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The US-Russian security 'reset': implications for Central-Eastern Europe
and Germany
Nik Hynekab; Vit Striteckya; Vladimír Handla; Michal Kořana
a
Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic b Saltzman Institute of War and Peace
Studies, Columbia University, New York, USA
Online publication date: 28 June 2010
To cite this Article Hynek, Nik , Stritecky, Vit , Handl, Vladimír and Kořan, Michal(2009) 'The US-Russian security 'reset':
implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany', European Security, 18: 3, 263 — 285
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European Security
Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2009, 263285
The US Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern
Europe and Germany
Nik Hyneka,b*, Vit Striteckya, Vladimı́r Handla and Michal Kořana
a
Institute of International Relations, 118#50 Prague, Czech Republic; bSaltzman Institute of
War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, New York, USA
Downloaded By: [Hynek, Nik] At: 07:01 29 June 2010
(Received 10 November 2009; final version received 27 January 2010)
The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the USperformed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they
have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after
the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and
security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP
procedure are examined through John Ruggie’s theoretical observations. The
second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for CentralEastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian
attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security
architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic
realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part
of the article tackles the implications of heightened USRussian bilateralism for
Germany. Authors’ findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews,
suggest the contrary process, namely Germany’s strengthened multilateral
commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence
Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are
concluding remarks.
Keywords: USRussian relations; Central-Eastern Europe; Germany’s multilateralism and bilateralism; transatlantic security (NATO) and European security
(CSDP); Obama vs. Bush; geopolitics
Introduction
The US foreign and security policy (USFSP) after the accession of President Obama
to the office has generally been appreciated and seen in positive terms, especially at
the international level. On the surface, the USFSP under Obama has been
understood through the radical shift in policy since the two presidential terms of
George W. Bush. Without a doubt, Obama is the first US President since John F.
Kennedy in whom the character of so-called celebrity diplomacy appeared and then
became deeper. Obama possesses the ability to utilise new types of power which were
unavailable to Bush because of his rigid positions and lack of international
popularity. Obama has been very effective in his utilisation of direct and indirect
public diplomacy, which is evidenced by his numerous video speeches that are
strategically placed on the web portal YouTube or his ability to make speeches
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
ISSN 0966-2839 print/ISSN 1746-1545 online
# 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09662831003657192
http://www.informaworld.com
264 N. Hynek et al.
directly to the citizens of foreign states and, through this, mobilise their support. In
light of this popular perception of Obama and, through him, also of the USFSP, it
may be at first-sight counter-intuitive to argue that even though Obama is indeed
seen as the president who put an end to several trends that were introduced by Bush,
understanding the USFSP through the notion of discursive change is problematic at
best and misleading at worst.
The presented article attempts to cut through the stereotypical perceptions and
popular assessments of the USFSP under President Obama. In doing so, a
theoretically founded discussion of continuity and change in the USFSP is provided.
This part is important in so far as the rest of the article tries to address the
implications of certain overtures of Obama to Europe, especially his preference for
deep strategic bilateralism in regard to Russia and also his preference for shallow
nominal multilateralism in regard to NATO and the EU. As will eventually become
clear, although Obama’s efforts towards accommodating Russia and verbally
‘resetting’ the US’ previous relationship with it are understandable in principle,
the actual carrying out of Obama’s intentions and the political-strategic implications
involved are now much more problematic, and the US approach towards Russia has
raised concerns in Europe. The article will thus examine the reactions of selected
European states regarding the ‘reset’ and explore the ways in which they have
been adapting to the new set-up, including their foreign and security realignments. In
order to assess the implications of the recent USFSP for Europe, the Central-Eastern
European countries as well as Germany have been chosen to show unintended
consequences of the combination of Obama’s strategic bilateralism towards Russia
and his nominal multilateralism towards NATO and the European allies in general.
The article is divided into three parts and proceeds as follows: after the discussion
of the substantive continuity and limited change in the USFSP, the multilateral and
bilateral dimensions of the USFSP are examined through John Ruggie’s theoretical
observations concerning the anatomy of these institutions. As a part of this debate,
two examples of nominal multilateralism are used to demonstrate Ruggie’s
arguments: the US approach to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission and its commitment to ‘NATO-ising’ the third pillar of the National
Missile Defence. The analysis of the USFSP under Obama is then completed by an
elucidation of the US bilateralism towards Russia, which has born characteristics of
what the field of strategic studies has known as an instrumentally motivated strategic
condominium. The second part of the article deals with the implications of the
USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion
of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European
security architecture. It is in this geopolitical context as well as in the context of the
perceived geo-strategic withdrawal of the USA from the region that emotional
reactions and pleas to the USA to keep its commitment to the region are analysed.
Although this has been the popular understanding of where the Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) region finds itself now, the next section sheds light on the unexpected
process of the strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO 0EU) and the
simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into what has
been described as ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications
of the heightened USRussian bilateralism for Germany. Specifically, this part
contains a discussion of whether or not Germany will pursue a bilateral agenda as far
as its security relationship with Russia is concerned. The authors’ findings, many of
European Security
265
them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the opposite process namely
Germany’s strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to what
is now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), especially in light of
Germany’s complicated situation in NATO, which limits the bilateral option for
energy trade with Russia. The article then ends with some concluding remarks.
US foreign and security policy under Obama
Substantive issues: unbroken continuity and limited change
Continuity and change in the USFSP have been the subject of theoretical and policy
debates for some time. Whereas the logic of political process usually signals a clear
break with the past, especially when the presidential incumbent does not or cannot
stand for re-election, theoretical reflections often tend to point to existing patterns of
continuity (Campbell 1998, Jervis 2005, Bennett and Shambaugh 2007, Wittkopf
et al. 2007, Hoff 2008). As for perceptions of change in the USFSP, these are then
attributed to material shifts and changes of ideational expectations at the level of the
international system rather than being perceived as stemming from the radically
different views of the new administration. At first glance, the actions and moves
performed by Obama’s administration appear to defy the theoretical lessons and
confirm the logic of change that emanates from the political process. Obama has
been almost universally lauded for signalling his willingness to make a rupture with
the Bush administration. It has often been noted that Obama’s plans to bury the
Bush legacy, or, at other times, to display it in its bareness, were highly expected due
to the general perception of Bush’s years in office as a failure.
