x")e)_qd)-nbb_rhnm-r)-0gd otakhb- Cdodmchmfnm sgdhqhmsdqm_k qdrntqbdr _mc khmjr vhsg fnudqmldms _bsnqr) nqf_mhydc rnbh_kfqntor b_mad ghfgkxhmektdmsh_k _bsnqr-Fqntor _mc nqf_mhy_shnk(-r dmcnvdc vhsg k_qfd_mc rtoonqshud ldladqrgho) _cdpt_sd etmcr) rb_qbd Flzkx·uxjB YzorrYz}jmotm U}hroi Uuroim 57: hmenql_shnm)_mc bknrd khmjrvhsg qdkdu_msatqd_tbq_shb _mc dwdbtshud _bsnqrb_mad dwodbsdcsn ad hmektdmsh_k ok_xdqrhmsgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl@kksgd _bsnqrhmunkudchmsgd oqnbdrr g_ud hmsdqdrsr)a_rdc nm sgdhq qdrntqbdr) mddcr)nq hcdnknfx)vghbg sgdx rddj sn _bghdudsgqntfg o_qshbho_shnmhmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr- Gnv sgdx fn _ants o_qshbho_shmf _mc sgd dwsdmssn vghbg sgdx _qd rtbbdrretk _qd _eedbsdcax sgd aqn_cdq hmrshstshnm_k bnmsdws hmvghbg sgdx nodq_sdSgd hmrshstshnmr ne lnrs qdkdu_mbdsn onkhbx-l_jhmf odqs_hmsn sgd nqf_mhy_shnm ne rs_sd _mc rnbhds_k_bsnqr)_mc-sgd khmjradsvddm sgdlGnv onkhbx_bsnqr_qdnqf_mhydchmsdqm_kkx _mc hmqdk_shnm sn d_bg nsgdq vhsghm_ rtarxrsdl cdsdqlhmdrsgd m_stqdne sgdhqb_o_bhsxsn o_qshbho_sd hmsgd onkhbxol bdrr _mc _eedbshsr ntsbnldr- @ rs_sd&req_fldms_shnmhr qdekdbsdchmhsrdwdbtshud_mc atqd_tbq_shb neehbh_kr& b_o_ahkhshdr sn cnlhm_sd_ onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc bnmsqnk_bshuhshdr rtbg _r _fdmc_-rdsshmfnq onkhbxenqltk_shnm-@mhmsdqm_kkx chuhcdc rs_sd hr nesdmtm_akd sn qdrhrs sgd bnmekhbshmf cdl_mcr ok_bdc tonm 00 ax rnbhds_kfqntor- Rhlhk_qkx) eq_fldms_shnm_lnmf l_inq rnbhds_kfqntor l_jdr hscheehbtksenqsgdl sn cduhrd bngdqdmsonrhshnmrsgdx b_moqdrdms_s onkhbxcdkhadq_shnmrSgd nqf_mhy_shnm_k ed_stqdrsg_s _qdo_qshbtk_qkx vd_jdmhmf _qdedcdq_khrl) _ oqdrhcdmsh_k nq qdotakhb_mrxrsdl) _mc _m tmoqnedrrhnm_katqd_tbq_bxEdcdq_khrlchuhcdr_tsgnqhsxadsvddm svn kdudkrne fnudqmldms) vgdqd_r _ oqdrhcdmsh_k rxrsdl chuhcdr _tsgnqhsx _lnmf u_qhntr aq_mbgdr ne sgd fnudqmldms: sgd mdsdeedbsne ansg hr sn qdctbd rs_sd b_o_bhsxbnlo_qdc sn tmhs_qx o_qkh_ldms_qxrxrsdlr- @m tmcdq-qdrntqbdc) eq_fldmsdc) cdlnq_khydc) nq bnqqtos atqd_tbq_bx hr rhlhk_qkxcdahkhs_shmf adb_trd ne hsrhm_ahkhsx& sn cduhrd bngdqdmsonkhbhdr_mc cdedmcsgdl _f_hmrsoqdrrtqdr¥-eqd=lrnbh_kfqntor _mconkhshbh_mrSgd nqf_mhy_shnm ne rnbhds_kfqntor hr _krn _mhlonqs_ms e_bsnq_eedbshmfsgd m_stqdneonkhbxrtarxrsdlr _mcsgdqdaxsgd nodq_shnmne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _mc hsrntsbnldr- Hshr nesdmsgd rnbhdsx&roqnakdlr sg_s sgd rs_sd rddjr sn _ccqdrr sgqntfg otakhb onkhbhdr)_mc hshr sgdqdenqdsn ad dwodbsdcsg_s sgnrd chqdbskx_eedbsdcax sgd oqnakdl vhkknqf_mhydsn hmektdmbd onkhbx-l_jhmf-Sgd rnbhds_k_bsnqr dmf_fdc hmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr u_qx _bqnrr onkhbxrdbsnqr) _r d_bg onkhbxmnql_kkx hmunkudrnmkx sgnrd vhsg chqdbshmsdqdrsrhmsgd hrrtd hmptdrshnm- Dmbnlo_rrhmf _mc bngdrhudfqntor _qd_akdsn cduhrd bngdqdmsonrhshnmrsg_s qhrd_anud m_qqnv rdbshnm_khmsdqdrsr)_mc rtbg fqntor _qd sgdqdenqdlnqd khjdkxsn rdqudsgd hmsdqdrsr ne sgd rnbhdsx_r _ vgnkd- Sgd vnqrs rhst_shnmhr vgdm fqntor _qdhmchuhct_kkx rn rsqnmf _r sn l_jd hscheehbtksenqsgd rs_sd sn hfmnqdsgdl) xdssnn chrtmhsdcsn cdudknobngdrhudoqnon-r_krenq_ccqdrrhmfotakhb oqnakdlrSgd rsqtbstqd ne onkhbxrtarxrsdlr _eedbsrsgd nudq_qbghmfrdsr ne onkhbxhcd_r sg_s cdsdqlhmdsgd qdbnfmhshnm ne rnbh_koqnakdlr) sgd bnmrsqtbshnmne onkhbxnoshnmrsn qdrnkudsgdl) _mc sgd hlokdldms_shnm _mc du_kt_shnmneld_mr sn _bghdudrnktshnmrhmoq_bshbd-Rtarxrsdl rsqtbstqd ]] - 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0882- &O_qsmdqrgho _mc Otakhb @clhmhrsq_shnm9 Bnmbdost_k _mc Oq_bshb_kBnmrhcdq_shnmr&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 25) 0946-65]- ]) Aqh_mL_qrnm) _mc R_mcenqc Anqhmr-1///- [nk Mdv U}hroi Txmgtongzout1 Snqnmsn9Hmrshstsdne Otakhb@clhmhrsq_shnmne B_m_c_Jdqq) Bk_qj- 0872- [nk Etstqd ne Ntj}yzxogr YuiokzokyBHut~kxmktik nq Hutzot}otm Io~kx0 yozmDB_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrrJdqq)Cnmm_G- 0865- &SgdKnfhbne "Onkhbx"_mc Rtbbdrretk Onkhbhdr&) Uuroim Yioktiky 6) 29 240-52Jdqvhm) BnqmdkhtrL- 0883- &SgdDkdldmsr ne Qtkd-L_jhmf&)hmC-G- Qnrdmaknnl _mc Q-C- Rbgv_qsy) dcr) Mgtjhuuq ne Wkm}rgzout gtj Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Qg·1 Mdv Xnqj9 L_qbdk Cdjjdq) 234-70]] - 0888- W}rksgqotmB Mu· Lu~kxtsktz Fmktioky axozk Qg· gtj Rgqk Uuroim1 V_rghmfsnm9 Bnmfqdrrhnm_kPt_qsdqkx OqdrrJdx) U-N-)Iq- 0856- U}hroi Tvotout gtj Fskxoigt Iksuixgim1 Mdv Xnqj9 JmnoeJhbjdqs) V_ksdqI-L- 1//0- &OtakhbL_m_fdldms ne Gxaqhc Nqf_mhy_shnmr9 Fnudqm_mbd ne Pt_rh-@tsnmnlntr Dwdbtshud@fdmbhdr&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr U}hroi Rgtgmksktz Ou}x0 tgr7B 246-61. 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088/- &SgdQntmc S_akd Dwodqhdmbd9 Qdoqdrdms_shnm _mc Kdfhshl_bx hmB_m_ch_mDmuhqnmldms_kOnkhbxL_jhmf&) V}kkt,y V}gxzkxrm 86)39 47/-5/0]] - 0880- &Onkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr) OnkhbxRsxkdr)_mc OnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm9M_shnm_k @ooqn_bgdr sn Sgdnqhdr ne Hmrsqtldms Bgnhbd&)Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}xtgr 08) 19 0-10]] - 0883- &Onkhbx O_q_chflr _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd9 Kdrrnmr Eqnl sgd Nkc _mc Mdv B_m_ch_mOnkhbhdrSnv_qcr @anqhfhm_kOdnokdr&)Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}xtgr 11) 39 520-40]] - 0886_- &Hrrtd-@ssdmshnm _mc-Otmbst_sdc Dpthkhaqh_Lncdkr Qdbnmrhcdqdc9@m Dlohqhb_kDw_lhm_shnmne sgd Cxm_lhbr ne @fdmc_-RdsshmfhmB_m_c_&)Hgtgjo1gO4 Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrYioktik 2/) 092-18]] - 0886a- &Oqdchbs_akd _mc Tmoqdchbs_akdOnkhbxVhmcnvr9 Hrrtd) Hmrshstshnm_k _mc Dwnfdmntr Bnqqdk_sdrne B_m_ch_mEdcdq_k@fdmc_-Rdsshmf&) o_odq oqdrdmsdc sn sgd _qlt_k lddshmf ne sgd B_m_ch_mOnkhshb_k Rbhdmbd@rrnbh_shnm)RsIngm&r]] - 1///- &L_m_fhmfsgd "Gnkknv Rs_sd"9Oqnbdctq_kOnkhbxHmrsqtldmsr _mc LncdqmFnudqm_mbd&) igtgjogt U}hroH1Fjsotoyzxgzout 32) 39 301-20]] - 1//1- &CnMdsvnqjr L_ssdq> KhmjhmfOnkhbxMdsvnqj Rsqtbstqd sn OnkhbxNtsbnldr9 DuhcdmbdEqnl Entq B_m_ch_mOnkhbxRdbsnqr)088/-1///&) Hgtgjogt Ou}x0 tgr ne UurozoigrYioktik 24)19 124-56]] - _mc L- Q_ldrg- 0882- &O_ssdqmr ne OnkhbxHmrsqtldms Bgnhbd9OnkhbxRsxkdr) OnkhbxKd_qmhmf_mc sgd Oqhu_shy_shnm -Dwodqhdmbd&) Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 01) 09 2-13]] _mc ]] - 0884- Yz}jmotm Otakhb UuroimBUuroim Hmirky gtj Uuroim Y}hymyzksy1 Snqnmsn9NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr" ]] _mc ]] -0887- &Onkhbx Rtarxrsdl Bnmehftq_shnmr_mc OnkhbxBg_mfd9 Nodq_shnm_khyhmf sgd Onrsonrhshuhrs@m_kxrhrne sgd Onkhshbrne sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr&) Uuroim Rstchdr Ou}sgr59/ 29 355-71]] _mc ]] - 1//1- &SgdOnkhbxDeedbsrne Hmsdqm_shnm_khy_shnm9 @ Rtarxrsdl @citrsldms @m_kxrhr&ne OnkhbxBg_mfd&)Ou}xtgr ne Husvgxgzo~k Uuroim Ftgrmyoy 7/ 29 20-4/]] _mc Idqdlx Q_xmdq-0884- &CnHcd_r L_ssdq> ONkhbxRtarxrsdl Bnmehftq_shnmr _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd hmsgd B_m_ch_mEnqdrs Rdbsnq&) igtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 27) 29 271-30/" Gnvrd) Qnadqs) I- Qnadqs R- Oqhbg_qc)_mc Lhbg_dk I- Sqdahkbnbj- 088/- &Rl_kkdqnq Rl_qsdq Fnudqmldms>&)\to~kxyozm ne [uxutzu Qg· Ou}xtgr 3/9 387-430Gtadq) Dudkxmd)_mc Ingm C} Rsdogdmr- 0887- &Hmsdqm_shnm_khy_shnm _mc sgd Rnbh_k Cdlnbq_shb Lncdk9 Bqhrhr_mc Etstqd Oqnrodbsr&)Husvgxgzo~k UurozoigrRstchdr 20) 29 242-86Gtadq) Fdnqfd O- 0880- &Nqf_mhy_shnm Kd_qmhmf9 Sgd BnmsqhatshmfOqnbdrrdr _mc sgd Khsdq_stqdr&: Txmgtongzout Yioktik 1) 0977-004: 381 Gohroumxgvnm Gohroumxgvnm G_mrdm)Q_mc_k)_mc Cdrlnmc Jhmf- 1//0- &DtfdmhbHcd_r)Onkhshb_k Hmsdqdrsr)_mc Onk} hbx U_qh_mbd9Hllhfq_shnm _mc Rsdqhkhy_shnm OnkhbxhmAqhs_hm _mc sgd T-R9) auxrj Uurozoiy42 'I_m-(9 126-52G_mrdm)Rtr_m A- 0872- &OtakhbOnkhbx@C-_kxrhr9 Rnld QdbdmsCdudknoldmsr _mc BtqqdmsOqnakdlr&) Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}xtgr 019 03-31G_qfqnud) D-K-0864- [nk Royyotm QotqB [nk Yz}jm ul znk Nsvrksktzgzout ul Yuiogr Uur0 oim1 V_rghmfsnm9Tqa_m HmrshstsdG_qqhr)Qhbg_qc)_mc RhcmdxLhkjhr- 0878- [nk Uurozoiyul Wkm}rgzuxmHngtmk1 Mdv Xnqj9 NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrrG_qqhrnm)J_sgqxm- 1//0- &SnnBknrd sn Gnld9 ChnwhmBnms_lhm_shnmne Aqd_rs Lhkj _mc sgd Onkhshb_k @fdmc_&)Uuroim Yioktiky 239 24-51G_qqnv) Idmmx-1//0- &&&B_o_bhsx Athkchmf"_r _ OtakhbL_m_fdldms Fn_k9Lxsg) L_fhb ne sgd L_hm Bg_mbd&)U}hroi Rgtgmksktz Wk~ok· 2) 19 1/8-2/G_qr_mxh)Ingm B- 0866- Wgzoutgr Gkng~ou}x gtj Ggxmgototm Dpthkhaqhtl ot Lgsky gtj Yuiogr Yoz}gzouty1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrG_rs_j) L_mni) Lhbg_dk A- L_yhr) _mc Knthr @-Lnqqhr- 1//0- &SgdQnkdne Bnmrtldq Rtqudxr hmOtakhb OnkhbxCdbhrhnmL_jhmf&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim gtj Rgxqkzotm 1/)19 06/-74G_tekdq) Uhqfhmh_-1///- &Oqhu_sd RdbsnqHmsdqm_shnm_k Qdfhldr&) hmQ-@-Ghffnss _mc F-Q-C- Tmcdqghkk)dcr) Ftjxkgy Gokrkx1Knmcnm9Qntskdcfd) 010-26]] - 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0881- Ntixksktzgroys gtj U}hroi Uuroim1 Mdv Xnqj9Knmfl_mr]] - 1//0- [nk Qosozy ul Uuroim HngtmkB Ntixksktzgroys/ auxrj~ok· gtj znk W}rk ul Qg·1 V_rghmfsnm9Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrG_xr) R_ltdk O- 0848- Hutykx~gzout gtj znk Luyvkr ul JlloioktimB [nk Uxumxkyyo~kHut0 ykx~gzout Ru~ksktz 4;A304A531 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0876- Gkg}zm/ Mkgrzn gtj UkxsgtktikB Jt~oxutsktzgr Uurozoiyot znk \tozkj Yzgzky/ 0844-0874- Mdv Xnqj9B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrGdbkn) Gtfg- 0863- Rujkxt Yuiogr Uurozoiy ot Gxozgot gtj Y·kjktB Eqnl Wkrokl zu Ntiusk Rgotzktgtik1 Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0865- &Bnmbktrhnm9 OnkhbxCxm_lhbr&)hmQnrd '08659 126-55(]] -0867- &Hrrtd-Mdsvnqjr@Hkc-sgd-Dwdd-tshudDrs_akh9:gldms&) hm@-Jhmf) dc-) [nk Sk· FskxoijtUgrotiiorYmyzks1 V_rghmfsnm9 @ldqhb_HqDgsdqoqhrd Hmrshstsdenq )-"OTakhh=Onhhbx Qdrd_qbg]] - 0883- &Hcd_r)Hmsdqdrsr_mc Hmrshstshnmr&) hmK-B-Cncc _mc B- Ihkkrnm)dcr) [nk ul Fskxoigt UurozoiyBFvvxuginky gtj Ntzkxvxkzgzouty1 R_m Eq_mbhrbn9 Vdrsuhdv) 255-81Gdhcdmgdhldq) @qmnkcI--G0IfgGdbko) _mc B_qnkxmSdhbgL_HkkR)dcr- 0864- H3[[r1vgxg0 Imtgsoiy 160 Fskxoig1 Mdv Xnqj9Rs L_qshm&rOqdrrGdhjjhk_) S_mx_- 0888- &SgdQnkdne Rbhdmbd_mc Qdrd_qbg hmOnkhbxL_jhmf9 Sgd B_rd ne sgd R_mOdcqn QhudqA_rhm&) o_odq oqdrdmsdc _s sgd _mmt_klddshmf ne skkdVdrsdqmOnkhshb_k Rbhdmbd@rrnbh_shnm)Rd_sskdGdhmy)Ingm O-)ds _k- 088/- &Hmmdq Bhqbkdrnq Gnkknv Bnqdr&)Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoiy 41) 19 245-8/Gdkc) C_uhc) _mc @msgnmxLbFqdv- 0882- &Fkna_khy_shnm _mc sgd Khadq_kCdlnbq_shb Rs_sd&)Lu~kxtsktz gtj Tvvuyozout 17) 19 150-74Gdkkrsdqm)Fdqc-Lhbg_dk- 0875- &@rrdrrhmfDu_kt_shnm Qdrd_qbg&)hmJ_tel_m ds _k'08759 168-201(Gdmcqhbj) Qdadbb_ L-) _mc C_uhc M_bglh_r- 0881- &SgdOnkhbxRbhdmbdr9Sgd Bg_kkdmfdne Bnlokdwhsx&)Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 00) 2.39 20/-17Gdqhshdq)@cqhdmmd-0886- &Onkhbx-L_jhmfax Rtasdqetfd9 Hmsdqdrs@bbnllnc_shnm) Hmmnu_shnm _mc Rtarshstsd Cdlnbq_shb Kdfhshl_shnmhmDtqnod-Odqrodbshudr eqnl Chrshmbshud&Onkhbx @qd_r&) Ou}xtgr ul J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 3)19 060-78]] - 0888- &Dkdldmsrne Cdlnbq_shb Kdfhshl_shnmhmDtqnod9 @m@ksdqm_shud Odqrodbshud&)Ou}xtgr ul J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 5) 19 158-71Gdql_m) Dcv_qc R-: _mc Mn_l Bgnlrjx- 0877- Rgt}lgiz}xotm HutyktzB [nk Uurozoigr Jiutusm ul znk Rgyy Rkjog1 Mdv Xnqj9O_msgdnmAnnjrGdql_mm) Bg_qkdrE- 0871- &Hmrsqtldmsrne EnqdhfmOnkhbx&) hmO-B_kk_g_m)K-O-Aq_cx) _mc R1L1 Gdql_mm) dcr) Ikyixohotm WOxkomtUuroim Gkng~ou}x1 AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9 R_fd) 042-63Gdqmdr)Ftcltmc0865- &Rsqtbstq_k&Bg_mfd hmRnbh_kOqnbdrrdr&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul Yuiourumm 71)29 402-36Gdrrd) In_bghl Idmr- 0886- &Qdathkchmf sgd Rs_sd9Otakhb RdbsnqQdenql hmBdmsq_k_mc D_rsdqmDtqnod&)hmI--D- K_md)dc-) U}hroi Ykjux WkluxsB Wgzoutgrk/ [xktjy gtj Uxuhrksy1 Knmcnm9R_fd) 003-34Ghaahmf) Ingm Q-) _mc Dkhy_adsgSgdhrr-Lnqrd- 1//1- Yzkgrzn IksuixgimB Fskxoigty, Gkrokly ghu}z Mu· Lu~kxtsktz Ynu}rj auxq1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd Tmhudqrhsx - OqdrrGhaar) Cntfk_r @-)Iq- 0866- &Onkhshb_k O_qshdr_mc L_bqndbnmnkmhbOnkhbx&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 6090356-76]] -- 0867- &Nmsgd Onkhshb_k Db}mnlx ne Knmf-qtm kqdmcr hmRsqhjd@bshuhsx&) Gxozoyn Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 7) 19 042-64]] - 0876- [nk Uurozoigr Jiutusm ul Ntj}yzxogr Iksuixgioky1 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrrGhkf_qsmdq) Rsdogdm)_mc Bg_qkdr0- Anrj- 0870- &SgdQhrd _mc E_kkne Rnbh_kOqnakdlr9 @Otakhb @qdm_rLncdk&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul Yuiourumm 83) 0942-67Ghkk)K_qqxA-)dc- 0881- [nk Yzgzkul U}hroi G}xkgrrH[4rrp,1@qlnmj) MX9L-D- Rg_qodGhkk)Lhbg_dk) dc- 0882- [nk Uuroim UxuikyyB@ Wkgjkx1 Knmcnm9G_qudrsdqVgd_srgd_eGhmsyd)Nssn- 0864- [nk MoyzuxoigrJyygmy ul Tzzu Motznk1 Mdv Xnqj9NwenqcTmhudqrhsx OqdrrGhqrbgl_m) @kadqsN- 0847- [nk Yzxgzkmmul Jiutusoi Ik~kruvsktz1 Mdv G_udm9X_kd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrGhqrs)O_tk) _mc Fq_g_ld Sgnlornm- 0885- Lruhgrongzout ot V}kyzout1 Nwenqc9Onkhsx OqdrrGhrrbgdlnkkdq) L_ssghir) _mc Qna Gnood- 0884- &Bnohmfvhsg Hmsq_bs_akd Bnmsqnudqrhdr9-Sgd B_rd enq Oqnakdl RsqtbstqhmfhmOnkhbxCdrhfm _mc @m_kxrhr&) Ptu·rkjmk gtj Uuroim 7) 39 3/-50Gidqm)Admmx-0871- &klokdldm!