Regional Security Complex of Mali

Table of contents
1.Introduction !!.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.... 4-6
1.2. Motivation !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!...6-7
2. Project design page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!................................... 8
3.1 Introduction to theoretical framework page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 9
3.2 Regional Security Complex Theory page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!. !9-10
3.2.1 Major approaches within international society page!!!!!!!!!!10-11
3.2.2 Securitization page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. 11-13
3.2.3 Regional Security Complex page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14
3.2.4 Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa page !!!!!!!!!!.14-18
3.2.5 The societal sector page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18-20
3.2.6 The military sector page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.20-22
3.2.7 The political sector page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 23-24
3.3 Sovereignty page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 24
3.3.1 The nature of sovereignty page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 25-26
3.3.2 Colonization page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. .26-27
3.3.3 Decolonization page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. .27-28
3.3.4 Racial sovereignty page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 28
3.3.5 Positive sovereignty page ..!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29
3.3.6 Negative sovereignty page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!...29-32
3.4 Conclusion of theory page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 32-33
4 Methodology page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!34-35
4.1 Method for analysis page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35-36
4.2 Delimitations page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 36
4.2.1 Contemporary Study page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 36
4.2.2 Actors page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 36
4.2.3 Geography page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37
4.2.4 Theoretical page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37
5.1 Introduction to the security complex of Mali page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38
5.2 Introduction to West Africa page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..39-40
5.3 Introduction to the Malian conflict page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41
5.3.1 Historical context page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41-43
5.3.2 The current conflict page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!43-44
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5.4 The government of Mali page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45
6.3.3 Mali as an insulator state page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 76-77
5.4.1 Political turmoil and structure page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45
6.3.4 Interim conclusion page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.77
5.42 Coup 2012 page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46
6.4 Conclusion of analysis page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 78-80
5.4.3 Structure of the military page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46-47
7 Disussion page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 81
5.5 Ansar Dine page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.48
7.1 Negative sovereignty page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 81-83
5.5.1 Origin of Ansar Dine page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 48
7.2 Regional security complex page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 83-84
5.5.2 Affiliation of Ansar Dine page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. !48-49
8 Conclusion page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 84-85
5.5.3 Military and economic structure page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 49
5.6 Movement for National Liberation of Azawad page!!!!!!!!!!! !.49
Bibliography page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!86-94
5.6.1 Azawad ethnicity page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!49-50
5.6.2 Girevance with Mali page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!....50
5.6.3 Strucutre page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.50-51
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5.6.4 Liberation struggle of Azawad page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.51-52
5.6.5 MNLA present situation page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 52-53
5.7 ECOWAS page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 54
5.7.1 Structure of ECOWAS page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. 54-55
5.7.2 Future intervention by ECOWAS page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 55
5.7.3 Challenges for ECOWAS page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 56
6.1 Negative sovereignty in Mali page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. 57
6.1.1 Introduction page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 57
6.1.2 Territorial integrity page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. 57-58
6.1.3 MNLA and Ansar Dine page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. 58-60
6.1.4 International recognition page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..60
6.1.5 The Tuaregs page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..61
6.1.6 Interim conclusion page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61
6.2 Securitization page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62
6.2.1 Security dynamics following the coup d’etat page !!!!!!!!!..62-64
6.2.2 The territorial integrity and unity of Mali page!!!!!!!!!!!.. 64-65
6.2.3. Azawad and the various actors page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.. 65-70
6.2.4 New threats and positions page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..70-73
6.2.5 Interim conclusion pag!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 73
6.3 Regional Security Complex analysis page !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..74
6.3.1 Durable patterns page!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 74-75
6.3.2 Close geographical proximity and the reach of the superpower page 75-76
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and for the entire region. Consequences such as flows of refugees, hunger and ethnic
1-Introduction
conflicts are already apparent in the current conflict. But in further perspectives the
international society fears that northern Mali could become a safe haven for terrorist
Mali has since the first democratic election in 1992 been seen as an unique country in West
organizations such as AQIM and MUJAO.
Africa by the international community. In a sub-region marked by famine and drought, and
where civil-wars, coup d’états and military interventions are recurrent events; Mali has
Many of the Tuareg fighters have served under Gaddafi during the Libyan Civil War of
experienced a certain degree of governmental stability, including democratically fair
2011. Upon Gaddafi’s fall the Tuareg fighters returned to northern Mali heavily armed with
elections recognized by the international community.
sophisticated firepower from Gaddafi’s army and better trained than previously. This
resulted in an igniting of the secessionist Tuareg movement MNLA. The group and the
This understanding of Mali is often prevalent, but when looking further into the national
Malian army clashed in northern Mali in January 2012 resulting in MNLA seizing the major
political dynamics it quickly becomes obvious that Mali has had its share of internal turmoil.
cities of Timbuktu and Gao, along with several other minor cities in the north. The Malian
Historically, this is evident in the various secessionist rebellions by Tuareg groups in
President Amadou Toumani Touré’s response to the rebellion was deemed too slow and
northern Mali. The Tuaregs are traditionally nomadic and have been moving across in the
insufficient by a division of the military under the command of Captain Amadou Haya
western part of the Sahel belt . They have been fighting for independence from Mali and the
Sanogo, who led a coup against the government on March 22nd, 2012. However, the
creation of the sovereign nation of Azawad since the 1960’s when Mali became
rebellion in the north continued to conquer territory and by the 6th of April the MNLA
independent (Kisangani, 2012). The Tuaregs populate vast areas in the Sahel belt,
rebellion declared the region of Azawad, an area twice the size of Germany, an
predominately in Mali and Niger but also in Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya. The Sahel belt
independent state with its southern border just north of Mopti, cutting the country in two and
is characterized as a vast area south of the Sahara Desert with hardly any control of
leaving the southern government with one-third of the country (BBC, 2012, April 13).
borders, which has made it attractive for drug traffickers to use it in transporting drugs from
Meanwhile, in the wake of the coup, other rebel groups emerged on the scene. Most
West Africa into Europe: “!northern Mali has now become a dangerous crossroads of
notable is the radical Islamic salafist group Ansar Dine, consisting primarily of Tuaregs.
drugs, crime, terrorism and rebellion” (Abderrahmane, 2012, August 6). Economic income
Opposite to MNLA, Ansar Dine does not fight to divide Mali, but to implement Sharia. Ansar
from the drug trade have been said to sponsor terrorist activity in the area, this has mainly
Dine has on many accounts been fighting alongside the MNLA in northern Mali, but their
been linked to the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness
different agendas eventually led to a cession of their cooperation. Ansar Dine has been
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and to a lesser degree to Ansar Dine and the
heavily linked to AQIM and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, is being accused of having ties to
Movement National pour Libération de l’Azawad(MNLA) (Perry, 2012, October 22).
terrorist organizations. Ansar Dine has already enforced a radical Sharia-law in cities under
The recent Tuareg rebellion in early 2012 has given rise to a meltdown of the political
their control. Its Islamic ideology has put further pressure from the international community
system and the national army in Mali. The lack of the state’s ability to protect its territory
for the issue to be dealt with (Hirsch, 2012, October 22; Al-Jazeera, 2012, July 10; Al-
has made the northern part of Mali into a warzone with different actors competing on the
Jazeera, 2012, November 29).
scene. The different regional rebel and terrorist groups are using the security vacuum to
pursue their own interests, which varies from implementation of Sharia-law to liberation of
Due to international and regional pressure Sanogo appointed Diouncounda Traore as
Azawad to economic activity based on drug trade. Additionally the conflict has drawn in the
interim president in April 2012. Traore task is primarily committed to stop the rebel groups
regional body of ECOWAS and international actors including US, UN and France, who are
and dismantle Azawad. The United Nations has put the pressure on the African Union (AU),
planning military intervention, but also have their own interest in the conflict. If the conflict
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the government of Mali
escalates the international society is worried that it could have dire consequences for Mali
to act against what the UN calls a terror organization occupying territory in Northern Mali.
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On the 11th December 2012, the internal political situation escalated further, when Sanogo
assessment of different actors. In order to broaden our understanding of the region’s
arrested the Prime Minister, Cheick Diarra, accusing him of pursuing personal interest and
dynamic and relationship between the different actors we make use of analytical tools
not keen on solving he conflict in the north (Al-Jazeera, 2012, December 11). The former
provided by the framework of Regional Security Complex theory, defined by Barry Buzan
Prime Minister is an accomplished astrophysicist who worked on five NASA missions
and Ole Wæver (1998; 2003).
before becoming an American citizen. The circumstance under which Cheick Diarra was
arrested and resigned is unclear (Al Jazeera, 2012, December 11). The past events in Mali
Our problem definition is rooted in our curiosity, the conflict and the theory chosen for
have fragilized the political situation and the political climate seems ever changing as a
analysis:
result of the dynamics in Regional Security Complex of Mali.
- How can we understand negative sovereignty in Mali and what consequences does it
1.2-Motivation
have for how the different actors securitize each other in the potential regional security
complex of Mali?
Our project departs from a curiosity of how Mali, an otherwise relativity stable country in
West Africa, has been divided in two by what seems to be a traditional secessionist group
and an armed insurgent group with links to al-Qaeda. However, the UN, AU and ECOWAS
often articulate the group as one, either the Tuaregs or Ansar Dine, even though internal
skirmish has been reported and the origin of the two groups seems entirely separate. Thus
the international level and understanding of the situation seems contradictory to the local
situation on the ground in Mali, which is increasingly complicated by the coup in March,
when Sanogo overthrew the democratic elected government. ECOWAS has given amnesty
to the coup leaders, even though their protocol of 1999 should safeguard the democratic
institutions of its member countries. The national level of the conflict is also a contradiction
which nurses a muddy picture of relations between actors, due the government’s public
opinion of the Tuaregs being part of the problem even though most are citizens of Mali and
have lived in Mali for decades.
Our premise is that the Malian government is ot capable to perform the tasks, which are
usually are associated with a Westphalian state in control of its territory. The weak position
of the Malian state allows non-state actors to emerge on Mali’s sovereign territory, and
compete for power on the same level as the central government. Hence we have
accordingly applied Robert Jackson’s theory of Negative Sovereignty (1986; 1987) to our
analysis of the conflict. We find Jackson’s theory applicable as it can give a more clear
understanding of sovereignty in Mali. The emergence of non-state actors challenging the
recognized state, gives us the understanding of viewing Mali as a region itself, where the
central government is just one of many actors. We strive to further our understanding, by
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2. -Project design
3.1- Introduction to theoretical framework
This section presents the project design. Section 3.-Theoretical Framework explores two
theoretical approaches to understanding the conflict in Mali: Regional Security Complex
In our approach we are focusing on three theoretical approaches: Regional Security
Theory and Negative Sovereignty which are both summed up in the final part of the section.
Complex Theory, Securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Buzan & Wæver: 2003)
Section 4.-Methodology covers the methodological orientation of the project and introduces
and Negative Sovereignty (Jackson, 1986; 1987). Jackson’s notion on negative sovereignty
source criticism, the method for analysis and delimitation, to grasp the scope of the project.
allows us to examine the historical perspective of how colonization and decolonization has
5.-Regional Security Complex of Mali introduces and exhibits the historical context of the
constructed the states in Africa and how this construction has affected the present states.
West Africa including an introduction to the chosen actors. In chapter 6-analysis we use the
This serves a clearer understanding of the dynamics and foundation of the current- and
theories as a framework to analyze how the selected actors securitize each other and
ongoing conflict in Mali.
further, what consequences it has for Mali. The implications and contradictions between our
case and theory is discussed in section 7.-Discussion. 8.-Conclusion briefly concludes the
findings of the analysis and the discussion.
The second theory presented is Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). As outlined in
1.-Introduction the conflict is mostly evident in a regional context. RSCT allows us to
understand the conflict in this regional perspective, by emphasizing the regional dynamic.
The third theory introduced is Securitization. This functions as a tool to understand and
examine the intersubjective dynamics of the regional security complex (RSC). An
understanding of how the actors securitize each other, further illuminates the relations
between the actors and how they chose to handle a certain security threat. Securitization is
a tool incorporated into the theory of RSCT and should be understood in relations to a
RSC.
3.2-Regional Security Complex Theory
This section explores and elaborates on the framework for analysis defined by Buzan, de
Wilde and Wæver (1998), in terms of concepts, terminology and use of the framework.
Buzan and Wæver incorporate this analytical framework into their Regional Security
Complex Theory-RSCT (2003), which is introduced in this section and in the project to
analyze the Conflict in Mali.
The section’s first task is to outline two perspectives on international security namely
neorealist and globalist, for there next to use the two perspectives to frame the regionalist
perspective preferred by Buzan and Wæver (Ibid.). The third part contains an elaboration
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on the terminology of Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver (1998), which provides the underlying
issue in security studies. However, it does not override territoriality within the security
analytical tools used in the analytical section. Their regionalist perspective is in the fourth
paradigm. In terms of territoriality, the regionalist perspective borrows from both by
part, used to explain the level of actors, and their definition, in the analysis and their
addressing the interplay between territoriality and deterritorialitization, hence allowing
relevance for the analytical work. The fifth part introduces the four sectors for analysis, and
regional structures to act in a transnational manner and to be initiated in a response to
the final part of this section accounts for RSCT’s take on Sub Saharan-Africa (from here on
globalization. However, the neorealists emphasize that the international levels of structure
written as Africa) in general and West Africa in specific.
is still bound to territorially, which Buzan and Wæver agree to but add another regional
level. Buzan and Wæver argue that threats travel more efficiently across short distances
3.2.1-Major approaches within international security
than long but this obstacle can be crossed if the mode of threat is not territorially bound
(e.g. an economic threat or in the case of international terrorist threat) or if actors’
Traditionally post-Cold war theoretical perspectives on structures of international security
capabilities rise to a level where distance is no longer an issue. They are hereby suggesting
are divided in three: the neorealist, globalist and regionalist. Each contains a distinct focus
that certain elements of globalist perspectives can be incorporated if development in
on the level of analysis and thereby an embedded understanding of the structure of
regards to these elements allows it (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 9-14).
international security. The structure is in a theoretical context is understood as levels of
structure and how they are differentiated from each other. Neorealists understand the
In order to conceptualize the regionalist view Buzan and Wæver introduces a theoretical
international system as structured by state-actors and concerned with their material power.
understanding they call: Regional security complex theory (RSCT). Regional security
The material power of the state-actor is reflected in its hierarchical position in the
complex (RSC) is defined as:
international system, which is further conditioned by the balance-of-power logic. Power in
the system is a zero-sum game where external power cannot be added. The international
“A set of units whose processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked
institutions of the world, being the UN, the IMF, the Word Bank etc. are in a neorealist
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one
perspective not a result of globalization, but merely an internationalization of the
another.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 201)
predominate powers. Globalists understand the international system as consisting of both
non-state actors and state-actors, and are mainly concerned with the actors on a
RSC is not a concept which can only be applied to some situations and security issues but
supranational level. The system of states, as understood by the neorealist, needs to be
rather a way of viewing security issues in general. The argument is that security analyzed
redefined for the benefit of non-state actors and supranational institutions. Hence, pointing
solely through a national perspective does not make sense since security dynamics are
towards a non-territorial bound power, which exists by the premises of technology and
always relational. In order to understand the analytical components of RSC’s Buzan and
social advances mainly in terms of innovation in communication and transportation. These
Wæver state that RSC’s are characterized by “durable patterns of amity and enmity”. They
advances make it possible for actors across the structural levels to interact, empower and
go on to specify that this relation, in terms of security, is more often found between states
cooperate. It should be noted that states often play a large role in these networks but are
with a close geographical proximity and that this interaction is most noticeable in the
not the sole actor or main power center. The actors who interact on these levels, both the
military, political, societal, and environmental sectors (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 45). The
sub national and supranational, are mainly NGO’s, corporations and social movements,
military, political, societal sectors are explained further on in this section and will frame the
who in a globalist perspective can ‘outplay’ the states due to their mobility across borders.
analysis as well. The environmental sector is however not explained further and will not be
The regionalist perspective understood by Buzan and Wæver (2003) draws on neorealist
a focal point in the analysis. (See: 4.3 - Delimitation)
and globalist perspectives. The perspective agrees with the globalist premise that allows
the significant actors to be both non-state and state, by agreeing that globalization is an
Security should be understood as a term that can be used across the sectors, but varies in
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form across these sectors, essentially “security means survival in the face of an existential
threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). However, this needs to be seen in respect to securitization
Threats will at times arise and the securitization will happen ad hoc, however if the threat is
processes and how various actors securitize each other.
persistent the securitization can become institutionalized. This is seen mostly with threats
regarding the military sector, where the armed forces of other nations or non-state actors
have posse threats for centuries. A defense system will in such situations have been built
3.2.2- Securitization
as an answer to the threat. This institutionalization is often based on an ad hoc
Securitization is, according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), a process where an
measurement taken in by the actor and as the ad hoc threat becomes persistent, the
actor securitizes a threat by proclaiming it as a threat. This process is important to follow
security aspect becomes institutionalized (op. cit.: 27).
when conducting security analysis, because it will allow the researcher to understand the
power-relation between actors and the nature of the threat. A threat is seen as a continuum
The speech act’s approach to security analysis includes three types of actors. Referent
ranging from non politicized, politicized to securitized - any issue can be placed in this
objects, Securitizing actors and Functional actors.
continuum, where the status of securitized is acquired when a security move is successful.