In this light, it may be unexpected to argue that while Obama has clearly
distinguished himself from Bush at both the discursive and the procedural levels, an
analysis of the substantive/thematic level sets the limits to the idea of Obama
bringing about a significant change, thus confirming the theoretical arguments about
continuity in the USFSP. This continuity can be found in every major issue of the
current USFSP (Hynek 2009). For a suitable example, we can look at the most
important issue of Bush’s legacy Iraq. Obama when he was still a presidential
candidate assumed a minority centreleft liberal position towards the war in Iraq,
and his critical attitude was evident in fragmentary votes. His presidential decision
which he announced at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina on 27 February 2009 was
marked by a pragmatic shift in regard to the issue. Instead of the original tempo
for pulling out of Iraq that Obama adumbrated during his presidential campaign,
he opted for a compromise plan that stuck to the August 2010 pull-out (with
the exception of the transitional component). This has been but one illustrative
example of how radical electoral promises are neutralised and brought in line with
the structural continuity of the USFSP. Other issues that seem to confirm such an
argument are summarised in the Table 1.
Theorising the procedure: nominal multilateralism and deep bilateralism
As already pointed out, there have been some signs of change in the USFSP at the
procedural level. From a procedural perspective Bush’s rigid realism, which was
based on a Manichean worldview, was replaced by Obama’s pragmatic realism,
266 N. Hynek et al.
Table 1.
Continuity and change in the US foreign and security policy.
Continuity
Iraq
Afghanistan
Russia
Strategic, tactical and operational
levels; acceptance of political
responsibility by Obama
Steady pressure on the allies,
preference of the intra-NATO
solidarity over any really effective
solution on the ground
Attempts to renew the armscontrol regime; continuation of
the strategic-condominium style
of negotiations and diplomacy
Iran
Basic strategy of rewards and
punishments; the absence of a
coherent strategy
North Korea
Basic strategy of rewards and
punishments; the absence of a
coherent strategy
Partial change
Lowering the issue priority; reducing
the rigidity of the withdrawal plan
An increase in the priority of the
issue and in the political
responsibility; regional solution the
AfPak strategy
Discourse on resetting bilateral
relations; replacement of the third
pillar of BMD by plans for a seabased BMD and the use of the issue
for arms-control negotiations and for
concerted pressure on Iran
Strong discursive emphasis on the
establishment of diplomatic dialogue;
removing the conditions for the
dialogue
Discursive detachment of North
Korea from Iran (the end of the
axis of evil); the imposition of
international sanctions
which nevertheless contains a strong idealist discourse. The idealist rhetoric has,
however, often failed to materialise in practice as symbolic signals such as Obama’s
warm handshaking with Chavez and suppression of critical references to China’s
human-rights record show. Indeed, the first months of Obama’s policy suggest that
the gap between the level of discourse and the level of political actions has been
widened to an unprecedented degree. Most importantly for the purpose of this
article, the first experience with Obama’s foreign and security policy has revealed his
specific vision of the desirable character of international order. The intuitive
assertion that Obama would prefer deep multilateralism after the period of Bush’s
unilateralism has been proven rather incorrect, despite the fact that an emphasis on
multilateral solutions has resonated in his rhetoric.
More specifically, Obama’s foreign-political practice could be best conceptualised
as nominal multilateralism (Ruggie 1992). This concept was used to criticise the
shallow understanding of multilateralism by neo-liberal institutionalist scholars who
emphasised the state’s formal commitments (presence at multilateral platforms and
preference for a class of actions which would include three and more states; Krasner
1983, Keohane 1984, Oye 1986). What nominal multilateralism lacks is a strong
qualitative dimension. As Ruggie (1992, p. 565) has shown, the nominal definition of
multilateralism in fact subsumes institutional forms that have been traditionally
attributed to bilateralism, but not to multilateralism. Importantly, Ruggie (1992,
pp. 564568) distinguishes between an international order, an international regime
and an international organisation and goes on to argue that each of these can be
multilateral in its form. Indeed, Ruggie’s distinction enables us to see that while
Obama’s multilateralism has been confined to the levels of international regimes and
European Security
267
international organisations, his preference at the deepest level of international order
has been for bilateralism. Since an interstate order is defined by Ruggie (1993, p. 12)
as a set of ‘constitutive rules that order relations in a given domain of international
life’, i.e. an architectural dimension, it becomes clear why at the levels of
international regimes and international organisations his maximum could be
nominal multilateralism.
There has been a growing number of instances of Obama appearing to favour an
international order based on a framework of interactions between great powers,
especially including Russia and China. In contrast to the preference of a great power
concert of the ninetieth century, Obama’s efforts towards a great power concert are
not multilaterally based, but instead they involve a series of bilateral relations, i.e.
bilateral parallelism. The crux is the US’ relationship with Russia in the form of
a strategic condominium (for the concept, cf. Bellany 1983, p. 77, Kokoshin 1998,
p. 198, Andrews 2005, p. 110) and the efforts towards the creation of a new strategic
regime that would mutually link the USA with China in the realm of security. In the
case of China, manifestations of this bilateralism exist only in areas outside of
security (the economy, or the focal point of the Copenhagen Summit on global
warming in the G2 interactions of the USA and China).
Two examples: the NATO ISAF mission and missile defence
Obama’s deepest preference for bilateral parallelism has been complemented by his
nominal multilateral commitment, especially when dealing with the allies. The first
illustrative example concerns the strategy for Afghanistan. President Obama made
his ideas about the future action public on 27 March 2009, just a week before
the NATO Summit held in Strasbourg/Kehl (Obama 2009). Arguably, his comprehensive statement was aimed at setting the agenda for the summit. Although there
were no doubts about the leading role of the USA in Afghanistan, some of the
strategic moves outlined by President Obama were met with considerable reservations in Europe (interview with a NATO official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
Belgium, 26 September 2009). Additionally, the NATO Summit in France and
Germany was considered to be one of the first tests of Obama’s ability to convince
the European allies to become more engaged in Afghanistan. This attempt to
strengthen the multilateral framework came in difficult times as the security situation
was dramatically deteriorating and many European governments were considering a
withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan was one of the
major topics in Strasbourg/Kehl, the Final Declaration remained concise and general
on this issue (NATO 2004). It could be concluded that Obama’s so-called AfPak
strategy became paramount to NATO’s strategy, and that the European allies were
put in the position of actors who contribute to Afghanistan’s security and stability,
rather than that of actors who actively participate in the production of the related
strategy (interviews at ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2630 September
2009). While President Obama nominally upheld the multilateral framework, he also
showed an assertive strategy when pushing the agenda through.
