j3D-FL - Samba

Transkript

j3D-FL - Samba

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obj\fkba abp_ofmqfsb(c\fifkd ql dbkbo\qb qeb ]\pfp clo bs\ir\qfkd qeb
pqobkdqep(tb\hkbppbp( lo mromlpbplc pr_e pqor_qrobp,Fk qeb mlpq)t\o
bu7\,l,f,"ab_liNi.fw\qflk, (%qNb7(olb\lkpqol7_qflk
MQ.'t\o)qlok pq\qbp(\ka qeb
,,bpq\]ifpejbkq lc ,kbt fkpqfqrqflkplc fkqbok\qflk\i dlsbok\k_b( pqrabkqp
lc mlifqf_pplrdeq \k \mmol\_e qe\q tlria ]ibka qebfopqrafbptfqe nrbp)
qflkp lc grpqf_b(bnrfqv( \ka qeb mroprfqlc pl_f\i( b_lkljf_( \ka mlifqf_\i
absbilmjbkq &Jb\a( .652',
0
Fkqefp_lkqbuqlc _e\kdb \ka ob\ppbppjbkq( pbsbo\i kbt \mmol\_ebp ql
qeb pqrav lc mlifqf_\imebkljbk\ \mmb\oba, Pljb cl_rpba lk qeb jf_ol
ibsbi lc erj\k ]be\sflro \ka qeb mpv_elildv lc _fqfwbkp(bib_qlop(ib\a)
bop(\ka iba8 lqebop _lk_bkqo\qbalk qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc k\qflk\i pl_f)
bqfbp\ka _riqrobp8pqfiilqebop cl_rpba lk qeb k\qrob lc k\qflk\i \ka
dil]\i mlifqf_\ipvpqbjp, Jlpq lc qebpb\mmol\_ebp)]be\sflro\ifpj(
bifqb
pqrafbp(pqrafbplc mlifqf_\i_riqrob( \ka mlifqf_\i _v]bokbqf_p)e\sb _ljb
\ka dlkb \p p_eli\op bumbofjbkqbatfqe b\_e ]bclob do\pmfkdfqpifjfq\)
qflkp \ka \]\kalkfkd fqql pb\o_e clo pljbqefkd ]bqqbo&@\fokp(
.641',
Lkb \mmol\_e( eltbsbo( fp pqfiitfqe rp, Fqpcl_rp fp klq pl jr_e lk
qeb pqor_qroblc dlsbokjbkqp lo qeb ]be\sflro lc mlifqf_\i \_qlop( lo lk
te\q dlsbokjbkqp pelria lo lrdeq ql al( ]rq lk te\q dlsbokjbkqp
\_qr\iiv al, Qefp \mmol\_e cl_rpbp lk mr]if_ mlif_fbp\ka mr]if_ mlif_v)
j\hfkd( lo( \p fqp lofdfk\qlop abbjba fq( BA=;6G
D78@68'Mflkbboba ]v
E\olia I\pptbii \ka lqebopfk qeb Rkfqba Pq\qbp\ka qeb RkfqbaHfkdalj(
mlif_v p_fbk_bt\p bumb_qbaql obmi\_bqo\afqflk\i mlifqf_\i pqrafbp(fkqb)
do\qfkdqeb pqrav lc mlifqf_\iqeblov \ka mlifqf_\imo\_qf_btfqelrq c\iifkd
fkql qeb pqbofifqvlc cloj\i( ibd\i pqrafbp &I\pptbii( .62.8 Qlodboplk(
.66-',
I\pptbii molmlpbaqe\q mlif_v p_fbk_be\a qeobbafpqfk_q_e\o\_qbofp)
qf_pqe\q tlria pbqfq\m\oq colj b\oifbo \mmol\_ebp7 fqtlria ]b jriqf)
afp_fmifk\ov( mol]ibj)plisfkd(
\ka
bumif_fqiv kloj\qfsb,
?v
jriqfafp_fmifk\ov( I\pptbii jb\kq qe\q mlif_v p_fbk_b pelria ]ob\h
\t\v colj qeb k\oolt pqrav lc mlifqf_\i fkpqfqrqflkp\ka pqor_qrobp\ka
bj]o\_b qeb tloh \ka cfkafkdp lc pr_e cfbiap \p pl_flildv \ka b_l)
kljf_p( i\t \ka mlifqf_p,?v mol]ibj(plisfkd( eb bksfpflkba \ mlif_v
p_fbk_b \aebofkd pqof_qivql qeb _\klk lc obibs\k_b( lofbkqfkd fqpbic
qlt\oap qeb plirqflk lc ob\i)tloia mol]ibjp \ka klq bkd\dfkd fk
mrobiv \_\abjf_ ab]\qbp qe\q( clo bu\jmib( _e\o\_qbofwba,fkqbomobq\)
qflk lc _i\ppf_\i \ka pljbqfjbp l]p_rob mlifqf_\i qbuqp,?v bumif_fqiv
kloj\qfsb( I\pptbii jb\kq qe\q mlif_v p_fbk_b pelria klq ]b _il\hba
fk qeb drfpb lc %p_fbkqfcf_
l]gb_qfsfqv%(]rq pelria ob_ldkfwbqeb fjmlp)
pf]fifqvlc pbm\o\qfkddl\ip \ka jb\kp( lo s\irbp \ka qb_ekfnrbp( fk qeb
pqrav lc dlsbokjbkq \_qflkp &Qlodboplk(.650', Eb bumb_qbamlif_v
\k\ivpqp ql p\v _ib\oiv tef_e plirqflk t\p ]bqqboqe\k lqebop,
Qeb dbkbo\i lofbkq\qflk qlt\oap qeb \_qfsfqfbplc dlsbokjbkqp prd)
dbpqba]v I\pptbii obj\fkp tfqe rp \ka clojp qeb pr]gb_qj\qqbo lc qefp
]llh, Eltbsbo( qeb m\pp\db lc qfjb e\p iba ql pljb _e\kdbp fk qeb qeobb
pmb_fcf__ljmlkbkqp lc qeb mlif_v lofbkq\qflk eb fabkqfcfba &D\oplk(
.6538 AbIblk( .653( .6558 E\kpbk( .650', Cfopq(tefib qeb bjme\pfp lk
jriqfafp_fmifk\ofqv obj\fkp( \ i\odb ]lav lc ifqbo\qrobklt cl_rpbp lk
mr]if_ mlif_v fk dbkbo\i, Mlif_vp_fbk_bfp sbov jr_e \ %afp_fmifkb%
fqpbic(
tfqe \ rkfnrb pbqlc _lk_bmqp\ka _lk_bokp \ka \ sl_\]ri\ov \ka qbojf)
klildv lc fqpltk &Cfpej\k( .66.', >iqelrde j\kv lc qebpb _lk_bmqp
e\sb ]bbk ]looltba colj lqebo afp_fmifkbp(qebv e\sb \ pljbte\q
1
M>OQ F 6LQOMCRBQGML
m\oqf_ri\ojb\kfkd tebk rpba fk qeb _lkqbuq lc¢pqravfkd mr]if_ mlif_v,
Croqebojlob( qeb _lk_bmqlc jriqfafp_fmifk\ofqve\p _e\kdba fk qeb pbkpb
qe\q mlif_v p_eli\op klt q\hb fqclo do\kqba qe\q qebv jrpq ]loolt colj
lqebo afp_fmifkbp\ka jrpq ]b bumboqp
fk \q ib\pq qtl cfbiap7qeb _lk_bmqp
\ka _lk_bokp lc mlif_v p_fbk_b(\ka qeb efpqlov \ka fpprbpmobpbkqfk qeb
pr]pq\kqfsb \ob\ lc mlif_v( lo qeb %mlif_vcfbia%rkabo bu\jfk\qflk
&>kaboplk(.646\',
Pb_lka( lsbo qeb m\pq1- vb\op qeb sfoqr\iiv bu_irpfsb _lk_bok lc j\kv
mlif_vp_eli\op tfqe _lk_obqbmol]ibj)plisfkd e\p t\kba, >q qeb lrqpbq fq
t\p elmba qe\q qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \ka fqp lrq_ljbp
tlria vfbia _lk_irpflkp \ka ob_ljjbka\qflkp
afob_qiv\mmif_\]ib ql
bufpqfkdpl_f\i mol]ibjp, >iqelrde i\ra\]ib( qefp j\ufj
clrkaboba lk
qeb _ljmibufqv lc qeb mlif_v mol_bppfqpbic(fk tef_e dlsbokjbkqp lcqbk
molsba obpfpq\kqql %bumboq%
\asf_b lk pr]gb_qp tfqe tef_e qebv tbob
ab\ifkd &Tfia\sphv( .6468 >p_ebo( .653', Fkqeb ob\i tloia lc mr]if_ mli)
f_v(qb_ekf_\i prmboflofqvlc \k\ivpfp t\p lcqbk pr]loafk\qba ql mlifqf_\i
kb_bppfqv,
Cfk\iiv( qeb _\iip clo qeb mlif_v p_fbk_bpql obj\fk bumif_fqivkloj\qfsb
\ipl _e\kdba lsbo qfjb( \iqelrde o\qeboibppqe\k e\sb ,qeblqebo clrka)
fkd mofk_fmibp,
Clo qeb jlpq m\oq(mlif_v p_eli\op e\sb obcrpbaql bu_irab
s\irbp colj qebfo \k\ivpbp \ka e\sb fkpfpqba lk bs\ir\qfkd ]lqe qeb
dl\ip \ka qeb jb\kp lc mlif_v( \p tbii \p qeb mol_bpplc mlif_v)j\hfkd
fqpbic,Eltbsbo( \k\ivpqp%abpfob ql mobp_of]bpmb_fcf_dl\ip \ka klojp
ab_ifkba tfqe \k fk_ob\pfkd ob\ifw\qflk lc qeb fkqo\_q\]fifqvlc j\kv mr])
if_ mol]ibjp, Ebk_b( j\kv fksbpqfd\qlopklt bfqebobs\ir\qb mlif_fbpfk
qbojp lc pfjmib jb\probp pr_e \p bccf_fbk_v¢lobccbbqfsbkbpp(
lo rpb qeb
ob_loa lc mlif_v bccloqp¢
ql bpq\]ifpe tebqebo dlsbokjbkqp e\sb fk mo\_)
qf_b ]bbk afob_qfkdqebfo \_qfsfqfbpqlt\oap qeb \_efbsbjbkq lc qebfo
pq\qbadl\ip( fk bfqebo_\pb tfqelrq _lkpfabofkd qeb abpfo\]fifqv lo o\qfl)
k\ifqv lc qebpbdl\ip qebjpbisbp &Dobbk]bodbq\F,( .6448 AbIblk( .661',
>p qebpb _e\kdbp l__rooba( pljb l]pbosbop ]bd\k ql _\pqfd\qb qeb
klqflk lc \ mlif_v %p_fbk_b%
\ka ql bnr\qb fqpmoljlqflk tfqe \k bo\ lc
rkob\ifwba elmbp \ka bumb_q\qflkpclo pl_f\i bkdfkbbofkd \ka¢ dlsbok)
jbkq mi\kkfkd &iif]b( .64/', >iqelrde pljbqfjbp grpqfcfba ]v qeb
fkci\qba _i\fjp lc fkafsfar\i pqrafbp( qefp _ofqf_fpj pelria pbosb \p \
t\okfkd \d\fkpq mobj\qrob lo fii)clrkaba mobp@ofmqflkp
lo bu_bppfsb_lk)
_bmqr\i plmefpqov(o\qeboqe\k \p \ obgb_qflklc qeb kbba ql rkaboq\hb qeb
pvpqbj\qf_ pqrav lc dlsbokjbkq \_qflkp, Ql qeb buqbkqqe\q qeb mlif_v p_f)
bk_bp e\sb absbilmba \ pfdkfcf_\kq]lav lc bjmfof_\i \ka qeblobqf_\i
pqrafbp lc qeb \_qfsfqfbplc krjbolrp dlsbokjbkqp \olrka qeb dil]b( qeb
b\oiv bccloqp\ka af_q\ lc I\pptbii \ka efp cliiltbop obj\fk s\ir\]ib \ka
_lkqfkrb ql molsfab qeb clrka\qflk rmlk tef_e qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mli)
f_v fp _lkar_qba &T\dkbo bq\i,( .66.',
>jlkd qeb j\kv _ljmbqfkd abcfkfqflkplc %mr]if_mlif_v%(pljb \ob sbov
_ljmibu( tefib lqebop \ob nrfqb pfjmib, Abpmfqbqebfos\of\qflkp( qebv \ii
\dobb lk _boq\fkhbv \pmb_qp,Qebv \dobb qe\q mr]if_ mlif_fbpobpriq colj
ab_fpflkp j\ab ]v dlsbokjbkqp \ka qe\q ab_fpflkp ]v dlsbokjbkqp ql
obq\fk qeb pq\qrp nrl \ob grpq\p jr_e mlif_v \p \ob ab_fpflkp ql \iqbo fq,
Fk lqebo obpmb_qp(
eltbsbo( qeb _ljmbqfkd abcfkfqflkpafccbo_lkpfabo\]iv
&?fohi\ka(/--.7 _e, .', Qeobb bu\jmibp lc tfabiv rpba abcfkfqflkp tfii
prccf_bql _lksbv qeb _ljmibu jb\kfkd lc qeb qboj,
Fk mol]\]iv qeb ]bpq hkltk( \ka peloqbpq(abcfkfqflk( Qelj\p Avb
lccbop\ m\oqf_ri\oiv pr__fk_q clojri\qflk( abp_of]fkd mr]if_ mlif_v \p
zkvqefkd \ dlsbokjbkq _ellpbp ql al lo klq ql al% &Avb(.64/7 /', Qefp
clojri\qflk fp mboe\mpqll pfjmib( clo fq tlria qob\qbnr\iiv \p mr]if_
mlif_v bsbov \pmb_qlc dlsbokjbkq\i ]be\sflro( colj mro_e\pfkd lo c\fi)
fkd ql mro_e\pb m\mbo_ifmpql t\dfkd lo c\fifkd ql t\db kr_ib\o t\o(
\ka molsfabp kl jb\kp lc pbm\o\qfkdqeb qofsf\i colj qeb pfdkfcf_\kq
\pmb_qplc dlsbokjbkq \_qfsfqfbp,Kbsboqebibpp(Avb%pabcfkfqflk fp klq
tfqelrq jbofqp,
Cfopq(Avb pmb_fcfbp
_ib\oiv qe\q qeb \dbkq lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd fp \
dlsbokjbkq, Qefp jb\kp qe\q mofs\qb]rpfkbpp ab_fpflkp( ab_fpflkp ]v
_e\ofq\]ib lod\kfw\qflkp( fkqbobpqdolrmp( lqebo pl_f\i dolrmp( lo fkafsfa)
r\ip \ob klq fk qebjpbisbp mr]if_ mlif_fbp,Tebk tb q\ih \]lrq mr]if_
mlif_fbptb pmb\h lc qeb \_qflkp lc dlsbokjbkqp, >iqelrde qeb \_qfsfqfbp
lc klk)dlsbokjbkq\i \_qlop j\v \ka _boq\fkival fkcirbk_b te\q dlsbok)
jbkqp al(\ka,sf_b sbop$ qeb)ab_fpf\Cip¢)-C)
\_qfsfqfbplc pr_e dolrmp al))
klq fk qebjpbisbp _lkpqfqrqbmr]if_ mlif_v, Elt qeb jbaf_\i molcbppflk
fkqbomobqp
qeb _\rpbp lc irkd _\k_bo \ka qeb plirqflkp fq molmlpbp clo
obar_fkd fqpfk_fabk_b j\v e\sb \ ]b\ofkd lk te\q \ dlsbokjbkq bsbkqr)
\iiv albp \]lrq qeb mol]ibj, Eltbsbo( qeb molcbppflk%p
molmlpba plir)
qflk ql qeb mol]ibj fp klq fqpbic\ mr]if_ mlif_v8lkiv jb\probp qe\q \
dlsbokjbkq \_qr\iiv \almqp lo bkalopbp _lkpqfqrqbpr_e \ mlif_v,
Pb_lka( Avb efdeifdeqp qeb c\_q qe\q mr]if_ mlif_fbpfkslisb \ crka$
jbkq\i _elf_b lk qeb m\oqlc dlsbokjbkqp ql al pljbqefkd lo ql al klqe)
fkd \ka qe\q qefpab_fpflk fp j\ab ]v fkafsfar\ip pq\ccfkdqeb pq\qb\ka fqp
\dbk_fbp, Mr]if_ mlif_v%
fp( \q fqppfjmibpq(\ _elf_b j\ab ]v dlsbokjbkq
ql rkaboq\hb pljb _lropb lc \_qflk, > pifdeqivjlob afccf_riq_lk_bmqfp
qe\q lc \ %kbd\qfsb%
lo %klk)ab_fpflk%7
qe\q fp( \ dlsbokjbkq%p ab_fpflk ql
al klqefkd( lo pfjmiv ql j\fkq\fk qeb pq\qrp nrl &@obkplk(.64.8 O,>,
Pjfqe( .646', Bsbk qebpb pelria ]b abif]bo\qb ab_fpflkp( eltbsbo( pr_e
\p tebk \ dlsbokjbkq ab_fabp klq ql fk_ob\pbq\ubp( lo ab_ifkbp ql j\hb
\aafqflk\i crkap \s\fi\]ib clo \oqp(eb\iqe _\ob( lo pljb lqebo mlif_v \ob\,
Qeb c\_q tb e\sb qeb cobbalj ql m\fkq qeb fkqbofloplc lro eljbp fk
_lilrop lc lro _elf_b( clo bu\jmib( albp klq jb\k qe\q qefp fp \ mr]if_
mlif_v(]b_\rpb qeb dlsbokjbkq kbsbo abif]bo\qbiv ab_faba klq ql obpqof_q
lro lmqflkp fk qefp\ob\,
Tfiif\j Gbkhfkp%p
_lk_bmqr\ifw\qflk lc mr]if_ mlif_vfp \ ]fq jlob mob)
_fpbqe\k qeb lkb lccboba]v Avb]rq fiirpqo\qbpj\kv lc qebp\jb qebjbp,
Eb abcfkbp mr]if_ mlif_v \p %\pbqlc fkqboobi\qbaab_fpflkp q\hbk ]v \
mlifqf_\i \_qlo lo, dolrm lc \_qlop _lk_bokfkd qeb pbib_qflklc dl\ip \ka
qeb jb\kp lc \_efbsfkd qebj tfqefk \ pmb_fcfbapfqr\qflk tebob qelpb
ab_fpflkp pelria( fk mofk_fmib(
]b tfqefk qeb mltbo lc qelpb \_qlop ql
\_efbsb% &Gbkhfkp(
.645', Qefp fp \ rpbcri abcfkfqflk( klq ib\pq ]b_\rpb
Gbkhfkpbumif_fqivsfbtp mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \p \ mol_bpp(rkifhb Avb%p
abcfkfkd fq \p \ _elf_b( tef_e mobprjbp qeb¢bufpqbk_blc \k rkaboivfkd%
mol_bpp]rq albp klq pq\qbp3 bumif_fqiv,Gbkhfkp\ipl bumif_fqiv\_hklti)
badbp qe\q mr]if_ mlif_v fp rpr\iiv %\pbq lc fkqboobi\qzaab_fpflkp%,Fk
lqebo tloap( o\obiv albp \ dlsbokjbkq \aaobpp \ mol]ibj tfqe \ pfkdib
ab_fpflk8jlpq mlif_fbpfkslisb \ pbofbplc ab_fpflkp( pljb lc tef_e j\v
]b fk\asboqbkq o\qebo qe\k abif]bo\qb( ]rq _rjri\qfsbiv qebpb ab_fpflkp
_lkpqfqrqb\ mlif_v,Qerp \ eb\iqe mlif_v(clo¢bu\jmib( _lkpfpqplc \ pbofbp
lc ab_fpflkp obi\qba ql _lkpqor_qflk lc eb\iqe c\_fifqfbp(_boqfcf_\qflklc
mboplkkbi \ka jbaf_fkbp( \ka cfk\k_fkd qeb molsfpflk lc eb\iqe _\ob(
\jlkd j\kv lqebo obi\qbafqbjp, Lcqbks\oflrp fkqboobi\qbaab_fpflkp \ob
j\ab ]v afccbobkqfkafsfar\ip \ka \dbk_fbp tfqefk dlsbokjbkq( pr_e \p \
Abm\oqjbkq¢lcEb\iqe \p tbii \p Cfk\k_b lo Tbic\ob \ka ]v s\oflrp afsf)
pflkp \ka pb_qflkptfqefk qebj, >p Gbkhfkpklqbp( ql rkabopq\ka criiv \
dlsbokjbkq%peb\iqe mlif_vtb kbba ql q\hb fkql \__lrkq \ii qeb ab_fpflkp
lc \ii qeb dlsbokjbkq\i \_qlop fkslisba fk qeb cfk\k_fkd \ka \ajfkfpqo\)
qflk lc fqpeb\iqe)obi\qba \_qfsfqfbp&Qelev(.666',
Gbkhfkp\ipl fjmolsbp rmlk Avb ]v prddbpqfkdqe\q qeb nrbpqflk lc \
dlsbokjbkq%p _\m\_fqv ql fjmibjbkq fqp ab_fpflkp fp \ipl \ pfdkfcf_\kq
_lkpfabo\qflk \ccb_qfkdqeb qvmbplc ab_fpflkp fqq\hbp, Efp abcfkfqflk ob_)
ldkfwbp qe\q _boq\fk ifjfq\qflkp lk dlsbokjbkqp _lkpqo\fk qeb o\kdb lc
lmqflkp \s\fi\]ib fk \ mlif_v\ob\, Qebpbfkqbok\i \ka buqbok\i_lkpqo\fkqp
lk dlsbokjbkq j\hb mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( \ka bccloqpql rkabopq\ka fq(
afccf_riqfkabba, > dlsbokjbkq%p _elf_b lc \ mlif_v j\v ]b ifjfqba( clo
fkpq\k_b( ]v i\_h lc cfk\k_f\i( mboplkkbi(lo fkcloj\qflk\i obplro_bp(]v
fkqbok\qflk\i qob\qv l]ifd\qflkp( lo ]v aljbpqf_ obpfpq\k_bql _boq\fk
lmqflkp, Qerp( clo bu\jmib( tb tfii klq rkabopq\ka eb\iqe mlif_v fk
j\kv _lrkqofbp tfqelrq ob\ifwfkdqeb mltbocri( pbic)pbosfkdlmmlpfqflk
qe\q qeb jbaf_\i molcbppflkfp \]ib ql jlrkq \d\fkpq \kv dlsbokjbkq%p
bccloq ql _rq eb\iqe)_\ob _lpqp ]v obar_fkd qeb molcbppflk%pfk_ljb
%x%,>ijoa8..%6WN'
,£7Pfjfi\oiv(¢(rkabopq\kafkd,qeb\_qflkp lc aljbpqf_ dlsbok)
,(jbkq,p((j(qeb¢_roobifiq, bo\,,fk_ob\pfkdiv(obnrfobpabq\Fibarkabopq\kafkd ¢¢¢¢lc
qeb ifjfqp \ka lmmloqrkfqfbpmolsfaba ]v fkqbok\qflk\i \dobbjbkqp(
qob\qfbp(\ka _lksbkqflkp &Jfikbo \ka Hble\kb( .6638 Albok bq \i,(
.663\',
Gbkhfkp \ipl fkqolar_bp qeb fab\ lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \p dL\i)
lofbkqba ]be\sflro lk qeb m\oqlc dlsbokjbkqp( \k fab\ qe\q molsfabp \
pq\ka\oa ]v tef_e ql bs\ir\qb mr]if_ mlif_fbp, Fk efp abcfkfqflk( mr]if_
mlif_fbp\ob ab_fpflkp q\hbk ]v dlsbokjbkqp qe\q abcfkb \ dl\i \ka pbq
lrq \ jb\kp ql \_efbsb fq,>iqelrde qefpp\vp klqefkd \]lrq qeb k\qrob lc
qeb dl\ip lo qeb jb\kp fkslisba( fqmolsfabp pbsbo\i \sbkrbp clo bs\ir\q)
fkd mlif_fbpqe\q \ob jfppfkd colj Avb%pabcfkfqflk,Qebpbfk_irab qeb obi)
bs\k_b lc qeb dl\i( qeb _lkdorbk_b lc dl\i \ka jb\kp( \ka qeb abdobb ql
tef_e qeb jb\kp riqfj\qbiv pr__bba lo c\fi ql \_efbsb qeb fkfqf\idl\i,
> qefoa(jfaaib)o\kdb abcfkfqflk fp molSfaba ]v G\jbp >kaboplk( tel
abp_of]bp\ mlif_v \p %\mromlpfsb_lropb lc \_qflk cliiltba ]v \k \_qlo
lo \ pbqlc \_qlop fk ab\ifkd tfqe \ mol]ibj lo j\qqbo lc _lk_bok%&>kabo)
plk( .6517 z', Tefib sbov pfjfi\o ql qeb lqebo qtl( >kaboplk%pabcfkfqflk
\aap lkb \aafqflk\i bibjbkq ql qelpb klqba ]v Avb \ka Gbkhfkp]v efde)
ifdeqfkdqeb ifkh ]bqtbbk dlsbokjbkq \_qflk \ka qeb mbo_bmqflk(ob\i lo
lqebotfpb( lc qeb bufpqbk_blc \ mol]ibj lo _lk_bok obnrfofkd\_qflk, Qefp
mol]ibj)plisfkd mbopmb_qfsb
fp \ m\oqf_ri\oivfjmloq\kq \pmb_qlc qeb abc)
fkfqflk lc mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( tef_e tfii ]b obqrokbaql fk jlob abq\fi
]bilt,
Tfqefk qebfoifjfq\qflkp( \kv lo \ii lc qebpbabcfkfqflkppbosbql lrqifkb
fk \ dbkbo\i pbkpbte\q mr]if_ mlif_v fp, >ii fiirpqo\qbqe\q pqravfkd mr]if_
mlif_v fp \ _ljmibu \ka afccf_riqq\ph, Fq_\kklq ]b \__ljmifpeba pfjmiv
]v dlfkd qeolrde qeb lccf_f\i ob_loap lc dlsbokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hfkd
clrka fk pr_e clojp \p i\tp( \_qp( obdri\qflkp( \ka moljrid\qflkp,
>iqelrde qebpb\ob \ sfq\i plro_b lc fkcloj\qflk( mr]if_ mlif_fbpbuqbka
]bvlka qeb ob_loa lc _lk_obqb_elf_bp ql bk_ljm\pp qeb ob\ij lc mlqbk)
qf\i _elf_bp( lo _elf_bp klq j\ab( \ka qeb \k\ivpfp lc pr_e(_elf_bp kb_bp)
p\ofiv fkslisbp \k\ivpfp lc qeb _ljmibu \oo\v lc pq\qb\ka pl_fbq\i \_qlop
fkslisba fk ab_fpflk)j\hfkd mol_bppbp\ka qebfo _\m\_fqfbpclo \_qflk
&Eltibqq( .653', Ob_loap lc ab_fpflkp al klq obcib_qqeb rkbk_rj]boba
tfii lc dlsbokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hbop pl jr_e \p qeb ob_loa bcqeb fkqbo\_)
qflk lc qe\q tfii tfqe qeb _lkpqo\fkqprmlk fq\q dfsbk efpqlof_\i( mlifqf_\i(
\ka pl_f\i _lkgrk_qrobp &Pe\oh\kphv(.64.',
Pfjmiv abp_of]fkd \ dlsbokjbkq%p mlif_v fp kbsboqebibpp\ obi\qfsbiv
b\pv¢q\ph _ljm\oba ql hkLTfkd tev qeb pq\qbafa te\q fqafa \ka \ppbpp)
fkd qeb _lkpbnrbk_bp lc fqp \_qflkp, Pljbqfjbp \ dlsbokjbkq j\v
\kklrk_b qeb ob\plkp clo j\hfkd \ ab_fpflk( \ka qe\q j\v fkabba ]b qeb
qorqe, Eltbsbo( \ dlsbokjbkq lcqbk albp klq dfsb \kv ob\plk clo j\hfkd
\ ab_fpflk8 lo tebk fqalbp qeb mr]if_iv \sltba ob\plk j\v klq ]b qeb
\_qr\i ob\plk, Fkpr_e pfqr\qflkp fqfp ibcqql \k\ivpqp ql abqbojfkb tev \
m\oqf_ri\o\iqbok\qfsbt\p _elpbk \ka( sbov lcqbk( tev pljb lqebo pbbj)
fkdiv jlob \qqo\_qfsblmqflk t\p klq pbib_qba,Qeb q\phplc rkabopq\kafkd
tev \ mlif_v t\p klq fjmibjbkqba \p fkqbkaba \ka bs\ir\qfkd qeb lrq)
_ljbp lc \ mlif_v \ob kl b\pfbo,>ka( ql \aa ql qeb _ljmibufqv( elt \k\)
ivpqpbumi\fk mr]if_ mlif_v \ka qeb \pmb_qpqebv bjme\pfwb abmbka lk
5
M>OQ F 6LQOMCRBQGML
qebfoco\jbp lc obcbobk_b&?l]olt \ka Aovwbh(.6548 O\afk( /---8 Ivkk(
.666'( tef_e fk qrok abmbka lk qebfofkqbobpqp(
fablildfbp( \ka bumbof)
, bk_bp &A\kwfdbo(
.6628 V\klt( .66/8 Mefiifmp(.663',
Qefp i\qqbomlfkq e\p pfdkfcf_\kqfjmif_\qflkp clo qeb jbqelalildfbp
rpba fk mlif_v \k\ivpfp \ka e\p _ljb ql afsfab \k\ivpqp fkql qtl _\jmp,
Lk qeb lkb e\ka( qebob\ob qelpb tel ]bifbsb qe\q ob\plk\]iv l]gb_qfsb
\k\ivpfp fp mlppf]ib tfqe pq\ka\oa( %mlpfqfsfpq%(
lo nr\kqfq\qfsb pl_f\i p_f)
bk_b jbqelalildfbp( tef_e( ]v abcfkfqflk( cl_rp lk \_qr\i dlsbokjbkq
\_qfsfqfbp,Lqebopbj]o\_b jlob kr\k_ba \ka pr]qib %mlpq)mlpfqfsfpq%
lo
fkqbomobqfsb
qb_ekfnrbp jlob _ljjlk
fk qeb erj\kfqfbp( tef_e \ob rpba
ql ebim afp_bok \ka _ofqfnrb ]lqe _lk_obqb \ka mlqbkqf\i dlsbokjbkq
\fjp( fkqbkqflkp( \ka \_qflkp &Qlodboplk(.6638 Qeljmplk( /--.',%
>iqelrde qebpb afccbobk_bppelria klq ]b lsbopq\qba &Eltibqq \ka
O\jbpe( .665'( qebv pbosb ql rkabop_lob qeb j\kkbo fk tef_e lofbkq\)
qflkp qlt\oap mlif_v)j\hfkd \p \ pl_f\i mebkljbklk _\k \ccb_q\k\ivqf)
_\i qb_ekfnrbp \ka lrq_ljbp,
>ii lc qeb abcfkfqflkpmolsfaba \]lsb mlpfqqe\q mr]if_ mlif_vfp \ _ljmibu
mebkljbklk _lkpfpqfkdlc krjbolrp ab_fpflkp j\ab ]v krjbolrp fkaf)
sfar\ip \ka lod\kfw\qflkp fk dlsbokjbkq, Qebpb ab_fpflkp \ob lcqbk
pe\mba ]v b\oifbo mlif_fbp\ka cobnrbkqiv\ob ifkhba _ilpbiv tfqe lqebo
pbbjfkdiv rkobi\qba ab_fpflkp, >p pr_e( pqravfkd mr]if_ mlif_vmlpbp\k\)
ivqf_\i afccf_riqfbpclo tef_e mlif_v \k\ivpqp( klq promofpfkdiv(e\sb absbi)
lmba krjbolrp plirqflkp, Qeb( pfkdibjlpq fjmloq\kq lc)qebpb¢e\p( ]bbk¢ql¢
obar_b qeb ibsbi lc _ljmibufqv lc qeb \k\ivpfp ]v bjme\pfwfkd lkiv \ ifj)
fqbao\kdb lc obibs\kq _\rp\i lo bumi\k\qlov c\_qlop(zsbk tefib obfqbo\qfkd
qeb dbkbo\i kbba clo \ jlob elifpqf_ \mmol\_e bk_ljm\ppfkd qeb bkqfob
o\kdb lc mlppf]ibs\of\]ibp \ccb_qfkddlsbokjbkq\i ab_fpflk)j\hfkd,
Lkb _ljjlk
\mmol\_e e\p ]bbk ql \ppl_f\qb m\oqf_ri\oqvmbplc mlif)
_fbplo %mlif_v
lrq_ljbp% tfqe qeb k\qrob lc qeb mlifqf_\iobdfjb)abcfkba
illpbiv \p qeb lod\kfw\qflk lc qeb mlifqf_\i pvpqbj &Tlicb(.6568 Mowb)
tlophf \ka Ifjlkdf( .664', Fqe\p lcqbk ]bbk \odrba( clo bu\jmib( qe\q
mr]if_ mlif_fbps\ov \__loafkd ql qeb k\qrob lc \ mlifqf_\i pvpqbj \ka fqp
ifkhp tfqe pl_fbqv,Jr_e bccloqe\p dlkb fkql _i\ppfcvfkd\ka afccbobkqf\q)
fkd ]bqtbbk obdfjb qvmbptfqe qeb bumb_q\qflkqe\q molmboivfabkqfcvfkd
qeb obdfjb tfii dbkbo\qbfjmloq\kq fkpfdeqpfkql qeb k\qrob lc qeb mlif_fbp
ifhbiv ql ]b \almqba ]v b\_e qvmb&Mbqbop
bq\i,( .6448 @\pqibp(.6658 @\p)
qibp\ka J_Hfki\v( .664', Eltbsbo( _i\ppfcvfkdobdfjb qvmbp_\k lkiv ]b
\ pq\oqfkdmlfkq fk mr]if_ mlif_v \k\ivpfp ]b_\rpb fq qbiiprp ifqqib\]lrq ,
elt qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc qeb obdfjb j\kfcbpq qebjpbisbp fk fkafsfar\i
mlif_v ab_fpflkp, Fqjbobiv qbiiprp tebob ql illh clo fkcirbk_bp lk dls)
bokjbkq ab_fpflk)j\hfkd \ka te\q dbkbo\i obi\qflkpefmptb _\k bumb_q
ql cfka tefib pqravfkd \ dlsbokjbkq%p \_qfsfqfbp,
8MJGBT
9BGDLBDALC 8MJGBT
4TBJDP
1
>klqebo afob_qflk qe\q j\kv qeblofpqpe\sb q\hbk fp ql pb\o_e clo
_\rp\i s\of\]ibp fk mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd( lo clo te\q \ob pljbqfjbp
obc)booba
ql \p %mlif_vabqbojfk\kqp%&Jrkkp( .6428 E\k_l_h( .650', >k\i)
vpbpfk qefpqo\afqflk qbka ql _lk_bkqo\qblk qeb nrbpqflk lc tebqebo mr])
if_ mlif_fbp\ob abqbojfkba ]v j\_ol)ibsbi pl_fl)b_lkljf_ c\_qlop lo ]v
jf_ol)ibsbi ]be\sflro\i bibjbkqp( \ka \ dob\q ab\i lc _ljmbqfkd bsf)
abk_b e\p ]bbk d\qeboba \]lrq qeb obi\qflkpefm]bqtbbk mr]if_ mlif_fbp(
qeb _e\o\_qbofpqf_plc aljbpqf_ pl_fbqfbp\ka qeb fkqbok\qflk\i pvpqbj
&O\hlcc\ka P_e\bcbo(.64-'( \ka qeb ]be\sflro lc (mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hbop,
Pr_e pqrafbp\ob i\odbiv bjmfof_\i( _ljm\o\qfsb( \ka lcqbk nr\kqfq\qfsb fk
lofbkq\qflk, Tefib qebfo_ljm\o\qfsb bjmfof_\i cl_rp e\p bke\k_ba lro
rkabopq\kafkd lc¢ mr]if_ mlif_fbp ]v afpmbiifkd _ljjlk
jvqep \ka
\pprjmqflkp \]lrq qeb ifkhp ]bqtbbk mlif_v \ka lqebo pl_f\i \ka pl_fl)
b_lkljf_ mol_bppbp(ifhb pqrafbp lc mlifqf_\i obdfjbp qebv,qbka ql ib\k
qlt\oap dbkbo\i j\_ol)ibsbi bumi\k\qflkp lc%mr]if_ mlif_v)j\hfkd \ka
lcqbk c\fi ql pmb_fcvbu\_qivelt qebpbpqor_qro\i_e\o\_qbofpqf_p\ccb_qqeb
pmb_fcf_
pb_qlo\i\ka qbjmlo\i _lkqbuqpfk tef_e mlif_fbpabsbilm &Tfibk)
phv( .6428 Tfibkphv bq\i,( .6528 Tfibkphv \ka Qeokbo(.654',
Vbq\klqebo ifqbo\qrobcl_rpbp lk %mlif_v_lkqbkq%,Qefp \mmol\_e fp
\ppl_f\qba _ilpbiv tfqe qeb fab\ qe\q qeb k\qrob lc \ mlif_v mol]ibj \ka
qeb plirqflkp absfpba ql \aaobpp fq lcqbk abqbojfkb elt fq tfii ]b mol)
_bppba ]v qeb mlifqf_\i pvpqbj, Clo bu\jmib( tebqebo \ mol]ibj fp mof)
j\ofiv obdri\qlov( afpqof]rqfsb(obafpqof]rqfsb(lo _lkpqfqrqfsbfk _e\o\_qbo(
fq e\p ]bbk \odrba( abqbojfkbp elt fq fp ab\iq tfqe, Fk \ pfjfi\o sbfk(
G\jbp N, Tfiplk &.641' \odrba qe\q qeb abdobb lc _lk_bkqo\qflk lc _lpqp
\ka¢])bkbcfqpfjmlpb_!¢lk¢mlifqf_\i¢
\bqlop]v\ m\oqf_ri\omlif_v pe\mbp qeb
qvmblc mlif_vmol_bppbpqe\q tfii \__ljm\kv fq,Ebk_b( \p Qeblalob Iltf
&.64/' mrqfq(riqfj\qbiv %mlif_v
j\v abqbojfkb mlifqf_p%
\ka klq qeb lqebo
t\v \olrka( \p jlpq \k\ivpqp _ljjlkiv
prmmlpb, Ibpqbo P\i\jlk
&.65.'( q\hfkd qefpfkpfdeqql eb\oq( \odrba qe\q cl_rpfkd lk qeb k\qrob lc
qeb mlif_v qllip lo fkpqorjbkqp dlsbokjbkqp e\sb \q qebfo afpmlp\i ql
fjmibjbkq mr]if_ mlif_fbp fp qebobclobqeb ]bpq jlab lc \k\ivpfp clo
rkabopq\kafkd mr]if_ mlif_v,Eltbsbo( tefib qebobfp kl abkvfkd qe\q qeb
k\qrob lc qeb mol]ibj e\p \k bccb_qlk te\q _\k ]b alkb \]lrq fq(fqfp
lcqbk afccf_riqql _ljmobebka( lo ql \dobb rmlk( qeb mob_fpbk\qrob lc \
mlif_v mol]ibj \ka qeb m\qqbokplc _lpqp \ka ]bkbcfqpqe\q s\oflrp plir)
qflkp ql fqfkslisb, O\qebo qe\k ]bfkd \ qb_ekf_\i bubo_fpb(qeb _elf_b lc
mlif_v fkpqorjbkqp lo mlif_v _lkqbkq fp sbov jr_e \ccb_qba ]v i\odbo
pl_f\i \ka mlifqf_\i_lkpqo\fkqp\ka _lkqbuqp&Tllapfab( .6538 Mbqbop
\ka
S\k Kfpmbk(.665',
Qeb clroqe qo\afqflk _lk_bkqo\qbplk qeb bs\ir\qflk lc %mlif_vfjm\_qp%
lo lrq_ljbp, Qefp ifqbo\qrobe\p fkslisba qeb \ppbppjbkq lc qeb afob_q
\ka fkafob_qbccb_qplc pmb_fcf_mlif_fbp \ka fqp \k\ivpbp e\sb qbkaba
ql fdklob ]lqe _\rp\i c\_qlop\ka qeb k\qrob lc qeb qllip \q qeb afpmlp\i
lc dlsbokjbkqp &Tbfjbo \ka Sfkfkd( .66/', >k\ivpqp fkpqb\a rpb
qb_ekfnrbp lc pq\qfpqf_\ifkcbobk_bql \k\ivwb qeb%ifkhp]bqtbbk pmb_fcf_(
dlsbokjbkq moldo\jp \ka s\oflrp jb\probp lc mlif_v %pr__bpp%(
pr_e \p
fkaf_\qlop %lcpl_f\i _e\kdb \ka moldobpz,>jlkd b_lkljfpqp( pr_e pqra)
fbp e\sb bu\jfkba \ tfab o\kdb lc qlmf_pfk b\pfiv nr\kqfcf\]ib ob\ijp
pr_e \p cfp_\i \ka fkarpqof\i mlif_v)j\hfkd( fksbpqfd\qfkdqlmf_ppr_e \p
qeb obi\qflkp ]bqtbbk dlsbokjbkq bumbkafqrobp\ka _lomlo\qb fksbpq)
jbkq \_qfsfqvlo i\]lro jfdo\qflk, Qefp \mmol\_e cl_rpbp \ijlpq bu_ir)
pfsbiv lk mlif_v lrqmrqp( eltbsbo( \ka p\vp sbov ifqqib\]lrq qeb mlif_v
mol_bppbpqe\q iba ql qeb _ob\qflk lc qelpb lrqmrqp &Ivkk( .654',
Qebpb afccbobkqifqbo\qrobp\ka \k\ivqf_\i qo\afqflkp e\sb bufpqba(fk
m\oq(\p \ obpriqlc qeb afccbobkq_ljjrkfqfbp lc \k\ivpqp tlohfkd lk mr])
if_ mlif_v,%Dlsbokjbkqp qebjpbisbp( lc _lropb( e\sb \it\vp ]bbk
fkslisba fk qeb pqrav lc mr]if_ mlif_fbp(]lqe qebfoltk &Jbiqpkbo(.6438
Oldbopbq \i,( .65.' \ka qelpb lc lqebo _lrkqofbp &Olpb(.66.', Eltbsbo(
jr_e lc qeb ifqbo\qroblk mr]if_ mlif_v e\p ]bbk dbkbo\qba ]v \k\ivpqp
tlohfkd clo klk)dlsbokjbkq\i lod\oiiw\qflkp, Pljb lc qebpb \k\ivpqp
tloh afob_qivclo dolrmp \ccb@qba
]v mr]if_ mlif_fbp(pr_e \z _lomlo\qflkp(
_ero_ebp( i\]lro rkflkp( lo lqebo klk)dlsbokjbkq\i
lod\kfw\qflkp,
Qebob\ob \ipl \k\ivpqp tel tloh clo ibppafob_qiv\ccb_qbalod\kfw\qflkp(
pr_e \p mofs\qbqefkh)q\khp lo obpb\o_e fkpqfqrqbp(pljb lc tef_e _\k
e\sb _ilpb qfbptfqe dlsbokjbkq \dbk_fbp \ka mobpprobdolrmp, Cfk\iiv(
pljb \k\ivpqp tloh fkabmbkabkqiv(j\kv lc qebj fk qeb rkfsbopfqv pvp)
qbj &M\i(.66/',
>k\ivpqp tlohfkd fk qebpbafccbobkqqvmbplc lod\kfw\qflkp qbka ql e\sb
afccbobkqfkqbobpqp
fk mroprfkd mlif_v \k\ivpfp &Al]rwfkphfp(.663', >k\)
ivpqptlohfkd clo dlsbokjbkqp)\ka,flo, dolrmpafob_qiv,,\ccb_qba]v [[mr]if_[[
mlif_fbpqbka ql cl_rp qebfoobpb\o_elk mlif_v lrq_ljbp, Qebv lcqbk e\sb
\ afob_qfkqbobpqfk _lkabjkfkd lo _lkalkfkd pmb_fcf_mlif_fbp lk qeb
]\pfp lc qebfomolgb_qbalo \_qr\i fjm\_q lk qebfo_ifbkqlod\kfw\qflk, Mof)
s\qb qefkh)q\khp \ka obpb\o_efkpqfqrqbprpr\iiv bkglv jlob \rqlkljv(
qelrde pljb j\v ]b fkq.rbk_ba ]v qeb mobcbobk_bp
lc qebfocrkafkd lod\)
kfz\qflkp, Kbsboqebibpp(qebv obj\fk fkqbobpqbafk qeb %mo\_qf_\i%
pfab lc
mlif_vfpprbp \kaqbka ql _lk_bkqo\qbbfqebolk mlif_vlrq_ljbp lo lk qeb
fkpqorjbkqp \ka qb_ekfnrbp qe\q dbkbo\qb qelpb lrq_ljbp, >_\abjf_p(
lk qeb lqebo e\ka( e\sb \ dob\qab\i lc fkabmbkabk_b \ka rpr\iiv e\sb
kl afob_qmboplk\i pq\hb fk qeb lrq_ljb lc pmb_fcf_mlif_fbp,Qebv _\k
qebobclobbu\jfkb mr]if_ mlif_fbpjr_e jlob \]pqo\_qiv qe\k _\k jbj)
]bop lc qeb lqebo qtl dolrmp \ka( \p pr_e( qbka ql do\mmibtfqe qeb qebl)
obqf_\i( _lk_bmqr\i( \ka jbqelalildf_\i
fpprbp proolrkafkd mr]if_
mlif_v)j\hfkd, >_\abjf_ pqrafbpqbka ql illh \q qeb bkqfobmlif_v mol_bpp
)\j%q\Kb%fkj\ollqqkq%\"Tfab %o\kdb%lK\oqLQP8%qkbirafkd
mlif_v obdfjbp(
(,mlif_v(,\,bqbojfk\Giip(
,,(mll_vfkpqorjblfp",\ka_m_ifno ,,_lkqbkq fk qebfo\k\i)
vpbp &Dloalk bq\i,( .644',
Qebpb afccbofkdabdobbp lc kbrqo\ifqv \ka pbic)fkqbobpq
e\sb bslisba
fkql afpqfk_qflkpfk qeb ifqbo\qrob]bqtbbk %mlif_vpqrav%\ka %mlif_v\k\i)
vpfp%&?ollhp \ka D\dklk( .66-', Qeb clojbo qboj fp pljbqfjbp rpba ql
obcboql qeb pqrav %lc%
mlif_v \ka qeb i\qqboql pqrav %clo%
mlif_v,Mlif_v
pqrafbp(_lkar_qba j\fkiv ]v \_\abjf_p( obi\qbql %jbq\)mlif_v%
\ka dbk)
bo\iiv \ob _lk_bokba tfqe rkabopq\kafkd lsbo\ii mr]if_ mlif_vmol_bppbp
\ka fjmolsfkd qeblofbplc mlif_v)j\hfkd \ka jbqelalildfbp lc \k\ivpfp,
Mlif_v \k\ivpfp( fk _ljm\ofplk( fp \ ,qboj lcqbk rpba ql _e\o\_qbofwb
\mmifbaobpb\o_emroprba ]v dlsbokjbkq lccf_f\ip lo qefkh)q\khp\ka rpr)
\iiv afob_qba\q pvpqbj\qf_\iiv abpfdkfkd( fjmibjbkqfkd( \ka bs\ir\qfkd
bufpqfkdmlif_fbp&Jbiqpkbo(.6438 Tbfjbo \ka Sfkfkd( .6668 M\i( .664',
Qeb clojbo¢qbka ql ]b abp_ofmqfsb
\ka bumi\k\qlov _ljm\oba ql qeb jlob
mobp_ofmqfsb
lofbkq\qflk lc qeb i\qqbo,?lqe _\k ]b _lkqo\pqba tfqe qeb
jr_e ibpp pvpqbj\qf_ \ka pbic)fkqbobpqba
_ofqfnrb(\ka tfqe prmmloqG\o
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7
discipline and explained what is generally meant by the term. It has outlined a five-stage model of the policy cycle and framed research ques"
tions relevant to the analysis of each stage and to the workings of the
overall model. Chapter 2 examines in more detail several. of the most
commonly used approaches to studying public policy, emphasizing those
employed by economists, political scientists, sociologists, and others who
focus on the nature of general public policy processes. The potential and
limitations of each approach are discussed along with the particular
manner in which theorizing in the field has progressed over the past several decades.