A security move is a speech act where an actor tries to securitize a threat, by speaking
Referent objects are the objects, which are referred to in the act of securitizing. The object
about it as a threat. They draw on Bourdieu to establish that a speech act is not only
that is threatened and has a legitimate right for survival are almost always collectives as
speech but an action in itself, which is “dependent on social position of the enunciator and
states or nations, but could also be organizations or communities. The success of
thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field” (op. cit.:46). The securitization is thus
securitizing an object will often rely on the size of the object. This can be seen as a
becoming intersubjective and thereby reliant on the acceptance of the audience to become
continuum with individual or small groups at one end and large systems at the other end. It
legitimate, or in other words; if a certain threat is not accepted as such by the audience it
is very rare for individuals to achieve legitimacy as securitized objects; however it is also
will not gain the status of securitized.
difficult for large systems such as ‘humankind’ to constitute a securitized object. From this it
By stating this, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde
(1998) also state that studying and understanding securitization is to study discourses. The
becomes evident that the legitimate securitized object needs to be a graspable entity: “The
underlying aspect of this refers to an actor’s understanding of threat as something real, it
referent object is that to which on can point!” (op. cit.: 36).
does not however matter if the threat is real or not, but to what extent it is constructed as a
real threat. The threat becomes real if it is fully securitized e.g. the relevant actors accept it
Securitizing actors are the actors who securitize certain threats. By performing the speech
as a real threat. By being fully securitized it becomes legitimate to break the common rules
act they refer to the referent object. These actors are often political leaders, pressure
and procedures in order to deal with the discursive established existential threat (op. cit.:
groups, international agencies or governments. The distinction between the referent actor
25). E.g. the war in Iraq was initiated on the premise that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
and the securitizing actor lies in that a securitizing actor cannot usually securitize itself e.g.
destruction, which was an existential threat to the US. The US securitized it by speaking
a governmental regime will usually not securitize itself but the state or the nation. It is
about it as a threat in order to gain support for the pending war.
however not impossible for the referent object and the securitizing actor to be the
same. Rarely will we see an individual being the securitizing actor because he/she will be
Within certain securitization, rhetoric of survival is often prevalent - if we do not eliminate
the representative of a collective and therefore be bound to a certain role (op. cit.: 42).
the threat, we will not be here to eliminate it later. The speech act element drawn from
Functional actors are usually influential in the field of security but are not the referent
Bourdieu emphasizes that the speech act itself is an action in the sense that it holds an
objects or the securitizing actors. The influence has a say in whether the securitization of
active component relating to a social field (op. cit.: 26).
the securitizing actors is legitimate or not, it furthermore affects the general dynamics and
decisions of the field of security (op. cit.: 36).
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However, the case of Africa in general and explicitly West Africa challenges the theory’s
“The key question in security analysis is, who can “do” security in the name of what?”(Op.
emphasis on regional complexes, due to the rather unique case of African politics and the
cit.: 45).
structure of states in Africa. The continent generally poses challenges to IR theory and
RSCT is not an exception. This section of the chapter elaborates on the features of RSCT
3.2.3-Regional Security Complex
in relations to African security theory and furthermore on the specific case of West Africa
where, of course, Mali and Azawad is located (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 219).
Security issues are more prevalent in states with close geographical proximity; this point is
Africa currently consists of 54 recognized states, which, with the exception of a few, have
used on two levels. Firstly, it is used as a way to argue and legitimize the use of the
been colonized by European states, as mentioned in the section on context. Buzan and
regional perspective and RSCT as an approach to the analysis on security, and secondly it
Wæver identify the root of the ‘African problem’ for IR and RSCT, as being the postcolonial
is applied as an analytical tool to distinguish between actors inside of the security cluster or
state. The postcolonial state was superficially reflective of the European states and was
RSC and actors outside of it and their possible role within it
never able or enabled to reach the state level of this mirror. Post-independent states do and
did miss the central features of political, social and economic functionality, a deficiency
3.2.4-Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa
affluent throughout the state apparatus. Though, one feature is consistent across the
continent, the mutual and international recognition of the already established states. All
The dynamics of Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT in terms of actors, levels, securitization and
members of the African Union have agreed to this recognition and to uphold the current
power enables its use across a range of geographical locations. It helps to an
borders, however certain cases are exceptional as seen with the independence of South
understanding of how a particular location is linked to a sub-national, a national, a regional
Sudan in 2011. The general lack of features associated with the European state resorts in
and a global security complex, and furthermore it tells how these are interlinked. Buzan and
weak states that historically have been acting predatorily towards their populations to the
Wæver suggest that a number of regional security complexes exist in the world and that
extent that it functions more as personal regimes, based on neo-patrimonialism where
these are analytical entities, discursive constructed to the extent of the actors’ security
enrichment of elites are a top priority, and not the welfare of citizens. The weak states have
practices.
given room for non-state actors to relatively easily gain territorial, cultural, material and
political power. Some of these non-state actors are based on ‘ethnicity’ and can to some
extent be credited to pre-colonial times, however this postulate should be taken with a
constructivist’s nerve (op.cit.: 220). The weakness of most states makes them militarily
compete on the same level as the non-state actors, and some of the regimes come into
being by insurgents occupying capital cities. Buzan and Wæver argue that the strength of
the non-state actor and the weakness of the official state, forces the security focus to be
national and not interstate. At the same time the weakness of state on especially its neopatrimonial feature makes it increasingly possible for outside actors to interferer on a sub
national level, altering the power structures within (op.cit.: 229). The regional level of
security in Africa is marked by spillovers, especially in terms of refugee flows, expulsions of
foreigners and civil wars. The regional aspect becomes mainly a spillover of domestic
conflicts, with little interstate warfare. The interstate warfare comes mostly in the form of
regimes supporting non-state actors in other states’ territories, in the form of personalized
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regimes adding to proxy wars across borders. The low account of actual interstate wars and
West African States, ECOWAS, was formed in 1975 and consisted of sixteen countries, as
the spillovers present, suggest that each state interacts only with the states in its immediate
it does today. Nigeria being the main entrepreneur behind the community, the economic
proximity, leaving more empirical evidence for a regional security complex, RSC, consisting
powerhouse of the region and the possessor of the largest standing army is the pole of the
of all (sub Saharan) Africa. However, Buzan and Wæver find signs of emergent RSCs,
Unipolar system. In 1990, ECOWAS formed ECOMOG a peace-keeping structure mainly
labeled Proto RSC, mainly Southern and West Africa separately, and to a lesser extent the
based on Nigerian troops, which underlined the system’s unipolarity and the position of
Horn, Eastern and central Africa (op. cit.: 233). The illustration shown above defines the
power held by Nigeria. ECOMOG has however not been able to contain and stop the
West African RSC as a proto complex and Mali as an insulator state. Due to the project’s
spillover of domestic issues in West Africa. Nigeria’s role in the regional power relations is
focus on Mali, a definition of an insulator state and an account of the proto RSC are
the main argument for Buzan and Wæver case of a proto RSC in West Africa (op. cit.: 238-
accounted for below.
240)
The insulator is defined as a
state located in the border
region between two RSC's.
The interregional level of security issues in Africa is minimal with the AU and the OAU being
The insulator is both subject to
strong rhetorical and symbolical actors but not with any real punch. Few cases of
the regional security dynamics
interregional interaction are seen, mostly in the form of refugee flows and political figures
of its own RSC but also the
exiling in and out of region states (op. cit.: 248-249).
neighboring one. It is to weak
in nature to be able to define
On a global level, the weakness of African states allows for international intervention to
the security agenda to lift the
have large impacts on domestic issues. But it is hard to find accounts of global actors
boundary of the two RSC's
initiating conflicts in Africa, their roles have mostly been adding fuel to an already burning
and merging them. (op. cit.:
fire. African leaders have often proclaimed that it is their role on the periphery of the world
41)
capitalist system that led to the despair of their nations; ironically these are the very same
leaders who more than often have created huge fortunes on the trade to the core states.
The proto RSC of West Africa
This deviation, Buzan and Wæver claims, have often drawn attention away from the
is marked by domestic security
domestic issues on the continent. The international focus on Africa has often securitized
issues
since
other issues than the issues securitized by Africans leaders themselves, an example is
independence which, with the
AIDS, which until recently and still to some extent is a taboo across the continent but have
exception of a few, occurred in
been securitized by the international community (op. cit.: 249-253).
ever
the early 1960’ties: a state of
regional peace but internal
war. Most war where civil wars
The RSCT provides a framework for analysis, which can be applied on regions where
or insurgent wars, on one side
securitization takes place, in our case the contemporary conflict in Mali. In order to see how
often backed by other states in
the different actors securitize each other a presentation of each sector is necessary, since it
Africa or the previous metropolitan states; the former colonizers. Economic Community of
provides ground to understand the actors’ interrelationship.
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that they pose a threat to the we of a society. In order to cause insecurity for the societal
3.2.5-The societal sector
sector, that we must be threatened by a factor challenging the collective identity of a given
society.
This sector is concerned with the societal security of a given societal unit. The organizing
concept of this sector is identity. In brief societal security concerns the sustainability within
Integration projects
acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious
and national identity. (op. cit.: 119). Societal insecurity appears when societal units of
In some societies the state may attempt to shape a common culture to control some or all
whatever kind define a potential threat to their society. Societal units are structured around
of the machineries of cultural reproduction, such as the schools, religious institutions etc. In
identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as
repressive societies the minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their culture because
members of a community. Therefore a societal unit may exist across borders and states, as
the majority uses the state to structure educational, media and other systems to favor the
for instance with the case of the Kurdish people. A state may consist of several societal
majority culture (op. cit.: 122). Therefore some types of societal security threats are fought
units (Ibid.). It is a personal choice taken by the individual that defines whether one wishes
in the minds of individuals whereas others are more tangible matters influencing identity. In
to identify with a certain community and thereby belong to that societal sector. Factors such
the first case the security threat is about conversion, where people start to think of
as language, culture, history and location may have a large role in the idea of identity. (op.
themselves as something else. The second case of societal security threat is a result of
cit.: 120).
political decisions that may have an impact on identity and hinder the reproduction of a
certain culture in favor of another. Societies within the societal sector threatened by such,
can respond in two ways. Either through activities carried out by the community itself or by
The most common threats to societal security are highlighted in the theory as migration,
trying to move the issue to the political sector by having the threat placed on state agenda
Horizontal competition and Vertical competition.
(Ibid.). If the security issue is placed in the state agenda, the threat will fall into the political
sector instead of the societal. In essence, the differentiation can be seen as whether a
1)
Migration is a threat to societal security as the increase of foreign population may
interfere with the existing identity in a given community.
societal unit strives for statehood or wishes to be incorporated within an existing state
structure. Separate statehood for the unit will usually have a greater impact on the regional
dynamic (Ibid.).
2)
Horizontal competition is when a neighboring culture is influencing the existing
identity in a societal sector.
Security Actors and Referent Objects
3)
Vertical competition is when the existing identity is being challenged by an
The referent objects in the societal sector are whatever large groups carry the loyalties and
integrating project or secessionist regionalist project that pulls them toward either narrower
devotion of subjects in a form that can create a socially powerful argument that this we is
or wider identities. Examples are the European Union, Catalonia and former Yugoslavia
threatened (op. cit.: 123). In this case, it becomes the identity of the referent object being
(op. cit.: 121).
threatened. Through history the referent object have been narrowly defined; For most
people they have been local or family based either in the village, clan, region or city state.
A possible fourth issue, which may threat the societal security, could be depopulation.
The most important referent objects in the societal sector of today are tribes, clans, nations,
Famine, war, plague and natural catastrophes may lead to a decrease in population and
civilizations, religions and races (Ibid.). The nation is seen as a referent object in the
thereby threaten the existing identity of a given community. Equal for all security threats is
societal sector quite often. Persons in positions of state power often express the emotion of
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identity. In some cases state leaders use references to state and sovereignty and other
”The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty – the claim of exclusive right to self-
leaders use references to nation and identity. Oppositional political forces who are bidding
Government over a specified territory and its population.” (Ibid.)
for political power use references more to nation than to power. On the other hand the
defense of state and sovereignty will tend to benefit those in power. The logic of state
This quote underlines that the fundamental nature of the state and how it is acquired is by
security will tend to privilege the security of the state, whereas oppositional political actors
force. Use of force is also a way of upholding and asserting sovereignty (Ibid.). This is why
will tend to argue that the nation is under threat, as a means to gain power (Ibid.).
the agenda of the military security is mainly focused around the state. A focus on other
objects and securitizing actors will follow later in this section. The exception to the quote is
Africa
when a state disintegrates and or cannot find root, this will lead to anarchy such as it is
seen in several African countries. The military security agenda is mostly about
In Africa, the main societal referent objects are a mix of the extended family, village, clan,
governments’ effort to maintain and protect themselves from internal and external threats,
tribe and the nation state. Apart from the Horn of Africa and Maghreb, very little of Africa
not only military ones but also non-military threats - for instance ideologies and migrants.
has the typical security complex type of threats in which one state threatens another; this is
This is also how the military and political sector is linked together.
elaborated on in 3.2.8-Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa. Military threats more
often than not occur within states rather than between them. This happens over competition
The normal domestic functions of the government are administration and law, which
for state power. Thus in the societal sector the African states tend to be less concerned with
upholds the peace and thereby civil order. Beyond that it can uphold the territorial integrity,
threats from other states, but more concerned with competing societal sectors such as
but this is not always securitized as a threat since governments, in theory, are free to
other tribes, villages etc. (op. cit.: 128)
negotiate reorganization of their borders. However, if it is perceived as an international
threat the territorial integrity is of big importance (op. cit.: 50). In respect to governments as
focusing on self-preservation, it can be understood that if the government however see nonmilitary threats to their authority, they can securitize it to use force against it. This can be
seen in relations to the modern Westphalian states who disarm their citizens and wish to be
3.2.6-Military Sector
seen as the only legitimate providers of force. In contrast are the feudal and classical states
where use of force is divided between the state and citizens because of the rights of
The historical contemporary condition shows, that the military sector is most likely to be
citizens to bear arms and use force - not against the government but for self-protection. (op.
highly institutionalized, even though it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, the military sector
cit.: 51)
does not have to be about security in contrast to a traditionalist position because for some
states, the increase of military capacity does not necessarily have anything to do with
Referent Objects and Security Actors
internal security but is instead used for political and economic relations in foreign countries
cementing the state’s role in international relations. Many European countries serve as an
Many governments cannot incorporate all civil societies within their nations and this leaves
example of this. Since they do not have to fear external threats, the military activities are
a room for non-state units as referent objects for military security. If those non-state units
less about internal security and more about the political sphere. In the military sector the
acquire statehood with success, the international society will see them as just that - non-
state and the ruling elite is the most important actors, but not the only ones (op. cit.: 49).
state referent objects, without widespread recognition to their claim (op. cit.: 52-53). There
are several groups of people who challenge the nation state from within. These groups can
be: secessionists, unionists, revolutionaries etc. The international society often securitizes
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these would-be states because they are seen as a threat to the sovereignty. In such a case,
3.2.7-The Political Sector
the existing state might be motivated “... to use military force to secure its monopoly over
legitimate violence.”(op. cit.: 53)
The political sector is primarily about nonmilitary threats to sovereignty. Political security is
therefore concerned with the organizational stability of social order(s). The political sector is
A security agenda does not necessarily mean the involvement of the military. An example
the most widespread sector there is, often overlapping the other sectors for example,
of this can be if a group of would-be states do not comply with law and order, the
political-societal, military-political etc. you can argue that all military is political (op. cit.:
government can utilize the security agenda of law and order to a point where they threat
141). The political threats will vary in degree and have different goals. Since the main
human rights by countercrime (op. cit.: 54).
objective for a state is organizing ideology and thereby form a national identity, the political
threats can be feared on the same level as military threats because they aim is to
Some democratic governments can for their own survival securitize threats to national
destabilize the organizational stability of the state. The political threat arises from its aim at
sovereignty to keep themselves as the authorized securitizing actor for the state. That can
overthrowing the government and to pressure a particular policy to weaken the state as a
be by both democratic and non-democratic governments and in such cases it can be hard
power (op. cit.: 142).
to define whether the securitization is used for the good of the state or the government (op.
cit.: 56-57).
The political threats come from both internal and external actors:
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities
”Political threats are thus made to (1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which
relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutional ideas and issues defining the state:
Different societies will see and respond differently to the same objective threat so
and (2) the external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy”. (op. cit.: 144)
securitization is an inter subjective process which is socially constructed (op. cit.: 57). As an
example, the threats and vulnerabilities between two states in the international system, is
As stated in the quote, typically the threats will relate to, the external – recognition, and
both defined through their respective military capabilities but also their amity and enmity
internal – legitimacy (op. cit.: 145).
interplay which is historical and socially constructed (op. cit.: 58-59).
Security Actors and Referent Objects
After World War 2 a new attitude prevailed where states and individuals were equal. This
The main referent object of the political sector is the state, where other unit-level objects too
shift included the different ideologies of states as equally legitimate. Although it does not
can serve as referent objects for a political organization such as emerging superstate
imply that there are no strong or weak states in the international society. Problems of a
structures, self-organized, stateless societal groups and transnational movements (Ibid.).
state to assert its sovereignty domestically will thus still harm recognition and legitimacy
The government of the state will often be the securitizing actor, and as mentioned in the
internationally (op. cit.: 60)
military sector section, it can be hard to tell if securitization is done to protect the
.
government itself or the state, also in regards to internal and external threats (op. cit.: 5657/146). The internal threats will occur more in weak states, because there will be distrust
from the population towards the government using the state as a securitizing factor, to
protect themselves (op. cit.: 146).
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3.3.1-The nature of sovereignty
The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities
As a consequence of the peace negotiations in Westphalia, in the year 1648, new
Threats to sovereignty are a threat to the state, because sovereignty is what defines a state
standards were introduced and defined for the European states. The Thirty Years War was
as a state, so even minor threats to sovereignty can be seen as a security problem (op. cit.:
the reason for peace negotiations and the European states were recognized as sovereign
158).
independent nation states. The thought was that you could secure peace in the future
between the now sovereign European states. But what does sovereignty exactly entail?