Whereas the case of the AfPak strategy at the levels of NATO as an
international organisation and the related security regime (ISAF) shows at least
patterns of nominal multilateralism, the example of missile defence, which is raised
here and reaches Ruggie’s deepest level of international order, indicates a strong
268 N. Hynek et al.
bilateral tendency while neglecting the NATO multilateral framework. Bush’s
administration decided to go ahead with the plan of the so-called third pillar of
the US National Missile Defence (NMD) by placing its components in the Czech
Republic (an X-band radar) and Poland (ten ground-based, exo-atmospheric
interceptors). The issue of the third pillar of the NMD was originally discussed on
a purely bilateral basis between the US Government and the Czech and Polish
Governments. Although Washington as well as Warsaw preferred this format from
the very outset, the effect of the Czech pressure (mainly due to the firm preferences of
the Green Party, a junior coalition member) was the so-called NATOisation
(multilateralisation) of the project. This was a logical move from a strategic point
of view, as the NMD was to become a complementary part of the NATO’s Active
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) project (Hynek 2008). The
resulting form was designed to provide for a complex defence against all types of
ballistic missile threats. The process of NATOisation was officially embraced in the
Bucharest Summit Final Declaration issued in April 2008 (NATO 2008). The formal
declaration was crucial as it forged an uneasy consensus at the multilateral level,
suppressing previous criticism of the third pillar of the NMD by the European allies.
US bilateralism towards Russia: a strategic condominium in making?
Despite the fact that in Central Europe the discourse on the MD was heavily
burdened by simplistic geopolitics and historicism, in our view, it was the multilateral
commitment that was at stake when President Obama was taking the decision
regarding the third pillar of the BMD. This was the case not because of the result, but
rather because of the procedure (or rather the lack of a procedure as far as
coordination with the allies was concerned) through which Obama arrived at his
decision. It was striking how NATO totally disappeared from his explanations of the
future of the third pillar. Although the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Final Declaration
‘reaffirmed’ the conclusions of the Bucharest Summit in this issue area, including the
commitment to place the backbone of the future MD system at the NATO level, in
reality, President Obama essentially took a unilateral (and bilaterally informed)
decision to terminate the implementation of the third pillar (NATO 2004, Article 50).
The context in which this development occurred is crucial for one’s comprehension of
the link between Obama’s deeper preference for bilateralism and his nominal
multilateral commitment. In regard to the former, the key priority for Obama was
strategic arms-control negotiations with Russia (as well as his rather naı̈ve vision of a
future disarmament). In order to achieve this goal, he completely reframed the third
pillar of the NMD from a narrowly defined geo-strategic issue, as it was originally
understood by Bush, into a political bargaining chip for negotiations about the
nuclear-arms control and for a coordinated advance with Russia towards Iran (New
York Times 2009).
President Obama’s bilateral approach towards Russia follows a track that was
already established by George W. Bush, who, in his final years in office, laid the
foundations for what is termed here ‘the USRussian strategic condominium’. Being
far from an inclusive framework, deep bilateralism tends to become a format for
discussions of political and security issues that were traditionally reserved for
multilateral platforms. The pattern of the strategic condominium could already be
seen during the Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ visit to Prague in October 2007.
European Security
269
To the great surprise of the mass media and the then Czech Prime Minister Mirek
Topolanek, Gates unambiguously hinted that the US Government was seriously
discussing with the Russians their presence on the planned MD radar base in Brdy,
Czech Republic (Hospodáı̀ské noviny 2007). That this was not an aberration has
repeatedly been suggested by the top meetings of the former Presidents Bush and
Putin (in Sochi right after the Bucharest Summit) and of Presidents Obama and
Medvedev (in London right before the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and then in Moscow
in July 2009). The US foreign policy’s propensity to deal with essential political and
security issues such as missile defence or Iran within the framework of the strategic
condominium presents a fundamental challenge for all European states, regardless of
whether they are ‘new’ or ‘old’. The following lines discuss the already existing
fallouts and also reflect on the implications.
Implications for CEE countries: from frustrations to realignment
Russia courts Europe
Obama’s call for Europeans to strengthen their defence capabilities, as well as the US
discourse on the ‘responsibilisation’ of Europe, has been interpreted differently in
different political corners (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2009a). It
is becoming clear that the relative US withdrawal from Europe regardless of to
what extent it is perceived or real is closely watched by Russia. A part of the most
recent Russian strategy is trying to convince Russia’s European counterparts that the
declining American interest in Europe consequently means that Russia and Europe
need to strengthen their security interdependencies. In other words, a new European
security framework with less and less US involvement is inconceivable without
Russia’s fully fledged participation in European security issues (Kořan 2009).
Russia’s recent proposal for a new European security architecture (the so-called
Medvedev plan) certainly capitalises on the perceived decline of the US role in
European affairs. Although the first version of the Medvedev plan was introduced
back in June 2008, it was the US decision to scrap the project of the third pillar of the
BMD that reinvigorated the Russian efforts in this direction (Russia Today 2009).
Some commentators correctly exposed the hidden agenda of the plan and the
associated problems (if not dangers) for Europe in general and for Central European
countries in particular. In regard to the former, attempts to divide and bind NATO as
well as efforts to undermine existing European security treaties (the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) treaty) are the most important; as for the latter, the most prominent
problems have been Russia’s attempts to claim an analogue to the Monroe Doctrine
for what Russia labels the ‘Near Abroad’ (van Herpen 2008, Lo 2009). Initially,
there was some positive reaction to the plan in Europe back in 2008. The fact that the
French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, suggested after his meeting with Medvedev in
November 2008 that ‘we could meet in mid-2009 to lay foundations of what could
possibly be a future pan-European security system’ was largely influenced by his
opposition to the then active US plans to build the third site of the NMD (Traynor
and Harding 2008). Although one could be tempted to explain Sarkozy’s position as a
result of France being one of the major European powers and of seeing the potential
advantages of a closer security cooperation with Russia through a more direct
270 N. Hynek et al.
approach, the analysis below, which relies on the most recent evidence, suggests a
completely different development, both for France and for CEE countries.
An emotional plea to the USA not to leave CEE
Since the end of the cold war, there was until Obama’s decision to trade the third
pillar of the BMD for a more general strategic bilateralism with Russia a general
feeling that the region was secure due to its strategic and political importance to the
USA. A majority of the CEE countries experienced strong governmental proponents
of the security relationship with the USA. This hugely influential part of the political
elite has been known throughout the region simply as the Atlanticists (Eichler 2005,
Drulák et al. 2008). Thus, for example, Poland used the ‘supply-driven leadership’
which was offered by the then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to this
regional champion of US values to self-consciously invent and install itself into the
role of a senior ‘pro-European Atlantist’(cf. Stefan Batory Foundation 2004). This
ambiguous label deserves a short comment on its political function. The intention
was to simultaneously say three things: (1) that Poland, as an EU member, is
sceptical and suspicious of the development of the CFSP/CSDP; (2) that Poland has
considerable pro-American tendencies; and (3) that these tendencies are direct and
often bypass NATO.