.
Part II describes the institutional parameters within which policies are
made, the nature of the actors who make them, and the instruments the
actors have at their disposal for their implementation.
Chapter 3 discusses the various state and societal actors and institutions that play a
salient role in public policy-making. It uses the concept of a policy subsystem to capture the complex links between state and societal actors
involved in public policy-maklng. Chapter 4 describes the characteristics
of the general types of instruments available to government for implementing policies. It develops a taxonomy based on the range of possible
means by which goods and services of any kind can be delivered, from
the use of voluntary or community services to direct delivery by state
employees. Each chapter in this part not only inventories the range of
institutions, actors, and instruments that can affect policy-making, but
also establishes the difficulties of assessing and predicting which institutions, actors, and instruments will actually be involved in specific policymaking instances.
.
Part III sets out a schema for conceptualizing the policy process in
order to allow finer levels of analysis to be made. Each of Chapters 5 to 9
examines a critical componerit or sub-stage of the public policy process,
including how and why public concerns make their way onto the government's agenda; how and why some individuals and groups enjoy special
input into the formulation of governmental policy options; how and why
governments typically decide on a specific course of action; why governments use the types of policy instruments they do; and how their actions
and choices are typically evaluated.
Finally, Part IV sets out the conclusions of the study in the context of
the general relationships found to exist between ideas, interests, and
institutions. Chapter 10 presents the general pattern of the evolution of
policy-making in many pol~cy sectors, establishes a taxonomy of typical
policy styles, and discusses the reasons why policies tend to develop and
"Change~furotl:gh"a ".st:epp'ed:"Or·''''pttn'ctu8.ted:·~ilibria~>pre.cess. (Gerskk,
,·l991;·;..Bau.mgaIiaer . >.andJooes,1993;). Chaptetll ..1b.en,providesa brief
commentary on the nature of contemporary policy science and the need
for continued careful, systematic, empirical study if the field is to continue to develop in the way envisioned by its founders.
DeLe?n, Peter. 1988. Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy
Saences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Garson, G. David. 1986. 'From Policy Science to Policy Analysis: A Quarter
Century of Progress', in W.N. Dunn, ed., Policy Analysis: Perspectives,
Concepts, and Methods. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 3-22.
Jeriki~s-Smith, Hank C., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1993. 'The Study of the Public
Pohcy. Processes', in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, eds, Policy Change and
Leamlng: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1-9.
Lasswell, Harold D. 1951. 'The Policy Orientation', in D. Lerner and Lasswell,
eds, . The Policy Sdences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 3-15.
Sabatier,. Paul A. 1999. 'The Need for Better Theories', in Sabatier, ed.,
Theones of the Policy Process. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 3-17.
Torger~on, Douglas. 1986. 'Between Knowledge and Politics: Three Faces of
PohcyAnalysis', Policy Sciences 19,1: 33-59.
Tribe, Laurence H. 1972. 'Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?', Philosophy
and Public Affairs 2,1: 66":'110.
Wagner, Peter, et al. 1991. 'The Policy Orientation: Legacy and Promise' in
Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock, and Helmut Wollman, eds, Sodal Sciences ~nd
Modem
States:
National
Experiences
and
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2-27.
Theoretical
Crossroads
.
Approaches to Public Policy
As Peter DeLeon has noted, policy studies have a long history and a
short past. That is, the actions of government have been a focus of
i numerous critiques over the centuries, but their systematic analysis as a .
\ policy science dates back only several decades !DeLe.oD.,--l994-;-fletefs,
1~_~~]·_
Thus one of the difficulties encountered in studying public policyi\ making is ~e range. of various approaches, originating in various schools
(I of aca?errnc tho.ught, that have been ~rought to bear on the subject
~ (Sabatier,~999b! SchlageJ,1999). In thIS chapter we outline the main
approaclles to the study of public policy in the academic disciplines most
directly concerned with state behaviour, such as economic and political
~cien~e;point out t~eir strengths and weaknesses; and suggest how polIcy.sclence ha~ pr?fited from the insights offered by other sodal sciences
whIle developmg ItS Own distinctive methodology and theories.
LEVELS, METHODS, AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Before beginning this survey, we should note that theories in the social
sciences fall. into different types or orders, depending on the type and
range of SOCIalphenomena they attempt to explain and the basic method
they use to derive their insights and hypotheses. That is, social scientific
theorie~ differ acc.ording to their level of analysis, method of analysis,
and Unlt of an~lyslS (see Almond and Genco, 1977). With respect to their
level of ~nalysls~.some social scientific theories are 'general' or macrolevel SOCIaltheones that attempt to explain all phenomena within: their
purview. Others are less wide-ranging and focus orIly on a few very specific subsets of social life, either at a micro or meso level of analysis (Ray,
2001)..Similarly, SOcialtheories also differ according to their method of
analySIS:some are deductive theories developed largely on the basis of
21
the application of general presuppositions, concepts, or principles to specific phenomena. Others are less deductive and more inductive, developing generalizations only on the basis of careful observation of empirical
phenomena and subsequent testing of these generalizations against other
cases (Lundquist, 1987; Przeworski, 1987; Hawkesworth, 1992). And,
with respect to their units of analysis, some social theories focus attention on individuals as the basic social actor whose behaviour and actions
must be explained, while some view aggregate collections of individuals,
or groups, as the relevant analytical unit. Still others consider larger
social structures to have an independent impact on individual and collective actions (Hay and Wincott, 1998; Clark, 1998; Tilly, 1984).
If all the permutations within these three variations are considered,
the list of social theories relevant to policy would be almost infinite. Even
focusing orIly on examples of each of the different categories resulting
from differentiating between level (macro,meso, micro), method (deductive, inductive), and unit of analysis (individual, collective, structure)
would require the analysis of at least 18 representative cases. However,
for our purposes, this task can be simplified somewhat by focusing only
on general, or macro-level, social theories. This is acceptable because
academic disciplines such as economics and political science are interested in all social behaviour and activities and tend to view public policy-making as only a subset of such behaviour. amenable to the general
theories and explanations prevalent in each field. We will therefore
restrict our comments to well-known general categories of social theory
commonly applied in policy analysis. As such, only six representative
cases will be examined, based on differences in the characteristic basic
unit of analysis they employ and their method of theory construction
(Dessler, 1999).
The theories examined below differ according to whether they develop
their insights about policy-making in a deductive or an inductive manner
and whether they focus their attention on the activities of individuals,
groups, or institutions in the policy process (Oliver, 1993). Representative
examples of the basic types of general theory classified according to these
differences in units of analysis and method are set out in Figure 2.1.
There are many adherents to deductive approaches to social science theorization and many nuanced versions of its application to specific social
phenomena. In regard to understanding public policy-making, three general sub-types of this approach are discernible, depending on the unit of
analysis: rational choice theory, class analysis, or actor-centred neo-institutionalism. The representative examples of each general approach to be
Figure 2.1 General Approaches to the Study of Political
Phenomena and Illustrative Theoretical Examples
Method of Theory Construction
Deductive
Rational Choice Theories
(Public Choice)
Collectivity Class Analysis
(Marxism)
Structure
Actor-Centred
Institutionalism
(TI'ansactionCost
Analysis)
Individual
rJJ
i';
:s.;:=
;§
Inductive
Sociological Individualism
(Welfare Economics)
Group Theories
(Pluralism/Corporatism)
Socio-Historical
Neo-Institutionalism
(Statism)
examined below are, respectively, public choice theory, Marxist
analysis, and transaction cost analysis.
class
Rational Choice Theory: Public Choice
Rational choice theory has received a great deal of attention in recent
years. One variant of this approach is often referred to as public chOIce
theory, after the Institute for the Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic (now George Mason) University, where many scholars who
developed the approach worked (Dryzek, 1992; Monroe, 1991).
Rational choice theory generally.applies the principles of neo-cla,ssical ."
economics to political behaviour: Its chief assumption is that political
actors, like economic ones, act 'rationally', that is, in a calculating fashion, to maximize their 'utility' or 'satisfaction'. In this model, the only
political actor that counts is the individual who acts on the basis of this
ascribed characteristic psychological behaviour. Public choice theory is a
'strong' version of rational choice theory and is often used in policy analyses, primarily because the deductive application of its general principles
easily generates a clear and consistent set of policy prescriptions,
whether or not there is any actual merit to its fundamental axioms. As
James Buchanan, one of the founders of public choice theory and the
first among public choice theorists to win a Nobel Prize (for Economics),
put it: 'In one sense, all public choice or the economic theory of politics
may be summarized as the "discovering" or "re-discovering" that people
should be treated as rational utility maximizers, in all of their
>.,behaviouraJ,capacities.'
In tht!public ·cnoice approach it is assumed that individual political
actors (whether policy-makers or voters)are guided by self-interest in
choosing the course of action to their best advantage (McLean, 1987; Van
Winden, 1988). This simple assumption about the basis of human
behaviour leads public choice theorists to a complex series of related
propositions used to explain various aspects of politics and public policymaking. This approach has been applied, for example, to studies of voting behaviour (Downs, 1957), the relationship between political and
economic systems (Becker, 1958), the nature of individual and collective
decision-making behaviour (Coase, 1960), and the structure and institutions of government, including bureaucracies (Downs, 1967), legislatures
(Niskanen, 1971), political parties (Riker, 1962), and constitutions
(Buchanan, 1975).
In these studies, each subject is analyzed in terms of individual selfinterest. Thus, for example, voters are deemed to vote for parties and
candidates that will best serve their interest in terms of the rewards they
expect to receive from governments. Politicians are seen as constantly
vying for election in order to promote their interests in the income,
power, and prestige derived from being in office, and offer policies that
will win them voters' support. Political parties are seen to operate in
much the same way as politicians, deVising policy packages that will
appeal to voters. Bureaucrats' self-interest leads them to maximize their
budgets because larger budgets are a source of power, prestige, perks,
and higher salaries. They are largely successful in realizing their interest
because, as monopoly suppliers of unpriced goods and services, they
face no competition and because citizens and elected officials lack the
expertise to monitor their activities. Peter Self (1985: 51) succinctly summarized the theory as follows:
Following this approach, voters can be likened to consumers; pres... '·sure·'groups· can be seen as politicaI consumer associations' or
sometimes as co-operatives; political parties become entrepreneurs
who offer competing packages of services and taxes in exchange for
votes; political propaganda equates with commercial advertising;
and government agencies are public firms dependent upon receiving or drumming up adequate political support to cover their costs.
With respect to public policy-making, public choice theorists view the
policy process as one in which a variety of political actors engage in
competitive rent-seeking behaviour. That is, each actor attempts to use
the state to capture .some portion of the social surplus ('rents') that
accrues from productive social labour. Each actor would prefer, if possible, to free ride, that is, to obtain a share in the surplus resulting from the
action of other parties at no cost to themselves (Buchanan, 1980;
Kreuger, 1974). This conception of the motivations and roles of voters,
parties, and politicians in the policy process leads to the conclusion that
voters will cbnstantly seek more programs from government, constrained
only by their willingness to pay taxes, and that politicians, parties, and
bureaucrats will be willing to supply the programs because of their own
self-interest in power, prestige, and popularity. The result is a constant
24
PART I
Introduction
increase in the level of state intervention in the economy and society,
often in the form of a political business cycle. In other words, democratic
governments operate in a form of perpetual elect?ral campai.gn.in which
the types of decisions they take will vary accordmg to t~e timmg of the
electoral cycle, with popular decisions dispensing benefits taken before
election and unpopular ones, attributing costs, afterwards (Boddy and
Crotty, 1975; Frey, 1978; Locksley, 1980; Thfte, 1978).
Public policy-making in this view is thus simply a process of the gradual extension of state provision of goods and services to the public. Public choice theorists oppose this pattern, arguing that it distorts the
'natural' operation of market-based societies and reduces overall levels of
social welfare by encouraging free riders and other counterproductive
forms of rent-seeking behaviour. The general conclusion of public choice
theorists is that institutions must be developed tocurb destructive utilitymaximizing behaviour that serves the interests of particular indiv~duals
while adversely affecting the society as a whole. Hence, accordmgto
Buchanan, public choice theory does not lead to the conclusion that all
collective action, all government action, is necessarily undesirable. It
leads, instead, to an understanding that because people will tend to maximize their own utilities, institutions must be designed so that individual
behaviour will further the interests of the group, small or large, local or
national. The challenge, then, is to construct, or reconstruct, a political
order that will channel the self-serving behaviour of participants towards
the· common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to that
described for us by Adam Smith with respect to the economic order
(BuchananetaL, 1978: 17). - .....
.. - .... --- .In this view, the -same mechanism of individual utility maximization
that promotes the general good in the market takes a decidedly harmful
form in the political arena. This leads public choice theorists to reject
most of the policy analyses and prescriptions generated by other analysts, which tend to take a more sanguine view of government activity
(Rowley, 1983). They argue that government intervention in the affairs of
society should be limited to supplementing the market by enforcing and
creating property rights where these are weak or non-existent so that
market forces can operate and allocate resources in a manner beneficial
to the whole society.
The simplicity and logical elegance of the theory, along with the
impressive mathematical presentations that accompany studies wit~in
this framework, mask its many holes (Jones, 2001; Green and Shaprro,
1994). First of all, the theory is based on an oversimplification of human
psychology and behaviour that does not accord with ~eality._Ma~y political activities, for example, are undertaken for symbolIc or ntuallstic reasons; to treat them as goal-oriented behaviour directed at utility
maximization is to underestimate the complexity of .politics that surrounds public policy-making (Zey, 1992). Second, because of this over-
25
simplification, the theory has poor predictive capacity. There is no empirical proof, for example, for its prediction that government functions will
grow inexorably because of the competitive dynamics of democratic systems of representation. If anything, in most industrialized countries in
recent times government expenditure has been cut back, or at least not
expanded, and these fluctuations in patterns of government growth are
not new: how and why this occurs is virtually inexplicable within a public choice framework of analysis (Dunleavy, 1986). Third, and again
related to its faulty empirical dimension, most public choice theorization
is heavily influenced by US experiences, relying, for example, on a pattern of partisan electoral competition between two parties that forces voters to choose between two clearly definable alternatives. In reality, of
course, many democracies are multi-party systems in which parties have
to form legislative coalitions. Such practices do not permit a neat
dichotomy of choices for voters since electoral promises may be overridden by post-election legislative deal-making (Warwick, 2000). And,
regardless of the public choice theorists' insistence that their analysis is
'positive' and 'value-free', the theory is explicitly normative. The notions
that only social interactions in market-based exchange produce wealth
and that the state exists as a kind of parasite extracting rents from the
marketplace ignore the important role played by the state not only in
securing the basis for the economy in property rights and defence, but
also in organizing such key economic activities as education and technological innovation (Dosi et al., 1988). Thus public choice theory seeks, in
effect, to promote a particular vision of orthodox liberalism (also called
neo-conservatism or nea-liberalism)· that would promote markets wh-erever possible and severely restrict .the scope for government activity
without any empirical justification for so doing (Hood, 1991, 1995,
1998).
Recently, even public choice theorists have. realized that a gap exists
between their deductive models and empirical reality. Although they are
loath to drop any of their fundamental assumptions about human
behaviour and psychology, they have come to realize that some modification.sin their fundamental units of analysis are required. That is, it has
come to be recognized that public choice theory is institutionally constrained. It has little tp say, for example, about policy-making in nondemocratic systems that do not rely on free elections, a' central
assUmption of the modeL Moreover, it also disregards or underestimates
the effects of institutional factors in shaping actors' preferences, despite
its pretensions towards institutional design (Ostrom, 1986a, 1986b). Pioneering public choice theorists tended to regard institutions themselves
as changeable according to actors' preferences and were unwilling to recognize fully the durability of institutions and the pervasive impact they
have on individual behaviour. The realization by many former public
choice adherents of the effects of institutional structures on individual
26
PART I
Introduction
Approaches
choices has moved many rational choice theorists, including many who
had previously endorsed variants such as game theory (Harsanyi, 1977;
Scharpf, 1990; Elster, 1986), to embrace a more subtle and supple
approach to deductive social theory, a form of economistic 'neo-institutionalism' or 'actor-centred institutionalism', which will be discussed in
more detail below.
Class Analysis: Marxist Social Theory
Class theories are essentially group theories, in that they accord primacy
to collective entities in their analyses, but unlike inductive group theories
such as pluralism or corporatism, which will be discussed in the next·
section of this chapter, they tend to define their units of analysis in
'objective' terms and conduct their analysis in an explicitly deductive
fashion. That is, class theories ascribe group membership on the basis of
certain observable characteristics of individuals, whether or not the individuals involved see themselves in those terms, and they expect
behaviour that maximizes group interest to flow from this attributed
orientation.
According to Stanislaw Ossowski, 'class' refers to: 'Groups differentiated in various ways within a more inclusive category, such as the category of social groups with common economic interests, or the category
of groups whose members share economic conditions which are identical
in a certain respect.' While there are several types of class analysis, 1 we
shall concentrate on the 'Marxist' variety, which, because of its influence
on the development and' spread of Enropeansocialism iathe nineteenth
and twentieth Centuries, is by far the best known and theoretically developed. In this approach class membership is determined by the presence
or absence of certain characteristics, usually; but not always, related to
the economy.
The various nineteenth-century writings of the German philosopher
and political economist Karl Marx exhibited somewhat different notions
of class. However, the one developed by Marx in his mid-nineteenth century Manifesto of the Communist Party is the best known. Here Marx
argued that each society has two classes contesting political and economic power. In his material conception of history, human society has
passed through a number of distinct stages ('modes of production'), each
of which has a distinct set of technological conditions of production
('means of production') and a distinct manner in which the various
actors in the production process relate with each other ('class structure'
or 'relationscffprdtlucnun"'(Co'hen;"'1978).
Each mode of production
entailsa' partitU1ar"ctass-s)"Stem:'Which'is'ultimatelydetermined by ownership (or non-ownership) of the means of production.
In the logic of this model, in theory, each mode of production develops a dichotomous class system consisting of those who own the means
t
to·Public Policy
27
of production and those who must work for the owners, and the relationship between the two groups is inherently conflictual. Slaves battled
slave owners in slave societies; serfs struggled with landlords in feudal
society; and workers struggle with owners in capitalist society.Continued class struggle leads to eventual collapse of modes of production and
their replacement by another. mode, which in turn is eventually replaced
by yet another system. In practice, Marx expected that a dichotomous
class system would occur only for a brief period at the tail end of a mode
of production, although it would be possible to see its gradual evolution
over time as a mode of production matured and developed. At other
points in time, modes of production would have more complex class
structures in which multiple classes would exist (Nicolaus, 1967). At its
most complex, a mode of production might exhibit a class structure composed of as many as six classes: the two dominant classes from each of
three modes (that which immediately preceded it,. the mode itself, and
the mode that would follow it). The term often used to capture the complexities of multiple class structures in mixed modes of production is a
'social formation' (Poulantzas, 1973b).
Marxist class theory interprets public policies in capitalist societies as
reflecting the interests of the capitalist class. The capitalists' dominance
of the base-that is, the economy-affords them control over the state
and what it does. Indeed, according to Marx, the state is merely an
instrument in the hands of capitalists, who use it for the purposes of
maintaining the capitalist system and increasing profits ('surplus value'),
necessarily at the expense of labour. Given its deductive nature, analysis
of public policy from a Marxist ..perspective usually took the form of
demonstrating how.a particular policy. serves the interests of capital,
which is assumed as a proof that the latter used the state to further its
interest. This general set of assumptions about government is often
referred to as the instrumental theory of the state.
While a popular form of analysis in many countries and colonies
around the globe in the 1930s and 1940s, by the late 1960s in Western
Europe this instrumentalist line of analysis was beginning to be seen as
problematic by Marxist analysts on two counts. First, even if it were true
that a policy serves the interest of capital, it cannot be concluded ipso
facto that the policy ~as enacted at the behest of capital. To show this,
one would have to demonstrate that capitalists issued instructions that
wet: faithfully carried out by state officials, proof of which is usually
lac~~g. Second, and more importantly, this approach cannot explain
poliCIes adopted over the opposition of capitalists. In most capitalist
states, for instance, the. adoption of social welfare policies was vehemently opposed by many capitalists, something that cannot be explained
from this perspective. The recognition of this theoretical problem forced
a reappraisal of the role of the state in Marxist theory (Block, 1980; Foley,
1978; Gough, 1975; Poulantzas, 1978; Therborn, 1977, 1986).
28
PART I
Introduction
Second, much as was the case with public choice theory, in the traditional Marxist view the means of production constituted the basic structure shaping the state, law, and ideology. As we have seen, however, this
conceptualization is problematic because the state has played a crucial
role in organizing the economy and shaping the mode of production (Cox,
1987). The nineteenth-century promotion of natural resource sector production and the protection of inefficient import substitution industrialization in Canada, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and Mexico, for example, had
a decisive impact on those countries' economic structures and class relations and continue to shape the various classes' interests, the policy outcomes they desire, and the policy responses they elicit (Clarke-Jones,
1987; Duquette, 1999; Hirschman, 1958). Similarly, the proliferation of
Keynesian policies in the 1950s and 1960s in many countries (Hall, 1989)
occurred over the opposition of entrenched business interests and cannot
be understood without reference to ideological factors influencing state
behaviour, just as policies promoting privatization and deregulation in
many of the same countries in the 1980s (Ikenberry, 1990) cannot be
traced entirely or directly to the interests of capitalists (Arnariglio et al.,
1988).
Like rational choice theory, which in its later phases recognized to a
much greater extent the independent effects of institutions and sotial
structures on individual behaviour, class analy~is in the 1960s and 1970s
placed an increased emphasis on institutionaf or structural factors to
account for state activities and behaviour (Mclennan, 1989: 117-19). To
account for the state devising policies opposed by capital, for example,
the notion-'bf relative'autonomy of the state was developed. While
numerous neo-Marxists' area.ssociated with this'line of reinterpretation, .
the view offered by Nicos Poulantzas in the early 1970s was perhaps the
most prominent (Poulantzas, 1973a; Althusser and Balibar, 1977).
Poulantzas argued that conflicts among the various· fractions of capital,
coupled with the existence of a bureaucracy staffed by individuals drawn .
from non-capitalist classes, permitted the state some level of autonomy
from capital. This autonomy, in turn, allowed the state' to adopt measures favourable to the subordinate classes if this was found to be politically unavoidable or necessary for promoting the long-term interests of
capital in social stability.
While such measures may adversely affect the short-term interests of
capital, and may even be vehemently opposed by capitalists, Pouhmtzas
argUed they were always in their long-term interest. This is because the
structure of capitalism requires that certain essential functions be performed by the state if capitalism is to survive. Such functions include
enforcing property rights, maintaining peace and order, and promoting
conditions favourable to continued accumulation of profits. Hence, in
this 'structural' version of neo-Marxism, policy-making was still viewed
as serving the interest of capital, but not in the same instrumental sense
29
as conceived by early Marxists (Thompson, 1978). The rise of the welfare state, for example, is explained not as a direct response to the needs
of capital, but as the result of political pressures exerted by the working
class on the state (Esping-Andersen, 1981, 1985; Esping-Andersen and
Korpi, 1984). The structural imperatives of capitalism are not ignored,
however, because they impose limits on what the state can do in
response to working-class demands. Thus, it is argued, the welfare state
established by capitalist governments in response to working-class
demands was designed in a manner that did not undermine fundamental
property rights or profits.
Actor-Centred Institutionalism: Transaction Cost Analysis
A third deductive approach explicitly recognizes the limits of similar
individual and class-based theories to explain social behaviour and activity such as public policy-making. Like its inductive counterpart,
'statism', on which more information is provided below (Peters, 1999;
Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kato, 1996), this approach grew directly out of
expressed concerns about the ability of deductive theories based on individual and collective action to deal with the question of why political,
economic, and social institutions like governments, firms, or churches
existed at all, and to help assess the impact they had in fashioning constraints and providing opportunities for those actors to emerge, evolve,
. and interact (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1995). Many variants of this
approach exist, under titles such as the 'New Economics of Organization'
(Moe, 1984; Yarbrough and Yarbrou,gh, 1990; Williamson, 1996) or the
'Institutional Analysis and Development (lAD)" framework (Kiser and
Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom et al., 1993). All, however, use a form of what
Fritz Scharpf has termed 'actor-centred institutionalism' to understand
social processes, including political and policy-oriented ones (Scharpf,
1997).
Like recent class analysis, actor-centred institutionalism emphasizes
the autonomy of political institutions from the society in which they
exist. And, like public choice theory, it also begins with a simple idea
about calculating human behaviour. But unlike that latter approach, it
takes into account the facts that rules, norms, and symbols affect political behaviour; that the organization of governmental institutions affects
what the state does; and that unique patterns of historical development
constrain future choices.2 Institutions, hence, are defined to include not
only formal organizations such as bureaucratic hierarchies and marketlike exchange networks but also legal and cUltural codes and rules that
affect the calculations by individuals and groups of their optimal strategies and courses of action (Ostrom, 1999).
These assumptions focus this approach on the effects of structure on
. social actors and, as James March and Johan Olsen (1984: 738) put it:
30
PART I
Introduction
They deemphasize the dependence of the polity on society in favor
of an interdependence between relatively autonomous social and
political institutions; they deemphasize the simple pri~acy
of micro processes and efficient histories in favor of relatIvely
complex processes and historical inefficiency; they deemphas~ze
metaphors of choice and allocate outcomes in favor of other lOgICS
of action and the centrality of meaning and symbolic action.
One variant of this general approach is transaction cost analysis
(North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). This approach acknowledges the crucial role played by institutions in political life, and argues that these exist
in society in order to overcome impediments caused by information
asymmetries and other barriers to 'perfect' exchange in society. The
basic unit of analysis in this appr~ach is related to the 'transaction'
among individuals within the confines of an institutional order (Coase,
1937). Institutions of various kinds are significant to the extent that they
increase or lower the costs of transactions. In this perspective institutions
are 'the products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions by
instrumentally oriented individuals' (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 8).
In the transaction cost approach to social theory, the argument is not
that institutions cause an action. It is rather that they affect actions, by
shaping the interpretation of problems and possible solutions and by
constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to which
they can be implemented. While individuals, groups, classes, and states
have their specific interests, they pursue them in the context of existing
formal organizations and rules al1d norms that shape expectatioIJ.sand
affect the possibilities of their realization (Williamson, 1985).
In the political realm, in the transaction costs perspective, institutions
are significant because they 'constitute and legitimize individual and collective political actors and provide them with consistent behavioural
rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and
endowments, and thereby with a capaclty for purposeful action' (March
and Olsen, 1994: 5). In the policy realm, as with public choice theory,
this analysis leads to a distinct preference for market-based forms of government action and activity, but for different reasons, avoiding the
reliance of public choice theory on ascribing inherently wasteful rentseeking behaviour to government actors.
Focusing on the nature of economic transactions, a typology of goods
and services has been developed to illustrate the appropriate roles played
by governments, and markets in their provision. In this typology, all
,.,goods.oiID.d .sePlicesAn.so¢ety"can 1)e .divided..intO,fOl.lf ,types.according to
the transactional criteria of '.exclusivity' and '.exhaustiv.eness', that is,
whether a transaction involving a 'good of serViceis limited to a single
consumer and whether it is completely consumed after an economic
transaction. These criteria of exclusivity and exhaustiveness generate the
four types of goods and services listed in Figure 2.2.
31
Figure 2.2 A General Taxonomy of Goods and Services
Exhaustiveness
High
High
Low
Private Good
Common-Pool Good
Toll Good
Public Good
SOURCE:Adapted from E.S. Savas, Alternatives for Delivering Public Services:
Toward Improved Performance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).
In this view, pure private goods make up the bulk of goods and services produced in sOGiety.These are goods or services, such as food, that
can be divided up for sale and are no longer available to others after their
consumption by consumers. At the other extreme are pure public goods
or services, such as street lighting, which cannot be parcelled out and
can be consumed without diminishing the sum of the good available.
Between the two are toll goods and common-pool goods. The former
include semi-public goods such as bridges or highways, which do not
diminish in quantity after use but for the use of which it is possible to
charge. Common-pool goods are those, like fish in the ocean, whose
usage cannot be directly charged to individuals but whose quantity is
reduced after use.
In the transaction costs perspective, the two types of social organizations considered to be the most effective in minimizing transaction costs
are markets, on the one hand, and the hierarchical form of organization,
or 'bureaucracy', on the Other.In the market forin, th'e costs of overcoming information and other needs are'largely externalized as multiple producers and consumers 'share the costs of acquiring and disseminating
information and other goods and services. In a hierarchy these costs' are
internalized, as occurs for example in large corporations in the modern
era. In an optimal arrangement, it is argued, a government would seek to
externalize costs onto citizens by enhancing market-based activities. Citizens would then be able to know the true price of government services
and act rationally with' respect to their consumption, spending, and
investment decisions (Horn, 1995).
According to the prtnciples of transaction cost analysis, governments
should not interfere in transactions and activities related to private goods
and services. They should simply enforce basic property rights and prevent criminal behaviours (such as theft) undermining these types of
transactions. Public goods, however, should be provided by the government because markets cannot provide goods or services for which businesses cannot charge or profit. Governments should also not allow toll
goods tobe treated like public goods and so must charge for their usage.
From this perspective, the costs of constructing and maintaining roads
and bridges should not be charged to all taxpayers and then offered for
32
PART I
Introduction
'free' to those using the facilities, which encourages the latter to treat
these as public goods; rather, those using the facilities must pay for the
costs. In the case of common-pool goods, the government should establish property regimes through licensing to prevent their depletion (Savas,
1977, 1987). The sale of fishing quotas through public auction, which
gives the 'right' to a certain quantity of fish to those succeeding at the
auction, is often cited as an example of this principle.
This analysis of appropriate institutional behaviour based on the
nature of economic transactions is replicated in many other areas of
social and political life by adherents of this approach to policy studies.
Policy-relevant activities such as the negotiation of international treaties,
the operation of multi-level systems of government, and issues of regulatory enforcement are subject to similar\~nalyses in which the actions and
decisions of policy actors are modelled as the outcomes of multiple,
nested games occurring within the confines, costs, and payoffs established by institutional orders (Scharpf, 1997; Putnam, 1988; Scholz,
1984; Sproule-Jones, 1989).
This generates a useful body of insights into appropriate and inappropriate behaviour within the fixed confines Qf a given institutional order
and makes transaction cost analysis quite compatible with, and an extension of, earlier individualist and collectivist deductive approaches to policy theorization (Dowding, 1994). However, this approach is somewhat
eclectic in the sense that it directs attention to a wide range of international and domestic norms, rules, and behaviour that affect actual and
perceived transaction costs and hence may be relevant to explaining policy-making (Putnam, 1988; AtkinSC5tl,'1978);'This results in the tempering of its otherwise purely deductive orientation, le-aving it to'empirical
investigations to determine the significance of specific variables on policy outcomes in specific circumstances. Its main problem, however, lies
with its inability to provide a plausible coherent explanation of the origin
of institutions, or their alteration, without resorting to functionalism.
That is, since this approach argues that individual and collective preferences are shaped by institutions, it is unclear how institutions or rules
themselves are created, and once in place, how they would change
(Cammack, 1992; March et aI., 2000; Peters, 1999; Gorges, 2001).
Actor-centred institutionalism hence tends to provide an excellent discussion of the constraints placed on policy actors and what is 'rational'
for them to do in specific circumstances, but says very little about what
causes those constraints to move in any particular direction (BroInley,
1989: ch. 1). While overcoming many of the problems associated with
earlier individual and collective approaches such as public choice theory
and class analysis by clearly acknowledging the need to take institutional
orders into account in analyzing policy-making behaviour, transaction
cost analysis is at once both limited and vague in its analysis of the history and evolution of policy~making activities.
Unlike the deductive theories that attempt to apply universal maxims to
the study of political phenomena, inductive theories are constructed not
from e 'top down' but from the 'bottom up'. They depend on the accumulation of multiple empirical studies of any phenomenon for their raw
data, ~om which theorists attempt to extract generalizable propositions.
By theIr very nature these theories are less elegant and parsimonious
t~an deductive theories. They often do not have a fully integrated or unified ~et of .theor~tical propositions that can be applied to any case under
conSIderation, SIncethey are, by definition, always 'under construction'.
Like deductive theories, several sub-types of inductive social theories
exist. These, too, can be usefUlly distinguished according to whether
they fo~~s on individuals, groups, or structures in their efforts to explain
the political world and public policy-making.
0
Sociological Individualism: Welfare Economics
Many inductive social theories are also based on the individual but usually the~ .do not contain the simplifying psychological aXioms df individual utIlIty self-maXimization characteristic of their deductive
counterparts~ s~ch as public choice theory (Gerth and Mills, 1958). Welfare econonucs ISone such theory, and is perhaps the most widely used
approach to the study of public policy. Indeed, much of what is called
policy analysis in the literature is often only applied welfare economics
even ~oughthis ~srarely statedexplidtly (Weimer and Vining;-1999). '
ThIS ~pproach ISbased on the notion that individuals, through market
mechanIsms, should be expected to make most social decisions. Unlike
.their deductive counterparts, however, welfare economists recognize that
markets cannot always distribute resources efficiently or, to put it
anoth~r way, carmot always aggregate individual utility-maximizing
behavIOur so as to optimize overall social welfare. In such instances,
. ~efe~e~ to as market failures, welfare economists argue that political
Institutions can act to supplement or replace markets .
.~he principl~s of welfare economics were first worked out by the
Bntis? eco.n.onu~tAlfr~d Pigou (1932) during World War I. Although he
only I~entifie.d Instances of market failures related to the tendency of
some Indus~es to generate monopolies and the inability of both con~umers and Investors to receive information necessary for decision-makIn?, later analysts argued the existence of many more such· market
failures (Bator, 1958; Zerbe and McCurdy, 1999). At minimum, these
include the following:
• Natural monopoly refers to the situation in certain industries with
large capital requirements and disproportionate returns to scale that
34
•
•
•
•
PART I
Introduction
tends to promote a sIngle firm over its competitors. In industries such
as telecommunications, electricity, and railways, the first company to
establish the necessary infrastructure, if unregulated, enjoys cost
advantages that make it difficult for other firms to compete. The lack
of competition, when it occurs, leads to loss of the society's economic
welfare.
Imperfect information occurs when consumers and investors lack adequate information to make rational decisions. Unregulated pharmaceutical firms, for instance, have no incentive. to reveal adverse side
effects of their products, nor do consumers have the expertise required
to evaluate such products. Once again, decisions may be taken that do
not serve the society as a whole. /
In the presence of externalitieS, too, the market is deemed to fail.
These involve situations in which production costs are not borne by
producers ('internalized') but passed on to others outside (external to)
the production process. The most often cited example of an externality
relates to the costs of pollution that a company in pursuit of reduced
costs and increased profits imposes on the society as a whole.
The tragedy of the commons is a market failure that occurs when common property resources, such as fisheries, pastures, forests, or pools of
oil, are exploited without the necessary regulation to maintain the
resource. In these circumstances individual users often benefit from
increasing their use of the resource in the short term although all users
will suffer in the long term from the increased depletion of the resource.
Destructive competition is a. controversial market failure resulting
when aggressiVecoI11petition between-firms causes negative sideeffects im workers and society (Utton, 1986). It"isargued that excessive competition can drive down profit margins and lead to the unnecessary reduction of working conditions, adversely affecting overall
social welfare.
These are the core types of market failures; others have sought to
broaden the concept by including other types within this schema. Thus
education, industrial research and development, art and culture, and
social peace and stability are argued by many as instances of activities
with 'positive externalities' that the market does not supply adequately
despite a social need, indicating the existence of market failure.
Sustained criticisms of the vagueness of the criteria used to define
market failures have led many welfare economists to attempt to recon"
ceptuali;z;ethe qrigin~ noti~~. ~ecent critics have argued that market failures are in fact only one side'!of"an:equation and that there are also
irtnate1inii:tations-'-'-govemmertt"failures-to government's ability to correct market failures. They posit that in several specific instances the state
cannot improve on the market, despite the laUer's failings (Le Grand and
3S
Robinson, 1984; Mayntz, 1993a; Bozeman, 2002). There are three commonly cited instances of such government failure:
displacement is the situation in which an administrative agency charged with producing a particular good or service displaces public goals with its own 'private' or 'organizational' ones.
These may extend to maximizing its budget or power or whatever else
the organization values. In such circumstances, government action to
correct market failure may simply increase inefficiency.
• Rising costs, the supposed disparity between government revenues
and costs, are cited as another instance of government failure. Governments receive tax revenues from general sources but have specific program costs. Without a method to match COl!tsto revenues, it is argued,
governments often fail to control expenses.
• Derived externalities are the third type of government failure. Certain
government actions, such as health-care provision, have a broad
impact on society and the economy and can have the effect of excluding viable market-produced goods and services, negatively affecting
overall levels of social welfare (Wolf, 1979; Le Grand, 1991; Weimer
and Vining, 1999: 194).
• Organizational
Although the exact status and causes of government and market failures remain controversial and largely inductively derived, welfare
economists have developed a theory of public policy-making based on
these concepts. They argue that governments have a responsibility to
-correct market failures because· optimal social outcomes wiil·.not-result_
from unco-ordinated individual decision-making. In this view, govern-··
ments facing a demand for action should first determine if a market failure is causing a social problem; only if one is found should government
intervene to correct the problem (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). However, even then, in order to avoid government failures, policy-makers
must also carefully evaluate their· own capacity to correct the market
before attempting to do so (Vining and Weimer, 1990; Weimer and Vining, 1992).
Once it is agreed that a problem requires state intervention, the key
public policy question for welfare economists is to find the most efficient
way of doing so. The most efficient way, in this perspective, is the least
costly one, and the technique used to determine it is cost-benefit analysis. Its objective is to find out how to achieve the same output for less
input, or more output for the same input (Carley, 1980: 51). Such analy.sis involves evaluating all alternatives and their consequences in terms
of their monetary costs and benefits and then choosing the alternative
that maximizes benefits while minimiZing costs. Costs and benefits in
this mode of analysis are determined by:
36
PART I
Introduction
1. Enumerating all adverse and positive consequences arising from
implementation of an option in monetary terms.
2. Estimating the probability of occurrence.
3. Estimating the cost or benefit to society should it occur.
4. Calculating the expected loss or gain related to each consequence by
multiplying (2) and (3).
5. Estimating the costs of such actions into the future to give a net present value (Fischoff, 1977; Bickers and Williams, 2001).
Cost-benefit analysis is essentially a technique for making the government replicate market decision-making as closely as possible for the purpose of allocating resources. It has been described as 'an attempt to use
economic technique, in place of formal market bargaining or price setting, to locate a Pareto-optimal policy alternative' (Gillroy and Wade,
1992: 7; Zeckhimser and Schaefer, 1968). The criterion of Pareto optimality requires that an action be undertaken only if it offers the possibility of
making at least one person better off without worsening the situation of
any other person. However, while Pareto optimality may be achievable in
a competitive market (though that is disputable as well), it is impossible
to apply in the public policy arena because all government actions make
some better off at the expense of others. Social security for the poor
makes the rich who pay for it worse off and is therefore not Pareto optimal; nor is putting criminals in jail, because it makes them worse off.
The difficulties with the principle of Pareto optimality have resulted in
its replacement in contemporary welfare economics by the so-called
Kaldor cn1erion,which requires that policy alternatives· maximizing net
benefits over cosfbe chosen. Under this criterion, a policy can be chosen
even if some lose as long as the total gains are higher than the sum of
losses. A cost-benefit analysis is employed to find out the Kaldor-efficient
allocation, and the option offering the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is
selected for adoption and implementation.
While not without merits, cost-benefit analysis is often problematic.
Despite numerous attempts to refine the model, there is no acceptable
way of putting a dollar value on various intangible costs and consequences (Zeckhauser, 1975). There is no way, for instance, to calculate
precisely the costs of social security programs in terms of their effects on
the recipients' work incentive, or their benefits in terms of the social
peace and tolerance they promote. Moreover, the costs and benefits of
any policy are often not evenly distributed, for some pay more than others, while some benefit more. And there is often a severe problem of
aggregating or summing up the various components of an option. Building a new airport involves disparate problems, such as increased noise
for residents in adjoining areas, decreased travelling time for some and
increased time for others, increased pollution, beneficial employment
and savings effects, and so on, all of which affect different sections of the
Approaches to Puqlic Policy
37
society differently and so need to be evaluated differently, yet there is no
generally acceptable way of doing so (Carley, 1980: 51-5). Efforts to
improve cost-benefit technique continue; however, so do criticisms.