The political sector is defined and connected along principle lines. These principles are
Sovereignty is regarded as a key principle within the international society and it has played
often mediated by international organizations, on both regional and global levels. The two
a huge role in defining modern nation states. Basically sovereign statehood is ‘constitutional
levels can in many instances contradict one another, implying that the power balance
independence’ of other states. This implies a few different aspects such as a right to self-
between these super-state structures are important to look at and analyze in order to
determination, ruling over a defined territory and non-interference policy in the interests of
assess the external and internal threats. Recent development has shown that global
another states’ domain (Jackson,1987:522).
structures play a larger role than before. This can be seen in UN laws, which are
implemented and followed on a larger regional scale than before (op. cit.: 160)
Although sovereignty was more or less based in Europe it has been implemented in
systems throughout the world, not at least in the African colonies. The term in itself has
Both the sectors and RSC revolves around a state and the how the state acts in terms of
been changed throughout time since factors such as technology, globalization, conflict, and
different threats from other actors, both weak and strong. The construction of the state is of
colonization and de-colonization have challenged how sovereignty is perceived.
great importance when it comes to how the state fares in a security complex. The
The general discourse of sovereignty, according to Jackson, primarily revolves around legal
construction usually revolves around the acquisition of sovereignty. The Westphalia state is
theory, international law and international institutions. Jackson emphasizes that the legality
by far the most popular notion on statehood.
of the state is important in terms of sovereignty: it is a “game constituted and regulated by
rules” (Ibid.).
3.3-Sovereignty
This constituted game is defined by two major rules: constitutive rules (civil) and
instrumental rules (organizational). The constitute set of rules are guidelines of how states
The following section relies on Robert H. Jackson’s article from 1987: "Quasi-States, dual
are to act in the international society. In the international society sovereignty implies the
regimes and neo-classical theory" and his article from 1986: “Negative Sovereignty in Sub-
following: equality of states, mutual recognition, non-intervention policy, treaty making,
Saharan Africa”, and aims to explain the concept of sovereignty and how it applies to a
diplomacy and other civil international duties (Ibid.).
post-colonial African context. This section offers an outline of the primary aspects of
sovereignty focusing on sovereignty in post-colonial Africa including the implications racial
Instrumental rules, are slightly more "realist" in essence and if sovereignty in fact is a game,
sovereignty and negative sovereignty has had and continues to have to the African state.
the instrumental rules is how you win it. The instrumental set of rules, represent the interest
In order to understand sovereignty in Africa one has to understand what sovereignty is,
of the state and is often apparent in a state’s foreign policy.
where it came from and how it has developed throughout history.
Jackson goes on to reflect upon the importance of sovereignty and what consequences it
entails. The political value that sovereignty entails cannot be underrated, but also other
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factors arise when sovereignty is achieved both on a domestic and international level.
which new rules and principles changed and in fact are antipoles in terms of prevailing
These intended consequences are among others: order, justice and economic welfare. A
ideology before and after colonization. Since colonization no more is legitimate in the
part from intended consequences, Jackson also presents the possibility for unintended
international society, the rules and principles are defined from a de-colonial way of thinking:
consequences of sovereignty. In an African context some of the unintended consequences
“Colonization is no longer considered internationally legitimate, and current norms of
have been“!surprising civil and socioeconomic adversities!” (op.cit.:523) This is in many
international behavior prescribe decolonization just as emphatically as earlier norms
ways the consequence of negative sovereignty which will be looked at later on in the
prescribed it.” (op.cit.:524)
section.
3.3.3-Decolonization
3.3.2-Colonization
The years after World War II decolonization were slowly emerging in the Sub-Saharan
African states' way to sovereignty has indeed been crumpled by the somewhat turbulent
states. In 1955 3 states were independent, in the year 1960 all the ex-French colonies
history. Jackson draws on the 1885 Law of Constitution, where European established
became independent and by 1980 all the African states were independent, except Namibia
powers defined the territorial borders of Africa. Jackson points out that in such a context the
(Ibid.). This era of rapid decolonization represented a new set of values in the international
African states would not be able to attain sovereignty, because they did not posses certain
system where statehood independence, was a prevailing attitude. It was now a right of the
conditions. There were two reasons why sovereignty was unattainable for the African
colonial states to have self-determination.
states: The first reason relies on the conditions of attaining sovereignty which were
fundamentally different than today. The ideology of the international society, cultural,
In the creation of post colonial Africa the immediate task was to create international
economic and political conditions were, at the time, nowhere near attainable for
legitimacy. Jackson points to two frameworks of the nation in a European context as
sovereignty. The second reason is connected to the difficult situation the African colonized
possible models for the new African nation states; the territorial nation and the cultural
states found themselves in during the late 1880’s. They were embedded in the colonial
nation. Because the states in Africa were culturally diverse most of them containing
system (and ideology) and did not qualify for recognition by the international society and
numerous ethnnonations, international legitimacy through the idea of a cultural nation would
they were so to speak owned by their colonizing nations who did not have an interest in
be an extensive project which was politically ruled out. Instead, the framework of the African
promoting sovereignty and independence in the same way as the nation-states in Europe.
nation states was decided around the territorial concept which would not only shape the
Not until after World War II, when the colonists left, would African states be able to
identity of each state but ultimately be the factor that would gain it international legitimacy
formulate their constitutive rules and acquire sovereignty. The conditions in the African
(Jackson,1986:250).
states had changed and Jackson points to the “prevailing international moralities and
ideologies”(Ibid.) as key factors in the change that the African states went through where
To contextualize the concept of the territorial nation, and why this model was deemed more
the year 1960 marks the change in regimes, also referred to as the “wind of change” (Ibid.).
suitable than the idea of the cultural nation, Jackson uses Nigeria as an example. Nigeria
consists of many different tribes and different religions and territorial boundaries were not
The ideological change in the international society is reflected in the acceptance of peoples
defined in the pre-colonial times. The borders of Nigeria have thus been created in colonial
right to control their territory and self-determination.
times by the British, and Jackson notes, that Nigeria culturally resembled Britain rather than
Italy, meaning that the ‘common culture’ of Nigeria at the time of independence was defined
The fact that colonization had a huge impact on the constitutive rules of sovereignty in the
through its colonizer. The idea is that the common culture implemented by the Colonizing
African states cannot be underrated. Jackson argues that there has been a regime shift in
States could not be sustained after independence since Britain was no longer present in
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Nigeria which then left the territorial nation as the main claim to international legitimacy
(Ibid.).
Positive sovereignty can be described through the following quote regarding the empirical
foundation of new statehood.
3.3.4-Racial sovereignty
“A new state comes into existence when a community acquires not momentarily but with a
When it comes to international legitimacy and looking beyond the confines of the territorial
reasonable probability of performance, the essential characteristics of a state, namely, an
nation Jackson sees an emerging discourse in post-colonial Africa: The concept of self-
organized government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by
governing, which rests upon a variation of majority rule excluding racial minority
any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations!” (op.cit.:254)
governments – especially European descendants. To simplify it further “Only indigenous
This quote describes what is behind positive sovereignty. Especially the part of the
Africans can govern the new African states.” (op.cit.:252)
statement referring to an organized government being capable of conducting its own
international relations is a sign of positive sovereignty.
International legitimacy through the lens of the territorial nation and indigenous self
governing has implications according to Jackson.
3.3.6-Negative sovereignty
Firstly, the focus on legitimacy and sovereignty through the territorial perspective creates
Where positive sovereignty is defined through the capability to self-govern ones state and
problems because the African states are multi national in nature. The problem Jackson
conduct international relations, negative sovereignty can be defined as having a
points out is that many people live in one state in Africa while ethnically being from a
government not capable of the aspects of governing. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa,
neighboring country, and if Somali’s living in Kenya do not wish to adopt A Kenyan
Jackson notes that pressure from the international society in the aftermath of the Second
nationality, they can emigrate. In fact, in some cases African states have forced people to
World War to decolonize the colonies was so great, and perceived as a moral obligation
flee to neighboring countries. This is a part of why Africa has the highest amount of political
that the actual process itself happened very quickly and did not give the newly formed
refugees of any world region.
African states a good foundation to govern from a position of positive sovereignty.
“It was the far more demanding and constructive obligation of leaving behind a viable
Secondly, the discourse that African states must have African governments and that
successor state within the artificial boundaries of each colony by somehow fostering a
international legitimacy in this perspective does not include how the government exercises
capable and internally legitimate indigenous ruling élite.” (op.cit.:255)
its power or how it came to power is problematic. The only overriding factor is that the ruler
or government must respect the territorial aspect, meaning that only black native Nigerians
This demanding and constructive obligation takes time – time the decolonization process
can rule over Nigeria (Ibid.).
did not have and thus Jackson’s argument is that one of the defining reasons for negative
sovereignty in sub-Saharan Africa is found in the way the empires transferred the power
Further more, Jackson points out that the ethnonations of any African state might not have
over to the African states.
any influence on it. “The principle of racial sovereignty is blind to ethnonationalism and
Africa’s numerous ethnonations have no legal or moral standing either internationally or
In the of the former British colonies in Africa the pressure from the international society
even, in most cases, internally.” (op.cit.:253)
made the empire move away from long-term policy of development in the colonies. Instead,
the democratic parliamentary system known as the Westminster model was implemented
3.3.5-Positive sovereignty
rather quickly so elections could be held and the transfer of power could be done. Likewise,
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in the former French and Belgium colonies the process of decolonization was quick – even
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for
quicker than in the case of the British colonies as it happened in the span of just one year.
delaying independence’.” (Jackson, 1986:256)
Furthermore, the French and Belgium model of decolonization did not take into
consideration the differences of the states in terms of their indigenous capacity of self-
The concept of self-determination in the quote above refers back to a previous statement
government (op.cit.:256).
about the nature of racial sovereignty. Where self-determination and racial sovereignty
might be supported here Jackson argues that it has little to do with empirical statehood
The first issue regarding the time-span of the decolonization process ties back to the earlier
which is an indicator of positive sovereignty. His point is that even though there is a
statement that the foundation of positive sovereignty takes time to implement. The second
historical relationship between empirical statehood and international legitimacy, the lack of
issue refers to the fact that the different colonies under the same colonial ruler did not share
empirical statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa has not resulted in a lack of international
the same capability to sustain the changes that independence created. This means that
legitimacy. He further points out that many African states that do not have internal
positive sovereignty for the weaker states would be harder to create and uphold since the
legitimacy, experience international legitimacy (op.cit.:257). This is a continuation of one of
model did not differentiate between them and the colonies seemingly more ready for
the issues with racial sovereignty focusing on who is ruling the African states as opposed to
independence. Another reason why the quick decolonization process has implications on
how they came to power and how they are in fact using that power. The international
sovereignty was that the colonies did not usually organize their colony as they would
society is upholding international legitimacy through negative sovereignty and, according to
organize the government in their respective nations. Instead, the colonial governments and
Jackson, hesitant about intervening in conflicts in African states.
its officials were often few in numbers and their goal was often turned to what would benefit
their nation of origin: “they were not comparable not to states but, rather, to small provincial,
“International legitimacy has not been adversely affected even in cases of extremely
county, or municipal governments in European countries.” (Jackson, 1987:525) The lack of
abusive tyrannies – Amin’s and also probably Obote’s Uganda; Macias’ Equatorial Guinea
sovereignty in the colonies during the colonial period made it possible. The decolonization
– or in cases of ethnic oppression verging on genocide – Kayibanda’s Rwanda and
also implies that the former colonial officials would leave the control of the state to the
Micombero’s Burundi. Black African governments evidently enjoy a new kind of freedom.”
indigenous people of the colonies. This had major consequences for the implementation of
(op.cit.:258)
an independent state apparatus, since the indigenous population was simply lacking
To sum up Jackson’s main points he argues that the moral obligation from the international
experience. Jackson again argues that the reason for this was that independence was not a
society to decolonize Africa immediately in the aftermath of the Second World War did not
carefully carried out plan by the colonial powers but was a consequence of a rapid change
give the newly formed African states a viable foundation to practice positive sovereignty. In
of norms and values in the international society after World War II. The local Africans in
general this was due to the fact that the colonial period had not fostered a ruling elite with
their respective, now independent states, had no experience whatsoever in government
the capabilities of continuing or creating the foundation of positive sovereignty post-
administration. The lack of experience and the newly formed self-determination led to the
independence. Furthermore, he sees a problem with the fact that the de-colonization
collapse of some of these new states (op.cit.:526).
process did not take into consideration the issues and needs of each African state but
rather focused on the moral obligation of independence more so than the moral obligation
The issues involving the decolonization in the colonies, is not just an example of how the
of leaving behind a state actually able to govern on a long term scale. Jackson also sees
colonial powers used poor judgment in their decolonization models. Jackson points out that
another consequence involving the morality concerning the former colonies from an
the root of the issue of negative sovereignty is found in the UN general assembly. The 1960
international perspective. Self-determination and self-governing has created a space in time
General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
where the African states receive international legitimacy through negative sovereignty
Peoples states that “‘all people have the right to self-determination’ and that ‘inadequacy of
because the international society and the African states see self-governing as the dominant
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factor of legitimacy, which can overshadow more inherent problems with the governments.
securitize each other in the Malian conflict gives us a good analytical foundation for
In some cases this can even cover up not just negative sovereignty by way of failure to be
approaching Mali as a regional complex in itself.
able to govern but also discard more severe cases of maltreatment of the populations of the
African states.
3.4-Conclusion of Theory
Jackson’s theory on negative sovereignty in Africa relies on a historical perspective where
colonization and de-colonization has been shaping the present structure of African states,
which according to Jackson caused that many African states currently has negative
sovereignty. Jackson emphasizes that moral obligation, post second world war, created a
foundation for international legitimacy, which enhanced the negative sovereignty of the
African states. Because of a prevailing thought where the international society and African
states perceives self-governing and racial sovereignty as the prevailing factor for legitimacy.
This is evident throughout the state system of African states, from the colonial defined
borders to the lack of governmental capacity to the internal legitimacy of the state. This
gives the notion of African states only being states by name.
RSCT provides a framework for analysis in relation to conflicts and dynamics in a given
region. The argument builds on the premise that security issues are significantly more
interrelated in a regional complex with close geographical proximity. RSC are constituted by
the relation between amity and enmity, and it is within this spectra that securitization
occurs. By dividing the speech acts into sectors the researcher forms a clearer picture of
the power relations between the relevant actors and how they securitize each other. RSC
contextualized in West Africa, has encouraged a securitization analysis based on state
actors as well as non-state actors, which due to the weak structure of African states makes
it difficult to constitute a permanent RSC. Buzan and Wæver underlines that most African
states only have the capacity to interfere in the immediate proximity, making it difficult to
suggest a regional security complex. They are thus only suggesting proto-complexes in the
African context. This means that they only see tendencies that potentially could support the
idea of a RSC. However, that does not eliminate the use of the theory in an African context.
As briefly mentioned in 1.2-Motivation and further explained in 5.1-Introduction to the
Regional Security Complex of Mali, the presence of multiple actors and their capacity to
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4-Methodology
illuminate the day to day aspects of the conflict, and especially very recent development in
the conflict are only found through news articles on the internet.
Our analysis is theoretically based on two frameworks: Regional Security Complex Theory,
including Securitization, and Sovereignty. Because there is substantial difference between
4.1-Method for analysis
the two, different methods are used when applying them to the case. Both are concerned
with the different actors in the Mali conflict. ECOWAS, the Government of Mali, Ansar Dine,
Initially we make use of Jackson’s theory on negative sovereignty, in order to explain the
and MNLA are the actors the analysis revolves around, and the aspects of the analysis
present situation in Mali. By focusing on the historical background of African sovereign
concerned with securitization are centered on how they securitize each other. First hand or
states, the theory elaborates on reasons as to why Malian sovereignty currently is being
primary sources are ideal when it comes to the securitization of the actors but it is not
challenged. We apply concepts from Jackson’s negative sovereignty theory to the context
possible to only use primary sources as there, in the case of some of the actors, is limited
of Mali, and thereby seek to explain the present challenges facing the Malian state. The
first hand information to analyze. Secondary sources will also be relevant in the part of our
theory of Regional Security Complex provides us with a theoretical framework, which
analysis concerned with sovereignty and the regional security complex.
highlights the dynamics of a region threatened by issues of security. We wish to apply the
theoretical perspective of such a region, to the context of Mali. Within the framework we
Thus we are using a variation of sources – some firsthand from the actors themselves, and
make use of the theoretical tool such as the theory of securitization. The securitization
also articles from external sources. This is partly done because of the lack of primary
theory helps us better our understanding of the involved actors and their interaction with
sources and partly to offer a more detailed and nuanced view on the conflict through the
each other. The securitization analysis is structured based upon central themes in the
securitization of the actors and the conflict itself. Since this analysis is source-heavy it is
conflict of Mali. This will help us improve our overview of the conflict, as the involved actors
important to have a point of departure in terms of how we handle the sources.
constantly shift objectives and relationship with each other. As presented, our analysis is
We are aware of the possible implication of supplementing the primary sources with
divided into three sections, which are a chapter on Sovereignty, a chapter on Securitization
secondary sources in the aspects of our analysis concerned with securitization, but for the
and a chapter on the Regional Security Complex. We have proposed a research question
sake of a more detailed analysis we are using Vibeke Ankersborg's source criticism (2007)
for each section in our project:
as a way of approaching our sources.
Sovereignty: How do we see negative sovereignty applied to the context of Mali, and how
We are aware that American sources might have an agenda of framing the conflict as one
does this influence the involved actors?
relating to international terror and though aspects of the conflict we are aware of potential
American interests in making this conflict one of international terrorist threats. We are being
Securitization: What does their securitization tell us about the relationship between MNLA,
critical of this framing but choose to treat all our sources in an equally critical way as is a
Ansar Dine, the Mali government and ECOWAS?
theme in source criticism (Ankersborg, 2007: 132).
Regional Security Complex: What constitutes Mali as a Regional Security Complex, and
The majority of our sources are news articles from the internet. There is of course a
how does the dynamics in the wider region influence our understanding of this Regional
potential issue with a heavy use of internet articles in academic work, but since this conflict
Security Complex?
is new and very much in constant development, the focus has been on shedding a light on
the conflict. Reports and analysis on the conflict are not to the same extent able to
34
35
Each analytical section will be summed up by an interim conclusion. Based upon key
4.2.3- Geography
findings from the analysis, we seek to answer our problem definition and outline a
conclusion.