_shnmQdrd_qbg-Sgd Khmj Fnmd Lhrrhmf&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 1)29 2/0-7]] _mc C_uhc N- Onqsdq-0882- &Hlokdldms_shnmRsqtbstqdr9 @ Mdv Tmhsne @clhmhrsq_shud@m_kxrhr&) hmAhkk'0882(zo~kU}hroi UuroimB[nk Uurozoiyul Yuiogr Hnuoik ot J}xuvk gtj Gohroumxgvnm 59; Gohroumxgvnm Fq_anrjx) OdsdqM- 0884- &TrhmfMnm-Fnudqmldms_k Qdrntqbdr sn Enrsdq Qdftk_snqx Bnlokh_mbd&)Lu~kxtgtik 7) 39 416-4/Fq_mcd) D- 0885- &SgdRs_sd_mc HmsdqdrsFqntor hm_ Eq_ldvnqj ne Ltksh-KdudkCdbhrhnm-L_jhmf9 Sgd B_rd ne sgd Dtqnod_m Tmhnm&) Ou}xtgr ne J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 29 202-27Fq_ms)Vxm) _mc @mmdL_bM_l_q_- 0884- &VgdmOnkhbxBnlltmhshdr Hmsdqrdbs9 Sgd B_rdr ne @fqhbtkstqd_mc A_mjhmf&)UurozoigrYz}joky 329 4/8-04Fq_msg_l) @mcqdv-1//0- &Gnv Mdsvnqjr Dwok_hm TmhmsdmcdcOnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm Ntsbnldr9 Sgd B_rd ne TJ Q_hkOqhu_shy_shnm&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 68) 39 740-6/Fq_x) O_s) _mc O_tk s&G_qs-0887- U}hroi Uuroim Ioygyzkxy ot akyzkxt Dtqnod- Knmcnm9 QntskdcfdFqddm) Cnm_kc) _mc H_mRg_ohqn- 0883- Ugznurumokyne Wgzoutgr Hnuoik [nkuxm1 Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrrFqddmadqf) Fdnqfd C-) ds _0- 0866- &CdudknohmfOtakhb OnkhbxSgdnqx9 Odqrodbshudr eqnl Dlohqhb_kQdrd_qbg&)Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 609 0421-32Fqdfnqx) Qnahm)Shl LbC_mhdkr)_mc C_qxkEhdkcr-1//0- &Cdbhrhnm @hchmf)Mns Chrotsd Qdrnktshnm9Bqd_shmfHmrhfgsrSgqntfg Rsqtbstqdc Dmuhqnmldms_kCdbhrhnmr&) Intqtgr ne Uuroim Ftgrmyoy gtj Rgtgmksktz 1/) 29304-21Fqhffr) Rsdudm-0888- &QdrsqtbstqhmfGd_ksgOnkhbxMdsvnqjr9 @EqdmbgOnkhbxRsxkd>&) akyz J}xuvkgt Uurozoiy11) 39 074-1/3Fqhl_) @-O-0874- &O_qshbho_snqx Qhsdr9Hmsdfq_shmf OtakhbHmunkudldmshmDmuhqnmldms_kHlo_bs @rrdrrldms&) hmI-A-Q- Vghsmdx _mc U-v- L_bk_qdm)dcr) Jt~oxutsktzgr Nsvgiz FyykyysktzB [nk igtgjogt J•vkxoktik1 Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnHmrshstsd enqDmuhqnmldms_kRstchdr) 22-40Fqhlrg_v) C_lh_m) RsdudmUhmbdms)_mc Gtfg Vhkklnss- 1//0- &MdvBnmsqnkLncdr _mc Dldqfdms Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Enqlr9 Oqhu_sd-OtakhbBnmsq_bshmfhmOtakhb@clhmhrsq_shnm&) Fjsotoyzxgzo~k [nkuxm gtj Uxgizoik 12) 293/6-2/Ftdrr) Fdnqfd L-) _mc O_tk F- E_qmg_l- 1///- Hgyky ot U}hroi Uuroim Ftgrmyoy1 V_rghmfsnm9Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrFtkhbj) Ktsgdq G- 0826- &Mnsdrnm sgd Sgdnqx ne Nqf_mhy_shnm&) hmFtkhbj _mc Tqvhbj '0826(]] _mc Kxmc_kTqvhbj) dcr- 0826- Ugvkxy nm znk Yioktik ne Fjsotoyzxgzout1 Mdv Xnqj9Hmrshstsdne Otakhb @clhmhrsq_shnm]] _mc ]] dcr- 0836- Ugvkxy nm znk Yjktik ne Fjsotoyzxgzout1 Mdv Xnqj9 @-L- JdkkdxFtlldss) O-)dc- 0885- Lruhgrongzout gtj U}hroi Uuroim1 Bgdksdmg_l9 Dcv_qc Dkf_qFtmmhmfg_l) Mdhk)Odsdq Fq_anrjx) _mc C_qqdm Rhmbk_hq0887- Rl_qs Wkm}rgzoutB Ikyomtotm Jt~oxutsktzgr Uuroim1 Nwenqc9Bk_qdmcnmOqdrr]] _mc Inrdog Qddr- 0886- &HmctrsqxRdke-Qdftk_shnm9 @mHmrshstshnm_k Odqrodbshud&) Qg· gtj Uuroim 08) 39 252-303]] _mc C_qqdmRhmbk_hq0888- &Qdftk_snqxOktq_khrl9 CdrhfmhmfOnkhbxLhwdr enq Dmuhqnmldms_kOqnsdbshnm&) Qg· gtj Uuroim 10) 0938-65]] _mc Lhjd C- Xntmf- 0886- &Snv_qcNoshl_k Dmuhqnmldms_k Onkhbx9Sgd B_rd ne AhnchudqrhsxBnmrdqu_shnm&) Jiurumm Qg· V}gxzkxrm 139 132-87Ftrs_errnm) Ftmmdk)_mc I-I- Qhbg_qcrnm-0868- &Bnmbdosrne Q_shnm_khsx _mc sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr&)J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrWkykgxin 69304-25G__r) DqmrsA- 0847- [nk \tozotm ne Dtqnod9 UurozoigQYuiogr gtj Jiutusoigr Kuxiky 2:61-2:68. Knmcnm9Rsdudmr_mc Rnmr]] - 0864- &Hrsgdqd _ Gnkd hmsgd Vgnkd> Jmnvkdcfd) Sdbgmnknfx) Hmsdqcdodmcdmbd) _mc sgd Bnmrsqtbshnmne Hmsdqm_shnm_k Qdfhldr&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 18) 29 716-65G__r) L_qj 0- 1//0- &OqnrodbsSgdnqx _mc sgd Bta_m Lhrrhkd Bqhrhr&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Yz}joky V}gxzkxrm 349 130-6/- 59A - G__r) OdsdqL- 0881- &Hmsqnctbshnm9 Dohrsdlhb Bnlltmhshdr _mc Hmsdqm_shnm_k Onkhbx Bnnqchm_shnm&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 35)09 0-25G_ff_qc) Rsdogdm)_mc Bgtmf-HmLnnm- 088/- &Hmrshstshnmr _mc Dbnmnlhb Onkhbx9Sgdnqx _mc _ Jnqd_m B_rd Rstcx&) auxrj Uurozoiy31)19 10/-26]] _mc Adsg @-Rhllnmr- 0876- &Sgdnqhdrne Hmsdqm_shnm_k Qdfhldr-&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 30)29 380-406G_gm) Qnadqs v-) _mc Ingm @- Ghqc- 0880- &SgdBnrsr _mc Admdehsrne Qdftk_shnm9 Qduhdv _mc Rxmsgdrhr&) bgrk Ou}xtgr ne Wkm}rgzout 7)09 122-67G_hcdq)Cnm_kc- 0878- &Fq_msr_r _ Snnk ne OtakhbOnkhbx&) hmR_k_lnm '0878_9 82-013(G_hcdq-L_qjdk) Cnm_kc O-) _mc L_qj Q- Inrkxm- 1//0- &FtmOnkhbx)Nohmhnm)Sq_fdcx _mc Ak_ld @ssqhatshnm9 Sgd Bnmchshnm_k Hmektdmbd ne Hrrtd Eq_ldr&) Ou}xtgr ne Uuro0 zoiy 52) 19 41/-32G_idq)L__qsdm z[- 0882- &ChrbntqrdBn_khshnmr_mc sgd Hmrshstshnm_ty_shnm ne Oq_bshbd9 Sgd B_rd ne @bhcQ_hmhmAqhs_hm&) hmEhrbgdq_mc Enqdrsdq'08829 32-65(G_kk)Ingm @-)_mc F- Ingm Hjdmadqqx-0878- [nk Yzgzk1Lhmmd_onkhr9Tmhudqrhsxne Lhmmdrns_ OqdrrG_kk)Lhbg_dk) _mc Jdhsg A_mshmf-1///- &SgdMnmoqnehsRdbsnqhmB_m_c_9@mHmsqnctbshnm&)hmA_mshmf)dc-) [nk SutUxuloz Ykizux ot HgtgjgB Wurky gtj Wkrgzoutynovy1 Lnmsqd_k_mc Jhmfrsnm9LbFhkk-Ptddm&rTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 0-17G_kk)Odsdq @- 0875- LT~kxtotm znk JiutusmB [nk Uurozoiy ne Yzgzk Ntzkx~ktzout ot Gxozgotgtj Kxgtik1 B_laqhcfd9 OnkhsxOqdrr-& dc- 0878- [nk UurozoigrUu·kx ne Jiutusoi NjkgyB Pkmtkyogtoys Fixuyy Sgzouty1 Oqhmbdsnm) MI9Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 088/- &Onkhbx O_q_chflr) Dwodqsr)_mc sgd Rs_sd9Sgd B_rd ne L_bqndbnmnlhb Onkhbx-L_jhmfhmAqhs_hm&) hmAqnnjr _mc F_fmnm '088/(]] &0881- &SgdBg_mfd eqnl Jdxmdrh_mhrl sn Lnmds_qhrl9 Hmrshstshnm_k @m_kxrhr _mc AqhshrgDbnmnlhb Onkhbxhmsgd 086/r&) hmR- Rsdhmln ds _k-)dcr) Rsqtbstqhmf Uur0 ozoiyBMoyzuxoigr Ntyzoz}zoutgroys ot Husvgxgzo~k Ftgrmyoy1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 8/-003]] - 0882- &Onkhbx O_q_chflr) Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf_mc sgd Rs_sd9Sgd B_rd ne Dbnmnlhb OnkhbxL_jhgf hmAqhs_hm&) Husvgxgzo~k Uurozoiy14) 29 164-85]] -0886- &SgdQnkdne Hmsdqdrsr)Hmrshstshnmr _mc Hcd_r hmsgd Bnlo_q_shud Onkhshb_kDbnmnlx ne Hmctrsqh_khydc M_shnmr&) hmL-k- Tbga_bg _mc @-R-Ytbjdql_m) dcr) Husvgxgzo~k UurozoiyBWgzoutgrozm/ Btkstqd gtj Rsqtbstqd- B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 063-1/6]] _mc Qnrdl_qx B-Q-S_xknq-0885- &enkhshb_k Rbhdmbd_mc sgd Sgqdd Mdv Hmrshstshnm_khrlr&)UurozoigrYz}joky 339 825-46G_kk)Sg_c D-) _mc K_tqdmbdI- N&Snnkd-1///- &Rsqtbstqdrenq OnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm9 @m@m_kxrhrne M_shnm_kKdfhrk_shnm0854-0855 _mc 0882-0883&) Fjsotoyzxgzout gtj Yuiokzm 20)59 556-75G_ll: Jdhsg D- 0872- &O_ssdqmr ne Hmektdmbd @lnmf Bnllhssddr) @fdmbhdr)_mc Hmsdqdrs Fqntor&) Qkmoyrgzo~k Yz}joky V}gxzkxrm 7) 29 268-315G_llnmc) Sgnl_r G- 0875- &@fdmc_Bnmsqnk)Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Rsqtbstqd) _mc Atqd_tbq_shbOnkhshbr&) Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrYjktik 2/) 19 268-31/]] - _mc I_bj G- Jmnss- 0888- &Onkhshb_k Hmrshstshnmr) OtakhbL_m_fdldms) _mc Onkhbx Bgnhbd&)Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wkykgxin gtj [nkuxm 8) 0922-74]] _mc ]] - 1///- &OtakhbL_m_fdldms) @clhmhrsq_shudKd_cdqrgho _mc Onkhbx Bg_mfd&)hmI-0- Aqtcmdx) 0)I- N&Snnkd)_mc G-F- Q_hmdx)dcr) Fj~gtjtm U}hroi RgtgmksktzB Mdv Ik~kruvsktzy hm [nkuxm/ Rkznujy gtj Uxgizoik1 V_rghmfsnm9 Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr)38-63G_mbnbj) L- Cnm_kc- 0872- &Bnlo_q_shud Otakhb Onkhbx9@m @rrdrrldms&) hm @-VEhmhesdq) dc-) UurozoigrYjktikB [nk Yzgzk ne znk Ioyjvrotk1 V_rghmfsnm9@ldqhb_m Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd@rrnbh_shnm)172-2/7- Envkdq)Dcltmc O-)_mc C_uhc Rhdfdk)dcr- 1//1- \xhgt Uuroim Nyy}ky1 Snqnmsn9Nwenqc TmhudqrhsxOqdrrEnw)Bg_qkdrI- 088/- &Hlokdldms_shnmQdrd_qbg9Vgx _mc Gnv sn 0e_mrbdmcOnrhshuhrs Ldsgncnknfx&) hmO_ktlan _mc B_khrs_'088/(Eq_mbhr)Ingm F- 0882- [nk Uurozoiyul Wkm}rgzoutBF Husvgxgzo~k Ukxyvkizo~k1 Nwenqc9 Ak_bjvdkkEq_mjd) Fdnqfd Q- 1//0- &@ookhb_shnmr ne Lds_-@m_kxrhrenqL_qjdshmf _mc Otakhb Onkhbx9@Qduhdv&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim gtj Rgxqkzotm 1/)19 075-1//Eqddl_m) F_qx O- 0874- &M_shnm_k Rsxkdr _mc OnkhbxRdbsnqr9Dwok_hmhmf Rsqtbstqdc U_qh_shnm&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 4) 39 356-85Eqddl_m) Ingm Kdhodq-0844- [nk UurozoigrUxuikyyB J•ki}zo~k G}xkg}0Qkmoyrgzo~kHus0 sozzkk Wkrgzouty1Mdv Xnqj9Q_mcnl Gntrd]] _mc Itchsg O_qqhrRsdudmr-0876- &@ Sgdnqdshb_k_mc Bnmbdost_k Qddw_lhm_shnm ne Rtarxrsdl Onkhshbr&) U}hroi Uuroim gtj Fjsotoyzxgzout 1)09 8-13Eqdmbg)Ingm Q-O-) _mc Adqsq_l Q_udm- 0848- &Sgd A_rdr ne Rnbh_kOnvdq&)hm CB_qsvqhfgs) dc-) Yz}joky ot Yuiogr Uu·kx1 @mm@qanq9Tmhudqrhsxne Lhbghf_m Oqdrr) 04/-56Eqdx) Aqtmn R- 0867- &Onkhshbn-Dbnmnlhb Lncdkr _mc Bxbkdr&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi $11tusoiy 89 1/2-1/Eqdx)EqdcdqhbjV- 0860- &Bnlldms9 NmHrrtdr _mc Mnmhrrtdr hmsgd Rstcx ne Onvdq&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 549 0/70-00/0Eqhdcl_m) Kdd R- 1//1- [nk Roixukiutusoiy ul U}hroi Uuroim Ftgrmyoy1 Oqhmbdsnm) MI9 Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrF_kk)Fdq_kc 0- 0872- [nk Hgtgjogt QkmgrYmyzks/ 1mc dcm- Snqnmsn9B_qrvdkkF_qrnm) F- C_uhc- 0875- &Eqnl OnkhbxRbhdmbdsn Onkhbx@m_kxrhr9 @ Pt_qsdq Bdmstqx ne Oqnfqdrr&)hmV-M- Ctmm) dc-) Uuroim FtgrmyoyB Ukxyvkizo~ky/ Hutikvzy/ gtj Rkznujy1 Fqddmvhbg) Bnmm-92Ak Oqdrr)2-11F_tr) Ingm L- 0820- &Mnsdrnm @clhmhrsq_shnm&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 58/ 09 012-23F_vsgqno) Knthr B- 0860- Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Uurozoiy gtj Yuiogr Hngtmk1 Mdv Xnqj9-Rs L_qshm&rOqdrr-Fdgqhmf) Sgnl_r) _mc Rda_rsh_mNadqsgtq- 1///- &Dwoknqhmf Qdfhld Hmsdq_bshnm9 @ Eq_ldvnqj ne @m_kxrhr&) o_odq oqdrdmsdc sn sgd Ehm_kBnmedqdmbdne sgd DTehm_mbdcBnmbdqsdc@bshnmOqnfq_lld nm sgd Deedbshudmdrrne Hmsdqm_shnm_k Dmuhqnmldms_k @fqddldmsr _mc DT Kdfhrk_shnm-EqhcsineM_mrdmHmrshstsd)A_qbdknm_) 8-00 Mnu- 1///Fdms) Bg_qhshD- 1///- &MddckdDwbg_mfd Onkhbx@cnoshnmhm@ldqhb_m Bhshdr9anm SuzD,/ Uuroim Yioktiky 229 014-42Fdnqfd) @kdw_mcdq0- 0858- &Sgd"Nodq_shnm_kBncd"9 @ Mdfkdbsdc @ooqn_bg sn sgd Rstcx ne Onkhshb_k Kd_cdqr _mc Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Yz}joky V}gxzkxrm 02908/-111]] - 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0883_- &Chrbnudqhmf O_ssdqmrhmQdftk_snqx GHrsNqx9BnmsHmTHsx) Bg_mfd _mc }tk_snqx Qdfhldr&) ru}xtgr ne UuroHb1M1oyzuxm 5)19 -046-76--- 0883a- &DbnmnlhbQdftk_snqx OnkhbHdr9 Qdftk_shnm_mc Cdqdftk_sHNml Ghrsnq} Bnmsdws&)em C-G- Qnrdmaknnl _mc Q-C- Rbgv_qsy) dcr) Mgtjhuuq ne Wkm}rg0 zout gtj Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Qg·1 Mdv Xnqj9L_qbdk Cdjjdq) 80-005Dkcqdcfd) Mhkdr)_mc RsdogdmI_x Fntkc- 0861- &Otmbst_sdcDpthkhaqh_9 @m}sdqm_shud sn OgxkdshbFq_ct_khrl&) hmS-I-L- Rbgnoe) dc-) Ugrkuhourumm1R_mEq_mBHRBN9 Eqddl_m) Bnnodq) 71-004Dkjhm)Rsdogdm0- 0875- &Qdftk_shnm_mc Qdfhld9 @ Bnlo_q_shud @m_kxrhr&) ru}xtgrul U}hroi Uuroim 5) 0938-61-Dkkhf)Idqqx) _mc Cnm K_unhd- 0884- &SgdOqhmbhokd-@fdms Qdk_shnmrghoHmN}f_mHy_shnmr&) hmO-Enrr) dc-) Jiutusoi Fvvxuginky zu Txmgtongzouty gtj Ntyzrz}zoutyB Ft Ntzxuj}izout1 @kcdqrgns9C_qslntsgDkkhnssBgqhr _mc Qncnkogd Rbgk_doedq-1//0- &Sgd@cunb_bx Bn_khshnmEq_ldvnqj9 @ookhb_sh}m sn sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr-enq sgd Cdudknoldms ne Enqdrs Bdqshehb_shnm hm Rvdcdm&)ru}xtgr ne J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 7) 39 531-50- Dkkhnss)Cnlhmhb) _mc L_qshm_ LbFthmmdrr- 1//0- &OtakhbHmpthqx9O_m_bd_ nq Ok_bdan>&) ru}xtgr ne Hutzotmktioky gtj HxoyoyRgtgmksktz 0/) 09 03-14Dkkhnss) Dtdk) _mc @mcqdv H-D-Dvnkk- 1///- &SgdDunktshnmne _m Hrrtd9 Sgd Qhrd _mc Cdbkhmdne @eehql_shud@bshnm&) Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 06)1.29 101-26Dklnqd) Qhbg_qcE- 0867- &Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Lncdkr ne Rnbh_kOqnfq_l Hlokdldms_shnm&) U}hroi Uuroim 15) 19 074-117]] - 0876- &Hmrsqtldmsr_mc Rsq_sdfxhmOtakhb Onkhbx&) Uuroim Yzrrjoky Wk~Nk· 6)09 63-075Dkrsdq)Inm) dc- 0875- Wgzoutgr Hnuoik1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr- 0880- &SgdOnrrhahkhsxne Q_shnm_kOnkhshbr&) hmC) Gdkc) dc-) Uurozoigr [nkuxm 1 [ujgm1 Nwenqc9Onkhsx- ----Dmfkdg_qs)Jdmmdsg F-) _mc Lhbg_dk I- Sqdahkbnbj- 0870- U}hrNH Ugxzqizvgz·t r[Q znk Wkm}rgzuxmUxuikyyB [nk Nyy}k ne K}tjotm1 Nss_v_9 Dbnmnlhb Bntmbhkne B_m_c_Dorsdhm)O_tk I- 0886- &AdxnmcOnkhbxBnlltmhsx9 Eqdmbg@fqhbtkstqd_mc sgd F@HS&) ru}xtgr ne J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 3) 29244-61Dqaqhmf)Ktsy) _mc Dchd M- Fnkcdmadqf- 087/- &Eqnms O_>dMdvr _mc Qd_k9}nqkc}tdr9 @Mdv Knnj _s @fdmc_-Rdsshmfax sgd Ldch_&)Fskxzigtpu}sgr ne UurozoigrYizktik 13) 09 05-38Dqhjrnm)Qnadqs R-)Mnql_m Q- Ktssadf) _mc Jdms 0- Sdchm)dcr- 087/- FskxNHgt U}hrzi Tvotout1 Mdv Xnqj9In0l Vhkdx _mc Rnmr) Fdq_kc B- Vqhfgs Iq) _mc In0l O-Lbkudq- 0878- &Onkhshb_k O_qshdr)Otakhb Nohm} _mc Rs_sdOnkhbxhmsgd TmhsdcRs_sdr&)Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 72) 29 618-28Drohmf-@mcdqrdm) Fnrs_- 0870- &Eqnl Vdke_qdRs_sdsn Cd}n-bq_shbRn-bh}rl9 Sgd }>kh} shbr ne Dbnmnlhb Cdlnbq_bx hmCdml_qj _mc Rvdcdm) HmL- YdHskhm) dc-) UurozoHgr Uu·kx gtj Yuiogr [nkuxm/ 000-3/- 0874- UurozoiyFmgotyz RgxqkzyB [nk Yuiogr Iksuixgzoi Wugj zu Uu·kx1 Oqhmbd} MI9Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr- 088/- [nk [nxkk auxrjy ne akrlgxk Hgvozgroys1 B_laqhcfd9 Onkhsx-_mc V_ksdqJnqoh- 0873- &Rnbh_k Onkhbx_r Bk_rr Onkhshbr hmOnrs-V_q B_ohs_khrl9 }mchm_uh_) @trsqh_)_mc Fdql_mx&) hmI-G- Fnkcsgnqod) dc-) Txjkx gtj Hutlroiz ot Hutzksvuxgxm Hgvozgroys1 Nwenqc9Bk_qdmcnmOqdrr-Dsgdqdcfd) KknxcR- 0870- &FnudqmldmsKd_qmhmf9 @mNudquhdv&)hmR-K-Knmf) dc-) [nk Mgtjhuuq ne UurozoigrGkng~oux1Mdv Xnqj9I>kdmtl) ]] _mc I_ldr Rgtgmksktz qotkyy Rgnqs- 0872- &Sghmjhmf@ants Fnudqmldm-s Kd_qmhmf&) ru}xtgr 598 ne Yzzzjoky1/) 0930-47- Dsyhnmh)@lhe_h- 0856- &Lhwdc-Rb_mmhmf9 @ "Sghqc" @ooqn_bg sn Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 16) 492749"&81Du_mr) L_qj) _mc Inm_sg_m C_uhdr- 0888- &Tmcdqrs_mchmf OnkhbxSq_mredq9@ LtkshKdudk)Ltksh-Chrbhokhm_qx Odqrodbshud&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 66) 19 250-74 Du_mr) Odsdq-0881- &Rs_sd_r Oqnakdl _mc Rnktshnm9Oqdc_shnm)Dladccdc @tsnmnlx) _mc Rsqtbstq_kBg_mfd&)hmRsdogdmG_ff_qc _mc Qnadqs Q- J_tel_m) dcr) [nk Uuro0 zoiy ne Jiutusoi Fjp}yzsktzB Ntzkxtgzoutgr Hutyzxgotzy/ Ioyzxoh}zo~k Hutlroizy/ gtj znk Yzgzk1Oqhmbdsnm) MI9Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 028-70]] - 0884- Jshkjjkj F}zutusmB Yzgzky gtj Ntj}yzxogr4zgtyluxsgzout1 Oqhmbdsnm) MI9Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) C- Qtdrbgdldxdq) _mc S- Rjnbonk) dcr- 0874- Gxotmotmznk YzgzkGgiq Nt1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrE_kj) Qhbg_qc- 0886- &Rs_sdne Rhdfd9 Vhkk Fkna_khy_shnmVhm Nts>&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Fllgoxy 62) 09012-25E_xnk)Gdmqh-0838- Lktkxgr gtj Ntj}yzxogr Rgtgmksktz1 Knmcnm9Ohsl_mEdhbj)Itqfdm- 0881- &Bnlo_qhmfBnlo_q_shud OnkhbxRstchdr-@ O_sg Snv_qcr Hmsdfq_shnm>&) ru}xtgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 01) 2-9146-75Edkcl_m) QnmI- 1//1- &FnudqmldmsHmrtq_mbd&) hmR_k_lnm '1//1_9 075-105( Edqm_mcdr)Qnm_kc)_mc Gdqadqs @- Rhlnm- 0888- &@Rstcx ne Gnv Hmchuhct_krRnkud Bnlokdw _mc Hkk-RsqtbstqdcOqnakdlr&) Uuroim Yioktiky 219 114-34Ehmjkd)Odsdq)ds _k- 0883) Kkjkxgr Lu~kxtsktz Wkrgzouty ·ozn Ntzkxkyz Lxu}vyB F Wkiut0 yojkxgzout1 Nss_v_9 OqhuxBntmbhkNeehbdEhmmdlnqd)L_qsg_) _mc J_sgqxm Rhjjhmj- 0887- &Hmsdqm_shnm_k Mnql Cxm_lhbr _mc Onkhshb_k Bg_mfd&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 41) 39 776-806Ehrbgdq)Eq_mj- 0882- &Onkhbx Chrbntqrdr _mc sgd Onkhshbrne V_rghmfsnm