The main problem with the conception of public policy-making
offered by welfare economists, however, is not related to their methods
or to the elegance of their theoretical assumptions about reciprocal market and government failures. Rather, these theorists have failed to recognize that states almost never make their policies in the essentially
technical manner assumed by the theory. Even if one could identify the
most efficient and effective policy, which is difficult given the limitations
innate to the social sciences, th.e actual policy choice is a political one,
bound by political institutio!1s and made by political actors, often in
response to political pressures. As such, the technical analyses generated
by welfare economists are often merely anothe~ political resource used
by proponents of one or another option for government action or inaction to further their claims (Weiss, 1977b3. Only in very specific circumstances when welfare economists happen to be policy-makers-as
happens at times in some countries in' some sectors, such as taxation or
fiscal management-would one expect political decisions to be based
solely on welfare-maximizing criteria as defined by welfare economists
(Markoff and Montecinos, 1993). The neglect of political variables by
welfare economics has led its critics to describe it as 'a myth; a theoretical illusion' that promotes 'a false and naive view of the policy process'
(Minogue, 1983: 76; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: SO-I).
Group Th~ortes: Pluralism and Corporatism
A second inductive approach to social theory that has been prominent in
studies of policy-making,. especially in political science, focuses on
groups and not individuals. The best-known examples of this approach
are\'plJIralism', which originated in the United States and continues to be
\(>--the 'dominant perspective in American political science, and 'corporatism', which is a similar group theory developed in Europe.
While [~yic:le!1ce
.9fpluralist tilinkiIlgcan be found in the works of one
of the founding fathers' 6IThe United States, Ia,J:I!es.Madison (Madison
and Hamilton, 1961), ~d a French observer of early nineteenth-century
America, ~E!Xisde Tocqueville (1956), the doctrine received its first formal expression by Arthur Bentley in 1908. The theory has been considerably modified and refined over the years, but the fundamental tenets
postulated by Bentley remain intact. Some prominent pluralist thinkers,!'
responsible for a revival of Bentley's work in the US in the post-World
War II era, include Robert Dahl (1956, 1961), NelsonPolsby (1963), and
especially David Truman (1964).
'
Pluralism is b.a.sed.onJ.beaS~ll[[lptionof the primacy of interest groups
!E:the political process. In The Process of Government, Bentley argued
that different interests in society found their concrete manifestation in
different groups consisting of individuals with similar concerns and, ultimately, that 'society itself is nothing other than the complex of the
groups that compose it.' Truman modified Bentley's notion of a one-toone correspondence between interests and groups and argued that two
kinds of interests-latent and manifest-resulted in the creation of two
kinds of groups-potential and organized (Truman, 1964; also see Jordan, 200p). For Truman, latent interests in the process of emerging pro~
vided the underpinnings for potential groups, which over time led to the
emergence of organized groups, allowing politics to be seen as a more
dynamic process than Bentl~y seemed to be arguing.
Groups in pluralist theory are not only many and free-forming, they
are also characterized by overlapping membership and ,a lack of representational monopoly (Schmitter, 1977). That is, the same individual
may belong to a number of groups for pursuing his or her different interests; a person, for instance, may belong at the same time to Greenpeace,
the local Chamber of Commerce, and Ducks Unlimited, among others.
Overlapping membership is said to be a key mechanism for reconciling
conflicts and promoting co-operation among groups. In addition, the
same interest may be represented by more than one group. Environmental causes, for example, are espoused by a large number of groups iIi
every industrialized country. Politics, in the pluralist perspective, is the
process by which various competing interests and groups are reconciled.
Public policies are thus a result of competition and collaboration among
groups working to further their members' collective interests (Self,
1985).
.
Contrary to the interpretation presented in many commentaries, pluralists do not believe that all groups are equally influential or that they
have equal access to government (Smith, 1990: 303-4). In fact, they recognize that groups vary in terms of the financial or organizational (personnel, legitimacy, members' loyalty, or internal unity) resources they
possess and the access to government they enjoy (Lindblom, 1968; Lowi,
1969; McConnell, 1966; Schattschneider, 1960). Neverthel~ss, as far as
the policy process is concerned, as McLennan has observed, 'It is impossible to read the standard works without getting the sense that resources,
information and the means of political communication are openly available to all citizens, that groups form an array of equivalent power centres
in society, and that all legitimate voices can and will be heard.' As such,
pluralist theories are to some extent justifiably criticized for not haVing a
sufficiently developed notion of groups' varying capacity to affect gov'·ernmerrtda,"isron"-making.
-,..,:Amore<8igI'rifkam,;P£(i)blem,with,the,GJ)plicaiion.;Qf".pluralism
to public
policy-making, however, is that the role of the government in making
public policies is quite unclear (Smith, 1990). The early pluralists
assumed that the government was a sort of 'transmission belt' registering
and implementing the demands' of interest groups. The government was
often thought of not actually as an entity but as a place, an 'arena' where
competing groups met and bargained (Dahl, 1967). The recognition that
this view did not accord with the reality of what governments actually
did led to its reconceptualization as a 'referee' or 'umpire' of the group
struggle. In this view, the state was still ultimately a place where competing groups met to work out their differences, but this time the government was considered a kind of neutral official setting out the rules of
group conflict and ensuring that groups did not violate them with
impunity (Berle, 1959). As Earl Latham (1952: 390) put it:
The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of
the successful coalitions, and records th~ terms of the surrenders,
compromises, and conquests in the form, of statutes. Every statute
tends to represent compromise because the very process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation and consent. The legislative vote on any issue thus tends to represent the
composition of strength, I.e., the balance of power among the con~
tending groups at the moment of voting. What may be called public
policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at
any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their favor.
This is an overly simplistic view of the government, as public choice critics of pluraltsm such as Mancur Olson (1965) were quick to point out;
because it assumes that public officials do not have their own interests
and ambitions, which they seek to realize through'their control of the
governmental machinery. It also neglects the fact that states often maintain special ties with certain groups and may even sponsor establishment
of groups where there are none or if those in existence are found to be
difficult to co-opt or accommodate (Pal, 1993a).
The pluralist notion of the government responding to group pressure
is also misconceived because it assumes unity of purpose and action on
the part of the government. As some critics have pointed out, 'bureaucratic.politics' is a pervasive phenomenon that has a critical impact on
public policies (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Different departments and
agencies have differe:r:tinterests and conflicting interpretations of the
same problem, and how these differences are resolved has an impact on
what policies are adopted-and how they are implemented.
Recognition of these problems with pluralism (Connolly, 1969) led to
the emergence of what is sometimes described as 'neo-pluralism' within
the American political science community. The reformulation retained
the significance attributed to competition among groups, but modified
the idea of approximate equality among groups and explicitly acknowledged that some groups are more powerful than others. Charles lindblom, for example, has argued that business is more powerful than
40
PART I
Introduction
others for two reasons. First, government in a capitalist society needs a
prosperous economy to serve as the basis for tax rev~nues to spend on
programs and its own re-election. To promote e~onoIDlcgrowth, gove~ments must maintain business confidence, whICh often means paYIng
special heed to the demands of the business community. Second, in capitalist societies there is a division betweeri public and private sectors, the
former under the control of the state and the latter dominated by business. The private sector's dominance by business gives it a privileged
position in comparison to other groups in that much employment an?
associated social and economic activity are ultimately dependent on pnvate-sector investment behaviour (Lindblom, 1977). Unlike the classical
pluralists, who seemed only to acknowledge but not incorporate the
observation that some groups may be more powerful than others because
of their superior organization and resources, Lindblom argued that the
strength of business lay in the nature of capitalism and democracy itself.
As such, business need not, though it may, exert pressure on the government to realize its interests; the government, in accordance with the
imperatives of capitalism and the pursuit of its own self-interest, will
ensure that business interests are not adversely affected by its actions.
Other problems with pluralist analyses of public policy-making, however, rema.in. One concern, which led some early critics of pluralism to
adopt a more deductive, rational choice orientation, involves the motivations individuals have for joining groups. Mancur Olson, for example,
argued that a fundamental flaw in pluralist theory related to the ability of
individuals to gain the advantages of group membership without actually
joining a.ilroti.p~ This' ability'to 'free 'ride', Olson argued, meant,that
group membership could not simply be taken for granted but had to' b:
fostered by providing 'selective incentives' to individuals to 'make It
worth their while' to join (Olson, 1965; McLean, 2000).
Later studies revealed that groups form for a variety of reasons, and
pointed to the role patrons played in providing start-up funding and organizational assistance to groups (Nownes and Neeley, 1996; Nownes,
1995; Nownes and Cigler, 1995). Such studies highlighted a second serious problem with pluralist theory: its excessive concentration on the role
of interest groups themselves and its relative neglect of other equally
important factors in the political and policy-making processes. While
neo-pluralism was a significant improvement on its predecessor, it did
not address all the problems innate to a concentrated focus on groups as
collective social actors.
The theory also continued to overlook the role of the international system in shaping public policies and their implementation. International
economic interdependence makes states' policies increasingly subject to
international pressures, regardless of domestic group pressures. It is difficult to understand, for example, the industrial and trade policies of
industrialized countries without reference to the international economy
41
and the political pressures it places on policy-makers. The role of ideology was also unjustifiably neglected in the pluralist explanations of politics and public policy. The liberal tradition pre-eminent in Anglo-Saxon
countries (including Canada, the US, and Australia), for example, has
had a significant impact on their governments' hesitant and often contradictory intervention in the economy.
As was the case with welfare economics, these lacunae have been
filled by adding an institutional dimension to pluralist analysis, in which
the state is viewed as an independent actor in its own right, which can
and does affect the groups that contest political life and make policy
(Nordlinger, 1981). This development is discussed in the next section.
Pluralism's applicability to countries besides the United States has
also been especially problematic because of differences in underlying
political institutions and processes that challenge pluralist assumptions
and precepts derived only from examination of the US experience (Zeigler, 1964). British parliamentary institutions found in Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Japan, or Sweden, for example, do not lend themselves to the kind of open access that groups enjoy in relation.to legislatures in the US and other countries with similar republican systems of
government (Presthus, 1973).3 And many authoritarian countries simply
lack the kinds of groups conceived by pluralists as being the basic building blocks of political analysis. Even if groups have the freedom to organize, the numbers actually formed are fewer than in the US and tend to
be much more permanent and formalized. This finding led some group
theorists, such as Phillipe Schmitter, to speculate that pluralism was only
one form in which' group systems .could develop. Schmitter (1977)
argued that, depending on a range of variables and historical factors, a
corporatist form of political organization was much more likely than a
pluralist one to emerge in many countries outside the US.
In Europe, theories treating groups as their primary unit of analysis
have tended to take a corporatist form. The roots of corporatism extend
back to the Middle Ages when there were concerns about protecting the
'intermediate strata' of autonomous associations between the state and
the family (Gierke, 1958a, 1958b).4 These included guilds and other
forms of trade associations as well as, most importantly, religious organizations and churches ..Corporatist theory argues that these intermediate
strata have a life of their own above ana. beyond their constituting individuals, and that their existence is part of the 'organic' or natural order
of society. Much of political life and conflict in Europe in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries concerned efforts by emerging national states to
control the operations of these 'autonomous strata' and the latter's
efforts to resist state control (Cawson, 1986; Mann, 1984; Winkler, 1976).
Corporatism can be best understood, as Schmitter has observed, in
contrast to pluralism. The latter proposes that multiple groups exist to
represent their respective members' interests, with membership being
42
PART
I Introduction
voluntary and groups associating freely with each other without state
interference in their activities. In contrast, corporatism is:
[A] system of interest intermediation in which the constituent units
are organized into a limited number of ~ingular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.
(Schmitter, 1977: 9)
The groups here are not thought of as free-forming, voluntary, or competitive, as in pluralism. Nor are they considered to be autonomous, for
they depend on the state for recognition and support in return for a role
in policy-making. Corporatism thus explicitly takes into account two
problems endemic to pluralism: its neglect of the role of the state and its
failure to recognize institutionalized patterns of relationships between
the state and groups.
In corporatist theory, public policy is shaped by the interaction
between the state and the interest group or groups recognized by the
state. Interaction among groups is institutionalized within and mediated
by the state (McLennan, 1989: 245). Public policy towards a declining
industry, for instance, would take the form of bargaining between and
among the state and relevant industry associations and trade unions as
to how best to rationalize the industry and make it competitive. The
making of social-'welfare"policies" similarly involves negotiations .·with .
business associations, socU~:I
welfa.regroups, and possibly trade unionsif the proposed policies affect their' members, The outcome of these
negotiations depends not only on the organizational characteristics of the
groups but on the closeness of their relationship with the state. The state
itself is not seen as a monolith, but as an organization with internal fissures that affect its actions.
.
Although this conception accords fairly well with political practices in
many European countries, there are still problems with corporatism .as
an approach to politics or the study of public policy. First, it is a descriptive category of a particular kind of political arrangement between states
and societies (such as in Sweden or Austria), not a general explanation
of what governments do, especially those in non-corporatist countries.
Thus it has little to say about why countries such as Australia, Canada,
and the United States have the particular public policies that they do,
except to pdiritout that th:e lack of institutionalized co-operaUon
""between'the state and groups in these countries often leads to fragmented and inconsistent policies (Panitch, 1977, 1979)..
Second, the theory does little to further our understanding of public
p()licyprpcesses,ev:eIl in ostensibly corporatist countries. While- it is
43
significant to know that not all countries have open-ended competition
among groups as suggested by pluralism, this in itself does not say very
much about why a policy is adopted or why it is implemented in a particular manner. The close links between governments and certain groups
are certainly important, but these are also only one among many factors
shaping policies and policy-making (Castles and Merrill, 1989; Kernan
and Pennings, 1995).
Third, the theory does not contain a clear notion of even its own fundamental unit of analysis, the 'interest' group. Contemporary societies
contain myriad interests, and it is not clear which are or should be represented by the state. In some cases, the relevant groups are defined in
terms of ethnicity, language, or religion (Lijphart, 1969), while in others
they are defined with reference to their economic activities. The bulk of
corporatist literature concentrates somewhat arbitrarily on producer
groups, such as industry associations and trade unions, and on their role
in specific sectors, such as labour market policy and wage bargaining
(Siaroff, 1999).
Fourth, the theory is vague about the relative significance of different
groups in politics. Are we to treat all groups as equally influential? If not,
then what determines their influence? The corporatist literature is silent
on such questions. Finally, the theory has no clear conception of the
nature of the state, its interests, and why it recognizes some groups. and
not others as representatives of corporate interests. The answers to these
questions vary dramatically among scholars working in the corporatist
framework. Some argue that corporatism is a manifestation of an
autonomous state desiring to managesocial-change or ensure social stability (Cawson, 1978). Others suggest it isa system sought by the major
corporate actors and thus is simply put into place by the state at their
behest (Schmitter, 1985).
Despite its shortcomings, corporatist theory has played a significant
role in the analysis of public policy, especially in Europe and Latin America. By highlighting the autonomous role of the state in politics, it paved
the way for more sophisticated explanations of public policy-making
than those provided by earlier inductive group theories such as pluralism
(Smith, 1997). More significantly, by emphasizing the importance of
institutionalized patter.ns of relationships between states and societies, it
fostered the emergence of new inductive approaches such as 'statism',
. which offer a more comprehensive explanation of public policy-making
(Blom-Hansen, 2001).
A third general type of inductive political theory has taken to heart the
insights of critics of pluralism and corporatism and has emphasized organized social structures and political' institutions it its analyses. Many
44
PART I
Introduction
analyses in this mould focus solely on the state, seeing it as the leading
institution in society and the key agent in the political process. Others,
however, also attribute explanatory significance to organized social.
actors in addition to the state.
Both interpretations have their origin in the works of late nineteenthcentury German historical sociologists and legal theorists who highlighted the effects of the development of modern state institutions on the
development of society. Rather than argue that the state reflected the
nature of a nation's populace or social structure, theorists such as Max
Weber and Otto Hintze noted how the state's monopoly on the use of
force allowed it to reorder and structure social relations and institutions
(Hintze, 1975; Nettl, 1968; Weber, 1978).
Sociological or historical neo-institutionalism has been summarized
by Stephen Krasner (1988: 67) as follows:
An institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and political life. The preferences, capabilities, and basic self-identities of individuals are
conditioned by these institutional structures. Historical developments are path dependent; once certain choices are made, they
constrain future possibilities. The range of options available to policymakers at any given.time is a function of institutional capabilities
that were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in response
to very different environmental pressures.
This perspective explicitly' acknowledges that policy preferences and
capacities are usually understood in the context of the-sotiety'in which
the state isemtiedded (Nett!, 1968; Przeworski, 1990; Therborn, 1986).
Like its more deductive counterpart, actor-centred institutionalism, Peter
Hall described an 'institutionalist' analysis as one focused on the impact
of large-scale structures on individuals and vice versa. As he put it:
The concept of institutions ... refer[s] to the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure
the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity
and economy. As such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as
opposed to conventional, standing. Throughout the emphasis is on
the relational character of institutions; that is to say, on the way in
which they structure the interactions of individuals. In this sense it
is the organizational qualities of institutions that are being emphasized. (Hall, 1986: 19)
However, historical or sociological neo-institutionalism differs from its
deductive counterpart in several critical areas. First, there is no effort
made in this approach to reduce institutions to less organized forms of
social interaction, such as norms, rules, or conventions. Second, there is
4S
no attempt to reduce institUtlons to the level of individuals and individual activities, such as economic or social transactions. And, third, institutions are simply taken as 'givens', that is, as observable social entities in
themselves, with little effort made to derive the reasons for their origins
from a priori principles of human cognition or existence (March and
Olsen, 1994).
Using such a socio-historical line of analysis yields, to use Theda
Skocpol's terms, a 'state-centric' as opposed to 'society-centric' explanation of political life, including public policy-making (Skocpol, 1985). In a
'strong' version of the statist approach, as Adam Przeworski (1990: 47-8)
put it in a pioneering book:
states create, organize and regulate societies. States dominate other
organizations within a particular territory, they mould the culture
and shape the economy. Thus the problem of the autonomy of the
state with regard to society has no sense within this perspective. It
should not even appear. The concept of 'autonomy' is a useful
instrument of analysis only if the domination by the state over society is a contingent situation, that is, if the state derives its efficacy
from private property, societal values, or some other sources
located outside it. Within a true 'state-centric' approach this concept has nothing to contribute.
In the statist version of neo-institutional analysis the state is viewed as
an autonomous actor with the capacity to devise and implement its own
objectives, not necessarily just to respond to pressure from dominant
social groups or'classes:dts-autonomyand
capacity are based on its
staffing by officials with personal and' agency interests and ambitions
and the fact that it is a sovereign organization with unparalleled financial, personnel, and-in the final instance-coercive resources. The proponents of this perspective claim that this emphasis on the centrality of
the state as an explanatory variable enables it to offer more plausible
explanations of long-term patterns of policy development in many countries than do other types of political theory (Krasner, 1984; Skowronek,
1982; .Orren and Skowronek, 1998-9).
It is difficult to accept statism in the strong form described above,
however. For one, it hilS difficulty accounting for the existence of social
liberties and freedoms or explaining why states cannot always enforce
their will, such as in times of rebellion, revolution, civil war, or civil disobedience. In fact, even the most autocratic governments make some
attempt to respond to what they believe to be the population's preferences. It is, of course, especially impossible for a democratic state to be
entirely autonomous from a society with voting rights. And, as Lindblom
and others pointed out, in addition to efforts to maintain and nurture
support for the regime among the population, capitalist states, both
democratic and autocratic, need to accommodate the imperatives of the
marketplace in their policies. Second, the statist view suggests implicitly
that all 'strong' states respond to the same problem in the same manner
because of their similar organizational features. This is obviously not the
case, as different. states (both 'strong' and 'weak') often have different
policies dealing with the same problem. To explain the differences, we
need to take into account factors other than the features of the state
(Przeworski, 1990).
To be fair, however, few subscribe to statism in the 'strong' form
described above. Instead of replacing the pluralist notion of the societal
direction of the state with the statist notion of the state's direction of
society, most inductively oriented institutionalist theorists merely want
to point out the need to take both sets of factors into consideration in
their analyses of political phenomena (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989; McLennan, 1989). As Skocpol herself has conceded:
In this perspective, the state certainly does not become everything.
Other organizations and agents also pattern social relationships and
politics, and the analyst must explore the state's structure in reiation to them. But this Weberian view of the state does -require us to
see it as much more than a mere arena in which social groups make
demands and engage in political struggles or compromises.
(Skocpol, 1985: 7-8)
This milder version of statism thus concentrates on the links between the
state and society in the context of the former's pre-eminence in pluralist
group theory. To that extent, ~tatism complements rather. than replaces
society-centredness and restores some bal-anceto soeial-and politiealtheorizing,·whieh, it can be argued; had lost its equilibrium (Orren and
Skowronek, 1993; Almond, 1988; Cortell and Peterson, 2001).
The first observation to emerge from this brief discussion of the manner
in which broad approaches to the study of social phenomena have been
applied to public policy-making is that there are many different, often
contradictory, ways to approaching the subject of public policy. An
extensive literature exists both promoting and denouncing the origins,
assumptions, and application of each approach to the subject. Nevertheless, a few general conclusions can be gleaned from this literature.
First, there is an overwhelming tendency in the deductive literature to
apply preconceived theoretical insights to actual instances of public pol"icy-mmng.·'ThisUl''Ilot-neeessanly 'a' problem, as using this method
',.·allows'·>l.>bsE$\lat-ion..of.",.w¥ergencebetween
actual and expected
behaviour, which hopefully would lead to refinement of the initial
assumptions. However, many deductive-oriented researchers often seem
to forget the contingent nature of their hypotheses and the need to
constantly test and refine their assumptions against empirical evidence.
Consequently, instead of using the study of public policy to test the
hypotheses and assess the explanatory capacity of their theories, analysts
often simply read public policy~makingin terms of the theoretical framework, models, or metaphors they are using (Dobuzinskis, 1992). Application of inductive theories to the study of public policy-making has also
revealed that the claim of any of these approaches to the status of a complete 'general theory' is suspect. There has been a distinct evolution of
thinking away' from welfare ~cOP()~lics, pluralism, and corporatism
towards neo-institutional analysis, which promotes more open-ended
and empirically informed inquiry.
Second, many approaches, both deductive and inductive, tend to
explain the phenomena under consideration in incompatible monocausal terms. This temptation must be resisted if we are to understand
public policy. Analysts working in different theoretical frameworks study
the same case differently and, not surprisingly, arrive at different conclusions. While bringing different points of view to bear on a question furthers our understanding of a phenomenon, the exercise also involves the
danger of turning into a verbal dialogue among the deaf, serving no useful purpose. On the other hand, while some of the problems associated
with the general theories discussed above can be overcome by layering
multiple units of analysisS and combining inductive and deductive
methodologies, there are limits to the kinds of syntheses that can be
developed at a general level of analysis.
Third, the most widely used approaches in disciplines such as economics and political science, whether- they are inductive er·deductive in
nature, tend to view human activity as part of the struggle to survive in a
world in which wants are limitless and the resources available to satisfy
them are limited. This view extends to all political phenomena, including
public·policy-making.ln recent times, the policy sciences have begun to
abandon this notion of all-pervasive conflict and have suggested that the
lessons actors learn from their own and others' experiences are also significant determinants of their behaviour, including policy-making. That
is, the objectives actors seek depend on what they believe to be desirable
and achievable, which in turn depends on their previous achievements
and disappointments., Discussion, arguments, and persuasion among
actors are viewed as an integral part of the policy process conceived of as
a process of learning by trial, error, and example.6 The present book is
strongly influenced by these emerging trends towards broadening the
analytical framework of policy studies to include both conflict and learning and towards a greater emphasis on incorporating the results of empirical analyses of many policy domains into the process of theory-building
in policy science.
What this overview reveals, then, is that the policy sciences cannot be
furthered simply by applying existing general theoretical approaches,
48
PART I
Introduction
whether deductive ~r inductive. What is needed in policy analysis, as
was suggested in Chapter 1, is an analytical fr~ework.
that 'permits
consideration of the entire range of factors affectmg public pohcy, and
allows hypotheses to be tested through the empirical analysis of the reality analysts are attempting to describe and understand.
Rather than seek a synthesis of general social, political, and economic
theories that can explain policy-making, theoretical efforts in the policy
sciences should remain firmly rooted in the middle or meso level. That
is, policy theory cannot and should not· claim to be more than a part of
the development of general theories of social and political phenomena
whose contours remain to be discerned at some point in the future. However, careful empirical studies and careful generalization can provide a
useful middle-range theory and understanding of public policy-making.
This theory may be inelegant, but as the discussion of the six general
theories presented above reveals, precision and adequacy should be
more important meta-theoretical objectives in policy analysis than parsimony and aesthetics. To begin this process of middle-range theory construction, the nature of policy actors, institutions, and instruments will
be considered in more detail in Part II.
FURTHER READINGS
Hale, M.Q. 1960. 'The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley', American Political
Sdence Review 54, 4: 955-61.
Kiser, Larry, and Elinor Ostrom. 1982. 'The Three Worlds of Action', in
Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry. B.~verly Hills, Calif.: Sage,
179-222.
..
Le Grand, Julian. 1991. 'The Theory of Government Failure', British Journal
of Political Science 21, 4: 423-42.
McLennan, Gregor. 1989. Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: Classic Debates
and New Departures. Cambridge: Polity Press.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. 'The New Institutionalism:
Organizational Factors in Political Life', American Political Sdence Review
78: 734-49.
Nordlinger; Eric A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press .
. Pigou, A.C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan.
Schmitter, Phillipe C. 1977. 'Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of
Societal Change in Western Europe', (;omparatiye Politic;aLStu4if!s 10, 1:
7-38.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research' , in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol,
eds, Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press,
3-43.
Stokey, Edith, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1978. A Primer for Policy Analysis.
New York: W.w. Norton.
49
'Ii"uman, David R. 1964. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and
Public Opinion. New York: Knopf.
_
Van Winden,Frans A.A.M. 1988. 'The Economic Theory of Political DecisionMaking', in Julien van den Broeck, ed., Public Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer,
9-57.
Winkler, J.T. 1976. 'Corporatism', European Journal of Sociology 17, 1:
100-36.
1. Ossowski (1963) has argued that over the course of history there have
been four different types of class analysis used to explain political
phenomena: dichotomous class systems; gradation schemes; functional
conceptions; and the 'Marxian' synthesis of those other models.
2. Keohane (1989: 163) described them as 'persistent and connected sets of
rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations'.
3. However, the use of a pluralist analysis in the examination of socialist oneparty states proved much more beneficial than earlier analysis based on
notions of 'totalitarianism'. For example, see Hough (1972); Skilling
(1966).
4. The term 'neo-corporatism' is often used simply to distance contemporary
corporatist theory from the authoritarian practices of fascist governments
throughout Europe and Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s, which
claimed to be corporatist. Neo-corporatism is thought to be a term less
likely to conjure up images of militarism, nationalism, or totalitarianism
associated with fascism, but is otherwise identical to 'corporatism'. We
will, however, use the terms 'corporatism'
and 'neo-corporatism'
interchangeably. See Malloy (1993); Schmitter (1982); von Beyme (1983).
5. See the efforts to accomplish this in the synthesis of deductive and
inductive neo-institutionalisms in Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) and
Hollingsworth (2000). On the limits of these efforts, see Hay and Wincott
(1998) .
6. While the learning theories represent a major departure for policy analysis
from political, economic, or sociological theorization, oilly recently have
they started taking the insights of actor- and institution-centred theories
into account. See, for example, Stewart (1992) and Livingston (1992).
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Policy Actors and Institutions
As the discussion in Chapter 2 has shown, there is a vibrant, though ultimately inconclusive, (iebate in the literature on the role of individuals,
groups, and institutions in:the public policy process. The dispute hinges
on the causal significance of the actors' interests and capabilities compared to the institutional context or structures in which they operate.
Some analysts regard individual and collective actors as the only relevant
categories of analysis, while others maintain that what actors seek and
do depends on the political, economic, and social structures that surround them.
Most of the approaches to public policy discussed in the preceding
chapter treat individual and group actors as the key explanatory variables. Thus' the' welfare~economicsand--public' choice theories regard
individuals as the agents who shape policy, whereas the theories built on
group and class theory, such as pluralism and Marxism, attribute primacy to organized groups. While some of the more nuanced of these
analyses do consider the institutional context within which these actors
operate, their conceptual and methodological predisposition prevents
them from dealing adequately with the institutional factors affecting public policy.
,
.
Built on critiques of these early theories, the most recent outgrowths
of the evolution of policy-relevant social theorization, such as statism
and transaction cost analysis, attempt to take into account both actororiented and structural variables. A.).thoughtheir methodologies differ,
both approaches treat state organizations as central institutional actors
affecting the preferences and activities of other policy actors. Both
attempt to explain public policy processes and outcomes in terms of the
interacting effects of state objectives and capabilities and those of social
actors.
Hence, much recent theorizing reflects the understanding that both
actors and institutions play a crucial role in the policy process, even
though one may be more important than the other in specific instances
53
(Lundquist, 1987). Individuals, groups, and classes participating in the
policy process no doubt have their own interests, but how they interpret
and pursue their interests' and the outcomes of their efforts are shaped by .
institutional factors. Even more significantly, some institutional arrangements are believed to be more conducive to effective policy-making and
implementation than others (Stoker, 1989; May, 1993; Siedschlag, 2000).
In this book we follow the statist tendency to define institutions narrowly as actual structures or organizations of the state, society, and the
international system. Following this approach, we are less concerned, as
opposed to transactions cost analysts and others, with the origins of
these institutions,which are taken as empirically given. Rather we are
concerned with the way institutions are organized internally and in relation to each other (March and Olsen, 1998). In addition to their formal
organizational characteristics-membership, rules, and operating procedures-we do, however, recognize the insights of actor-centred institutionalists. who emphasize not just the structural components of
organizations but also the principles, norms, and ideas they embody.
These principles, in the form of formal or informal rules and conventions, as well as ethical, ideological, and epistemic concerns, help to'
shape actors'behaviour by conditioning their perception of their interests and the probability of these interests being realized (March et al.,
2000; Timmermans and Bleiklie, 1999). While not monolithic,
omnipresent, or immutable, institutions cannot be avoided, modified, or
replaced without considerable effort.1
INTEGRATING ACTORS AND INSflTUTIONS:
tHE POllCY UNIVERSE AND THE POliCY SUBSYSTEM
Since actors and institutions exist in a mutually defining relationship, it
is useful to have a term that can encompass both elements of this fundame.ntal policy relationship. For this purpose, students of the policy sciences have developed the concept of aJ!!Jlicyun~J7e~~ thought of as a,
fundamental unit containing all possible international, state, and social
actors and institutions directly or indirectly affecting a specific policy
area. Fr£m these poten~ members, a subset is drawn that comprises a \
sectoral(g()liGYsub~§.t.s~~.':~
(Freeman, 1955; Cater, 1964; Freeman and
Stevens, 1987). The policy subsystem is a space where relevant actors
discuss policy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests. During the course of their interaction with the other actors, they
often give up or modify their objectives in return for concessions from
others. These interactions, however, occur in the context of various institutional arrangements surrounding the policy process, which affect how
the actors pursue their interests and ideas and the extent to which their
efforts succ'eed (Knoke, 1993; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Sabatier and
J enkins-Smith, 1993I)T~-----------------------'
'A policy subsystem includes both actors who are intimately invoived·
in a policy process as well as others who are only marginally so. In Chapter 6 we will discuss additional terminology developed to describe the
actors who participate more often and more directly in the policy process
as belonging to interest networks and those involved to a lesser degree as
, belonging to discourse communities.2 Ultimately, we will show how the
nature of the relationship between these two components of a subsystem
is a significant determinant of the nature of policy content and helps to
explain much about fundamental policy dynamics (Peters, 1992a).
Figure 3.1 diagrams the basic relationship between actors and institutions that typically exists in a policy subsystem.
Almost an infinite variety of actors and institutions in the policy universe
may actually or potentially constitute a policy subsystem. Composition
varies by country, policy sector, or 'domain', and over time (Jordan and
Maloney, 1997). The exact composition of a policy subsystem and the
relative significance of its constituents is an empirical question that cannot be delineated a priori. All that we can say with certainty is that the
policy institutions and actors come from within the machinery of the
state and from the society at large. The following discussion is intended
to convey a sense of the typical sources of key subsystem actors and
institutions, which are drawn from the international system as well as
from domestic state and social systems.
A large body of literature argues that states are increasingly constrained
and shaped by global forces (Ohmae, 1995; Falk, 1997). However, for the
most part, the public policy literature has tended to focus on domestic
state activities and to treat the international realm as an external condition to which domestic policy actors respond rather than as an integral
part of the policy process. To the extent that scholars consider international institutions and actors, they usually focus on 'global' or 'transnational' policies, such as trade, environment, and telecommunications
(Gummett, 1996; Reinicke, 1998). Moreover, the ,international realm is
often understood in monolithic terms, such that the impact of the international is considered to be constant and not variable across sectors and
time. The reality, however, is that the international realm is a differentiated entity in which different international actors have different impacts
on domestic policy-making and policy outputs (Hobson and Ramesh,
2002).
Recognition of the international system's influences on public policy is
one of the more exciting recent developments in the discipline. The international system not only influences policy sectors that are obviously
international-trade and defence, for example-but also sectors with no
immediately apparent international connection, such as health care and
old age pensions. The sources of influence lie in the overall structure of
the international system, and a nation's place in it, and the specific
'regimes' that exist in many policy areas, about which we will say more
shortly.
While the international system has probably always affected public
policy to some extent, its scope and intensity have increased greatly in
recent times. This is the result of what is described as \globalization or, '.
more precisely, \internationalization:' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). \
Although initially conceiVed in someWhat simplistic terms, the recent
policy literature recognizes the highly complex character of internationalization, the different forms it takes across space and time, and the varying effects it has on different policy sectors and states (Bernstein and
Cashore, 2000; Bennett, 1997; Brenner, 1999; Weiss, 1999). This recognition has led researchers to investigate more carefully the means, manner,
and mechanisms through which domestic policy processes are linked to
the international system (Coleman and Perl, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995;
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Such studies are
still at an early stage and the challenge before scholars is to incorporate
changes induced by. internationalization into existing conceptions of
domestic policy processes and its outcomes (Hollingsworth, 1998).
The Policy Effects of International Institutions
Assessing the effects of international institutions is a lot more difficult
than assessing those in the domestic arena. For one thing, states are
sovereign entities with, in theory, the legal authority to close their
borders to any and all foreign influences as and when they choose. In
Policy Actorsand
56
PART II
Institutions,
Institutions
57
Actors, and Instruments
reality, however, it is nearly impossible for states to stop foreign influences at the border because of constraints rooted in the international system (Held and McGrew, 1993; Walsh, 1994). The extent to which a state
is able to assert its sovereignty depends on the severity of iriternational
pressures and the nature of the issue in question, as well as features
innate to the state itself (Knill and Lehinkuhl, 2002).
To understand the disparate international factors affecting states'
behaviour, scholars have developed the concept of 'international
regimes' to describe institutionalized arrangements in a given policy area
(Krasner, 1982; Haggard and Simmons, 1987). Regimes have been
defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989: 19) as 'sets of governing arrangements' or 'networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects'. Regimes vary considerably in
form, scope of coverage, level of adherence, and the instruments through
which they are put into practice (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). Some
regimes are based on explicit treaties whereas others are based simply on
conventions that develop as a l,"esultof repeated international behaviour.
Some cover a variety of related issues while others are' quite 'narrow in
coverage. Some are closely adhered to and others often are flouted. Some
are enforced through formal or informal penalties whereas others make
no such provision. Some regimes are administered by formal organizations with large budgets and staffs, while some are more akin to moral
codes (see Rittberger and Mayer, 1993).
Regimes affect public policy by promoting certain options and constraining.others. Mor~ than that, they shape actors' preferences and the
ease with which they Can be re'altzelf(Doern efci.l.,'1996b):Thus a government willing to assist domestic producers by offering' export· subsi- ..
dies, for example, .may not be able to do so because of formal or informal
international constraints. Regimes of varying scope and depth can be
found in most, though not all, prominent policy areas.
Mapping all the effects of all international regimes is clearly beyond
the scope of this book. Here we will orily outline the regimes prominent
in the areas of trade, finance, and production to illustrate' how they affect
public policy.
The International 1tade, Finance, and production Regimes
The edifice on which the contemporary international trade regime is
based is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in
1947 and succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Its
membership includes alIIlost all states in the world and the vast majority
of world exports are governed by its provisions.
The WTO requires members to work towards lowering trade barriers
\>y according 'national treatment' to unports3 and not subsidizing
exports. These requirements are intended to assist internationally competitive producers,··at the expense oLproducerswho are n()tC:Olnp~titive.
The agreement restricts governments' ability to support domestic industries, either through protection against imports or subsidy for exports,
although tenacious governments do find ways of getting around the
restrictions. The difficulties involved in protecting against imports create
opportunities and wealth for successful exporters, and by implication the
whole economy, but at the same time impose costs on uncompetitive
industries and firms. These costs, again, are often borne by the whole
society in the form of higher unemployment and greater public expenditure on social welfare (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995).
The international monetary regime has even a greater impact on public policy, especially after the adoption of a flexible exchange rate system
in 1976. The fact that exchange rates of currencies are determined by
financial markets according to the demand and supply of a country's currency~instead ()f being fixed by international agreement, as was the
case under the earlier, foundational, Bretton Woods agreement of 1944exposes governments to international financial pressures. Since the
financial markets depend on dealers' interPretation of a country's present
economic conditions and their expectations for the future, this system
often results in unpredictable fluctuations in the value of national currencies. Governments are therefore under constant pressure not to do anything that may, rightly or wrongly, displease the foreign exchange
market.
, Even more important than the flexible exchange rate system are the
effects of financial deregulation and technological 'improvements that
enable the transfer of money around the globe at high speed. By the late
1990s,foreign exchange !Fading around· the -world ,amounted to more
than $2,trillion per day. With such huge volumes at stake, international
money markets have the ability to cause havoc for a country whose policies are viewed unfavourably by international capital. States must now
be extremely careful .about the' effects of their policies, as these affect
exchange rates, which in turn affect interest rates and export competitiveness, the repercussions of which are felt by the entire economy. A
government's decision to .increase expenditure on social welfare, for
instance, may be viewed unfavourably by mOriey traders, who may sell
off the currency, thereby depreciating it, whichrp.ay in turn necessitate
an increase in interest rates by the government, the result of which will
be a slow-down in the economy and higher unemployment. The net
result of all these actions and reactions would be negation of the original
decision to increase spending. The expected adverse market reaction to
budget deficits also limits the scope for using this vital fiscal policy
instrument to boost economic activity and lower unemployment (Huber
and Stephens, 1998).
Similarly, the liberalization of rules restricting foreign investment, particularly since the 1980s, has led to a massive expansion of foreign direct
investment and proliferation of transnational cOrPorations (TNCS), which
in turn have affected states' policy options. In 1999, there were 63,000
TNCsthat owned 690,000 foreign affiliates with US$17.7 trillion in assets
and annual sales exceeding US$13.6 trillion (UNCTAD,
2001). The TNCS
not only control large pools of capital, but they are also major players in
international trade and control much of the world's leadIng technology
and management skills. Since their primary interest is profits, the TNCs
have a motive to.locate production where they see the greatest opportunity for maximizing profits.
Given their size and strength, TNCsare major players in the world
economy and, by implication, in politics and public policy. They can
cause serious damage to a country's economy by withholding investment
or deciding to take their investment elsewhere, possibilities that policymakers can ignore only at great economic peril. There is also now a competition among countries to attract TNCSby offering conditions the latter
would find appealing. This often takes the form of a state commitment to
control labour costs, maintain tax levels comparable to those in other
similar nations, and set rninimal restrictions on international trade and
investment. All these pressures represent severe restrictions on states'
policy options, not just in economic matters but in non-econqmic matters
as well.
The Effects of Internationalization
That being said, international regimes do not affect all nations equally.
The more powerful nations enjoy greater policy autonomy within the
international system than their less powerful counterparts. This is not
only because the powerful states have thecapactty to force other nations
to change their behaviour but also because others often voluntarily alter
their behaviour to match the expectations of the dominant powers (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002). Thus, for example, atthe present time any international trade or investment agreement opposed by a predominant trade
and investment nation such as the United States is unlikely to be
reached, and if it is achieved it is unlikely to be of much significance.
The Chinese government is similarly able, for example; to negotiate
terms with TNCsdesiring access to its gigantic domestic market that are
unlikely to be available to most other nations.
The internationalization of the world economy has accelerated the
speed with which the effects of events elsewhere (natural calamities,
wars, terrorist actions, financial crises, stock market gyrations, etc.)
spread via the telecommunications media (Rosenau, 1969). This has
expanded the scope for policy spillovers as previously isolated sectors
'-eunYerge;' lWerlap,'and"ebUide;'Wrrat-were"Rl'fu-e'Past'seenas .discrete
,~tOfS":'7.sw:;h..as,.telecommW1il;atiD.ns",aD.d
,.,(l(;UDp,uters,."or agriculture and
trade-are now increasingly viewed as elements of a single sector. Any
international effort to reduce agricultural subsidies, for instance, has an
effect on rural development, social welfare, and environment policies
and, ultimately, overall government fiscal policy. Another example is the
fear of capital flight, which haunts policy-makers when they are faced
with major decisions involving large public expenditures that require tax
increases or budget deficits. Traditional social poliey areas such as social
security and health care have thus become apart of economic policymaking as a result (Unger and van Waarden, 1995; Coleman and Grant,
1998).
Internationalization also creates new opportunities for learning from
the policy experiences of others. This is the theme of much recent work
on policy transfers, which especially highlights the role of transnational
epistemic communities and no~-governmental organizations in promoting learning activities (Haas, 1992; Evans and Davies, 1999). The lessons
of privatization of telecommunications in Britain and the deregulation of
airlines in the United States in the 1980s rapidly spread around the world
and across policy sectors because of the active role played by the associated policy communities (Ikenberry, 1990). Moreover, internationalization promotes new patterns of policy-making (Rittberger and Mayer,
1993). When a domestic policy actor loses out in a domestic setting~ it
now may seek to have the policy transferred to the arena of international
organizations if it expects its position to receive a more favourable reception in that venue. Powerful new international organizations and regimes
such as the European Union (EU), the WTO, and the North American Free
TI:ade Agreement (NAFfA)have opened up new action channels for
domestic policy actors pursuing their interests (Howlett and Ramesh,
2002; Richardson, 1999; Cortell and Davis, 1996; Demaret, 1997).
The role of the international actors in public policy-making is both interesting and sensitive, as only national governments and their citizens are
usually expected to participate in most domestic policy processes. As the
above discussion suggests, however, international actors play an increasingly significant role in many areas of domestic political life. These actors'
may be individuals working as advisers or consultants to national governments or members of international organizations with the authority
under international agreements to regulate their members' behaviour.
Internati,onal actors vary considerably in their ability to influence
domestic policies, and this, to a significant extent, is the result of differences in their resource endowments. One of the strongest resources
determining their influence is whether an international regime facilitates
their involvement. Such actors are likely to find it easier to intervene in
policy sectors in which an international regime sanctioning their intervention already exists (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6; Coleman and Perl, 1999).
The central place occupied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
the international monetary regime, for example, enables its officers to
60
PART II
Institutions,
interfere in the intimate details of public policy-making in many nations
facing serious financial or fiscal problems.
An even more significant resource is the possession of theoretical and
practical expertise in a policy sector (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).
Many international organizations-for example, the UN, World Ban.k,
IMF,DEeD, World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Organization (ILO)~are repositories of immense expertise in policy issues,
and governments often rely on this expertise when making policies, thus
giving such international actors significant influence in the policy process. The financial resources that international organizations can dispense to governments are another source of influence. The differences
with respect to levels of expertise and finance are thus often crucial
determinants of the different impact that different international actors
have on domestic polities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).
However, the nature of the policy subsystem that exists at the national
level also affects the international actors' role in the policy process. International actors can be expected to be influential in sectors with fragmented subsystems because such fragmentation alloW's them greater
opportunity for intervention. Conversely, international actors find it difficult to influence policies where the associated subsystem is coherent and
united in opposition to external intervention (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 25;
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993b). The most conducive situation for
international actors is, of course, when the subsystem is coherent and in
favour of external involvement-in such instances the international
actors can be expected to be an integral part of the domestic policy process (Pappi atidHefimIig; 1999);
.-.,-,- .. ,
1\vo dimensions of the organization of domestic states have a profound
effect on the ability of states to make and implement policies: autonomy
and capacity. Autonomy refers to the extent of the state's independence
from self-serving and conflicting social pressures. Observers of politics
have long argued that the self-serving motives and actions of groups
often benefit their members at the expense of the rest of the society
(Olson, 1965, 1982). Consequently, policy-making institutions solely
responsive to societal demands, as public choice theorists argue is supposed to be the case with democratic governments, can generate policies
that benefit some groups but worsen the welfare of the society as a
whole. The problem can be overcome, however, if the government is
insulated from the need to respond to the societal pressures. While this
may compromise some of the basic tenets of democracy, the trade-off is
that it is often conducive to more effective collective welfare-enhancing
policy-making (Haggard andMoon, 1990: 212). Thus it has been argued
that corporatist regimes in Europe and some semi-authoritarian regimes
r
61
in East Asia, for example, possess the political institutions necessary to
resist group demands, and as a result have produced sound policies that,
apparently paradoxically, can promote economic prosperity as well as
equity (Olson, 1986; Weiss and Hobson, 1995).