The geographical area is not as limited because we have chosen to involve ECOWAS and
its role in the analysis, however the geography of the conflict is limited to the space in which
4.2- Delimitations
the actors are located and operate, which is Mali and more specifically northern Mali. It is
evident in northern Mali that the present actors operate with little to no regard for the
4.2.1-Contemporary study
national borders, exemplified by the traditional nomadic lifestyle of the Tuaregs and the
international nationalities of the members in Ansar Dine.
We are aware that the situation is dynamic and that an intervention in Mali is highly likely,
emphasizing that political development in Mali happens swiftly. This is exemplified by the
4.2.4- Theoretical
coup in March and by the sudden change in power dynamics in Mali, it constituted. The
project, in essence, offers a contemporary analysis of the conflict based on the literature
Theoretical we have chosen to work with the Regional Security Complex Theory and
available to us, and the three theoretical perspectives we have chosen.
Positive/Negative sovereignty. This is a conscious choice due to our investigation of the
complex conflict, where the concept of Securitization will enable us to understand the
4.2.2-Actors
intersubjectivity of security and the relations between the actors. Buzan, Wæver and de
Wilde (1998) have chosen to emphasize five sectors in their work: Societal, Economic,
As evident in 5-Introduction to Mali as a Regional Security Complex and throughout the
Political, Military and Environmental, however due to our initial understanding of the conflict
project, the conflict in Mali involves a multitude of actors, which stretches far beyond Mali.
we have chosen to leave out the environmental sector and the economic sector which the
The UN, the EU, France, the US, Nigeria etc. are all involved in the conflict on some level.
involved actors do not articulate with the same frequency as the other sectors.
However, we have chosen to focus on the most directly involved actors: ECOWAS, the
government of Mali, Ansar Dine and MLNA. We see these actors as the most involved and
for whom the consequences are most significant. We are fully aware that actors such as
AQIM and MUJAO are important players in the conflict, but due to lack of information and
the fact that we see other actors as more bound to Mali as a nation. This delimitation is
furthermore theoretical with relation to Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) Regional Security
Complex Theory where a focus on the regional security is emphasized on the background
that security issues and securitization happens predominantly on a regional level (see 3.2Regional Security Complex Theory). The regional choice is also based on a consideration
of superficiality contra in-depth analysis; it is our opinion that the chosen format gives a
sufficient balance of analysis for our purpose and in reference to the theory chosen.
36
37
5.1-Introduction to the security complex of Mali
5.2-Introduction to West Africa
In contemporary Mali the dynamics of the conflict proves that Mali in itself can be perceived
The project’s Regional Security Complex of Mali 5.1 is situated in West Africa it is therefore
as a regional security complex. The reason being is the amount of actors with which are
important to outline the context of West Africa, in terms of major trends taken place in the
able to compete on the same level as the Malian government. The fact that the non-state
political system with a focus on the conflicts in the countries. This is in order to conduct the
actors are securitizing each other, and the Malian government, implies that we are able to
following analysis in relations to the region making it more relevant for the subject matter. It
see it as a security complex in itself. This is underlined in 3.2.4-Regional Security Complex
furthermore builds on the theoretical framework of regionalism provided by Buzan and
Theory in Africa. The historical context explains the current conflict in Mali and the
Wæver (2003) and allows us to compare the current situation in Mali to the region making it
emergence
MNLA.
more relevant. It is beyond this section and the project to discuss or conclude on the
This security regional complex of Mali will be outlined in the following chapter on how the
reasons why Mali is in its present form, and here we are merely outlining the facts as
different actors, within Mali’s borders, securitize each other. Moreover we will include
soberly as possible.
of
the
non-state
actors
Ansar
Dine
and
Jackson’s notion on negative sovereignty, which provides an explanation to how the conflict
has evolved and the dynamics of Mali’s regional security complex. The analysis will include
West Africa is inhabited by 238 million citizens spread across sixteen countries, the
an assessment of the securitization processes of the actors involved: Ansar Dine, MNLA,
members of ECOWAS and Mauritania, who left ECOWAS in 2000. Just above half of the
the Malian government and ECOWAS. Other actors such as AQIM and MUJAO also
population lives in rural areas and the annual average income per person is 309 $, which is
contribute to the dynamics of the Malian regional security complex, but they will not handled
just below the Sub-Saharan average of 470$. Economic growth has within recent years
separately in the analysis.
been steady at 2.5%, however the population grows at 2.2% a year. Most of West Africa is
located just below the Sahel belt, with some countries having territory above, into the
Sahara (worldbank.org).
Generally the countries of the region gained independence in the late 50’ties to the mid
60’ties, however Liberia gained independence in 1847 and Cap Verde in 1975. From 1955
to 2004 the region has experienced some turmoil including 44 successful military-led coups,
43 three often-bloody failed coups, at least 82 coup plots and at least 7 civil wars,
depending on definition (McGowan, 2006: 234-236). In this statistics we find one single
country sticking out, Cap Verde has never experience a coup d’état or civil war. However
this does not change the fact that West Africa is the region in Africa most plagued by coup
d’état accounting for 45 percent of all coups in Africa, but only compelling 33 percent of the
countries. In West Africa there is furthermore a relatively high success rate of coups at 50,6
percent, which could be a partial answer to the high amounts of coups. The statistics are
from 1956 to 2001 (McGowan, 2005:5), which means that the Arab spring of 2011 and the
38
39
Malian coup in the spring of 2012 are not included. The destabilizing features of coup d’état
and civil wars in West Africa has led to allegations of al-Qaeda infiltrations in the diamond
5.3-Introduction to the Malian conflict
trade (McGowan, 2006: 6), the regions current involvement in international drug trade
(Perry, 2011) and huge refuges flows (McGowan, 2006: 6), implying that the stability of the
As mentioned in 1-Introduction, Mali has, after its first democratic election in 1992, been a
region is in the interest of for the international community in terms of international security
unique case of stability in an otherwise unstable region. However, this is only with regards
and countries outside in region in terms of national security.
to transition of governments and elections, which have been held democratically, peacefully
and in accordance with international regulation. This track record of fair transitions was
The political structure of most countries in West Africa have since independence been
broken by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo on the 22nd of March. Sanogo took over
dominated by clientelism, authoritarianism and political leaders who are in office for self-
government by force as a response to the government’s ineffective action to counter the
enrichment. This is reflected in the structure of military which often experiences factionalism
Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country. Tuareg rebellions are however not a new
along ethnic, religious or regional identities or between alliances to different military leaders.
phenomenon in Mali. The present rebellion was organized under the banner of MNLA, but
This often ends in rivalry between military leaders that have contributed to the instability of
before that various Tuareg based groups have rallied under different banners. To further
the region (McGowan, 2006: 238).
the understanding of the present conflict and the Tuareg rebellions, we have to look at the
historical
context.
This section sheds light on the context of which the current conflict in Mali is located. The
following section introduces the main actors in the conflict (see 4.3.1-Delimitation Actors):
5.3.1-Historical context
The Government of Mali, Ansar Dine, MLNA and ECOWAS. This is finalized by an
introduction of the conflict which outlines the conflict at present.
The Tuaregs form part of the Berber group and usually distinct themselves by wearing blue
head veils. They are present throughout the western part of the Sahel, implying that they
are present in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Niger. They are far mostly present in
northern Mali and, northern and western Niger, where they represent 7 percent and 9.3
percent respectively. Even though they are a minority in the countries, Islam continues to
play an integrationist role as 90 percent of Malians and 80 percent of Nigeriens are Muslim.
The Tuaregs have nomadic habits and had a large influence on trans-Saharan trade in precolonial times, where they provided security services on a level that required most transSaharan caravans to enter a business relationship with them. By the late fifteenth century
they had established the sultanate of Agadez based on a decentralized structure,
constituted by a number of confederal entities with dynamic or at least non-definitely
defined borders. As France expanded their empire across the Sahara they dismantled the
power of the Tuaregs, but still regarded them as superior to the Black Africa. The French
never saw any economic value in the desert, so they were rather willing to allowing the
Tuaregs to continue some of their trans-Saharan activity and their nomadic way of living
(Kisangani, 2012:69). Even though the colonial rule only lasted 38 years from 1922 to 1960
and the French was only present from the 1890’s till independence it had immerse effect on
40
41
the societal structures of the region. This is evident in the educational strategy, where only
weapons Flames of Peace. In 2004 AQIM took refuge in Mali after a hostage negotiation,
certain ethnic minorities were educated and on the background included in government at
the US responded quickly by sending military instructors to Mali as part of the global war on
junior level. The Tuaregs was not included in this privileged group, as they opposed colonial
terror. AQIM was before this located in the proximity of Mali, across the Sahara and the
education and the colonial regime in general. The consequence of selective education was
Sahel, but after 2004 they had a more permanent presence in Mali. In 2006 new Tuaregs
that the independence movement of Mali did not include the Tuaregs, implying that they
attacks was led by Hassan Vaghagha, as a direct respond to the governments lack of
were not represented in the post colonial government ruled by Black Africans of southern
handling the Tuaregs and their request for further autonomy. Governmental convoys was
Mali. However, the Tuaregs had fought colonial regimes on their own, but never formed part
further attacked in 2007 and 2008 by Tuareg dominated groups, this was seen again as a
of the southern based liberation (Ibid.). The fixed borders of Mali after independence
response to the government of Mali and their repetitive lack of given in to the Tuaregs
seriously limited the movement of the Tuaregs, and when the first and second post colonial
demands. In this period northern Mali also saw the emergence of more anti-Tuareg
drought of 1973-1974 and 1983-1986 hit the Sahel area they had to flee into the
movements most significantly Ganda Iza. Even though the Tuaregs are located throughout
neighboring countries. Particularly Libya was effect by this migration. President Muammar
countries of the Sahel and the Sahara desert, no unified front has ever combined them in
al-Ghadaffi chose to incorporate the refugees in the Libyan army and created the Islamic
post-colonial times(op.cit.: 74).
Legion, which only consisted of Tuaregs and was send to fight in the Sahel region.
Incorporation of the Tuaregs fitted well into the Ghadaffi’s earlier 1970’s Pan-Arabism
The current rebellion should in this historical context be seen as a continuation of the
rhetoric, because he saw the Tuaregs and the potential territory which they, in Ghadaffi’s
colonial and post-colonial Tuaregs rebellions. By outlining the historical developments it
view, represented as a natural extension of Libya and the pure Arab tribe. After Ghadaffi’s
also becomes inherent that the Tuaregs are not one combined force but are represented by
death in 2011 most of the war-hardened returned to Mali and joined the already existing
multiply entities. Furthermore the share amount of actors and their interest increases the
rebellion against the central government (op.cit:69-87).
complexity of the conflict. AQIM is a good example of this complexity because the group
draws major attention from the US, due to their role in the Global War on Terror.
The first Tuareg rebellions in independent Mali were however not directly connected to the
transnational refugee caused by the droughts. In 1990 a Popular Movement for the
The current rebellion is understood by Kisangani (2012) as mainly caused by the Tuaregs
Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) commando attacked the prefecture in Méneka to liberate
loss of cultural identity as a nomadic people. The catalysts are consequences of the
fellow imprisoned Tuaregs, this started a wave of Azawad based movements, some breaks
historical development and are: (1)The political exclusion, (2)the limitation of movement due
offs from MPLA, including: Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA), Popular Movement of Azawad
to colonial boundaries, (3)the Black African domination of Tuareg territory and (4) the
(MPA), Popular front for the Liberation of Azawad and the Revolutionary Popular Army of
reemergence of social identity caused by the waves of migration, especially to Libya
Azawad (ARLA). Some of the groups had more emphasis on Islam, while others sole
(op.cit.: 91).
agenda was to liberate Azawad. MPA was led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who is seen as the leader
of Ansar Dine, one of the main actors in the current conflict. In spite of an agreement of
5.3.2-The current conflict
unity in 1992, by 1994 intra rivalries lead to war between the groups and against the central
government. Especially FIAA attacked Black African villages in southern Mali, because the
Since the military coup on the 22nd of March by a group of soldiers, led by Captain Amadou
group saw the villages as representative of the government (op. cit.: 87). These attacks
Haya Sanogo and calling themselves the Committee for the Re-establishment of
spurred local southern based militias to rise in order to protect their communities; among
Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDR), northern Mali has been occupied by
these was Ghanda Koy, a group still present in the current conflict. These rebellions came
mainly two armed groups: MNLA and Ansar Dine. MNLA fights for Azawad, Ansar Dine
to an end in 1996, mainly due to a large peace agreement that resulted in a burning of
fights for a collected Mali ruled by draconian Sharia-law. The armed groups’ and the
42
43
government’s agenda has changed as a responds to the escalation and development of the
conflict (BBC, 2012, March 23; MNLAMOW, 2012 Januar 17; Globalpublicsquare, 2012
5.4-The government of Mali
August 14).
The government of Mali is facing hard challenges following the northern rebellions that are
Since the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad by MNLA the 6th of April, MNLA
implementing their own state-systems in the conquered areas. The government are fighting
has lost territory in the urban districts, in battles with Ansar Dine, and are now only said to
to hold the country together while they are awaiting support from regional and international
govern in the rural districts of northern Mali (Guardian, 2012, October 24). The major aim of
actors.
MNLA to liberate the northern part of Mali has now turned into a desire to be involved in the
potential western supported EOCWAS intervention; even though the MNLA leader Ag
5.4.1- Political turmoil and structure
Acherif says the intervention will fail and lead to more disorder (Reuters 2012, October 8;
MNLAMOW, 2012, December 1). Ansar Dine have changed their priority as well: before the
Following Mali’s independence from French dominance in 1960 the first Malian president,
organization fought for a Mali built on strict Sharia-law, however with the consequences of
Modibo Keita, introduced a one-party system based on socialist ideas. Keita’s rule over the
an international intervention the group has changed perspective by calling for an open
republic of Mali only lasted until 1968 when he was overthrown by a military coup lead by a
political dialogue between the fighting groups in northern Mali. They have furthermore
Malian general – Moussa Traore (Al-Jazeera, 2012 April 13th). General Moussa
stated an "availability to immediately engage in a process of political dialogue with the
Traore implemented a military monarchy where opposite political parties were forbidden,
Malian transitional authorities” (France24, 2012, November 8th).
therefore the one-party system continued. Throughout the 1970’s Traore and other highranking military officers remained in power despite creating a new constitution in 1974. The
The Malian interim President Dioncounda Traore made a formal request for military
new constitution was aimed at making Mali a civilian rule, but still within a one-party political
intervention on the 1st of September for ECOWAS to provide five battalions to re-conquer
structure. Moussa’s monarchy however was challenged in 1980 with 3 coups aiming to
the occupied area. The ECOWAS military executives needed to formulate a strategy for the
overthrow Moussa, which were all unsuccessful. The rest of the 1980’s were predominantly
intervention and submit it to the UN Security Council, who requested it or submission by the
quiet in terms of internal political stability. Turmoil and dissatisfaction rose in the early
26th of November (CNSNews 2012, September 7; France24, 2012, November 8). The UN
1990’s and led to students, politicians and military personal pressuring Moussa’s state
general-secretary Bank Ki Moon will now use the strategic concepts formulated by
apparatus. Eventually the military monarchy was overthrown and the protesters arrested
ECOWAS as a reference point for the authorization of a future international force deployed
Moussa. The protesters were, among others, led by the Amadou Toure who functioned as
in Mali (Diplomatie 2012, November 29).
acting president until election in 1992. From 1992 and onwards Mali is said to have had a
multiparty democracy. Essentially Mali is a republic based on the constitution from 1992.
The official request from Mali’s government for regional intervention came after months of
The constitution entails a separation of power. (State Gov. 2012, January 3rd):
international pressure. The official request is needed for The UN Security Council to give a
Executive: Mali’s president, he is the head of state and commander of the armed forces.
mandate to ECOWAS so they can intervene in the occupied area (CNSNews 2012,
Legislative: The national assembly is the only legislative institution consisting of 147
September 7).
members.
Juridical: Supreme Court holds both juridical and administrative power.
Mali is a multi-party democracy with currently 16 different in the National Assembly.
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45
(ISS, 2009). Recent numbers show the Malian military consist of: 7350 in the army, 50 in
the navy and 400 in the air force and a total of 4800 in paramilitary force (ISS, 2009). Their
5.4.2- Coup 2012
military budget consists of 13% percent of the national budget (1.51$ billion)
Although, Mali has acquired a more or less modern democracy, the military recently
(Economywatch, 2012 December 5th). The current situation of the Malian military is
showed that it is still influential on the political scene. On March 22 2012, a coup was
challenged by the rebels in the north and the army infact almost collapsed in the spring of
successful. The coup leader, Captain Sanogo reasoned his actions by addressing the
2012, which led Captain Sanogo to perform the coup (LA Times, 2012, April 12th). When
conflict in northern Mali and how the former government dealt with the matter. Apparently
northern rebels seized Timubuktu government soldiers fled the city. The weak military
Sanogo and his companions felt the government was too soft: “The army didn’t have at
capability of Mali has forced the government to make inquiry from the regional body,
their disposal the materials they needed to put an end to the rebellion in the north of Mali”
ECOWAS, to intervene in order to defeat the northern rebels in order to create stability in
(New York Times 2012. April 13th), states a military spokesman when reasoning the coup.
Mali.
After regional and international pressure from ECOWAS, UN etc. Sanogo however resigned
as president in order to prevent further sanctions. In April Dioncounda Traore was
appointed, as interim president in order to accommodate international pressure. Additionally
did Traore appoint a new Prime Minster, Cheik Diarra, and formed a new government.
However Sanogo and his military colleagues did on December 11th arrest the newly
appointed Prime Minister Cheik Diarra, allegedly because Diarra was to occupied by
pursuing his own interests instead of prioritizing the conflict in the north. The actions of
Sanogo have quickly given cause for criticism by the AU, ECOWAS, UN and US who calls
for
constitutional
order.
(World
Time,
2012,
December
12).