This Polish self-perceived exceptionalism, driven by the political ambitions and
supported by the domestic consensus, fittingly encountered the ‘Rumsfeldian’
American foreign policy, and Poland became a byword for the ‘New Europe’ (cf.
Šedivý and Zaborowski 2004, Stı̀ı́tecký 2006). The situation was similar in the Baltic
states, the Czech Republic and other regional states. This is not to say that small
cracks (at first) and quite large cracks (later on) did not start to appear in the US
CEE political interactions during the Bush administration. These could be attributed
to a certain degree of disillusionment of the CEE countries with their treatment by
the USA in light of their contribution to the stabilisation of Iraq, the mission in
Afghanistan and, in the case of Poland, also to missile defence. The cracks stemmed
mainly from the lack of material rewards that was expected by the CEE political
elites in return for their participation in various coalitions of willing and also in the
NATO ISAF mission.
Judging by the political reaction, however, the biggest shock came when Obama
announced his plan to cancel the US plans to build the third pillar of the BMD in
September 2009. Since Obama’s inauguration, there has been a growing feeling in
many CEE countries that they are being left behind by his administration, be it for
the sake of better American relations with Russia or because the USA simply
reconsidered its strategic commitment in CEE to engage in other more important parts of the world (for a telling analysis of the possible American realism towards
Russia, see Sestanovich 2008, Kořan 2009). The initial CEE panic, one cannot really
call it by a different name, was quickly replaced by emotional pleas in which the
darkest visions and traditional geopolitical realism are resurfaced. The whole region
was portrayed as being in danger of falling into the closed sphere of influence called
as the Near Abroad. An embodiment of this conviction and of a strategy that
stems from it can perhaps best be seen in an open letter to Obama that was written
by 22 prominent CEE thinkers, politicians and intellectuals, and published in the
Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza. The letter unveils deep concerns about President
European Security
271
Obama’s new realistic foreign policy, which allegedly tends to overlook the CEE
region and is said to lead to long-lasting damages, especially in regard to the
restlessly growing ambitions of Russia. In the letter, the United States are asked to
reconfirm their mission as a European power and show their readiness to stay fully
engaged in CEE even though they face tough challenges elsewhere (Gazeta Wyborcza
2009a).
The impossible happens: the Europeanisation of the CEE Atlanticists
The open letter to Obama, which overflows with backward thinking, frustration and
emotions, should not be taken as the universal measure of CEE political action. On
the contrary, important and counter-intuitive changes can be seen in an analysis of
the most recent steps of the regional political elite. In July 2009, Poland made an
important and progressive decision to include the then European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) as one of the priorities of its EU presidency programme (the
second half of 2011). What is more, Poland surprisingly joined France in its efforts to
assert the European security dimension, with the potential to neutralise the previous
French backing of Russian security plans. This new and quite unexpected partnership was made public when the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kuchner, visited
Poland in July 2009 (Gazeta Wyborcza 2009b). Consequently, Poland started to build
a CEE coalition in order to support its decision to include the ESDP/CSDP among
its political priorities (interview with a Senior Czech diplomat based in Poland,
Warsaw, 6 September 2009). So far, the most interesting development in this
direction has been Poland’s attempt to revitalise EU’s Group of Six (G6) platform,
i.e. an unofficial group of the six most populated countries (Germany, France, UK,
Italy, Spain and Poland1; interview with a Senior Czech diplomat based in Poland,
Warsaw, 6 September 2009). Although the original focus of the G6 was the substance
of the third pillar of the EU (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters),
Poland has been trying to initiate discussions of other political issues, including the
future shape and tasks of European security.
The above development represents quite a departure from the previously
dominant strategy of CEE countries to build their political standing through the
means of cultivation of a special relationship with the USA. That the process of
the Europeanisation of CEE in the security field has not been limited to Poland can
be seen in the recent turn in the thinking of the prominent neoconservative and
former staunch Atlanticist Alexander Vondra, who formerly served as the Czech
Minister for EU Affairs (as a part of former PM Topolanek’s strategy to nullify the
country’s ESDP/CSDP commitment) and has been one of the signatories of the open
letter to Obama. He has openly stated that due to the US withdrawal from the
region, it is the right time to take European security seriously and deepen ties among
the European allies (Vondra 2008). Since Slovakia espoused a more pro-European
security outfit in the security dimension already some 3 years ago, and as Hungary’s
Atlanticism was always rather shallow and pragmatic (see Drulák et al. 2008,
pp. 148150), it is obvious that the rock-solid pro-US orientation of the CEE
countries that was long taken for granted has faded (cf. Debski 2009), with Poland,
the Czech Republic and even the Baltic states (Jukneviciene 2009) shifting towards
European security architecture and policy.
272 N. Hynek et al.
‘Normal life’, not a ‘special relationship’ with the USA
While it is still too early to fully assess the future potential of the discussed changes,
it is already clear that there is much more political space within CEE for adopting a
different view on the balance between pro-European and pro-US orientations. There
has been a growing recognition that instead of building ‘special’ or ‘strategic’
relationships with the USA on a bilateral and/or regional basis, a stronger EU is
needed in order for CEE to be a globally credible actor and politically responsible
partner for the USA. An eloquent example of this new line of thinking was an
address by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, which was
delivered on 5 August 2009 in San Francisco. Sikorski said, ‘We support building a
more federal [European] Union, which is able to play in global fields of competition
as one of the strongest players . . . I am sure that a Union, which is able to take its fair
share of responsibility for global affairs, is compatible with interests of the United
States’ (Sikorski 2009). Indeed, there is a growing understanding within CEE that a
stronger Europe with its own reinvigorated security architecture is needed for dealing
effectively with Russia.
Recent efforts of CEE countries to centre their security commitments and loyalty
on the EU have resonated well with the interests of the US Government. Taking into
account a message that was conveyed by the US Vice President Joe Biden during his
October 2009 trip to Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, the USA strongly
welcomed such initiatives. One of the key aims of Biden’s journey was precisely to
confirm the ‘normalisation’ of the relationship between the USA and CEE, thereby
encouraging these countries to become partners rather than protégés of the USA. In
his speech on the USCEE partnership, Biden went on to paraphrase one of the old
speeches of the former Czech president and signatory of the open letter to Obama,
Vaclav Havel, maintaining that ‘[a] person who cannot move and live a normal life
because he is pinned under a boulder has more time to think about hopes than
someone who is not trapped in this way’ (The White House Office of the Vice
President 2009b). It can be expected that the CEE countries will be more cautious
and perhaps more self-confident when it comes to deal making with the USA from
now on. The change of the discourse and an emerging political consensus on
strengthening Europe, including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
ESDP/CSDP, might become one of the most important changes in CEE of the past
decade (Stı̀ı́tecký and Hynek 2009).