But, in addition to autonomy, the state must also have the capacity to
make and implement effective policies. The capacity of the state, which
is a function of its organizational coherence and expertise, is also a significant determinant of its success in performing policy functions. Unity
within and among various levels, branches, and agencies of the government and high levels of bureaucratic expertise are regarded as crucial to
enhance state capacity. An executive bogged down in constant bargaining xvith the legislature or government departments in constant conflict
among themselves cannot be expected to perform policy functions ade.quately. Similarly, the society will not be well served by a bureaucracy
.without the expertise necessary to tackle the complex problems it is
required to address.
States with political institutions that promote autonomy and capacity
are sometimes described as strong states; those without such institutions
are weak states (see Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a; Katzenstein, 1977;
Nordlinger, 1987). Japan is often cited as a classic example of a strong
state in the industrialized world, whereas the United States is described
as a weak state; other industrialized countries fall somewhere in
between (Katzenstein, 1977). States such as Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan in East Asia are often regarded as some of the strongest in the
world. The executive-bureaucratic apparatus is the core of strong states;
weak: states have legislatures at their core and interest'groups dominate
policy-maJdrtg.The rea.son why some states are strong and others are
weak is usually argued to be primarily historical and related to the conditions present at their origins (Dyson, 1980).
Although describing states as strong or weak is intuitively appealing,
it is not without its problems in terms of public policy analysis. First,
there is no reason to believe that strong states will necessarily make policies that serve the interests of the society as a whole, rather than those of
self-serving groups (Haggard and Moon, 1990: 215). It is just as possible
that such states will make ill-conceived or predatory policies that will
benefit state elites ansi lower the society's general welfare. Indeed, in
such a situation, a strong state will be worse than a weak state, as far as
the society-is concerned, because of its higher capacity to cause damage.
Military and police governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America or
many former Communist regimes in Eastern Europe are cases in point
(see Migdal, 1988). Second, the overall characterization of states as
strong or weak is too general to be of much analytical use in sectoral
public policy analysis (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a). No state is strong
in all sectors, nor is any state weak in every sector. Thus, even the socalled strong states have shown remarkable weakness in some areas-
note the Japanese government's continued inability to 'rationalize' its
agricultural policy-and the supposedly weak states may show remarkable strength in some areas, such as the US government's strong military
capacity despite the fragmentation of the overall American state apparatus (Weaver and Rockman, 1993b).
Rather than characterizing states as strong or weak, we must devote
efforts to examining empirically the capacity and autonomy of governmental institutions in specific sectoral and subsectoral· policy processes.
In this regard, whether a state has a federal or unitary form of government and whether its representative institutions are characterized by
fusion or division of legislative and executive powers are two important
factors affecting the sectoral role of the·state.
All governments operate at multiple levels, spatially. In unitary systems, the existence oLa clear chain of command or hierarchy linking
the different levels of government together in asup~rordinate/subordinate relationship reduces the complexity of multi-level governance and
policy-making. Thus, in France or China, for example, the national government retains, in principle, all decision-making powers. It can choose
to delegate these powers to lower levels of government or dictate to
them, \is the case may be, but the role of the central, national government is essentially unchallenged at the top of the country's governmental hierarchy.
The salient feature of federal political systems with respect to public
policy is the existence of at least two autonomous levels or orders of government within a country. The two levels of govemment found in countries like AustraliaiCanada;lndia,· Brazil, Nigeria, and the US,.to name
only a few (Burgess and Ga"8f\on;1993; Duchacek; 1970), are not bound
together in a superordinate/subordinate relationship but, rather, enjoy
more or less complete discretion in matters under their jurisdiction and
guaranteed by the constitution. This is distinct from the unitary systems
found in countries such as China, Britain, Japan, and New Zealand,
where there is only one level of government and the local bodies (for
example, regional, county, or municipalities) owe their existence to the
national government rather than to the constitution.
Federalism has been cited as a major reason for the weak policy
capacity of governments in many policy sectors in Australia, Canada, and
the United States. It has constrained these states' capacity to develop
consistent and coherent sectoral policies. In these countries, national
policies in most areas require intergovernmental agreement, which
involves the federal and provincial or state governments in complex,
''eXtel'fsive,·'Bl1d·'tim~JconS'Urtiing''lIegOtia:ti.ons
with no guarantee that these
''1l'l!gOtiations'·will'l3onalude.•in.the',.manner envisioned by the initiating
government (Banting, 1982; Schultz and Alexandroff, 1985; Atkinson
and Coleman, 1989b). Similarly, both levels of government are subject to
unpredictable judicial review of their measures, which further restricts
the ability of governments to realize their objectives.
The existence of a federal system thus significantly affects the capacity
of state officials to deal with pressing issues in a timely and consistent
fashion because public policies are made and implemented by the
national/central as well as state/provincial governments. It makes public
policy-making a long, drawn-out, and often rancorous affair as the different governments wrangle over jurisdictiondl issues or are involved in
extensive intergovernmental negotiations or constitutiondllitigation. Different governments within the same country may make contradictory
decisions that may weaken or nullify the effects of a policy (see Grande,
1996; McRoberts, 1993).
Another domestic'\'lnstitutional variable affecting public policy concernsthe links between the executive, legislature, and judiciary provided
under a country's constitution. In parliamentary systems, the executive is
chosen by the legislature from among its members and remains in office
only as long as it enjoys majority support from legislators. In presidential
systems, the executive is separate from the legislature, is usually elected
directly by the voters, and need not enjoy majority support in the legislature (Stewart, 1974). The United States is the archetype of the presidential system, whereas most of the rest of the world has some version of a
parliamentary system; other countries, such as France, have a hybrid of
the two systems.
The separation between the executive and legislative branches of the
government in presidential systems, and the fusion of ~e two in parliamentary ones, has..-importantconsequencesfor the policy,process;4The
division of powers promotes difficulties for policy-makers in presidential
systems. The individual members and committees of the legislature play
an active role in designing policies, including those proposed by the President. It matters only marginally if the party of the President's affiliation
forms the majority in both houses of the legislature because of the local
concerns thatof;ten motivate legislators. To ensure majority support for
policy measures requiring legislative approval, it is common for the President to bargain with the members of the legislature, offering administrative and budgetary concessions in return for support, and thereby often
changing the original iptent of a policy proposal. The active involvement
of the members of the legislature in prafting bills promotes multiple
points of conflict with the executive; it also opens up greater opportunities for interest groups and voters to influence the policy process, the
result of which may be diluted or even conflicting policies.
In parliamentary systems, in contrast, the executive can more often
than not take legislative support for its measures for granted, thanks to
the strict party discipline enforced on individual members of the parliament. While there may be some bargaining over a policy within a party
caucus, there is little chance of changing a bill once it has been introduced in parliament. The only time when this may not be the case is
when the governing party does not have an outright majority in the legislature and governs in coalition with other parties, who often demand
modification to the policy in return for their support. In many countries,
especially those with proportional systems of representation that allow
for a proliferation of minor parties, coalition governments are routine,
which complicates policy-making, though not as much as in the presidential system (Warwick, 2000). Generally speaking, however, policymaking in parliamentary systems is centralized in the executive, which
usually enables the government to take decisive action if it so chooses.
This is not entirely undesirable, insofar as a state's policy capability is
concerned, because the adversarial politics characteristic of legislatures
in presidential systems reduces the likelihood of generating coherent
policies.
The structure and role of the judiciary also affect the policy process. In
federal systems, there is typically an autonomous judiciary entrusted
with the task of adjudicating jurisdictional disputes arising from vague
constitutional language setting out the respective areas of responsibility
for each order of government. The same is true for countries with
entrenched bills of civil or human rights, which typically give the courts
the power to strike down laws inconsistent with the individual or collective rights guaranteed under the constitution. In these countries, the judiciary acts as another potential veto point that constrains what the
executive can do in policy matters (Russell, 1982). In countries without
federalism or bills of rights,' such as Great Britain, the courts playa more·
limited role, which permits policy-makers -greater room for manoeuvre
and latitude in their actions.
However, the role of the judiciary in the policy process varies according to the nature of the country's political institutions. British practices of
judicial review, for example, developed out of efforts on the part of central officials under the monarchy to control local officials. Many of these
efforts were originally resisted by the local populace, bdth conuiloners
and nobles, as unwarranted interference in local affairs. When Parliament replaced the monarchy as the source Of central political power,
however, the same principles of central judicial review of local actions,
which had been a symbol of despotism, became a symbol of democratic
government. This differs substantially from judicial practices in the US,
for example, where, following the American Revolution, the natural-law
principles of sovereignty that had informed British legal thought were
replaced by principles of natural rights and constitutional supremacy.
One manifestation of this was the refusal of the American judiciary to
subordinate itself to either Congress or the executive, and to insist on its
own role in determining the legality of laws and regulations of all kinds.
This has resulted in much more active judges in the US than in Britain,
and ones who are much less likely to defer to legislative or executive
desires (de Smith, 1973; Jaffe, 1965; Wade, 1965, 1966). Generally speaking, such judicial autonomy and assertiveness complicate policy-making
and erode a state's policy capacity.
. Elected Officials
The elected officials participating in the policy process may be divided
into two categories-members of the executive and legislators. The executive, also referred to as me cabinet in many countries, is one of the key
players in any policy subsystem. Its central role derives from its constitutional authority to govern the country. While other actors also are
involved in the process, the authority to make and implement policies
..rests ultimately with· the executive. There are indeed few checks on the
executive in parliamentary systems (such as Japan, Canada, Australia,
and Britain) as long as the government enjoys majority support in the
legislature. It is somewhat different in republican or presidential systems
(as in the United States or Brazil), where the executive often has a difficult task convincing the legislature to approve its measures. But even
here, the executive usually has a wide area of discretion beyond legislative control in financial and regulatory matters, as well as in defence,
national security, and issues related to international treaty obligations of
different kinds.
In addition to its prerogative in policy matters, the executive possesses
a range of other resources that· strengthen its position. Control over infor:
mation is one such critical resource: The executive has unmatched information that it withholds, releases, and manipulates in a manner to
bolster its preferences and weaken the cases of those opposed to it. Control over fiscal resources is another asset favouring the executive because
legislative approval of ,the budget usually permits wide areas of discre"
tion for the government. The executive also has unparalleled access to
mass media in publicizing its positions-the 'bully pulpit' as it is termed
in the US-and undermining those of its opponents. Moreover, the executive has the bureaucracy at its disposal to provide advice and to carry
out its preferences. It fan, and often does, use these resources to control
and influence societal actors such as interest groups, mass media, and
think-tanks. In many countries, as well, the government has important
powers allowing it to control the timing of the introduction and passage
of laws in the legislature. This confers· a great deal of control over the
political agenda on the executive (Bakvis and MacDonald, 1993).
Counteracting the executive's immense constitutional, informational,
financial, and personnel resources are conditions that make their task
difficult. The tremendous growth in the size, scope, and complexity of
government functions over the years, for example, prevents generalist
66
PART II
Institutions,
politicians from controlling, or often even being aware of, the many specific activities of government nominally under their control (Adie and
Thomas, 1987; Kernaghan, 1979, 1985a). Moreover, in democratic governments ministers are constantly bombarded with societal demands,
many of which are mutually contradictory but which they often cannot
ignore because of the need to maintain voters' support (Canes-Wrone et
aI., 2001). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a government may not
have the organizational capacity to make coherent policies and implement them effectively.
Members of the legislature playa very different role in government. In
parliamentary systems the task of the legislature is to hold governments
accountable to the public rather than to make or implement policies. But
the performance of this function permits opportunities for influencing
policies. Legislatures are crucial forums where social problems are highlighted and policies to address them are demanded. Legislators also get
to have their say during the process of approving government bills and
governmental budgets to fund their implementation. In return for their
consent, they are sometimes able to demand changes to the policies in
question. Legislators may also raise and discuss problems of implementation and request changes. However, a legislature's policy potential
often may not be realized in practice. This is because of the dominance
enjoyed by the executive and its effects on the internal organization of
the legislature and on the role played by legislative committees (Olson
and Mezey, 1991).
Most laws are proposed by the executive and more often than not sub.sequently ·adopted by the legislatur-e.This is-especi.ulyso in parliamentary systems where the majority party forms the· government and
therefore is generally expected to support the passage of bills proposed
by the executive. In presidential systems, on the other hand, the legislature is autonomous of the government constitutionally as well as in practice, which explains why presidents, irrespective of whether their party
holds a legislative majority, must strike bargains with the legislature or
risk defeat of their policy proposals.
The internal organization of the legislature is also a significant determinant of its role in the policy process. Legislatures where the membership is tightly organized along party lines, and marked by a high degree
of cohesion and discipline, permit little opportunity for legislators to take
an independent stand. This is particularly true in parliamentary systems
where the legislators belonging to the governing party are always
expected to support the government. Similarly, the role of individual leg""i'si8:Hn~i5'1ower'inpai'lia:merits1n'which one party has a clear majority;
' •. tfle,<existenee"oE.
several minor parties in coalition governments permits
greater opportunity for legislators to express their opinion and force the
government to compromise.
67
In many contemporary legislatures, most important policy functions are
performed not on the floor of the legislature but in the committees established along functional or sectoral lines to review proposed legislation.
Committees often build considerable expertise in the area with which they
deal, and the extent to which this happens enables the legislature to exercise influence over making and implementing policies. But to build expertise, the members need to serve on the committees over a relatively long
period of time. Committee members must also not necessarily vote along
party lines if their autonomy and assertiveness are to be maintained.
The _nature of the problem being considered also affects legislative
involvement in the policy. process. Technical issues are unlikely to
involve legislators because they may not fully understand the problems
or solutions, or they may see little political benefit in pursuing the matter. National security and foreign policy-making is also usually con.'ducted in a shroud of secrecy and outside the legislature. Similarly,
policies dealing with a problem perceived to be a crisis are unlikely to
involve the legislature very much because of the time it takes to introduce, debate; and pass a bill. Policies deal~ng with allocation OF redistribution of resources or income among components of the public
generate the highest degree of passion and debate in legislatures, but
usually do not have much effect on a government's overall policy orientation. However, other policies related to propagation and maintenance
of certain symbolic values-such as the choice of a national flag, immigration, multiculturalism, praYers in schools, or the elimination of
racism and sexism-are often so divisive that the executive may be
..somewhat more willing to-t-ake -the legislater-s'·views into account· in
forming legislation.
As a result of these limitatiops, legislatures generally play only a small
role in the policy process in parliamentary systems. While individual legislators, on the basis of their expertise or special interest. in a particular
issue, can be included in a policy subsystem, legislatures as a whole are
not very significant actors in the making or implementing of public policies. In congressional or republican systems, on the other hand, where
the legislativ.e agenda is less tightly controlled by the executive, individual legislators can and do play a much more significant role in policy
processes and legislatjve committees are significant members of many
policy subsystems.
Appointed
Officials
The appointed officials dealing with public policy and administration are
often collectively referred to as the 'bureaucracy'. Their function is to
assist the executive in the performance of its tasks, as is suggested by the
terms 'civil servants' and 'public servants'. However, the reality of modem government is such that their role goes well beyond what one would
68
PART II
Institutions,
expect of a 'servant'. Indeed, bureaucrats are very often the keystone in
the policy process and the central figures in many policy subsystems
(Kaufman, 2001).
The structure of the bureaucracy has perhaps the strongest effect on
public policy processes, especially at the sectoral level. Atkinson and
Coleman (l989a: 51) measure state strength in terms of the bureaucracy's strength at the sectoral level, and argue that:
it is critical to determine, first, the degree to which ultimate decision-making power is cOncentrated in the hands of a relatively
small number of officials and, secondly, the degree to which these
officials are able to act autonomously. . . . the state is weak in a
given sector when authority is dispersed and no one group of officials can take the lead in formulating policy.
Concentration of power in only a few agencies reduces occasions for
conflict and permits long-term policy planning. Diffusion of power, in
contrast, fosters inter-agency conflicts and lack of co-ordination; d~13isions may be made on the basis of their acceptability to all concerned
agencies rather than intrinsic merit. The bureaucracy's autonomy from
politicians and societal groups also contributes to its strength and effectiveness in policy-making. Tobe strong, a bureaucracy must have a clear
mandate, a professional ethos, and enjoy strong support, but not interference, from politicians in its day-to-day activities. Close ties with client
groups are also to be avoided if a bureaucracy is to be effective. An ability to generate and process its own information is also important if
reliance on irtterest groups is tobe avoided.
The states in countries like France, Korea, Singapore, and Japan have
bureaucracies that enjoy an exalted status in government and society
(Katzenstein, 1977). They are said to constitute a homogeneous elite
grouping that plays the most important role in the policy process. They
undergo long professional training and pursue service in the govern. ment as a lifelong career. In other societies, bureaucracies enjoy relatively low status and lack the capacity to resist pressures trom
legislators or social groups, which often promotes incoherence and
short-sightedness in policies.
The effective mobilization of bureaucratic expertise is rarer than commonly believed (Evans, 1992). Despite the massive expansion in bureaucracies throughout the world over the last several decades, weak
bureaucracies in the sense understood here are the norm rather than the
exception (Evans, 1995). In many countries with corruption, low wages,
and poor working conditions, bureaucracies often do not have the capability to. deal with the complex problems they are asked to address. If
these conditions obtain in a country, then it is quite likely that the state
will have difficulty devising effective policies and implementing them in
the manner intended. In many countries, even if bureaucratic expertise
69
exists in a particular area, problems of organization and leadership prevent its effective marshalling (Desveaux et al., 1994).
Most of the policy-making and implementation functions once performed by legislatures and the political executive are now performed by
the bureaucracy because the functions of modern government are too
complex and numerous to be performed by the cabinet alone (see Bourgault and Dion, 1989; Cairns, 1990b; Priest and Wohl, 1980). The
bureaucracy's power and influence is based on its command of a wide
range of important policy resources (see Hill, 1992: 1-11). First, the law
itself provides for certain crucial functions to be performed by the
bureaucracy, and may confer wide discretion on individual bureaucrats
to make decisions on behalf of the state. Second, bureaucracies have
unmatched access to material resources for pursuing their own organizational, even personal, objectives if they so wish. The government is the
largest single spender in most (if not all) countries, a situation that gives
its officials a powerful voice in many policy areas. Third, the bureaucracy
is a repository of a wide range of skills and expertise, resources that
make it a premier organization in society. It employs large numbers of
just about every kind of professional, hired for their status as experts in
their areas of specialization. That they deal with similar issues on a continuing basis endows them with unique insights into many problems.
Fourth, modern bureaucracies have access to vast quantities of information on the different aspects of society. At times the information is deliberately gathered, but at other times the information comes to it simply as
a part of its central location in the government. Fifth, the permanence of
the bureaucracy and the long tenure of its members often give it an edge
over its nominal superiors, the elected executive. Finally, the fact that
policy deliberations for the most part occur in secret within the bureau"
cracy denies other policy actors opportunities to mount opposition to its
plans.
However, we must avoid exaggerating the role of the bureaucracy. The
political executive is ultimately responsible for all policies, an authority it
does assert at times. High-profile political issues are also more likely to
involve higher levels of executive control. Executive control is also likely
to be higher if the bureaucracy consistently opposes a policy option preferred by politicians. ¥oreover, the bureaucracy itself is not a homogeneous organization but rather a collection of organizations, each with its
own interests, perspectives, and standard operating procedures, which
can make arriving at a unified position difficult. Even within the same
department, there are often divisions along functional, personal, political, and technical lines. Thus it is not uncommon for the executive to
have to intervene to resolve intra- and inter-bureaucratic conflicts and
bureaucrats in democratic countries require the support of elected officials if they are to exercise their influence in any meaningful way
(Sutherland, 1993).
Political Economic Structures
The capabilities of a state are determined not just by how it is situated in
the international order and how it is organized internally, but also by
how it is linked to the society whose problems it is supposed to resolve
through appropriate policies. To be able to make and implement policies
effectively, the state needs the support of prominent social actors for its
actions. The extent to which these actors are able to offer the necessary
level and form of support depends, among other things, on their own
internal organization. Fragmentation within and among prominent social
groups weakens the state's ability to mobilize them towards the resolution of societal problems. If the societal conflicts are particularly severe,
the state may find itself paralyzed in performing many policy functions.
On the other hand, unity within and among social groups makes for a
stable policy environment that facilitates policy-making and promotes
effective implementation. Strong organizations can bargain more effectively and need not make unreasonable demands for the sake of maintaining their members' support. And when they agree to a measure, they
can enforce it upon their membership, through sanctions if necessary.
Mancur Olson has argued that in societies characterized by 'encompassing' (that is, umbrella groups consisting of a variety of similar interests)
rather than 'narrow' interest groups, the groups 'internalize much of the
cost of inefficient policies and accordingly have an incentive to redistribute income to themselves with the least possible social cost, and to
give.som~ weight t9.~col1omi.CgI'Q.wth.
@dto the inte~~sJ~of.so.cietya~ a_.
whole' (Olson, 1982: 92). The.e~$tence of Ilumerousnarrowintere~t
groups, in contrast, promotes competition among groups that pressure
the state toserve their members' interests only, regardless of the effects
on others. The cumulative effect of such action often can be contradictory and ineffective policies that leave everyone worse off.
The problem of societal fragmentation is particularly severe when narrow sectional groups are too strong to be ignored by even a strong state,
or if the state is too weak to ignore societal pressures. However, the best
situation, insofar as effective making and implementing of policies is
concerned, is for both state and society to be strong, with close partnership between the two. Peter Evans (1992) calls this institutional arrangement 'embedded autonomy'. In contrast, policy effectiveness is lowest
when the state is weak and the society fragmented. In the former scenario, states in partnership with social groups can be expected to devise
..clilbesiY.e;;md~loago.t.eIm~policiei.'~fr.the,;lat:ter,,,1he
state can be expected to
produce only,shorhlermand,usu.aUY.ineff~ctj:v~ policies.
Business Actors
As pointed out by both neo-pluralist and corporatist theorists, the organi-
zation of business and labour is often most significant in determining a
state's policy capabilities. This is because of the vital role each plays in
the production process, which is, in every society, a fundamental activity
that has effects far beyond the economy.
Among interest groups, business is generally the most powerfuL with
an unmatched capacity to affect public policy. To understand what is
referred to as the 'structural power of capital', we need to comprehend
the broader socio-economic context of a capitalist economy. Such an
economy, by definition, entails a market form of economic organization
in which ownership of the means of production is concentrated in the
hands of the corporations. This fact lies at the root of business's unparalleled power (Lindblom, 1977).
The increasing globalization of production and financial activities, due
to improvements in modern means of communication and transportation
and the gradual removal of controls on international economic transactions, has contributed tremendously to the power of capital in recent
decades. It is possible for investors and managers to respond, if they so _
wish, to any unwanted government action by moving capital to another
location. Although this theoretical mobility is limited by a variety of factors-including the availability of suitable investment opportunities in
other countries-the potential loss of employment and revenues is a
threat with which the state must contend in making decisions. Because
of their potential to affect state revenues negatively, capitalists-both
domestic and foreign-have the ability to 'punish' the state for any
action it might take of which they disapprove (Hayes, 1978).
The financial contributions that businesses make to political· parties
also afford them an important resource for influencing -policy·makers.
Elections can sometimes turn on relatively short-term issues and personalities, which necessitate large budgets to influence voters through extensive media advertising campaigns. In such situations, political parties
supported by contributions from business are in a better position to run
such campaigns and thus influence voting behaviour. This can lead political parties and candidates running for office to accommodate business
interests more than they would those of other groups. Similarly, the
financial contributions that businesses often make to .public policy
research institutions and individual researchers serve to further entrench
their power. The organizations and individuals receiving funds tend to be
sympathetic towards business interests and can proVide business with
the intellectual wherewithal often required to prevail in policy debates
(McGann and Weaver, 1999; Abelson, 1999) .
The structural strength of business has the potential to both promote
and erode social welfare. The latter is likely to be the case when business
lacks organizational coherence. The ability of individual firms and capitalists to pressure the government to serve their interests can lead, if the
latter succumbs to the pressure, to incoherent and short-sighted policies.
Endemic conflicts among various business groups only aggravate such
situations. The problem may be offset if business has a central cohesive
organization-or peak association-able to thrash out differences and
come up with coherent policy proposals. If the government does accept
such proposals, they are likely to serve the interest of the broader economy (though not all sections of the society equally) rather than the interests of particular firms or economic sectors. A strong business
organization is therefore a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
coherent and effective policy-making.
A strong business organization is able to adopt a bold position if necessary and convey it to the government, without incurring serious opposition from its rank and file. It usually takes the form of a peak
association (a sort of federation of associations) with the authority to
impose sanctions and discipline among its members, since the state must
have confidence that once a commitment has been made by the association, it can expect adherence to it by individual businesses. Moreover, if
the state is confident of the strength of the business association, then it
can delegate. some business-related responsibilities to the business association itself. Generally speaking, the US is regarded as haVing the weakest business organizations in the industrialized world and Japan the
strongest, with countries like Britain or Canada falling closer to the uS
model. Other European countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Sweden, fall closer to the Japanese model (Katzenstein, 1977).
The strength or weakness of business and the varying patterns of government-industry relations found in a country are usually shaped by a
range of historicalfactors'-(Wilson, -1990a). Although the example of
Japan cifed above is somewhat atypical, business is often strongly organized if it has been confronted with strong, persistent challenges from
trade unions or socialist parties. The stronger the unions, the stronger
will be the business influence. The threat does not 'necessarily have to be
continuing, so long as such was the case in the past. Second, countries
with strong states often have strong business organizations because, in
order to pressure strong governments, business itself must be well organized. A strong state may also nurture a strong business association in
order to avoid the problems arising from too many groups making conflicting demands on the same issue. The existence of strong business
associations simplifies 'the government's job by aggregating their
demands within the organization. Third, the organizational strength of
business is affected by the structure of the economy. In national
economies characterized by low industrial concentration or high levels of
foreign ownership, it is difficult for the disparate elements to organize
and devise a common position. Fourth, political culture, too, has an
important bearing on the extent and nature of business involvement in
politics. In countries such as the US and Canada with cultures highly
supportive of business, corporations have seen few reasons to organize.
Moreover, the degree to which social norms approve of functional representation affects the strength of business. Americans, and to a lesser
extent citizens of Britain, Canada, Australia, and other Anglo-American
democracies, are distrustful of business representing their interests on a
regular basis behind closed doors. In the corporatist countries, on the
other hand, functional representation is accepted and indeed is often
encouraged (Siaroff, 1999).
Labour
Labour, too, occupies a powerful position among social groups, though
not so powerful as business. Unlike business, which enjoys considerable
weight with policy-makers even at the individual level of the firm, labour
needs a collective organization, a trade union, to have its voice heard in
the policy subsystem. In addition to bargaining with employers on behalf
. of their members' wages and working conditions, which is their primary
function, trade unions engage in political activities to shape government
policies affecting them (Taylor, 1989: 1). The origin 6f the role of the
trade unions in the public policy process is rooted in late nineteenth-century democratization, which enabled workers, who form a majority in
every industrialized society, to have a say in the functioning of the government. Given the voting clout afforded them by democracy, it was
sometimes easier for them to pressure the government to meet their
needs than to bargain with their employers. The creation of labour or
social democratic parties, which eventually formed governments in many
countries, further reinforced labour's political power (Qualter, 1985).
-The nature and effectiveness of the trade-unions' participation in the
policy process depend on a variety of institutional and contextual factors.
The structure of the state itself is an important determinant of union participation in the policy process. A weak and fragmented state will not be
able to secure effective participation by unions, because the latter would
see little certainty that the government would be able to keep its side of
any bargain. Weak businesses can also inhibit the emergence of a powerful trade union organization because the need for it is less immediate.
However, the most important determinant of labour's capacity to
influence the policy process and its outcomes is its own internal organization. The level of u]J.ionmembership affects the extent to which states
seek or even accept union participation in the policy process. The same
is true for the structure of bargaining units: decentralized collective bargaining promotes a fragmented system of articulation of labour demands.
Britain, Canada, and the United States, for example, have decentralized
bargaining structures, whereas in Australia, Austria, and the Scandinavian countries bargaining takes place at the industry or even' countrywide level (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Hibbs, 1987). A union
movement fragmented along any or all of possible regional, linguistic,
ethnic, religious, or industrial versus craft, foreign versus domestic, or
import-competing versus export-oriented lines will also experience difficulties in influencing the policy process. Fragmentation among labour
ranks tends to promote local and sporadic industrial strife and incoherent
articulation of labour's interest in the policy process (Hibbs, 1978;
Lacroix, 1986).
.
Finally, to realize its policy potential labour needs a central organization, such as the Australian or British Trade Union Congress (TUC), the
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-cm), even more than
does business. Collective action is the only tool labour has to influence
the employers' or the government's behaviour, so the more united a front
it is able to put up, the more successful it is likely to be. To be effective,
the trade union central needs to enjoy comprehensive membership and
have the organizational capacity to deal with conflicts among its members and maintain unity; Trade unions' role in the policy process tends to
be the highest in corporatist political systems, such as in the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the Netherlands, where the state encourages
the formation and maintenance of strong trade union centrals, anif the
lowest in pluralist political systems such as the United States and
Canada, where it does not.S
The nature of a country's political economy, therefore, has an important
structural impact on policy-making. In liberal capitalist, 'Western' societies, for example, this 'generates aHeast two important policy actors,
bu.sinessand labou.r, which are involved in .many'policy deliberations
and activities. However, other important policy actors, linked to the
structures and institutions of representative democracy, also exist in
these societies.
The Public
Surprising as it may appear, the 'public' plays a rather small direct role in
the public policy process. This is .not to say that its role is inconsequen- .
tial, as it provides the backdrop of norms, attitudes, and values against
which the policy process is displayed. However, in most liberal democratic states policy decisions are taken by representative institutions that
empower specialized actors to determine the scope and content of public
policies, rather than the public per se determining policy.
One important role played by members of the public in democratic
'poIitil:!s;'dfconrse; 1S'··voting..On the one hand, in democratic states vot··'ing-rs-the'me8t·basic'means of participating in the political and, by implication, policy processes. It not only ·affords citizens the opportunity to
express their choice of government, but also empowers them to pressure
political parties and candidates seeking their votes to offer them attrac-
tive policy packages. On the other hand, the voters' policy capacity usually cannot be actualized, at least not directly, for various reasons. In
modern democracies policies are made by representatives of voters who,
once elected, are not required to heed the preferences of their constituents in their day-to-day functioning. Moreover, as was discussed
above, most legislators participate very little in the policy process, which
tends to be dominated by experts in specific sectoral areas rather than by
legislative generalists (Edwards and Sharkansky, 1978: 23). More significantly, candidates and political parties often do not run in elections on
the basis of their policy platforms; and even when they do, voters usually
do not vote on the basis of proposed policies alone. Having said that, it is
true that politicians do heed public opinion in a general sense while
devising policies, even though they do not always respond to or accommodateit.
The impact of public opinion on policy processes is more frequent
and pervasive, although even less direct than voting. Despite .many
works over the past decades that have consistently found the relation- .
ship between public opinion and public policy-making in democratic
societies to be a tenuous, complex one, there persists a tendency to view
this relationship as simple, direct, and linear (see Luttbeg, 1981; Shapiro
and Jacobs, 1989). That is, from at least the time of the early works on
the subject by scholars such as V.O. Key (1967), E.E. Schattschneider
(1960), and Bernard Berelson (1952) in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s,
prominent political scientists and others have repeatedly found little or
no direct linkage between public opinion and policy outcomes. Nevertheless, in study after study this finding has·,been. made and remade, as
investigators appear dissatisfied with it (Monroe, 1979; Page and
Shapiro, 1992). As Schattschneider suggested, this is no doubt due to
the sincere but sometimes simplistic notions of democracy held by
many analysts, who support the notion of 'government for the people'
and feel uneasy that that this might not be accomplished through 'government by the people'.6
'But both the policy and democratic processes are much more complex
thqnlinear linkage theories suggest. Democracy means more than mob
rule, and political theorists from Edmund Burke onward hav~ noted the
complex notions of.popular representation that democratic governments
contain (Birch, 1972). Analyzing the role of public opinion in contempoc
rary democratic governments requires a nuanced analysis of the realities
of democratic governance and policy-making processes. While a concern
for popular sovereignty is laudable, as Schattschneider has suggested,
theoretical speculations must be tempered by empirical facts if the nature
of the relationship existing between public opinion and public policy is
to be adequately described and understood.
The simplest model of the relationship between public opinion and
public policy-making views government as a policy-making machine-
directly processing popular sentiments into public policy decisions and
implementation strategies. As has been pointed out repeatedly over the
course of studies into the subject in the past half-century in the United
States and elsewhere, however, this account is problematic (Erikson et
al., 1980; Erikson et al., 1989). It assumes that public opinion has a concrete, quasi-permanent character that can be easily aggregated into
coherent policy positions. Innumerable studies, however, have underlined the vague, abstract, and transitory nature of public opinion, and
have emphasized the difficulties encountered in aggregating the 'babble
of the collective will', as Rousseau put it, into universally endorsed policy prescriptions (Rousseau, 1973; also see Lowell, 1926). Moreover,
many opinion researchers and policy scholars have noted how these difficulties have multiplied as scientific and complex legal issues have come
to dominate policy-making in contemporary societies, further divorcing
policy discourses from public ones (see Pollock etal., 1989; Torgerson,
1996; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002).
This is only the first of several major logical and empirical problems
encountered by direct linear-linkage theories of democratic representation. Even assuming that public sentiments could be delivered directly
and in a consistent form to policy-makers, the model encounters several
other, terminal, problems. For one, it attributes very little autonomy to
governments. Exactly how governments acquire and process information
is not considered to be a major issue, except insofar as these process'es
'block' the transmission of popular sentiments into government action.
But the processes by which government agendas are established and policy options formulatedare·by
no means ,simple and: unproblematic.Numerous studies have underlined the complex nature of policy construction and the multiple competing interpretations of social reality and
'potential policy responses to social issues that governments face in contemplating action (Holzner and Marx, 1979; Schneider, 1985; Samuels,
1991; Livingston, 1992). Many others have underlined the complex
nature of decision-making processes in government, which belie the simple machine-like formulations of the linear-linkage model. Finally, the
model also sees as unproblematic the various linkages that exist between
the implementation or execution of policy and the enactment of policy
decisions and pronouncements. Once again, an enormous literature in
public administration underlines the complexity of implementation processes and belies the notion that government officials simply execute
decisions in a neutral and 'objective' way (see Forester, 1984; Lindblom
and Cohen, 1979; Weiss, 1977a).
Not surprisingly, these difficulties with simple models of direct public
opinion effects led some students of the public opinion-public policy
relationship to develop more sophisticated ones that took some of these
concerns into account. However, while some proposed alternate general
visions of the nature of the relationship between opinion and policy,
many can be seen as attempts to rescue simple linear models by altering
only secondary aspects of the general model.
Anthony Downs's well-known model of the issue-attention cycle, for
.instance, provides a good example of a linear-linkage model that takes
into account the vague and transitory nature of public opinion on specific policy issues. As set out in his 1972 arti~le on environmental policymaking, public policy-making in many areas of social life tends to
revolve around specific issues that momentarily capture public attention
and demand government action. However, he also noted that many of
. these problems soon fade from view as their complexity or intractability
bec~e apparent. As he put it:
public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon anyone
domestic issue for very long-even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society. Instead, a systematic issueattention cycle seems strongly to influence public attitudes and
behaviour concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these
problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short
time, and then-though still largely unresolved-gradually fades
from the center of public attention. (Downs, 1972: 38)
The idea of a systematic issue-attention cycle in public policy-making
gained a great deal of attention in subsequent years and Downs's work is
often cited as an improved model for explaining the linkages between
public opinion and public policy (see, e.g., Dearing and Rogers, 1996).
A reasonable conclusion to reach on the basis of the above discussion
is that whatever the policy effects'of public -opinion,they are not direct in
nature. As many students of this relationship have noted, this raises several possibilities. One is that public opinion has no effect, a possibility
ruled out by the many' empirical studies that have' found some general
correspondence between the behaviour of public policy-makers and public opinion in some issue areas (see, e.g., Weber and Shaffer, 1972; Bennett, 1980). A second is that rather than directly affecting public
policy-making in specific sectors, generalized public opinion-the policy
mood or policy sentiment of a population at a particular time-makes up
one element of the background conditions or environment in which the
policy process unf9lds (Durr, 1993; Stimson, 1991; Adams, 1997; Best,
1999).
Think-Tanks and Research Organizations
Another significant set of societal actors in the policy process is composed of the researchers working at universities, research institutes, and
think-tanks on particular policy issues and issue areas. University
researchers often have theoretical and philosophical interests in public
problems that may not lead to research results that can be translated
directly into usable knowledge for policy purposes. To the extent that
they do conduct research for the purpose of participating in policy
debates, they often function in a manner similar to their counterparts in
think-tanks. Indeed, in many instances academics undertaking directly
relevant policy research are sponsored by think-tanks (Ricci, 1993; Stone
et ai., 1998). The following discussion will therefore concentrate on the
role of these private, ideologically based organizations.
.
A think-tank can be defined as 'an independent organization engaged
in multidisciplinary research intended to influence public policy' (James,
1993: 492). Such organizations maintain an interest in a broad range of
policy problems and employ, either full-time or on a contract basis,
experts on various issue areas in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on the issues facing governments. Their research tends to be
directed at proposing practical solutions to public problems or, in the
case of some think-tanks, finding evidence to support the ideological or
interest-driven positions they advocate. This sets them apart somewhat
from academic researchers at universities, whose interests are more specialized and who do not necessarily seek practical solutions to policy
problems. Explicitly partisan research is also generally eschewed in
academia.
However, while think-tanks are generally more partisan than their
purely academic counterparts, they, too, must maintain an image of
intellectual autonomy from the government or any political party if policy-makers are to take them seriously. Large prominent think-tanks In the
United States include the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise
Institute, and the Urban Institute. Similar organizations in Canada'
include the C.D. Ho~-Institute, ctheFraser Institute, the Canadian-Centre - .
for Policy Alternatives, and' the Institute for Research on Public Policy.- .
Major think-tanks in Britain include the Policy Studies Institute and the
National Institute for Economic and Social Research. Literally hundreds
of such institutes are active in the Western, developed countries, some
with broad policy mandates, others that are more limited in their
purview, such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association
(Lindquist, "1993;Abelson, 1996).
. Think-tanks target their research and recommendations to those
politicians who may be expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas
bei,ng espoused (Abelson, 2002). They also seek originality in their ideas
and, unlike the researchers working in universities or the government,
spend a great deal of effort publicizing their findings (Dobuzinskis, 2000;
Stone, 1996; Weaver, 1989). The need for a quick response to policy
issues and problems has forced many think-tanks to develop new 'prod"utt~lineif:1Shott:pfthY'reports~jbt:Irnaf,'<ri'ticles,'an'd
policy briefs that can
.',be.MluicklY,Jead.and,mgested:bave.replaced'book,,'1ength studies as the
primary output of many think-tanks. In addition, a premium has been
placed on writing articles and op-ed pieces for newspapers and making
appearances on radio and television programs. This new brand of
research and analysis is dependent on 'the public policy food chain',
which includes a range of knowledge- and policy-oriented institutions.
Over the last few decades, much of the work of think-tanks has been
devoted to promoting economic efficiency, since this has been an important preoccupation of the governments in the industrialized world.
A number of trends have become evident in recent years with respect
to the functioning, operation, and influence of think-tanks in many countries. Some of the more prominent trends include:
• The increasing complexity of policy debates. The twin movements of
democracy and diversity have served to involve groups that, historically, have not been represented in domestic and international affairs.
Women, indigenous groups, and non-governmental organizations are
now playing a central role in developing and implementing foreign
affairs policies and programs. These new entrants to the policy
debates have created many new specialized think-tanks and public
policy research organizations.
• The transborder nature of many contemporary problems and the networking of think-tanks and policy institutes. At the international level,
globalization/internationalization simultaneously unites and divides
the countries of North/South and East/West. Thansnational problems
such as AIDS,hunger, and global warming require a global response.
Some think-tanks have responded by becoming transnational organizations in the effort to bridge the chasm between North/South and
East/West. In addition, the emergence of regional or continental economic·alliaflee~·-suchas-·the··EU-'-andNAFFA
has created .new· networks
of regionally oriented policy institutions.
• The downsizing of governments and the.increasing competition among
think-tanks for funding. The proliferation of think-tanks has been
accompanied by cutbacks in public funds available for research. In
many countries, federal, provincial, and local governments have cut
their funding for public policy research. This happened as policy units
in governments were downsized or eliminated in budget-cutting exercises in the 1990s. At the same time, events occurring elsewhere, such
as the end of the Cold War, had a profound impact on the funding of
research organi4ations focused on areas such as international and
security affairs since donors and governments no longer saw the need
for such research. As a result, think-tanks have had to devote considerablE!resources to raising funds rather than conducting research and
producing position papers (McGann and Weaver, 1999).
Analysts working in universities or government tend to choose to
work on problems determined by the public's or the government's interest, or by their own personal curiosity about a particular subject,
and have largely avoided the specific problems facing think-tanks in the
80
PART II
Institutions,
contemporary environment. Through sustained analysis and critique,
however, these researchers can have a notable impact on public policy,
largely through what Carol Weiss has termed their 'enlightenment function' (Weiss, 1977a, 1977b; Bryman, 1988). This. role can also be taken
on by consultants, who can serve to carry the ideas and results of policy
research directly to governments (Lapsley and Oldfield, 2001).
Political Parties
Political parties are an intermediating actor, like think-tanks, existing on
the margins or border between state and societal actors. They have a significant impact on public policy, though in the modern era this usually
has been only indirectly. They tend not to be represented in policy subsystems, though many of the actors in the subsystem may be influenced
by the party to which they are affiliated. Political parties tend to influence public policy indirectly, primarily through their role in staffing the
executive and, to a lesser degree, the legislature. Indeed, once in office, it
is not uncommon for party members in government to ignore their official party platform while designing policies (Thomson, 2001).
Political parties' impact on policy outcomes has been the subject of
some limited, but specific, empirical research and commentary (Blais et
al., 1996; Castles, 1982; Imbeau and Lachapelle, 1993; McAllister, 1989).
Findings concerning the role of parties in public policy-making, for
example, have included evidence that, historically,' European 'governments led by Christian and social democratic parties have been related
positively to the development of welfare state programs (Wilensky, 1975;
Korpi; 1983), and that 'le'ft-Wing"and'right-wiIlg' governments have had _....
differentfiscal p·olicy orientations towards, resp'ectively,unemployment
and inflation reduction (Hibbs, 1977). Partisan differences have also
been linked to different characteristic preferences for certain types of policy tools, such as public enterprises or market-based instruments (Chandler and Chandler, 1979; Chandler, 1982, 1983). However, the
contemporary significance of parties has also been challenged by those
who argue that government has become too complex for influence by
partisan generalists, with day-to-day influence stemming more from policy specialists in government and those in the employ of interest groups
and specialized policy research institutes (King and Laver, 1993; Pross,
1992). Similarly, other studies focusing on the extent of policy learning
and emulation occurring between states or subnational units (Lutz,
1989; Poel, 1976; Erikson et ai., 1989) and those examining the impact of
international influences on domestic policy-making have argued the case
for the reduced importance of parties in contemporary policy processes
(Johnson and Stritch, 1997; Doern et al., 1996a).
The idea that political parties playa major role in public policy processes, of course, stems from their undeniable influence on elections and
electoral outcomes in democratic states. While vote-seeking political par-
81
ties and candidates attempt to offer packages of policies they hope will
appeal to voters, the electoral system is not structured to allow voters a
choice on specific policies. Likewise, as discussed above, the representational system also limits the public's ability to ensure that electorally
salient policy issues actually move onto official government agendas
(King, 1981; Butler et al., 1981). The official agenda of governments is, in
fact, usually dominated by routine or institutionalized agenda-setting
opportunities rather than by partisan political activity (Kingdon, 1984;
Walker, 1977; Howlett, 1997a).
Even when parties do manage to raise an issue and see it move from
the public to the official agenda, they cannot control its evolution past
that point. As Richard Rose (1980: 153) has put it:
A party can create movement on a given issue, but it cannot ensure
the direction it will lead. Just as defenders of the status quo may
find it difficult to defend their position without adapting it, so too
proponents of change face the need to modify their demands. Modifications are necessary to secure the agreement of diverse interests
within a party. They will also be important in securing support, or
at least grudging acceptance, by affected pressure groups. Finally, a
governing party will also need to make changes to meet the weaknesses spotted by civil service advisors and parliamentary draftsmen responsible for turning a statement of intent into a bill to
present to Parliament.