5.4.3- Structure of the military
Even though Mali is considered a far more stable country than its West African neighbours
its military proved able to overthrow the existing government. The military tradition of Mali,
even on the political level, is apparent since their independence. For instance was the
former ruler, Moussa Traore, not only president, he also served as a general for the entire
army during his presidency (Le Monde, 2012 April 12th). The origin of the Malian military is
of colonial descent as the current Malian military is a product of Malian conscript and former
French soldiers who volunteered in starting up the Malian army in 1960 (Toure, 2011
January 21st).
In the early years of independent Mali, their military mostly relied on the Soviet Union for
weapons and training since they were political allies because of their joint political views,
but are today receiving military aid and training from predominately the US and France
46
47
that aims to spread jihad throughout West Africa (News24, 2012 January 3). Although the
5.5-Ansar Dine
constant shifting alliances in the region have made it hard to understand who Ansar Dine is
allied with. Ansar Dine also fought side by side with MNLA against the central Mali
Ansar Dine is an armed rebel group operating in the north of Mali and has been compared
government and occupied Gao, the city of Kidal and Timbuktu. Moreover Ansar Dine has
to al Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Malian based Anser Dine roughly
destroyed the sacred shrines in Timbuktu belonging to the Muslim Sufis and imposed strict
translated means “defenders of faith” and is a radical Islamic group who aims to implement
Sharia laws on their occupied territory.
Sharia laws of Wahabism in all of Mali. In the international media the group has been
labelled terrorists and international actors regard Ansar Dine as a serious threat to the
security in the region.
5.5.3- Military and Economic Structure
5.5.1- Origin of Ansar Dine
There are no official statements by Ansar Dine explaining their financial and military
Ansar Dine has operated since 2011 when their leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly formed the group
backing, but it’s believed that Ansar Dine is backed from Qatar and Al-Aqaeda In Maghreb.
(BBC NEWS 2012, June 17). Ghaly is himself a Tuareg and part of the Ifogha tribe based in
Furthermore Ghaly’s personal fortune can be a boost to the group’s finances. Additionally
north-eastern Mali, more precisely the Kidal region. Whilst Ansar Dine is dominated by
Ansar Dine have been linked to the drug trade from Guinea-Bissau across Mali before
members of the Ifogha Tribe, there are also several of Tuareg tribesmen as well as
reaching
foreigners from Algeria, Niger and Nigeria. Ghaly is a known figure in the political landscape
It can seem hard to get a clear understanding of who Ansar Dine is. However the group is
who emerged on the scene in the 1990’s Tuareg Rebellion against the Bamako based
very clear with expressing its objectives of Sharia Law in Mali, and have therefore caught
central government of Mali. An American political officer in Mali describes Ghaly as an
the attention of the International world. But there is no question that Ghaly is the main
eager hostage mediator:”Like the proverbial bad penny, 'ag Ghaly' turns up whenever a
person behind Anser Dine. He is described as “independent and often inscrutable”
cash transaction between a foreign government and Kidal Tuaregs appears forthcoming”
(Wikileaks, 2008 October 3) in his leadership, and well-connected throughout the Sahel
(Wikileaks, 2008 October 3). Ghaly worked as a very successful hostage mediator, earning
region with various militant groups (Ibid.).
Europe
(AllAfrica,
2012
August
6)
(Cutting
Edge,
2012
June
14).
a small percentage every time he is involved. In 2003, Ghaly was involved in securing the
release of 14 Germans kidnapped by an Algerian Islamist group, GSPC , which now has
5.6- Movement for National Liberation of Azawad
become AQIM (BBC NEWS 2012, June 17). Ghaly was later granted employment as a
Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia by President Armadou Toure in late 2007 until 2010, when
Movement of National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a political and military organisation
he was forced to leave this position as Saudi Arabia declared him Persona Non Grata, for
in Northern Mali, the members are mostly Tuaregs who historically are a nomadic people
having contacts with terrorist elements.
living in Sahel belt and on Sahara Desert. Many have chosen to stay settled and mainly
work with agriculture. MNLA main objective is to liberate the nation of Azawad from Mali or
5.5.2- Affiliation of Ansar Dine
to be included in Mali on their terms.
Rreportedly, Ansar Dine has ties to AQIM where one of Ghaly’s cousins is a higher
5.6.1 Azawad ethnicity
commander (Beaumont, 2012). Furthermore the former spokesman of Ansar Dine recently
became the military leader of AQIM affiliated with MOJWA , which is another Islamist group
The region of Azawad consists of many different tribes. Some of those have embraced the
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49
battle for Azawad and are in support of the MNLA struggle. These are the Soonghays,
assembled a 28 member Transitional Council of State, which is set to rule the future state
Moors and Fulays. Other tribes in the region are the Bambars, Peuls, Mossis and Oulofs.
of Azawad (Memri, 2012, June 19).
Tribal leaders of these mentioned tribes are not in official support of the MNLA struggle for
Azawad (Tamazgha France, 2012, October 3).
Many of the MNLA fighters are former soldiers from the Libyan Gaddafi army. As the
Gaddafi regime was overthrown many of the Tuareg tribesmen from the Libyan army
returned home to join the MNLA struggle. These are said to be well trained from their
5.6.2-Grievance with Mali
involvement in the Arab Spring and well armed because they have looted the leftover
weapons from the Libyan army (Stratfor Global, 2012, February 2).
The Tuareg people claims to have been neglected and treated indifferently by the central
Government of Mali. The alleged discrimination of the Tuareg people has been the root of
the grievance between the Malian authorities and the people of Tuareg. Conflicts and
5.6.4 Liberation struggle of Azawad
uprisings emerged in the 1960’s and have today again surfaced (Mclathy Washington
Bureau, 2012, March 21). The Tuaregs appear to be somewhat integrated in the Malian
On the 6th of April the MNLA claimed full control over Azawad and claimed independence
society. One way in which this is seen is in the the Malian army where many soldiers are of
from Mali. Through a spokesperson in Paris the MNLA issued a statement: “Mali is an
Tuareg descent. Despite the Malian army consisting of several Tuaregs, the army have
anarchic state. Therefore we have gathered a national liberation movement to put in an
been accused of bombing civilian Tuaregs in the north of Mali (Amnesty, 2012, February
army capable of securing our land and an executive office capable of forming democratic
23).
institutions. We declare the independence of Azawad from this day on” (Guardian, 2012,
October 24).
5.6.3- Structure
The international response to MNLA declaring independence has been quite clear. It
The MNLA is a fusion of different groups such as the MFUA (Movement of the United
received no international support and was condemned by all involved actors. The African
Fronts for Azawad) and Northern Mali Tuareg Movement. These groups have been fighting
Union called the announcement null and of no value what so ever. The French Defense
for decades against, what they view as systematic oppression of the Tuareg people by the
Minister said that a declaration of independence not recognized by the African states meant
official authorities in Mali. It is imperative for the MNLA to clarify that it represents all
nothing to France and the Algerian Prime Minister said it would never question the integral
Saharan groups in Azawad, and not only the people of Tuareg despite it being the biggest
territory of Mali (Al Jazeera, 2012, April 6).
ethnical group in Azawad (MNLA Movement, January 22).
The MNLA has on several occasions called on the international community to recognize its
struggle for an independent Azawad, yet received no support. Furthermore the MNLA has
An executive committee consisting of leaders in charge of respective areas, make up the
been accused of cooperating with a radical islamist group, which operates in Azawad as
ruling hierarchy of the MNLA: Bilal Ag Cherif serves as the General Secretary, Mahmoud
well. This group is called Ansar dine and has been strongly linked to the North African Al
Ag Aghaly as head of the Political Bureau, Ag Mohamed Najem as the Head of Military
Qaeda fraction, Maghreb. According to MNLA, the two groups held conversations back in
Operations and Moussa Ag Acharatoumane as the Spokesperson (North Africa united,
March as to clarify the future of Azawad. However it quickly became clear that the two
2012, February 21) (MNLA Movemen, 2012, January 22). Furthermore the movement has
groups had completely different objectives. MNLA is a secular group who strives to achieve
an independent State of Azawad. The Islamist group Ansar Dine wishes to impose sharia
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51
law in Azawad, and does not wish to liberate Azawad from Mali. The MNLA stresses that
common enemy for both of the groups. The idea of a liberated Azawad seems very doubtful
the conversations with Ansar Dine stopped immediately as they discovered their Sharia
due to 3 major reasons. For one MNLA has lost control with most of Azawad to Ansar Dine.
objectives for Mali. A spokesperson goes as far as saying: “Yes we had convesations with
Secondly the MNLA wish of a liberated Azawad has been condemned everywhere in the
Ansar dine, but that doesn’t mean we made a pact with the devil” (All Africa, 2012, July 20).
international community. Last but not least ECOWAS has been granted UN mandate to
intervene in the northern part of Mali, with the purpose of helping the Central Government
After the talks the two groups have become each other’s enemies and fought battles in
regaining full control over the region (CNN, 2012, September 25).
Azawad over important cities as Gao and Timbuktu. Reports indicate that MNLA have been
forced to leave the once self-claimed territory after losing fights to Ansar Dine. The MNLA
however claims that they left Gao and Timbuktu to prepare new strategies for war. The
international community views Ansar Dine as a threat to security in the region, and MNLA
has not only refused any tie with Ansar Dine, but also claims to be the only actor fighting
them. A spokesperson for MNLA stressed:
“We have always been misunderstood by the
international community, but soon they will realize what is really happening. We are a
movement who shows all interest in fighting the terrorists. We know the terrain and we are
the only ones fighting them” (All Africa, 2012, July 20).
5.6.5 MNLA present situation
Status quo for MNLA is that they have been pushed back to rural areas of Azawad, and lost
control over previously occupied cites as Gao and Timbuktu. Furthermore the MNLA
freedom struggle for Azawad has received no support in the international community. The
MNLA must also look for further military supply, as the weapons from the former Libyan
army is a short-term solution. Even in the Tuareg diaspora the support for MNLA seems
uncertain. The MNLA popularity amongst Tuareg diaspora is hard to measure, however a
French journalist tried to do so when interviewing several Tuaregs living abroad. The
majority of the interviewed expressed that all they wanted was peace and stability for their
region, and few believed in an independent State of Azawad. Some even expressed
sentiment for a common Mali, yet without oppression of their people (Guardian, 2012,
October 24). The conflict is still on going and fact of the matter is that MNLA now has two
enemies to combat. The initial enemy was the Central Government in Bamako, but the
emergence of Ansar Dine has inevitably added to the number of enemies. The fight against
Ansar Dine is interesting as they are battling over common ground, yet with different
objectives for the territory. Furthermore the Central Government in Bamako is still a
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53
trigger humanitarian disaster, pose a serious threat to sub-regional peace and security,
5.7- ECOWAS
result in serious and massive violations of human rights, and/or follow the overthrow or
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 and is a
attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government and any other situation that
regional structure which currently has fifteen members all situated in West Africa. The
the
initial mission of ECOWAS was economic integration and prosperity through collaboration
Even though ECOWAS plans to have monetary union in West Africa, implying a common
and
currency, in 2015 the organization has since the 90’ies been very involved in conflict, as the
monetary
union,
resulting
in
prosperity
for
the
people
of
West
Africa.
Mediation
and
Security
Council
deems
appropriate.”(Olonisakin,
2011:23).
above implies, which has moved its sole focus from that of economic integration to conflict
5.7.1- Structure of ECOWAS
prevention and peace keeping. This is also why the organization is relevant as an actor in
the Mali conflict and why it is relevant to look at previous interventions by ECOWAS
The organization is one of the five regional structures of the African Economic Community,
(Olonisakin, 2011). The broadening of focus by ECOWAS was a development that reflected
and consists of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers,
the regional conflict dynamics of the time, which were transnational constituted by the
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security,
onflicts in Liberia (1989) and Sierra Leone (1991). Conflicts that were counterproductive for
the Community Tribunal, the ECOWAS Parliament, the Executive Secretariat and six
the economic development of the region, and therefore worked against the primary of
Specialized Technical Commissions. The Authority of Heads of State and Government is
objective of EOCWAS, led the organization to intervene in both cases. Since there was no
the supreme body of ECOWAS and composes of Heads of state; they decide the general
structure in place for intervention, the operation was ad-hoc intervention, but intervention
direction of the organization, co-ordinate the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and
mechanism was institutionalized in the protocol of 1999 (Musah, 2011:154).
social policies of the Member states. Each year the chairman of the authority changes. In
2012 it is Alassane Ouattara, President of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire who is chairman.
5.7.2- Future intervention by ECOWAS
The Parliament of ECOWAS holds 115 seats shared among the states in proportion to
population seize, however each member state has at least five seats, the present mandate
In 2001, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance gave ECOWAS
of the parliament is only consultative and advisory. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
a legal framework optioning more permanent dealing along the process of conflict, from
Management and Resolution, Peace and Security is a result of the 1999 protocol and is
pre-crisis symptoms to post-conflict peace building. The institutionalization of intervention in
overseeing: (1) Defense and Security Commission, (2) Council of Elders, (3) Early Warning
ECOWAS has provided a closer collaboration with the United Nation and The African
Observation and Monitoring Centre, and (4) ECOMOG. The distress in West Africa was the
Union. Since initiation in 1963 AU has been setting forward plans for a continental armed
catalyst for the creation of the Mechanism and the current structure builds on multiply
force to deal with conflict and crisis, most plans have relied on standing regional brigades to
protocols adopted over the last 34 years. The most significant protocols are: the 1978
perform the task, and EOCWAS is in this regard on the forefront of the continent. This
Protocol relating to Non-Aggression (PNA) which refrain member states from using force
position as front runner to deliver a regional brigade is due to the financial and logistical
against each other; the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD)
support from the EU and the UN. The UN Charter relies on all members countries to
which commits the members to mutual aid and assistances if aggression and threat is
request authorization from the UN Security Council, before military intervention including
displayed towards one member, which can be from internal and external forces (ISS); and
ECOWAS forces. However, there is recognition that regional structures can intervene
the 1999 protocol of Program for the Co-ordination of Assistance for Security and
before a UN mandate, if the intervention is according to UN general policies. The close
Development, which suggest a standing ECOWAS army consisting of personnel from all 15
corporation has also resulting in all recent peace agreements being negotiated and agreed
members that can be deployed according to four criteria: “aggression or conflict within a
upon by the regional, continental and global institutions.
members state; a conflict in two or more members states; internal conflicts that threaten to
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55
6.1- Negative sovereignty in Mali
5.7.3- Challenges for ECOWAS
6.1.1-Introduction
Even though ECOWAS has participated in regional intervention it has the inherent
Negative sovereignty is defined as a country's government not being able to perform the
challenge of being constituted by states which themselves deal with a multitude of issues,
functions
affecting ECOWAS mostly in terms of limited financial means. Implicating that ECOWAS
actors. Contextualizing this in Mali gives us the understanding that Mali can be viewed as a
has inadequate funds to reconstruct post-conflict societies, especially in regards to
country where sovereignty is constantly fought over, between the non-state actors of MNLA
infrastructure. The lack of funds furthermore means that ECOWAS lacks the technical
and Ansar Dine, and the central government. The lack of governmental presence in Mali,
knowledge to strengthen the socio-economic conditions for the people of West Africa and
gives room for these non-state actors to compete for power on the same level as the
the institutional infrastructure of the states. Division between the Anglophone and the
government, it however also leaves room for new actors to enter the country.
usually
associated
with
the
state;
this
leaves
room
for
non-state
Francophone nations in ECOWAS dates back to precluding structures, but still tends to
slow the bureaucratic process of ECOWAS. The main strength of ECOWAS lies in its
Sovereign statehood, as outlined in 3.3-Sovereignty, can be understood as the right to self-
regional knowledge, commitment to regional security and integration, and a potential well
determination and ruling over a defined territory. The territory of Mali was drawn by
functioning institutional framework. This is especially the mechanism of conflict prevention
European powers in 1885 during the Berlin Conference. It was kept under official French
(Olonisakin, 2011:22).
administration from 1922 to 1960 (Kisangani, 2012: 69), where Mali gained independence
due to the new international moralities and ideologies which emerged after the Second
World War. These included the acceptance and the right for people to self-determination
and control over territory. International legitimacy of the African nations was then, according
to Jackson (1987), formed on colonial defined territories, instead of being based on the
more natural borders of the multiply cultures and ethnonations. A nation-building process
based on these more natural given boundaries was seen as an incomprehensible project by
the colonial powers. The nations were therefore built on territorial limitations instead of
cultural ones and consequently their sovereignty was only juridical instead of empirical.
6.1.2-Territorial Integrity
In the spring of 2012, Mali experienced an unprecedented challenge to its territorial
integrity. The limited resources of the Malian military could not stop the MNLA from
attacking and conquering the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao. The lack of governmental
respond, subsequently led to the March coup. Captain Amadou Sanogo was in command of
the coup that aimed at crushing the northern rebellion, restore national unity and reestablish territorial integrity (WSJ, 2012, Marts 22). Pressure from ECOWAS made Sanogo
announce a transfer of power to civilian rule by assigning the leader of the National
Assembly Dioncounda Traore as Interim President. Sanogo implemented this as a
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57
temporary solution, which should last until a democratic election in April 2013 (NYTimes,
integration of the Tuaregs and
2012, April 1). The government of Mali was in peace negotiations with MNLA before the
decentralization policy, which gave some self-governance to the communes of Mali.