Sghmj S_mjr&) hmEhrbgdq_mc Enqdrsdq'08829 10-31(]] _mc Ingm Enqdrsdq)dcr- 0876- Hutlxutzotm ]gr}ky ot Uuroim FtgrmyoyB [nk Uuro0 zoiy ne Hxozkxog1 AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9 R_fd]-] _mc ]] ) dcr- 0882- [nk Fxm}sktzgzo~k [\xt ot Uuroim Ftgrmyoy gtj Urgt0 totm1 Ctqg_l) MB9Ctjd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrEhrbgnee) A_qtbg- 0866- &BnrsAdmdehs@m_kxrhr_mc sgd @qs ne Lnsnqbxbkd L_hmsdm_mbd&) Uuroim Yioktiky 7) 19 066-1/1Ehrgl_m) Dsg_m-0880- &Onkhshb_k Oghknrnogx _mc sgd OnkhbxRstchdr Nqf_mhy_shnm&) UYB UurozoigrYioktik gtj Uurozoiy139 61/-2Ek_sgl_m) QhBg_qcD- 0855- [nk U}hroi NtzkxkyzBFt Jyygm Hutikxtotm znk Suxsgzo~k Ioyiu}xyk ne Uurozoiy1Mdv Xnqj9VhkdxEkdllhmf) Qnx A-) A- C_m Vnnc) _mc Ingm Angsd- 0888- &@ssdmshnm sn Hrrtdr hm_ Rxrsdl ne Rdo_q_sdcOnvdqr9 Sgd L_bqncxm_lhbr ne @ldqhb_m Onkhbx@fdmc_r&)ru}x0 tg-ul Uurozoiy50)09 65-0/7Enkdx)Ctmb_mJ- 0867- &Rs_sd Dwodmchstqdeqnl _ L_qwhrsOdqrodbshud&) ru}xtgr ne U}h0 roi Jiutusoiy 8) 19 110}27Enns) C_uhc J- 0868- &Onkhshb_k Bxbkdr) Dbnmnlhb Bxbkdr _mc sgd Sqdmc hm Otakhb Dloknxldms hmB_m_c_&)hmLdxdq V- Atbnudsrjx) dc-) Yzzzjrky ot U}hroi Jsvrum0 sktzgtj Husvktygzout ot Hgtgjg1 Snqnmsn9 Atssdqvnqsgr enq Hmrshstsd enq Qdrd_qbg nm Otakhb Onkhbx)54-7/Enqdrsdq)In0l- 0873- &Antmcdc Q_shnm_khsx _mc sgd Onkhshbrne LTcckhmf Sgqntfg&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 33) 0912-20]] - 0878- Urgttotm ot znk Kgik ne Uu·kx1 Adqjdkdx9Tmhudqrhsxne B_khenqmh_ OqdrrEnql_hmh) Qnadqs- 088/- [nk Rmzn ne Yioktzoloi U}hroi Uuroim1 Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9 Sq_mr_bshnmEntb_tks) Lhbgdk- 0861- &SgdChrbntqrd nm K_mft_fd&)hmEntb_tks) dc-) [nk Fxingkur0 nfx ne Ptu·rkjmk1 Mdv Xnqj9O_msgdnm- ]] Gnvkdss) _mc C-) K_xbnbj) dcr) Uuroim Yz}joky ot HgtgjgB [nk Yzgzk ul znk Fxz1 Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr) 80-013]] - 1///- &Fkna_kChrbnqc9Sgd BnmetrhmfChrbntqrd ne Sghmj S_mjr&)hmS- Bngm) R-LbAqhcd) _mc I- Vhrdl_m) dcr) Uu·kx ot znk Lruhgr Jxg1 Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mCncfd) L_qshm) _mc Bgqhrsnogdq Gnnc- 1//1- &O_uknuh_m OnkhbxQdronmrdr sn Ldch_ EddchmfEqdmyhdr>C_mfdqntr Oqtfr Qdftk_shnmhmBnlo_q_shud Odqrodbshud&) Ou}x0 tgr ul Hutzotmktioky gtj HxoyoyRgtgmksktz 0/) 09 0-02Cndqm)F- Aqtbd- 0856- &SgdQnkdne Qnx_kBnllhrrhnmr hmsgd Fdmdq_kOnkhbxOqnbdrr _mc hm Edcdq_k-Oqnuhmbh_k Qdk_shnmr&)Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 0/) 39 306--22]] - 0860- &Sgd Qnkd ne Bdmsq_k@cuhrnqx Bntmbhkr9 Sgd RbhdmbdBntmbhk ne B_m_c_&)hm&Cndqm _mc @tbnhm'08609 135-55(]] - 0870- [nk Sgz}xk ul Yioktzoloi gtj [kinturumoigr Hutzxu~kxym ot Kkjkxgr Uuroim Kuxsgzout1 Nss_v_9 RbhdmbdBntmbhkne B_m_c_]] - 0887-&&SgdHmsdqok_x @lnmf Qdfhldr9 L_oohmf Qdftk_snqx Hmrshstshnmr hmsgd Tmhsdc Jhmfcnl) sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr) _mc B_m_c_&)hm Cndqm _mc Vhkjr '08879 18-4/(& ]] _mc Odsdq@tbnhm) dcr- 0860- [nk Yzx}iz}xky ul UuroimqRgqotm ot Hgtgjg1 Snqnmsn9L_blhkk_m]] &ds _k- 0888- &B_m_ch_mQdftk_snqx Hmrshstshnmr9Bnmudqfhmf _mc Bnkkhchmf Qdfhldr&) hmCndqm) L-L- Ghkk)L-I- Oqhmbd)_mc Q-I- Rbgtksy) dcr) Hngtmotm znk W}rkyB Hgtgjogt Wkm}rgzuxm Wkmosky gtj Ntyzoz}zouty1 0aqnmsn9 Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr) 2-15& ]] ) K- O_k)_mc A-V- Snlkhm) dcr- 0885_- Guxjkx HxuyyotmyB[nk Ntzkxtgzoutgrong0 zout ul Hgtgjogt U}hroi Uuroim1 Snqnmsn9NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr_mc ]] - 0885a- &SgdHmsdqm_shnm_khY_shnm ne B_m_ch_mOtakhbOnkhbx&)hmCndqm)O_k)_mc Snlkhm '0885_9 0-15(]] _mc Qhbg_qcV- Oghcc- 0881- Hgtgjogt U}hroi UuroimBNjkgy/ Yzx}iz}xk/ Uxuikyy/ 1mc dcm- Snqnmsn9MdkrnmB_m_c_]] _mc Sdc Qddc- 1//0- &Rbhdmbd _mc Rbhdmshrsrhm Qdftk_snqx Fnudqm_mbd9@ Ldyyn-KdudsEq_ldvnqj enq@m_kxrhr&) Yioktik gszU}hrzH'Ugroim 17) 29084}1/3} ]] _mc R-Vhkjr) dcr- 0887- Hngtmot1mWkm}rgzuxmNtyzoz}zouty ot Gxozgot gtj Suxzn Fskxoig1 Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr]] _mc U-R- Vhkrnm) dcr- 0863_- Nyy}ky ot Hgtgjogt U}hroi Uuroim1 Snqnmsn9 L_blhkk_m]] _mc ]] - 0863a- &Bnmbkt&rhnmr _mc Nardqu_shnmr&)hmCndqm _mc Vhkrnm ) '0863(c&Nlaq_hm)M-0886- &OtakhbHmpthqhdrhmB_m_c_&)Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 73/ 0975-0/6Cnm_gtd) Ingm C- 0878- [nk Uxo~gzongzoutIkioyoutB U}hroi Jtjy/ Uxo~gzkRkgty1 Mdv Xnqj9A_rhbAnnjr]&]&] _mc Inrdog R- MxdIq) dcr- 1//0- Lu~kxtgtik gtj Gommkx/GkzzkxRgxqkzy1 V_rghmfsnm9Aqnnjhmfr Hmrshstshnm OqdrrCnrh) F-) ds _k-)dcr- 0877- [kintoigr Hngtmk gtj )utusoi [nkuxm1 Knmcnm9OhmsdqCnvchmf) Jdhsg- 0883- &Sgd Bnlo_shahkhsx ne Adg_uhntq_khrl) Q_shnm_kBgnhbd _mc "Mdv Hmrshstshnm_khrl"&) Ou}xtgr ul [nkuxkzoigr Uurozoiy5)09 0/4-06Cnvmr) @msgnmx-0846- Ft )utusoi [nkuxm ul Iksuixgim1 Mdv Xnqj9G_qodq)]] - 0856- Ntyojk G}xkg}ixgim1 Mdv Xnqj9G_qodq _mc Qnv]] - 0861- &To_qhc&CnvmVheg"Dbnknfx-sgd-srrtd-@ssdgmnm Bxbkd"&)[nk U}hroi '!msdqdrs39;'49-61. Cqdymdq)C_mhdkV- 1///- &Hcd_r)Atqd_tbq_shb Onkhshbr) _mc skhdBq_eshmfne EnqdhfmOnkhbx&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 33) 39 622-38Cqnq) Xdgdyjdk- 0853- &Ltcckhmf Sgqntfg-"Rbhdmbd" nq Hmdqsh_&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxg0 zoutWk~oka5/7/ 29043-96]] ) -S fff 14A9;1 U}hroi Uuroimsgqotm Wk0k•gsotkj1 R_mEq_mbhrbn9 Bg_mckdq]]] -0858- &SgdOqdchbshnm ne Onkhshb_k Ed_rhahkhsx&) K}z}xky 'Itmd(9 171-7Cqtbjl_m) I_qs(-drM-1//0- &Nm sgd Khlhsr ne Eq_lhmf Deedbsr:Vgn B_mEq_ld>&) Ou}x0 tgr ul Uurozoiy52) 39 0/30-55Cqxydj) Ingm R- 0881- &Gnv E_qHrHsEqnl Uhqfhmh_ _mc Qnbgdrsdqsn Eq_mjetqs> Otakhb Bgnhbd _r Fkna_kSgdnqx&)GxozoynOu}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 11) 39 286-307]] _mc Aqh_mQhokdx- 0877- &Sgd @lahshnmr ne OnkhbxCdrhfm&)Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 6) 39 6/4-08Ctbg_bdj) HunC- 086/- Husvgxgzo~k KkjkxgroysB [nk [kxxozuxogrIosktyout ul Uurozoiy1 Mdv Xnqj9Anks)Qhmdg_qs_mc VhmrsnmCtckdx) Fdneeqdx)V_xmd O_qrnmr)_mc Bk_tchn L- Q_c_dkkh-1///- &Rxlonrhtl9 Sgdnqhdrne sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr&)Ou}xtgr ul J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 6)09 011-3/]]] _mc Idqdlx Qhbg_qcrnm-0887- &@qdm_r vhsgnts Qtkdr _mc sgd OnkhbxBg_mfd Oqnbdrr9Ntsrhcdq Fqntor _mc AqhshrgQn_cr Onkhbx&) UurozoigrYz}joky 359 616-36-_mc ]] - 0888- &Bnlodshmf@cunb_bx Bn_khshnmr _mc sgd Oqnbdrr ne "Eq_ld Qdekdbshnm"9 @Knhkfhstchm_k @m_kxrhrne DTRsddkOnkhbx&) Ou}xtgr ul J}xuvkgt U}hroi Uuroim 5) 19 114-37Ctmkd_ux) O_sqhbj- 0875- &Dwok_hmhmf sgd Oqhu_shy_shnm Annl9 Otakhb Bgnhbd udqrtr Q_chb_k@ooqn_bgdr&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 53)09 02-23-] _mc BgqhrsNogdqGnnc- 0883- &Eqnl Nkc Otakhb @clhmhrsq_shnmsn Mdv Otakhb L_m_fdldms&) U}hroi Rutkm gtj Rgtgmksktz 03) 29 8-05Ctmm) Vhkkh_l M- 0877- &Ldsgncr ne sgd Rdbnmc'FTg[7 Bnohmfvhsg sgd Vhkcdqmdrr ne Bnmudmshnm_k Onkhbx@m_kxrhr&) Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 6) 39 61/-26Ctptdssd) Lhbgdk- 0888- G}orjotm Sk· IksuixgiokyB Jiutusoi gtj Yuiogr Wkluxs ot Gxgnor/ Hnork gtj Rk•oiu1 Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrrCtqq) Qnadqs G- 0882- &Vg_s Lnudr OnkhbxRdmshldms>&) Fskxoigt Uurozoigr Yioktik Wk~ok· 76) 09 047-61Ctqq_ms) Qnadqs E-) _mc O_tk E- Chdgk-0878- &@fdmc_r)@ksdqm_shudr _mc Otakhb Onkhbx9 Kdrrnmr eqnl sgd T-R- EnqdhfmOnkhbx@fdmc_&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 8) 19 068-1/4Cvhudch) o.P., dc- 0871-&Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Yzgzkot HgtgjgB Jyygmy ot Mutu}x Tl O1J1Muj0 mkzzy1Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrrCxd) Sgnl_r Q- 0861- \tjkxyzgtjotm U}hroi Uuroim1 Dmfkdvnnc Bkheer)MI9 OqdmshbdG_kk]] - 1//0- 4hv0Iu·t Uuroimsgqotm1 Mdv Xnqj9Bg_sg_l GntrdCxdqrnm) Q}l_mn) _mc Eq_mj Ltdkkdq- 0882- &Hmsdqudmshnm ax Ntsrhcdqr9 F Rsq_sdfhb Odqrodbshudnm Fnudqmldms Hmctrsqh_kOnkhbx&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 02) 0958-77Cxrnm) Jdmmdsg G-E- 087/- [nk Yzgzk 4[gjozout ot akyzkxt J}xuvkB F Yz}jm ul _m Njkg gtj Ntyzoz}zout1 Nwenqc9L_qshmQnadqsrnmDbnmnlhb Bntmbhk ne B_m_c_- 0868- Wkyvutyohrk Wkm}rgzoutB Ft Ntzkxos Wkvuxz1 Nss_v_9 Rtookx _mc RdquhbdrB_m_c_& Dcdkl_m) Ltqq_x- 0853- [nk Ymshuroi \yky ul Uurozoiy1Bghb_fn9Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn Oqdrr° --& 0877- Hutyzx}izotm znk Uurozoigr Yvkizgirk1 Bghb_fn9 Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn Oqdrr) Dckdx) Bgqhrsnogdq E-) Iq- 088/- Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Qg·B Wkznotqotm O}joiogr Hutzxur ul G}xkg}ixz}BBm1Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrrDcv_qcr) Fdnqfd B-) _mc Hq_Rg_qj_mrjx- 0867- [nk Uuroim UxkjoigsktzB Rgqotm gtj Nsvrksktzotm U}hroi Uuroim1 R_mEq_mbhrbn9 Eqddl_mDcv_qcr) V_qc- 0843- &SgdSgdnqx ne CdbhrhnmL_jhmf&) Uyminurumoigr G}rrkzot 40) 39 27/-306& Dhmgnqm)Ghkkdk I- 0871- &Kd_qmhmf eqnl Dwodqhdmbd _mc Rtanoshl_k Qtkdr hmCdbhrhnm L_jhmf&)hmC- J_gmdl_m) O-Rknuhb)_mc @-Sudqrjx) dcr) O}jmksktz \tjkx \tikx0 zgotzmBMk}xoyzoiy gtj Gogyky1B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr)157-72- 593 Gohroumxgvnm Bqdmrnm)L_ssgdv @- 0860- [nk \t0Uurozoiy ne Fox Uurr}zoutB @ Rstcx ne Sut0Ikioyout10 sgqotm hmznk Hozoky1A_kshlnqd9Ingmr Gnojhmr TmhudqrhsxOqdrrBtrgl_m) Qnadqs D- 0830- [nk Ntjkvktjktz Qdftk_snqx Hussoyyouty1 Knmcnm9Nwenqc TmhudqrhsxOqdrrBtsqhfgs) O- 0854- &Onkhshb_k Rsqtbstqd) Dbnmnlhb Cdudknoldms) _mc M_skNm_k Rdbtmsx Oqnfq_lr&) Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ne Yuiourumm 6/) 49 426-4> -) C_gk) Qnadqs @-0845- @ Uxklgik sn Iksuixgzoi [nkuxm1 Bghb_fn9Tludlsx ne Bghb_fn Oqdrr]] - 0850- anu Lu~kxtyDB Iksuixgim gtj Uu·kx hmgt Fskxoigt Hozm1Mdv G_udm9 X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0856- Ur}xgroyz Iksuixgim hmznk \tozkj YzgzkyBHutlroiz gtj Hutyktz1 Bghb_fn9 Q_mc LbM_kkx_mc Bg_qkdr D- Khmcaknl- 0842- Uurozoiy/Jiutusoiy gtj akrlgxkB Urgttotm gtj Uurozoiu0kiutusoi Ymyzksy Wkyur~kj otzu Ggyoi Yuiogr Uxuikyyky1 Mdv Xnqj9 G_qodq _mc QnvC_mdjd) Fqdfnqx @- 0881- &A_bjsn sgd Etstqd9 Lhrok_bdc Dkdldmsr >e Onkhshb_k Hmpthqx _mc sgd @cu_mbdc Rxrsdlr @fdmc_&)hmVhkkh_l M- Ctmm _mc Qhs_L_d Jdkkx)dcr) Fj~gtiky hm Uuroim Yz}joky Yotik 4A831 Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9 Sq_mr_bshnmOqdrr) 156-8/C_mhdkr)L_qj Q- 0886- [kxsotgzotm U}hroi UxumxgsyB @mFskxoigt UurozoigrUgxgju•1 @qlnmj) MI9L-D- Rg_qodC_myhfdq)L_qhd- 0884- &Onkhbx @m_kxrhrOnrsqmncdqmhydc9 Rnld Onkhshb_k _mc Odc_fnfhb_kQ_lhehb_shnmr&) Uuroim Rstchdr Ou}sgr56/ 29324-4/C_tfaidqf) B_qrsdm-0886- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr _mc @fqhbtkstq_kOnkhbxQdenqlr9-Dwok_hmhmf Cdqdftk_shnm hmRvdcdm _mc Qd-qdftk_shnmhmsgd Dtqnod_m Bnlltlsx&) Lu~0 kxtgtik 0/) 19 012-31_mc C_uhc L_qrg- 0887- &Dwok_hmhmf OnkhbxNtsbnldr9 Hmsdfq_shmf sgd Onkhbx }vnqj @ooqn_bg vhsg L_bqn-Kdudk _mc Lhbqn-Kdudk@m_kxrhr&) hmL_qrg) dc-) Husvgxotm Uuroim Skz·uxqy1 Atbjhmfg_l9 NodmTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 41-60 -C_uhc) O_tk @-0874- &Bkhn _mc sgd Dbnmnlhbr ne PVDQSX&) Fskxoigt Jiutusoi Wk~ok· 64)19 221-6C_uhc) Vhkeqdc K- 0874- [nk NRU Uuroim UgxgjomsB [nk Rgixukiutusoiy ne Yzghorong0 zout/ Yzx}iz}xgr Fjp}yzsktz/ gtj Jiutusoi Ik~kruvsktz1 Mdv Xnqj9Oq_dfdqC_uhdr) 0- 0888- &Du_kt_shnm _mc Odqenql_mbd L_m_fdldms hmFnudqmldms&)J~gr}g0 zout 7) 19 04/-8Cd_qhmf) I_ldr m-+ _mc DudqdssL- Qnfdqr- 0885- Fmktjg0Ykzzotm1 Sgntr_mc N_jr) B_khe-9R_fdCdam_l) Fdneeqdx- 0864- &Mnmcdbhrhnmr _mc Onvdq9 Sgd Svn E_bdr ne A_bgq_bg _mc A_q_sy&Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 58) 29 778-8//cd Aqthim)Ing_m @-)_mc DqmrsE-sdmGdtudkgne- 0880- &Onkhbx H}r}ldmsr enq-Rsdd}mf @tsnonhdshb@bsNqr&) hmQndk_mcHmS&Udkcds _k-)dcr) F}zuvuzkyrY gtj HTtlom}xgzr1Tt [nkuxmB Sk· Fvvxuginky sn Yuiokzgr Yzkkxotm1Cnqcqdbgs9Jktvdq) 050-6/_mc - 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0875- &SqdmcrhmOnkhbxRbhdmbdrQdrd_qbg9Cdsdqlhm_msr _mc Cdudknoldmsr&) J}xTvkgt Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrWkykgxin 03) 0.19 2-11ff 14A;;1 Fj~oik gtj HTtyktzB [nk Ik~kruvsktz ne znk Uuroim Yioktiky1 Mdv Xnqj9 Qtrrdkk R_fd Entmc_shnm]] - 0881- &Onkhbx Enqltk_shnm9 Vgdqd Hfmnq_ms@qlhdr Bk_rg Ax Mhfgs&)Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 00) 2.39 278-3/4]] - 0883- &Qdhmudmshmf sgd OnkhbxRbhdmbdr9Sgqdd Rsdor A_bj sn sgd Etstqd&) Uuroim Yioktiky 16) 0966-84]] -0886- &@esdqv_qc9 Sgd &Nmbd _mc Etstqd Rs_sd ne OnkhbxSdqlhm_shnm&) Ntzkxtg0 zoutgr Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 1/9 22-35]] - 0888_- &SgdLhrrhmf khmj Qduhrhsdc9Bnmsdlonq_qx Hlokdldms_shnmQdrd_qbg&) Uuroim Yz}joky Wk~ok· 05) 2.39 200-27]] - 0888a- &SgdRs_fdr @ooqn_bg sn sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr9Vg_s G_r HsCnmd>Vgdqd HrHsFnhmf>&) hmR_a_shdq'0888_9 08-23(]] _mc J_shd J_tel_mhr- 1//0- &OtakhbOnkhbxSgdnqx9 VhkkHsOk_xhmOdnqh_>&) Uur0 oim H}xxktzy 0/) 39 8-02Cdqm_qds)O_tk- 0886- &SgdQdbhoqnb_kHmektdmbdne Ltkshk_sdq_k_mc Qdfhnm_kSq_cd Qtkdr9 @ Eq_ldvnqj ne @m_kxrhr&) hmCdl_qds) I--E- Adkkhr)_mc F-F- Ihldmdy) dcr) Wkmoutgr gtj R}rzorgzkxgroys glzkx znk \x}m}gm Qntmc9 HTt~kxmktik/ Io~kxmktik gtj Ntzkxgizout1 Khdfd9Hmrshstsdc&Dstcdr Itqhchptdr Dtqnoddmmdr cd Tmhudqrhsd khdfd) 7/4-27Cdqx) C_uhc- 0873- Fmktjg08kzttm gxoj Uxuhrrs Ikdotozat1 K_vqdmbd9Tmhudqrhsx Oqdrr ne J_mr_r]] - 0888- &Onkhbx ax sgd V_x9 Vgdm Onkhbxhr Hmbhcdms_k sn L_jhmf Nsgdq Onkhbhdr&) Ou}xtgr NeU}hroi Uuroim 07) 19 052-65cd Rlhsg) R-@-0862- O}joiogr Wk~ok· ne Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Fizout1 Knmcnm9Rsdudmr _mc RnmCdrrkdq) C_uhc- 0888- &Bnmrsqtbshuhrlvhsghm _ OnrhshuhrsRnbh_kRbhdmbd&) Wk~ok· Ne Ntzkxtgzoutgr Yz}joky 149 012-26Cdrud_tw) I_ldr @-)DudqsKhmcpthrs)_mc FkdmS_mdq-0883- &Nqf_mhyhmf enq Hmmnu_shnmhm Otakhb Atqd_tbq_bx9 @HCR) Dmdqfx _mc DmuhqnmldmsOnkhbxhm B_m_c_&) Hgtgjogt Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrYioktik 16) 29382-417Cdu_r) M-)R- Cdk_x)_mc L- Gtaa_qc- 1//0- &Qdudmtd@tsgnqhshdr9@qdSgdx sgd Qhfgs Udghbkdenq Hloqnudc S_w @clhmhrsq_shnm>&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout gtj Ik~kruv0 sktz 10)29 100-11Chnm)Kdnm- 0862- &SgdOnkhshbrne Bnmrtks_shnm&) Lu~kxtsktz gtj Tvvuyozout 7) 29 221-42Cnadkk)Qncmdx)_mc C_uhc Ytrrl_m- 0870- &@m Du_kt_shnmRxrsdl enqFnudqmldms9 He Onkhshbrhr Sgd_sqd) sgdm Du_kt_shnmhr 'lnrskx( @qs&) Hgtgjogt Otakhb Fjsotoyzxg0 zout 13)29 3/3-16Cnatyhmrjhr) K_tqdms- 0881- &Lncdqmhrs_mc OnrsqmncdqmhrsLds_ognqr ne sgd Onkhbx Oqnbdrr9Bnmsqnk_mc Rs_ahkhsxur Bg_nr _mc Qdekdwhud Tmcdqrs_mchmf&) Uuroim Yio0 ktiky 149 244-7/]] - 0885- &Sqdmcr_mc E_rghnmrhmsgd L_qjdsok_bd ne Hcd_r&)hmCnatyhmrjhr) L- 58; Gohroumxgvnm Gohroumxgvnm B_qudq)Ingm-1//k- &@Sgdnqx ne