While their direct influence may be muted, however, their indirect
influence is not. The roleplayetlbypolmcalparties
in staffing political
executives and legislatures,of'cours'e, allows them considerable influence on the content of policy decisions taken by those individuals,
including those related to the staffing of the senior public service. However, this power should not be overestimated. In modern governments,
as we have seen, the degree of freedom enjoyed by each decision-maker
is circumscribed by a host of factors that limit the conduct of each office
and constrain the actions of each office-holder. These range from limitationsimposed by the country's constitution to the specific mandate conferred on individual decision-makers by various laws and regulations
(Pal, 1988; Axworthy,,1988). Various rules set out not only which decisions can be made by which government agency or official, but also the
procedures they must follow in doing so.
Political parties tend to have only a diffuse, indirect effect on policymaking through their role in determining who actually staffs legislative,
executive, and judicial institutions. Their role in agenda-setting is very
weak, while they playa stronger, but still indirect, role in policy formulation and decision-making due to the strong role played in these two
stages of the policy cycle by members of the political executive. Their
role in policy implementation is virtually nil, while they can have a more
82
PART II
Institutions,
direct effect on policy evaluation undertaken by legislators and legislative
committees (Minkenberg, 2001).
The fact that the influence of parties on particular stages of the policy
process may be muted, or that any such influence may be waning, does
not neces~arily lead to the conclusion that 'parties don't matter'. That is,
as Richard Rose argued almost a quarter-century ago in the case of
Britain:
Parties do make a difference in the way [a country] is governed~
but the differences are not as expected. The differences in office
between one party and another are less likely to arise from contrasting intentions than from the exigencies of government. Much
of a party's record in office will be stamped upon it from forces outside Its control. . . . parties are not the primary forces_shaping the
destiny of ... society; it is shaped by something stronger than parties. (Rose, 1980: 141; also see Hockin, 1977)
Mass Media
The media consist of other important intermediating actors active in the
policy-making process. Some regard the role of the mass media in the
policy process as pivotal (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Parenti, 1986)7
while others describe it as marginal (Kingdon, 1984). There i~ no denying that theinass media are crucial links between the state and society, a
position that allows for significant influence on the preferences of government and society in regard to the identification of public problems
and their'solutions. Yetat the same time; like political-parties, their ,direct
role in the various stages oithe policy process is often' sporadic and most
often quite marginal.
The role of the media in the policy process originates in the fact that
in reporting problems they function both as passive reporters and as
active analysts, as well as advocates of particular policy solutions. That
is, news programs do not just report on a problem but often go to great
lengths in locating a problem not otherwise obvious, defining its nature
and scope, and suggesting or implying the availability of potential solutions. The media's role in agenda-setting is thus particularly significant
(Spitzer, 1993; Pritchard, 1992). Media portrayal of public problems and
proposed solutions often conditions how they are understood by the public and many members of government, thereby shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of others more likely. Questions in
parliamentary question periods or at presidential press conferences are
','"often bcrsedon 'StOries inlhEi 'day'<s television news or newspapers.
.This ts"ParticularIY"signiticant"eonsidering that news reporting is not
an objective mirror of reality, undistorted by bias or inaccuracy.
Reporters and editors are newsmakers, in the sense that they define what
is worthy of reporting and the aspects of a situation that should be high-
83
lighted. Thus, policy issues that can be translated into an interesting
story tend to be viewed by the public as more important than those that
do not lend themselves so easily to narrative structures and firsFperson
accounts and sound bites. This partially explains why, for example,
crime stories receive so much prominence in television news and, as a
corollary, the public puts pressure on governments to appear to act tough
on crime. Similarly, groups and individuals able to present problems to
the media in a packaged form are more likely than their less succinct
counterparts to have their views projected (Callaghan and Schnell, 2001;
Lutz and Goldenberg, 1980; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Parenti, 1986).
We must not, however, exaggerate the mass media's role in the policy
process. Other policy actors have resources enabling them to counteract
media influence, and policy-makers are for the most part intelligent and
resourceful individuals who understand their own interests and have
their own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy options. As a rule,
they are not easily swayed by media portrayals of issues and preferred
policy solutions or by the mere fact of media attention. Indeed, they
often use the media to their own advantage. It is not uncommon for public officials and successful interest groups to provide selective information to the media to bolster their case (Lee, 2001). Indeed, very often the
media are led by state opinion rather than vice versa (Howlett, 1997a,
1997b).
Interest Groups
A fourth significant intermediating actor, as pluralist political theorists
recognized, is the organized special interest-group: While policy-making
is a preserve of the government; and particularly of'the executive and
bureaucracy, the realities of modern politics enable groups formed specifically to promote the interests or positions of specialized social groups to
play a significant role in the process. One of the most important
resources of such interest groups is knowledge, specifically information
that may be unavailable or less available to others. The members of specialized groups often know the most about their area of concern. Since
policy-making is a highly information-intensive process, those with information may normally expect to play an important role in it. Politicians
and bureaucrats often find the information proVided by special interest
groups indispensable for performing their tasks. Government and opposition politicians at times curry favour with such groups to secure the
information required for effective policy-making or for attacking their
opponents. Bureaucrats similarly often need these groups' help in developing and implementing many policies (Hayes, 1978; Baumgartner and
Leech, 1998).
The other resources possessed by interest or pressure groups are organizational and political. Special interest groups often make financial contributions ,to the campaign chests of sympathetic political parties and
84
PART II
Institutions,
politicians. They also campaign for and deliver votes to sympathetic candidates who they think would support their cause in the government.
However, interest groups' political impacts on the formulation and implementation of public policies vary considerably according to their access
to differing levels of organizational resources (Pross, 1992; Baumgartner
and Leech, 2001). First, interest groups differ tremendously in terms of
size of membership. All other things being equal, larger groups can be
expected to be taken· more seriously by the government.8Second, as discussed above in the context of business and labour associations, some
groups may form a 'peak association' consisting of representatives from
other groups with similar interests (Coleman, 1988). A coherent peak
association may be expected to be more influential than those interest
groups operating individually. Third, some groups are well funded,
which enables them to hire permanent specialized staff and influence
parties and candidates during electiOns. While the exact impact of interest group campaign expenditures on government policy is contentious,
there is no doubt that differences in financial resources matter (Nownes
and Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 1995, 2000; Nownes and Cigler, 1995) and
that in democratic political systems the information and power resources
of interest groups make them key members of policy subsystems. While
this does not guarantee that their interests will be accommodated, they
are unlikely to be entirely ignored except in rare circumstapces when
executives make a high-level and deliberate decision to go ahead with a
.policy despite opposition from concerned groups.
CONCLUSION'
The chapter began by noting that policy processes draw upon actors
from a subset of members of the policy universe, increasingly at both the
domestic and international levels. Policy subsystems are constructed
from this universe, involving both state and societal actors in complex
systems of interaction ..Constitutional and legal provisions are important
determinants of subsystem membership, while the power and knowledge
resources of subsystem actors critically affect the nature of their activities
and interactions. In most sectors, given their central location and access
to abundant organizational resources, the minister(s) and bureaucrcits in
charge of a policy sector are usually the key governmental actors in policy processes affecting that area, with the legislators, particularly in parliamentary systems, playing a secondary role. Their societal counterparts
are drawn mainly from among special interest groups and research organizations, and business and labour, because of their key role in many
policy areas, often are major actors in many of these processes. All these
actors have their own objectives, which they seek to achieve through
. subsystem membership and participation in the policy process.
:Sut what objectives theypurstl~, how tiley do so, and the extent to
85
which they succeed in their efforts depend t9 a large extent on the
domestic and international institutional context in which they operate. At
the domestic level, the structure of political institutions affects the autonomy and capacity of the executive and bureaucracy, a situation paralleled
at the international level by the structure of international regimes and the
role played by state resources within them. These structures have a decisive effect on actors' interest and behaviour, and on the outcomes of the
policy process.
Atkinson, M., and W Coleman. 1989. The State, Business and Industrial
Change in Canada. Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press.
Cerny,Philip G. 1996. 'International Finance and the Erosion of State Policy
Capacity', in P. Gummett, ed., Globalization and Public Policy.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,83-104.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1978 'The Second Image Reversed: The International
Sourcesof Domestic Politics', International Organization 32: 881-912.
Haggard, Stephen, and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. 'Theories of International
Regimes', International Organization 41,3: 491-517.
Hayes, Michael.T.1978. 'The Semi-SovereignPressure Groups: A Critique of
Current Theory and an Alternative 'JYpology', Journal of Politics 40, 1:
134-61.
Held, David. 1991. 'Democracy,the Nation-State and the Global System', in
Held, ed., Political Theory Tbday. Oxford:Polity Press, 197-235.
James, Simon. 1993.'The Idea Brokers:The Impact of Think Tankson British
-Government',.PublicAdministration .2'1:471-90.
Kaufman, Herbert. 2001 'Major Players; Bureaucracies in American
Government',Public Administration Review 61, 1: 18-42.
King, Anthony. 1981.'What Do Elections Decide?', in D. Butler, H.R.
I!enniman, and A. Ranney, eds, Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative
Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington: American Enterprise
Institute for Public PolicyResearch.
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Olson, David M., and Michael L. Mezey,eds. 1991. Legislatures in the Policy
Process: The Dilemmas of Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress.
'
Rose, Richard. 1980.Do Parties Make a Difference? London: Macmillan.
Spitzer, Robert J., ed. ,1993. Media and Public policy. Westport, Conn.:
PraegeL
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Taylor, Andrew J. 1989. ITade Unions and Politic~: A Comparative
Introduction. Basingstoke:Macmillan.
Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman. 1993. 'Assessing the Effects of
Institutions', in Weaver and Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter?
Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington:
BrookingsInstitution, 1-41.
Wilson, Graham K. 1990. Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction,
2nd edn. London: Macmillan.
Wilson, Graham K. 1990. Interest Groups.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
1. On the persistence of institutions and their effects, see Hoffman (1999);
Keohane and Hoffman (1991); Zysman (1994); Cortell and Peterson
(1999); Cammack (1992).
2. Grant Jordan, has spent much effort cataloguing and categorizing the
images and metaphors used to describe policy subsystems. See Jordan
(1981, 1990a, 1990b);Jordan and Schubert (1992).
3. That is to say, not discriminating against imports once they have crossed
the border after meeting all legal requirements, including payment of
applicable·tariffs.
4. For a detailed comparison of the policy consequences of parliamentary
and,presidential systems, see Weaver and Rockman (1993a).
5. In Australia, however, trade unions play a significant role in the policy
process when the Labour Party is in office, despite the generally pluralist
character of the political system.
6. The normative and ideological nature of much discussion on this subject
is apparent in the titles and terms used to describe many findings.
Recently, this can be seen in the otherwise excellent comparative and
historical studies of Joel Brooks, who, finding very little relationship
between public opinion and policy-making, terms this phenomenon
.democratic frustration', suggesting it results from a problem with the
policy system failing to react properly to the democratic one. See Brooks
(1985, 1987, 1990). More recently, see Petry (1999).
7. For good literature reviews on this subject, see Cook et al. (1983); Graber
(1989).
8. The relative strength provided by ideologicaland organizational resources
is a subject of some debate. See, for example,Burt (1990).
J'
Policy Instruments
In the preceding chapter we discussed the principal actors and institutions that determine and comprise the membership of policy subsystems.
Before elaborating in Chapters 5 to 9 on the role played by subsystems at
each stage of the policy process, we will first discuss the policy instruments-also called policy tools or governing instruments-that governments use to put policies into effect. These are the actual means or
devices governments have at their disposal for implementing policies,
and among which they must select in formulating policy. Thus, a government not only decides whether or not to do something about deteriorating water quality, for example, but also whether it should implement its
decision through mass campaigns urging people to refrain from polluting
activiti~s, r~gulation prohibiting all activities causing· th~pollutiOh, th~
provision of a subsidy to the polluting firms encouraging thein to switch
to safer production technologies, or some combination of these or other
means (Gunningham et al., 1998; Gunningham and Young, 1997). The
choice of which instrument to use to put a decision into effect is often no
less contentious than the decision itself and is very much the subject of
discussion, deliberation, and dispute among subsystem members active
in the policy process.
Like much else in the policy sciences, the study of policy instruments
by scholars of public policy began with Harold Lasswell and his insights
into the subject in his. 1936 work, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.
Over the decades, efforts have moved from simple description of each
tool, to the development of classification schemes for categories of tools,
and then to attempts to understand the reasons behind their use by governments. In this chapter we will set out one method of classification of
the. policy instruments available to policy-makers. We will then describe
the main features of key instrument types and note the extent of their
substitutability. Our intent at this stage is descriptive rather than
prescriptive, because factors of context importantly determine the appropriateness of various instruments in specific circumstances (Peters and
Van Nispen, 1998; Bemelmans et aI., 1998). The question of why governments tend to select a particular instrument and not some other technically equal or even more appealing instrument is addressed in Chapter 8.
The variety of instruments available to policy-makers to address a policy
problem is limited only by their imaginations. Scholars have made
numerous attempts to identify such instruments and classify them into
meaningful categories (see Salamon and Lund, 1989: 32-3; Lowi, 1985;
Bemelmans etaI., 1998). Unfortunately, many such schemes are either
pitched at a high level of abstraction, making them difficult to apply in
practical circumstances, or dwell on the idiosyncrasies of particular tools,
thereby limiting the range of the descriptions and explanations they provide. A scheme that is sufficiently abstract to encompass the various possibilities, yet concrete enough to correspond with the way policy-makers
actually interpret their choices, is required.
The origins of such a scheme stem from Lasswell's insight that gov.ernments use a variety of policy instruments to achieve a relatively limited number of political ends. Rather than face a choice among a huge
number of policy tools, Lasswell (1958: 204) argued that governments
had developed a limited pumber of 'strategies' that involved 'the management of value assets in order to influence outcomes'. Understanding
these basic strategies and their component· instruments, according to
Lasswell, involved understanding the nature and types of governing
resources that governments have at their' disposal (see also French and
. Raven, 1959).
In the 1940s and 1950s, this insight was developed and elaborated
upon by several American political scientists. In his 1941 study of federal
r.egulatory commissions, for example, Robert Cushman developed a simple basic taxonomy of policy instruments by focusing on the insight that
governments could either regulate or choose not to. regulate societal
activities, and'that if they chose the former they could regulate either in a
coercive or non-coercive manner (Cushman, 1941). In their work on governments and planning, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (1953) also
developed a number of spectra, or continuous scales, which highlighted
the almost infinite number of possible permutations of policy tools, but
also the manner in which these tools relied for their effectiveness on a
limited number of criteria, such as their intrusiveness, their dependence
on state agencies or markets, and a number of other variables.
In the 1960s, Theodore Lowi (1966, 1972) adopted these insights into
the limited number of basic types or categories of policy tools involved in
government activity. He observed that American governments had
tended to favour certain' types of instruments for prolonged periods,
allowing analysts the opportunity to identify major transitions in government activities on this basis. He argued that a four-cell matrix based on
the specificity of the target of coercion and the likelihood of its actual
application would suffice to distinguish the major types and eras of government activity. The original three policy types he identified included
the weakly sanctioned and individually targeted 'distributive' policies;
the individually targeted and strongly sanctioned 'regulatory' policy; and
the strongly sanctioned and generally targeted 'redistributive' policy. To
these three, Lowi later added the weakly sanctioned and generally targeted category of 'constituent' policy.
Although widely read, Lowi's typology was difficult to operationalize
and somewhat internally inconsistent, and as a result it was rarely
applied. However,' the notion of 'policy determining politics' proved
alluring and led to other efforts to classify and comprehend policy instruments. As Charles Anderson (1971: 122) stated:
Politics is always a matter of making choices from the possibilities
offered by a given historical situation and cultural context. From
this vantage point, the institutions and procedures of the state to
shape the course of economy and society become the equipment
provided by a society to its leaders for the solution of public problems. They are the tools of the trade of statecraft . . . the skillful
policy maker, then, is he who can find appropriate possibilities in
the institutional equipment of his society.
Instrument choice or 'statecraft', from this perspective, is public policy-making, and the role of the policy analyst is one of assisting 'in constructing an inventory of potential public capabilities and resources that
might be pertinent in any problem-solving situation' (ibid.).
In the 1970s, efforts were made to better understand the nature of
these instruments and tools available to governments (see Rondinelli,
1976, 1983; Goggin et al., 1990). Anderson's suggestion that public policy analysis shift from the study of policy problems and inputs to the
study of policy implements and outputs was endorsed by scholars such
as Bardach (1980) and Salamon (1981), both of whom suggested that
policy studies had 'gdne wrong' right at the start by defining policy in
terms of 'areas' or 'fields' rather than in terms of tools. As Salamon
(1981: 256) argued:
The major shortcoming of current implementation research is that it
focuses on the wrong unit of analysis, and the most important theoretical breakthrough would be to identify a more fruitful unit on
which to focus analysis and research. In particular, rather than
focusing on individual programs, as is now done, or even collections
90
PART II
Institutions,
of programs grouped according to major 'purpose: as is fre~uently
proposed, the suggestion here is that we,should conc,entrat~mst;ad
on the generic tools of goverrunent actIOn, on the technIques of
social intervention.
Salamon also framed two important research questions to, be
addressed in the analysis of the tools of government action: 'What consequences does the choice of tool of government action have for the effectiveness and operation of a ,government program?' and 'What factors
influence the choice of pro~ram tools?' (ibid., 265). Throughout the
1980s these questions were taken up by the 'policy design' literature
(Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Dryzek and Ripley, 1988; Linder and Peters,
1984).
.'
The first step in their answer was to inventory policy instruments (see
Steinberger, 1980). One influential early attempt to develop an exhaustive catalogue of policy instruments was carried out by the Dutch
economist E.S. Kirschen and his colleagues, who discovered that despite
the almost infinite number of possible 'permutations and combinations of
instruments, only a relatively small number of basic policy tools were
typically used by European governments to carry out their economic
policies. Kirschen nevertheless concluded that there were at least 64 general types of instruments in this sector alone, thus illustrating the dilemmas of attempting to provide a complete list of policy tools used in all
policy fields (Kirschen et al., 1964).
Rather than attempt to construct such lists, most analysts looked for
ways to grOllP roughly similar types of instruments into a few general
categories that could then be analyzed, to determine the answers to Salamon's questions. Most authors looked to Lasswell's early work oninstrument 'strategies' and tried to identify the basic 'governing resources' that
different instruments relied on for their effectiveness (Balch, 1980).
Bardach (1980), for instance, argued that government had three 'technologies' at its disposal-enforcement, inducement, and benefactionand that these required different combinations of four critical
governmental resources: money, political support, administrative competency, and creative leadership. Rondinelli did much the same thing, arguing that all policy instruments depended on a limited set of 'methods of
influence' that governments had at their disposal: in his case, persuasion, exchange, and authority (Rondinelli, 1983: 125).
A simple and powerful taxonomy was offered by Christopher Hood
(1986a), who proposed that all policy tools used one of four broad cate;~',!l'Jf'.pemi-ng~'resoarces~l'He"arguediliat
governments confront
,,pubJ,ic,pr.IJblems1hraughilie:use,~Uhejnformation in their possession as
a central policy actor ('nodality'), their legal powers ('authority'), their
money ('treasure'), or the formal organizations available to them ('organization') or 'NATO'. Governments can use these resources to manipulate
Policy Instruments
91
policy actors, for example, by withdrawing or making available information or money, by using their coercive powers to force other, actors to
undertake activities they desire, or simply by undertaking the activity
themselves using their own personnel and expertise.
Other schemes existed, such as Elmore's and Schneider and Ingram's,
which focused on the outputs associated with instruments, rather than
their inputs, but these received less attention than did Hood's.2 This is
because resource-based schemes like Hood's allowed a relatively small '.
number of general categories of policy tools to be identified, and permitted the ready analysis of specific tools by grouping them together in very
small number of general categories. Such schemes aid analysis by distinguishing clearly between policy choices involving changes in policy tools
within categories and between them. In the first instance, for example,
the parameters or 'settings' of a tool might be changed but not the basic
category of the tool itself, as occurs, for example, when the amount or
extent of a government subsidy is varied. In the second, rather than
involving a change in the calibration of an instrument, changes might
involve an alteration in overall tool category. An example of such a
change would include one where privatization results in a government
eliminating public corporations, choosing to use regulations or legal
standards rather than bureaucratic forms of organization to achieve its
ends.
Using Hood's idea of governing resources, a basic taxonomy of instrument categories can be set out. Figure 4.1 presents such a classification
scheme with illustrative examples of the types of policy tools found in
each category.
As Figure 4.1 shows, policy instruments tend to fall into two types:
substantive instruments, such as public enterprises and user charges;
designed to deliver or affect the delivery of goods and services in society;
and procedural instruments, such as the creation of adVisory committees
~d government reorganizations, used to alter aspects of policy deliberations.This distinction will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 8 when
we examine the reasons why governments use particular types of tools or
what is sometimes referred to as 'the rationale for instrument choice'.3
Here, we will describe the general contours of the types of instruments
found in each of the ca.tegoriesset out in Figure 4.1.
Direct Provision
In our effort to understand the more exotic instruments employed by governments, we tend to forget this basic and most Widely used public policy
instrument. Instead of waiting for the private sector to do something it
desires or regulating non-governmental performance of a task, a government can often perform the task itself, delivering goods and services
-
Figure 4.1 Policy Instruments,
(Cells provide examples
J1t<{~~iitY'kD>'-,
by Principal Governing Resource
of instruments-in
each category)
Authority
Treasure
Organization
Information
Monitoring
and Release
Command
and Control
Regulation
Grants and
Loans
Direct Provision of
Goods and SerVices
and Public Enterprises
Advice and
Exhortation
Self-Regulation User Charges
StandardSetting and
. Delegated
Regulation
Commissions
and Inquiries
Advisory
Committees
and
Consultations
Use of Family,
Community, and
Voluntary
Organizations
Taxes and Tax Market Creation
Expenditures
Interest Group Government
Creation and
Reorganization
Funding
Adapted from Christopher Hood, The Tools of Government (Chatham,
NJ: Chatham House, 1986), 124-5.
SOURCE:
directly by using government employees, funded from the public treasury,
for a task (Leman, 1989: 54; Leman, 2002; Mayntz, 1979; Devas et al.,
2001).'Much of what governments .do is done through this 'instrument,
including activities such as national defence, diplomatic relations; policing, firefighting, social security, education, management of public lands,
maintenance of parks and roads, and census and geological surveys.
There are several advantages of using direct provision as a policy
instrument (Leman, 1989: 60). First, direct provision is easy to establish
because of low information requirements, unlike other instruments,
which rely heavily on non-government actors and hence require constant
monitoring and supervision of their activities. Second, the large size of
the agencies usually involved in direct provision enables them to build
resources, skills, and information necessary for efficient performance of
their task. Third, direct provision avoids many problems associated with
indirect provision-discussion, negotiations, and concerns with noncompliance-that can lead governments to pay more attention to enforcing terms of grants and contracts than to results. Fourth, direct provision
permits internalization within government of many types of transactions,
thus minimizing the costs involved in policy implementation.
The disadvantages of direct provision, however, can be no less significant. While in theory a government can do everything that the private
sector can, in practice this may not be the case. As theorists of govern-
ment failures have noted, delivery of programs by the bureaucracy is
often characterized by inflexibility, something that is unavoidable in liberal democratic societies, which value accountability and the rule of law
and where governments must abide by formal operating procedures
encoded in time-consuming legal budgeting and appointment requirements. Second, political control over the agencies and officials involved
in providing goods and services may, and often does, promote political
meddling to strengthen a government's re-election prospects or address,
other specific contemporary political needs rather than to serve the public as a whole. Political control may also lead to incoherent directives to
agencies delivering goods and services because of the contradictory pressures that beset governments. Third, since bureaucratic agencies are not
subject to competition, they are often not sufficiently cost-conscious, for
which the taxpayers ultimately pay. Fourth, the delivery of programs may
suffer because of inter- and intra-agency conflicts within the government
(Bovens et al., 2001).
Public Enterprises
Also known as state-owned enterprises (SOES),Crown corporations, or
parastatal organizations, public enterprises are entitieS totally or partially
owned by the state but yet enjoying some degree of autonomy from the
government. There is no definitive way of identifying a public enterprise,
which explains why gQvernments quite often do not publish a definitive
list of the enterprises they own. The main problem is determining how
public an enterprise must be in order to be called a 'public' enterprise. At
oneextrem€, with only a small gevernment share of ownership, a firm
mayreseIfible apnvate enterprise, and at the other, with close to 100 per
cent government equity ownership, an enterprise may appear to be an
ordinary bureaucratic agency (Stanton and Moe, 2002).
However, three broad generalizations can be made about the basic
features of public enterprises (Ahroni, 1986: 6). First, they involve a large
degree of public ownership. Analysts often use an arbitrary figure of a
minimum 51 per cent ownership of a firm by a government or government~ to call a firm a public enterprise, since this amount ensures government control of appointments to a company's board of directors.
However, in large corporations with widely held stock, a much smaller
percentage would be sufficient to control board appointments. The term
'mixed enterprise' is used to describe a second category of firms owned
jointly by government and the private sector. Second, public enterprises
entail some degree of control or direct management by the gov:ernment.
Completely passive ownership of a firm operated entirely free from governinent control does not constitute a public enterprise. Hybrid 'special
operating agencies' or 'public authorities' created in many countries in
recent years to operate specific services such as airports, harbours, and
water or electrical power utilities are not traditional public enterprises in
that governments usually do not directly control their boards of directors
(Advani and Borins, 2001; Kickert, 2001). Third, public enterprises produce goods and services that are sold, unlike public goods such as
defence or street lighting for which those receiving the services are
taxed. As a corollary, their sales revenues must bear some semblance to
their costs, though generating profits is usually not the primary objective
of these firms, as it is for their private-sector counterparts.
Public enterprises as policy instruments offer a number of advantages
to governments (Mitnick, 1980: 407). First, they are an efficient economic policy instrument in situations where a socially needed good or
service is not produced by the private sector because of high capital outlays or low expected returns, for example, in providing rural electrification or high-speed Internet access. Second, as with direct provision, the
information threshold required to establish public enterprises is in many
instances lower than when using other kinds of instruments, such as voluntary instruments or regulation. It does not require information on 'the
target activity or the goals and preferences of the targeted firms, because
the government as owner can do whatever it wishes through the enterprise itself. Third, in terms of administration, public enterprises may
actually simplify management if extensive regulation is already present.
Instead of building additional layers of regulation to force firms to comply with government aims, for instance, it might be desirable simply to
establish a company that does so without the need for the cumbersome
processes and oversight provisions attending regulation. Finally, profits
from public enterprises may accrue to public funds, any surplus in which
can be used to pay for public .expenditures in othefareas.-Asignificantproportion of government revenue in Singapore; for example, comes
from the profits of its public enterprises.
The disadvantages of public enterprises are no less significant. First,
governments often find them difficult to control because' managers can
adopt various avoidance measures to evade government directives. Moreover, the ultimate shareholders (the voters themselves) are too diffuse,
and their personal interest too distant, to exercise effective control over
the company. Second, public enterprise can be inefficient in operation
because continued losses do not lead. to bankruptcy, as would occur in
the private sector. Indeed a large number consistently lose money, which
is a major reason underlying efforts to privatize them in many countries
in recent years (see Howlett and Ramesh, 1993; Ikenberry, 1988). Finally,
·many public enterprises, such as in the area of electricity and water supply, operate in a monopolistic environment enabling them to pass the
·'~ts·,gftheiT'inefficiency"to·conSUtIfers;·lQ'sttategy no different than that
".,a-f.a·,J,Yivate,irm-enja¥ingamoaopoly,position (Musolf, 1989).
Family, Community, and Voluntary Organizations
The characteristic feature of this type of instrument is that it entails no or
little involvement by the government; the desired task is instead performed on a voluntary basis by non-governmental actors. In some cases,
governments must create the conditions under which voluntary actors
operate, while in others governments decide deliberately that they will
do nothing ('non-decision') about a recognized public problem, because
they believe a solution is already being, or will be, provided by some
other actor, whether through existing private companies in the market or
by family or voluntary organizations. These services are often provided
by non-governmental organiz;:.~ioD"(NGOS) operating on a voluntary
basis in that their members ate not compelled to perform a task by the
government. If they do something that serves public policy goals, it is for
reasons of self-interest, ethics, or emotional gratification (Salamon,
1995).
The existence of such organizations is supported by government
(in)action and they are an important tool for implementing many economic and social policies. Their usage has grown in recent decades
because of increasing governmental retreat from direct provision and,
extensive privatization of public enterprises. NGOS are preferred in many
liberal democratic societies, especially, because of their cost-efficiency,
consistency with the cultural norms of individual freedom, and the support they provide for family and community ties. However, they are also
found in many other types of societies.
In all societies, relatives, friends, and neighbours, or family and community organizations, such as churches and charities, provide numerous
goods and services, and the government may take measures to expand
their role in ways-that senreits.policy goals-.-ltmay do so either indirectly
by cutting back on government services in the hope that the family or
community will step in to fill the gap, or directly by promoting their
involvement through preferential regulation or financial incentives such
as tax deductions for charitable donations or expenses (Phillips et al.,
2001).
All societies regard looking after the needs of family members and
others close to them as an essential responsibility of the individual. Children, the aged, and the sick are ordinarily looked after in this manner,
mainly in terms of care, but financial assistance if necessary is also common: It has been calculated that in 1978 the total cost of the transfer of
cash, food, and housing within families in the United States amounted to
US$86 billion (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989: 281). Non-monetary transfers
are almost impossible to estimate, however, because families provide a
range of services whose value cannot be measured in monetary terms. It
is estimated, for example, that about 80 per cent of home health-care services for the elderly are provided by family members (ibid., 19).
Voluntary organizations involve 'activities that are indeed voluntary
in the dual sense of being free of [state] coercion and being free of the
economic constraints of profitability and the distribution of profits'
96
PART II
Institutions,
Policy Instruments
(Wuthnow, 1991: 7). Voluntary organizations providing health services,
education, and food to the poor and temporary shelter for battered
women and runaway children are prime examples of such organizations.
Voluntary groups that form to clean up beaches, riverbanks, and highways are other examples. Although these functions could well be provided by the market or the government, they may also be left wholly or
partially to volunteers.
Charitable, not-for-profit groups, often church-based, used to be the
primary means of fulfilling the basic needs of those who could not provide for themselves, but over the last century the expansion of the welfare state gradually diminished their importance. Even so, they are still a
widely used means of addressing social ,problems today. In fact, in the
US, often seen as the archetype of an individualist materialistic society,
the non-profit voluntary sector delivers more services than the government itself (Salamon, 1987: 31). In recent years, because of the budgetary crises faced by governments, many countries have pressed to
expand the role of the voluntary sector.
In theory, voluntary organizations are an efficient means of delivering
most economic and social services. If it were feasible, it wc>Uldobviously
be cost-efficient to provide social security or health and education services or build dams and roads on the basis of voluntary efforts of individuals. Voluntary organizations also offer flexibility and speed of
response and the opportunity for experimentation that would be difficult
in governmental .organizations (Johnson, 1987: 114). They are often
quicker than the government in providing relief to victims of natural disaster, for instance. Moreover, meeting ··social needs··in ·this ·manner· .
decreases the need for government action, which appeals to those who
believe that state intervention is inherently inimical to political freedom.
Not-for-profit groups are also an equitable instrument because they are
usually directed at only those in need. Another beneficial spillover is
their positive contribution to promoting community spirit, social solidarity or cohesion, and political participation (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b, 1996,
2000,2001).
However, most practical circumstances severely limit the usefulness of
voluntary organizations. Their efforts are largely inapplicable to many
economic problems, for example, such as the promotion of technological
innovation and enhanced productivity. And even in the social sphere,
their efficiency and effectiveness may be compromised by the fact that
large voluntary groups can be chaotic or may become bureaucratic and
in practice become little different from government organizations. If they
depend on the government for funds they also may not be cost-efficient;
it might be cheaper for the state to perform the task directly. In the US,
for example, the government prOVides40 per cent of total expenditure by
voluntary organizations, a larger source of funds than private contributions (Salamon, 1987: 31). And the proportion of private funding would
97
have been even lower without the tax deductibility allowed for such
contributions.
Contemporary economic and social problems are simply too vast to be
addressed adequately on the basis of voluntary efforts alone; most people have neither the time nor the resources to contribute to such activities in a substantive manner. Such organizations are therefore unlikely to
work outside areas that give their active members satisfaction for religious, ethical, or political reasons. Consequently, voluntary organizations are not likely to undertake most tasks performed by modem
governments.
The primary advantage of promoting the family and community as an
instrument of public policy is that it does not cost the government anything unless it chooses to provide grants or subsidies for these efforts. In
many circumstances, as in the case of family or community care for the
long-term disabled, this is much less expensive than their care in public
institutions. Moreover, the functioning of non-profit community organizations, churches, co-operatives, and families enjoys widespread political
support in most societies (Quarter, 1992). But pitted against these advantages are some serious disadvantages. Family- and community-based
instruments, for example, are generally weak instruments for addressing
complex economic problems~ Efficiency of scale may also warrant centralized provision by the government rather than decentralized provision
by the family or community. Reliance on these types of instruments for
solving public problems may also be inequitable because many individuals do not have anyone, or anyone with the financial resources or emotional commitment; to look after them. It is similarly inequitable for the
caregivers. In most societies, for eXample,women tend to be the main .care providers, a role increasingly difficult to perform because of increasing female participation in the labour force. As such, family and community instruments can often only be relied upon as adjuncts to other
instruments needed to address the pressing social problems of our times.
Market Creation
By far.the most important, and contentious, type of voluntary instrument
is _the market organization. The voluntary interaction between consumers and producers I with the former seeking to buy as much as they
can with the limited amount of money at their disposal and the latter
searching for highest possible profits, can usually be expected to lead to
outcomes that satisfy both. In theory at least, while the primary motive
on the part of both sides is self-interest, the society as a whole gains from
their interaction because whatever is wanted (backed by the ability to
pay) by the society is provided at the lowest price. Theoretically, then,
those wanting even such critical goods as health care or education can
simply buy the services from hospitals and schools operating for profit.
Markets exist when there is scarcity and a demand for particular
goods or services. But government action is required both to create and
to support market exchange. This is accomplished by securing the rights
of buyers and sellers to receive and exchange property through the establishment and maintenance of property rights and contracts through the
courts, police, and quasi-judicial systems of consumer and investor protection, such as securities and exchange commissions and competition
tribunals. Even so-called 'black', 'grey', or other types of illegal or quasilegal markets for commodities or services, such as illegal drugs or prostitution, owe their existence to governments that attempt to ban the
production and sale of these goods or services, thereby creating shortages that can provide high rates of return for those willing to risk punishment and imprisonment for their provision.
Governments can use a variety of regulatory, financial, and information-based tools to affect market activities, and these will be discussed in
the following sections. However, they use their organizational resources
to create markets. One way this can be done is by the creation of a new
set of property rights thrQugh government licensing schemes. On the
basis of the assumption that the market is often the most efficient means
of allocating resources, property-rights auctions by the government establish markets in situations where they do not exist. The market is created
by setting a fixed quantity of transferable rights to consume a designated
resource, which has the effect of creating an artificial scarcity ·and
enabling the price mechanism to work. The resource can .be communal
radio, television, or cell-phone frequencies, oil wells, or fish stocks, anything that would not be scarce unless made so by the government (Sunnevag, :1.O00) •. Those wishing. to consume the.resourcemust bid at.an
auction for the limited amount available,PDtential buyers will bid
according to the value they attribute to the resource, with those offering
the most in return for the government securing their right.
Many countries have proposed to control the use of dangerous pollutants in this manner (Bolom, 2000), and some such schemes exist in
environmental agreements, such as the so-called Kyoto Protocol on
greenhouse gases. In these schemes, typically, the government is
expected to fix the total amount of the pollutant that can enter the market and then through periodic auctions sell the right to discharge the limited amount available. This means tpat firms intending to use a pollutant
in their production process must buy the right to do so at an auction
before they can buy the pollutant itself. Those with cheaper alternatives
will avoid using the pollutant because of the extra cost of buying rights.
Manufacturers for whom there is no cheap alternative continue to pay
'''th'e''pridtl<Jr'tbe'rigltt4c 'USethe'poliutant;~However, ·~en'·theY"'M-e under
..xl;coD:$tant~es,sure,to i:SeaIch·.Jor,.allernatives,.}aecause,..oL
theaxtra costs
they must otherwise bear.
The advantage of using an auction of rights in such cases is that it
.restricts the use of specific types of goods while still making them avail-
able to those without alternatives. Of course, the same could be done
through r~gulation, but then the government would have to determine
who should be allowed to use the limited amount available, a difficult
task because of the high information costs involved. In the case of auctions, in theory at least the decision will be made by the market according to the forces of demand and (artificially limited) supply.
Another example of the use of auctions of property rights is in controlling the number of motor vehicles on city roads. After experimenting
with a number of instruments to control the rapidly increasing number
of motor vehicles that were causing traffic congestion and posing an
environmental hazard in the long run, the government of Singapore
decided to resort to the auction of the right to vehicle ownership. The
annual supply of new motor vehicles in the country is limited to about
4,000. But before one can buy a car, one must purchase a Certificate of
Entitlement at an auction organized by the government. Since the annual
demand for new cars is far in excess of 4,000, in recent years the successful bidders have had to pay in excess of Singapore $50,000 just to
buy an entitlement (over and above the price of the car itself). This
instrument has ensured that the government is able to control the number of vehicles on streets without determining which specific individuals
or firms can own cars, the latter being determined by the market. Of
course, the auction is also a highly lucrative source of revenue for the
government.
One advantage of auctions of property rights to establish markets is
that they are easy to conduct (Cantor et aI., 1992). The government,
based on what it considers the ..maxirnum a,ffiOuntofa· good or serviee.",,,
that should be permitted, fixes the ceiling and then lets the market do the
rest. Second, they are a flexible instrum~nt, which allows the government to vary the ceiling as and when it wants; the subjects must adjust
their behaviour accordingly. Property-rights auctions also allow the subjects to adjust their behaviour according to other changes in their circumstances, such as with respect to development of cost-saving
technology, without requiring a corresponding change in the government's policy or instrument. Third, auctions offer the certainty that only
a fixed amount of undesired activity occurs, something not possible with
other voluntary. or mixed instruments.
One of the disadvantages of auctions is that they may encourage speculation, with speculators buying up and hoarding all rights by bidding
high, thereby erecting entry barriers to small firms or consumers. Second, it is often the case that those who cannot buy the rights, because
none may be available for sale, will be forced to cheat, whereas in the
case of user charges or subsidies they would have an alternative, albeit
often at a high price. This can result in high enforcement costs if grey or
black markets are to be avoided. Third, auctions are inequitable to the
extent they allocate resources according to ability to pay, rather than
opposition in democratic societies otherwise structured along more egalitarian principles.
A 'free market' in the true sense of the term is therefore almost never
used as a policy instrument in practice. When a government does choose
to resort to this instrument to address a public problem, it is usually
accompanied by other instruments such as regulation to protect consumers, investors, and workers; it is also accompanied frequently by subsidies intended to further promote the desired activity (Cantor et ai.,
1992). Thus the voluntarism of markets is relative rather than absolute.
Government
Reorganizations
Unlike the instruments discussed so far, which are intended to alter the
configuration of goods and services delivered in soCiety, there are also
'procedural' instruments that rely on the use of government organizational resources. The objective of these instruments is to alter policy processes in such a way that governments can retain their legitimacy or
capacity to act (Howlett, 2000). The foremost example of such an instrument is institutional reorganization whereby governments seek to
achieve an objective by reorganizing the structures or processes through
which they perform a function (Peters, 1992b; Carver, 2001). These activities are sometimes referred to as 'network management', in which governments use their personnel and other organizational resources to alter
or restructure how policy actors interact with each other (Klijn, 1996;
Klijn et ai., 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).
Reorganizations can involve the creation of new agencies or the reconfiguration ofo.ld.ol}e~. One popular tech,I.ljque.fQJsuchpurpQ-ses is minis- _
terral reorganization. Some of these alterations can ,oc(;uraccidentally or
as a by-product of organizational changes in government machinery
brought about for other reasons, such as electoral or partisan ones. However, intentional organizational change to the basic structures or personnel of government departments and agencies has become an increasingly
significant aspect of modem policy-making (lindqUist, 1992; Aucoin,
1997). This. can involve changes in the relationships between departments and central co-ordinating agencies, or between departments, or
within ministries.
In the first instance, ministries can be given greater autonomy and
capacity to set their own direction, or they can be brought into tighter
control by central executive agencies (Smith et ai., 1993). In the second
case, government departments can be divided into more specialized
units, as has happened in instances where, for example, specialized
."~pal!tment::s~deaJiRgi,,WittI;:particular'.industrial
sectors have been created
froni la.~erunits.or ;the:revers~,pro~s,:oftl,J.eamalgamation of specific
purpose units into omnibus ministries has occurred. This has been the
pattern in many countries recently, for example, where specific resource
ministries such as forests and mines have been combined into depart-
ments of the environment or sustainable development (Brown, 1992). Or
new units. can be created to deal with new issues, as. has occurred in
many countries over the last two decades, for example, with the creation
of new human rights agencies (Howe and Johnson, 2000). In the final
instance, the same kinds of interdepartmental reforms can be made at
the intradepartmental level, reducing or augmenting the autonomy of
subunits or reorganizing them to expand or retract their spheres of.activity. 'In the latter instance, this often involves the creation of specialized
units within departments to enhance their planning capacity (Chenier,
1985; Prince, 1979).
Reorganizing government structures can have a very dramatic impact
on existing policy processes and on the types of interactions between and
among state and societal actors (Peters, 1992b). However, it is also the
case that there are limits to such reorganizations. First, they can be
expensive and time-consuming. Second, if they occur too frequently,
their impact can be much dissipated. And third, there can be constitutional or jurisdictional limits to the kinds of activities that specific governments can take on and the fashion in which they can do so (Gilmore
and Krantz, 1991).
Authority-Based Instruments
Command and Control Regulation
There are numerous definitions of regulation, but most tend to be quite
restrictive in focus (Mitnick, 1978). A good general one is offered by
Michael Reagan, who defines it as 'a process. or activity in which government .requires or proscribes certain activities cor behaviour on the
part of individuals and institutions, mostly private but sometimes public; and does so through a continuing administrative process, generally
through specially designated regulatory agencies' (Reagan, 1987: 17).
Thus, regulation is a prescription by the government that must be complied with by the intended targets; failure to do so usually involves a
penalty. This type of instrument is often referred to as 'command and
control' regulation.
Some regulations, such as those dealing with criminal behaviour, are
laws and involve the police and judicial system in their enforcement.
Most regulations, however, are administrative edicts created under the
terms of enabling legislation and administered on a continuing basis by a
government department or a specialized, quasi-judicial government
agency (first called independent regulatory commissions in the US) that is
more or less autonomous of government control in its day-to-day operations. Regulations take various forms and include rules, standards, permits, prohibitions, laws, and executive orders. Although we may not
always be aware of their presence, among other things they govern the
price and standards of a wide variety of goods and services we consume,
need, and can generate fierce opposition from those affected because of
the extra costs they must bear in buying the right (Woerdman, 2000;
Kagel and Levin, 2002). Thus, in Singapore the rich buy more than one
car, not least because shortage has turned car ownership into a status
symbol, while those who really need one, for example, to start up a business, may not be able to buy a vehicle if they do not have the additional
money required to buy the certificate of entitlement.
Another way that governments can create markets is through the privatization of public enterprises, especially if those enterprises had previously exercised a state-sponsored monopoly on the production or
distribution, or both, of a particular good or service. Privatization can be
carried out in numerous ways, from issuing shares to all citizens, to the
simple transfer of state shares to community organizations or their sale
on public exchanges. In all cases, this amounts to the transfer of a public
enterprise to the private sector and the transformation of the goal of the
enterprise from public service provision to maximization of shareholder
value. Moreover, though; it also usually involves the signal, either overt
or covert, that new firms will be able to enter into the market formerly
served by the state-owned company, allowing for the creation of a competitive market for that particular good or service.