MNLA. This goal has been pursued earlier through the
military coup. The government was willing to give some autonomy to Azawad by
MNLA's statement could be seen as a response to the boundaries drawn at the Berlin
decentralization, but not recognition of completely autonomous Azawad. This should be
Conference that emphasized the territorial state without recognition of the cultures diversity
seen as part for the continuous decentralization process in Mali, which was initiated in 1991
and ethnonations contained within. A containment that the government emphasizes, by not
(Magharebia, 2012, Marts 7). Neither the couped President Amadou Toumani Toure nor
allowing MNLA desired independence. This leads to a lack of management by the
Captain Sanogo would recognize the legitimacy of MNLA's fight for an independent state
government in the state which is then defined as negative sovereignty. The negative
(Magharebia, 2012, Marts 7; WSJ, 2012, Marts 22; Guardian, 2012, October 24). The two
sovereignty is best defined as the opposite of positive sovereignty and should be
leaders of state are thereby choosing to uphold the territorial sovereignty, left by the
understood as: a government which is not capable of the different aspects of governing.
colonial power, denying cultural sovereignty to the MNLA and Azawad. However, the
impossibility of crushing the rebellion in the north clearly shows that the government cannot
MNLA and Ansar Dine fought together against the government to conquer territory. Initial
defend the territorial integrity and are therefore showing signs of negative sovereignty. The
the two groups had a united front under the label MNLA, but as the conflict developed
negative sovereignty was inherent in the regime led by Toure, emphasized by the rebellion
Ansar Dine chose to break out of the front. They kicked MNLA out of the major cities and
in the north and Sanogo’s coup. The coups did little to create a foundation for positive
implemented Sharia-law. The negative sovereignty present in Mali gave Ansar Dine space
sovereignty, because Sanogo is still unable to handle the northern rebellion and there by
to act independently and to implement Sharia-law in the cities. Their capacity to implement
performing the tasks of governance.
law and govern can be understood as an attempt to create positive sovereignty and they
can in this capacity be seen as superior to the government, emphasized by their
spokesperson statement with regards to the citizens of the proclaimed Azawas. They were
6.1.3-MNLA and Ansar Dine
"very reluctant" to follow the Sharia law but "now we don't have any problem."(Voanews,
2012, August 23). This is in sharp contrast to the negative sovereignty previously held by
Mali's interim government fights for a restoration of national unity and a re-establishment of
the government.
territorial integrity. The government understands the Turegs and the MNLA as
indigenousness to Mali, the Malian state are thus trying to integrate both MNLA and
As described in 5.5- Ansar Dine, the members of the group is mostly Tuaregs, which as a
Azawad. On the 17th of January MNLA stated that: “The important military operations of the
people have had grievances with government, mainly due to: (1)The political exclusion,
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad will continue so long as Bamako does not
(2)the limitation of movement due to colonial boundaries, (3)the Black African domination of
recognize this territory as a separate entity.” (MNLA, 2012, January 17). This was before
Tuareg territory and (4) the reemergence of social identity caused by the waves of
the coup and the major advance by MNLA. Contradictory to this the Malian interim Prime
migration, as mentioned in 5.2-Introductoin to Conflict. These grievances are linked to the
Minister Diarra stated that: “We are not afraid nor ashamed of negotiating because we are
post-colonial administration, who was implemented rather quickly in 1960 due to
dealing with fellow Malians” (Hasni, 2012, June 23).
international pressure, according to 3.3-Sovereignty. The international community, through
the UN channels, expressed a need for racial sovereignty and a right to self-determination
MNLA’s main competitor for power in the region of Azawad was at the time the government,
in the colonies, where actual territorial sovereignty was disregarded in preference for
from which MNLA wanted to separate and gain independence. If the separation is
indigenous rule. Evidence of this is found in The 1960 General Assembly Declaration, and
successful, it could lead to the enthnonation of the Tuareg and in that way create positive
AU’s fourth article stating that states should have: ”respect of borders existing on
sovereignty in Azawad. However, the government of Mali seeks a united Mali with an
achievement of independence;”(AU, 2000, July 11). In Mali this has consequences because
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59
the post independent government did not include the Tuaregs of the north. This was both
6.1.5-The Tuaregs
due to the French colonial educational system and the international pressure for a swift
decolonization period. The consequences are a racial sovereignty were the government is
The nomadic lifestyle of the Tuaregs entails that they cross borders and the recurrent
international recognized, but not nationally present by way of territorial integrity. The right to
draughts forces them to. Because of this they have migrated throughout the region,
self-determination and racial sovereignty is currently upheld by the regional body of
illuminated the Sahel and the Sahara Desert as an environment of mobility and not just an
ECOWAS, referred to in the Final Communique of the 26th of April Extraordinary Summit
insulator between North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa, historically this is evident in the pre-
on Mali: “Summit urges all the stakeholders concerned to commit to the faithful
colonial trans-Sahara trade. However, the Tuaregs are currently not the only actors who
implementation of the roadmap until the holding of the Presidential election and the
can utilize the areas. AQIM and MUJAO have both seen to emerge from the desert
restoration of the unity and territorial integrity of Mali.” (ECOWAS 2012, April 26). By
following the instability of 2012. The involvements of these terrorist linked groups have
recognizing and emphasizing a territorial integrity based on racial sovereignty the UN,
attracted the attention of the international community especially, the US and France. This
ECOWAS and AU is amplifying the negative sovereignty which is founded in the borders of
illustrates that the conflict draws ties globally. France has met with Algeria, a country they
1885: the government becomes a state in name only, with little internal legitimacy. Internal
have seen as significant to the conflict mostly due to the country’s former role as host to
legitimacy is especially relevant for the MNLA and Ansar Dine, two groups does not
AQIM, and due to their former ties to the Tuaregs (ICG, 2012, September 24). This
recognize the central government, and in that sense does they act against the internal
underlines that ECOWAS alone cannot handle the conflict, as Algeria is not a member
legitimacy.
state. But more importantly for positive sovereignty, southern Algeria is also home to some
Tuareg groups, which implies that if positive sovereignty is to be archived Algeria will need
6.1.4-International recognition
to give up territory in favor of the Tuaregs. This implies that Algeria is also an emphasizer of
negative sovereignty.
Ansar Dine has been linked to AQIM and global terrorism by the international community:
“The United Nations and western powers have expressed concern that northern Mali is
becoming a safe haven for terrorists.” (Voanews, 2012, August 23). When addressing the
6.1.6-Interim conclusion
concern for the territorial integrity of Mali, the international are articulating the threat of
terror as being the major consequence of Mali not being able to uphold the territorial
The interests of the government, the instrumental rules, are bound by the goal of upholding
integrity. Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General underscores this by stating that there is
the territorial integrity and obtaining international recognizing. However, as exemplified
an “urgent action is needed in order to help the Malian government reunite the country and
throughout this section Mali is marked by a negative sovereignty, which is amplified through
put an end to the threat posed by AQIM to Mali, its neighbors and the entire international
the international community’s recognition of non-inclusive Mali. The negative sovereignty
community” (diplomatie, 2012, November 29). By focusing on the possible terrorist threat,
became inherently clear by the advance of rebellions, the coup and the lack of capacity to
the international community approves of a racial non empirical sovereignty and an
regain the lost territory. The consequences of this have been an attraction of terrorist-linked
emphasis on Mali’s territorial integrity, the ability to defend the borders. This implies that as
groups to the area of northern Mali, and a space where non-state actors have been able to
long as Mali can control the borders, the nation is internationally recognized. This is evident
compete for power on the same level as the government.
in the former image of Mali as stable country and unique case of functioning democracy in
an otherwise unstable region, even though there has been multiple Tuaregs rebellions
throughout the post-1991 history of Mali.
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61
rules and regulations of the treaties and protocols, the legitimacy and sovereignty of
6.2- Securitization
ECOWAS comes into question.
The following section will analyze the securitization of the different actors in the conflict by
looking at their speech acts and applying the concepts from securitization in 3.2-Regional
The political threat to the territorial integrity of Mali and the constitutional threat to ECOWAS
Security Complex theory. The aspects of securitizing will highlight the dynamic relationship
following the coup resulted in months of threatening, imposing and lifting sanctions on Mali
of the actors to better the understanding of the conflict.
(ECOWAS press release, 2012, March 30; AFP, 2012, April 8; BBC, 2012, May 14;
AllAfrica, 2012, May 22).
6.2.1- Security dynamics following the coup d’état
A fragile working relationship
The coup, led by Captain Sanogo, against the democratically elected government on the
22nd of March 2012 happened in the wake of uprisings in the north of Mali. When the
In April Sanogo handed over governmental power in Mali. This was done by instating
military junta, CNRDR, took power after the March coup, their, at the time, spokesperson
Dioncounda Traore as interim president in April, an action prescribed by ECOWAS if Mali
Lieutenant Konaré was asked what the goals for the coup was and he answered “to defend
wanted regional recognition. Traore has since then appointed two vice presidents, one in
the nation” (Nossiter, 2012, March 22). Though the rebellion in the north consisted mainly of
charge of defense and security in relations to conflict, and one in charge of the non-political
Tuaregs the government proscribed to a narrative of a distinct nation. The notion of one
forces (al-jazeera, 2012, July 30) The threats from ECOWAS to impose sanctions on Mali
nation and one people is emphasized by Sanogo’s statement that the MNLA rebellion
are the likely reason for the transfer of power. ECOWAS is a significant functional actor in
“makes the Malian people suffer in their flesh and souls. We are inviting all political classes
the conflict needing to affirm the securitizing threat that the government is defining as the
and all social actors to come and be represented at a national convention!” (AFP, 2012,
MNLA, Ansar Dine and other rebels operating in the Azawad region. The regional
April 3).
recognition in this case also allows Mali’s Government and the military the assistance
CNRDR is here framing the coup d’état as a just cause but ECOWAS saw the coup as
needed to restore its internal territorial integrity. Furthermore, ECOWAS is securitizing
something else entirely. The following is a press release from ECOWAS sent out after it
CNRDR through the sanctions threats and implementation of sanctions. So far ECOWAS
was made aware that the coup had been successful.
has been successful in the securitization of the Government and CNRDR but the
“The action of the Junta is completely at odds with the provisions of the Supplementary
implementation of the civil government is according to ECOWAS Political Director Abdel-
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance ! By this unconstitutional act, the Junta
Fatau
has automatically alienated and outlawed itself from the Community, and ECOWAS calls on
“Things are changing dramatically with people putting pressure on the interim government
it to immediately relinquish power to the rightful Government so that the country could
and also the influence of the ex-junta not having diminished in any way, because all
return
indications are that they are still trying to pull strings from behind the scene,”(Clottey, 2012,
to
constitutional
normality.”
(ECOWAS
press
release,
2012,
March
22)
Musah
still
not
a
reflection
of
political
stability
in
Mali.
The coup itself is of a military character, and can be seen as a mix of the military and
July 31).
political sector, but the threat from the perspective of ECOWAS is a political threat to the
This quote makes it unclear whether CNRDR is merely superficially following the superstate
sovereignty of Mali. The supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’s
structure or actually implementing the reforms required. This is made further evident by
article 1 b states that free and fair elections are the correct and only way of handing over
ECOWAS’ statement when Sanogo formed a new government in the summer following the
power (ECOWAS protocol, 2001, December 21) making it both a threat to the state and
coup d’état in March of 2012:
people of Mali but also a threat to ECOWAS. When a member state does not follow the
“While expressing the hope that the newly created Government truly reflects the diversity of
the Malian nation and carries the support of the Malian people, the Commission will
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continue to closely monitor developments in the country.” (ECOWAS statement, 2012,
thus making ECOWAS’ claim in the conflict not just one of assistance, but also one of direct
August 21)
involvement. The securitization of the conflict is also done by calling upon the neighboring
countries to help solve the crisis (ECOWAS statement, 2012, March 19). Thus the conflict
The concern articulated in this quote show aspects of the societal sector of securitization
itself becomes of a regional nature, cementing ECOWAS’ stake in it as a securitizing actor.
being used. The diversity of the Malian people and their subsequent support in this case
In such a case as ECOWAS being a securitizing actor, the African Union and the UN
ties back to aspects of the societal sector involving potential societal insecurity, which
Security Counsel is used as a functioning actor as they are giving legitimacy to ECOWAS’
occurs when societal units define a threat to their society. The Societal unit, or the Malian
claim by way of assisting ECOWAS and giving a mandate to the intervention, which is still
people, also becomes the referent objects in ECOWAS’ securitization of the government.
pending but expected to pass (ECOWAS final communiqué, 2012, November 11; Haberler,
The already fragile working relationship between ECOWAS and the Mali government may
2012, November 23).
have hit another dent in the road. According to recent reports, Sanogo arrested Prime
The support to the Malian government and the subsequent plans for intervention are the
Minister Diarra accusing him of inciting violence, and hours later, The Prime Minister
politicized aspects of the securitization where the adoption of the plan of action by the AU
resigned along with his entire cabinet (AllAfrica, 2012, December 11). This is yet another
as well as the expected mandate from the UNSC is the securitized manifestation of the
case of the military, led by Sanogo, interfering with the political process in Mali. It is
securitization move.
something that ECOWAS has discouraged (BBC, 2012, May 14) and could possibly reignite
In a statement made right after MNLA declared the independence of Northern Mali,
the strained relationship between ECOWAS and a government under military control.
ECOWAS announced its views on the new state of Azawad. “The Commission wishes to
6.2.2- The territorial integrity and unity of Mali
(ECOWAS statement, 2012, April 6)
From the 16th to the 18th of March the President of the ECOWAS commission, Kadré
In the same document, ECOWAS states that unity and territorial integrity is imperative to
Désiré Ouedraogo led a fact finding mission to Mali to assess the situation in the North. On
the situation of Mali. While identity belongs in the societal sector, ECOWAS uses the
the 19th of March, ECOWAS released a statement concerning the findings of said mission
framing of unity, and Mali being one entity - not as a question of identity, but as a political
and
talking point used to reiterate the concept of territorial integrity.
remind all the armed groups in the North of Mali that Mali is one and indivisible entity!”
ECOWAS’
position
on
the
escalating
uprisings
in
the
north.
“The mindless acts of violence, terrorism and banditry pose a serious threat not only to the
territorial intergrity of Mali and the regional integration process, but also to international
peace and security. ! The Commission wishes to reiterate its solidarity with the
6.2.3 – Azawad and the various actors and interests
Government of the Republic of Mali and to leave the MNLA in no doubt that ECOWAS will
take all necessary measures to assist the country to safeguard its' sovereignty and
In April the MNLA declared independence from Azawad after several military aggressions.
territorial integrity and ensure the continuity of constitutional rule in the country.” (ECOWAS
The MNLA and Ansar Dine were allies fighting the government of Mali, side by side.
statement, 2012, March 19)
However their ideological differences, followed by the destruction of the Timbuktu relics,
This quote highlights the dual function of ECOWAS in the context of securitization. As
resulted in the two actors becoming enemies fighting against each other. Ansar Dine
mentioned earlier, ECOWAS functions as a functioning actor in the conflict by giving its
managed to push MNLA from parts of their conquered territory and at present the two
support and assistance to the Government of Mali. This is done by stating that sovereignty
actors rule respective parts of Azawad (Associated Press, 2012, November, 28).
and territorial integrity is at the forefront of the conflict. Beyond that ECOWAS also acts as a
MNLA and securitization:
securitizing actor by framing the conflict as having regional and international implications –
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people of Azawad are joining the Malian army and combating MNLA forces, in fact, highThe MNLA regards the government of Mali as a threat to its objective of liberation. The
ranking
MNLA expresses this in an official statement: “Several Tuaregs have been executed
Though the idea of a Tuareg identity is one that the MNLA pushes in its securitization, the
solemnly on the basis of ethnicity” (MNLA, 2012, January 12). In the same press release
previous statement shows that the MNLA does not have a monopoly over Tuareg or
the MNLA “urges international organizations to respond in order to prevent the Malian
Azawadian identity. The fact that fellow Azawadians are in direct combat with MNLA forces,
government of committing genocide” (MNLA, 2012, January 23).
supports the notion that membership of a given societal unit is a personal choice. Several
It is clear that the MNLA views the government of Mali as a threat to their existence and
Azawadians have thus chosen not to identify with the societal unit of the MNLA, but it is
thereby tries to securitize it. In this case the referent object for MNLA is the region of
framing the narrative that Azawad is a separate entity that contextually should be
Azawad as this is the object, which is referred to and threatened. The functioning actors are
considered independent from the rest of Mali. “France has attached Azawad to the Malian
the AU, UN and ECOWAS, as these are the actors who have a say in whether the
state
securitization is legitimate or not. As stated in the theory section, the securitization process
The alleged colonization has therefore pulled the identity of the Azawadians unwillingly
requires certain steps in order to be accomplished. The audience in this securitization
towards a wider Malian identity. This is a result of Azawad being an integrating project,
process is the international community and the people of Azawad, as the statements are
forcefully included in the Malian state. This is an example of Vertical competition and is the
pointed
main threat of insecurity posed against the societal unit of MNLA. The theory suggests that
towards
them
with
the
purpose
of
gaining
their
support.
commanders
without
consent.
are
We
of
Tuareg
have
been
descent
(Boisvert,
colonized”
(MNLA,
2012,
2012,
24th
6th
Oct).
April).
Beyond the government of mali, MNLA is also securitizing Ansar Dine in the context of the
a societal unit faced with these threats of societal insecurity may respond in two ways. One
Azawad
that:
option is to place the issue on the political agenda and thereby seek assistance from the
“We are ready to fight these terrorist organizations. We will move soon and are taking our
state to resolve the issue. A second option would be for the societal unit to take action itself
arms, vehicles and material, but we still need help. We are calling on France, America and
and striving for separate statehood, apart from the existing structure of statehood. MNLA
other countries that stand against Ansar Dine to help us find them and kill them” (CNN,
has responded to the societal threat of insecurity, a result of Vertical Competition, by
2012, 2nd July).
striving for separate statehood. MNLA has repeatedly expressed its desire for an
The referent object is still the region of Azawad, as the region and its people are those who
independent state of Azawad.
region.