Fnudqmhmfsgd Otakhb&rAtrhmdrr9 Qdcdrhfmhmfsgd Inar ne An_qcr) Bntmbhkr _mc Bnllhrrhnmr&) U}hroi,Rrotgmksktz Wk~ok· 2) 09 42-61B_rskdr) Eq_mbhrF- 0871- &SgdHlo_bs ne O_qshdrnm Otakhb Dwodmchstqd&) hmB_rskdr) dc-) [nk Nsvgiz ul UgxzokyBUurozoiygtj1 Uuroiokyot Iksuixgzoi HgvozgroyzYzgzky1Knmcnm9R_fd]] - 0887- Husvgxgzo~k U}hroi UuroimBUgzzkxty ul Uuyz0agx [xgtyluxsgzout1 Bgdk¥ sdmg_l9 Dcv_qc Dkf_q]] _mc Q-C- LbJhmk_x-0868- &CndrOnkhshbr L_ssdq>@m@m_kxrhrne sgd Otakhb Vdke_qd Bnllhsldms hm @cu_mbdc Cdlnbq_shb Rs_sdr&)J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Wkykgxin 6) 19 058-75]] _mc ]] - 0886- &CndrOnkhshbrL_ssdq> kmbqd_rhmfBnlokdwhsx_mc Qdmdvdc Bg_kkdmfdr&) J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrWkykgxin 2090/1-6]] _mc U_mbd Ldqqhkk-0878- &Snv_qcr _ Fdmdq_kLncdk ne Otakhb OnkhbxNtsbnldr&) Ou}xtgr ul [nkuxkzoigr Uurozoiy0) 19 066-101B_sdq)Cntfk_r- &0853-Uu·kx ot agynotmzutB F HxozoigrQuuq gz [njgm,yYzx}mmrk ot znk Sgzout,y Hgvozgr1Mdv Xnqj9Q_mcnl GntrdB_u_m_fg) Lhbg_dk) C_uhc L_qrg) _mc L_qshmRlhsg- 0884- &SgdQdk_shnmrghoAdsvddm OnkhbxMdsvnqjr _s sgd Rdbsnq_k_mc Rta-Rdbsnq_k Kdudkr9@ Qdronmrd sn Inqc_m) L_knmdx _mc LbK_tfgkhm&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 62 'Vhmsdq(9516-8B_vrnm) @k_m-0867- &Oktq_khrl)Bnqonq_shrl _mc sgd Qnkdne sgd Rs_sd&)Lu~kxtsktz gtj Tvvuyozout 02)19 067-87]] - 0875- Huxvuxgzoys gtj Uurozoigr[nkuxm1 Nwenqc9A_rhkAk_bjvdkkBdqmx)OghkhoF- 0885- &Hmsdqm_shnm_k Ehm_mbd_mc sgd Dqnrhnmne Rs_sdOnkhbxB_o_bhsx&) hmFtlldss '08859 72-0/3(]] - 1//0- &Eqnl "HqnmSHh_mfkdr"sn "Fnkcdm Odms_mfkdr">Fkna_khyhmfsgd Onkhbx )Oqnbdrr&)Lruhgr Lu~kxtgtik 69 286-30/&Bg_cvhbj) @mcqdv- 1///- &Rstcxhmf Onkhshb_k Hcd_r9 @ Otakhb Onkhshb_kChrbntqrd @ooqn_bg& ) Uurozoijr Yz}joky 379 172-2/0Bg_mckdq)L-@- 0871- &Rs_sdDmsdqoqhrdhlc O_qshr_mrghohmOqnuhmbh_k Onkhshbr&) Hgtg0 jogt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik ]] ]] 48B:440731, -0872- &SgdOnkhshbrne Otakhb Dmsdqoqhrd&) hmOqhbg_qc'08729 074-107(_mc VL- Bg_mckdq-0868- U}hroi Uuroim gtj Uxu~otiogr Uurozoiy1 Snqnmsn9 LbFq_v-Ghkk QxdqrnmBg_ol_m) Qhbg_qc @- 0862- &Bnllhrrhnmr hmOnkhbx-L_jhmf&)hmBg_ol_m) dc-) [nk Wurk ul Hussoyyouty ot Uuroim0Rgqotm1 Knmcnm9Fdnqfd @kkdm _mc Tmvhm) 063-77Bgdkhlrjx) Dkd_mnq-0884- &VgdqdVd Rs_mcSnc_x hmsgd Oq_bshbdne Du_kt_shnm9Rnld Qdekdbshnmr&) Ptu·rkjmk gtj Uuroim 7) 29 7-1/ Bgdmhdq)Ingm @- 0874- &Lhmhrsdqr ne Rs_sdsn @rrhrs9Vdhfghmf sgd Bnrsr _mc sgd Admdehsr&)Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 17) 29 286-301Bgqhrsdmrdm)Snl) _mc OdqK_dfqdhc) dcr- 1//0- Mdv U}hroi RgtgmksktzB [nk [xgty0 luxsgzout ul Njkgy gtj Uxgizoik1 @kcdqrgns9@rgf_sdBgtqbgl_m) B- Vdrs- 0856- &Vhbjdc Oqnakdlr&) Rgtgmksktz Yioktik 03) 39 A030-A031Bk_qj) Vhkkh_l Qnadqsr- 0887- &@fdmsr_mc Rsqtbstqdr9 0[un Uhdvr ne Oqdedqdmbdr)0[un Uhdvr ne H}rshstshnmr&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Yz}joky V}gxzkxrm 319 134-6/Bk_qjd) Lhbg_dk- 0881- &Hlokdldms_shnm&) hmG_qqno) dc-) Uu·kx gtj Uuroim ot Qohksr Iksuixgioky1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr&Bk_ejd"knmdr:"L:&08769F Yzgvrk ,YzgzkBHg4zxOBjoo4t,!tj[oYzo,oror,Wkyu}xiky ot Hurj agx1 -)ll9sH0v:"TChu-dqrhsx-)ne Snqnmsn-OqdrrBkdlnmr) Q_mc_kkR-) _mc L_qj J- LbAdsg- 1//0- U}hroi Uuroim Uxg•oyB [nkuxm gtj Uxgmsgzoys/ F Hgyk Fvvxugin1 Toodq R_cckd Qhudq)MI9Oqdmshbd-G_kkBknjhd)Gtfg LbCnv_kk) _mc I- Vhkkh_l Qnahmrnm-0858- Wumgr Hussoyyouty ul Nt1woO/oxmB [nk Yomtoooigtikul Nt~kyzoYgzoutyot GxozoynUurozoiy1Mdv Xnqj9Nbs_fnm Annjr- 58A Bn_rd) Q-G- 0826- &SgdM_stqd ne sgd Ehql&)Jiutusoig 3) 02-05 'Mnu-(9 275-3/4]] -085/- &SgdOqnakdl ne Rnbh_kBnrs&)Ou}xtgr ul Qg· gtj Jiutusoiy 29 0-33Bnaa) Qnfdq m-+ _mc Bg_qkdrC- Dkcdq-0861- Ugxzoiovgzout ot Fskxoigt UurozoiyB[nk Imtgsoiy ul Fmktjg0G}orjotm1 Anrsnm9@kkxm _mc A_bnm]] &]) I-J- Qnrr) _mc L-G- Qnrr- 0865- &@fdmc_Athkchmf_r _ Bnlo_q_shud Onkhshb_k Oqnbdrr&)Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 6/) 09 015-27]] &] _mc L_qb Gnv_qc Qnrr) dcr- 0886_- H}rz}xgr Yzxgzkmokyul Fmktjg IktogrB F~uojgtik/ Fzzgiq gtj Wkjklotozout1 K_vqdmbd9TmhudqrhsxOqdrr ne J_mr_r]] _mc ]] - 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&SgdCdrhfm ne Hmrshstshnmr&) hmC-0- Vdhldq) dc-) Ntyzoz}zoutgr Ikyomt1 Anrsnm9Jktvdq) 06-25A_mshmf)Jdhsg F- 0871- [nk akrlgxk Yzgzk gtj1 Hgtgjogt Kkjkxgroys1 Jhmfrsnm9 Ptddm&rTmhudqrhsxHmrshstsdne Hmsdqfnudqmldms_k Qdk_shnmr]] -0884- &SgdRnbh_kOnkhbxQduhdv9OnkhbxL_jhmf hm_ Rdlh-RnudqdhfmRnbhdsx&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 27) 19 172-8/A_qc_bg) Dtfdmd- 0865- &Onkhbx Sdqlhm_shnm_r _ Onkhshb_k Oqnbdrr&)Uuroim Yioktiky 6) 19 012-20ff 14A::1 [nk Nsvrksktzgzout LgskB angz Mgvvkty Flzkx g GorrGkiusky g Qg·1 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 LHS Oqdrr]] - 087/- &Hlokdldms_shnmRstchdr _mc sgd Rstcx ne Hlokdldmsr&) o_odq oqdrdmsdc _s sgd _mmt_klddshmf ne sgd @ldqhb_m Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd@rrnbh_shnm]] - 0878- &Rnbh_k Qdftk_shnm_r _ FdmdqhbOnkhbxHmrsqtldms&)hmR_k_lnm '0878_(]] _mc Qnadqs @- J_f_m- 0871- Luotm ax znk GuuqB [nk Uxuhrks ul Wkm}rgzuxm \txkgyutghrktkyy1 Oghk_cdkogh_9 Sdlokd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrA_qjdq)@msgnmx)_mc A- Ftx Odsdqr)dcr- 0882- [nk Uurozoiyul J•vkxz Fj~oikB Hxkgzotm/ \yotm _mc Rgtov}rgzotm Yioktzoloi Ptu·rkjmk lux U}hroi Uuroim1 Ohssratqfg9 Tmhudqrhsx ne Ohssratqfg OqdrrA_qmdss)Lhbg_dk M-) _mc L_qsg_ Ehmmdlnqd- 0888- &SgdOnkhshbr) Onvdq) _mc O_sgnknfhdr ne Hmsdqm_shnm_k Nqf_mhy_shnmr&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 42) 39 588-621A_qqdss)Rtr_m) _mc BnkhmEtcfd- 0870- Uuroim gtj FizoutB Jyygmy nm znk Nsvrksktzg0 zout ul U}hroi Uuroim1 Knmcnm9Ldsgtdm- A_snq)Eq_mbhrL- 0847- &Sgd@m_snlx ne L_qjds E_hktqd&)V}gxzkxrm Ou}xtgr Tl Jiu0 tusoiy 61) 29 240-68A_tlf_qsmdq) Eq_mj Q-) _mc Aqx_mC- Inmdr- 0880- &@fdmc_Cxm_lhbr _mc OnkhbxRtarxrsdlr&) Intqm_k ul Uurozoiy42) 39 0/33-63-_mc ]] - 0882- Fmktjgy gtj Ntyzghorozmot Fskxoigt Uurozoiy1Bghb_fn9 Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn Oqdrr-_mc ]] - 0883- &@ssdmshnm) Antmc_qx Deedbsr)_mc K_qfd-Rb_kdOnkhbxBg_mfd hm@hq0k9"_mronqs_shnm Onkhbx&) hmC-@-Qnbgdenqs_mc Q-V Bnaa) dcr) [nk Uurozoiyul Uxuhrks IklotozoutB Yngvotm znk Uuroim Fmktjg1 K_vqdmbd9Tmhudqrhsxne J_mr_r Oqdrr-_mc Adsg 0- Kddbg- -0887- Ggyoi NtzkxkyzyB[nk Nsvuxzgtik ul Fqntor hmUurozoiy gtj 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R_ms_Lnmhb_) B_khe-9BdmsdqenqOnkhbxQdrd_qbg hmDctb_shnmLbE_qk_mc)@mcqdv R- 0876 - &Hmsdqdrs Fqntor _mc Sgdnqhdr ne Onvdq hm@ldqhb_&) GxozoynOu}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 06) 19 018-36& - 0880- &Hmsdqdrs Fqntor _mc Onkhshb_k Shld9 Bxbkdr hm@ldqhb_&)GxozoynOu}xtgr qurozoigr Yioktik 10) 29146-74- -) LbF_mm) I_ldr) _mc Q- Jdms Vd_udq) dcr- 0888- [nsq [gtqy gtj HaQNYugkzzkyBHgz0 grmyzy lux Njkgy gtj Fizout1 Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9m-}_bshnm-& -LbFq_v) J_sgkddm L- 088/- &@unhchmf Ak_ld9 @mDwodmldms_kHmudrsHf_shnm ne Onkhshb_kDwbtrdr _mc Itrshehb_shnmr&) GxozoynOu}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 1/9 088-131LbFthqd) Lhbg_dk- 1//1- &L_m_fhmfMdsvnqjr9 Oqnonrhshnmrnm Vg_s L_m_fdqr Cn _mc Vgx Sgdx Cn Hs&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 51) 49488-5/8LbK_tfgkhm) Lhkaqdx V 0874- &Hlokdldms_shnmQd_khshdr_mc Du_kt_shnmCdrhfm&)hm Rgnsk_mc_mc L_qj '0874(LbKd_m) k_hm-0876- U}hroi HnuoikBFt Ntzxuj}izout1 Nwenqc9A_rhkAk_bjvdkk]] - 1///- &Qduhdv@qshbkd9 Sgd Chuhcdc Kdf_bx ne L_mbtq Nkrnm&) GxozoynOu}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 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TmhsdcRs_sdr&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 00) 0968-0/5L_kknx)I_ldr L- 0882- &Rs_sdbq_es) Rnbh_kOnkhbx)_mc Fnudqm_mbdhmK_shm@ldqhb_&) Lu~kxtgtik 5) 19 11/-63L_knmdx) Vhkkh_l @- 1//0- &Qdftk_shnmhm_m Dohrnchb Onkhbx-L_jhmf Dmuhqnmldms9 Sgd V_sdq HmctrsqxhmDmfk_mc_mc V_kdr&)U}hroq Fjsotoyzx\!o3t 68) 29 514-31 -"Fqbsqhs0nqc_mnn_msh¥LcqdVL9&LsH:_tfgkhm9&H883-sHmsdqdrs Fqntor _mc Otagb ¥&&&-I0/0h}V:&&&Had&kHI-ri)jq:k-NTs%hcdq ---Lncdk))Qd9kcrhsdk0}=in-tl_k ul U}hroi Uuroim 03) 09 06-27L_mcdkk)L-O- 1///- &@Qduhrdc Knnj _s L_m_fdldms hmMdsvnqj Rsqtbstqdr&)Ntzkxtg0 zoutgr Ou}xtgr ul Txmgtongzoutgr [nkuxm gtj Gkng~oux 2) 0.19 074-10/- Gohroumxgvnm 5;6 L_mm) Lhbg_dk- 0873- &Sgd@tsnmnlntr Onvdq ne sgd Rs_sd9HsrNqhfhmr)Ldbg_mhrlr _mc Qdrtksr&)J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ul Yuiourumm 14)19 074-102L_mydq) Qnm_kc-0873- &Onkhbx Q_shnm_khsx _mc Onkhbx@m_kxrhr9Sgd Oqnakdl ne sgd Bgnhbd ne Bqhsdqh_enq Cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf&)hmN-O-Cvhudch) dc-) U}hroi Uuroim gtj Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Yz}joky1 Ftdkog9 Tmhudqrhsxne FtdkogL_qbg) I_ldr F- 0867- &Antmcdc Q_shnm_khsx) @lahfthsx) _mc sgd Dmfhmddqhmfne Bgnhbd&)Gkrr Ou}xtgr ul Jiutusoiy 8) 19 476-5/7]] - &0870-&Cdbhrhnm L_jhmf Odqrodbshud9CdbhrhnmrhmNqf_mhy_shnmr_mc Sgdnqhdr ne Bgnhbd&)hm@-G-u_m cd Udm_mc VE- Inxbd) dcr) Ukxyvkizo~ky ut Txmgtongzout Ikyomt gtj Gkng~ou}x1 Mdv Xnqj9Vhkdx)1/4-33]] - 0883- F Uxoskx ut Ikioyout0RgqotmB Mu· Ikioyouty Mgvvkt1 Mdv Xnqj9 Eqdd Oqdrr]] _mc Ing_m O-Nkrdm-0864- &SgdTmbdqs_hmsxne sgd O_rs9Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Kd_qmhmfTmcdq @lahfthsx&) J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrWkykgxin 29 036-60]] _mc ]] - 0868_- Fshom}ozm gtj Hnuoik ot Txmgtongzouty1 Adqfdm9Tmhudqrhsdsrenqk_fds]] _mc ]] - 0868a- &Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Bgnhbd Tmcdq @lahfthsx&) hmL_qbg _mc Nkrdm'0868_(]] _mc ]] - 0873- &SgdMdv Hmrshstshnm_khrl9 Nqf_mhy_shnm_k E_bsnqrhmOnkhshb_kKhed-&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 67)29 623-38]]] _mc ]] - 0878- Wkjoyiu~kxotm Ntyzoz}zoutyB[nk Txmgtongzoutgr Ggyoy ul Uuro0 zoiy1Mdv Xnqj9EqddOqdrr]] _mc ]] - 0883-- &Hmrshstshnm_k Odqrodbshudrnm Onkhshb_k 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&Onkhbx Kd_qmhmf_mc E_hktqd&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi UurrHb 01) 39 220-43 ---0882- &L_mc_sd Cdrhfm _mc Hlokdldms_shnm9 Dmg_mbhmfHlokdldms_shnm Deenqsr_mc Rg_ohmfQdftk_snqx Rsxkdr&) Ou}xtgr ul Uuroim Ftgrmyoy gtj Rgtgmksktz 01)39 523-52--" - 0888- &EnrsdqhmfOnkhbxKd_qmhmf9@ Bg_kkdmfdenq Otakhb @cmtqtrsq_skNm) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Wk~ok· ul U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 3) 0910-20\\ . h113. &Rnbh_k Qdftk_shnm&) hmR_k_lnm '1//1_9 045-74(ds _k- 0886- Jt~oxutsktzgr Rgtgmksktz gtj Lu~kxtgtikB Ntzkxmu~kxtsktzgr Fvvxuginky zu Mgngxjy gtj Y}yzgotghorozm1 Knmcnm9}ntskdcfd-) L_xmsy) Qdm_sd- 0868- &OtakhbAtqd_tbq_bhdr _mc Ongbx Hlokdldms_shnm) Ntzkxtg0 zoutgr Yuiogr Yioktik Ou}xtgr 20) 39 522-34¥ 0872- &SgdBnmchshnmrne DeedbshudOtakhb Onkhbx9@ Mdv Bg_kkdmfdenq Ongbx @m_kxrhr&) Uuroim gtj Uurozoiy00) 19 012-32-¥ 0882_- &Fnudqmhmf E_hktqd_mc sgd Oqnakdl ne Fnudqm_aHkhsx9 Rnld Bnlldmsr }_ Sgdnqdshb_kO_q_chfl&)hmI- Jnnhl_m) dc-) Rujks Lu~kxtgtikB Sk· Lu~kxt0 sktz0Yuiokzm Ntzkxgizouty1 Knmcnm9R_fd- ) ¥ 0882a- 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Cd}rHnm L_jhmf Tmcdq Etyyx Dmuhqnmldmsr9@mNudquhdv _mc Hkktrsq_shnm)KuxkyzYinktik 24)19 370-4/1-&_k Ldqsnm) Qnadqs J- 0825- &Sgd Tm_mshbho_sdcBnmrdptdmbdr&ne OtqoNRHudRNB! @bshnm&) Fskxoigt Yuiou-1umoigrWk~ok· 5) 09 783-8/3- 0837- &SgdRdke-Etkehkkhmf Oqnogdbx&)Ftzouin Wk~ok· 7) 19 082-10/Ldsb_ked)Kdr- 0867- &Onkhbx L_jhmf hmSgqatkdms Dmuhqnmldmsr&) h} J--G_m! _mc D-mRbg_qoe)dcr) NtzkxuxmgtongzouzngrUuroim RgqotmB Qosozy zu Huuxjntgzzut gtj Hktzxgr Hutzxur1 Knmcnm9R_fd) 26-44-) Ldxdq) @k_mC- 0871- &@c_oshmf sn Dmuhqnmldms_kInksr&)Fjsntnyzxgzo~k Yinktik V}gx0 ) &FdneeqdxQ- Aqnnjr) _mc I_ldr A-Fndr- 088/ -- Dmu}nmldms_kInksr )_mcHmcT}sqx Qdunktshnmr9 Nqf_mhy_shnm_k Qdronmrdr sn CHrbnmshmtntr Bg_mfd) Yzxgzkmni Rgtgmksktz Ou}sgrr4B 82-00/-& Lhfc_k) Indk"R- 0877- Yzxutm Yuiokzoky gtj akgq YzgzkyB1Yzgzk0YuinkqWqrgzzuty gtj Yzgzk Hgvghorozokyot znk [noxj auxrj1 Oqhmbdsnm) MI9OmmbdsnmTqtudqrHsxOqd}r9 Lhkkdq)Kdnm_qcR- 0865- &SgdRsqtbstq_kCdsdqlhm_msr ne sgd Vdke_qdDeenqs9@ Bmshptd _mc _ 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Hmmnu_shnm&) Fskx0 oigt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrYioktik 30) 29 627-6/Lhmsy)@kdw-0882- &SgdCdbhrhnmsn @ss_bj Hq_p&) Ou}xtgr ul Hutlroiz Wkyur}zout 26) 39 484-507]] _mc MdgdHmh_ Fdu_- 0886- &SgdOnkhGdtqhrshb Sgdnqx ne EnqdhfmOnkhbxCdbhrhnm L_jhmf&) hmFdu_ _mc Lhmsy)dcr) Ikioyout0Rgqotm ot agx gtj UkgikB [nk Humto0 zo~k0WgzoutgrIkhgzk1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9KxmmdQhdmmdq]] ds _k- 0886- &SgdDeedbsne Cxm_Hmhb _mc Rs_shbBgnhbdRdsr nm Onkhshb_k Cdbhrhnm L_jhmf9 @m@m_kxrhrTrhmf sgd CdbhrhnmAn_qc Ok_senql&)Fskxoigt Uurozoigr Rbhktik Wk~ok· 80)29 442-55Lhmsyadqf) Gdmqx)Ctqt Q_hrhmfg_mh)_mc @mcqdSgdnqds- 0865- &Sgd Rsqtbstqd ne "Tmrsqtbstqdc" CdbhrhnmOqnbdrrdr&)Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Yioktik V}gxzkxrm 109 135-64Lhsbgdkk)-Qnm_kcJ-) Aq_ckdxQ- @fd) _mc Cnmm_I- Vnnc- 0886- &Snv_qc _ Sgdnqx ne Rs_jdgnkcdq Hcdmshehb_shnm _mc R_khdmbd9 CdehqHhmf sgd Oqhmbhokd ne Vgn _mc Vg_s Qd_kkxBntmsr&)Figjksm ul Rgtgmksktz Wk~ok· 11) 39 742-75Lhsmhbj)A_qqxL- 0867- &SgdBnmbdosne&Qdftk_shnm&) G}rrkzot ul G}yotkyy Wkykgxin 86/ - 49 0-1/]] - 087/- [nk UurozoigrJiutusm ul Wkm}rgzoutBHxkgzotm/Ikyomtotm/ gtj Wksu~otm Wkm}rgzuxmKuxsy1 Mdv Xnqj9Bnktlah_ TmhudqrhsxOqdrrLnd) SdqqxL- 0873- &SgdMdv Dbnmnlhbr ne Nqf_mhy_shnm&) Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul Uuroz0 oigr Yioktik 179 628-66Lnmqnd) @k_mC- 0868- &Bnmrhrsdmbx Adsvddm Otakib Oqdedqdmbdr_mc M_shnm_kOnkhbx Cdbhrhnmr&) Fskxoigt UurozoiyV}gxzkxrm 6) 092-08Lnmqnd) JqhrsdmQdmvhbj- 0880- &SgdSgdnqx ne Q_shnm_k@bshnm9 Nqhfhmr_mc Trdetkmdrr enq Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd&) hmLnmqnd) dc-) [nk Jiutusoi Fvvxugin zu UurozoiyBF HxozoigrWkgyykyysktz ul znk [nkuxm ul Wgzoutgr Fizout1 Mdv Xnqj9 G_qodqBnkkhmr) 0-20Lnmsfnldqx) Ingm C- 1///- &Rnbh_k B_ohs_k_r _ OnkhbxQdrntqbd&)Uuroim Yioktiky 229 116-32° Lnmsodshs)Dqhb-1//1- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr) Edcdq_k@qq_mfdldmsr) _mc sgd Cdudknoldms ne Dmuhqnmldms_kQdftk_shnmr9@ Bnlo_qhrnm ne etd B_m_ch_m_mc @ldqhb_m @fqhbtkstq_k Rdbsnqr&)Lu~kxtgtik 04)09 0-1/Lnrradqfdq) J_qdm- 1///-& [nk Uurozoiyul Njkgy gtj znk Yvxkgj ul Jtzkxvxoyk cutky1 V_rghmfsnm9Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrLtbbh_qnmh) F_qx- 088/- [nk UurozoigrKgor}xk ul Jsvrumsktz Uuroim/ 0834-0871- Ohssratqfg9 Tmhudqrhsxne Ohssratqfg Oqdrr]] &0881- &SgdF_qa_fd B_mLncdk _mc sgd Rstcx ne OnkhbxL_jhmf9 @ Bqhshptd&) Uurozm13) 2935/-71Ltkenqc) Bg_qkdr.