The ‘normalisation’ of relations with the USA and a significant shift towards the
European Union do not, however, entail a resignation on the transatlantic agenda.
The CEE countries have currently focused on the development of the new NATO
Strategic Concept. In particular, the CEE countries have emphasised the need to gain
NATO’s re-assurance with regard to the Article V of the Washington Treaty
(interview with a high official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, Czech
Republic, 11 December 2009) as well as rejecting any agreement with Russia which
would be modelled after the Medvedev Plan (for more details, see an interview with
Radoslaw Sikorski; Central Europe Digest 2009).
To sum up, it is clear that none of the CEE countries are willing to positively react
to proposals to grant Russia more influence over European security affairs. Also,
instead of seeking US protection by having a special status in the USFSP, which was
previously an intuitive and near-automatic position (often at the expense of their
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273
relations with the ‘old member countries’), the CEE countries have genuinely begun
to be interested in strengthening the European political and security project. How
this stance can be translated into the overall European security strategy depends to a
large extent on the position of Germany. Germany’s new government can be seen as
the key to the future of European security and transatlantic relations. This role also
involves rebuilding the strained ties between Germany and the CEE countries. After
all, it was Poland where the new German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle went
for his first official visit.
Implications for Germany: strengthening ESDP/CSDP and balancing Russia
‘Improved vagueness’ with the USA, a complicated position in NATO
Bilateralism usually comes to Germany as an offer from both Washington and
Moscow. During the 1990s, the GermanUS relationship hinged on the strategic
leadership the USA offered to the reunited Germany. George H.W. Bush in 1989 as
well as Bill Clinton in the 1990s offered Germany a ‘partnership in leadership’ (Bush
1989). Germany under Helmut Kohl, however, always avoided exceptionalism in
relations with the USA and sought to construct a new German foreign policy as a
continuation of the rather low key presence of Germany in the international arena.
This pattern was interrupted when the much more ambitious political attitude of the
then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder clashed with the unilateralist approach
of the then US President George W. Bush. Schroeder’s ‘unlimited solidarity’ with the
USA after 9/11 did not extend to the military pre-emptive action, where German
policy saw a chance for political prevention (cf. Harnisch 2004, pp. 134, Lundestad
2004, pp. 34). The crisis of the GermanUS relations reached its peak when Berlin
forged a ‘coalition of unwilling’ with France and Russia in order to oppose the
US-led invasion of Iraq. The ostentatious emancipation from the US hegemony
represented an unprecedented shift in German policy and, in light of the recent US
steps which were discussed in the beginning of the article, the reason for the current
worries concerning future moves by Germany (Stelzenmüller 2009, p. 89, Szabo 2009,
pp. 2341).
Despite the fact that the current German Chancellor Angela Merkel managed to
restore much of the trust between Germany and the USA since 2005, several
structural issues, nevertheless, separated Germany and the USA during the George
W. Bush administration. These were mainly the ‘caveats’ visible in Germany’s limited
engagement in the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, its objections to NATO’s
enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, and its scepticism towards the third pillar of
the NMD. With the Obama administration, the latter two issues, arguably, lost their
critical relevance. The limitations on the German military involvement in Afghanistan, however, represent a test not only of GermanUS relations but also of the intraNATO unity itself. While German nation-building efforts in Afghanistan have been
considerable and, up to a point, relatively successful, the same cannot be said about
the country’s military contribution. Recently, Berlin has withdrawn the political
mandate for the German Special Forces, which had previously been involved in war
fighting alongside the US troops (Deutscher Bundestag 16. Wahlperiode 2008, p. 4).
Germany’s future commitment is being put into question not only by the deliberate
and sustained attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against German troops in
274 N. Hynek et al.
Northern Afghanistan but also by the associated threat of a possible legal action
against German military personnel, as the case of the German commander who
ordered an air strike in the Kunduz Province on 4 September 2009 and may stand
trial for manslaughter in Dresden, Germany suggests (Der Spiegel 2009a, Der Spiegel
2009b). The situation seems to be anchored in zero-sum logic: on the one hand, there
is considerable US pressure on Germany to engage in combat operations; on the
other, German military involvement stretches beyond the country’s traditional postSecond World War normative taboo and is thus unpopular with the public.
Obama’s nominal multilateralism towards NATO and his preference for deeper
bilateralism in relation to Russia came as no surprise to most politicians in Berlin,
and the reaction has been sober (interview with Karsten Voigt, Coordinator of
GermanAmerican Cooperation at the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany, 29
June 2009). The only exceptions to this have been younger conservative politicians,
who expressed their worries about a return of Russian imperial ambitions and
directly criticised the USRussian strategic bilateralisms (von Kladen 2009b).2 The
generally sober reaction can be attributed to the Germans’ conviction that their
country will be even more important to the USA, particularly due to Germany’s
pivotal role as a consensus builder within the EU as well as its possible role in the
USRussian dealings. Indeed, the German foreign and security policy has always
had to live with superpower bilateralism, and this forms the basis of Germany’s belief
that the recent situation is not too different from previous US attempts to engage the
USSR/Russia in political dialogue, mainly in the strategic arms-control domain
(interview with a high official of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany, 30
June 2009). However, it remains to be seen to what extent Germany, with its current
problems in/with NATO, can rely on the traditional card of integrating this process
into the Alliance’s multilateral framework (interview with a high official of the
Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany, 29 June 2009). Despite the calm German
reaction, German politicians seem to guess rather than know what the future of
their relationship with the USA will be. This has been clear from Merkel’s recent
address to the US Congress, in which she discursively returned to the 1990s and the
proved concept of ‘partnership in leadership’, although this time, the concept was
discursively wrapped up in the European framework.3
These long-term settings will also delimit a space for the new German right-wing
government. To begin with, it is unlikely that Angela Merkel will loose control over
the agenda of relations with the USA and Russia. At the same time, she has not
clearly presented her ideas concerning her country’s preferences in the area of foreign
and security policy. Additionally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido Westerwelle,
who has been mentored by Hans Dietrich Genscher seeks to establish his profile
through the introduction of two initiatives. Both, balanced Ostpolitik as well as
intensification of relations with Poland and other CEE countries, could yet prove to be
important but remain sketchy so far (Werner 2009). Also, there has been a notable
tendency to domesticate German foreign and security policy, often incorrectly
understood as re-nationalisation, lying in the attempts of domestic semi-sovereign
actors in Germany, mainly the Federal Constitutional Court and Länder, to gain
more influence over the German foreign policy. This trend of ‘rescuing the nation
state’ apparently sets new limits to executive driven foreign policy (Hranisch 2009,
pp. 464466).