The
spokesperson
for
the
MNLA
has
expressed
allegedly are threatened by Ansar Dine. The securitizing actor is the MNLA, as it is the
actor attempting to securitize Ansar Dine. The functioning actors are the US, France and
Ansar Dine and securitization
international actors who are influential and have a say on the decisions in the field of
security. The audiences of the speech act are France, the US and other international actors
Ansar Dine as the securitizing actor primarily addresses democratic societies and Mali’s
who are addressed directly.
government in particular. As in the case of MNLA, the referent object in Ansar Dine’s
The MNLA is fighting predominantly for the people of Tuareg and the people of Azawad.
securitization is the people of Mali. Ansar Dine’s role in securitization is best perceived from
The unifying factor of the MNLA as a societal unit is the identity of either being of Tuareg
the societal sector. In spite of the ethnic diversity, Ansar Dine perceives the Malian people
descent or of Azawadian descent. Azawad is referred to as “our homeland belonging to the
as one social unit with a collective Muslim identity that should abide by Sharia: “From what
people of Azawad” (MNLA, 2012, 18th Jan). The identity in itself does not automatically
is known necessarily we are not an ethnic, or tribal or racist group!and our loyalty is to all
qualify membership to a societal unit. Each individual must make the choice of identification
Muslims” (Siraaj, 2012 April 12th). Their motivation for their aggressions is the fact that they
with a particular societal unit. In regards to MNLA, the British journalist Andy Morgan
feel
suggests that the Tuareg support for the MNLA has never been greater, due to successful
In terms of vertical competition it could be argued that Ansar Dine regards the values of
propaganda (Andy Morgan, 2012, 28th March). However, contrary to this many Tuaregs or
Western democracies as an imposing force wanting to implement certain institutionalized
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67
this
identity
is
threatened
by
the
Malian
system
and
its
values.
values to create a majority culture not contextual to the religious values of Mali society as
The political sector is primarily about non-military threats to sovereignty. The would be state
defined by Ansar Dine. Relating to this, Iyad Ag Ghaly expresses the view of Ansar Dine in
of Azawad views Ansar Dine as a political threat with the aim of overthrowing the MNLA
a speech on the radio after capturing Timbuktu in April by quoting from the Koran: “I have
government and weaken the state as a power. This is supported by the earlier statement
been ordered to kill the people until they testify that there is no god except Allah!” (Siraaj
from the MNLA calling upon all allies to join in the fight against Ansar Dine.
12 April 2012).
Ansar Dine positions itself as a state like actor in Azawad by holding the government
responsible for having failed to ensure stability and protect the people in northern Mali.
With this statement Ghaly introduces a hardliner, none-comprising philosophy where the
According to Ansar Dine officer, Sanda Abou Amama, this was done out of the plight of the
enemy is everyone and who is not Muslim. The referent object in this optic is the Muslim
Azawadian people: “!we came to Timbuktu for the rescue of people who called for our
society which is being threatened by laws that are not consistent with Sharia: “Manmade
help!” (Al-Jazeera 2012 April 9). This corresponds with a statement from Ghaly: “We call
laws that is taken from the Jews, Christians and their followers!which resulted in
all the segments of the Muslim society to help us in establishing the religion, spreading
oppression, aggression, immorality, disobedience, poverty, deprivation...” (Siraaj, 2012,
justice, security and ruling !” (Siraaj 2012 April 12)
April 12) Firstly, Ghaly is both referring to the Malian government and the international
society and states that these manmade laws can only be resolved with conflict; the threat
Using the words justice, security and ruling, Ansar Dine could be viewed as entering into
can only be met with military force, which is proved by Ansar Dine’s offensive aggressions
state like territory in their securitization, and rhetoric concerning Azawad. This view is
in northern Mali.
supported by a news clip where the phrasing law and order is used to describe Ansar
Dine’s role in Timbuktu after taking control of the town (al Jazeera, 2012, April 9).
MNLA, Ansar Dine and the State of Azawad
Furthermore, articles state that Ansar Dine use punishments which could be seen as
variations of law and order, as well as stocking the food markets, and making sure the
The military sector is primarily focused on the state but other actors may also serve as
hospitals are functioning (Nancy Palus, 2012, June 24; Idriss falls, 2012, June 22). Equal
focus point in the military sector. Military security evolves maintaining sovereignty over its
to the case of the MNLA, Ansar Dine becomes a threat to the Malian government since they
territory and population.
are taking the role of a religious movement group trying to implement their own ideology on
In regards to MNLA, they have established the Executive Member of Committee serving as
behalf of a disintegrated state and to some extent filling out some of the state-like functions
government of Azawad, which seeks to protect its territory, sovereignty and population by
in the controlled areas.
means of military forces (MNLA, 2012, April 6). This example can be seen as a way in
ECOWAS, as part of a potential functioning actor to the independent state of Azawad
which MNLA creates aspects of a would be state – in this case the would be state of
released the following statement after MNLA declared the North as an independent state:
Azawad, reacting against the military security threat posed by the government of Mali, in
“ECOWAS wishes to reaffirm its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Mali. In
order to maintain territory and sovereignty. However a would be state might be securitized
this regard, it wishes to put all on guard against any temptation to proclaim any part of Mali
in the international community as it might be seen as a threat to sovereignty within an
as a sovereign state, as it will never recognize any such state.” (ECOWAS statement, 2012,
existing statehood. The international community has never acknowledged the would be
April 6th)
state of Azawad and instead perceives it as a threat to Malian sovereignty (Al Jazeera,
This securitization by ECOWAS is partly to support one of its member states through the
2012, April 6).
commitment from article 58 of the ECOWAS treaty to prevent intra-state conflicts
If MNLA’s would be state of Azawad were to be acknowledged in the international
(ECOWAS treaty, 1993). Article 58 further states that the prevention of inter-state conflicts
community, the audience would legitimize their use of military force against the Malian
is also a matter of concern for ECOWAS since the MNLA and Ansar Dine are defined as a
government.
Tuareg dominant groups (Al jazeera, 2012, March 20; The Global Dispatches, 2012, March
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69
27; Flood, 2012, June 13) and since the Tuareg people are spread over neighboring
2001 more or less seen as a success by scholars: “In the Malian case, the Tuareg
countries (New York Times 2012, April 10). An implementation of an independent Azawad
separatists, for the most part, have laid down arms and are no longer a threat to Malian
state could then not only have implications on the territorial integrity of Mali but could
national sovereignty.” (Seely, 2001: 505).
potentially be defined as a threat because of the possibility that the territory of the Azawad
When the government is politicizing MNLA and Ansar Dine, the referent object is the state
state could stretch to areas in neighboring countries of Algeria and Niger – thus creating
of Mali. This is very consistent with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde as explained in 3.2-
problems with those states’ territorial integrity. A different hypothesis or possible implication
Regional Security Complex Theory, stating that the state will often use the state as referent
of a successful Azawad is that the fragile territorial balance of the other ECOWAS member
object. This is supported further by ECOWAS in its instruction to the transitional
states could be in danger. Potential secessionist movements in other states would have a
government concerning the conflict.
model to draw from if they also wished to redraw the territorial landscape of the West
“! dialogue among all the internal stakeholders on the transition, and also with the
African states and form new ones.
armed groups not involved in terrorist and criminal activities, and who accept without
conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, as well as the secular nature
6.2.4 – New threats and new positions
of the State.” (ECOWAS final communiqué, 2012, November 11)
As previously stated, Azawad is for the government of Mali and ECOWAS a matter of
The terrorist threat vs. the domestic.
territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Territorial integrity of Mali has been securitized, as
mentioned earlier, due to the intervention likely to get underway in 2013. A shift in positions
As stated above, Ansar Dine and MNLA are understood as domestic and thus politicized by
from the different actors has resulted in a dynamic securitization of the groups in Azawad
the government therefore they are possible to negotiate with. AQIM and MUJAO are
being implemented.
understood as foreign groups and are seen as “Terrorists and drug traffickers (who) for the
most part are not Malian citizens” (AFP, 2012, November 18), as stated by the Prime
While earlier securitization of the actors has been largely consistent with territorial integrity
Minister. This is further emphasized by President Traore who says when addressing the
and the upholding of territorial border through the military intervention, the recent discourse
two groups that “We will not hesitate to wage a total and relentless war” (Oumar, 2012, April
surrounding the MNLA and Ansar Dine show a separate understanding of the groups.
13). This allows for a distinction between the military and political sector - two sectors that
Former Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra made this notion clear when saying”...Both
are otherwise often overlapping. This is an empirical separation based on the narrative
groups were made up of fellow Malians...” (The Botswana Gazette, 2012, November 21)
proscribed by the government, where AQIM and MUAJAO are foreign and MNLA and
and “We are not afraid nor ashamed of negotiating because we are dealing with fellow
Ansar Dine are domestic. This implies that where MNLA and Ansar Dine are politicized,
Malians” (Hasni, 2012, June 23).
AQIM and MUJAO are securitized. MNLA and Ansar Dine are thus operating within the
political sector and AQIM and MUJAO are operating within the military sector. The real
MNLA and Ansar Dine are regarded by the government as being domestic and they are
threat of any of the groups is hard to tell and the difference is often drawn by the articulation
included in the Malian social unit, giving their voice more legitimacy. They can from a
done by the government.
governmental position be put on the state agenda by way of negotiation, which means that
the issues are politicized rather than securitized. This is further evident in the historical
3.2.6- The Military Sector states that an institutionalized military is a response to a
politization of the Tuaregs’ presence in the government’s implementation of a
continuous threat, often relating to secessionist non-state units. Laws are often
regionalization policy. This structural program was initiated in 1991 and aimed towards
implemented to deal with the threat. Evidently in the government, the military has been
decentralizing of power, from the central government to the region. The program was by
institutionalized. They are fighting against secessionist groups and laws have previously
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71
been implemented to deal with such groups. The decentralization of power began in 1991 is
willing to participate in a dialogue in order to solve the current conflict: “Ansar al-Din
an example of how laws have been implemented to handle future conflicts with the
announces its abandonment of its demand about applying the Islamic Sharia all over Mali,
Tuaregs. The threat from the newer groups, AQIM and MUJAO, are not reflected in any
but will continue to impose it in Kidal province!” (Oumar, 2012, November 15).
laws, further indicating that the threat is new and the means of dealing with it is ad-hoc.
Ansar Dine has not elaborated on this shift in direction and it is also unclear why the Kidal
President Dioncounda Traore urged AU and the UN envoys on the 19th of October to help
province has been chosen as the base of Ansar Dine, but one reason could be that it is the
Mali against AQIM and MUJAO as "We must not lose a single second. This is an
home province of Ansar Dine leader, Ghaly and perhaps also because of its remote
emergency, this is a race against time," (al-jazeeral, 2012, October 19), underlining the fact
location – in the north eastern corner of Mali, bordering Algeria and Niger.
that this is an emergency and that Mali has no permanent mechanism to deal with the
MNLA’s new position is to “respect national unity and the territorial integrity of Mali” (Jemal
threats from AQIM and MUJAO, but need external aid. This should be seen as an
Oumar, 2012, December 5). It also involves the “! rejection of any form of extremism and
acknowledgement of the difference between on one side AQIM and MUJAO, and on the
terrorism” (Jemal Oumar, 2012, December 5).
other side Ansar Dine and MNLA, and between the military and the political threat they
pose. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the government is trying to securitize AQIM and
Beyond the threat from the government, the international community and ECOWAS of
MUJAO, while politicizing Ansar Dine and MNLA. The successfulness of this securitization
intervention, another reason could be that by inviting to dialogue and inviting a compromise
depends on the audience, which in this context is the international community (mainly
in terms of their strict religious ideology and territorial demands, Ansar Dine and MNLA
ECOWAS), the population of Mali and the two domestic groups.
could be gaining and strengthening their position in Mali. One possible advantage, which
can be derived from the on-going peace dialogue, is that they can perhaps attain
The political sector is more concerned with the threat from non-military units. Ansar Dine
international and regional legitimacy because they themselves are capable of entering in
and MNLA can both be understood as a military threat, but the developments of the conflict
democratic peace talks. If Ansar Dine and MNLA are being recognized nationally, regionally
have increasingly made the government regard them as a political threat. On the 19th of
and internationally, specific interests in Azawad would be far more realistic. Though this is
November the Prime minster stated that “Dialogue is inevitable. People who make up the
true in theory, Sharia and autonomy of Azawad still seems like a long shot when going back
Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) or Ansar Dine are our compatriots,” (Daily
to ECOWAS’ previous demands that territorial integrity and Mali as a secular state is at the
Times, 2012 November 19), again claiming that the two groups can be negotiated with.
forefront
of
the
demands
for
dialogue
and
compromise
with
rebel
groups.
3.2.7-The Political Sector lets us understand that such groups threaten the national
recognition of the state and should therefore be dealt with by way of negotiation. It becomes
6.2.5 – Interim conclusion
clear from the Malian identity articulated by the government that these groups are regarded
as part of the nation.
From the beginning of the riots in Mali and the subsequent coup d’état in March to the latest
developments, the securitization of the conflict by the different actors is dynamic and
The new position of Ansar Dine and MNLA in Azawad.
changing. The complex association between the actors shows that the conflict is anything
but black and white. The relationship of amity and enmity is central in terms of the
Previous positions from MNLA and Ansar Dine have been the sovereignty of Azawad and
securitization, and the difference between friend and foe is hard to ascertain and seems to
the implementation of Sharia law in Mali respectively but recently, statements have shown a
be changing all the time. This highlights the fragile balance of the relationship of these
shift in positions from the two groups. What exactly caused the shift is difficult to say, but
actors and also underlines the shaky ground that is the foundation of the conflict. The next
the future plan for regional and international military intervention is a plausible explanation.
section will explore the concept of sovereignty, more specifically the question of negative
From being confrontational and none-reconciling in their discourse Ansar Dine has been
sovereignty in the context of the conflict.
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6.3 Regional Security Complex analysis:
the relationships between the actors are durable and empirical in nature. The securitization
of the government by ECOWAS can be seen as a new pattern and on the face of it, the
The first section of this analysis,6.1-Negative Sovereignty, argues that Jackson’s notion of
durability is not present but there is a relationship between the government- and state of
negative sovereignty applies to the state of Mali. Through this perspective Mali can be
Mali on one side and ECOWAS on the other. This relationship and pattern is durable,
considered a weak state unable to rule over its territory. The analysis of securitization in the
mainly through Mali’s member status in ECOWAS. Another example of a durable pattern of
previous section further shows the interdependent relationship and fragile balance between
amity and enmity, can be found in the government’s relationship with Ansar Dine and
the actors operating in Mali and the Mali conflict. These aspects will be included in the
MNLA. These organizations are new, both formed in 2011 (Marc André Boisvert, 2012,
following section which will frame Mali and the Malian conflict in the context of RSCT as
October 24), but both have Tuareg members as substantial part of their respective groups.
defined by Buzan and Wæver(2003).
The Tuaregs have a contextual relationship with the state of Mali, and the region of Azawad
The RSCT explains that the postcolonial African state is a weak state and thereby lacks
in this context is a historical issue that has been fought over. Though both Ansar Dine and
central features in political, economical and social functionality. The weak state has given
MNLA’s members are not solely Tuaregs, Azawad as a battleground and issue of
room for non-state actors to gain territorial and political power within the existing state
contention along with the problematic relationship between the state of Mali and Tuareg
territory. In the context of Mali an example of this is that both the MNLA and Ansar Dine
people, make the securitization in the current conflict a durable pattern. The interaction
have sought to gain territorial and political power in Mali. The fact that Ansar Dine and the
between actors, and historical and contextual dynamics presents a conflict so intertwined
MNLA jointly managed to combat Malian forces in the north, proves that the non-state
that a security threat in one part of the region, will affect the rest of the region. The
actors in Mali can compete militarily on the same level as the state, and in this particular
securitization attempts between MNLA, Ansar Dine, Government of Mali and ECOWAS in
context actually triumph over the existing state. The RSCT argues that the non-state actor
the context of amity and enmity is what lays the foundation for a theoretical Regional
may function in some way as a recognized state. The would be state of MNLA and Ansar
Security Complex.
Dine’s state-like functions highlight this notion. MNLA has even assembled an Executive
member of Committee to govern their desired state of Azawad (Temost, 2012, April 1).
6.3.2- Close geographical proximity and the reach of the superpower
Ansar Dine has imposed Sharia law and installed an Islamic court of Law to serve as the
juridical power in their occupied territories (Voa, 2012, August 23). Even though Ansar Dine
Along with the durability of the actors’ relationship, the close geographical proximity also
and MNLA’s securitization is mostly targeted towards each other or the government of Mali,
helps the understanding of this conflict being a security complex. Though the conflict is
the weakened state of Mali makes way for an understanding of the conflict through the
largely an intrastate issue, the relative power of the non-state actors in this case and the
framework of the RSCT.
weak state allows for an understanding of the conflict in Mali being viewed through the lens
of RSCT. Beyond that, ECOWAS’ presence in the Malian conflict shows the regional
6.3.1- durable patterns
perspective beyond the intrastate nature of the conflict. The securitization of the conflict by
ECOWAS also illuminates the interstate
feature of the case. Beyond calling upon the
A regional Security complex is defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity. The
neighboring countries to help solve the conflict, as seen in 6.2-Securitization ECOWAS has
different threats characterized in the previous section of the analysis shows these patterns
furthermore held meetings with the member states but also countries bordering Mali
of amity and enmity through Ansar Dine, MNLA, ECOWAS and the government of Mali’s
(ECOWAS final communiqué, 2012, April 26; ECOWAS final communiqué, 2012,
attempts to securitize or politize each other. The durability of these patterns can be
November 11). The inclusion of Mauritania and Algeria who are not members of ECOWAS
understood as important to the RSCT in the way that relationships need to be defined and
but share borders with northern Mali illustrates the regional perspectives of the conflict. As
of a lasting nature. While the conflict in a concrete sense is new, the underlying dynamics of
previously stated, ECOWAS has an interest in making sure that the security threat does not
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escalate into other parts of the region. This is not only an issue for the ECOWAS countries
the first wave of the conflict, which consisted of implementation of Sharia-law in Mali and
but also an issue in the region for the countries sharing territorial boundaries.
the creation of an independent state of Azawad. The argument about the insulator being a
One of the implications relating to the RSCT is the refugee flows resulting from the conflict.
state where the regional dynamics of the neighboring security complex invites an
UNHCR estimates that at least 203,845 people have been internally displaced in Mali. In
understanding of the initial discourses and positions stemming from the Middle Eastern
addition, about 250.000 people have fled for neighboring countries (United Nations, 2012,
RSC. Especially, what led Tuareg's to found the MNLA is contextual to this understanding.