- 0867- &Vgx Sgdx Cnm&sDudmVgdm Sgdx Ntfgs Sn9 Hlokhb_shnmr 5;9 Gohroumxgvnm ne Bnlokh_mbd Sgdnqx enq Onkhbxl_jdqr&)hm@-Dsyhnmh)dc-) Uuroim Wkykgxin1 Kdhcdm9D-I- Aqhkk) 36-51Ltmmr) Inxbd L- 0864- &SgdDmuhqnmldms)Onkhshbr)_mc OnkhbxKhsdq_stqd9@ Bqhshptd _mc Qdenqltk_shnm&)akyzkxt UurozoigrV}gxzkxrm 17) 39 535-56Ltmshfk) Odsdq-1//1- &Onkhbx) Onkhshbr_mc Rnbh_kBnmsqnk9 @ Rxrsdlhb Etmbshnm_kKhmfthrshb @m_kxrhrne DTDloknxldms Onkhbx&) 2dws11) 29 282-330- - Ltrnke) KknxcC- 0878- &SgdFnudqmldms Bnqonq_shnmSnnk9Odqlts_sHnmr _mc OnrrHaHkhshdr&) hmR_k_lnm '0878_9 120-41(M_bglh_r) C_uhc- 0868- U}hroi Uuroim J~gr}gzoutB Fvvxuginky gtj Rkznujy1 Mdv Xnqj9 RsL_qshm&rOqdrrM_sg_mrnm)Bnmrs_mbd@- 1///- &Rnbh_k Lnudldmsr _r B_s_kxrsr enq OnkhbxBg_mfd9 Sgd B_rd ne Rlnjhmf _mc Ftmr&) Ou}xtgr ul Mkgrzn Uurozoiy/Uuroim gtj Qg· 13) 29 310-77Mdkrnm)Sgnl_r D-) _mc Ynd L- Nwkdx-0888- &HrrtdEq_lhmf Deedbsrnm AdkhdeHlonqs_mbd_mc Nohmhnm&) Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoiy50) 39 0/3/-56Mdssk)I-O- 0857- &SgdRs_sd_r _ Bnmbdost_k U_qh_akd&) auxrj Uurozoiy1/) 39 448-81Mhbd)C-B- 0876- &Hmbqdldms_k _mc Mnmhmbqdldms_kOnkhbxQdronmrdr9 Sgd Rs_sdr _mc sgd Q_hkqn_cr&) Uurozm1/9 034-45Mhbnk_tr)L_qshm-0856- &Oqnkds_qh_s _mc Lhcckd Bk_rr hmL_qw9Gdfdkh_mBgnqdnfq_ogx _mc sgd B_ohs_khrsCh_kdbshb&) Yz}joky nm znk Qklz 6) 0911-38Mhrads) Qnadqs- 0861- &Hmsqnctbshnm9 Sgd Oqnakdl ne Rnbh_kBg_mfd&)hmMhrads) dc-) Yuiogr Hngtmk1 Mdv Xnqj9G_qodq _mc Qnv) 0-34Mhrj_mdm)Vhkkh_l @- 0860- G}xkg}ixgim gtj Wkvxkyktzgzo~k Lu~kxtsktz1 BgHb_fn9 Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn Oqdrr- Mnqcg_tr) V- 0864- &SgdOnkhshb_k Atrhmdrr Bxbkd&)Wk~ok· ul Jiutusni Yz}jnky 75B 058-8/Mnqckhmfdq) Dqhb@-0870- Nm znk F}zutusm ul znk Iksuixgzoi Yzgzk1B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0876- &S_jhmfsgd Rs_sd Rdqhntrkx&)hmL- Vdhmdq _mc R-O-Gtmshmfsnm)dcr) \tjkxyzgtjo[OBm Uurozoigrvk~kruUsktz1 Anrsn-m9Tsskd)Aqnvm&-- : ]] - 0877- :Sgd Qdstqm sn sgd Rs_sd9Bqhshptdr&)Fskxoigt1 UurozoigrYiokti1q Wk~nk· 71) 29 764-74Mnqsg)Cntfk_r B- 088/- Ntyzoz}zouty/ Ntyzoz}zoutgr Hngtmk gtj Jiutusoi Ukxluxsgtik1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrMnvmdr) @msgnmxI- 0884- &SgdNsgdq Dwbg_mfd9Otakhb HmsdqdrsFqntor) O_sqnmr)_mc Admdehsr&) Yuiogr Yioktik V}gxzkxrm 65) 19 270-3/0]] - 1///- &Onkhbx Bnmekhbs_mc sgd Rsqtbstqd ne Hms-dqdrs Bnlltmhshdr&) Fskxoigt UurozoiyV}gxzkxrm 17)29 2/8-16_mc @kk_mI- Bhfkdq-0884- &OtakhbHmsdqdrsFqntor _mc sgd Qn_c sn Rtquhu_k&) Uurozm16)29 27/-3/3_mc Fq_msMddkdx-0885- &Snv_qc_m Dwok_m_shnm enqOtakhbHmsdqdrs Fqnto Enq}hnm _mc Oqnkhedq_shnm9 "Rddc Lnmdx") Chrstqa_mbdr) Dmsqdoqdmdtqrgho)_mc O_sqnm_fd&) Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}sgr57/ 09 63-81Mtm_m) Ehnm_-0888- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqj Sq_mrenql_shnm9Sgd Hlokdldms_sHnmne sgd DB Chqdbshudnm O_bj_fhmf _mc O_bj_fhmf V_rsd&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 66) 29 510-27Mxd Sgnl_r Q- 1//1- [nv0Iu·t Uuroimsgqotm1 Mdv Xnqj9 Bg_sg_l GntrdMxk}qqc)Itkhd- 0884- &Hrrtd Mdsvnqjr _mc MnmOqnehsNqf_mhy_shnmr&) Uuroim Yz}joky Rduhdv 03) .2/.3=z2:6..,,315. . Nakmfdq)Gdqadqs) _mcTvd V_frbg_K 1//0- }E-_lhkhdrneM_shnkkR_mc OtakhBOnkhbx&) akylJ}xuvkoNz-Ujrozoiy57/ 09 88-&-003Ngl_d) J- 0884- [nk Jtj ul znk Sgzout Yzgzk1Knmcnm9G_qodqBnkkhmrNkhudq)O_ldk_ D- 0882- &Enql_kLncdkr ne Bnkkdbshud@bshnm&) Ftt}gr Qduhdv ul Yuiour0 umm 089160-2//- Nkrnm)C_uhc L-) _mc Lhbg_dk 0- Ldydx) dcr- 0880- Qkmoyrgz}xkyot znk Uuroim UxuikyyB [nk Iorkssgy ul Jiutusoi Uuroim1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrNkrnm)L_mbtq- 0854- [nk Qumoiul Hurrkizo~k FizoutB U}hroi Luujy gtj znk [nkuxm ul Lxu}vy1 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0871- [nk Woykgtj Ikirotk ul SgzoutyB Jiutusoi Lxu·zn/ Yzgmlrgzout/ gtj Yuiogr Womojozoky1 Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0875- &@ Sgdnqx ne sgd Hmbdmshudr E_bhmfOnkhshb_k Nqf_mhy_shnmr9 Mdn-Bnqonq_shrl _mc sgd Gdfdlnmhb Rs_sd&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Uurozoigr Yioktik Wk~ok· 6) 19 054-78Nqf_mhy_shnmenq Dbnmnlhb Bn-nodq_shnm_mc Cdudknoldms 'NDBC(- 0882- Rgtgmotm ·ozn Rgxqkz0,!bvk Rkingtoysy1 O_qhr9NDBCNqqdm)J_qdm)-_mc Rsdogdm Rjnvqnmdj- 0882- &Adxnmcsgd Hbnmnfq_ogx ne Nqcdq9 Mnsdr enq _ &MdvHmrshstshnm_khrl&) hmK-B-Cncc _mc B- Ihkkrnm)dcr) [nk Imtgsoiy ul Fskxoigt UurozoiyBFvvxuginky gtj Ntzkxvxkzgzouty1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv Oqdrr]] _mc ]] -0887-8- &Qdfhldr _mc Qdfhld Athkchmfhm@ldqhb_m Fnudqmldms9 @Qduhdv ne Khsdq_stqdnm sgd 083/r&) UurozoigrYioktik V}gxzkxrm 002)39 578-6/1Nranqmd)C-) _mc D- F_dakdq-0881- Wkot~ktzotm Lu~kxtsktz1 Qd_chmf)L_rr-9 @cchrnmVdrkdxNrrnvrjh) Rs_mhrk_v-0852- Hrgyy Rsqtbstqd hm znk Yuiogr Hutyiou}ytkyy/ sq_mr-Rgdhk_ O_ssdqrnm-Mdv Xnqj9EqddOqdrr ne FkdmbndNrsq_mcdq)Rtr_m @-)_mc Rst_qs K_mfsnm)dcr- 0876- Ynolzotmznk IkhgzkB U}hroi2Uxo~gzk Ykizux Wkrgzouty ot znk Rujkxt akrlgxk Yzgzk1Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9Sq_mr_bshnmNrsqnl) Dkhmnq0875_- &@ Ldsgnc ne Hmrshstshnm_k @m_kxrhr&) hmJ_tel_m ds _0- '0875(]] - 087Fa- &@m @fdmc_ enqsgd Rstcx ne Hmrshstshnmr&) U}hroi Hnuoik 379 2-14]] - ]- 0888- &Hmrshstshnm_k Q_shnm_kBgnhbd9@r @rrdrrldms ne sgd Hmrshstshnm_k @m_kxrhr _mc Cdudknoldms Eq_ldvnqj&) hmR_a_shdq'0888_9 24-60(Nrsqnl) Uhmbdms) C_uhc Eddmx)_mc G_qslts Ohbgs)dcr- 0882- Wkznotqotm Ntyzoz}zoutgr Ftgrmyoy gtj Ik~kruvsktzB Nyy}ky/ Frzkxtgzo~ky gtj Hnuoiky1 R_mEq_mbhrbn9Hmrshstsd enq Bnmsdlonq_qx Rstchdr Oqdrr) N&Rtkkhu_m)Cdanq_g)_mc A_qqxCnvm- 1//0- &Onkhbx Cdbhrhnml_jhmf Lncdkr hmOq_bshbd9@ B_rd Rstcx ne sgd Vdrsdqm @trsq_kh_m"Rdmsdmbhmf@bsr"&)Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}xtgr 18) 0945-6/N&Snnkd) K_tqdmbdI- 1///_- &Cheedqdms OtakhbL_m_fdldmsr> Hlokhb_shnmrne Rsqtbstq_k BnmsdwshmGhdq_qbghdr_mc Mdsvnqjr&) hmO141Aqtcmdx) N&Snnkd)_mc G-F- Q_hmdx) dcr) Fj~gtiotm U}hroi RgtgmksktzB Mdv Ik~kruvsktzy ot [nkuxm/ Rkznujy gtj Uxgizoik1 V_rghmfsnm9Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 08-37]] - 1///a- &Qdrd_qbgnm OnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm9@rrdrrldms _mc Oqnrodbsr&)Ou}x0 tgr ul U}hroi Fjso[ooyzxgzout Wkykgxin gtj [nkuxm 0/) 19 152-77Nthlds) L_sghdt) _mc UhmbdmsKdlhdtw- 1///- Qky Wkykg}• cd Uurozow}kU}hrow}kB \t Gorgt Hxozow}k kz \tk ]uok cd Kuxsorongzout1 Ptdadb9 TmhudqrhsdK_u_k Bdmsqd c&@m_kxrd cdr OnkhshptdrOtakhptdrNvdmr) Rtr_m) _mc Shl Q_xmdq-0888- "&Vgdm Jmnvkdcfd L_ssdqr"9 Sgd Qnkd _mc Hmektdmbd ne sgd Qnx_k& Bnllhrrhnm nm Dmuhqnmldms_kOnkktshnm&) Ou}xtgr Tl Jt~o0 xutsktzgr Uuroim gtj Urgttotm 096-13O_cadqf) CI9 0881- &Mtsqhshnm_k K_adkhmf_r _ OnkhbxHmrsqtldms&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul Fmxoi}rz}xgr Jiutusoiy 63) 49 01/7-02O_fd) Admi_lhm 0-) _mc Qnadqs X- Rg_ohqn- 0881- [nk Wgzoutgr U}hroiB Kolzm bkgxy ul 4[ktjy ot Fskxoigt Uuroim Uxklkxktiky1 Bghb_fn9Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn OqdrrO_fd) Dcv_qc B- 0874_- Uurozoigr F}znuxozm gtj G}xkg}ixgzoi Uu·kxB @ Husvgxgzo~k Ftgrmyoy1 Aqhfgsnm)Rtrrdw9 Vgd_srgd_e]] - 0874a- &K_vr_r _m Hmrsqtldms ne Onkhbx9@ Rstcx hmBdmsq_k-Knb_k Fnudqmldms Qdk_shnmr&) Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 4)19 130-54- O_k)Kdrkhd@- 0876- Ptakhb PnkhbxAm_kxrhr;Am Imsqnctbshnm.Snqnmsn9Ldsgtdm]] - 0877- &G_mcr_s sgd Gdkl> Kd_cdqrgho _mc Otakhb Onkhbx&) hmO_k_mc C_uhc S_q_r) dcr) Pqhld Mhmhrsdqr_mc Pqdlhdqr; Pnkhshb_k Ld_cdqrgho _mc Ptakhb Pnkhbxhm C_m_c_. Rb_qanqntfg) Nms-9Oqdmshbd-G_kk) 05-15]] - 0881- Ptakhb PnkhbxAm_kxrhr; Am Imsqnctbshnm,1mc dcm- Rb_qanqntfg) Nms-9 Mdkrnm]] - 0882_- Imsdqdrsrne Ss_sd; Tgd Pnkhshbrne L_mft_fd, Mtkshbtkstq_khrl, _mc Fdlhmhrl hmC_m_c_. Lnmsqd_k_mc Jhmfrsnm9LbFhkk-Ptddm&rTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0882a- &@cunb_bxNqf_mhy_shnmr_mc Kdfhrk_shudOnkhshbr9 Sgd Deedbsrne sgd Bg_qsdq ne Qhfgsr _mc Eqddcnlr nm HmsdqdrsKnaaxhmf ne Edcdq_k Kdfhrk_shnm) 0878-0880&) hmE-K-Rdhckd)dc-) Epthsx _mc Cnlltmhsx; Tgd Cg_qsdq,ImsdqdrsAcunb_bx _mc Rdoqdrdms_shnm.Lnmsqd_k9HmrshstsdenqQdrd_qbg nm Otakhb Onkhbx)008-46]] - 0886- Bdxnmc PnkhbxAm_kxrhr;Ptakhb Irrtd M_m_fdldms hmTgqatkdms Thldr. Snqnmsn9HSO MdkrnmO_ktlan) CdmmhrI- 0876- Tgd Pnkhshbrne Pqnfq_l Eu_kt_shnm. AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9 R_fd]] _mc C-I- B_khrs_-088/_- Ilokdldms_shnm _mc sgd PnkhbxPqnbdrr; Oodmhmf Uo sgd Bk_bj Bnw. Mdv Xnqj9Fqddmvnnc Oqdrr]] _mc ]] - 088/a- &Nodmhmf To sgd Ak_bj Anw9Hlokdldms_shnm _mc sgd Onkhbx Oqnbdrr&)hmO_ktlan _mc B_khrs_'088/_(O_mhsbg)Kdn- 0866- &SgdCdudknoldms ne Bnqonq_shrl hmKhadq_kCdlnbq_bhdr&) Cnlo_q_shudPnkhshb_k Sstchdr 0/) 0950-8/]] - 0868- &Bnqonq_shrlhmB_m_c_&)Sstchdr hmPnkhshb_k Ebnmnlx 0) 0932-81O_ooh) Eq_my Tqa_m) _mc Bgqhrsh_mG-B-@- Gdmmhmf-0887- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr9 Lnqd Sg_m _ Lds_ognq&)Jntqm_k ne Tgdnqdshb_kPnkhshbr0/) 39 442-64]] _mc ]] -- 0888- &SgdNqf_mhy_shnmne Hmektdmbd nm sgd DB&rBnllnm @fqhbtkstq_k Onkhbx9@ Mdsvnqj @ooqn_bg&)Etqnod_m Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k Rdrd_qbg 47; 146-70O_qdmsh) Lhbg_dk- 0875- ImudmshmfRd_khsx;Tgd Pnkhshbr ne sgd M_rr Mdch_. Mdv Xnqj9 Rs L_qshm&rOqdrrO_sdl_m) B_qnkd-086/9 o_qshbho_shnm_mc Ddlnbq_shb Tgdnqx. B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrO_ssnm)B_qk U-) _mc C_uhc R- R_vhbjh- 0882- B_rhb Mdsgncr ne PnkhbxAm_kxrhr _mc Pk_mmhmf.Dmfkdvnnc Bkheer)MI9Oqdmshbd-G_kkO_xmd)Ingm V- 0871- &Bnmshmfdms CdbhrhnmAdg_uhntq&)Prxbgnknfhb_kBtkkdshm81) 19 271-3/1]] ) I_ldr Q- Adssl_m) _mc DqhbI- Ingmrnm- 0877- &@c_oshud Rsq_sdfxRdkdbshnmhm CdbhrhnmL_jhmf&)Jntqm_k ne Ewodqhldms_kPrxbgnknfx=Ld_qmhmf,Mdlnqx _mc Cnfmhshnm03) 29 423-41Odqqnv) Bg_qkdr- 0873- Nnql_k Abbhcdmsr;Lhuhmf vhsg Hhfg-Rhrj Tdbgmnknfhdr. Mdv Xnqj9 A_rhbAnnjrOdsdqr) A- Ftx- 0873- Tgd Pnkhshbrne Btqd_tbq_bx; A Cnlo_q_shud Pdqrodbshud.Mdv Xnqj9 Knmfl_m]] - 0881_- &SgdOnkhbxOqnbdrr9@mHmrshstshnm_khrs Odqrodbshud&) C_m_ch_mPtakhb Aclhmhrsq_shnm 24) 19 05/-7/]] - 0881a- &Fnudqmldms&Qdnqf_mhy_shnm9 @ Sgdnqdshb_k@m_kxrhr&) Imsdqm_shnm_k Pnkhshb_k SbhdmbdRduhdv 02) 19 088-107]] - 0887- &SgdDwodqhldmshmfRnbhdsx_mc OnkhbxCdrhfm&)hmVhkkh_l M- Ctmm) dc-) Tgd Ewodqhldmshmf Snbhdsx;Err_xr hmHnmntq ne Dnm_kc T. C_loadkk. Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9Sq_mr_bshnm)014-28]] - 0888- Imrshstshnm_kTgdnqx hm Pnkhshb_kSbhdmbd;Tgd 'Ndv Imrshstshnm_khrl'. Knmcnm9Ohmsdq]] -1//1- &SgdOnkhshbrne Snnk Bgnhbd&)hmR_k_lnm '1//1_9 441-53(- IngmB- CNTfgshd)_mc L- J_sgkddm LbBtkknbg- 0866- &Sxodrne Cdlnbq_shb Rxrsdlr _mc 0(qodr ne OtakhbOnkhbx&) Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr89 216-44--) -]) _mc ]] - 0867- &CnOtakhb OnkhbhdrU_qx hmCheedqdmsSxodr ne Cdlnbq_shb Rxrsdl>&)hmO-F-Kdvhr) C-B- Onssdq)_mc E-F- B_rskdr)dcr) Tgd Pq_bshbd ne Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr;A Rd_cdq. Knmcnm9Knmfl_m-] _mc Aqh_mV- Gnfvnnc- 0874_- Tgd P_sgnknfx ne Ptakhb Pnkhbx. Mdv Xnqj9 NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] _mc ]] - 0874a- &Hm Rd_qbgne sgd Hrrtd-@ssdmshnm Bxbkd&) Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshbr 36)09 127-42]] _mc @msgnmx A_qjdq) dcr- 0882- Acuhrhmf [drs Etqnod_m Gnudqmldmsr; Impthqhdr,Ewodqshrd_mc PtakhbPnkhbx.Dchmatqfg9 Dchmatqfg TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] _mc E-J-L- U_mMhrodm)dcr- 0887- Ptakhb PnkhbxImrsqtldmsr; Eu_kt_shmf sgd Tnn,krne Ptakhb Aclhmhrsq_shnm.Mdv Xnqj9 Dcv_qc Dkf_qOdsdqrnm)Ingm- 0884- &Cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmsgd Dtqnod_m Tmhnm9Snv_qcr _ Eq_ldvnqj enq@m_kxrhr&) Jntqm_k ne Etqnod_m Ptakhb Pnkhbx1) 0958-82Odsqx)Eq_mbnhr-0888- &SgdNohmhnm-Onkhbx Qdk_shnmrghohmB_m_c_&)Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshbr 50) 19 43/-4/Oghcc) Qhbg_qcV- 0864- &SgdDbnmnlhb Bntmbhkne B_m_c_9HsrDrs_akhrgldms) Rsqtbstqd) _mc Qnkdhmsgd B_m_ch_mOnkhbx-L_jhmf Rxrsdl 0852-63&) C_m_ch_m Ptakhb Aclhmhrsq_shnm 07) 29317-62]] _mc F- Aqtbd Cndl- 0872- b_m_ch_m Ptakhb Pnkhbx;Icd_r, Ssqtbstqdr, Pqnbdrr.Snqnmsn9LdsgtdmOghkkhor)Ihl) Aqtbd Bg_ol_m) _mc C_uhc Rsdudmr)dcr- 1//0- Bdsvddm Ss_sd _mc M_qjds; Err_xr nm Cg_qhshdr,L_v _mc PQkhbxhmC_m_c_. Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne Snqnmsn OqdrrOghkkhor)Rtr_m C- 0880_- &Gnv Nss_v_ Akdmcr9RgheshmfFnudqmldms Qdk_shnmrghor vhsg Hmsdqdrs Fqntor&) hmE-@adkd)dc-) Hnv Oss_v_ Sodmcr 0880-819 Tgd Pnkhshbr ne Fq_fldms_shnm. Nss_v_9 B_qkdsnmTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 072-117]&]] - 0880a- &Ld_mhmf_mc Rsqtbstqd hmRnbh_kLnudldmsr9 L_oohmf sgd Mdsvnqj ne M_shnm_kB_m_ch_mVnldm&r Nqf_mhy_shnmr&) C_m_ch_mJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_kSbhdmbd 13) 39644-71]] - 0887- &Chrbntqrd)Hcdmshsx) _mc Unhbd9Edlhmhrs Bnmsqhatshnmrsn OnkhbxRstchdr&)hmK-Cnatyhmrjhr) L- Gnvkdss) _mc C- K_xbnbj) dcr) PnkhbxSstchdr hmC_m_c_; Tgd Ss_sd ne sgd Aqs. Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr) 131-54Ohdqrnm)O_tk- 0882- &Vgdm DeedbsAdbnldr B_trd9 OnkhbxEddca_bj _mc Onkhshb_k Bg_mfd&)[nqkc Pnkhshbr 349 484-517]] -1///- &Hmbqd_rhmf Qdstqmr)O_sgCdodmcdmbd)_mc sgd Rstcx ne Onkhshbr&) Aldqhb_mPnkhshb_k SbhdmbdRduhdv 83)19 140-56Ohfnt) @-B-0821- Tgd Ebnmnlhbr ne [dke_qd, 3sg dcm- Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mOndk)C_kd G- 0865- &SgdCheetrhnmne Kdfhrk_shnm@lnmf sgd B_m_ch_mOqnuhmbdr&) ,C_m_ch_mJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k Sbhdmbd89 5/4-15Onkknbj)OghkhoG-) Rst_qs @-Khkhd) _mc L- DkkhnsUhssdr-0878- &G_qcHrrtdr) Bnqd U_ktdr _mc Udqshb_k Bnmrsqhkhms9 Sgd B_rd ne Mtbkd_q Onvdq&)BqhshrgJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k Sbhdmbd12) 0918-4/Onkrax) MdkrnmV- 0852- Cnlltmhsx Pnvdq _mc Pnkhshb_kTgdnqx. Mdv G_udm9X_kd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 0873- Pnkhshb_k Immnu_shnmhmAldqhb_; Tgd Pnkhshbrne PnkhbxImhsh_shnm.Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrrOnrmdq)Qhbg_qc@- 0863- &Sgdnqhdrne Dbnmnlhb Qdftk_shnm&) BdkkJntqm_k ne Ebnmnlhbr _mc M_m_fdldms Sbhdmbd4) 19 224-47Ontk_msy_r)Mhbnr-0862_- Pnkhshb_k Pnvdq _mc Snbh_kCk_rrdr. Knmcnm9Mdv KdesAnnjr]] - 0862a- &NmRnbh_kBk_rrdr&)Ndv LdesRduhdv 679 16-43]] - 0867- Ss_sd, Pnvdq, Snbh_khrl. Knmcnm9Mdv KdesAnnjr,; 5A3 Gohroumxgvnm, Onvdkk)V_ksdqWh.,_mc O_tk I- ChL_ffhn) dcr- 0880- [nk Mdv Ntyzoz}zoutgroys hmTxmg0 tongzoutgr Ftgrmyoy1 Bghb_fn9Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn OqdrrOqdrrl_m) Ideeqdx 0-) _mc @_qnmA- Vhkc_urjx- 2:M. NsvrksktzgzoutB Mu· Lxkgz J•vkizgzouty ot agynotmzut gxk Igynkj ot Tgqrgtj/ 2qc dcm- Adqjdkdx9Tmhudqrhsx ne B_khenqmh_ OqdrrOqdrsgtr) QnadqsU- 0862- Jrozk Fiiussujgzout ot Hgtgjogt Uurozoiy1B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd)TmhudqrhsxOqdrrOqdrsnm)Kdd D-) _mc Ct_md Vhmcrnq- 0881- [nk W}rky ne znk Lgsk ot znk Lruhgr Jiut0 usmB Uuroim Wkmoskylux Ntzkxtgzoutgr G}yotkyy1 Anrsnm9Jktvdq @b_cdlhb OtakhrgdqrOqhbg_qc)I- Qnadqs R-) dc- 0872- Hxu·t Huxvuxgzouty ot HgtgjgB [nk igri}r}y ne Ntyzx}sktz Hnuoik1 Snqnmsn9AtssdqvnqsgrOqhdrs)L_qfns) _mc @qnmVngk- 087/- &SgdFqnvsg ne Edcdq_k_mc Oqnuhmbh_k Qdftk_shnmne Dbnmnlhb @bshuhsx0756-0867&) hmV-S- Rs_matqx) dc-) Lu~kxtsktz Wkm}rg0 zoutBYiuvk/ Lxu·zn/ Uxuikyy1 Lnmsqd_k9HmrshstsdenqQdrd_qbg nm OtakhbOnkhbxOqhmbd)Lhbg_dk I- 0868- &Onkhbx @cuhrnqx Fqntor hmFnudqmldms Cdo_qsldmsr&) hm F-A- Cndqm _mc O- @tbnhm)dcr) U}hroi Uuroim ot HgtgjgB Txmgtongzout/ Uxuikyy/ Rgtgmksktz1 Snqnmsn9F_fd) 164-2//Oqhsbg_qc)C_uhc- 0881- &SgdMdvr Ldch_ _mc Otakhb Onkhbx@fdmc_r&)hmJdmm_ldq '0881(Oqnrr) @- O_tk- 0881- Lxu}v Uurozoiy gtj U}hroi Uuroim1 Snqnmsn9Nwenqc Tmhudqrhsx Oqdrr]] _mc k_hmR- Rsdv_qs- 0882- &Knaaxhmf)sgd Unktms_qxRdbsnq _mc sgd Otakhb Otqrd&)hmR-C- Oghkkhor)dc-) Mu· Tzzg·g Yvktjy 0882-08839 F Ruxk Iksuixgzoi HgtgjgD Nss_v_9 B_qkdsnmTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 0/8-31]] _mc Rtr_m LbBnqptnc_kd- 088/- &SgdRs_sd)Hmsdqdrsr)_mc Onkhbx-L_jhmf hm sgd D_rs Bn_rs Ehrgdqx&)hmBnkdl_m _mc Rjnfrs_c '088/(Oqxnq)E-K- 0857- U}hroi J•vktjoz}xky ot Huss}toyz gtj igvozgroyz Sgzouty1 Gnldvnnc) Hkk-9 Q-C- HqvhmOqydvnqrjh) @c_l- 0876- &Ldsgncr ne Bqnrr-m_shnm_kQdrd_qbg) 086/-729 @m Nudquhdv&)hmL- Chdqjdr) G-M- Vdhkdq)_mc @-A-@ms_k)dcr) Husvgxgzo~k Uuroim WkykgxinBQkgxtotm eqnl J•vkxoktik1 @kcdqrgns9Fnvdq) 20-38]]] - 088/- [nk Yzgzk _mc znk Jiutusm \tjkx Hgvozgroys1 Bgtq) Rvhsydqk_mc9 G_qvnnc @b_cdlhb Otakhrgdqr]] _mc Edqm_mcnKhlnmfh- 0886- &Lncdqmhy_shnm9 Sgdnqhdr _mc E_bsr&)auxrj Uuro0 zoiy 389 044-72Otsm_l) Qnadqs C- 0877- &Choknl_bx _mc Cnldrshb Onkhshbr9 Sgd Knfhb ne Svn-Kdudk F_ldr&) Ntzkxtgzoutgr Txmgtongzout 319 316-5/]] - 0884_- &Anvkhmf@knmd9@ldqhb_&r CdbkhmhmfRnbh_kB_ohs_k&)Ou}xtgr ne Iksuixgim 5)09 54-67]] - 0884a- "etmhmfHm)SgmhmfNts9 Sgd Rsq_mfdChr_ood_q_mbdne Rnbh_kB_ohs_khm @ldqhb_&)UYBUurozoigrYioktik gtj Uurozoiy'Cdb-(9 553-72]] - 0885- [nk Ikirotk ul Ho~orYuiokzmBMu· HuskD Rn angzD Nss_v_9 B_m_ch_m BdmsqdenqL_m_fdldms Cdudknoldms]] - 1///- Gu·rotm FrutkB [nk Hurrgvyk gtj Wk~o~grne Fskxoigt Huss}tozm1 Mdv Xnqj9 Rhlnm _mc Rbgtrsdq]] - 1//0- &Rnbh_k B_ohs_k9Ld_rtqdldms _mc Bnmrdptdmbdr&)Ny}sg 1) 0930-41Pt_ksdq) SdqdmbdG--0874- Tvotout Hutzxur hmznk Iksuixgioky1 Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mPt_qsdq) I_bj- 0881- igtgjg,y Yuiogr JiutusmB Hu0uvkxgzo~ky/Sut0Uxulozy/ gtj Tznkx so4Lxzzs,\[ozzm,Jxxzkxvzoyky1, SNSnmsn9I_ldr &lqsldq9Q_apx)L_qb- 0884 -¥Hmektdm}fOtahhbOnkhbxn)m &B_m_ch_m Aqn_cb_rshmf& )B_m_ch_m U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 27) 29300-21& Q_cenqc) J-I- 0866- Husvrk• Ikioyout UxuhrksyB Ft Ntzkmxgzkj Yzxgzkmmlux Wkyur}zout1 Qdrsnm)U_9QdrsnmOtakhrghmfBnlo_mx- Gohroumxgvnm 5A4 Q_chm)Adqxk@-1///- Gkmutj Rginog~krroB Uuroim Ftgrmyoy Husky ne Fmk1 V_rghmfsnm& Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrQ_jnee) Rst_qs G-) hkmcFtdmsgdq E- Rbg_dedq-086/- &Onkhshbr) Onkhbx)_mc Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd9Sgdnqdshb_k@ksdqm_shudr&) Uurozoiygtj Yuiokzm 0)09 40-66Q_ldrg) L- 08849 &DbnmnlhbFkna_khy_shnm_mc OnkhbxBgnhbdr9 Rhmf_onqd&)Lu~kx0 tgtik 0/) 19132-5/ff 153331 akrlgxk Hgvozgroys ot Yu}znkgyz FyogB Yuiogr Yki}xozm/ Mkgrzn/ gtj Jj}0 igzout Uuroioky1Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mQ_x)I_ldr Kdd-1//0- &Hmsdfq_shmf Kdudkrne @m_kxrhrhmVnqkc Onkhshbr&) Ou}xtgr ul [nk0 uxkzoigr Uurozoiy02) 39 244-77& Q_xmdq)I-) ds _k- 1//0- &Oqhuhkdfhmf sgd Rta-Rdbsnq9 Bqhshb_k Rta-Rdbsnqr _mc Rdbsnq_k Qdk_shnmrghorhmEnqdrsOnkhbx-L_jhmf&) KuxkyzUuroim _mc Jiutusoiy 1) 2.39 208-21Qd_f_m)Lhbg_dk C- 0876- Wkm}rgzoutB[nk Uurozoiyne Uuroim1 Anrsnm9khsskd)AqnvmQdhc)Shlnsgx D- 0868- &SgdE_hktqdne OOAR9 Qd_kHmbdmshudr enqsgd 087/r&) Tvzos}s 0/)39 12-26Qdhm)L_qshm)Fnrs_ Drohmf-@mcdqrdm) _mc Kdd Q_hmv_sdq)dcr- 0876- Yzgmtgzout gtj Wktk·gr ot Yuiogr UuroimB [nk Woyk_mc Kg\ ne Uuroim Wkmosky1@qlnmj) MX9L-DRg_qod: ]] _mc Cnm_kcRbgnm-0885- &Eq_ld-Bqhshb_k Onkhbx@m_kxrhr_mc Eq_ld-Qdekdbshud OnkhbxOq_bshbd&) Ptu·rkjmk1gtj Uuroim 8)09 74-0/4Qdhmhbjd)Vnkef_mf G- 0887- Lruhgr U}hroi UuroimB Lu~kxtotm aoznu}z Lu~kxtsktzD V_rghmfsnm9Aqnnjhmfr HmrshstshnmQdkxd_)G_qnkc B- 0866- &SgdOqnuhrhnmne Fnudqmldms Hmenql_shnm9 Sgd Eqddcnl ne Hmenql_shnm@bsDwodqhdmbd&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 1/) 19 206-30Qgncdr) Q-@-V- 0873- &Onvdq-Cdodmcdmbd) OnkhbxBnlltmhshdr _mc Hmsdqfnudqmldms_kMdsvnqjr&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout G}rrkzot 389 3-20]] - ]-0885- &SgdMdv Fnudqm_mbd9FnudqmhmfVhsgnts Fnudqmldms&)UurozoigrYz}j0 rky 339 541-56]] - 0886_- \qiO1Bxyzgtjoq Lu~kxtgt/ikB Uuroim Skz·uxqy/ Lu~kxtgtik/ Wklrk•o~ozm/ gtj Fiiu}tzghrrozm1 Atbjhmfg_l9 Nodm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]] - 0886a- &Eqnl L_qjdshr_shnm sn)Ohoknl_bx9 Hs&rsgd Lhw sg_s L_ssdqr&) F}y0 zxgrogt Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 45) 19 3/-43]] _mc C_uhc L_qrg- 0881- &MdvChqdbshnmrhmsgd Rstcx ne OnkhbxMdsvnqjr&) J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ne UurozoigrYjktik 109 070-1/4Qhbbh)C_uhc-) 0882- qnk ,No,gtyluxsgzout ne Fskxoigt UurozoiyB[nk Mdv agynotmzut 1 gtj znk Qyrd ne [nsq [gtqy1 Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrrQhbg_qcrnm) Idqdlx I-) dc- 088/- Uxo~gzoygzout gtj Ikxkm}rgzout ot Hgtgjg gtj Gxozgot1@kcdqrgns9C_qslntsg]] --0-884: &}t V_sdq Onkhbx9Tmbdqs_hm@fdmc_r) RgheshmfMdsvnqjr _mc Bnlokdw Bn}gtnmr ) bcc G- Aqdrrdqr)K-I- N&Snnkd)_mc I- Qhbg_qcrnm)dcr) Skz·uxqy lux agzkx UunimB F Husvgxgzo~k Ukxyvkizo~k1Knmcnm9Eq_mj B_rr) 028-56]] - 0888- &}msdqdrs Fqntor) Ltksh-@qdm_Onkhshbr_mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)hmR-R-M_fdk) dc-) [nk Uunim UxuikyyB Bnll_bj) MX9Mnu_ RbhdmbdOtakhrgdqr) 54-0//]] -1///- &Fnudqmldms)HmsdqdrsFqntor _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)UurozoigrYz}joky 7;, 0//5-14-& Ftmmdk Ftrs_errnm) _mc Fq_msInqc_m- 0871- &SgdBnmbdosne OnkhbxRsxkd&hm Qhbg_qcrnm)dc-) Uuroim Yzmrkyot akyzkxt J}xuvk1 Knmcnm9Fdnqfd @kkdm _mc Tm}]] -_mc@-F-Inqc_m- 0868- Lu~kxtotm \tjkx Uxkyy}xkB[nk OnkhbxUxuikyy ot g Uuyz0 Ugxrrgsktzgxm Iksuixgim1 Nwenqc9L_qshmQnadqsrnm-& ]] ) _mc Q-G- Jhladq- 0867- &Knaaxhmf)@clhmhrsq_shudQdenql _mc Onkhbx Rsxkdr9Sgd B_rd ne K_mcCq_hm_fd&) UurozoigrYz}joky 15)09 36-53Qhdcdk)I_ldr @-0861- &Bhshydm O_qshbho_shnm9 Lxsgr _mc Qd_khshdr&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxg0 zout Wk~ok· 'L_x-Itmd(9 100-1/- 5A5 Gohroumxgvnm Gohroumxgvnm Qhjdq)Vhkkh_l G- 0851- [nk [nkuxm ul UurozoigrHugrozouty1Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsx Oqdrr]] - 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0876- &Ne L_qjds E_hktqd)Unktms_qxE_hktqd)_mc Sghqc-O_qsxFnudqmldms&)hm Nrsq_mcdq_mc K_mfsnm'0876(]] ) dc- 0878_- Gkmutj Uxo~gzongzoutB[nk Sg_hr ul Lu~kxtsktz Fizout1 V_rghmfsnm9Tqa_m Hmrshstsd- ]] - 0878a- &SgdBg_mfhmfSnnkr ne Fnudqmldms @bshnm9 @mNudquhdv&)hmR_k_lnm '0878_(]] - 0878b- &Bnmbktrhnm9 AdxnmcOqhu_shy_shnm&) hmR_k_lnm '0878_(]] - 0884- Ugxztkxy ot U}hroi Ykx~oikBLu~kxtsktz0Sutvxuloz Wkrgzouty ot znk Ruj0 dqmakrlgxk Yzgzk1A_kshlnqd9Ingmr Gnojhmr TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] ) dc-1//1_- [nk [uury ul Lu~kxtsktzB @ L}ojk zu znk Sk· Lu~kxtgtik1 Mdv Xnqj9NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]] - 1//1a- &DbnmnlhbQdftk_shnm&) hmR_k_lnm '1//1_9 006-44(]] _mc Lhbg_dk R-Ktmc- 0878- &SgdSnnkr @ooqn_bg9A_rhb@m_kxshbr&) hmR_k_lnm '0878_9 12-4/(R_khratqx)Qnadqs G-) ds _k- 0876- &Vgn Vnqjr vhsg Vgnl> HmsdqdrsFqnto @kkh_mbdr _mc Noonrhshnm&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrRBhdmbd Wk~ok· 70) 39 0106-23R_klnm) Bg_qkdr) dc- 0878- Ntluxsgzout HgsvgrmtyB Rgtgmotm znk Uxuikyy ul Yuiogr Hngtmk1 Mdvadqqx O_qj) B_khe-9 R_fdR_ksdq)Kh_q_-0870- U}hroi Ntw}oxoky hmHgtgjg1 Nss_v_9 RbhdmbdBntmbhkne B_m_c_R_ltdkr) V_qqdmI- 0880- &"0gksg"_mc "Chrbntqrd" hhksgd Rnbh_kBnmrsqtbshnmne Dbnmnlhb Qd_khsx9@mDrr_x nm-sgd Qdk_shnmne Jmnvkdcfd sn Rnbhndbnmnlhb Onkhbx&) Ou}xtgr ul Uuyz0Pkmtkyogt Jiutusoiy 02)39 400-13R_mcdqrnm)H_m-1//1- &Du_kt_shnm) OnkhbxKd_qmhmf_mc Duhcdmbd-A_rdcOnkhbx-L_jhmf&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 7/) 09 0-11R_qoj_x_) R- 0877- Quhhmotm ot Hgtgjg0agmy gtj Rkgty1 Cnm Lhkkr) Nms-9BBG B_m_ch_mR_u_r) D-R-0866- Frzkxtgzo~ky lux Ikro~kxotm U}hroi Ykx~oikyB[u·gxj Nsvxu~kj Ukxlux0 sgtik1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv Oqdrr]] - 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0886- Lgsky Wkgr Fizuxy UrgmB Fizux0Hktzkxkj Ntyzoz}zoutgroys ot Uuroim Wkykgxin1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv OqdrrRbg_ssrbgmdhcdq)D-D-0824- Uurozoiy/Uxkyy}xky gtj znk [gxoll1 Mdv Xnqj9Oqdmshbd-G_kk]] - 085/- [nk Yksoyu~kxkomt UkuvrkB @ Wkgroyz,y]ok· ul Iksuixgim ot Fskxoig1 Mdv Xnqj9 Gnks)Qhmdg_qs_mc VhmrsnmRbgk_fdq)Dcdkk_-0888- &@Bnlo_qhrnm ne Eq_ldvnqjr) Sgdnqhdr) _mc Lncdkr ne Onkhbx Oqnbdrrdr&)hmR_a_shdq'0888_9 122-5/( -& Rbglhcs)UhUhdqs& @9YNNk9 "Sg~OnkhshbrneDbNskalhb@citrsldms&hm"Eq_mbd_qhsk&Ahh-h_hm9 Vgdm9C-ddr-:Chrb'(ts%D!-9L_ssdq->9} ,Ou}sur ul Dtqnod_m [email protected]==3.;'?358 -53& Rbglhssdq) Oghkkhod B- 0866- &Lncdr ne Hmsdqdrs Hmsdqldch_shnm_mc Lncdkr ne Rnbhds_k Bg_mfd hmVdrsdqm Dtqnod&)Husvgxgzo~k UurozoigrYz\joky 0/) 096-27]]] - 0871- &Qdekdbshnmr nm Vgdqd sgd Sgdnqx ne Mdn-Bnqonq_shrl G_r Fnmd _mc Vgdqd sgd Oq_whrne Mdn-Bnqonq_shrl L_x Ad Fnhmf&)hmF- Kdglaqtbg _mc O-BRbglhssdq) dcr) Ugzzkxty ul HwxvuxgzoyzUuroim0Rgqotm1 Knmcnm9R_fd]] -- 0874- &Mdn-bnqonq_shrl&_mc sgd Rs_sd&) hmV- Fq_ms)dc-) [nk UurozoigrJiutusm ul Huxvuxgzoy[ON11 Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mRbgmdhcdq)@mmd)_mc GdkdmHmfq_l- 0877- &Rxrsdl_shb_kkx OhmbghmfHcd_r9@Bnlo_q_shud@ooqn_bgsn OnkhbxCdrhfm&)Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 7) 0950-7/]] _mc ]] - 088/_- &Adg_uhntq_k@rrtloshnmr ne OnkhbxSnnkr&)Ou}xtgr ul Uuro0 zoiy 41) 19 40/-18]] _mc ]] - 088/a- &Onkhbx Cdrhfm9Dkdldmsr) Oqdlhrdr _mc Rsq_sdfhdr&) hmR-RM_fdk)dc-) Uuroim [nkuxm gtj Uuroim J~gr}gzoutB Hutikvzy/ Ptu·rkjmk/ Hg}yky gtj Suxsy1 Mdv Xnqj9Fqddmvnnc) 66-0/1]] _mc ]] - 0882- &Rnbh_k Bnmrsqtbshnmne &e_qfdsOnotk_shnmr9Hlokhb_shnmrenq Onkhshbr _mc Onkhbx&) Fskxoigt Uurozoigr Rbhdmbd Wk~ok· 76) 19 223-36]] _mc ]] - 0886- Uuroim Ikyomt lux Iksuixgim1 K_vqdmbd9TmhudqrhsxOqdrr ne J_mr_rRbgmdhcdq)E-) _mc Aqtmn R- Eqdx-0877- &Onkhshbn-Dbnmnlhb Lncdkr ne L_bqndbnmnlhb Onkhbx9@ Qduhdv ne sgd Dlohqhb_kDuhcdmbd&) hmSgnl_r C- Vhkkdss)dc-) Uurozoigr G}yotkyy HmirkyB [nk Uurozoigr Jiutusm ul Rutkm/ Ntlrgzout gtj \tksvrumsktz1 Ctqg_l) MB9Ctjd TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 128-64Rbgmdhcdq)Inrdog V- 0874- &Rnbh_kOqnakdlr Sgdnqx9 Sgd BnmrsqtbshnmhrsUhdv&) @mmt_kWk~ok· ul Yuiourumm 009188-18Rbgnky) Ingm S- 0873- &Bnnodq_shnm"Cdsdqqdmbd)_mc sgd Dbnknfx ne Qdftk_snqx Dmenqbdldms&) Qg· gtj Yuiokzm Wk~ok· 07) 19 068-113]] - 0880- &Bnnodq_shud Qdftk_snqx Dmenqbdldms_mc sgd Onkhshbrne @clhmhrsq_shud Deedbshudmdrr&) Fskxoigt UurozoigrYioktik Wk~ok· 74)09 004-25Rbgnm)Cnm_kc @-)_mc L_qshmQdhm-0883- Kxgsk WklrkizoutB [h·gxjy znk Wkyur}zout ul Ntzxgizghrk Uuroim Hutzxu~kxyoky1Mdv Xnqj9A_rhbAnnjrRbgtkl_m) O_tk Q- 0877- &SgdOnkhshbrne "Hcd_shnm_kOnkhbx"&) Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoiy 83B 152-80Rbgtksy) Qhbg_qc)_mc @k_m@kdw_mcqnee0874- Jiutusoi Wkm}rgzout gtj znk Kkjkxgr 00/Ymyzks1 Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne Snqnmsn-Oqdrr-) Rbgv_qsy) Aqx_m-0886- &OTakhb Hmpthqhdr&) Hgtgjogt U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 3/) 0961-74Rbh_qhmh) O_rb_k-0875- &Dk_anq_shnm ne sgd Rvhrr @fqhbtkstq_kOnkhbxenqsgd F@HS Mdfnsh_shnmr9 @ Mdsvnqj @m_kxrhr&) Y·oyy Ou}xtgr ul Yuiourumm 11) 0974-004Rdke)Odsdq-0874- Uurozoigr[nkuxoky ul Rujkxt Lu~kxtsktzB NzyWurk gtj Wkluxs1 Knmcnm9@kkdm _mc TmvhmRg_ohqn)Qnadqs X-)_mc K_vqdmbdQ- I_bnar- 0878- &SgdQdk_shnmrghoAdsvddm Otakhb Nohmhnm_mc OtakhbOnkhbx9 @ Qduhdv&)hmR- Knmf) dc-) UurozoigrGkng~ou}x Ftt}gr1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv OqdrrRg_qj_mrjx) Hq_-4A:41 &Bnmrsq_hmsr nm Hmmnu_shnm hmOnkhbxL_jhmf9 Dbnmnlhb Cdudknoldms _mc Onkhshb_k Qntshmdr&)hmEq_mj L_qhmh)dc-) [u·gxj g Sk· U}hroi Fjsot0 oyzxgzoutB[nk Rottu·hxuuq Ukxyvkizo~k1 Rbq_msnm) Odmm-9Bg_mckdq]] - 0886- Uuroim Rgqptm hmNyxgkrBWu}zotky lux Yosvrk Uxuhrksy gtj Huvotm ·ozn znk Husvrk•1 Ohssratqfg9 Tmhudqrhsxne Ohssratqfg Oqdrr& Rg_qo) Dk_hmdA- 0}83_- &O_q_cnwdrne M_shnm_k@msh-CqtfOnkhbxl_jhmf&)hmC_uhc @Qnbgdenqs_mc Qnfdq V- Bnaa) dcr) [nk Uurozoiyul Uxuhrks IklotozoutB Yngvotm znk Uuroim Fmktjg1 K_vqdmbd9TmhudqrhsxOqdrr ne J_mr_r) 87-005]] - 0883a- &SgdCxm_lhbr ne Hrrtd Dwo_mrhnm9 B_rdr eqnl Chr_ahkhsxQhfgsr _mc Eds_kQdrd_qbg Bnmsqnudqrx&) Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoiy45) 39 808-28Rkk_qod)KI- 0874- &Bdmsq_k Bnnqchm_shnm_mc sgd OnkhbxMdsvnqj&)UurozoigrYz}joky 66/ 29 250-70Rgdqhee)Ods_ D- 0872- &Rs_sdSgdnqx) Rnbh_kRbhdmbd)_mc Fnudqmldms_k Bnllhrrhnmr&) Fskxoigt Gkng~ou}xgr Yioktzoyz 15)R9 558-7/- 5A9 Gohroumxgvnm GoeOroumxgvnm Rgnsk_mc)Q- K_mbd)_mc LdkuhmL- L_qj- 0874- Yuiogr Yjktik gtj Yujgr Uuroim1 AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9 R_fdRh_qnee) @k_m-0888- &Bnqonq_shrlhm13 Hmctrsqh_kCdlnbq_bhdr9 Ld_mhmf _mc Ld_rtqdldms&) J}xuvkgt Ou}xtgr ul UurozoigrWkykgxin 259 064-1/4Rhdadq)R_l C- 0870- Kgzgr WkskjokyB [nk Nxutoky ul Yujgr Ntzkx~ktzout1 Mdv Xnqj9 OkdmtlRhdcrbgk_f) @kdw_mcdq-1///- &Hmrshstshnm_khy_shnm _mc BnmekhbsL_m_fdldms hmsgd Mdv Dtqnod-O_sg-Rg_ohmf enq sgd Adssdq nq Vnqrd>&)o_odq o)qdrdmsdcsn sgd 07sg Vnqkc Bnmfqdrr ne sgd Hmsdqm_shnm_k Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd@rrnbh_shnm)Ptdadb BhsxRhldnm) Qhbg_qc- 0865_- &RstcxhmfOtakhb Onkhbx&) Hgtgjogt Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoigr Yj0 ktikA/ 39 437-7/]] - 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B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd Tmhudqrhsx OqdrrRknuhb)O_tk) A_qtbg Ehrbgnee)_mc R_q_g Khbgsdmrsdhm-0866- &Adg_uhntq_kCdbhrhnm Sgdnqx&)Ftt}gr Wk~ok· ul Uyminurumm 179 0}28UU +,,,--+--,; _mc ]] - 0874- &Qdftk_shnmne Qhrj9 @ Orxbgnknfhb_kOdqrodbshud&) hmQ-F- Mnkk)dc-) Wkm}rgzuxmUurokmgtj znk Yujgr Yioktiky1 Adqjdkdx9Tmhudqrhsxne B_khenqmh_ Oqdrr)130-67Rlhsg) @cqh_m-1///- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr _mc @cunb_bx Bn_khshnmr9Dwok_hmhmf Onkhbx Bg_mfd _mc Rs_ahkhsxhmTJ Hmctrsqh_kOnkktshnmOnkhbx>&) Jt~oxutsktz gtj Urgt0 totm B9 Lu~k/xtsktz gtj Uuroim 07984-003Rlhsg) Fhkadqs)_mc C_uhc L_x- 087/- &Sgd@qshehbh_k Cda_sd Adsvddm Q_shnm_khrs _mc Hmbqdldms_khrsLncdkrne odbhrhnm-L_jhmf&)Uuroim gtj Uurozoiy7) 19 036-50- 5A: Rlhsg) L_qshmI- 088/- &Oktq_khrl)Qdenqldc Oktq_khrl _mc Mdnoktq_khrl9 Sgd Qnkdne Oqdrrtqd Fqntor hmOnkhbx-L_jhmf&) UurozoigrYz}joky 27 'Itmd(9 2/1-11--& 0882- Uxkyy}xk/ Uu·kx gtj UuroimB Yzgzk F}zutusm gtj Uuroim Skz·uxqy ot Gxozgotgtj znk \tozkj Yzgzky1@kcdqrgns9G_qudrsdq Vgd_srgd_e]] -0883- &Onkhbx Mdsvnqjr _mc Rs_sd@tsnmnlx&) hmR- Aqnnjr _mc @--F- F_fmnm) dcr) [nk Uurozoigr Ntlrroktik ul NjkgyB Uuroim Huss}tozoky gtj znk Yujgr Yjktiky1 Mdv Xnqj9)Oq_dfdq-]) C_uhc L_qrg) _mc C_uhc Qhbg_qcr- 0882- &Bdmsq_k Fnudqmldms Cdo_qsldmsr _mc sgd OnkhbxOqnbdrr&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 60 'Vhmsdq(9456-83Rlhsg) Qhbg_qc@- 0868- &Cdbhrhnm L_jhmf _mc Mnm-CdbhrhnmL_jhmf hmBhshdr9Rnld Hlokhb_shnmrenq Bnlltmhsx Rsqtbstq_k Qdrd_qbg&)Fskxoigt Yujurumoigr Wk~ok·, 33) 09 036-50Rlhsg) Qnfdqr L- 0886- &Rshkk Aknvhmfhmsgd Vhmc9 Sgd @ldqhb_m Ptdrs enq _ Cdlnbq_shb)Rbhdmshehb Onkhshb_k Rbhdmbd&) hmS- Admcdq_mc B-D- Rbgnqrjd) dcr) Fskxoigt Figjksoi H}rz}xk ot [nBotyluxsgzoutB Kolzm bkgxy/ Ku}x Ioyjvrotky1 Oqhmbdsnm)MI9 Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 160-2/4Rlhsg) Sgnl_r A- 0866- &@cuhrnqx Bnllhssddr hmsgd Otakhb OnkhbxOqnbdrr&)Ntzkxtg0 zoutgr Wk~ok· ul Fjsotoyzxgzo~k Yjktiky 32)19 042-55--& 0874- &Du_kt_shmf Cdudknoldms Onkhbhdr_mc Oqnfq_lldr hmsgd Sghqc Vnqkc&) U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout gtj Ik~kruvsktz 4)19 018-33Rmnnj) Rbnss @- 1///- Kxoktjrm KoxkB[nk Fiiojktzgr Ynuuzju·t ul t.r. 