Although some scholars see privatization as a panacea, capable at
one stroke of eliminating corrupt or inefficient public-sector providers
and replacing them with more efficient private-sector ones, others point
out that this is not always the case. In many Eastern European postsocialist countries, for example, large-scale and largely uncontrolled
privatizations resulted in many instances of massive layoffs and plant
closures, with' severe economic consequeIices' for affected families,
communities, and regions. In others, like Russia, where securities markets were not well developed, plants were simply transferred to their
managers, who in many cases were able to reap windfall profits from
their sale. It is also the case, as welfare economists have argued, that
some industries have economies of scale that allow large firms to maintain their monopolistic position, regardless of whether they are owned
by governments or private investors. Privatization of such firms merely
transfers monopoly profits from the public sector, where they can be
used to finance additional public services, to the private sector, where
they are often used for personal luxury consumption (Beesley, 1992;
Bos, 1991; Donahue, 1989; Le Grand and Robinson, 1984; MacAvoy et
aI., 1989; Starr, 1990a).
In Western countries with much smaller numbers of public enterprises, a more co;nmon form of privatization has involved contracting
out of government services, that is, the transfer of various kinds of goods
and services formerly provided 'in-house' by government employees to
'outsourced' private firms (Kelman, 2002; DeHoog and Salamon, 2002).
Again, while some see any transfer of service provision from the state to
the private sector as an inherent welfare gain-, others note that in many
cases the same employees end up being hired by the new service
provider to provide the same service, but at less pay, while others have
noted _that the costs to administrators of establishing, monitoring, and
enforcing contracts often cancels out any cost savings (see Lane, 2001;
Ascher, 1987; Grimshaw et aI., 2001).
A much talked about but little used form of government market creation involves the use of vouchers. These are papers with a monetary
face value offered by the government to consumers of a particular good
or service, given by consumers to their preferred supplier, who in turn
presents the voucher to the government for redemption. Vouchers allow
consumers to exercise relatively free choice in the marketplace, but only
for specific types or quantities of goods. They are common in wartime as
a means to ration supplies of materials, and have also been used in
peacetime in schemes such as food stamps for the poor. This promotes
competition among suppliers, which arguably improves -quality and
reduces costs to the government. However, vouchers can also disrupt
established patterns of public service provision. Their proposed use in
education, for example, may force schools to compete against each other
for students, which can lead to greater inequities in service provision
between wealthy and impoverished school districts (Valkama and Bailey,
2001; Steuerle and 'IWombly,2002).
Establishing markets can be a highly recommended instrument in certain circumstances (Averch, 1990; OEeD, 1993; Hula, 1988). It is an effective and efficient means of providing most private goods and can ensure
that resources are devoted only to those goods and services valued by the
society, as reflected ia the individual's willingness to pay. It also ensures
that if there is meaningful- competition among suppliers, then valued
goods and services are supplied at the lowest possible price. Since most
goods and services sought by the population are of a private nature, governments in capitalist societies rely extensively on the market instrument.
In many situations, however, the market may be an inappropriate
instrument to use (Kuttner, 1997). As we saw in Chapter 2, markets cannot adequately provide public goods, precisely the sort of things most
public policies involve. Thus, markets cannot be used for providing
defence, policing, stieet lights, and other similar goods and services valued by society. Markets also experience difficulties in providing various
kinds of toll goods and common-pool goods (see Chapter 2 for definitions) due to difficulties involved in charging consumers for these kinds
of products. The market is also a highly inequitable instrument, because
it meets the needs of only those with the ability to pay. In a purely market-based system of health-care delivery, (or example, a rich person with
money can have a wish for cosmetic surgery fulfilled, while a poor person suffering from kidney failure will not receive treatment. It is not surprising that the use of markets in such situations faces tough political
from radio statio,ns to energy prices, as well as the quality of water we
drink and the air we breathe, among other things.
The nature of regulations varies somewhat depending on whether
they are targeted towards economic or social spheres of human activity.
Economic regulations control aspects of the production processes specific to particular goods and services, such as the prices and volumes of
production, or return on investment, or the entry into or exit of firms
from an industry. A good example of this type of regulation is that carried out by various kinds of marketing boards, regulatory bodies that are
particularly prominent in the agricultural sector. The intent of such
boards is to keep farm commodity prices high by restricting supply.
Their objective is to correct perceived imbalances or inequities in economic relationships that may emerge as a result of the operation of market forces. Economic regulations' have been the traditional form of
regulation; their social counterparts are or more recent origin.
Social regulations refer to controls in matters of health, safety, and
social practices such as civil rights and discrimination of various sorts.
They have more to do with our physical and moral well-being than with
our pocketbooks. Examples of social regulation include rules regarding
liquor consumption and sales, gambling, consumer product safety, occu~
pational hazards, water-related hazards, air pollution, ,noise pollution,
discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, or ethnicity, and
pornography (Padberg, 1992). Many areas of regulation, such as environmental protection, liquor consumption, and gambling, exist as hybrids
between pure economic and pure social regulation, because the problems may: 'have-economic origins but 1heit a.dverse·effects are mostly
social. While there is a great deal of overlap between the tVITo,soCialregulations tend to be more general than economic ones and do, not focus
on particular industries (for example, banks or telecommunications), as
do economic regulations, but on broader problems or functions, such as
pollution, safety, or morality. This has important implications for their
administration and enforcement because social regulation tends to cut
across several sectors and come under the jurisdiction of several government agencies (see May, 2002; Salamon, 2002b).
There are several advantages of regulation as a policy instrument (see
Mitnick, 1980: 401-4). First, the information needed to establish regulation is less than with many other tools because a government need not
know in advance the subject's preferences, as it must in the case of voluntary instruments. It can simply establish a standard, for example, a
permitted pollution level, and expect compliance. Second, where the
concerned activity is deemed entirely undesirable, as is the case with
films and, videos depicting pedophilia, it is easier to establish regulations
prohibiting the possession of such products than to devise ways of
encouraging the production and distribution of other types of more
benign goods or seryices~ Third, regulations allow for better co-ordina-
tion of government efforts and planning because 'of the greater predictability they entail. Fourth, their predictability makes them a more
suitable instrument in times of crisis when an immediate response is
needed. Fifth, regulations may be less costly than other instruments,'
such as subsidies or tax incentives. Finally, regulations may also be politically appealing if the public or policy subsystem wants to see quick and
definite action on the part of the government.
The disadvantages of regulation are equally telling (see Anderson,
1976). First, regulations quite often distort voluntary or private-sector
activities and can promote economic inefficiencies. Price regulations and
direct allocation restrict the operation of the forces of demand and supply and affect the price mechanism in capitalist societies, thus causing
sometimes unpredictable economic distortions in the market. Restrictions on entry to and exit from industrial sectors, for example, can reduce
competition and thus have a negative impact on prices. Second, regulations can, at times, inhibit innovation and technological progress
because of the market security they afford existing firms and the limited
opportunities for experimentation they permit. Third, regulations are
often inflexible and do not permit the consideration of individual circumstances, resulting in decisions and outcomes not intended by the regulation (Dyerson and Mueller, 1993). Social regulations are particularly
problematic. It is almost impossible to specify in many instances exactly
what is acceptable under regulation. The use of phrases such as 'safe
and effective' drugs, for instance, allows for too much uncertainty. If regulations specify detailed standards, however, then they can become irrelevant in new circumstances. (Bardach, 1989: 203-4) . Foutth, in terms of.
administration, it may simply not be possible to set regulations for.every ,
undesired activity. For example, there are millions of pollutants; a special
regulation would be required for each if this instrument were chosen for
, policy purposes. Finally, the cost of enforcement by regulatory commissions may be high because the costs of information, investigation, and
prosecution make policy-making legalistic and adversarial (see Hahn and
Hird,1991).
or
Delegated
Self-Regulation
Another form of regulatory instrument is delegated regulation. Unlikethe
situation with command and control regulation, in this instance governments allow non-governmental actors to regulate themselves. This is
sometimes referred to as 'self-regulation' although this latter term tends
to portray the resulting regulatory arrangements as more 'voluntary' than
is actually the case. That is, while non-governmental entities may, in
effect, regulate themselves, they typically do so with the implicit or
explicit permission of governments, which consciously refrain from regulating activities in a more directly coercive fashion (Donahue and Nye,
2001).
These delegations can be explicit and direet,for example, when governments allow professions such as doctors, lawyers, or teachers to regulate themselves through the grant of a licensing monopoly to a bar
association, a college of physicians and surgeons, or a teachers' college .
(see Sinclair, 1997; Tuohy and Wolfson, 1978). However, they can also be
much less explicit, as occurs in situations where manufacturing companies develop standards for products or where independent certification
firms or associations certify that certain standards have been met in various kinds of private practices (see Andrews, 1998; Gunningham and
Rees, 1997; Iannuzzi, 2001). While many standards are invoked by government command and control regulation, others can be developed in
the private sphere. As long as these are not replaced by governmentenforced standards, they represent the acquiescence of a government to
the private rules, a form of delegated regulation (see Haufier, 2000,2001;
Knill, 2001).
A major advantage of the use of voluntary standard-setting is cost,
since governments do not have to pay for the creation, administration,
and renewal of such standards, as would be the case with traditional
command and control regulation. This is especially the case in areas
such as professional regulation, where information asymmetries between
those regulated and regulators mean public administration of standards
is especially expensive and time-consuming. Such programs can also be
effective in international settings, where establishment of effective governmental regimes, such as sustainable forestry practices, can be especially diffi·cult(Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001). However, possible savings in
administrative costs. once again must be .balanced against additional
costs to society that might result from ineffective orin€ffiGient administration of voluntary standards, especially those related to ·non-compliance.4 For example, the recent (2002) Enron scandal in the US involving
the energy giant's auditing firm, Arthur Anderson, has undermined confidence in the accounting profession's ability or even willingness to
police itself.
Advisory
Committees
and Quangos
Governments can also use their authority resources to affect policy processes. This involves alteration of the government's authority to elevate
the views of some policy actors above others in formal and informal policy processes. It is based on preferential recognition extended by states to
specific policy actors, enhancing their access to decision-makers and
their voice in policy deliberations (Dion, 1973; Anderson, 1979b).
'.A.}~dard.mo-V·,m:··ithi'S,;categGry··is'·lh.e··.·'t1dTJi:aory;ctJmmittee
(Smith,
,197.7..;.~Gill,aQ40}.Some
ofthes.e ..are.ionnalized..and more or less pennanent, while others tend to be more ad hoc, informal, and temporary
(Brown, 1955, 1972; Balla and: Wright, 2001). Both involve governments
selecting representatives to sit on these committees and the extension to
those representatives of some special rights within the policy process.
Many countries have created permanent bodies to provide advice to governments on particular ongoing issue areas, such as the economy, science and technology, and the environment (for Canada, see Phidd, 1975;
Doern, 1971; Howlett, 1990). However, many other such bodies exist in
almost every policy area. These range from general advisory committees
and specialized clientele advisory committees to specific task-oriented
committees and others (see Peters and Parker, 1993; Barker and Peters,
1993).
Permanent bodies advise governments on particular issue areas on an
ongoing basis, while others are formed for shorter periods of time to look
into specific issue areas. Ad hoc task forces or inquiries, including some
forms of Royal Commissions, are created by governments largely to fashion a consensus among interested parties on the nature of a policy problem and its solution (Wilson, 1971). They are usually quite specific in
their focus and conduct different types of hearings and 'stakeholder' consultations aimed at developing such a consensus. These should not be
confused with the more open-ended, research-oriented bodies that are
created under these same titles (Sheriff, 1983). Ad hoc task forces and
similar bodies are not intended to develop new knowledge or promulgate
old, but rather to provide a venue for organized and unorganized interests to present their views and analyses on pressing contemporary problems, or to frame or reframe issues in such a way that they can be dealt
with by governments (Owens and Rayner, 1999).
A second tool in this category is a kind of public-private partnership
, (Linder, 1999). There are numerous different types of Slichp.C\rtneJsh.ips.
many of which are a form of contracting.ouLused ..to deliver goods and
services and, therefore, exist as substantive rather than procedural
instruments. However, some partnerships exist primarily to enhance the
capacity and permanence of private-sector actors, usually non-governmental organizations (NGOS),which are delegated minor government
tasks in order to receive funding, the main purpose of which is to maintain~these organizations' availability for consultations and the provision
of advice to governments (Armstrong and Lenihan, 1999; Kernaghan,
1993). In some countries, such as Britain, governments have created an
entire category of quasi-autonomous NGOsor QUANGOs,
which fulfill an
important role in poli"cy-makingprocesses (Hood, 1986b; Kickert, 2001).
Various issues arise with respect to the use of this tool, including who
is included or excluded, how broad is the range of interests represented
among committee or QUANGO
members, and how specific individuals are
designated as 'representative'. Design issues also involve questions of
size, as larger groups may be more representative of more views but will
have greater difficulty arriving at uniform recommendations. These
issues have taken on more salience in recent years as efforts to increase
'stakeholder' . consultations have occurred in many jurisdictions (see
Glicken, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997). While these kinds of consultative
partnerships are useful, they have some drawbacks, notably the potential
to co-opt societal actors to the point where the advice they provide to
governments merely reflects the aims and desires of the government
itself (Phillips, 1991a; Saward, 1990, 1992). Also difficult is identifying
exactly who is a 'stakeholder' and who is not, which can lead to difficulties if interested parties are missed or overlooked (Glicken, 2000;
Mitchell et al., 1997). And these processes can lead to cynicism on the
part of participants if they feel their positions have been ignored, or that
the purpose of a task force or committee is simply to impose a predetermined view on participants rather than the other way around (Riedel,
1972; Grima, 1985).
A third general category of policy instruments relies not so much on government personnel or governmental authority for its effectiveness, but
rather on government financial resources and the government's ability to
raise and disburse funds. This refers to all forms of financial transfers to
individuals, firms, and organizations from governments or from other
individuals, firms, or organizations under government direction. These
transfers can serve as incentives or disincentives for private actors to follow the wishes of government. As an incentive, the purpose of the transfer is to reward a desired activity, thereby affecting social actors'
estimates of costs and benefits of the various alternatives. While the final
choice is left·to individualsandfirm-s, the likelihood .of the desired choice
being made is enhanced because of the financial subsidy it draws (Beam
and Conlan, 2002). As a disincentive, the purpose is to penalize certain
types of behaviour by raising the costs that individuals and other policy
actors incur in following it (Cordes, 2002).
Subsidies: Grants, Tax Incentives, andLoans
One of the most prominent forms of treasure-based instrument is grants,
which are 'expenditures made in support of some end worthy in itself,
almost as a form of recognition, reward or encouragement, but not
closely calibrated to the costs of achieving that end' (Pal, 1992: 152;
Haider, 1989). Grants are usually offered to producers, with the objective
of making them provide more of a desired good or service than they
would otherwise. The expenditure comes out of the government's general tax revenues, which requires legislative approval. Examples of grants
include government funds provided to schools, universities, and public
transportation.
Another prominent form of subsidy is the tax incentive involving
'remission of taxes in some form, such as deferrals, deductions, credits,
exclusions, or preferred rates, contingent on some act (or the omission of
some act)' (Mitnick, 1980: 365). Tax incentives or tax expenditures
involve taxes or other forms of government revenues, such as royalties or
licence fees, which are forgone. That is, a subsidy is provided since revenues that would normally have been collected are not.
Governments find tax incentives appealing, not least because they are
hidden in complex tax codes and so escape notice, which makes their
establishment and continuation relatively easy (McDaniel, 1989; Leeuw,
1998). Moreover, in most countries they do not need legislative budgetary approval, for no money is actually spent; rather, revenues are forgone (Maslove, 1994). Nor is their use constrained by availability of
funds, because they involve no direct expenditure. They are also easier to
administer and enforce because no special bureaucracy needs to be created to administer them, as would be the case with many other instruments. The existing taxation bureaucracy is usually entrusted with the
task. The amounts 'spent' in this manner are huge. For example, Christopher Howard has estimated that US federal tax expenditures alone
accounted for $744.5 billion or 42 per cent of total federal direct expenditurE~S
in the year 2000 (Howard, 2002: 417).
Loans from the government at an interest rate below the market rate
are also a form of subsidy. However, the entire amount of the loan
should not be treated as a subsidy, only the difference between the interest charged andthe market rate (Lund, 1989).
Other policy instruments not technically considered as subsidies may
involve some component of subsidy. Thus, regulations that restrict the
quantity of a particular good or service produced or sold also involve
subsidy to the .produ{:ers-because they can often artificially increase
prices. Dairy and poultry producers in many countries are subsidized in
this manner. Regulations involving marketing boards that fix prices to
protect competition from driving down prices and thus hurting other
existing producers, for example, also involve subsidy from consumers.
Restrictive licensing, such as that received by the taxicab industry in most
places, is another example of this kind of subsidy through regulation.
Government proCurement from local producers at a price higher than the
market price is also a subsidy to these producers to the extent of the difference between the purchase price and the market price (Howard,
1997).
Subsidies offer nUmerous advantages as policy instruments (see Mitnick, 1980: 350-3; Howard, 1993, 1995). First, they are easy to establish
if there is a coincidence of preference between what the government
wants someone to do and what the latter desires. If the target population
believes an action to be desirable but for some reason does not carry it
out, then a subsidy may make a difference in their behaviour. For
instance, firms contemplating plant modernization or labour training
may be swayed to act if tax incentives for these activities are provided;
similarly, people are encouraged to put away money for their retirement
rather than spend it right away if they are provided withgJax exemption
for so doing. Second, subsidies are a flexible--instrument to administer
because the individual participants decide for themselves how to
respond to the subsidy in the light of changing circumstances. Likewise,
they permit local and sectoral circumstances to be taken into account, as
only those individuals and firms believing a subsidy to be beneficial
would take it up. Third, by allowing individuals and firms to devise
appropriate responses, subsidies may encourage innovation on their part.
In contrast, directives, by establishing performance standards, normally
discourage innovative responses from the public (it is, of course, also
possible to make a subsidy contingent on innovation). Fourth, the costs
of administering and enforcing.subsidies may be low because it is up to
potential recipients to claim benefits. Finally, subsidies are often politically more acceptable because the benefits are concentrated on a few
whereas the costs are spread across the population, with the result that
they tend to be supported strongly by the beneficiaries and opposed only
weakly by their opponents (Wilson, 1974).
There are also disadvantages to the use of subsidies, of course. Since
subsidies (except tax incentives) need financing, which must come from
new or existing sources of revenues, their establishment through the formal budgetary process is often difficult. They must compete with other
government programs needing funds, each backed by its own network of
societal groups, politicians, and bureaucrats. Second, the cost of gathering information on how much subsidy would be required to induce a
desired behaviour may also be high. Arriving at a correct amount of subsidy by trial and error can be an expensive.way.ofimplementinga.policy ..
Third, since-subsidies work indirectly, there is also often a time lag
before the desired effects are discernible. This makes them an inappropriate instrument to use in a time of crisis. Fourth, subsidies may be
redundant in cases where the activity would have occurred even without
the subsidy, thus causing a windfall for the recipients. At the same time,
they are hard to eliminate because of the opposition from existing beneficiaries who stand to lose from their removal. Fifth, subsidies may be
banned by international agreements, as they are in trading industries
because of the pernicious effects that subsidized imports can have on
local industries and employment.
Financial
Disincentives:
Taxes and User Charges
A tax is a legally prescribed compulsory payment to government by a
person or firm (1tebilcock et al., 1982: 53). Th.emain purpose of a tax is
z-nommliy,'ito .;~raise"TeYemres·.>.for·'the>·86Vemment's·financing
of expendi.tures..,,Howev,er.,,,u.,GilD.,.,also.be,
llSed,as a policy instrument to induce a
desired behaviour or discourage an undesirable behaviour. Taxes can
take a variety of forms and differ as to how they are put into effect.
Payroll taxes of various sorts are used in most countries to fund social
secunty programs. Under such schemes, the employer typically withholds a specified portion of the employee's salary (called the employee
contribution), matches the amount by a proportion determined by the
government (employer contribution), and then hands the amount thus
collected to the government. The purpose of payroll taxes is often to
build an insurance pool for designated risks such as unemployment,
sickness, industrial injury, and old age pensions. When the specified
contingency occurs, the insured is indemnified from the fund. In a sense
this is no different from private insurance one can buy for various risks;
except that some risks are regarded as crucial to the society and hence
insurance against them is made compulsory by the government. Compulsory membership in an insurance fund expands the number of insured
and thus reduces the cost of premiums by spreading the risk for specific
individual activities among the general populace (Katzman, 1988; Feldman, 2002).
Taxes can also be used to curb undesirable behaviour. In contrast to a
subsidy, which is a positive incentive and works by rewarding a desired
behaviour, taxes can be applied as a negative incentive (or sanction) that
penalizes an undesired behaviour. By taxing a good, service, or activity,
the government indirectly discourages its consumption or performance
by making it more expensive to purchase or produce. Many governments' policy objectives of reducing smoking, drinking, and gambling
because of their ill effects, for example, can be partially achieved through
exceptionally high taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling revenues.
Studies show that the high price of cigarettes caused by high taxes was a
key reason for reduction in cigarette.consumption in Canada in the early
1990s,-for example, -although these taxes encouraged smuggling and
other forms of tax-avoidance behaviour (Studlar, 2002).
A particularly innovative use of a tax as a pollcy instrument is a user
charge. Instead of inducing a behaviour by rewarding it through subsidy
or requiring it through regulations, the government imposes a 'price' on
certain behaviours that those undertaking them must pay. The price may
be seen as a financial penalty intended to discourage the targeted
behaviour. User charges, similar to auctions of property rights, are a
combination of regulation and market instruments. The regulatory aspect
has to do with the government setting the charge (tax) for an activity
without prohibiting or limiting it. How much of the target activity is
undertaken is determined by market forces responding to the level of
charges. The extra cost involved leads firms and individuals to conduct
formal or informal cost-benefit analysis, and so conclude that the activity
must be ceased altogether or reduced to a level where benefits exceed
costs. Efforts to reduce costs may encourage a search for (cheaper) alternatives that will reduce the chargeable activity. A firm can reap windfalls
if it is able to implement technologies that do not involve the target
behaviour or the charge associated with it. The success of a user charge
112.
PART II
Institutions,
Policy Instruments
is contingent on setting optimal charges so that only an acceptable level
of undesired activity occurs.
User charges are most commonly used to control negative externalities. An example from the area of pollution control is that of user charges
on pollution, known as effluent charges (Sproule-Jones, 1994; Zeckhauser, 1981). Reducing pollution has costs, the marginal rate of which
tends to increase with each additional unit of reduction. If a charge is
levied on effluent discharge, the polluter will keep reducing its level of
pollution to the point at which it becomes more expensive to reduce pollution than simply to pay the effluent charge. In theory at least, the polluter will thus be constantly seeking to devise ways to minimize the
charges it has to pay by cutting back on the level of pollution it discharges. The government would ideally set the effluent charge at the
point where social benefits equal social costs, assuming that the society
knows how much pollution it can live with given the costs of decreasing
the level of pollution. Any other price would be inefficient; lower charges
would yield excessive pollution and too high a charge would raise costs,
and, ultimately, the price that consumers pay. Another innovative example of user charges is provided by Singapore's efforts to control downtown traffic congestion, discussed above. During peak hours, commuters
are required to pay a set fee to enter the downtown area, which forces
them to compare the costs of entering the area in their own vehicles with
the cost of taking a bus or underground train, which are exempt from the
. charge. Research shows that the charge has had a marked impact on
reducing traffic inflow into the downtown area, and other cities, like London, England; have now· implemented-Ol"are--€Gnsidering- similar
schemes; •
Among the advantages of taxes·and user charges as policy instruments
are the following. First, they are easy to establish from an administrative
standpoint. Companies have few grounds to oppose such measures; they
cannot claim that it is not possible to reduce the activity in question, as
they can continue the existing level of activity by paying the charge. Second, taxes and user charges provide continuing financial' incentives to
reduce undesirable activities. Since reducing the charges firms pay would
enable them to reduce prices or increase profits, it is in their self-interest
to minimize the target activity. Regulations, by contrast, provide no
incentive to reduce the behaviour below a specified standard. Third, user
charges promote innovation by making it in a firm's interest to search for
cheaper alternatives. Fourth, they are a flexible instrument, as the government can continue to adjust rates until a point is reached where the
desirable amount of the target activity occurs. Moreover, unlike regulation, where the discovery of new technology would require a change in
regulations, subjects respond to user charges on their own. Finally, they
are desirable on administrative grounds because the responsibility for
113
reducing the target activity is left to individuals and firms, which reduces
the need for large bureaucratic enforcement machinery.
There are some disadvaritages of taxes and user charges as well. First,
they require precise and accurate information in order to set the correct
level of taxes or charges to elicit desired behaviour. Second, during the
process of experimentation to arrive at optimum charges, resources may
be misallocated. The existing charges, for example, might encourage the
installation of machineiy that would be unviable when rates are reduced.
Third, they are not effective in times of crisis when an immediate
response is required. Finally, they can involve cumbersome and possibly
damaging administration costs if their rates are not set properly and they
encourage evasive behaviour on the part of their targets, as occurred in
the smoking example cited above.
Interest Group Funding
A prominent procedural tool in this category is interest group funding. As
public choice theorists have pointed out, interest groups do not arise
automatically to press for certain policy solutions to ongoing problems,
but rather require active personnel, organizational competence, and,
above all, funding if they are to becoIIie a policy force. While different
countries have different patterns and sources oUnterest group funding,
governments play a large role in this activity in all democratic states
. (Maloneyet aI., 1994).
In some countries, like the US, funding for interest group creation and
ongoing expenses tends to come from private-sector actors, especially
philanthropic trust funds and private-companies; butgevernments facilitate this through favourab~ tax treatmenr for-estates, charitable trusts,
and corporate donations (Nownesand Neeley, 1996; Nownes, 1995). In
other countries, like Canada, the state plays a much greater role in providing direct financing for interest groups in specific areas where the
government wishes to see such groups become, or become more, active
(Pal, 1993a; Phillips, 1991a; Pross and Stewart, 1993; Finkle et aI., 1994).
And, of course, in corporatist countries in Europe,· Latin America, and
parts of Asia, states not 9nly facilitate interest group activities through
financial means, but also through the extension of special recognition
and associational rights to specific groups, providing them with a
monopoly or near monopoly on representation. This brings with it a
greater ability to raise revenues through memberships (Jordan and Maloney, 1998; Schmitter, 1977, 1985).
Like many other procedural instruments, alteration of the interest
group system through the use of financial or treasure-based instruments
involves some risks. Although it may be useful for government to build
SOcial,capacity in these areas in order to obtain better information on
social needs and Wants, this kind of 'boundary-spanning' activityS can
114
PART II
Institutions,
also result in the co-optation or even emasculation of bona fide interests.
It can also result in a significant distortion of the overall interest articulation system if only those groups favourable to the government receive
funding (Saward, 1990, 1992; Cardozo, 1996).
Nodality or Information-Based Instruments
The fourth category of policy tools involves the use of information .
resources at the disposal of governments.
Public Information
Policy Instruments
Campaigns
This is a passive instrument whereby the government puts out information with the expectation that individuals and firms will change their
behaviour in a desired manner. The information is often of a general
nature, intended to make the population more knowledgeable so that
they can make informed choices. For instance, information on tourism,
programs, and economic and social statistics is disseminated by the government through advertising campaigns, leaving it to the population to
draw conclusions and respond accordingly (Salmon, 1989). However, the
information may also be more precisely targeted to elicit a particular
response, as in the case of publicizing information on the ill effects of
smoking (Weiss and Tschirhart, 1994; Vedung and van der Doelen,
1998). In either case, there is no obligation on the public to respond in a
particular manner (Adler and Pittle, 1984). In many countries this passive release of information may be mandated or facilitated by freedom of
information or access to information laws. These,lawsaIlow access to
specific types of gov'ernment information by members of the public
(Relyea, 1977; Bennett, 1990, 1992). Such legislation is usually accompanied by privacy acts and official secrets acts, which balance open access
with restrictions on the release of some types of information, the exact
content of which varies from country to country (Qualter, 1985).
Exhortation
Exhortation, or suasion as it is also called, involves orily slightly more
government activity than pure dissemination of information (Stanbury
and Fulton, 1984). It entails a concerted effort to change the subjects'
preferences and actions, rather than just informing them about a situation with the hope that they will change their behaviour in a desired
manner. However, it does not include altering the attractiveness of the
choice by offering rewards or imposing sanctions .
.",·"Exam.ptes·'OfeXhlJrtatioti"i'rit1u.de''<lavemsements
urging people to keep
"fih.md,~alfuy;,·no1'J:1ll·,waste.,wateL~"energy, and to use public transportation. Consultations between government officials and financial,
industry, or labour representatives are also often a form of exhortation
because in these meetings governments often hope to alter these parties'
115
behaviour. This group of instruments assumes one or both of two things: .
(1) that the realm of private behaviour in question must remain private
and government cannot legitimately apply coercive instruments; (2) that
motivations are strong enough that the subjects themselves can be relied
on to achieve policy goals once apprised of new information. For example, to prevent the spread of AIDS, the government can do little to force
safe sexual behaviour but must instead rely on dissemination of information, hoping that people will make informed choices to avoid activities
that carry risks of infection.
The use of information-based tools offers numerous advantages to
governments (ibid., 297-301). It is a good starting point for a government
dealing with problems to which definite solutions are unavailable. Second, it is easy to establish, and if the problem is solved through exhortation alone, then nothing more needs to be done. However, even if a
better instrument is found, the policy of suasion can be changed or abandoned without much difficulty. Third, it is inexpensive in terms of both
financial and personnel costs because it involves little financial commitment or enforcement by the bureaucracy. And finally, exhortation is consistent with the norms of liberal democracy, which value debate,
persuasion, individual responsibility, and freedom.
Bowever, exhortation. is too weak an instrument when immediate
results are required, as in times of crisis. The government may use it
merely to portray itself as doing something about a problem, rather than
actually doing something meaningful (Edelman, 1964: 44-72). Thus, government exhortation against violence against women, in the absence of
other instruments, may beaf littleuse . ..AsStanbury and Fulton conclude,
'In· the-absence of positive or negative inducements (or more bluntly,
leverage), most efforts at suasion probably have either a low probability
of success or have a relatively short shelf life: At best, it should be used in
conjunction with other instruments when they are available.
Research Inquiries, Investigative Commissions,
and Freedom of Information Legislation
Information resources can also be used for procedural purposes. These
instruments are quite varied and range from the selective release or withholding of government information to the creation of specialized
research bodies to compile existing information into a form usable by
governments. All of these tools, however, have the same end in mind: to
alter the nature of the perceptions held by actors in policy subsystems so
as to alter the nature of existing and future policy processes (Termeerand
Koppenjan, 1997).
Governments may employ a range of temporary bodies to compile
existing information into a usable form or sometimes just to procrastinate in making a decision, hoping that public pressure for action will
ease over time. Foremost among these is the ad hoc inquiry, commission,
or task force. These agencies exist in many forms in different countries
and are often established to deal with new or particularly troubling policy problems. They attempt to provide a forum that combines specialized
academic research and more generalized public input into the definition
of and potential solution to policy problems, generating information that
becomes available to all participants in the policy process and altering
their knowledge, or epistemic, base as a result (Sheriff, 1983; Wraith and
Lamb, 1971: 302-23; Chapman, 1973).
These commissions have some advantages in terms of removing a
subject from immediate partisan debate, although this can lead to·
charges that they are merely delaying tactics and thereby undermine
their legitimacy (Elliott and McGuinness, 2001). This often results in the
use of important or respected figures to head Such inquiries to ensure
that their creation and deliberations remain above partisan or public
reproach. This is especially the case with high-profile investigations such
as Royal Commissions and presidential commissions (McDowall and
Robinson, 1969; Cairns, 1990a; d!Ombrain, 1997).
In many jurisdictions, a system of formal reviews of ongoing policy
areas is also evident. These reviews serve as 'institutionalized'
task
forces or investigations into ongoing issues and the efforts made by gov~
ernment bodies to deal with them (Bellehumeur, 1997; de la Mothe,
1996; Raboy, 1995; Banting, 1995). These reviews are usually done 'inhouse' but sometimes also involve the use of outside experts (Owens and
Rayner, 1999). In both cases, they generate and disseminate information
on government activities, which is then used by actors in the policy process to inform themselves about government actions and, as a result, toadjust their own actions within "policy subsystems accordingly.
Discussion in this chapter indicates that aparsimonious
scheme for categorizing policy instruments can be generated by examining the limited
number of basic 'resources' that governments can emplby. While this
discussion helps to. outline the types of decisions pqlicy-makers must
make about exactly how they will attempt to achieve their policy goals, it
tells us little about how or why those choices are made. In Chapter 8we
will discuss several causal models of instrument choice. This chapter,
however, like the preceding one outlining the principal actors and institutions affecting public policy-making, has merely inventoried an important element of the public policy process. How the process actually
operates is discussed in Part III.
Anderson, Charles W. 1977. Statecraft: An Introduction
Judgem.ent.New York: John Wiley and SonS.
to Political Choice and
Balch,· George 1. 1980. 'The Stick, the Carrot, and Other Strategies: A
Theoretical Analysis of Governmental Intervention', Law and Policy
Quarterly 2, 1: 35-60.·
Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung, eds. 1998.
Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments
and Their Evaluation.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Gunningham, Neil, Peter Grabosky, and Darren Sinclair. 1998. Smart
Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hood, Christopher. 1986. The Tools of Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House.·
'
__
. 1986. 'The Hidden Public Sector: The 'Quangocratiza:tion' of the
World?', in F.-x. Kaufman, G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds, Guidance,
Contro~ and Evaluation in the Public Sector. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
183-207.
Lowi, Theodore J~ 1972. 'Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice', Public
Administration Review 32, 4: 298-310.
Mitnick, B.M. 1980. The Political Economy of Regulation. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Peters, B. Guy, and F.K.M. Van Nispen, eds. 1998. Public Policy Instruments:
Evaluating the Thols of Public Administration.
New York: Edward Elgar.
Salamon, Lester M., ed. 1989. Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government
Action. Washington: Urban Institute, 23-50.
__
, ed. 2002. The TholsofGovernment: A Guide to the New Governance.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1990. 'Behavioral Assumptions of Policy
Tools', Journal of Politics 52, 2: 510-29.
Wolf, Charles, Jr. 1988. Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect
Alternatives, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Woodside, K 1986. 'policy Instruments and the Study of Public Policy',
Canadian Journal of Political Sc;ience 19: 775-94.
1. On earlier, or similar, resource-based schemes, see Lundquist (1987);
Anderson (1977); Baldwin (1985).
2. McDonnell and Elmore also used a fourfold classification of instruments
although they dassifiedinstruments
according to the end desired rathe;
than the resources used. For MCDonnell and Elmore, instruments could be
categorized as 'mandates',
'inducements' ,'capacity-building',
and
.system-changing'. See McDonnell and Elmore (1987); Elmore (1987).
Schneider and Ingram (1990a, 1990b) proposed a similar list of categories,
which they called 'incentives',
'capacity-building',
'symbolic and
hortatory', and 'learning'.
3. On the distinction between procedural and substantive instruments, see,
generally, Howlett (2000). On the art of political manipulation or
'heresthetics', see Riker (1983, 1986).
4. Critical assessments of the effectiveness of these instruments can be found
in Gibson (1999) and Karamanos (2001).
S. On 'boundary-spanning' in interorganizational relations, see Cohen and
Levinthal(1990) and Lane and Lubatkin (1998).
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Agenda-Setting
Agenda-Setting: Policy Determinants,
Policy Ideas, and Policy Windows
rI Why do some issues appear on the governmental agenda
for action and
.
i n?t
others? ,,:ltho.ugh often taken for granted, the means and mechaby which Issues and concerns are recognized as candidates for
! government action are by no means simple. Some demands for govern)ment resolution of some public problems come from international and
I domestic actors, whereas others are initiated by the governments themI selves. These issues originate in a variety of ways and must undergo
\complex pr?cesses ~efore they are seriously co?~idered for resolution.
\1Agen~a-se~!!!!&,
the first and perhaps the most cntical stage of the policy
cycle, is-concerned with these processes.
I
~()hIlI<il1gdon,in his path-breaking inquiry on the subject in the early
1980s, provided the .fQ.l1owing
concise definition of this stage:.
'.
! msms
as I conceive of i( is the list of subjects or problems to
which governmental officials, and people .outside of government
closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious
attention at any given time. . . . Out of the set of all conceivable
subjects or problems to which officials could be paying attention,
they do in fact seriously attend to some rather than others. So the
agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable'subjects to
the set that actually becomes the focus of attention. (Kingdon,
1984: 3-4)
\ I~da,
What happens at this early stage has a decisive impae;ton the entire
policy process and its outcomes. The maniler an<:iform in whichpfobl€Jhsarerecognized, if they are recognized at all, are important determin~t~~fl:l0':Vth.ey will ultimately. beaddr~sse<:i .by_pQIicy~makers; As
Cobb an-aElder (i912: 12) put it:
Pre-political, or at least pre-decisional processes often play the most
critical role in determining what issues and alternatives are to be
considered by the polity and the probable choices that will be
121
made. What happens in the decision-making councils of the formal
institutions of government may do little more than recognize, document and legalize, if not legitimize, the momentary results of a continuing struggle of forces in the larger social matrix,
At its most,~~, a~~_nda-settin8is about the r~co.gnitiOI).
of a problem \
on the Part of the government.' How a problelTIcQmesJo be.interpreted \
as a public problem requiring government .action raises deeper questions .~
~
the nature of human knowledge and the social construction of that
kiiowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Holzner and Marx, 1979), and
the"'pJ)li'cysc:!~!lC_~~Jjter.e.tuIe
has gone through significant c):1angesin its
understanding of what constitutes a public problem. Early works
assumed that pI.oblems.had an 'ot>i~,ctiYE(existencewaiting to be 'recognized' by governments. !J:.at~r.~2rksbegan to acknowledge that problem
recognition is yeIT:}Iltl~hasociallY-Cons1ructedprocess. It involves defi- .
nitions of normalcy and what constitutes an undesirable deviation from
that status.'~e)1ce, J'roblemr~cognition is not a simple mechanical proJ
cess, but' a -Sociologicalone in which the 'frames' within which governme?ts o:Qerate and think are of critical significance (Goffman, 1974;
Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Schon and Rein, 1994).
In.this view, the 'problems' that are the subject of agenda-setting are
consIdered to be constructed in the realm of public and private discourse
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1981; Holzner and
Marx, 1979; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993; Spector and Kitsuse, 1987). As
Murray Edelman (1988: 12-13) has argued:
. Problems come into discourse and therefore into' existence as reinforcements of ideologies; not simply because they are there or
b~cause they are important for well-being. They signify who are
virtuous and useful and who are dangerous and inadequate, which
actions will be rewarded and which penalized. They constitute people as subjects with particular kinds of aspirations, self-concepts,
and fears, and they create beliefs about the relative importance of
events and objects. They are critical in determining who exercise
authority and who accept it. They construct areas of immunity
from concern because those areas are not seen as problems. like
leaders and enemie~, they define the contours of the social world,
not in the same way for everyone, but in the light of the diverse situations from which people respond to the political spectacle.
~hese frames, ?f course, are not always widely, or as strongly, held by.
all Important policy actors, meaning that the age.nda:se.tting process is
very often one in which there is a clash of frames. (Bleich, 2002). The res-
j
~1':;~ti~~-t~~o~i~~~~-ilil!t~1~g~~~:. ~~ ~:ri~:i~~~e a~~::st~U:}~:~1 ~
(Surel, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1992; Steinberg, 1998). In its original
122
J..
PART III
The Public
Policy
I
Process
formulation by the French social philosopher Michel Foucault (1972), the
notion ofa political disc.ourse was set out as a tool for understanding the
historical evolution of society. The task of historical analysis, and social
theory in general, was to understand the nature of the origin and evolution of discursive formations over time, and to situate current discourses
into this overall conception of history.\FrO!!1thi.~_.Q_~!"SIJ~t::.ti.Ye>-the
idea
that agenda-setting is a process in whichpoUcy:mak.ePLreact to objective
conditions in a rational manner is deceptive, if not completely misleading.Rather, policy-makers are involved in the same discourses as the
public and in the manipulation of the signs, sets, ancl. scenes of a political
play or theatre. According to the script of these ideological discourses,
different groups of policy actors are involved, and different outcomes
prescribed, in the agenda-setting process (Muntigl, 2002) .
. In this view, then, t.he..agenaa of· politics_oLpolicy~makiI1g. is .created
opt oLthehistory,traditions,
atti_tl.:l4~s,aIl~ beli~fs_()LapJ~Qpleencapsulatedalldcodified
in Jheterms
of its political discourse (Jenson, 1991;
Stark, 1992). Symbols and statistics;bofllreaIaniffaoncated,
are used to
back up one's preferred understanding of the causes' of the problem.
AnciE:!IlLclUdc;oI1t~:rJ:lPQr.a.ry
$ymbols are discovered or created to make
one's case. Convenient statistics are put together to bolster that case. In
these statistics, as policy-makers know all too well, one finds what one
looks for.
I HenCe,
to understand
agenda-setting we must comprehend
how
demands for a policy are made by individuals and/or groups and
responded to by government, and vice versa. In addition, the conditions
must be understood under which these demands emerge. and are. articu- .lated in prevailing policy discourses (Spector- and Kitsuse, 1987: 75-6).
Towards this end, we need to understand the material interests of social
and state actors as well as the institutional and ideological contexts in
which they operate (Thompson, 1990).
In order to understand this complex interplay at the agenda-setting
stage of the policy process, students of policy-making over the years have
developed
several different theoretical
models of agenda-setting
behaviour. These have ranged from simple one-way models in which
governments are seen as responding in a quasi-automatic
fashion to
large-scale changes in society, to those in which the relationship between
the state and social actors is seen to be much more dialectical or interrelated in nature.
<Mast ,.early,wo!iks .c,oo.ilie.s.uj)}ecLof .,agenda"setting began with the
assumption that socio-economic conditions led to the emergen{;€ of.p~ticular sets of problems to which governmentseventuallyr.esporu;ledJna
lagged, causal fashion. These include models based on the~~ea that the
Agenda-Setting
123
issues facing all modern governments are converging towards the same
set; that the interplay of economic and political cycles affect the nature of
. issues that attain agenda status; that these same issues are determined
by swings in public mood or sentiment; and that a more specific pattern
of swings in government attention is a feature of agenda-setting in modern democracies. Each of these early models will be discussed in turn.
Economic and Technological Determinism:
The Convergence Theses
Thei4ea that public policy problems and issues originate in the level of
'development' of a society, and that particular sets of problems are common to states at similar levels of development, was first broached by
early observers of comparative public policy-making. By the mid-1960s
Thomas Dye and others in the United States had concluded that cultural,
political, and other factors were less significant for explaining the mix of
public policies found in different jurisdictions than were factors related
to the level of economic development of the society in question. In his
study of policy development a( the state level in the US, for example, Ira
Sharkansky concluded that 'high levels of economic development-measured by such variables as per cent urban per capita income, median
educational level and industrial employment-are
generally associated
with high levels of expenditure and service outputs in the fields of education, welfare and health: This conclusion led him to argue that 'political characteristics long thought to affect policy-voter
participation, the
strength of each major .party.the degree oUnter-party competition, and
the equity of legislative apportionment~have
little influence which is
.independent of economic development' (Sharkansky, 1971).
This observation about the nature of public policy formation in the
American states was soon expanded to the field of comparative public
policy dealing with the different mixes of public policies found between
and across nations. Authors such as Harold Wilensky (1975), Philip
Cutright (1965), Henry Aaron (1967), and Frederick Pryor (1968) all
developed the idea that the Structure of a nation's economy determined
the types of public policies its government would adopt. In its extreme
form, this line of analysis led to the emergence of the convergence thesis.
The convergence thesis suggests that as countries industrialize, they
tend to converge towards the same policy mix (Bennett, 1991; Kerr,
1983). The emergence of similar welfare states in industrialized countries, its proponents argue, is a direct result of their similar levels of economic wealth and technological development. Although early scholars
indicated only a positive correlation between welfare policies and economic development, this relationship assumed causal status in the works
of some later scholars. In this 'strong' view, high levels of economic
development and wealth created similar problems and opportunities,
124
PART III
The Public Policy Process
which were dealt with in broadly the same manner in different countries,
regardless of the differences in their social or political structures.
Wilensky, for example, noted that 'social security effort', defined' as
the percentage of a nation's GNP devoted to social security expenditures,
varied positively with high levels of five key socio-economic and political
variables. In a comparative study of 60 countries, he found that 83 per
cent of the variance in levels of social security effort could be explained
by examining differences in the age of the social security systems, the.
age of the population, the level of economic development defined in
terms of GNP per capita, and whether the state was 'totalitarian' or liberal
democratic (Wilensky, 1975: 658-9). He found that the strongest correlation was between social security effort and the level of GNP per capita, a
correlation leading him to argue that economic criteria were more significant than political ones in understanding why those public policies had
emerged.' As he explained it, 'economic. growth makes countries with
contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy
for constructing the floor below which no one sinks' (ibid.).
i,\ IIlthis view, agendacsetting is thus a virtually automatic process
occurring as a result of the stresses and strains placed on governments
by industrialization and economic modernization. It mattered little, for
example, whether issues were actually generated by social actors and
placed on government agendas, or whether states and"state officials took
the lead in policy development. What was instead significant was the
fact that similar policies emerged in different countries irrespective of the
differences in their social and political structures.