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275
Reinforcing the commitment to European security
It is the real depth of the USARussian strategic bilateralism that will determine
whether the USFSP will pose a challenge to or represent a chance for Germany.
As the previous section showed, it is clear that the USA is not in a hurry to nail down
the nature of its relationship with Germany. Also, due to the complicated position of
Germany in NATO, one of the recent developments has been the significant German
investment into strengthening EU security. The pro-European multilateralism of
Germany is of a principal nature, going far beyond a purely instrumental approach.
In Ruggie’s terms, it is rooted at the level of the international/European order. As far
as Germany’s security strategy is concerned, it has rested on the notion of so-called
reflexive multilateralism (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2002, p. 690). The concept has been
fulfilled by Berlin’s emphasis on the redirection of bilateral impulses into multilateral
frameworks, especially by the strengthening of the EU as a security actor and the
integration of Russia into the G8. Germany’s reflexive multilateralism can be
understood as a deeply internalised, culturally induced habit, an approach used to
secure influence and rely on confidence-building measures (Baumann 2002, p. 5).
Since the former Chancellor Schroeder’s discourse on German ‘enlightened interests’
and the politics of the ‘German way’ (Hacke 2003), the previous German policy of an
‘exaggerated’ multilateralism has been transformed into a more pragmatic approach;
today, Germany does not refrain from defining its national interest and preferences
(Baumann 2006, Hellmann 2009).
The pragmatic style of Germany’s foreign and security policy does not, however,
suggest its de-Europeanisation, but, in the context of the recent steps of the USA
and the country’s complicated situation in NATO, rather the opposite trend: its
Europeanisation. Current developments suggest that Germany has moved beyond
being what Waever calls an ‘anti-power state’, which was a characteristisation of
Germany up until the recent past (Wæver 2005, p. 57). Thus, the latest document on
the matter, which was jointly produced by Germany’s Federal Foreign Office and its
Federal Ministry of Defence, emphasises that ‘German security policy is largely
defined through the European Union. The Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) of the European Union and the ESDP as an integral part of the CFSP have
assumed ever greater importance. In this context, the ESDP plays a decisive part in
developing a balanced partnership with NATO and the United States’ (Germany’s
Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Defence 2009). Furthermore, the
Lisbon Treaty is perceived as an upgrading of the EU’s security potential as it
broadens the spectrum of its actions. The member states commit themselves to
mutual assistance (through a solidarity clause and a mutual defence clause; Art.
42/7). Significantly, small groups of states are allowed to act on their own when the
mission secures the unanimous support of the Council. Last but not least, the
European Defence Agency (EDA)’s competencies have been recently expanded to
contribute to the regular assessment of participating EU countries in respect to their
capabilities (interview with a high official of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin,
Germany, 30 June 2009).
Although Germany has to a growing extent been committed to the ESDP/CSDP,
it cannot itself ensure an efficient and effective EU collective security action. On the
one hand, Germany shows a serious commitment to the multilateralist future of
security and defence in the EU. Beyond political and institutional design, Germany’s
276 N. Hynek et al.
contribution is crucial, especially when it comes to the implementation of obligations
concerning levels of troops of EU member states. Germany has actively co-shaped
the system of battlegroups, which comes back to the Headline Goals. More
specifically, Germany has been involved in the creation of eight battlegroups (in
the period of 20072013), all of which are multinational. The country has become
one of only a few EU states which were ready and able to offer their command and
control capacity to the EU, created the European Operations HQ (Potsdam, Geltow)
and has been actively engaging other EU states to use this instrument (Mölling
2007). To mention but one example of another EU state using this instrument, the
joint Czech and Slovak battlegroup used the Operations HQ. The experience of close
cooperation with CEE countries is perceived by the German military officials as an
example of a new quality in the common action of the EU member states (interview
with a high ranking official at the Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, Germany,
3 July 2009). On the other hand, should this push for Europeanisation fail, German
policy has more room for manoeuvre than most of the other EU states. A high
ranking German official acknowledged that military superpowers and great powers
can unlike Germany conduct unilateralist policy, but he added that ‘Germany
can take the liberty of bilateralism. Hopefully, we remain multilateral, but countries
such as the Czech Republic are much more dependent on multilateralism than
Germany. . .A failure of the Lisbon Treaty would come at a much greater expense for
Czech interests than for German interests’ (interview with Karsten Voigt, Coordinator of GermanAmerican Cooperation at the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin,
Germany, 29 July 2009). Paradoxically, like Germany’s multilateralism in the 1950s,
this new bilateralism would come as a German reaction to the changing external
environment not as Germany’s first choice.
Energy dealings with Russia: (decreasing) economic deviation
The notion of a ‘strategic partnership’ has also been used in a different context to
depict the nature of GermanRussian energy relations. Not only has this language
worried the USA, but also Germany’s partners in the EU have been suspicious of it
for some time as well. The worries have been strengthened in light of the recent
security situation, which was analysed in the previous sections. One could hear
opinions suggesting that since the USA deepened its strategic bilateralism towards
Russia, Germany could perhaps resort to the same strategy. The realm of energy has
been then used to suggest that a precedent already exists. To what extent are these
worries substantiated? To begin with, there are good reasons to believe that the much
feared ‘strategic partnership’ between Germany and Russia has been less a reflection
of political and security cooperation between the two countries than a realisation of
their growing mutual dependency in the energy sector and pragmatic cooperation.
The attempts of the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank Walter
Steinmeier to recast the ‘strategic partnership’ as a ‘modernisation partnership’ had
all the typical features of the German Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Bahr era (Steinmeier
2008). The ‘change-through-rapprochement’ concept was no less controversial
during the 1970s and the 1980s than it is now, as in both cases it was seen as an
overly friendly attitude towards a difficult but important partner. German
Atlanticists viewed it as an irresponsible drifting of the German social democracy
towards Russia (von Kladen 2009). The proposal, however, was designed to make the
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277
relationship more matter-of-fact and, no less importantly, to raise the profile of
Steinmeier’s policy agenda within the grand coalition (interview with an official of
planning department of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany, 22 April 2009).
It has mostly been practical economic cooperation that has been at the heart of
the GermanRussian relationship rather than political and security grand designs.