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&Qdeq_qmhmf&kmbqdldms_khrl9 @ Bnmrsqtbshud Qdronmrd sn Bqhshbr&) Uuroim Yioktiky 14) 29144}62Vdhrr) B_qnk G- 0866_- \yotm Yuiogr Wkykgxin ot U}hroi Uuroim /Rgqotm1 Kdwhmfsnm) L_rr-9 Kdwhmfsnm Annjr]] - 0866a- &Qdrd_qbgenqOnkhbx&r R_jd9 Sgd DmkhfgsdmldmsEtmbshnmne Rnbh_kRbhdmbdQdrd_qbg&)Uuroim Ftgrmyoy 2) 39 420-34- & ]] -087/- &Jmnvkdcfd Bqddo _mc Cdbhrhnm@bbqdshnm&) Ptu·rkjmkB Hxkgzout/ Cheetyout/ \zorongzout 0) 29 270-3/3Vdhrr) I_mds @- 0871- &Bnohmfvhsg Bnlokdwhsx9@mDwodqhldms_kRstcx ne Otakhb OnkhbxCdbhrhnm-L_jhmf&)Ou}xtgr ne Uuroim Ftgrmyoy gtj Rgtgmksktz 1) 0955-76]] _mc L_qx Srbghqg_qs-0883- &OtakhbHmenql_shnmB_lo_hfmr _r Onkhbxkmrsqtldmsr&) Ou}xtgr ne Uuroim Ftgrmyoy gtj Rgtgmksktz 02)09 71-008- &:vdh-rr9SHhmes_)¥&0}8}¥&&&&Fkna_khy_shnqs9_qhcM_shnm0k-0&z:Nudmlmbd9 @tsnmnlx nq Hmsdqcd) ")od-_cdtbd9-QdIIhdHkI neImsltkshCm-nk)RskI-c-h>r-140r-kVo -°(: 48-77]] _mc Ingm L- Gnarnm- 0884- Yzgzkygtj Jiutusoi Ik~kruvsktzB F Husvgxgzo~k MoyzuxoigrFtgrmyoy1 B_laqhcfd9 Onkhsx¥OqdrrVg_kdm) Sgnl_r- 0876- &Hmsqnctbshnm sn Cdbhrhnm-L_jhmf Tmcdq U_qhntr Jhmcr ne 636 Tmbdqs_hmsx&) hmI- J_boqyxj _mc R-@-Nqknurjh) dcr) Tvzosongzout Rujkry \yotm Etyyx Ykzy gtj Uuyyohorozm[nkuxm1 Cnqcqdbgs9C- Qdhcdk)16-38Vhkc_urjx) @_qnm-0851- &Sgd@m_kxrhrne Hrrtd-Bnmsdwsrhmsgd Rstcx ne CdbhrhnmL_jhmf&) Ou}xtgr ne Khrozoiy13) 39 606-21" ]] - 0858- &QdrbthmfOnkhbx@m_kxrhreqnl OOAR&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout Wk~ok· 'L_q--@oq-(9 078-1/1]] )]- 0868- Yvkgqotm N[}zn zu Uu·kxB [nk Fxz gtj Hxglz ne Uuroim FtgrmyoyB Anrsnm9 Khsskd) AqnvmVhkdmrjx) G_qnk} .- )08649 [nk akrlgxk Yzgzk gtj Jw}grozmB Yzx}iz}xgr gtj Njkurumoigr Wuuzyne U}hrni J•vktjnz}xky1 Adqjdkdx9Tmhudqrhsxne B_khenqmh_ Oqdrr]] _mc Knvdkk Sgqmdq-0876- Iksuixgzoi Huxvuxgzoys gtj Uuroim QotqgmkyB [nk 1 NtzkxjkBvktjktik ne NtjnByzxogr/Qghux0Rgxqkz/ Ntiusky/ gtj Yuiogr Uuroioky ot Jomnz Hu}tzxzky1 Adqjdkdx9Tludqrhsx ne B_khenqmh_ Hmsdqm_shnm_k " @qd_Rstchdr]] -ds _k- 0874- Husvgxgzo~k Yuiogr UuroimB [nkuxoky/ Rkznujy/ Kotjotmy1 Adqjdkdx9 kmrshstsdne Hmsdqm_shnm_k RstchdrVhkjr) Rsdogdm) }mc L_tqhbd Vqhfgs- 0876- &Bnmbktrhnm9 Bnlo_qhmf Fnudqmldms) Hmctr} Qdk_sknmr9 Rs_sdr)Rdbsnqr)_mc Mdsvnqjr&) hmVhkjr _mc Vqhfgs) dcr) Bnlvgxgzz~kLu~kxtsktz0Ntj}yzxm WkrgzoutyB akyzkxt Dtqnod) znk \tozkj Yzgzky gtj Ogvgt1 Nwenqc9Bk_qdmcnmOqdrr) 163-202& Vhkkh_lrnm) NkhudqD- 0874- [nk Jiutusoi Ntyzoz}zouty ne HgvozgroysBKoxsy/ Rgxqkzy/ Wkrgzoutgr Hutzxgizotm1 Mdv Xnqj9EqddOqdrr]] -- 0885- &0h&_m}_bshnm Bnrs Dbnmnlhbr _mc Nqf_mhy_shnmSgdnqx&)hmVhkkh_lrnm) -dc-) [nk RqingtrYq ne Lu~kxtgtik1 Mdv Xnqj9 NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 108-38Vhkrenq})C_UHc-0874- Sgd Hutputiz}xk ne Hcd_r _mc Hmsdqdrsr&) Husvgxgzo~k Uurozoigr 1Yz}jnky 07) 29 246-61]] - 0883- &O_sgCdodmcdmbx)nq Vgx Ghrsnqx L_jdr HsCheehbtksats Mns Hlonrrhakd sn Qdenql Gd_ksg B_qd Rxrsdlr hm_ Ahf V_x&) Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 03 2& 140-73& Vhkrnm) B_qsdq@- 1///- &Onkhbx Qdfhldr _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 1/)29 136-60&Vhkrnm)Fq_g_l J- 088/_- G}yotkyy gtj UurozoiyBF Husvgxgzo~k Nqzxuj}izout 1mc&¥ dcm- Knmcnm9L_blhkk_m- & f1 f1 4AA3h14tzkxkyz Lxu}vy1 Nwenqc9A_rhkAk_bjvdkkVhkr>})-I_ldr P- 08639 &SgdOn}shbrne Qdftk_shnm&)hmI-v- LbJhd) dc-) Yuiogr Wkyvut0 1ynhnrnzmgtj znk G}yskyy Uxkjrigsktz1 V_rghmfsnm9Aqnnjhmfr HmrshstshnmVhkrnm)U- Rdxlntq- 0860- &SgdQnkdne Qnx_kBnllhrrhnmr _mc S_rj Enqbdr&hmCndqm _mc @tbnhm'08609 002-18(& Vhkrnm)Vnncqnv- 0776- &SgdRstcx ne @clhmhrsq_shnm&) UurozoigrYioktik V}gxzkxrm 5/ 19 086-111Vhmjkdq)I-S- 0865- &Bnqonq_shrl&) Dtqnod_m Ou}xtgr ne Yuiourumm 06) 09 0//-25Vndqcl_m) Dcvhm- 1///- &Nqf_mhyhmf Dlhrrhnmr 0h&_chmf9 Sgd A_qqhdqne Cnldrshb Odqlhs @kknb_shnm&) Jtkxmm Uuroim 179 502-12Vnk}) Bg_qkdr)-Iq-0868- &@&Sgdnqx ne Mnml_qjds E_hktqd9Eq_ldvnqj enq Hlokdldms_shnm@m_kXRHR&) Ou}xtgr ne Qg· gtj Jiutusoiy 11) 09 0/6-28]] - 0876- &L_qjdsr _mc Mnm-L_qjds E_hktqdr9Bnlo_qhrnm _mc @rrdrrldms& Ou}x0 tgr ne U}hroi Uuroim 6) 0932-6/& ]] - 0}77- Rgxqkzy nq Lu~kxtsktzyB Hnuuyotm Gkz·kkt Nsvkxlkiz Frzkxtgzo~ky1 B_lamcfd) L_rr-9 LHS OqdrrVnked)In-d}C- 0878- &C}lnbq_bx _mc Dbnmnlhb @citrsldms9 @ Bnlo_q_shud @m_kxrhr ne }ngshb_kBg_mfd&) l Q-D-Enfkdrnmf _mc I-C- Vnked) dcr) [nk Uurozoiyne Jiutusoi Fjp}yzsktz1 Mdv Xnqj9Fqddmvnnc OqdrrVnncr)- A: C_m) 2->cIdeeq}}R- Od_jd- 0887- &SgdCxm_lhbr ne EnqdhfmOnkhbx@fdmc_Rdsslf) Fsktigt KhrnzzigrYioktik Wk~ok· 81)09 062-73- 415 Bhakhnfq_ogx Vnncrhcd) J- 0872- &SgdOnkhshb_k Dbnmnlx ne OnkhbxHmrsqtldmsr9 S_w Dwodmchstqdr _mc Rtarhchdr&)hmL- @sjhmrnm_mc L- Bg_mckdq)dcr) Tgd Pnkhshbr ne C_m_ch_mPtakhbPnkhbx.Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr) 062-86"]] - 0875- &Onkhbx Hmrsqtldmsr _mc sgd Rstcx ne Otakhb Onkhbx&) C_m_ch_mJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k Rbhdmbd08) 39 664-82Vq_hsg) Q-D-)_mc F-A- K_la- 0860- Ptakhb Impthqhdr_r _m Imrsqtldms ne Gnudqmldms. Knmcnm9Fdnqfd @kkdm _mc TmvhmVtsgmnv) Qnadqs) dc- 0880- Bdsvddm Ss_sdr _mc M_qjdsr; Tgd Wnktms_qxSdbsnq hm Cnlo_q_shud Pdqrodbshud.Oqhmbdsnm) MI9Oqhmbdsnm TmhudqrhsxOqdrrX_mnv) Cunq_l- 0881- &Rhkdmbdr hmOtakhb OnkhbxChrbntqrd9 Nqf_mhy_shnm_k _mc Onkhbx Lxsgr&) Jntqm_k ne PtakhbAclhmhrsq_shnmRdrd_qbg_mc Tgdnqx 1) 39 288-312X_qaqntfg) AdsgU-) _mc Qnadqs L- X_qaqntfg- 088/- &Hmsdqm_shnm_k Hmrshstshnmr _mc sgd Mdv Dbnmnlhbr ne Nqf_mhy_shnm&) Imsdqm_shnm_k Oqf_mhy_shnm33) 19 124-48X_sdr) I- Eq_mj) _mc Khr_ F- Ytjnvrjh- 0865- &Bg_q_bsdqhy_shnm ne @lahfthsx hmCdbhrhnm-L_jhmf&)Bdg_uhntq_kSbhdmbd109 08-14Xdd)@kadqsR- 0885- &SgdB_tr_k Deedbsrne Hcd_r nm Onkhbhdr&) Imsdqm_shnm_k Oqf_mhy_shnmr4/) 0958-0/7Xhrg_h)X_dk-0882- &OtakhbHcd_r _mc Otakhb Onkhbx&) Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr 14) 19 1/6-17Xntmf) Nq_mQ- 087/- &Hmsdqm_shnm_k Q}fhldr9 Oqnakdlr ne BnmbdosEnql_shnm&)[nqkc Pnkhshbr; 442-67. Y_g_qh_chr)M- 0884- M_qjdsr, Ss_sdr, _mc Ptakhb Pnkhbx;Pqhu_shy_shnm hmBqhs_hm_mc Fq_mbd.@mm@qanq9Tmhudqrhsxne Lhbghf_m Oqdrr]] _mc Bgqhrsnogdq R- @kkdm-0884- &Hcd_r)Mdsvnqjr) _mc OnkhbxRsqd_lr9 Oqhu_shy_shnmhmAqhs_hm _mc Fdql_mx&) PnkhbxSstchdr Rduhdv 03)0.19 60-87Ydbjg_trdq) Qhbg_qc-0864- &OqnbdctqdrenqU_kthmfKhudr&) PtakhbPnkhbx12) 39 308-53]] - 0870- &Oqdedqqdc Onkhbhdr" Vgdm Sgdqd Hr _ Bnmbdqmenq Oqna_ahkhsxne @cnoshnm&) Jntqm_k ne Emuhqnmldms_kEbnmnlhbr _mc M_m_fdldms 79 104-26]] _mc Dkldq Rbg_dedq-0857- &OtakhbOnkhbx_mc Mnql_shud Dbnmnlhb Sgdnqx&)hm Q-@-A_tdq _mc J-I- Fdqfdm) dcr) Tgd Sstcx ne PnkhbxFnmm_shnm.Mdv Xnqj9 Eqdd Oqdrr) 16-)-0/1Ydhfkdq)K- G_qlnm- 0853- ImsdqdrsFqntor hmAldqhb_m Snbhdsx.Dmfkdvnnc Bkheer)MI9 Oqdmshbd-G_kkYdkchsbg:Lnqqhr) Iq) _mc In_m "AtskdqEnqc- 0883- &Tmbdqs_hmsx) Onsdmsh_kOnvdq _mc Mnmcdbhrhnmr&) Snbh_kPrxbgnknfx Qt_qsdqkx 46) 0953-65-& Vhkkh_l G_qqhr)Fdnqfd L- Sgnl_r) _mc Gdmqx@- V_kjdq- 0872- &Cdbhrhnmr) Mnmcdbhrhnmr_mc Lds_cdbhrhnmr&)Rdrd_qbg hm Snbh_kMnudldmsr, Cnmekhbs_mc Cg_mfd 49 0-21- " Ydqad) Qh!<g_qc/-) _mc Gnv_qc D- LbBtqcx- 0888- &SgdE_hktqdne L_qjds E_hktqd&) Jntqm_k ne PnkhbxAm_kxrhr_mc M_m_fdldms 07) 39 447-67Ydx) L_qx- 0881- &Bqhshbhrlrne Q_shnm_kBgnhbd Lncdkr&)hmYdx)dc-) DdbhrhnmM_jhmf; Aksdqm_shudrsn R_shnm_kCgnhbdMncdkr. Mdvatqx O_qj) B_khe-9R_fd) 0/-20Yhikrsq_)FdqqhsI_m- 0867-8- &MdsvNqjrhmOtakhb Onkhbx9 Mtbkd_qDmdqfxhmsgd Mdsgdqk_mcr&)Snbh_kNdsvnqjr 09248-78Ytbjdq) KxmmdF- 0877- &VgdqdCn Hmrshstshnm_k O_ssdqmrBnld Eqnl> Nqf_mhy_shnmr _r @bsnqrhmRnbh_kRxrsdlr&) hmYtbjdq) dc-) Imrshstshnm_kP_ssdqmr_mc Oqf_mhy_shnmr;Btkstqd _mc Emuhqnmldms.B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 A_kkhmfdq) 12-38Yxrl_m) Ingm- 0883- &Gnv HmrshstshnmrBqd_sd Ghrsnqhb_kkxQnnsdc m-_idbsnqhdrne Fqnvsg&) Imctrsqh_k_mc Cnqonq_sdCg_mfd 2)09 132-72- _bsnq'r(9 _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)010-1) 015-7) 027-8: _tsgnqhs_shud_mc mnm_tsgnqhs_shud)052-4: atrhmdrr) 6/-2: _mc bg_mfd) 128-3/) 130-1: _mc du_kt_shnm) 1/8-0/) 113: _mc cdbhrhnml_jhmf) 064-6) 066-7: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 075-8) 08/: hmchuhct_k _r) 10) 11-3: hmsdqm_shnm_k) 44) 48-5/: onkhbx)05) 41}75) 135-6: _mc onkhbxenql_shnm) 036-45: _mc onkhbx qdfhldr) 12/: onkhshb_k) 63-73: rnbhds_k)6/-3: rs_sd) 54-8 _clhmhrsq_shnm)rbhdmshehb) 078-80 _cUhrnqxbnllhssddr) _r snnkr) 0/5-7 _cunb_bx bn_khshnmr)040-1 _fdmc_) 01/: cdmh_k)030: rxrsdlhb.hmenql_k _mc hmrshstshnm_k.enql_k)021-2 _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 02) 01/-31) 052: _mc ldch_) 71-2: ltkshu_qh_sd lncdkr ne) 020-8: o_ssdqmrne) 0219"4:rsxkdr ne) 028-30) 12/: tmhu_qh_sdlncdkr ne) 011-20 @kcqhbg)Gnv_qc) 112 @kkdm) BgqhrsnogdqR-)045 @kkhrnm) Fq_g_l) 053 _m_kxrhr9anssnl-to.sno-cnvm) 075) 078-80: bk_rr) 15-8: bnrs-admdehs) 24-6: kdudkne) 1/-0: ldsgnc ne) 1/-0) tmhsne) 1/-0 "_m_kxrsr9bnlltmhshdr ne) 0/: onkhbx)1/8 @mcdqrnm)Bg_qkdr)78 @mcdqrnm)I_ldr) 6) 02 @mcdqrnm)O_tk) 065 @rbgdq)Vhkkh_l) 3 _rrnbh_shnm)od_j) 61) 73 @sjhmrnm)Lhbg_dk L-) 5.2) 042 _tbshnm)ne oqnodqsx-qhfgsr)87-0// @tchsnq Fdmdq_kne B_m_c_) 102 _tsgnqhsx snnkr) 8/ _tsnmnlx9 ne _rrnbh_shnmr)30: _mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 5/-0) 51: &dladccdc&)6/: ne sgd rs_sd) 17) 34 A_bgq_bg)Odsdq)125 A_q_sy)Lnqsnm R-)125 A_qc_bg) Dtfdmd) 78) 8/ a_qf_hmhmf)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 06/) 060) 070 A_tlf_qsmdq) Eq_mj Q-) 027-8) 03/) 045) 047) 13/ Admrnm)I- Jdmmdsg) 04 Admskdx)@qsgtq)26-7 Adqdkrnm)Adqm_qc)64 Ahqjk_mc)Sgnl_r @-)4 anssnl-to _m_kxrhr)ne hlokdldms_shnm) 075) 078-80 Anudmr)L_qj)1/6-7 Aq_xaqnnjd) C_uhc) 068 Aqdrrdqr) GB!Hkr Sg-@-)045 Aqdvdq)F_qx) 01-02) 051-2 Aqhs_hm) itchbh_qx hm)53 Atbg_m_m) I_ldr) 11) 13 atqd_tbq_bx9 _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 060: _mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 56-8: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 075-8) 078-80) 082)1//: _mc sq_o-r_bshnmbnrsr) 20 atqd_tbq_sr) &rsqdds-kdudk&) 078-80 atrhmdrr _bsnqr) _mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 6/-2 B_loadkk) Ingm) 121 b_o_bhsx)rs_sd9_mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 5/-0) 51: _mc du_kt_shnm)112: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 1/0-1) 1/2 b_ohs_khrl) 26) 60-2 &b_tr_khsx)etmmdkne&)020-1 bg_mfd) onkhbx)035-6)110-1: _sxohb_k) 126: khmjhmfmnql_k _mc _sxohb_k) 127-30: mnql_k) 123-6: o_ssdqmr ne) 127: udmtd) 13/ bg_qhs_akdfqntor) _r snnkr) 85 bgnhbdr) sxodr ne) 054 bk_rr9_m_kxrhr)15-8: rsqtffkd) 16 Bnaa) Qnfdq m-+ 01/-0) 017) 021-4) 027) 125 bndqbhnm)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 087) 088 Bngdm)Lhbg_bk)064-6 Bngdm) Vdrkdx L-) 112 Bnkdl_m) Vhkkh_l C-) 57) 042 &bnll_mc _mc bnmsqnk&9 qdftk_shnm) 0/2-4: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076 bnllhrrhnmr) _r snnkr) 004-05 bnllnm-onnk fnncr) 20 &bnllnmr) sq_fdcx ne sgd&)23 bnlltmhshdr) onkhbx)04/-0 bnlltmhsx nqf_mhy_shnmr)_r snnkr) 84-6 bnlodshshnm9_lnmf fqntor) 26-32: cdrsqtbshud) 23 bnlokdwhsx9_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 066-7: rtarxrsdl) _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 1/0-1)1/2: _mc sghmj s_mjr) 68 bnlokh_mbd) _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 08/-0 bnloqnlhrd) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 06/ bnmrnkhc_shnm) _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)03/-0 bnmrshstdmsonkhbx)78 bnmrsq_hmsr9 _mc-cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 071: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 1/2-3: _mc onk-hbxenql_shnm) 034-5 bnmrtks_shnm9_mc du_kt_shnm)102) 104: _r snnk) 003-04 bnmsdms)onkhbx)8) 120-2: hcd_shnm_k bnlonmdmsrne) 122: o_ssdqmrhm)122-3 bnmsq_bshmfbnts)_r snnk) 0//-0 bnmsqnk)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076) 08/-0 bnmudqfdmbdsgdrdr) _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 012-4 bnqonq_shnmr)sq_mrm_shnm_k) 46-7 bnqonq_shrl) 26)31-2 bnrs'r(9 _mc du_kt_shnm)100-01: qhrhmf) 24: sq_mr_bshnm)20-1 bnrs-admdehs_m_kxrhr)24-6 Bqnvm bnqonq_shnmr)82-3 Btrgl_m) Qnadqs)77 bxbkd'r(9 _mc du_kt_shnm)1/6) 105}06) 113: hrrtd-_ssdmshnm)66) 017-20: onkhbx)00-07)117)134: onkhshb_k atrhmdrr) 13) 014-5 C_gk) Qnadqs) 26) 77 cdbhrhnm'r(9_bbqdshnm)066-7: _m_kxrhr ne) 6-7: hmsdqqdk_sdc) 5:-_mc otakhb onkhbx)4-6: rsq_sdfhdr ne) 06/-0: sxodr ne) 054 cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf9 lncdkr ne) 054-67: onkhbx)051-73: _mc rsxkd)067-72)12/-0 CdKdnm)Odsdq)1/) 051-2 cdlnbq_bx9 _mc du_kt_shnm)104: _mc hmrsqtldms bgnhbd)086-1// cdrhfm) onkhbx)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 075) 083-1/1 -cdsdqlhm_msr) obhkhbx)8 -"))&)&cdhdlkhmh%lE&3HkF=_fdmc_--rdsshmf)c12-4 cdudknoldms) dbnmnlhb9 _mc otakhb onkhbhdr) 012 Chdgk)O_tk E-)127 ChL_ffhn) O_tk I-) 2/ chqdbsoqnuhrhnm)087 chrbntqrd9 bnlltmhshdr) 43: 042-5: _mc oqnakdlr) 010-1 chrhmbdmshudr) ehm_mbh_k) _r snnkr) 00/-02 