. The convergence thesis- was-.quickly-disputedbY ..l::J,:igc:~·whoargued
that it oversimplified the process. of policy development andTnaccurate1y
portrayed the nature of the actual welfare policies found in different
jurisdictions, policies characterized by significant divergence as well as
convergence (Heidenheimer et al., 1975).'~!vv_ClsI}Q!.~d,for
example, that
in comparative studies of policy development in the American states,
economic measures explained over one-half of the interstate variations in
policies in only 4 per cent of the policy sectors examined. ~cond, the
definition of 'political factors' used by investigators was reStrlcted to
such things as voter turnout, party strength, and equity of legislative
apportionment and did not include such obvious factors affecting program development as tax effort or the nature of intergovernmental
grants, both significant factors in the US federal system. ~
it was
intimated that the desire to· make a strong economic argument had led
investigators to'overlook the manner in which economic factors varied in
significance over time and by issue area (Sharkansky, 1971).
'Similar criticisms were made against the more broadly cross-national
compansClriiCThe"ineasuresused by Wilensky and others were criticized
for failing to capture the nUItlerous different dimensions of social welfare
programs (Miller, 1976). Instead of focusing on welfare efforts, which is a
Agenda-Setting
125
measure of expenditure on social security as a percentage of GDP, it was
argued that analysts needed to consider all the ways in which the state
affects income distribution in society (Korpi, 1983). This broader
approach was said to reveal a great deal of divergence in the social policies of similarly industrialized countries. It was suggested that subtle but
significant differences in social welfare policies-such as whether bene- .
fits were geared to wage levels or guaranteed basic incomes-were
glossed over in the analyses arguing for convergence (Esping-Andersen,
1990; Ramesh, 2000; Boychuk, 1997). Others argue<ithat the issue was
not simply social security effort, but the overall level of public expenditures in different countries, a phenomenon felt to be inextricably linked
to partisan politicar factors and the ideological complexion of the government in power (Castles,and McKinlay, 1979; Castles, 1982; Hibbs, 1977;
King, 1981;von Beyme, 1984).
I
Interplay of Politics and Economics: Political Business Cycles
In the mid~19.I?Os,a second explgnation_o.Lagenda-setting emerged that
was less deterministic and tlfai treated politicaI -anaeconomtc factors as
an integral whole. It argued that industrialization cr:~at~s a needior
social security (because of aging of the population and urbanization) as
well as the economic, resowces (because of increases in productivity) to
address this need. It also creates a working class with a need for social
security and the political resources (because of the number of voters who
belong to this class) to exert pressure on the state to meet its needs. The
ideology ef the.government in pewer-and-the-politicaHhreats it faces an: also 'important factors in the extent to which the state meets the demand
for social welfare. While some issues, such as the role of iIiternational
economic forces in domestic policy formation, were still debated
(Cameron, 1984; Katzenstein, 1985), this view offered a reasonable synthesis of the political-economic explanations of public policy. However, it
remained at a fairly high level of abstraction and was difficult to apply to
specific instances of agenda-setting (see Uusitalo, 1984).
One way that scholars sought to overcome this problem was by reintegrating political and economic variables in a new 'political economy of
public policy' (Hancock, 1983). Here it was argued that both political
and economic factors are important determinants of agenda-setting and
should therefore be studied together, especially insofar as political-economic events can affect the timing of policy initiatives.
One of the most important versions of this line of argument posited
the idea of ~~>
The economy, it was suggested, has I
its own internal dynamics, which on occasion are altered by political '
'interference'. The notion of a political business cycle grew out of the literature on business cycles, which found that the economy grew in fits
and starts according to periodic flurries of investment and consumption
I
126
PART III
Agenda-Setting
behaviour (see Schneider and Frey, 1988; Frey, 1978; Locksley, 1980).
When applied to public policy-making, it was argued that in the modern
era governments often intervened in markets to smooth out fluctuations
in the business cycle. In democratic states, it followed that the nature of
these interventions could be predicted. on the basis of the political ideo1- ogy of the governing party-either pro-state orpro-market-while
the
actual timing of interventions would depend on the proximity to elections. Policies that caused difficulties for the voting public were, according to observers, more likely to be developed when an election did not
loom on the immediate horizon. As Edward Thfte (1978: 71) put it:
Although the synchronization of economic fluctuations with the
electoral cycle often preoccupies political leaders, the real force of
political influence on macroeconomic performance comes in the
determination of economic priorities. Here the ideology and platform of the political party in power dominate. Just as the electoral
calendar helps set the timing of policy, so the ideology of political
leaders shapes the substance of economic policy.
i
While few disagreed that partisan ideology could have an impact on
the economy, this approach was critici?:~dfor its limited application to
countries, such as the United States, where electoral cycles were fixed. In
many other countries, the timing of elections is indeterminate and
depends on events in parliaments or other branches of government, and
detailed calculations of policy timing are much more difficult if not
impossible for governments to make (Foot, 1979; Johnstori, 1986). It was
also argued. that .the concept. of.the business cycle itselLwas Jundamentally flawed and that the model simply pointed. out the interdependence
of politics and economics already acknowledged by most analysts (see
McCallum, 1978; Nordhaus, 1975; Schneider and Frey, 1988; Boddy and
Crotty, 1975).
Ideas and Ideology: Policy Paradigms and Policy Moods
Political-economic explanations were an improvement in studies hoping
to identify policy determinants and helped underscore the contingent
nature of agenda-setting and issue recognition. However, they did little to
identify the actual content of policy initiatives. Problems with these early
'materialist' explanations of why governments dealt with certain social
problems andnot others led in the 198Q$Jo stu,cf.iesthatfocused on the
effects of social and political'ideas in definingJh~ ~orts'of problems with
which governments werepreocc4pied (KiIlg 1973).
It' had long been noted, of course, that the ideas in.dividuals hold on
-an' eriauring'basishave'a "signific~t'lfflect -'art theae'Cisions they make.
Although efforts have been made by economists, psychologists, and others to reduce these sets of ideas to a rational calculation of self-interest, it
j
12 7
is apparent that traditions, beliefs, and attitudes about the world and
society affect how individuals interpret their interests (Flathman, 1966).
These sets of ideas or ideologies, therefore, can be construed to have a
significant impact on public policy-making, for it is through these
ideational prisms that individuals conceive of social or other problems
that inspire their demands for government action and through which
they construct various proposed solutions to these problems (Chadwick,
2000; George, 1969).
'
However, it must be appreciated that there are different types of ideas
and their effects on policy-making, and especially agenda-setting, vary
quite dramatically. As [email protected]) have noted, at
leasttlu:~gtypes of id.~S,Me-rele¥:ant1Q_p.Qlj.CY:
IJUQrl!Lviews, 'principled
.licliiis.. and[ca.li$aTideas (see Braun, 1999; Campbell, 19(8). These basic
sets of ideas can InTIuence policy-making by serving as '[oad!!1_~p_s:
for
action, by affecting the strategic interactions that take place between policy actors, and, once institutionalized, by constraining the nature of policy options.
[World views or ideologies, of course, had long been recognized as
helping people make sense of complex realities by identifying, among
other things, key actors in political processes and their motivations.
These sets of ideas, however, tend to be very diffuse and do not necessarily translate easily into specific views on specific policy problems.
While scholars recognized that the general/ppljcy mood or policy sentiment found in a jurisdiction could be an important componeiit of its poltey system, linking, for example, the election of representatives of a
certain political persuasion te· key offices-in a democratic polity (Durr,
1993; Stimson, 1991; Stimson et al., 1995; Lewis-Beck, ,1988; Suzuki,
1992; Adams, 1997), this link to agenda-setting remained quite indirect
($tevenson, 2001; Elliott and Ewoh, 2000).
principled beliefs andeausalstories, on the other hand, can exercise a
much more direct influence on policy problem recognition and policy
content. In the policy realm, this notion of ideas creating claims or
demands on governments was taken up by Frank Fischer and John
Forester (1993) and Paul Sabatier (1987, 1988), among others (see
George, 1969). The concept of causal stories, in particular, has been
applied to agenda-setting by Deborah Stone (1988, 1989). In Stone's
view, agenda-setting 'usually involves constructing a 'story' of what
caused the policy problem in question. As she has argued:
C:ausal..theories., if they are successful, do more than convincingly
demonstrate the possibility of human control over bad conditions.
'f-j.rS1J
they can either challenge or protect an existing social order.
S~~ond, by identifying causal agents, they can assign responsibility
to particular political actors so that someone will have to stop an
activity, do it differently, compensate its victims, or possibly face
128
PART III
The Public
Policy
Process
Agenda-Setting
punishment. ,lrlti~ciJ they can legitimate and empower particular
actors as 'fixers' of the problem. And fourth, they can create new
political alliances among people who are shown to stand in the
same victim relationship to the causal agent. (Stone, 1989: 295)
In his work on policy change in Britain, feter~Hall referred to principled
belief structures and causal ideas as constituting aLRolicyparadiE!!J:, and
stressed its significance at all stages of the policy process, including
agenda-setting. As Hall (1990: 59) has argued, a policy paradigm establishes:
j
the broad goals behind policy, the related problems or puzzles that
policy-makers have to solve to get there, and, in large measure, the
kind of instruments that can be used to attain these goals. Uke a
gestalt, this framework is all the more powerful because it is largely
taken for granted and rarely subject to scrutiny as a whole. It seems
likely that policy-makers in all fields are guided by some such
paradigm, even though the complexity and coherence of the
parad~gm may vary considerably across fields.
. !How-liWer.•.the influencuf
causal ideas and beliefs is not automatic.
Wijh9JJghJig_!I!~~~hQI~Lil!'8!1f..dthat sOiIleideas simply become fashion~ able at specific points in time, as 'ideas whose time has come' (Igngdon,
1984; Jacobsen, 1995), oth.-ers.-houre..noted that this process in fact is a
complex one that requires successfully linking ideas to actors in the policy process and overcoming resistance of established actors to new ideas
(Drezner, 2000; Legro; 2000). ,As Hansen and King (2001) have argued:
!
!.
I
jdeas are more likely to b~-anslated
into policy under..thr:ee...mndi,lli>ns: when there is ~ergyJ2~aF'anthnterests,
when
'.the. actors Pos~J~.~Uhe,.re.q.uisite.enJhttsias-m,-anQiI!§tiMiQ.[l~l.position, aodwlleil tinlingc()ntriplltesto
a brQa.d_cons1ellatiQIloJ.preterences that reinforce theseideas;'iatnei'than
detracting from them.
~~'
'That is, while ideas are an important independent variable in policymakitig, the links between ideas and interests, between ideas and actors,
or between ideas and circumstances are-p.aramount in understanding
~!leir e!fect-Gn·agenda~~ttiIlgp'e_havjour
(Blyth, '1997).
Interest Groups and the Media: The Issue-Attention
Cycle
i The need to characterize more accurately the sets of actors and ideas
\involved in agenda-setting drove other studies of this stage of the policy
I cycle. Many of the early works on the subject were American and were
deeply imbued with the pluralist sentiments prevalent in mainstream
! American
political science of earlier eras, and consequently focused on
interest groups and the role played by those groups in creating 'pressure'
129
on governments to consider certain policy actions. Thus, for example, in
their classic work on the subject, Cobb, Ross, and Ross defined agenda- \
setting as 'the process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public
officials' (Cobb et ai., 1976: 126).
However, not all authors and studies focused on the role of interest o~
pressure groups, per se, in fO,clising government attention on certain\
issues. In the area of communications
studies, for example, studies!
attributing a central role to fuemedialrr'framtng' public debate and dis-'
cussion were common (McCombs? 1981). Such studies usually examined
the linkages between media' coverage of issues and its impact on public
opinion in democratic polities, arguing that this linkage would spur governments to act on specific issues framed by the media as 'actionable',
that is, as resolvable by government activity (Nelson and Oxley, 1999;
Bosso, 1989).
As was discussed in Chapter 3, one very influential.earLYlnodel of the
agenda-settingIH".ocess._was developed by the British scholar Anthony,
Rl:)~.E~)n tl!~--!2~Q.~!.based on this kind of analysis. In Downs's view,
public policy-making in many areas of social life tended to revolve
around specific issues that momentarily captured public attention, resulting in demands for government action. These problems would soon fade
from view as the complexity or intractability of the problem became
apparent to members of the public. As he put it:
Public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon anyone
, do.mes~c.~s~ueJor_v.ery 10Il:~::-:-~vel1}f
i.tillvolyes a cl?.IltiIluing problem of crucial iIJJ,ponan,ce to society. Instead, a systematic issueattention cycle seeins strongly to influence public attitudes and
behaviour concerning most key domestic problems. Each of these
problems suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short
time, and then~though
still largely unresolved~gradually
fades
from the center of public attention. (Downs, 1972: 38) ,
In a democracy, where politicians ignore public demands at their peril,
Downs argued, waxing and waning public attention would result in a
characteristic cyclical pattern of agenda-setting and public policy-making: \theissue=attennoncycle"
This idea of a systematic pattern of agenda-setting gained a great deal of '
attention in subsequent years and Downs'-s-worl<js one of the most often
<Qtedin the.agenda-settingJiterature.
Nevertheless, hi;' 'original hypothesis
was rather vague. It was not clear, for example, whether this cycle was
expected to apply to 'most key domestic problems', as the above quotation
:~;~~~~:~~:;:
~o ~s :=e~~~:2.r:~~~:~t:~~}:~s~;b~.,~~~.
sugIn that article, Downs noted that not all problems would follow the
same kind of cycle. The problems most likely to be affected by the issue-
I~
130
PARTIII
Agenda-Setting
'attentionsyndrome, he argued, were only those that shar~~asic
~haracteristics. ~r~t,)he~ us?ally were problems that adversely affected
a minority of the populatlon'l~ec:QIld!these problems usually were generated as the side effects of arrangements that benefited the majority of the
population. !TlIirdJ the problems were capable of generating 'dramatic'
moments, bUt not sustained periods, of media attention. Together these
three characteristics would ensure that:
I
most people will not be continually reminded of the problem by
their own suffering from it ... solving the problem requires sustained attention and effort, plus fundamental changes in social
'institutions and behaviour; ... the media's sustained focus on this
problem soon bores a majority of the public. (Ibid., 42)
' This discussion, of course, suggests that other types. of agenda-setting
\,behaviour would be expected whenever a problem falls to meet any of
ithese three conditions. That is, numerous problems exist that have, at
minimum, one of the following characteristics: (1) the problem directly
affects the majority of the population; (2) the problem is simple to understand and resolve; and/or (3) the problem, at some point in time, could
generate continuing, sustained, 'dramatic' media coverage. Downs did
not elaborate on these types of issues, however, or on the likely typical
patterns of policy developmeIit and change, if any, that might characterize them (Howlett, 1997a).
\ Despite its frequent citation in the policy literature over the past three
decades, the idea of Downsian-type issue-attention cycles has rarely been
made an
\ subject to empirical,evaluation.l~~qHggwood
efforttooperationalizetheirQY'lItJlerS:tQILOLDoWUS:S-cyele;
attempting to
assess the relationship between waves of public interest as measured in
Gallup polls and periodic waves of organizational change or institutionbuilding in the US federal government. Although they found evidence of
major periods of administrative consolidation and change over the
course of recent US history, they noted that only seven of 12 instances of
administrative reorganization met the expectations of' the Downsian
model. That is, they exhibited such changes during the same decade as
the peak of public interest as measured by Gallup survey questions. In
another four, however, changes occurred in the decade following peak
public interest, while in one area-social welfare policy-change
occurred prior to peak public interest. The, evidence was even weaker
when organizational initiations were examined. They found only four
organizational initiations coincided with the same decade as peak public
'.i'intere5t",lWhiie,,,four:':()ccur:redin'the'following
decade and three,,,economicJ)Olic¥.•Jlousing, ,.,andsocial welfare-occurred prior to peak
public interest (Peters and Hogwood, 1985b: 250).
On the basis of these results, Peters and Hogwood offered only partial
support for Downs's hypothesis. As they argued: 'Our evidence supports
131
Downs' contention that problems which have been' through the issueattention cycle will receive a higher level of attention after rather than
before the peak' (ibid., 251). However, ~ey were also careful to note that
there appeared to be at least two patterns or cycles at work in the issueattention process in addition to what Downs first identified. In the first
type, cycles were initiated by external or exogenous events such as war
or an energy crisis and then were mediated by public attention. In this
type of 'crisis' cycle, the problem would not 'fade away' as Downs
hypothesized. In the second type of 'political' cycle, issue initiation originated in the political leadership and then, too, was mediated by public
att~ntion (ibid., 252; see also Hogwood, 1992).
1NhilE!~tudi~_§:t!Ehas Jhat by Downs were useful in adding the systematic evaluation of the role of policy actors into discussions of agendasetting, they tE!nde~to_i.8Q.<:J.r:~.pr
downplay. t!J.i!.
LQI.e
...<:J.Lthe_s!ate,jIL
this
:p!<?~~_s(Sharp, 1994b; Yishai, -1993). Forexample, they failed to note
how officially scheduled political events, such as annual budgets,
speeches from the throne, or presidential press conferences, could spark
media attention, reversing the causal linkages originally attributed to
these actors in the agenda-setting process (Cook et al., 1983; Howlett,
1997; Erbring and Goldenberg, 1980; Flemming et aI., 1999). Empirical i
evidence gathered in many other case studies revealed that critical!
dimensions of interest group success and failure in gaining agendal
access tended to be linked to state institutional structures and the avail-\
ability of access points, orj1:Jolicyv~ue~~ from which these groups could
access government officials ana decision-makers (Baumgartner and
Jones, 1993; Boockmann, 1995;PFOSS,1992);-
J
~9ne of these_early.appro_ac~~sgenera.!elim9d_~s_QrlheQtiesofag~nda- 'I i
setting·that withstood testiI1ggUdexamination. At best they provided I
some linkages between the emergence of certain general types of issues
on policy agendas and certain sets of general social, political, and economi<;:variables. The problems associated with each of the early efforts
to identify a single cause or factor driving public policy agenda-setting(
led to the dev:loPlllept of more, compleX>Plllltiy~rt~t~__
!I!Q~~l§,.which\
attempted .sY~fematicallY-,1QcQml;>iIl.£~()I!1E!QLthe..central'laf.iatJ-les.jni
-I
ti~ly ident.!fie~ in these early studies into a more accurate theory of ':
agenda-setting.
~.
..•.
".,
The Funnel of Causality
, In the 1970s Anthony King (1973) in Great Britain, Richard Hofferbert
(1974) in the United States, and Richard Simeon, (1976a) in Canada
each developed models that sought to capture the general relationships
132
PART III
jexisting among interests, institutions, ideas, politics, and economic conditions in the process of agenda-setting. These models were ?as:d on ~e
notion that the vari~bl~s existed within a /t!rj].rlf!l~E!:~S!!~y!j
m which
\,each was 'nested' wIthin another.
\ The funnel-of-causality approach reviewed and synthesiz,ed much of
the existing literature on agenda-setting. Rather than viewing material,
ideational, institutional, and actor-related variables as dichotomous or.
zero-sum, this approach argued that all these factors are involved in the
creation and recognition of social or policy problems. More specifically, a
series of causal variables were identified, including those related to the
socio-economic and physical environment, the distribution of power in
society, the prevailing ideas and ideologies, the institutional frameworks
of government, and the process of decision-making within governments
(King, 1973). Hofferbert and Simeon suggested that these variables were
intertwined in a nested pattern of mutual interaction in which policymaking occurs within institutions, institutions exist within prevailing sets
of ideas and ideologies, ideologies within relations of power in society,
and relations of power within a larger social and material environment.
This synthetic model helped delineate the relations existing between
the multiple material and ideational variables identified in previous
studies without bogging down in attempts to specify their exact relationship or causal significance. Wh!!ethiajSJ)J.~_!TI0del'sj\I'.~~t~~!_s!J:E:!Il~}1,
~QY'l~_~r,-jtJs..-al~Q_
it~~atest
weakness-=-V=:a:Itr~e
it
allows some discussion between alterilate viewpoints to take place,
while leaving it to empirical studies to determine the exact relationship
between' the central variables. Ilt- is-also· a ~es~
though, because it
does little toexpiainthe differ~ces--foiilid in specific cases according to
the actual causative agent at work. }Vhyone issue might be influenced
by ideas and another, for example; 'by environmental. factors is not
broached, let ~one resolved. §imi.larlY..,-thefunnel-of-causality model
says very little about how multiply-mediated general forces such as the
environmental context, ideas, and economic interests are actually manifested by policy actors in the agenda-setting process (Mazmanian and
Sabatier, 1980).
l
Agenda-Setting Patterns
A ~~n
agenda-setting studies occurred in the early
1970s when scholars such as c:;obbJoss. ~d~Jl~.~~Q..ciateJidiiL:r.eI}.L
. \ mncar.Q.genda..::-~~ting
patterns or 'styl~f wlth diff~~~.!l!W~S_Qtp-ol~
1
Agenda-Setting
munity as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the
legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority' (Cobb and
~~~;e::
:~~:~~~~.
~; e~.:
C1
~~b~
;eal.s.
°th. . a:.:.~a.so.f.O.c~.e~.i,S~~S~~:~s~~I.
..~!'...alJ.y
thousanl~~Q.LisS-u.es...tllat_3()}J).e_j;jt1z~S_!!~d_
t9.ne.matters of •
~oncern an..AwQW~L)J.ay:e!he
gov~rnII1ent~osornething about.
.'
"~owever, only a small proportion of the problems on the systemic or!
informal agenda are taken up by the government for s~rious considera- 'i
tion. Only once a government has accepted that something needs to be,
done about a problem can the issue be said to have entered the institu- :
tional agenda. These are issues to which the government has agreed to
give serious attention. In other words, the public agenda is an agenda for
discussion while the institutional agenda is an agenda for action, indicating that the .policy process dealing with the problem in question has
begun.
Cobb, Ross, and Ross identified four major phases of agenda-setting
that occur as issues moved between the systemic and institutional agendas.Ig;§J!gs...are-fusti-nffiated,~~ir~()l1JtiQn_:L~.!:
sp~9.fied,~lljlportfor the
is.s.ue...i5.-~n4.~, and 'g_!ll.1c.cessfui;-the-i-ss.lli'~Tl:t~rs
the institutional
i!8~_da (Cobb et al., 1976: 127).1 In earlier studies,-willcfi--wereiriflu- \
enced--strongly by pluralism, public problems were viewed as always\ .
moving from the systemic to the institutional agenda. However, investigation of actual cases of agenda-building revealed difficulties with such a
conception, and Cobb and his colleagues developed several different
models of agenda-setting to describe how issues actually moved from
society to state or from state to"thesaciety 'as-they proceeded onto the
official-agenda.
Cobb, Ross, and Ross first developed these different models after having undertaken studies of the agenda-setting process in different countries. According to them, there were tQ!~~J?~~i~-.£.~:t!~I1lS
or models, of I
ag~:nda-setting:the outside initiation model, the mobilization model, and \
the iiisilleTrlitiation model, each associated with a particular type of
political regime. They identified lth:~QJJ.tsig~iTl:~t!:E:..tionJ1lQd.elwith liberal ;\
plura1j.stsocieties. In this model, 'issues arise in nongovernmental groups
and are then expanded sufficiently to reach, first, the public. [systemic]
agenda and, finally, tile formal [institutional] agenda.' In this model the
key role is played by social groups. Issues are initiated when a group
articulates a grievance and demands its resolution by the government.
Those same groups attempt to expand support for their demand, a process that may involve submerging the specific complaint within a more
general one and the formation of alliances across groups. Finally, these
groups lobby, contest, and join with others in attempting to get the
expanded issue onto the formal agenda. If they have the requisite political resources and skills and can outmanoeuvre their opponents or advocates of other issues and actions, they will succeed in having their issue
~~~=~.Si~!%~~::ddi~;{~T:~~~:~:;;~:'~~~~
whodis.ti-p...guishedbetween! th~~st@ic _qIJI}f9.Il!l:<l.U?~?!~.~~~.d.a
and
\th:eJrrsti.tlItiQJlaJ or f9J]!!.~!_~t~t~~;nd.Q.The systemic agenda '~?nsists of
all issues that are commonly perceIved by members of the pohtical com-
133
enter the formal agenda. Thus, as Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976: 132) summarize it:
The outside initiative model applies to the situation in which a
group outside the government structure 1) articulates a grievance,
2) tries to expand interest in the issue to enough other groups in
the population to gain a place on the public agenda, in order to 3)
create sufficient pressure on decision makers to force the issue onto
the formal agenda for their serious consideration.
Successful entrance onto the formal agenda does not necessarily mean a
favourable government decision will ultimately result. It simply means
that the item has been singled out from among a mass of others for more
detailed consideration.
: [hemOlJilizationTTlQdel
is quite different and was attributed' by Cobb,
Ross, and Ross to 'totalitarian' regimes. This model describes 'decisionmakers trying to expand an issue from a formal [institutional] to a public
[systemic] agenda' (ibid.). In the mobilization model, issues are simply
placed on the formal agenda by the government with no necessary preliminary expansion from a publicly.recognized grievance. There may be
considerable debate Within government over the issue, but the public
may well be kept in the dark about the policy and its development until
its formal announcement. The policy maybe specified in some detail or
it may establish only general principles whose specification Will be
worked out later. Expansion of support for the new policy is important,
however, as successful implementation depends on a favourable public
reaction to the polity. Towards this' end~-government leMers 'hold meet·
ings and engage iripublicrelations campaigns aimed a'tmobiliiing public support for their decisions. As the authors put it, 'The mobilization
model describes the process of agenda building in situations where politicalleaders initiate a policy but require the support of the mass public for
its implementation ... the crucial problem is to move the issue from the
formal agenda to the public agenda.'
i In the inside initiati.()r1. 7T/.Qdel,
influential groups with special access to
decision-makers initiate a policy and do not necessarily want it to be
expanded and contested in public. This can be due to technical as well as
political reasons and is a pattern of agenda-setting one would expect to
find in corporatist regimes. In this model, initiation and specification
occur simultaneously as a group or government agency enunciates a
grievance and specifies some potential solution to the problem. Expansion is restricted tospecialized,groups or agencies with some knowledge
or interestln the 5ubjec:CEntrance on the agendaisV1rtually automatic
..due t6~the"ptivtleged''Pta'ce' of those"'desiring'a "decision. According to
Cobb, Ross, and Ross:
Proposals arise Within governmental units or in groups close to the
government. The issue is then expanded to identification and attention groups in order to"create sufficient pressure on decision makers
to place the item on the formal agenda. At no point is the public
greatly involved, and the initiators make no effort to get the issue on
the public agenda. On the contrary, they try to keep it off. (Ibid., 136)
/ ThiLUneQf analysis identifies several typical patterns or styles of
~geiid~-setting~-Whlleit does soon the basis of an (unstated) notion of a
relatively crude policy subsystem-one in which state and societal actors
are clearly separated-the most important variable in this analysis is
regime type. That is, in this mogel the type of agenda-setting process I
likely to be found in any sector is ultiInalelyciet~I:J:!lined!Jy the_general "
nature of the political system; outside initiation is argue-crtobe typical of I
llbefaIaemocraCi{;, m.obilization·typical of one-party states, and inside
inipation typical of authoritarian bureaucratic regimes.
.iH()\Vever,itwassoon recogIlized that the~e d!ffeLelJ,t~1Yt~~_gfag~nda-:
,setting vaiiea~i1onbmijdifiYiegllne-~s_~ys~c~or'. as examples of each,.:
type of agenda-setting behaviour-could be found within each regime'
type. This led to additional studies attempting to be more specific about
exactly what processes were followed within political regimes, especially
complex democratic polities like the United States.
Policy Windows and Policy Streams
[1~~:_~~~Q§,_!_qllllKingg.Q.p
.. (1984). developed a sophisticated app~oac~1i
-to -agenda-settingbased on his detaIled study ,of agenda proce.sses lD tb~ Ii
US federal legislative system. His model deals with the question of stat~{
and non-state. influences on agenda-setting by focusing on the role
played by policy entrepreneurs both inside and outside of government in
taking. advantage of agenda-setting opportunities~~licy. wi~d9WS\-to
move Items onto formal government agendas. It suggests that the characteristics of issues combine with the characteristics of political institutions
and circumstances, and the development of policy solutions, in a fashion
that. can lea.d to the opening and closing of windows of opportunity for
agenda entrance. Such opportunities can be seized upon or not, as the
case may be, by poli0' entrepreneurs who are able to recognize and act
on them.
In Kingdon's study of agenda-setting in the pnited States, t):lreeset§oH
yariables-~!!~~~S?! 1?J,:Q1:>l.ems,
[>QU!;k~,and \J2oli_!ic~-aresalaTo inter- \
act. the problem stTJ!a.mJ.~ff;rsto the perceptions of problems as public
problems reqUiring government action and past government efforts to
resolve them. People come to see a condition as a 'problem' with reference to their conception of some desired state of affairs. In Kingdon's
136
PART III
Agenda-Setting
view problems typically come to the attention of policy-makers either
because of sudden events, such as crises, or through feedback from the
operation of existing programs (ibid., 2o).LrJ].~poliC}L..sm~~TTl.consists of
experts and analysts examining problems and proposing solutions to
them. In this stream, the various possibilities are explored and narrowed
down. Finally, :the political streq.JTI. 'is composed of such factors as swings
of national mood;-· adIDIni~trative or legislative turnover, and interest
group pressure campaigns' (ibid., 21). In.~iqgdoIl's~~"Y,
these!hree
streams operate on diffE!rent paths an.d.p_ursue-coursesmor-e.orlessjndependent of one another until at speciftc.poJnts intime->_Orpolicy windows, their paths intersect.'
-.
- TiitIienghfdicll.mstances,
policy windows can be seized upon by key
players in the political process to gain entrance for particular issues. Policy entrepreneurs play the chief role in this process by linking or 'coupling' policy solutions and policy problems together with political
opportunities (ibid., chs 7-8). As Kingdon argues, 'The separate streams
of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times.
Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to
favourable political forces.' At that point an item enters the official (or
institutional) agenda and the public policy process begins.
h . It is important to note, however, that linking the three policy streams
\1!together is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for issue entrance.
IlSomething else is required for these three streams to come together and
secure issue entrance-the
opening of a policy window. Kingdon suggested that while window openings were sometimes governed by certain
fortuitous happenings-including
seemingly- unrelatedextemal
'focusing
events', crises,· or·· accidents; or the· presence or absenee of policy
entrepreneurs both within and outside of governments-at
other times
they were affected by institutionalized events such as periodic elections
or budgetary cycles (Birkland, 1997, 1998). As he argued:
windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream..
. . Policy entrepreneurs, people who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for
prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling
solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solu~
tions to politics. (Kingdon, 1984: 21)
'pjJfe~-typ.es
.. 0Lwindows ..were identified
implicit in his work. As Kingdon stated:
by Kingdon
and are
Sometimes, windows open quite predictably. Legislation comes up
for renewal on schedule, for instance, creating opportunities to
. change, expand or abolish certain programs. At other times, windows open quite unpredictably, as when an airliner crashes or a
13 7
fluky election produces unexpected turno\fer in key decision-makers. Predictable or unpredictable,
open windows are small and
scarce. Opportunities come, but they also pass: Windows do not
stay open long. If a chance is: missed, another must be awaited.
(Ibid., 213)
Ultimately, Kingdon suggested that two principle types of window exist:
th~"':PIQplem' and 'political' windows:
..
.
Basically a window opens because of change in the political stream
(e.g. a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats ... or a shift in national mood); or it opens
because a new problem captures the attention of governmental officials and those close to them. (Ibid., 176)
To this initial distinction Kingdon added the idea that windows would
also vary in terms of their predictability. While arguing that random
events are occasionally significant, he stressed the manner in which
institutionalized windows dominate the US agenda-setting process.2 As
he put it, 'There remains some degree of unpredictability. Yet it would be
a grave mistake to conclude that the processes . . . are essentially random. Some degree of pattern is evident' (ibid., 216). In fact, he argued
that many windows open on a more or less predictable, cyclical, pattern:
'Windows sometimes open with great predictability. Regular cycles of
various kinds open and close windows on a schedule. That schedule
varies in its precision and hence its predictability, but the cyclical nature
... oLmany windows is nonetheles.s e.vident (ibid., 193).
Hence the general model established. by Kingdon suggests the existence of atleastfour
possible window typesbased
on the relationship
betwee.n.the
oligin of . the' window.~political.
or problem-and
their
degree of institutionalization
or routinization. Although Kingdon did not
provide a specific nomenclature to describe the four window types, the
general outline of each type is discernible from an examination of his
work and several of his principal sources.3 Thus, thefour principal window.tYPes are:
• routini:z.ed political win,doUJs,in which institutionalized
procedural
events diCtate predictable window openings;
• disqetionary political windows, in which th.e behaviour of individual
political actors leads to less predictable window openings;
i. spillover problem windows, in which related issues are drawn into an
already open window; and
• random problem windows, in which random events or crises open
unpredictable windows.
These basic types of windows and their relationship
5.1. In this model, the level of institutionalization
are set out in Figure
of a window type
138
PART III
Agenda-Setting
Figure 5.1 A Model of Policy Window Types
139
19~~>_12~1)developed a model that modifies Kingabn's work and helps
explain the typical patterns of agenda-setting behaviour found in
democratic polities. For Baumgartner and Jones, !tlJ.e.'im.,!ge'of a policy
problem\,is signi~cant because of how iUIlfluen!:~smel1).b~rshipin rele--v§tj'-Qg<;f~~~-sy~eIils.Hence,-ilieyargue that:
.-
fo
When they are portrayed as technical problems rather than as
social questions, experts can dominate the decision-making process. When the ethical, social or political implications of such policies assume center stage, a much broader range of participants can
suddenly become involved. (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991: 1047)
determines its frequency of appearance and hence its predictability (Boin
and Otten, 1996; Howlett, 1997b).
Kingd.0n's mOcl~1ha~ 1:J~eIlused to describe and assess the nature of
US foreign polley agenda-setting (Woods and Peake, 1998); the politics of
privatization in Britain, France, and Germany (Zahariadis, 1995; Zahariadis and Allen, 1995); the nature of US domestic anti-drug policy (Sharp,
1994a); the collaborative behaviour of business and environmental
groups in certain anti-pollution initiatives in the US and Europe (Lober,
1997); and· the overall· nature of the reform' processin'-EssternEurope
(Keeler, 1993). While a major improvement on earlier models, however,
it has been criticized. for presenting a view of ,the agenda-setting process
that is too contingent on unforeseen circumstances, ignoring the fact that
in most policy sectors, as Downs had noted, activities tend to occur in
spurts and then congeal for lengthy periods of time. (In other words,
while Kingdon's model provided anexcellent.di~<:.tlSsioriof agenda~!ietting dynamics, it failed to address adequately
brageada, setting stability noted by Cobb and his colleagues (see Dodge and Hood,
th~~:;g:stence
The key element in the process of agenda-setting, Baumgartner and.
Jones argue, revolves around the creation of~CJl-llUlrtOPOlies7' in which'
specific subsystems gain the ability to control the interpretation of a .
problem and thus the manner in which it is conceived and discussed. !
Both governments and members of the public are located in policy subsystems, and the primary relationship upon which Baumgartner and
Jones focus their analysis of US agenda-setting is that between individuals and groups represented in existing subsystems and those who would
like to be. In their model,/su,bsystem members s~ek to alter policy ima~es
through a number of tkctlcs related to altenng the venue of polley
debate, or other aspects of the prevailing policy discourse, and thereby
undermine the complacency or stability of an existing policy subsystem.
IThe strategies adopted by groups, Baumgartner and Jones argue, generWIyfall into two types. fInthe Downsianstrategy, groups can publicize
a problem in order to alter its venue by encoufagmgthe public to tall
upon govemmentstoresolve it (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 88). In a
l_s~Q.Q!l.9_typic~.3~oach,which they term a '.?c:l1att!iclmeider'mobilization, groups involved in the policy subsystem that do not like the policies
being developed or discussed by governments seek to alter the institutional arrangements within which the subsystem operates in order to
expand or contract its membership (ibid., 89).
2002).
Policy Monopoly Models
in the 1990s, beginning from the observation that the process of agendasetting involves both periods of stability and periods of dynamism, schol·.m;''f.trcuse.dw,the 'adi~ifres"of·agerida,:,s-,,~1ting~etors'1n·tryingto
.explain
:ilills;pattem~,:oRarticulM"attention~,~paid.>to·:the":jrOOesses
of discussion,
debate, and persuasion among actors interested in the policy, each actor
presenting a variety of evidence and argument in support of a particular
position (Majone, 1989). On this basis Baumgartner and Jones (1991,
This brief overview of studies into agenda-setting has shown how these
have moved from simple univariate models to more sophisticated ones
linking numerous variables in complex multivariate relationships. It has
also shown how contemporary studies have centred on the elaboration of
a basic set of agenda-setting patterns or styles, revealing much about the
timing of agenda-setting activity and the overall nature of the policy
dynamics that result from it.
Building on earlier univariate studies that focused on the impact on
agenda-setting of such variables as the nature of the economy, the political system, policy-relevant ideas and beliefs, and the activities of central
140
PARTIII
Agenda-Setting
,political actors, currentstudiesh~ve sho~nh.owthese variables. combine
number cifagenda-settinK styles and-h0w- for\~i.toUS.and. ex.pected political eventscan draw-state and soCiaIaIfention
Ito particular issues in fairly predictable ways'.
,
As Cobb, Ross, and Ross first realized, !the most significap.tvarlClbles
related to the identification ..of typical agE!nda~setrtng:-sty1eS
haveta .,.do
with the nature of the actOrsinitiating policy discussions and the manner
in which the government is involved intl}is initiation. Instead of emphasizing the nature of the political regime in determining these patterns,
however, a more fruitful avenue, as Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones
i\. suggested, is to conceptualize the agenda-setting process, interrns of the
i\\interac~ioIl,of the nature of the policy subsysteIIl iIl,v6lY~d,iil'the ..issue
\area WIth.the n~tUI'eof the problem i~self. In this latter dimension; in a
tlemocratlc SOCIetythe level of publIc support for the resolution of a
~roblem is cri~cal (Soroka, 2002)."?ome probleIIls have a."Yide~ranging
Impact on SOCIetyand therefore the demands for their resolution are
likely to be initiated by the public. pthersare of~ignificaIl~eonlY to particular groups, which, depending on the closeness of their relations with
the government of the day, may be able to undertake inside initiation.
Government officials may engage in eitherqIob.Uizatipn 9Iinsid€,initiation, depending on theleveLofptlblic stlPportfor solving the problem in
question: if support is forthcoming, then we are likely to see its COnsolidation; otherwise, the government will have to resort to mobilization.
rhus" the central questiQIlin agenda::~etting is not the type of regime
i~volved, but rather, as both Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones recogmzed,Jl).the.natureof
the policy subsystemjnY-Qlvedwith theprohlem~
which, cieterrttines whether 'the state or societal actors imtiate tlie pro~'
; cess, and (2) the Jevel of public support forit~uesolution (May, 1991).
\ That is, the mode of agenda-setting is determined by the nature of'public
support for the issue and by the nature of the initiating actor(s).4
The three typical patternsidentif:ieci by Cobb, Ross, and Ross fill in
three of the four possible ba~ic agenda-setting styles generated in this
way (see Figure 5.2).
.
i \~?create a relativelysmall
FigureS.2
Models of Agenda-Setting by Policy Type
Nature
I-
~
B.o
.g Q
:g
"0
Societal Actors
State
of Public
Involvement
High
Low
Outside Initiation
Consolidation
Inside Initiation
Mobilization
, SOURCE:
Adapted from Peter J. May,'ReconsideringPolicyDesign:Policiesand
Publics', Journal of Public Policy 11,2 (1991):187-206.
141
iThe four::t .type of agenda-setting, consolidation, occurs when the government Inltlates the process of solving a public problem for which there
is already extensive popular support. In such instances the issue does not
have to be 'initiated', nor does public support have to be 'mobilized'. It is
enough for the state to 'consolidate' the existing support and go ahead
with making policy (Dye, 2001).
'
CONCLUSION
While the exact timing of the emergence of an issue onto the systemic or
formal policy agenda depends, as Kingdon showed, on the existence of a
policy window, the nature of the reception an issue receives, and, as we
shall see in Chapter 6, the types of solutions put forward to it, all of these
aspects of the agenda-setting process depend very much on the nature of
the policy subsystem found in the area concerned. Whether or not sub~ystem me~bers are capable of creating and retaining a monopoly on the
mterpretatIOn and understanding of a policy issue, as Baumgartner and
Jones highlighted in their work, largely determines whether the matching of problems and solutions found in the agenda-setting and subsequent policy formulation stages of the policy process will result in
consideration of the issue within an existing policy paradigm or ill more
novel approaches to the subject (Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Jeon
and Halder-Markel, 2001).
Agenda-setting is not automatic. Policy monopolies not only contro!
how an issue is considered, but also whether or not it is given any coni
sideration at all (David, 2000; Gent, 2000). Many studies in the 1950 and
1960s into problems of race in America, and other studies in the 1970s
and 1980s into such issues as gender discrimination, attest to the fact
that 'non-decisions' or decisions not to consider an issue as a social
problem worthy of action are very typical results of entrenched policy
actors content with the status quo (see Yanow, 1992; Bachrach and
Baratz, 1962; Debnam, 1975; Frey, 1971; R.A. Smith, 1979). In addition,
governments, in particular, can practise different strategies not only of
a?enda-setting but of f!8eTlIiadenial, That is, as the discussion in the preVIOUSchapter revealed, governments have different procedural tools at
their disposal that allow them to control many aspects of policy subsystem behaviour, inclu'tlingits membership and the relations among those
members, which can help them channel policy discourses in directions
they would like them to go (Cobb and Ross, 1997b).
FuRTHER
READINGS
Baumgartner,Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and
American Politics. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
Instability
in
142
PART III
Bennett, Colin J. 1991. 'What is Policy Convergence and What CausesIt?',
British Journal of Political Science 21: 215-34.
Cobb, Roger w., J.K. Ross, and M.H. Ross. 1976. 'Agenda Building as a
Comparative Political Process'., American Political Science Review 70, 1:
126-38.
__
and Marc Howard Ross, eds. 1997. Cultural Strategies of Agenda
Denial: Avoidance, Attack and Redefinition. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas.
Downs, Anthony. 1972. 'Up and Down with Ecology-the 'Issue-Attention
Cycle', The Public Interest 28: 38-50.
Dye, Thomas R. 1978. 'Politics Versus Economics: The Development of the
Literature on Policy Determination', Policy Studies Journal 7: 652-62.
Kingdon, John W. 1995 [1984]. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies.
Boston: HarperCollins.
May, Peter J. 1991. 'Reconsidering Policy Design: Policies and Publics', .
Journal of Public Policy 11: 187-206.
Simeon, Richard. 1976. 'Studying Public Policy', Canadian Journal of.
Political Science 9: 548-80.
Spector, Malcolm, and John I. Kitsuse. 1987. Constructing Social Problems.
New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Stone, Deborah A. 1988. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Glenview, Ill.:
Scott, Foresman.
Wilensky, H.L. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and
Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Yanow, Dvora. 1992. 'Silences in Public Policy Discourse: Organizational and
Policy Myths', Joumal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2,4:
399-423.
1. Kingdon (1984: 4) further differentiates within the institutional agenda,
locating the specialized agendas of government agencies, the legislative
agenda of government, and the decision agenda of the executive.
2. Other authors, of course, argue that American agenda-setting is a much
less random process. See Baumgartner and Jones (1993).
1'3. Much of Kingdon'sapalysis islJa.s..E!90.I).~arlierwork undertaken by Jack
I
\yaII<er (1977) into the agenda-set!i!1sprocess-fOllowediniiieUs
Senate.
An examination of Walker's work makes-If CTeaiUiafl<:mgctoo's principal
h~othesis, related to the frequency of predictable and unpredictable
wmdows, was derived from the application of Walker's observation that
US Senate agenda items varied widely in terms of their level of
institutionalization or 'routinization'. Kingdon also made use of Walker's
...distinction between .:.disgetionary' ..,and ,'l1<lnr.di.s.l;:IetipI}aly'
issues.
4. For empirical case. studies ,<lLtheseeffects, see Druckman (2001) and
"JacOby (2000).