The two countries proceed from quite different perspectives; the Russian policy often
boils down to a zero-sum game attitude while Germany’s follows the logic of nonzero-sum games, which allows for absolute gains. Also, neither the German public
nor the mainstream German media are pro-Russian. Additionally, the ‘strategic
partnership’ has little social backing. Not even the German classe politique has
engaged in deliberation on relations with Russia; there are only a few politicians who
have their own Russian expertise and entertain direct contacts with the Russian
policy-makers, let alone broader societal circles (interview with editor of Osteuropa
Volker Weichsel, Germany, Berlin, 24 April 2009). The bulk of GermanRussian
relations thus fall into the realm of the economic. There are 4600 German firms
which operate in Russia, and Russia occupied the 12th place among the importers of
German goods and the eighth place among exporters into Germany in mid-2008
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). The German Government has sought to secure
Russian investment into the German economy, especially into some of its hard struck
companies, such as the Wadan shipyards or Opel. The German Government has
even shown a readiness to risk criticism from the EU Commission. In fact, Germany
has always shown resilience in its pursuit of the national interest when it came to the
economy and securing energy resources. What is often forgotten is the fact that even
the Kohl Government did not give in to the US pressure and continued the gas
pipeline deal with the USSR, which effectively started the export of massive gas and
oil supplies from today’s Russia to Germany and Western Europe.4
How important are the energy links between the two countries in political terms
really? Most importantly of all, Germany is ever less inclined to perceive its energy
relations with Moscow as a security issue, thereby effectively refusing the discourse
on ‘energy security’ (see for example, Götz 2009, pp. 318). The German readiness to
push ahead with the North Stream project, notwithstanding the criticism from CEE
countries, represents a rather rare example of the national focus of German policy in
the area of international trade. Nevertheless, after the gas crisis in January 2009, the
German support for the North Stream and the South Stream pipelines has been
extended to include the EU’s ‘counter-project’ of the Nabucco pipeline. Joshka
Fischer has become an adviser to the Nabucco project in a gesture of defiance
directed against his former boss Schroeder and the North Stream project (Freifeld
2009). What is more, a partial Europeanisation of the German energy policy has
been under way, and it opens up chances to progress with the energy agenda in the
EU. While Germany may not be a driving force of the EU’s energy policy, it is not
expected to obstruct it either (interview with two high ranking officials of the Foreign
Office, London, UK, 28 May 2009). Therefore, the picture has become more diverse.
On the one hand, Germany is deepening its cooperation with Russia; for example,
a GermanRussian energy agency has been launched by Merkel and Medvedev in
July 2009 in order to increase the efficiency of the Russian energy sector with the help
of modern German technologies (Bundesministerium für Wirtshaft und Technologie
2009). During the German elections on 27 September 2009, German voters expressed
their opinions about the level of Germany’s dependence on Russian energy supplies
278 N. Hynek et al.
(Vinocur 2009). Finally, one of the top priorities of the new German Government
has been the diversification of energy resources (Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt
2009, p. 22).
Germany’s multilateral security balance with Russia
Unlike the bilateral energy policy with Russia, Germany’s security policy towards
Russia has been based on the former country’s strategy of redirecting Russia’s
bilateral offers to multilateral settings (the so-called reflexive multilateralism). Since
the end of the cold war, Russia has not been seen by the majority of German
politicians as a threat in military terms.5 While Germany’s reaction to the Georgian
Russian war over South Ossetia in 2008 had been unambiguously critical, the later
German attitude to Moscow has been one of damage limitation and engagement
rather than containment (Dembinski et al. 2008). As insiders know too well,
Germany prevented any proposal in the EU that could have led to a tougher line with
Russia (Horsley 2009, p. 21). Thus, many have not been surprised when the German
reaction to the proposal of President Medvedev for negotiations about the future
European security architecture has been positive. Proceeding from a process-oriented
approach to international security, any intensive dialogue with Russia is viewed in
Germany as a chance to overcome the existing estrangement. At the same time,
however, even the supporters of such an approach to Russia see the limits of such a
dialogue; a new European security treaty is only a matter of the distant future and
cannot be based on Russian preferences. In the meantime, the role of the OSCE may
not be questioned and the example of the CFE mechanism should be used to resort
to further arms-control talks (Steinmeier 2009). Except for Die Linke, the most leftwing party represented in the Bundestag, no German political party is in favour of
abandoning the existing security framework, which is based on NATO and the EU
(Die Linke 2009).
German policy is post-Bismarckian in its attitude to Russia; while trading with
Russia on a bilateral basis, Germany maintains its integrated security ties with the
EU and NATO. The security area offers a good example of Germany’s multilateral
commitment vis-à-vis Russia as the bilateral fixation on Russia in the economic/
energy field has not been replicated here. While Germany has been instrumental to the
EU and NATO and has worked with or through them (the imperative ‘nie wieder
allein’), Russia has never experienced effective multilateral integration. Germany has
thus remained cautious when it came to bilateral dialogue on issues concerning
European security and the wider interests of the Euro-Atlantic community.
Consequently, when it came to military cooperation, the GermanRussian links
have been rather embryonic. They are based on formal contacts and official visits
and in no way correspond to the word ‘strategic’ in the description of the German
Russian partnership (interview with two officials at the Federal Ministry of Defence,
Berlin, Germany, 22 May 2009). The new conservative-liberal government of
Germany perceives Russia as a partner in dealing with a number of regional and
global challenges. At the same time, the emphasis is not on security or military
cooperation, but on the political will to help Russia to proceed with democratisation
and the establishment of the rule of law (Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt 2009,
p. 120).
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279
Thus, what is the real issue in Germany’s relations with Russia in the context of
recent moves of the USA and NATO? It seems most unlikely that the balance
between the German energy bilateralism with Russia and the German security
multilateralism will be distorted in favour of further ‘bilateralisation’ of security
under the MerkelWesterwelle Government. The historically symbiotic relationship
between Prussia and Russia (Stent 2007, p. 436) can hardly translate into an effective
strategic partnership between Germany and Russia without Germany becoming
increasingly embedded in the EU and NATO. Even the pragmatic pro-Russian
business community does not seek to depart from Western integrated structures but
rather to gain extra room for manoeuvre and thus a special bonus and profit from
dealing with Russia. Rather than drifting towards exclusive security bilateralism with
Russia and/or the USA, two other issues loom large over the German policy of the
new conservative-liberal government. First, the new German question seems to be
the one of Germany’s responsibility for changing Russia’s attitude to the West and of
the German ability to stand up to Russia if necessary (Stelzenmüller 2009). Second, it
is not yet clear in both principle and practice how the bilateral strategic interest in
securing the Russian oil and gas supplies will be integrated into the multilateral
framework of the European energy security policy and solidarity. Germany, like
other big EU states, has developed a tradition of sovereignty in the energy sector,
which is not easy to abandon.