chrok_bdldms) nqf_mhy_shnm_k) 24 chrsqhatshudonkhbx)78 Cndqm)Aqtbd) 087-8 cnldrshb rs_sd rxrsdlr9 edcdq_k)51-2: o_qkh_ldms_qx)52-3: _mc onkhbx) 5/-74: oqdrhcdmsh_k) 52-3: tmhs_qx)51: rdd _krn m_shnmr:rs_sdr Cnvmr) @msgnmx)66) 018-20) 027)125 cnvm-rhyhmf) fnudqmldms_k) _mc sghmjs_mjr)68 Cqnq)Xdgdyjdk) 061 Ctqq_ms)Qnadqs E-)127 Cxd) Sgnl_r) 4-5) 012 cxm_lhbr) onkhbx)127-32 dbnmnlhbr9 _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 086) 087: vdke_qd)22-6 Dcdkl_m) Ltqq_x) 010 deedbshudmdrr)ne oqnfq_lr) 102 deehbhdmbx) _mc du_kt_shnm)10/-03 Dkcdq)Bg_qkdrC-) 01/-0) 021-2 dkdbshnmr)015) 104: rdd _krn unshmf dmsdqoqhrd9 otakhb) 82-3:mkhwdc) 0/6 Drohmf-@mcdqrdm) Fnrs_) 123 Dsyhnmh) @lhs_h) 062-4 &du_kt_shnm) onkhbx)02) 1/6-16: _bsnqr hm) 1/8-0/) 113: _clhmhrsq_shud)10/-03: deedbshudmdrr)100) 102: deenqs)100: deehbhdmbx) 100-01: itchbh_k)103: lncdkr ne) 108-10: ntsbnldr ne) 105-08: odqenql_mbd) 100: _r onkhbxkd_qmhmf) 11/-1: onkhshb_k) 104-05: oqnbdrr) 101: rsxkdr) 111-3) 120: sdbgmhb_k)108-1/: sxodr ne) 10/-05: rdd'_krn kd_qmhmf) onkhbx Du_mr)Odsdq)6/ dwbktrhuhsx)ne fnncr) 2/-0 dwdbtshud)52) 54-5: _mc cdbhrhnm)053 dwg_trshudmdrr) ne fnncr) 2/-0 dwgnqs_shnm)003-04) 087 dwsdqm_khshdr9 cdqhudc) 24: _mc vdke_qd dbnmnlhbr) 23 H_hktqd9 _rr}rrldms ne) 1/6-8: fnudqm"-)ldms-)23-4:)l_qjds) 22-4 e_lhkx nqf_mhy_shnmr)_r snnkr) 84-6 E_xn!) Gdmqh)057 edcdq_khrl) 51-2 eddca_bj) onkhbx)105-08 ehm_mbd) hmsdqm_shnm_k) 46 Ehrbgdq)Eq_mj) 016 Enqdrsdq)Ingm) 016) 061) 07/-1 enqltk_shnm) onkhbx)02) 032-50: bg_q_bsdqhrshbrne) 033-4: bnmrsq_hmsrsn) 034-5: rsxkdr) 046-8) 12/: _mc rtarxrsdlr) 036-48: Entb_tks) Lhbgdk) 011 &eqdd qhcd&)12) 13) _mc oktq_khrl) 3/ Etksnm)I_md) 004 &f_qa_fd b_mlncdk&) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)064-6 " - Fdmdq_k@fqddldms nm S_qheer_mc Sq_cd 'F@SS()45 Fdqrhbj) BnmmhdI)F-) 122 Fdqrsnm)K_qqx)1/6 Fhkkqnx)Ingm L_qshm)25 fkna_khy_shnm9 _mc onkhbxbg_mfd) 13/-0: _mconkhbxbnmrsq_hmsr)& 44-5/) 60 -fn_kr) 035-6: _mc cdbhrhnmr)6 fnncr9 _mc l_qjdsr) 0/0-1: _mc rdquhbdr) 2/-1 fnudqmldms9 _r qdedqddnq tlohqd) 28: qdnqf_mhy_shnm) 0/1-2 fq_msr) _r snnkr) 0/7-02 fqnto'r(9 _r _bsnqr) 72-3: _r _m_kxshb_k tmhs)10: bg_qhs_akd)85: hmsdqdrs)72-3) 002-03) 017-20: _mc onkhbx)41-2: onsdmsh_k_mc nqf_mhydc)27: s_qfds) 076-7) 080: sgdnqhdr)15) 26-32 Ftkhbj) Ktsgdq) 057 Ftmm) Kdvhr @-)26 Ftrs_errnm) Ftmmdk)118 G_kk)Odsdq@-)33) 017) 035-6)110 G_kodqhm)Lnqsnm G-) 053 G_ll) Jdhsg D-)04/ G_mbnbj) L- Cnm_kc)014 G_mrdm)Q_mc_k)017 &g_qchrrtdr&) 125 G_qqhr)Qhbg_qc)123 ° gd_qhmfr)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076 Gdbkn)Gtfg) 038) 04/) 040)110)130 Gdhmy)Ingm O-)04/ Gdqjdq) Ch_md)112 ghdq_qbgx9_mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 51: _mc sq_mr_bshnmbnrsr) 20 Ghmsyd)Nssn) 33 Gneedqadqs)Qhbg_qc)020-1 Gnfvnnc) Aqh_mm-+26)02/-0 Gnnc) Bgqhrsnogdq)8/-0)0/8)088-1// &hcd_rdsr&)043) hcd_r) _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)015-7: rdd _krn chrbntqrd hcdnknfx) _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 015-7 &hl_fd&)_mc oqnakdl) 028 hlo_bsr) onkhbx)8-0/ hlokdldms_shnm) onkhbx)02) 074-1/5: _bsnqr _mc _bshuhshdrhm)076-8: bnmrsq_hmsrnm)5: lncdkr ne) 078-83: _r onkhbxcdrhfm) 083-1/1: rsxkdr) 1/2-3) 120 hmbdmshud'r(9mdf_shud)0k0:_r snnkr) 0/7-02 hmbqdldms_khrl) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 055-6) 06/-2 hmchuhct_k'r(9_r _m_kxshb_k tmhs) 11-3: _mc hmctbshudsgdnqhdr)22-6: _mc onkhbx)41-2 hmchuhct_khrl) rnbhnknfhb_k)22-6 hmektdmbd)hmenql_shnm-a_rdc) 1// hmenql_shnm9-a_rdc snnkr) 003-05: hlodqedbs)23: rdd _krn jmnvkdcfd: mnc_khsx hmhsh_shnm) hmrhcd.ntsrhcd) 022-4) 03/-0 hmotsr) _mc du_kt_shnm)100 hmpthqhdr)_r snnkr) 0/6 hmrshstshnm_khrl)_bsnq-bdmsqdc)15) 18-22 hmrshstshnm_khy_shnm) _mc vhmcnvr) 026-7 hmrshstshnmr9 hmsdqm_shnm_k) 44-8: o_qkh_ldms_qx) 30: onkhbx)41-72: onkhshb_k) 18-2/ hmrsqtldms'r(9 _tsgnqhsx-a_rdc) 0/2-7: 1/0-1: bgnhbd ne) 075) 083-1/1: bk_r} rhexhmf)77-80: bnlonmdmsr) 035-6: fnudqmhmf)76-006: hmudmsnqxne) 8/: jmnvkdcfd-a_rdc) 003-05: lhwdc) 085)1/2-3: mnc_khsx-a_rdc) 003-05: nqf_mhy_shnm_k) 1/0-1: nqf_mhy_shnma_rdc) 80-0/2: onkhbx)8)76-006: oqnbdctq_k) 80) 084) 085) 1/1: rtars_mshud) 80) 083-4: sqd_rtqda_rdc) 0/7-03: sxod) 035-6: unktms_qx) 084) 1/1: rdd _krn snnkr hmrsqtldms_khrl) _mc sgdnqx ne rs_sd) 2: hmrtq_mbdetmc) _mc o_xqnkks_wdr) 000 hmsdqdrs'r(9k_sdms_mc l_mhedrs) 27: fqnto) 15) 32: rdke-)11-3 hmsdqdrsmdsvnqj) 43) 042-5 hmsdqm_shnm_khy_shnm) 44-5/: _mc sghmjs_mjr) 68hmsdqm_shnm_k rxrsdl) _mc onkhbxbnmrsq_hmsr)43-5/: _mc onkhbx)3/-0 &hqnm sqh_mfkdr&) 037-8 hqq_shnm_khrl)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 064-6 hrrtd-_ssdmshnmbxbkd)66) 017-20 I_o_m) _r rsqnmf rs_sd) 50) 51 Idfdm) L_x_) 046 Idmjhmr)Vhkkh_l) 5-6 Idmjhmr-Rlhsg) G_mj B-) 040-1)043-4 Inmdr) Aqx_mC-) 027-8) 03/) 045) 047) 13/ Inmdr) Bg_qkdr /-) 02) 032-3 Inqc_m) @-Fq_ms) 040) 117 itchbh_qx9_mc cdbhrhnm)053: _mc cnldrshbrs_sdr) 53-4: _mc du_kt_shnm)102 J_kcnq bqhsdqhnm) 25 J_sydmrsdhm)Odsdq)HRN Jdng_md) Qnadqs) 45 Jdx) U-N-)64 Jhmf) @msgnmx)020 Jhmf) Cdrlnmc) 017 Jhmfcnm) Ingm) 01/) 024-7) 03/ Jhqrbgdm) D-R-)8/ Jmhkk)Bgqhrsnog) 118 jmnvkdcfd9 -a_rdc hmrsqtldmsr) 003-05: _mc¥cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 068: _mc du_kt_shnm)112 Jq_rmdq)Rsdogdm)33 Jqhdrh)G_mrodsdq)046 k_antq) _r hmsdqdrsfqnto) 62-3" K_rrvdkk) G_qnkc) 2)00-01)76)77 K_sg_l) D_qk)28 K_tl_mm) Dcv_qc /-)04/ k_v'r() _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 075 kd_qmhmf) onkhbx)11/-1) 124) 13/) 130: rnbh_k)111)112: mnm-)111: dmcnfdmntr.dwnfdmntr)110-1 kdf_bhdr)onkhbx)106) 107) 126 kdf_khrl) qdoqdrdms_shud)1/2 kdfhrk_stqd)54-6: _mc cdbhrhnm)053 kdrrnm-cq_vhmf)111 Kduhmsg_k) C_mhdk@-)112 khadq_khrl)nqsgncnw) 14 khbdmrhmf) qdrsqhbshud)0/8 Khkhd) Rst_qs @-)125 Khmcaknl) Bg_qkdr)28-3/) 34) 77)06/-1) 068)106 Khmcdq)RsdogdmG-) 1//-0 kn_mr)_r snnkr) 0/8 Knvh) Sgdncnqd) 8)77-8 LbKdmm_m)Fqdfnq) 27 L_qbg) I_ldr) 18-2/) 064-6 - l_qjds'r(9 ak_bj) fqdx) 87: e_hktqd)22-3: _mc sq_mr_bshnmbnrsr) 20: hmvdke_qd dbnmnlhbr) 22-4 l_qjds bqd_shnm)_r snnk)86-0/1 l_qjdshmf an_qcr) 0/3 L_qrg) C_uhc) 045 L_qw) J_qk) 15 L_qwhrl) _mc rnbh_ksgdnqx) 15-8 l_whlhy_shnm) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 056 ldch_9 _r _bsnq)71-2: _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)017-20 Lhkjhr) Rhcmdx)123 lhmhrsqx)_mc qdnqf_mhy_shnm) 0/1-2 Lhmnftd) L_qshm)26 Lhmsyadqf) Gdmqx)063-4 &lhwdcrb_mmhmflncdk&) _mc cdbhrhnml_jhmf) 062-4 lnahkhy_shnm)_mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 022-4) 03/-0 lnmnonkhdr) 22-3: _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 027-8: onkhbx)125 lnncr) onkhbx)015-7 Ltbbh_qnmh)F_qx) 065-6 ltkshchrbhokhm_qhsx) ne onkhbxrbhdmbd)2-3 ltkshokd _qdm_r)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 066-7 M_bglh_r) C_uhc) 108 m_shnmr)5/-8: _mc onkhbxrsxkd)117-2/: rdd _krn cnldrshb rs_sd: rs_sdr Mdkrnm)Sgnl_r D-) 04/ mdn-bnmrdqu_shrl) 14 mdn-hmrshstshnm_khrl)32-5 mdn-khadq_khrl)14 mdn-oktq_khrl) 28 mdsvnqj'r(9 hmsdqdrs)43) 042-5: hrrtd) 037-8: l_m_fdldms) 0/1: onkhbx) 04/-0) 042 mnc_khsx)1//: -a_rdc hmrsqtldmsr) 003-05: snnkr) 8/: rdd _krn hmenql_shnm:jmnvkdcfd mnm-cdbhrhnm) _mc otakhb onkhbx)4-5 mnm-fnudqmldms_knqf_mhy_shnmr'MFNR() 84 mnql_shudmdrr) ne onkhbxrbhdmbd)2-3 mns-enq-oqnehs fqntor) _r snnkr) 85 Mxd)Inrdog) 45 naidbshudr) onkhbx)_mc du_kt_shnm)102 neehbh_kr9 _oonhmsdc)56-8: dkdbsdc)54-6: dwdbtshud)54-5: kdfhrk_shud)54-6 Nkrdm)Ing_m) 18-2/) 064-6 Nkrnm)L_mbtq) 28) 3/) 6/ nohmhnm)otakhb9_Hkc o'(khbx)-64-\ noshlhy_shnm)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 070) 072 noshnmr)onkhbx)033) 035-6: _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)051) 058 nqf_mhy_shnmsnnkr) 8/ Nrrnvrjh)- Rs_mhrk_v)15 N&0ankd)K_tqdmbdO1/67 ntsbnldr9 _mc du_kt_shnm)100-01: _mc m_shnm_k rsxkd)117-2/: onkhbx)0/ ntsotsr) onkhbx)7) 0/ Onkknbj)OghkhoG-) 125 Onkrax) Mdkrnm)26 onrhshuhrl) _mc onkhbx_m_kxrhr)7 onrs-onrhshuhrl) _mc onkhbx_m_kxrhr)7 ONTk_msy_r)Mhbnr)17 Onvdkk)V_ksdq v-) 2/ oqdchbs_ahkhsx) _mc vhmcnvr) 026-7 oqdrhcdmsh_krxrsdl) 52-3: _mc cdbhrhnm) 497C rdd gryu qdotakhb_m Oqdrrl_m) Ideeqdx0-) 074 oqhmbho_k-_fdms sgdnqx) ne hlokdldms_o_q_chfl) onkhbx)015-7) 120-2) 123 shnm)080-2 o_q_rs_s_knqf_mhy_shnmr)82-3 oqhu_sdfnncr) 20 O_qdsnnoshl_khsx)25 oqhu_shy_shnm) _r snnk) 0// o_qkh_ldms_qxrxrsdl) 52-3: _mc cdbhoqnakdl'r(9 _mc du_kt_shnm)102: _mc rhnm)&053:itchbh_kdu_kt_shnmhm)102 hlokdldms_shnm) 081: odqbdoshnmne) o_qshbho_shnm) otakhb) 12/ 6: otakhb) 01/-1) 018-2/) 03/-0: o_sg cdodmcdmbx)105-07) 126 qdbnfmhshnm)010-1) 021: vhmcnvr) o_ssdqmr)_fdmc_-rdsshmf)021) 028: rdd 026-7 _krn rsxkd oqnakdl-rnkuhmf9 2-3: _ookhdc) 00-07: od_j _rrnbh_shnm)61) 73 rxrsdl_shb) 03 odqenql_mbd) l_m_fdqh_k) 10/-03 oqnbdctq_k hmrsqtldmsr) 80) 084) 085) odqstqa_shnmr)rxrsdlhb) 128 1/1 Odsdqr)A- Ftx) 02/-0)1//-0 oqnbdctqdr) hmcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 053) Ohdqrnm)O_tk) 106 056-7 Ohfnt) @keqdc)22 oqnbdrr) onkhbx9_mc m_shnm_krsxkd) oktq_khrl) 26-32 117-2/: o_ssdqmrne) 122-3 onkhbx9_bsnq)05: bg_mfd) 035-6)110-1) oqnbtqdldms) fnudqmldms) 0/8 123-30: bnlltmhshdr) 04/-0: bnmsdms) oqnfq_l rodbhehb_shnmr) 035-6 8)120-2: bxbkd)00-07)117)134: oqnodqsx-qhfgsr_tbshnmr) _r snnkr) 87-0// cdrhfm) 075) 083-1/3: du_kt_shnm)02) oqnuhrhnm9chqdbs)_r snnk) 80-¥1:chqdbsdc) 1/6-16: eddca_bj) 105-08: enqltk_1/2 shnm)02) 032-52: fn_kr) 035-6: hlokdOqydvnqjrh) @c_l) 34 ldms_shnm) 02) 074-1/5: kd_qmhmf) otakhb9 bgnhbdsgdnqx) 11-5) 086: dmsdq11/-1)124)13/)130: kdf_bhdr)106) oqhrd)82-3: fnncr) 20) 21: hmenql_107) 126: lnmnonkx lncdkr) 027-8) shnmb_lo_hfmr) 003: sgd) _r _bsnq) 125: lnncr) 015-7: mdsvnqjr) 04/-0) 63-6 042: o_q_chfl) 015-7)120-2)123: otakhb-oqhu_sdo_qsmdqrgho)_r snnk) 0/6 qdfhld) 122-3) 131: rdbsnq) 04-07: &otmbst_sdc dpthkhaqhtl) 07) 127)130 rdmshldms) 016: rs_ahkhsx)123-30: rsqd_lr) 024-7: rsxkd) 06)123: rtarxrsdlr) 05-06) 42-3) 036-48)135-6: sdqlhm_shnm)107-&08:sxodr) 78: tmhq_shnm_kbgnhbdsgdnqx) 11-5 &udqrd)42-3: udmtdr) 020: vhmcnvr) q_shnm_khrl)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 024-7 055-6/)062)07/ onkhbx)otakhb9 _m_kxrhrne) 6-7) 0/-00: Qd_f_m) Lhbg_dk) 0/2 cdehmhshnm ne) 4-7: _mc dbnmnlhb qdchrsqhatshudonkhbx)78 cdudknoldms) 012: rbhdmbd)1-3: qdfhld'r() _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf) 021-4: rstcx) 0/-00 hmsdqm_shnm_k) 44-5/: lnmds_qx) 46: &onkhgdtqhrshb lncdk&) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jonkhbx)122-3) 131: sxodr) 7 hmf)063 qdftk_shnm'r() _r snnkr) 0/2-4: rnbh_k) onkhshb_k o_qshdr9_mc atrhmdrr hmsdqdrsr) 0/3-4: cdkdf_sdc nq &rdke&) 0/4-5: 60: _r _bsnqr) 7/-1 qdrsqhbshud)0/8: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) -onkhshbr)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 086) 087 075"&6)080 qdftk_snqx onkhbx)78 &qdms-rddjhmf&) 12) 13 qdotakhb_mrxrsdlr) itchbh_kdu_kt_shnm hm)102: rdd _krn oqdrhcdmsh_k qdrd_qbg9nqf_mhy_shnmr)66-7/: _r snnk) 004-05 qdrntqbd'r(9 fnudqmhmf)8/-0) 81: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 1// Qgncdr) Q-@-V-)04/) 045)125 Qhbg_qcrnm)Idqdlx I-) 040)118 Qnmchmdkkh) Cdmmhr@-)8/ Qnrd) Qhbg_qc)70) 71) 111 Qnrr) I-J- _mc L-G-)017) 021-4) 03/)125 &qntmcrlncdk&) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 066-7 Qnx_kBnllhrrhnmr) _r snnkr) 0/6 qtkdr) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 053 R_a_shdq)O_tk) 016) 040-1)043-4)122) 128 R_k_lnm) KdrsdqL-) 8) 78-8/ R_khratqx)Qnadqs G-) 04/ r_shre_bshnm)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 06/) 070) 072) 124 Rbg__o) 0-) 126 Rbg_qoe)Eqhsy)18 Rbg_ssrbgmdhcdq)D-D-)64) 105-06 Rbglhssdq)Oghkkhod) 30-1 rdbsnq)onkhbx)04-07 Rdke)Odsdq)12 rdke-hmsdqdrs) hmchuhct_k)11-3 &rdke-qdftk_shnm&) 0/4-5 rdqu_msr)bhuhk-Ykk atqd_tbq_bx Rg_qj_mrjx) Hq_)012 Rhldnm) Qhbg_qc)020-1 Rhllnmr) Gdqadqs @-)117 Rhlnm) Gdmqx)057-6/) 078 Rjnbonk) Sgdc_) 34) 35 &rnbh_k rdbtqhsx deenqs&) 013-4 rohkknudqr)onkhbx)128-3/ rs_ahkhsx)onkhbx)123-30 rs_fdr) hmonkhbxbxbkd)0/-04 rs_jdgnkcdq) _mc _cuhrnqx bnllhssddr) 0/6&-7 Rs_matqx)V-S-) 004 rs_mc_qc-rdsshmf)unktms_qx)0/5 &rs_sdbq_es&) 78 ""}c}r)rdDhk(h"&823 rs_sdr) cnldrshb) V--74: rsqnmf _mc vd_j) 50&9&1: rdd _krhI&cnldrshbrs_sdr: m_shnmr rs_shrl) 32-5 rs_str ptn) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 054) .:. rs_stsdr) _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 075 Rsnmd)Cdanq_g) 016-7 rsqd_lr9 onkhbx)025-7: onkhshb_k) 025: oqnakdl) 024 rsqtbstqd'r(9 _r _m_kxshb_k tmhs"10: hmrshstshnm_k)14-5) 33: rnbhds_k)6/-3: dbnmnlhb) 6/: onkhshb_k) 63-73 rsxkd'r(9 _fdmc_-rdsshmf)021-4) 028-30: _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 067-72: _mc du_kt_shnm)111-3: _mc &f_qa_fd b_m lncdk&) 065-6: hlokdldms_shnm) 075) 083)1/2-3:m_shnm_k)117-2/:onkhbx) 06)123: onkhbxenql_shnm) 046-8: rdbsnq_k)12/-0) 121 rt_rhnm) _r snnk) 003-04 rta fnudqmldmsr) 037-8) 04/ rtarhchdr) _r snnkr) 0/7-02 rtarhchy_shnm)chqdbsdc)1/2 rtarshsts_ahkhsx)ne hmrsqtldmsr) 087-8 rtarxrsdl) onkhbx)05-06) 42-3) 036-48) 135-6: _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)028) 03/: bnlonmdmsr ne) 041-5: _mc cdbhrhnml_jhmf) 071: _mc du_kt_shnm)112: _mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076) 08/) 085) 1//-1: lncdkr ne) 037-45: o_q_chfl) 122: rsqtbstqd ne) 045-8 rtbbdrr) _rrdrrldms ne) 1/6-8 rxmsgdrdr) _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 062-4 rxrsdlr) atcfdshmf) 101-02 s&G_qs)O_tk) 1/6-7 s_qfds fqnto)&_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076-9-7)080 s_rj enqbd)_r snnk) 0/6) 004-05 s_wdr9_r snnkr) 00/-02: o_xqnkk)00/-00 Sdhrl_m) Fddqs Q-) 067 sdqlhm_shnm)onkhbx)107-08 sakk0j3_mjr) 66-7/) 104 shlhmf) ne hmhsh_shudr) 014-5 snkkfnncr) 20 snnkr) onkhbx)8) 76-006: rdd _krn hmrsqtldmsr sno-cnvm _m_kxrhr)ne hlokdldms_shnm) 075) 078-80 sq_cd) hmsdqm_shnm_k) 45-6 sq_mr_bshnmbnrs _m_kxrhr)18-22 sqd_rtqd-a_rdc hmrsqtldmsr) 8/) 0/7-03 ""&-mhasl_kr):_mc)-hlokdldms_shnm) 076 k[&tl_m) C_uhc) 26) 27 ""H[hes:&Dcv_hc: 0&15 tmhnmr)sq_cd) 61) 62-3 tmhs_qxrxrsdl) 51 tmhudqrd)onkhbx)42-3 Tqvhbj) Kxmc_k)057 TR@9itchbh_qx hm)53: _r vd_j rs_sd) 50) 62 trdq bg_qfdr) _r snnkr) 00/-02 u_m &HVhrs) L-k-V-) 125 u_m V__qcdm) Eq_mr)042 Uhssdr)&L-Dkkhns) 125 unktms_qhrl) hmrshstshnm_khydc) 1/2 unktms_qxnqf_mhh_shnmr)_r snnkr) 83-6 unshmf)_mc onkhbx)63-4: rdd _krn dkdbshnmr untbgdqr) _r snnk) 0/0 V_cd) L_tqhbd) 25 Vdadq) L_w) 33 Vdhrr) B_qnk)7/) 066-7 vdke_qd9dbnmnlhbr) 22-6: &deenqs&) 013-4: onkhbhdr)012-3) 014 Vhkc_urjx) @_qnmA-)3)074 Vhkdmrjx) G_qnkc) 012-3 Vhkjr) Rsdogdm)04/) 040 Vhkrnm) I_ldr Y-+8 vhmcnvr9 onkhbx)024-7: oqnakdl) 026-7 Vnqkc 0k&_cdNqf_mhy_shnm (mhf)+ 45-6 Vqhfgs) L_tqhbd) 04/) 040