November 2). The internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees fleeing to neighboring
The theory's definition of the insulators and their limited power in their respective regions
countries are good ways to contextualize what Buzan and Wæver mean by security issues
further invites a reason behind the later developments in the conflict. Because Mali is a
traveling more easily over short distances than over long and in the case of Mali they give a
weak insulator state in the West African RSC and because ECOWAS as a regional power
good picture of the implications regionally to the security complex.
is defining in the region, the fight for an independent Azawad, and a Mali founded on
It is also important to notice actors outside of the complex reacting to the securitization
Sharia-law have not been able to make roots.
process in Mali. For instance the US, an actor geographically located far away from Mali,
regards the emergence of Ansar Dine as a threat to US and global security (CNN, 2012,
6.3.4- Interim conclusion
August 14). Moreover in 2004 the US department of State funded the Pan Sahel Initiative, a
program with the purpose of enhancing borders in the Sahel region and preventing
This section builds on the securitization of the actors in the previous part. The security
movement of transnational terrorists such as AQIM (Global Security, 2012, March 26). The
dynamics pertaining to durable patterns of amity and enmity show a set of actors
countries targeted in the Pan Sahel Initiative were Niger, Chad, Mauritania and Mali. The
intertwined in not just their securitization but also their underlining relational patterns of
US views the region of Sahel as an area in which terrorists are operating and cooperating,
amity and enmity. The implication of refugee flow to neighboring countries and the IDP's not
and thereby an issue of threat to US security. Through the Pan Sahel Initiative, the US
only indicates the severity of the case but also frames the regional aspects of the case and
securitized the region of Sahel and from an American point of view, the region can be seen
further supports ECOWAS' role within it. The securitization by the US is also interesting to
as a Security Complex. This idea is workable but should not be mistaken with Mali in the
look at in terms of the aspects of the conflict regarding the terrorist threat. Lastly, Mali as an
context of a RSC. The US as a superpower is able to define security across regions and is
insulator state in the West African security complex provides a way to understand the
not confined to the boundaries of any regional complex. The threat here and the regional
events of the conflict and to put them in the context of the RSCT.
aspect of the Sahel belt is a superpower construct, and might not be made up of durable
patterns of amity and enmity. Furthermore the theory points out that security issues relating
to terror is not geographically limited to a regional environment.
6.3.3- Mali as an insulator state
The illustration in 3.2.4- Regional Security Complex theory in Africa shows the regional
security complex in West Africa. The Sahel belt is considered as insulators, with Mauritania,
Mali, and Niger inside the West African security complex; and Chad outside it. The insulator
status of Mali makes sense to look at when considering the Tuareg rebellion in the north.
The Pan-Arabism rhetoric along with the inclusion of the former Islamic Legion and its
return to Mali as mentioned in 5.3- Introduction to the conflict makes it beneficial to look at
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77
sovereignty. One of the key principles of the AU is to maintain the current borders in Africa,
and this principle exercises the concept of negative sovereignty by neglecting the empirical
6.4.-Conclusion of analysis
sovereignty of ethno nations such as Azawad. Thus the international community
recognizing the territorial integrity of Mali based on racial sovereignty amplifies negative
The development of the conflict has turned Mali into a country where sovereignty is
sovereignty in the context of Mali. The consequences of negative sovereignty in Mali have
constantly fought over.
given room for non-state actors to act independently on Malian territory. Apart from Ansar
In our analysis we have made use of the tools from Jackson’s negative sovereignty theory
Dine and MNLA, insurgents such as AQIM and MUJAO have emerged on Malian territory.
and applied them to the context of Mali. We find that sovereignty in Mali is a result of the
The international community regards these as threats not only to Malian territorial integrity,
colonial defined borders, in which ethnonations have been neglected in the process of
but also threats to the global security. In regards to this, restoring Malian territorial integrity
defining the territory. In Mali the French colonizers did not include the Tuareg people in the
becomes an issue of global security and further reduces the possibility of recognizing the
educational system. The political exclusion of the Tuaregs, along with international pressure
cultural sovereignty of the ethnonation Azawad. Based upon the tools from the theory of
for swift decolonization, resulted in a transferring of power to majority rule and the process
negative sovereignty, we have learned that negative sovereignty applies to the context of
thereby failed to include minorities in the nation building project of post-colonial Mali. Mali
Mali. The negative sovereignty has left room for non-state actors to emerge and challenge
as a country was built on territorial limitations rather than cultural ones and consequently
the recognized state of Mali. Different actors such as MNLA, Ansar Dine, the government of
their sovereignty was juridical rather than empirical. The lack of empirical sovereignty in
Mali and ECOWAS are involved in the conflict. By the tools provided to us from the
Mali has resulted in the emergence of powerful non-state actors who seek to challenge the
securitization theory, we have analyzed the relationship between mentioned actors.
territorial integrity of Mali. The non-state actors MNLA and Ansar Dine have both
questioned the territorial integrity of Mali. MNLA revolted against Malian authorities with the
From the beginning of the riots in Mali and the subsequent coup d’état in March to the latest
aim of liberating the region of Azawad and forming an independent state. In April 2012, the
developments, the changing relationships between actors have characterized the
rebellion of MNLA managed to triumph over the Malian army and claim independence over
securitization of the conflict. The complex association between the actors shows that the
the region of Azawad. The government of Mali failing to combat the rebellion in the north
conflict is anything but black and white. For instance actors such as MNLA and Ansar Dine
shows that the Malian government is unable to defend its territorial integrity. The presence
who previously were securitized as threats to Malian security are now politicized as fellow
of non-state actors who can compete for power on the same level as the government
Malians, by the Malian government. Initially the Malian government sought to combat these
makes the concept of negative sovereignty applicable to the government of Mali. In regards
by means of military force, but latest development show that the Malian government has
to this, it should be mentioned that the Malian government in 1992, implemented a
invited these to political dialogue over the Malian future. The former allies MNLA and Ansar
decentralizing program with the aim of granting the communes more autonomy and thereby
Dine became enemies fighting each other and suddenly regard each other as threats to
attempting to further integrate the minorities, including the Tuaregs, in the Malian state. We
their security. The relationship of amity and enmity is central in terms of the securitization,
view the decentralization program as an attempt of forming positive sovereignty in the
and the difference between friend and foe is hard to ascertain and seems to be constantly
government of Mali. The grant of autonomous power to the communes can be seen as the
changing. This highlights the fragile balance of the relationship of these actors and also
Malian state recognizing the ethno nation of Tuaregs. However, the decentralization
underlines the shaky ground that is the foundation of the conflict.
program failed to accomplish its objectives and the leaders of Mali denies the cultural
sovereignty of MNLA and their liberation of Azawad, by upholding the territorial sovereignty
The weak state of Mali leaving room for non-state actors to operate and compete, on some
left by colonial powers. In the international community there seems to exist an international
of the same levels as the recognized state, builds the dynamics of a theoretical Regional
consensus on maintaining the current borders, which is the foundation for negative
Security Complex. The dynamics are based upon interaction between actors MNLA,
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ECOWAS, Ansar Dine and the government of Mali. Actors attempting to securitize or
politize each other, in the context of this conflict, define these dynamics. The Regional
Security Complex is defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity. We see enmity and
7.-Discussion
amity applicable to the securitization process of Mali, in which actors constantly change
relationship of both enmity and amity. The interaction between actors speaks of a region so
The discussion takes point of departure from our problem definition and the findings in our
intertwined that a threat in one part of the region will affect the rest of the region. The
analysis. This foundation gives us on opportunity to discuss the conflict of Mali and the
presence of ECOWAS in the Mali conflict highlights the regional perspective of the conflict.
theory chosen. A discussion that in this sense illuminates the aspects of theory applicable
Furthermore ECOWAS including non members in the political process, speaks in favor of
to the context and the aspects of theory we find have limited our analysis. By looking at
the regional perspective to this conflict. The US securitizing the entire region of Sahel
where the theories illuminate these findings we take the theories one step further in two
stresses the notion that a Regional Security Complex should not be understood as closed
directions: (1) greater understanding of the context and thus the theories, and (2) into future
entity, but is merely a theoretical framework with dynamics of interaction by means of
perspectives. The (1) first direction is elaborated on in this discussion. The (2) future
securitization.
perspectives, although speculative, can be used in understanding the full extent of the
theories. 9.-Perspectives outlines these future perspectives and by doing this revisit the
theory and the future development of the conflict.
7.1- Negative Sovereignty
Negative sovereignty is analyzed in the Malian context in 6.1- Negative Sovereignty and
gives us the understanding of Mali as having negative sovereignty, which implies that nonstate actors can compete for power on the same level as the central government and that
Mali in itself can be defined as a regional security complex where multiple actors
predominantly securitize each other. From a theoretical understanding we see that almost
all African nations have negative sovereignty, mainly because they were not built on an
ethnonation that created internal legitimacy from the population. Mali is evidently composed
of many ethnic groups. The Tuaregs are more outspokenly involved in the conflict than any
other ethnic groups in Mali; they have furthermore been involved in many rebellions through
the democratic history of Mali: post 1992. The inclusion process initiated in 1992 built on a
decentralization policy, which strived to give the different communes of Mali more autonomy
and thereby please the Tuaregs. This can be seen as an example of how the Malian
government have tried to obtain positive sovereignty by understanding the Tuaregs as one
ethnonation. But as exemplified by the continuation of rebellions this have carried little fruit.
This decentralization process and the common conception of the rebellion, clearly perceive
the Tuaregs as one people and by this one unit with one agenda. However, as we have
emphasized in 6.1- Negative sovereignty the Tuaregs are divided and present in MNLA,
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Ansar Dine and the Malian government. In these groups they fight for a variety of causes
regional body upholds the negative sovereignty by continuously emphasizing the colonial
from implementation of Sharia-law, to an independent Awazad, to a united Mali. This
borders and thereby keeping the member states in a judicial status quo. But ECOWAS also
underlines that the Tuaregs cannot be understood as one people with a single agenda.
tries to build a foundation for positive sovereignty by implementing sanctions on the military
Furthermore, Ansar Dine and MNLA are only predominantly consisting of Tuaregs, other
junta, which pressured CNRDR to instate a transitional government. The mandate for the
ethnic groups such as Arabs and Black Africans are also members of the groups. MNLA
transitional government is to re conquer the North, by military action or diplomacy, and
are made up of people from Azawad, defining the group more as geographically untied than
thereafter hold a democratic election that can give the government internal legitimacy, and
ethnic based. Ansar Dine identity is linked to Islam and is not bounded by either geography
thereby create foundation for positive sovereignty.
or ethnicity. This is evident from our analysis, despite the fact that there is a common
understand of the rebellions been bound by the ethnicity of the Tuaregs. This analytical
7.2-Regional security complex
finding can be seen in contrast to the theory of ethnonation and poses the question: when
can an ethnonation actually been understood as an ethnonation? The Tuarges as one unit
The RSC is defined by the durable patterns of amity and enmity which have been evident in
can in this sense not be understood as one ethnonation. Contextualizing this to the
the securitization processes between the actors. ECOWAS acts with great authority in the
presence of Tuaregs across the Sahel with no central body that can lead and formulate a
Malian conflict and most decisions in terms of sanctions and a potential military intervention
united mission, it illustrates that multiple agendas exists, underlining that internal legitimacy
goes through this regional body. This emphasizes the fact that we can regard our case as
to the Malian government from all the groups that includes Tuaregs is pragmatically
being within the regional security complex of West Africa, the territorial foundation of
probably impossible. The conflict in Mali ignited around the time of return by the Tuaregs
ECOWAS. Buzan and Wæver states that RSCT in Africa, to a greater extent than other
from Ghadaffi’s Islamic Legion. It can be argued that these Tuaregs formed a social unit
regions, is dominated by non-state actors that sometimes has the ability to act on the same
that had not been part of the inclusion process and decentralization process, and thereby
level as the government this is apparent in Mali where MNLA and Ansar Dine have been
they had not experience a positive relation to the Malian government, which consequently
challenging the power of the Malian government. Although our empirical research shows
led to them not giving legitimacy to the political system. This does not only underline that
that other global actors is very much influential in the internal securitizations processes.
the fact that the Tuaregs probably did not constitute one ethnonation, but also stresses the
Actors such as the US, France and Algeria are contributing in how the securitization
general problematic of ethnonations: what constitutes a ethnonation and does ethnonations
processes are subject to change, most notable in how MNLA and Ansar Dine shifted their
even exist.
aims, due to the embossment of possible military intervention through ECOWAS. Even
Our premise for the project have been to regard the Tuaregs as more or less one unit and
though they go through the regional channels, they are underpinning the international
even though we in this discussion deconstruct this to a degree, the idea of the ethnonation
aspect of the conflict. Thus, overriding the regional perspective in preference to a more
in general, questions colonial borders. Comparing this to the general problematic of what
global security agenda. As described in 3.2.3-Regional Security Complex, a superseding
constitutes ethnonations, as outlined above, becomes pragmatically difficult to draw any
can occur if the threat is regarded as being of certain nature. In the case of Mali the threat,
borders that would create a foundation for empirical and thereby positive sovereignty in
in the eyes of the international community, is terrorist based and thus has an overriding
Mali. The nomadic traditions of the Tuaregs entail that they are not geographically bound,
effect. If the conflict is only understood as this, it becomes increasingly non-productive to
making it more or less impossible to permanently define borders for them as a group or
understand it in regional perspective. The Global War on Terror has a global perspective
people. The sultanate the Tuarges once governed was also of dynamic nature. The state
and the conflict can in this sense create a theoretical foundation for analyzing the conflict in
bound nature of negative and positive sovereignty can be understood as too state centric to
a global perspective. Even though, it is a global issue the US often articulates the issue as
be the foundation for a state as Mali.
being bound to the Sahel region, through the Pan Sahel Initiative. If we add the notion of
ECOWAS has a dual role in recognizing Mali and the negative sovereignty. Mainly, the
the Sahel having a charistica of mobility, instead of being an insulator, we find that an
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understanding of the Sahel-region being a regional security complex in itself is supported
contextualizes the conflict in light of its development. explains the dynamic of the actors
by the theory, and allows for an analysis based on this. The nomadic nature of the Tuaregs
and serves as a good way of perceiving the power relations in the region.
further entertains this notion because they can move across the Sahel and because they
are key actors in the conflict, by being present in both Ansar Dine and MNLA. Increased
interaction and cooperation between insurgents groups such as, AQIM, MNLA, Ansar Dine
and MUJAO across national boundaries, have contributed to the extension of dynamics
characterizing a Security Complex. The security threats in the Sahel have proven effectual
across the otherwise perceived insulators and boundaries of security complexes. The threat
of terrorism questions the perception of the current conflict in a national context, because it
will inevitable draw in actors outside Mali both from the Sahel belt and international actors,
who are dictating the securitization of the actors and have been shaping the conflict.
8.-Conclusion
Our analysis proves that the political instability characterizing the Malian conflict can be
understood in terms of negative sovereignty. We can understand negative sovereignty as
being grounded in the colonization and de-colonization processes, which led to the current
national borders. These borders contained multiple societal units with different agendas and
traditions in Mali. The central government failed to include all these societal units. This
negative sovereignty was further emphasized by the regional body of ECOWAS. The
negative sovereignty of the Malian government created the opportunity for MNLA and Ansar
Dine to obtain territory. Their obtainment of territory was, by themselves, articulated as
legitimate, as exemplified in our securitization analysis, mainly due to the groups’ previous
grievance with the government, their domestic origin and their equal power capabilities.
This is emphasized by the central government politicizing and including them in
negotiations; the government is legitimizing the actors but not their occupation of territory.
This is contrary to the non-legitimate actors of AQIM and MUJAO, who are being
securitized by the Malian government and the international society. If chose to understand
Mali itself as a security complex, as evident in our analysis, this was beneficial because the
various actors securitize each other extensively within this complex. However, our findings
show that the international community securitizes AQIM and MUJAO. Because they pose a
terrorist threat and terrorist threats can override otherwise regional security threats, this
applies well to our understanding of a international interests and role in RSC’s in general
and in the Mali case. The weak nature of the Mali state as an insulator of the West Africa
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address:http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2012/04/20124823532064383.html Retrieved: 12.11.2012
UN Mali Mandate Inches Closer: Home Page. Published by En Habler. Latest update:
23.11.2012. Internet address:http://en.haberler.com/un-mali-mandate-inches-closer244914/ - Retrieved: 10.10.2012
Viewing cable 08BAMAKO824, Follow up on Tuareg Insurgents in Mali: Confidential
Section 01 OF 03 Bamako 000824. Published by Wikileaks. Latest update: 3.10.2008.
Internet address:http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BAMAKO824.html - Retrieved:
9.10.2012
West Africa: Drug Trafficking and the Crisis in Mali: All Africa - Institute for Security Studies.
Published by All Africa - Abdelkader Abderrahmae. Latest update: 6.8.2012. Internet
address:http://allafrica.com/stories/201208060367.html - Retrieved: 7.12.2012
West Africa: ECOWAS Imposes Additional Sanctions on Mali and Guinea Bissau: All Africa
- The Analyst. Published by All Africa. Latest update: 22.5.2012. Internet
address: http://allafrica.com/stories/201205220454.html - Retrieved: 31.10.2012
West Africa: Facts and Figures: News and Broadcast. Published by The World bank. Latest
update: 2012. Internet
address:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20179737~p
agePK:34370~piPK:42768~theSitePK:4607,00.html- Retrieved: 05.12.2012
Who is Ansar Dine?: CNN World. Published by CNN - Michael Lambert and Jason Warner.
Latest update: 14.08.2012. Internet
address: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/ Retrieved: 10.10.2012
Timeline: Mali since independence: Africa. Published by Aljazeera. Latest update:
13.4.2012. Internet
address:http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012322111037483270.html Retrieved: 27.9.2012
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