Conclusion
It might be considered untimely to draw conclusions about the impacts of the
USFSP on European security as President Obama has been in office for less than a
year at this point. However, this effort can still be supported by two issues addressed
in this article. First, Obama’s foreign and security policy steps have been closely
watched, i.e. something that is natural in light of his discursive rupture with the past
as well as his rhetorical emphasis on the resetting of USRussian relations. The
enthusiasm which has accompanied Obama’s inauguration and his first months in
office bedimmed an analytically fundamental gap in the USFSP between the level of
discourse and the level of practices. Second, the reflections of Obama’s USFSP have
already been visible at the level of policy-making and political strategy in CEE
countries and Germany and suggest interesting and sometimes unexpected political dynamics. One of the most important trends, both for Germany and
(more surprisingly) for CEE countries, has been the notable push for an
Europeanisation of the foreign and security policies of these countries, including
their commitments to the ESDP/CSDP.
The article has shown that Obama’s deepened bilateralisms vis-à-vis Russia and
his nominal multilateralism towards NATO and the European Union have lead to
several important security- and foreign-political dilemmas and revealed certain
ambiguities. Although the offer of a strategic bilateral arrangement is extremely
tempting for Russia, a country which traditionally strives for a relation of this sort,
Russia’s options are not limited to a principal role in an instrumentally oriented
strategic condominium. Another traditional tendency could materialise in Russia’s
bilateral ties with Germany following the two countries’ progressive significant
energy cooperation. As we showed in the article, however, this possibility is not
currently on the table as Germany’s politicians have been very careful to balance the
280 N. Hynek et al.
bilateral economic ties with a reflexive multilateral approach in the domain of
security. Last but not least, Russia could opt for making the best of the potential
strengthening of the European multilateral security frameworks and lean closer to
common European security interests, which would fulfil the traditional German idea
of Russia being a part of an inclusive European security multilateralism.
Consequently, Germany’s possibilities include that of joining the framework of
bilateral parallelisms while building strategic relations with both Russia and the
USA. This situation would apparently mean the worst-case scenario for the
European multilateral projects such as the CFSP and the ESDP/CSDP, which
have been of vital interest for the CEE countries. It should be noted, however, that
the general German preference remains with NATO and the EU, with the latter
developing into a more effective instrument of foreign, security and defence policy
after the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. As mentioned above, Germany will endeavour to
create room and incentives for Russian engagement in the European security
framework, and attempt to balance its position within the EU’s emerging energy
policy, thus making the bilateral and multilateral levels complementary.
Finally, the Polish case has revealed perhaps the strongest ambiguities. For a long
time, Poland aspired, arguably with limited success, to a special relationship with the
USA, installing itself into the role of the principal European Atlantist and backed by
an overwhelming domestic consensus in this orientation. For this reason, the recent
Polish turn towards the ESDP/CSDP, which was analysed in the article, has a
transformative potential for Poland’s traditional loyalty. On the other hand, the fact
that the ESDP/CSDP has been kept as one of the options for the country has been
revealingly expressed in Poland’s latest efforts to harbour a US Army military base
that would serve as a geopolitical shield against Russia after Obama’s redefinition of
the NMD plans. Indeed, although it seriously turned towards the ESDP/CSDP,
Poland and, to a lesser though not insignificant degree, other CEE countries have a
long way to go in reconciling their geopolitical imageries with the German efforts to
multilaterally bring Russia to Europe.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Volker Weichsel and anonymous reviewers for
their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The article examines the reactions of selected
European states to the US-performed ‘reset’.
Notes
1. Very recently, Poland’s interpretations of the so-called G6 have been modified so that Italy
and Spain were not counted among the six members, but the EU presidential country and
the European Commission were (thus replacing Italy and Spain). This can be read as
Poland’s further attempt to establish itself as one of the major EU powers (interview with a
Polish Security Analyst familiar with this development, Brno, the Czech Republic,
6 November 2009).
2. According to von Klaeden, Russian policy has ‘unmistakably neo-imperialist traits’ (see
Internationale Politik 2009, p. 23).
3. ‘Merkel remembered the ‘‘generous offer’’ but further elaborated only on a partnership
between Europe and the United States, avoiding direct references to USGerman
bilateralism’ (Die Bundeskanzlerin 2009).
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281
4. Germany imports about 32 per cent of its oil and 37 per cent of its gas from Russia. The
most important and the most controversial GermanRussian project is the North Stream
gas pipeline. The pipeline is worth 6 billion euros and will supply Germany and Western
Europe with 55 bcm per year, bypassing the traditional transit countries Poland and
Ukraine, and also the Baltic states. Essentially a private project, the North Stream would
never have taken off without the crucial and controversial involvement of the former
German Chancellor Schroeder. Importantly, the German Government has secured the
support of the European Commission for this enterprise.
5. The principal change of the security environment (the peace dividend of the end of the cold
war) has been at the core of the new security policy of Germany since the early 1990s;
Russia is perceived not as a threat but as a partner. See the ‘Verteidigunspolitische
Richtlinien 2003’ (the principal directions of the German defence policy) as adopted by the
government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Greens in 2003.
Similarly, the government of the Christian Democratic Union (CDUCSU) and the SPD
exceptionally referred to Russia in its white paper on security and armed forces as a
‘security partner’ (see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006, p. 23; similarly see Belkin
2008).
Notes on contributors
Nik Hynek is Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague and
Lecturer at Charles University and Metropolitan University. Previously, he was Visiting
Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
USA and Visiting Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. He has largely
researched on international security and theories of IR. His publications have been accepted,
among others, to Security dialogue, Defence studies, Journal of international relations and
development, International journal, Contemporary political theory, or Communist and PostCommunist studies. Nik has co-edited Canada’s foreign and security policy for Oxford
University Press (with David Bosold) and Critical human security studies for Routledge (with
David Chandler).
Vit Stritecky is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, Czech
Republic and a Ph.D. candidate and lecturer at the Charles University, where he reads
methodology and theory of security studies, critical security studies, and Marxism in IR. He
has previously studied IR at Charles University, conflict studies at the Uppsala University,
Sweden and international security at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He is the author
of several book chapters and journal articles dealing with the Czech and European security
policies and Georgian post-Soviet security and politics.
Vladimı́r Handl is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations. He worked in
19962000/20022003 for the Institute of German Studies (University of Birmingham), was
Visiting Fellow at a number of German research institutions (Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Helmut Schmidt Universität der
Bundeswehr in Hamburg among others). His main research focuses on German foreign,
security and European policy, CzechGerman relations, Czech foreign and security policy,
transition of the communist parties in Central Europe.
Michal Kořan holds his Ph.D. in international relations (2008), he is a head of research at the
Institute of International Relations, Prague and an assistant professor at the department of
International Relations and European Politics at the Masaryk University in Brno. He mainly
focuses on foreign policies of the Central European countries and on the role of the Central
European region in European and world politics. He has written many scholarly articles and
book chapters on this issue and he is a coordinator of the team of authors of the annual Czech
foreign policy analysis monographs.
282 N. Hynek et al.
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