Policy Formulation:
)1
Policy Communities and Policy Networks
After a government has acknowledged the existence of a public problem
and the need to do something about it, policy-makers need to decide on
some course of action. Formulating such a course of action is the second
major stage in the policy cycle: /E!?lJ.9!JC!!JJ1.Ulatien.
As Charles Jones
(1984: 7) has observed, the distinguishing characteristic of policy formulation is simply that me.aillU!r~JH'9..Q0seQ1QJ:~QJy~sOIIlebody'sper.c..ep:
gon of the needs U1at exi~tin society; Policy formulation hence involves I
assessing possible solutions 'to policy problems or, to putit another way,
exploring the various options available for addressing a problem. {fhe\
proposals Jllay originatefin the ageIlda-settiogPE~c~~§ itself, as a problem
and its solution are placed simultaneously on the government agend,a
(Kiiigd6n~'1984J;\6rtheyma.YQg<i.ey~lc:Jpedaft~i
a.I\1t~b} p.aS:.ifiovedontci
the, qfficiai (lgeilaa.~ii all ca~es, aV@<3,l:>ltf§iJHoris'~aE~c:Qosideredand,nar-(
r~wedgQ\V!l t()JM§~,tI;1(lt_PQU?:~ak=~s (;~,acc~pt.
!his proc=~~ of \
qefiniIlg, considering, and accepting or rejecting optIOns IS the suDstanceii.
oftlie sec6nd'sta~::QfthepQllcYCYcle.
,:
'~ Lesfirts'i:iiisunderstood,
it needs to be emphasized that choosing a
solution to a public problem or fulfilling a societal need does not even
remotely resemble the orderly process proposed by some analysts. We
, saw in the preceding chapter on agenda-setting that defining and interpreting a problem is a highly nebulous process that does not always lead
to clear or agreed-upon definitions of problems. Even if policy-makers
agree on the, existence of a problem, they may not share the same understanding of its causes or ramifications. It is therefore to be expected that
'the search for a solutiont()?,pmblem
will be contentious and subject to
Wide variety of preSsures, often defeating efforts to consider policy
options in a rational or systematic manner.
l,The essence of the search for solutions to a problem entail.s,disco.veriIJ.~riot oIlly which actions are considered totle ..technic.al1YJ:;i!P~ of
I
'a'
addressing or correcting a problem but also which among these is considered to be possible, or feasible, to put into place (Majone, 1975, 1989;
Huitt, 1968; Meltsner, 1972; Dror, 1969; Webber, 1986). )Atthis stage,
optionsthatar~believed
will not work or will for some reason be unacceptable tQ Inajor. actors in the policy process are eliIlliI!S!,ted.Thus, for
example, those policy-makers involved in devising health policy to contain health-care costs in the industrialized countries do not usually cone
sider a British-style nationalized health service, which is rated highly for
its cost-efficiency, because of the opposition it would provoke from the
medical profession fearing reduced income. Nor do they consider denying health services to the aged, who account for a disproportionately
large proportion of health-care costs, because of the moral and political
outrage this would cause (see Alford, 1972, 1975).
'How options are excludedJ~oIll~Qnside-r.ationby policycmakers at this
stage of policy formulationtel)sus a lot about the policy options ultimately chosen for jIllpl~lllentation at thedecision..maldng stag~ of the
-policy process. Among other things, certain players in the policy process
can be advantaged over others if they are··granted some authoritative
voice in the diagnosis of a policy ill or the establishment of the feasibility
of a particular proposed policy solutfon. This is the case, for example,
with scientists or government specialists in many policy areas, but this
may not be the case if there are disagreements over the ability of experts
to deal with an issue in a competent or neutral manner (see Nathanson,
2000; Heikkila, 1999; Doern and Reed, 2001; Harrison, 2001; Callaghan
and Schnell, 2001).
Jones (1984: 78) describes-other broad characteristics of poliLyfOnIlU-·
lation:
1. Formulation need not be limited toon~·-seLoLac.tQ):s.Thus there may
well be two or more formulation groups producing competing (or
complementary) proposals,
2. Formulation rnay proceed without cleCl.fd~fiJJ.i1:iQn_oJ
the problem, or
without formulators ever haVing much contact with the affected
. groups ....
O~There is no necessary coincidence betweenJoI'IllWation and particular
institutions, though it is a frequent activity of bureaucratic agencies.
! 4. Formulation and reformulation may occur over a long period of time
without ever building sufficient support for anyone proposal.
5. There are often several appeal points for those who lose in the formulation process at anyone level.
6. The process itself never has neutral effects. Somebcidywins and somebody loses even in the workings of science.
The picture of policy form:ulation this characterization presents is that it
IS a highly diffuse and complex process that varies by ca,se.Like agendasetting, the nuances of policy formulation in particular instances. can be
..-~J
gJ:fl~pedQnlythroughempirical case studies. Nevertheless, most policy
formulation processes do share some common characteristics.
'First, policy formulation involves the recognition of technical and
politica,l.<::onstraintson state action. It involves recognizing limitations,
which reveals what is infeasible and, by implication, what is feasible.
This may seem obvious, but it is yet to be reflected in many of the voluminous writings proposing what policy-makers ought to be doing without reference to the limitations that constrain the choice of any proposed
action. For instance, the public .choice theorists' key assumption-that
politicians choose policies that best promote their electoral appealpresumes more. room for manoeuvre than is actually the case (Majone,
1989: 76). Politicians simply cannot do everything they consider would
appeal to voters.
Before we consider the limitations that policy-makers typically
encounter that lead them to reject certain types of options, it is worth
mentioning that the constraints neednot be.bas.edon facts (Merton,
1948). If significant actors in the policy subsystem believe that something
is unworkable or unacceptable, this is sufficient for its exclusion from
further consideration in the policy process. As we have seen with the discussion of agenda-setting in the previous chapter, perception is just as
real as reality itself in the policy process.
'The constraints the members of policy subsystems encounter may be
substantive or procedural. .Substantive constraints are innate to the.
~fthe
problem itself. Policy-makers Wishing to eliminate poverty
thus do not have the option of printing money and distributing it to the
poor because inflation will offset any gains, and so they must necessarily
address the problem in more indirect ways. Similarly, the goal of promoting excellence in arts or sports cannot be accomplished simply by ordering people to be the best artist or sportswoman in the world; the pursuit
of these goals requires far more delicate, expensive, and time-consuming'
measures. The problem of global wanning cannot be entirely eliminated
because there is no known effective solution that can be employed without causing tremendous economic and social dislocations, which leaves'
policy-makers to tinker with options that barely .scratch the surface of the
problem. Substantive problems are thus 'objective' in the sense that
redefining them does not make them go away, and their resolution or
partial resolution requires the use of state resources and capacities such
as money, information, and personnel, and/or the exercise of state
authority,
Procedural constraints have to do with procedures involved in adopting an OPtiOIl or carrying it out. These constraints may be either institutional or tactical. Institutional constraints, as discussed in Chapter 3, \
ihcllldeconstitutional provisions, the organization of the state and society, and established patterns of ideas and beliefs. They inhibit the choice
of some policy options and promote others (Yee, 1996). Efforts to contlol
Policy' Formulation
146
PART III
~. - .. ..
handguns in the United States, for example, run up against constraints
imposed by the constitutional right to bear arms. Federalism imposes
similar constraints on German, American, Mexican, Australian, and
Canadian policy-makers, among others, in many areas of public policy
where two levels of government must agree before anything can be done.
How the main social groups are organized internally and are linked with
the state also affects what can or cannot be done, especially the nature of
political party and electoral systems, which can create ,'policy horizons'
or limited sets of acceptable choices for specific actors in the policy process (Warwick, 2000; Bradford, 1999). In a similar vein, the predominance of specific sets of philosophical or religious ideas in many societies
can lead to difficulties with potential policy solutions that might seem
routine in others (DeLeon, 1992).
.
I
TYPES OF POllCY
147
ALTERNATIVES
iA.llsefuLWg)'tocthin~ about the nature of the policy options that are
developed in the policy formulation process is in terms of the extent to
which they propose solutions to problellls that depart from the policy
status quo. Some options call for new, substantial, or dramatic policy
change, while others involve only minor tinkering with existing policies
and programs (Majone, 1991).
In his work on economic policy change in Britain, Peter-HalUdentified
three different types of change:/{irst-order change in which only the settings of policy instruments varied; 'second-order change in which change
. occurred in the basic types or categories of instruments used to effect
policy; and 'third-order change in which the goalsbf policy are altered
(Hall, 1993).1 While useful, some of this terminology is confusing and
should be altered,' while the logic of the model also suggests that there
should be four basic types of change, not three.
With respect to terminology, the use of the teflll 'settings' to describe
first-order change can be confusing, since most uses of the term would
lead one to consider this to refer to the location of a policy instrument
within a policy environment, when Hall means to describe the calibration or fine-tuning of an instrument's content or component parts. More
significantly, Hall's model, as shown in Figure 6.1, is based'on-distinguishing between the means and ends of policy-ma,king andbetw:e~n
abstract and concrete aspects of policy outputs (see Campbell, 1998).
Given these two dimensions, four distinct categories of policy change are
pQSsib}f...ooHhr€€.These can be described as changes related to abstract
(:poLicygoals or more concretej:Jrogram specifications, referring to the ends
/'6f1ici1icy-tria1ting;'aIld"t6basic
poliCy[instrument type or genus, as
, opposed to alterations of existing linstru.l!J..fJJ:t., c.ornponents, when discussing changes in policy means.2
Figure 6.1 Types of Policy Options by Level of Generality and
Policy Component Affected
Level of Generality of Policy Content
'd
.•.•
Q.l I::
~ .~ SEnds'
<: ~
--
Q.l
'ii3
Means
Conceptual/Policy
Practical/Program
Policy Goals
Instrument Types
Program Specifications
Instrument Components
SOURCE:Adapted from Peter A. Hall, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the
State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain', Comparative Politics 25, 3
(19'93): 275-96.
;Options that address policy goals and instrument types require the injection of some new ideas and thinking into policy deliberations. More specific options dealing with program specifications and instrument
'settings' or components, on the other hand, are much more status quooriented, involving relatively minor alterations in existing policies. Proposals for policy and program changes tend to arise from new actors in
exJ.sting policy processes, while changes relating to instrument types
and components tend to develop among existing actors as their preferences change (Krause, 1997). This general situation is set out in Figure
6.2.
Figure 6.2 A Model of the Effects of the Presence
or Absence of New Actors and Ideas
on 1'yJ>es,of Policy Options Considered
Presence
Presence of
New Ideas
Continuity
Old Ideas
of
of New
Actors
Continuity.
of Old ActC?rs
Options relating to
changes in policy goals
Options relating to changes
in program specifications
Options relating to
changes in instrument
types
Options relating 'to changes
in instrument components
POLICY SUBSYSTEMS AND POllCY
FORMULATION
The preceding dis·cussion highlights the significance for policy formulat~!lQtQ1e nature of the policy actors present at this stage of the policy
Cycle,and of the ideas and knowledge they hold about the technical and
political feasibility of possible courses of action. This raises several
important questions about the process of policy formulation. Among the
mosffffiportantare: \Who is actually involved in this process? What are
th~quaJ.ificap:()ns for participation? (Timrnermans and Bleiklie, 1999).
While we will.need separate empirical analysis of each specific instance
of policy formulation to answer these questions, we can nevertheless set
out broad parameters to assist such analyses.
As we have seen in our discussion of agenda-setting, the notion of a
'~QU~.J.P.-Jl§ygen:diS
a powerful concept in policy analysis~ Rec~:ntstudies
'of policy formulation especially emphasize the importance of policys'Ubsystem structure and behaviour at the formulation stage of the policy
"cYCle' (see Howlett, 2002; Nyland, 1995; Marin and Mayntz, 1991:
,297-330; Le Gales and Thatcher, 1995; Kingdon, 1984; Milward and
Walmsley, 1984; Goldfinch, 2000). Unlike agenda-setting, where members
of the entire policy universe theoretically can be involved in policy delib, erations and actions,'in policy formulation the relevant actors are usually
restricted to members of policy subsystems, since arequirement ofparticipation at this stage of the process is sOmemillimall~YeLoLi{nowledgein .
tl:J.esubject area, allowing an actor to comment, at least hypothetically, on
the feasibility of options put forward to resolve policy problems.
Not surprisingly,idelltifying the key actors in policy subsystems, !what
pringsthem together, how they interact, and what effect their interaction
has on the policy has' attracted the attention of many students of policy
formulation (Heclo, 1994; Hall, 1997). Over the years scholars have
developed a variety of models, many of which were mutually contradictory and unnecessarily elaborate, to address these questions.3 In the following pages, we will examine several of these models, highlight the
points of agreement, and offer a model that is useful for conceptualizing
the nature of policy subsystems and the role they play in the process of
policy formulation.
Models of Policy Subsystems
, Subgovernments, Iron 1Hangles, and Issue Networks
t The oldest conception of a policy subsystem was developed in the United
, ,'States by early critics of pluralism. They developed the notion of the
fJ::s.uQgQy-emment!~
understood as g:r:oupillgsof societal and state actors in
,,4 tb\ltinizedpatterns of interaction (deHaven-Smith and Van Horn, 1984).
This concept was based on the observation that interest groups, congressional' committees, and government agencies in the US had developed a
system of mutual support in the course of constant interaction over legislative and regulatory matters. These three-sided relationships in areas
such as agriculture, transportation, and education were often dubbed
iron triangleS{ to capture the essence of their ironclad' control over many
aspects of the policy process (Cater, 1964). Such groupings were condemned for having 'captured' the policy process, thus' subverting the
principles of popular democracy by ensuring that their own self-interests
prevailed over those of the general public.4
In the 1960s and 1970s, further research into the American case
revealed that many subgovernments were not all-powerful, and that in
fact their influence on policy-making varied across issues and over time
(Hayes, 1978; Ripley and Franklin, 1980r Soon a more flexible and less
rigid notion of a policy subsystem evolved, called by Hugh Hecla the
lissge networR (Heclo, 1978).
Building'on his earlier work comparing social policy-making in Britain
and Sweden (Heclo, 1974: 308-10), Hecloargued that while some areas
of American political life were organized in an institutionalized system of
interest representation, other were not. As he put it:
Preoccupied with trying to find the few truly powerful actors,
observers tend to overlook the power and influence that arise out of
the configurations through which leading policy makers move and
do business with each other. Looking for the closed triangles of
control, we tend to mis,s the fairly open networks of people that
increasingly impinge upon government.
He was not denying the existence of iron triangles, of course, but merely
pointing out that their membership and functioning were often not as
closed or rigid as was suggested by some commentators.
Heclo. conceived of policy subsystems as existing upon a, spectrum,
with iron triangles at one end and issue networks at the other. He \
explained the q.ifferences between iron triangles and issue networks in
the following ways:
The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes small
. __l:;ir<;lesof participllnts who have succeeded In becoming largely
autonomous ..Issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a large
number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on others in their environment; in fact it is
almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins. Iron triangles and subgovernments suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow public
programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to
the alliance. Issue networks are almost the reverse image in each
respect. (Heclo, 1978: 102)
Issue netw:orks were .thus larger, much less stable, had a constant
turnover of participants, and were much less institutionalized than iron
triangles.
Heclo's alternative interpretation of the nature of the policy subsystems involved in policy formulation fostered several studies in Europe
and North America intended to refine the concept. These studies led to
the identification of a large variety of subsystems that necessitated the
development of alternate. taxonomies to Heclo's simple spectrum of issue
networks and iron triangles.
Policy Networks and Policy Communities
Comparative work on subsystems led tothe clarification of the variables
differentiating subgovernments from issue networks and to their renaming asrpolicy network~ and policy communities.
In his comparative study of foreign economic policy, Peter Katzenstein
(1977) referred to policy ni:!!YJorks:
as those links joining the state and
societal actors together in a policy process. Although he no more than
mentioned the term, other writers combined earlier discussions of policy
subsystems with elements of organizational and anthropological analyses to flesh out the concept (Milward and Walmsley, 1984).5
One such application was made in Britain by R.i\.W. Rhodes, who
argued throughout the early 1980s that interactions within and among
government agencies and social organizations constituted policy networks that were instrumental in formulating and developing policy.
, Rhodes suggested that networks varied according to their level of 'integration', which was a function of their stability of membership, restrictiveness of membership, degree of insulation from other networks and
the public, and the nature of the resources they controlled (Rhodes,
1984: 14-15). In the United States similar attributes were specified QY
Hamm, who argued that subgovernments could be differentiated according to their 'internal complexity, functional autonomy, and (levels of
internal and external) cooperation or conflict' (Hamm, 1983: 415).
In a major study of European industrial policy-making,' Will<s and
Wright endorsed Rhodes's typology, arguing that networks varied along
five important dimensions: 'the interests of the members of the network,
the membership, the. extent of members', interdependence, .the ext-ent.ta,·
which-the network is isolated ffollother networks, and the variations in
the distribution of resources between the members: Refining the iron triangle-issue network spectrum developed by Heclo, they argued that this
conception 3.J.loweda 'high-low' scale to be developed in which highly
integrated networks would be characterized by stability of membership
and inter-membership relations, interdependence within the network,
and network insulation from other networks. At the other extreme,
weakly integrated networks would be large and loosely structured, with
multiple and often inchoate links with other groups and actors (Wilks
and Wright, 1987: 301-2).
In.1he-llnited States empirical efforts to clarify and reformulate the
concept of policy'networks also were undertaken. Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson, for example, argued that networks tended to have
'hollow cores' in that even the most institutionalized networks appeared
.;,0. k.w:e·flo'clear:.readel'ship':{Heinz·''et,a1.,·~!l'99(};Salisbury
et al., 1987).
,.·"Others.argued.thatJU!twOIks.COl.ild.he.,cl~ifi~d:.accQfdiogto whether or
not state and societal members shared the same goals and agreed on the
same means to achieve those goals. Still others suggested that the num-
ber of discernible interests participating was the crucial variable defining
different types of networks (McFarland, 1987).
lUs important to note-tfla.h3Jl-of-t-hese-di.fierent.conceptionsconstrued,
policy networks as ~~SS~!)Ji~_inleLest~h<1~~d. That is, participants
wer-e-as-SUfuea:roparticipatein these networks to further their 9wn ends,
which were seen as essentially material and 'objectively recognizable'
from outside the network. This emphasis on common material interests
set studies of policy networks apart from those that focused on a second
type of subsystem, the policy community ..
In their early work on British policy subsystems, Richardson and Jor-,;
dap bad identifieQ,1i.gbtgx:oupsQfJ,1o!icy
actors, which they termed lpol-ii
'icy COmlIll,!J)jtii:!~'t\Although
most observers would later term these policyl:
'networks' (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1984), the two terms
continued to be used interchangeably for several more..years (see Milward and Francisco, 1983; Sharpe, 1985). 'Later, Wilks and Wright (1987:
296) sought to make :community' referto a more inclusivecateg()ry of
all those involved in policy formulation andJorestrict 'network' to a
subset of community members who interacted with. eachoth~~'Qll a regular basis .. In their view, 'Policy community identifies
actors and
potential actors drawn from the policy universe who share a common
policy focus. Network is the linking process within a policy community
or between two or more communities:
Although some European scholars continued to use the term 'community' to refer to tight-knit sets of policy actors (see Rhodes, 1996, 1997a;
Rhodes and Marsh, 1992), the use of 'community' in a broad sense to
describe policyact9rs who share a common .ideg.·set"or.outJ,9Qkfit,welL
with·the e~!ierdistinctiQndrg.Wl1jn the US by Beclo and others between
small, closed 'subgovernments' and larger issue networks (Walker, 1981;
Berry, 1989; Jordan and Maloney, 1997). While some scholars continued
to use the two terms to refer to the two ends of a spectrum of subsystems, much as Heclo had in his initial discussion, others began to think
of the two as coexisting in a 'nested' fashion in the sense that interestdriven policy networks existed as a subset of the membership of ideadriven policy communities (Chadwick, 2000; Singer, 1990; Torgerson,
1996; Rein and Schon, 1996; Dudley and Richardson, 1999).
those
Advocacy Coalitions
This insight, that a policy subsystem might consist of a number of subcomponents, wg.s developed at length in the 1980s in the works of Paul
Sabatier and his colleagues. They developed a sophisticated scheme for
studying ,the activities of policy actors in policy subsystems. In their
work; anLadvocacycoa.litiQn~~fersto a subset of actors in the policy sub!!ystem (Sa'bi'l:tlerand Jenkins-Smith, 1993b). According to Jenkins-Smith
and Sabatier:
152
PART III
Policy Formulation
'AnadvQcacy coalition consists of actors from a variety of public
and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set
of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other percep.tions) and
who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time.
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier argued that advocacy coalitions include
both state and societal actors at the national, subnational, and local levels of government. Their schemedeverly combines the role otlglowledge and interest in the policy process as policy actors are seen to come
together for reasons of common beliefs, often based on their shared
knowledge of a public problem and their common interest in pursuing
certain solutions to it. 'D1e..CS)r~_9itheirJ:>!ili~t~s.tem,
consisting of views
on the nature of humankind and the ultimate desired state of affairs, is
quite stable and holds the coalition togetheLAlI those inanacivocacy
\.coalitionparticipate in the policy process,inQici~Lto llse tJ:!!=_gQY~rrunent
{machinery to pursue th~ir(s.elf7serving)goals...-... "-While belief systems and interests determine the policies an advocacy
coalition will seek to have adopted, its ability to succeed in this endeavour is affected by a host of factors. These include the coalition's
res"our~es such as 'money, expertise, number of supporters, and legal
authority' (Sabatier, 1987: 664). Externalf<iGtofs also affect what it can
achieve by making some objectfves"e"as{erto accomplish than others
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993: 5). Some of these external factorsthe nature of the problem, natural resource endowments, cultural values,
and constitutional provisions-are relatively"stable over long periods "of
time and are therefore fairly predictable. Others are subject to a greater
degree of change, including public opinion, technology, level ofintlation
or unemployment, and change of political party in government. Sabatier
and his colleagues advanced the discussion of policy subsystems in
many ways, not least by arguing that they are not unified wholes, but
usually have more than one component part. That is, in their scheme, in
most cases there will be at least two advocacy coalitions in a subsystem-one supporting the status quo and one proposing changes-but
there may be more.
Taxonomies of Policy Subsystems and Subsystem Components
; By the end of the 1980s, it was clear from these works and others in
many different countries that a variety of different types of subsystems
existed, depending on the structural interrelationships existing among
their component parts. Efforts then turned to developing a more consistent method of classifying these components so that the different types of
subsystems could be better understood (see McCool, 1989; Ouimet and
Lemieux, 2000).
153
I
III one early effort at classifying policy networks, Atkinson and Cole-'
man developed a scheme based on the organization of state and society,
'and the links between the two, identifying eight basic types of subsystem. In their view, the two critical questions were whether societal interests are centrally organized and whether the state has the capacity to
develop policies independent of them-in other words, the level of state
autonomy from societal actors. Although initially clear, this taxonomy
was muddied by the addition of a concern for the level of concentration
of property owners in affected sectors, generating an eightfold system of
policy subsystems. These ranged from a type of pluralism said to
describe situations when all three variables were low, to the 'concertation' network, which was said to exist when the interests were centrally
organized, capital was concentrated, and the state enj6yed high capacity
and autonomy (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a: 54).
,'.Other eff\'lrts resulted in even more complex, and confusing, tax-\
onomies. Thus, for example, FfaI).sVil"I:L-YJ~~rdeIlJ1992)
attempted to\
combine Rhodes's analysis withnfafof Atkinson and Coleman, arguing
that networks varied according to seven criteria: number and type of
actors; function of networks; structure; institutionalization; rules of
conduct; power relations; and actor strategies. Ultimately, the typology
he developed included 12 types of subsystems depending on the number and type of actors and the nature of the functions they performed.
Like Atkinson and Coleman's initial effort, it proved difficult to apply in
practice.
Part of the problem with these classification systems had to do with
the purposes for which they were developed.( Some, like Atkinson and
Coleman's model, were developed to understand the politics of public
policy-making in a specific sector, such as industrial policy, and added a
level of detail concerning a specific industrial actor (business), which is
not required in the analysis of other subsystems. ,Others, like van Waarden, represented attempts to synthesize disparate schemes, all inductively developed from specific sectoral and issue-level case studies,
without first attempting to eliminate idiosyncratic sectoral elements such
as those found in Atkinson and Coleman's scheme.
(Adopting a different approach to the .classification of subsystems can
help simplify theiran¥ysis and clarify the role they play in policy formulation. Usingt.h-e. an.alytical_~ep,!!ation of community and network, in
particular, helps to clarify the' conceptualization of policy development
and the various factors behind it (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Carlsson, 2000). This conceptual distinction helps us understand the significant difference between the two different sets of motivations guiding the
action.~LQLtho.se
involved in policy formulation: ~oWleclgeorexpertise,
and materialjn!erest .•V\ discourse community dennes its membership by V
reference to a specific knowledge base whereas an'interest network is (
based on some common material interest. Viewed this way, two different
I,
154
PART III
p'0licy Formulation
aspects of the process of policy formulation came into sharper focus.
(Some ql~grs
of policy subsystems are linked tQKether1;>yepistemic
, cQJ;lcerns-a shared knowledge base-while Pth.flIIlii!ib.ers:~must have
not only this base, but a!sO--some1ype of.IDaierialinter~s.L~lQ~ing or
encouraging .regularized contact (Pappi and Henning, 1999). Although
the policy subsystem itself contains elements of both ideas and interests,
these can be distinguished from each other and their impacts on policy
formulation can be analyzed separately (see Hoberg, 1996).
\ IDisc01lIsecommun:ities·share some common level of understanding of
\a problem, its definition, and its causes,6 although disagreements will
rsually be present not only over how to translate these understandings
into policy solutions: but often also over aspects of these basic elements
(see Hajer, 1993; Fischer, 1993). Hence, a Wleful distinction can be drawn
between cOllliIlunitiesin which there iSf~.Q..QIillnant.knQ:wJedg~b~~~
and
those in which ithere iSOQt.f,. second critical dimension of policy community structure is the nUl"J::lRer
of relatively distinct 'idea sets' that exist
in the community (see Schulman, 1988) and if,aIld to what extent, a
consensus exists on any particular set (see Haas, 1992; MacRae, 1993;
Smith, 1993). Utilffiing these two dimensions allows us to construct a
simplewatrix of common discourse community types (see Figure 6:3).
155
and Jenkins-Smith noted, ~Jbi.r£Uyp.e.ofcOJlteste.d..l;;Ommunity
may form;
for example, in many countries in areas 'such as environmental protection, concepts of biodiversity and sustainable development contest
,equally well-entrenched ones of resource exploitation and utilitarianism.
lEinaJ1Y, where one idea set is dominant but faces challenges from less
popular ideas, aJgcti9JJ~J:ll~~!y'i.s
likely to be found. This is a type
of community found at present in trade and development policy subsys- \(
terns, for example, where a dominant free trade globalism faces a challenge from less popular but still compelling sets of ideas promoting more
autarkic local or national forms of economic exchange and development.
.With respect toHnterest networks, or more structured forms of subsystem interactions, many'c)bServers hav~ highlighted the significance of
S~() k~y..Ycrr.!~1Jl~~,!?
shaping the s~cture and b~haviour of policy networks: \!hemunber and t)'p.~_QJ.Jh~lL.ill~bershlE and'the._.qu.estlOn-of
wh~ther state ors-ocie't31memper$ dominatejhefr activities and .interac.jiguscsiniih, 1~i9'3;'C'oie~~~~dP~rl; i·~:i99).AreasoIlable classification
of issue networks can be developed using these variables, as shown in
Figure 6.4 (see Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a, 1989b; Coleman and
Skogstad, 1990).
Figure 6.4 A Taxonomy of Interest Networks
Figure 6.3 A Taxonomy of Discourse Communities
Number of Members
Number of Idea Sets
Dominant Idea Set
Yes
Hegemonic
Conimunity
FractiOus
Community
No
Contested
Community
Chaotic
Community
, SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the
, Politics of the Policy Process', Poli9l.5t.udigsJaum.aL.26,.3Cl9911):466-82.
In a situation where one idea set is dominant and unchallenged-slich
as is presently the case in the area of fiscal policy, where there is virtually
no opposition to the balanced budget orthodoxy-a '(prm OfOlgnopplistic
or '!:tegemoaic'communityrnay develop. io~JJt.her bapd, where multiple sets of ideas circulate with no single idea in a dominant position, a
much more!~haotic community will exist. A good example of this at pre. "'Semroncems"fue"sitti1cition'\Vith'''biogen~CsptmCy, wHere ideas ranging
'i~from;(he'~tmre"8cience'" Gf.genome ~arch-to'Teligious,
superstitious,
and conspiratorial industrial power theories coexist in the subsystem.
Where several major idea sets exist and contest dominance, as Sabatier
Few
State Corporatist
NetworKS
Societal
Social Corporatist
Networks
Many
State Pluralist
'.N.etWprks
Social Pluralist
Networks
SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem
Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis
of the Politics oithe Policy Process" Policy Studies Joumal26, 3 (1998): 466-82.
'InJ!llSJJlQQ,el,.small networks doIIlinated by government actors-as
are commonly found in highly technical issue areas such as nuclear,
chemical, or toxic substance regulation-can be distinguished from those
in which many societal actors are included, as might be the case with
education or other areas of state-led social policy-making. Otherdistinet
network types exist where a few societal actors dominate 'a small network, as in many areas of industrial policy, or where they dominate large
networks, as is the case in many countries in areas such as transportation and health-care delivery.7
While these types of classification schemes help to clarify the possible
structure of discourse communities and interest networks in policy
the subsystem greatly. affects its propensity to develop certain types of
policy options.' As was suggested.Q.bQve, this isbecause
the options
developed-whether
they affect policy goals,program
specifi,cations,
instrument types, or instrument components-are
affected by the presence or absence of new actors and new ideas at the policy formulation
stage (see Menahem, 2001; Montpetit, 2002; Bulkley, 2000).
Ihee.xistence
of subsystems open to new ideas and new actors is
required if options pertaining to policy goals are to emerge from the policy
formulation stage. If a subsystem is openonlytQ
either ideas or actors,
but not both, options that emerge are likely to relate only to alterations in
program specifications or instrument types, 'In the case of closed subsystems, a fairly typical type, as Baumgartner and Jones suggested, options
will tend to be restricted to the calibration of existing policy instruments.
The relationship of .subsystem.structure to JJ.oli.9'.Qptions and th~..resulting policy formulation styles are set out in Figure6.6.-·_··
.. ·
...
Figure 6.6 A Model of Policy Formulation Styles
Entrance of New Actors
Yes
Entrance of
New Ideas
No
Yes
No
Policy Renewal
(Open Subsystems)
Program Reform
(Contested Subsystem)
Policy Experimentation
(Resistant Subsystems)
Instrument Tinkering
(Closed Subsystem)
,
Although the development of these concepts is relatively recent, tlJ.ey
have been put to good use in dealing with a number of policy sectors
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1989a; Pross, 1992). Studies based on the
J.1Otirnrof -policy. communities and policynetworksh<lveJeYe<:lle~.A..~eat
d~aLahQllt policy fOIlJ),ulatjon in such areas as fisheries policy (Pross and
McCorquodale, 1990), women's issues (Phillips, 1991b), environmental
policy (Bruton and Howlett, 1992: 25), pharmaceuticals
(Atkinson and
Coleman, 1989b), information policy (Bennett, 1992), and many others
. (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990). The developmentofthe
concept of comIplex policy subsystems composed ofknowledge-basec!. discourse commuI nities and interest-based networks has had a significant impact on recent
studies of public policy formulation.
'
These studies have also pointed to the need to understand the process
,of cha.pges insUlJsyst~
ifth~,&eAfr.alprQcess,.qt.poliCY."change
and
developmenLis to .beunderstood .(see Jenkins,Smlfh,etal.,
1991; Baum"gattner:a:nd'JOnes;'1'91r'Whattyp'e'ofsubsystemeXists
in a given sector
or issue area is of major significance in understanding the dynamics of .
policy 'formulation within that area. Which policy options on the institu-
tional agenda will be considered seriously for adoption, and the types of .'
solutions or options considered to be feasible for resolving policy problems, is largely
function of the nature and motivation of key actors
arrayed in policy subsystems (Howlett, 2002).
a
Atkinson, Michael, and William Coleman. 1992. 'Policy Networks, Policy
Communities and the Problems of Governance', Governance 5,2: 154-80.
Daugbjerg, Carsten, and David Marsh. 1998. 'Explaining Policy Outcomes:
Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-LeveL?-nd MicroLevel Analysis', in Marsh, ed., Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham:
Open University Press, 52-71.
'
DeLeon, Peter. 1992. 'Policy Formulation: Where Ignorant Armies Clash By
Night', Policy Studies Review 11, 3/4: 389-405.
Hall, Peter A. 1993. 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The
Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain', Comparative Politics 25, 3:
275-96.
Hecla, Hugh. 1978. 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in A.
King,ed., The New American Political System. Washington: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 87-124.
Heinz, John P;, et al. 1993. The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National
Policy Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Jordan, A. Grant. 1981. 'Iron lliangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets:
Images of the Policy Process', Journal of Public Policy 1, 1: 95-123.
Knoke, David. 1993. 'Networks as Political Glue: Explaining Public PolicyMaking', in w'J. Wilson, ed., Sociology andthe Public Agenda. llondon:
Sage, 164-84.
..
'"
lindquist, Evert A. 1992. 'Public Managers and Policy CommunIties:
Learning to Meet New Challenges', Canadian Public Administration 35, 2:
127-59.
Majone, Giandomenico. 1975. 'On the Notion of Political Feasibility',
European Journal of Political Research 3: 259-74.
Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz, eds. 1991. Policy Networks: Empirical
Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Milward, H. Brinton, and Gary 1. Walmsley. 1984. 'Policy Subsystems,
'Networks and the Tools of Public Management', in Robert Eyestone, ed.,
Public Policy Formation. Greenwich, Conn.: JAr Press, 3-25.
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1997. Understanding
Governance: Policy Networks,
Governance, Reflexivity, and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University
Press.
Sabatier, Paul. 1988. 'An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change
and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein', Policy Sciences 21, 2/3:
129-68.
.
156
PART III
Policy Formulation
subsystems, and give us ageneraljde_ClClQQlJ.tthenatureofJ:lLe_~i~~rative processes -folloWedat th~ JQImuJ!lt!Q.!Lstage.QUhepglicycyde, they
do not in themselves generate specific hypotheses or indications of the
propensities of specific types of subsystems towards specific types of
options. To get a better sense of that issue, it is necessary to discuss not
only the separate components of subsystems, but how those components
come together into specific configurations of actors and ideas, or policy
subsystem types, and how those types tend to promote or inhibit consideration of certain types of policy options (Richardson, 1995).
In-this.regard, the insights of au¢ors like Baumgartner and Jones with
respect to agenda-setting are equally appropriate to policy formulation.
That is, subsystems that are 'monopolistic', involving hegemonic policy
communities, and that feature networks with fewer members will tend to
promote policy options that reinforce the status quo. Those that are
larger and more chaotic will be more likely to suggest alternative courses
of action.
;That subsystems playa significant role in the process of policy formula'tion has been hinted at by several authors (Zijlstra, 1978-9; Rhodes and
Marsh, 1992). Sabatier, for example, has argued that the nature of the
policy subsystem responsible for policy formulation is an important element in the analysis of policy change as coalition members mediate the
exchange of interests and ideas in public policy-making. Although they
focused their analysis on the role of'external,per.turbations' such as elections, wars, accidents, or crises that can disrupt established subsystems,
they also recognized that 'internalsubsYsJem behaviour must be such
that the opportunities presented by external 'shocks' actually lead to
internal change.8
More specifically, authors such as Marsh and Rhodes (1992b),
Bressers and O'Toole (1998), andZahariadis and Allen (1995) have suggested that the 'cohesiveness' or'closedness~ofpQUcysubsystems is an
important factorarlecuiii(the propensity for new or innovative policy
solutions to emerge from the policy formulation process.9 Hence, one of
Jhe most significant aspects of subsystem structure involves the nature of
the relationship, or the configuration, that exists between the two component parts of the subsystem: the discourse community and interest
network (see Bulkley, 2000; Schaap and van Twist, 1997). This is
l;Jecause subsystems featuring closely integrated communities and networks will be more cohesive and better able to resist the entrance of new
ideas and actors into policy processes than will those with sizable intellectual and psychological distances between the two subsets of actors.
This suggests that the principal factor that can be used to identify the
propensity of a policy subsystem to promote innovative policy options
involving substa.ntial changes to' existIDgpOlicya.rrarigements· is' a
157
subsystem structure that allows new actors and new ideas to enter into
policy deliberations (Schmidt, 2001). C::Q.I1yer.s_el¥. the predominance of
status quo policy options can be explained by reference to the fact that
the same sets of actors and ideas are involved in the policy process over
a long period of time.lO
Observers have often noted how policy-makers, in the course of interaction among themselves and in their day-to-day dealings with a public
problem, tend to develop a common way of looking at and dealing with ~
problem (Kenis, 1991; Haas, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). Slight adaptation ana N
adjustment of views on the basis of experience and new information is II
.~ndemic to the policy process, but most studies have found that understandings of.the nature of public problems and the acceptable or feasible
solutions to them are often remarkably durable and, once in place, difficult to change (Pierson, 2000; Sabatier, 1988). This common understand,
ing within a policy subsystem, however, can at times break down, setting
the stage for the emergence of new and different policy actors and dis-\
courses, consideration of new policy options, and, ultimately, innovative
policy outcomes. 11
iThis suggests that the relevant general types of policy subsystems that
determine the outcomes of the policy formulation process are as set out
in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5 Basic Policy Subsystem Configurations
Receptive to New Actors
Receptive to New Ideas
No
Yes
No
Closed Subsystem
(Integrated Policy
Community and
Network)
Resistant Subsystem
(Closed Policy
Community and
Open Network)
Yes
Contested
Subsystem
(Open Policy
Community and
Closed Network)
Open Subsystem
(Unintegrated Policy
Community and
Network)
SOURCE:Adapted from Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, 'Policy Subsystem Configurations and Policy Change: Operationalizing the Postpositivist Analysis of the
Politics of the Policy Process', Policy Studies Joumal26, 3 (1998): 466-82.
As Hanspeter Kriesi and Maya Jegen (2001: 251) put it, 'to know the
actor constellation is to know the parameters determining the choices
among the substantive policy options: In other words, the structure Of
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
include altering staffing levels in hospitals or altering physician fee
schedules. Second-order changes would involve changing the type of
instrument used to deliver health care, such as moving from user fees to
mandatory insurance arrangements. Third-order change would involve a
shift in policy goals, such as moving away from a biomedical focus on the
individual to a more holistic goal of collective, social, or community wellbeing.
For similar models based on a similar critique of Hall, see Daugbjerg
(1997); Smith (2000).
Grant Jordan has spent much effort cataloguing and categorizing the
images and metaphors used to describe policy subsystems involved in
policy formulation. See Jordan (1981, 1990a, 1990b); Jordan and Schubert
(1992). More recently, see Borzel (1998); Thatcher (1998).
For early studies in this vein, see Bernstein (1955); Huntington (1952);
Lowi (1969).
Aldrich and Whetton (1980), for example, talked about 'action sets' and
'networks', the former referring to a group of organizations created for a
specific purpose and the latter to the more general forms of
interorganizational co-ordination in which organizations were bound
together by common relationship. See also Benson (1982).
At this point, it is worth noting that· a similar conception of a policy
community has emerged in the international relations literature in which
loose groupings of knowledge actors are said to underlie international
institutions and regimes. These epistemic communities are defined, in the
words of Peter Haas (1992: 3), as 'a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue-area', He.elaborates:· 'Althoughan.epistemic community may consist
of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2)
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multlple linkages
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions
of validity-that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing
and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a
common policy enterprise-that
is, a set of common practices associated
with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed,
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as
a consequence: This is a clear elucidation of the knowledge base that
binds communities of actors together and how it affects their behaviour.
The emphasis on 'professionalism'; however, means the concept refers to
only a specific subset of policy communities. To avoid confusion, we use
the term 'discourse community' in this book to refer to both 'epistemic'
and other types of policy communities. See also E. Haas (1975); Keohane
(1990).
On the links between these types and traditional corporatist and pluralist
conceptions of interest intermediation, see Sciarini (1986).
8. See also the modifications to this position contained in Sabatier (1993b).
External changes affect the resources-money,
expertise, number of
supporters, .and legal authority-available
to subsystem members and
thereby lead to alterations in their behaviour and in policy outcomes.
Sabatier (1987: 664). See also Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991).
9. Although this insight is similar to that used to generate a simple spectrum
or continuum
of subsystem types-ranging
from integrated to
unintegrated and usually related to a single variable such as subsystem
size-this does not fully capture the complexity of subsystem structure.
See Marsh and Rhodes (1992b). While it is common to associate small
subsystems with integration and large ones with incohesiveness, many
studies have shown that small subsystems can exhibit unintegrated
communities and networks, while being large, similarly, does not prevent
subsystems from being unified and cohesive. See, for example, Giuliani
(1999); Kriesi and Jegen (2001).
10. The analysis of incremental decision-making, for example, attributes a
propensity for policy change to occur as a result of analysis of the
marginal differences between existing and proposed policy options to the
fact that the same sets of policy-makers must bargain among themselves
to arrive at a decision, and therefore are unlikely to overturn agreements
based on past negotiations and compromises. See Hayes (1992).
11. Much as was argued by Thomas Kuhn and others in the case of the
advance of scientific knowledge. See Kuhn (1962, 1974). In his early
works Kuhn was unclear about what exactly· constituted a 'scientific
paradigm'. However, in his later works he was more specific, arguing that
a paradigm was synonymous with the notion of a 'disciplinary matrix'. It
was 'what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share'.
See Kuhn (1974: 463); Masterman (l970).
Public Policy Decision-Making
create 'winners' and 'losers', even if the decision is to do nothing and to
retain the status quo.
Brewer and DeLeon's definition, of course, says nothing about the
actors involved in this process, or the desirability, likely direction, or
scope of public decision-making. To deal with these issues, different theories have been developed to describe how decisions are made in government as well as to prescribe how decisions ought to be made. The
nature of public policy decision-makers, the different types of decisions
that they make, and the development and evolution of decision-making
models designed to help understand the relationship between the two are
described below.
Public Policy Decision-Making:
Beyond Rationalism and Incrementalism
AUTHORITATIVE AND NON-AUTHORITATIVE
IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The decision-making stage of.the policy process is the one from which
emerges some formal or informal statement of intent on the part of
authorized public actors to undertake, or refrain from undertaking, some
action (O'Sullivan and Down, 2001). Actually undertaklng that course of
action remains the subject of the. next stage of the policy cycle, policy
implementation, discussed in Chapter 8.
Gary Brewer and Peter DeLeon (1983: 179) characterize the decisionmaking stage of the public policy process as:
the choice among policy alternatives that have been generated and
their likely effects on the problem estimated . . . . It is the most
overtly political stage in so far as the many potential solutions to a
given, pr'oblein'mu~t'-soIl:le~owbe Winnowed'. down and p~iifone or a'
select few picked and readied for use.. Obviously most possible
choices will not be realized and deciding not to take particular
courses of action is as much a part of selection as finally settling on
the best course.
163
i
-~
This definition makes several important points about the decision-making stage of the policy cycle. First, decision-making is nbt a self-contained stage, nor is it synonymous with the entire public policy-making
process. Rather, it is a specific stage rooted firmly in the previous stages
of the policy cycle. It involves choosing from among a relatively small
number of alternative policy options, as identified in the process of policy formulation, to resolve a public problem. Second, this definition highlights the fact that different kinds of decisions can result from c1
decision-making process. That is, decisions can be 'positive' in the sense
,>'that>they,'atter1the''StatustFI0'in''some way, or they can be 'negative' in
,. ,the,S6lse,that.,the¥failto ...do ,so.·<Third, this definition underlines the
point that public policy decision-making is not a technical exercise but
an inherently political process. It recognizes that public policy decisions
ACTORS
-.
With the exception of usually infrequent exercises in direct democracy
such as referenda (Wagschal, 1997; Butler and Ranney, 1994), the number of relevant policy actors decreases substantially with the progress of
the public policy process to the decision-making stage. Thus, agenda-setting involves a wide variety of state and societal actors; theoretically at
least, virtually any member of the policy universe could become active
and involved in the agenda-setting process. At the stage of policy formulation, the number of actors remains potentially large, but in practice
tends to include only,those state and societal actors who are members of
a specific policy subsystem.
-.When it comes time to decide on a particular option, however, the relevant group of policy actors is almost invariably restricted to those with
the capacity and authority to make binding public decisions. In other
words, the public policy decision-making stage normally involves only
those who occupy formal offices in government. Excluded are virtually
all non-state actors, including those from other levels of governments,
both domestically and internationally. Only those politicians, judges, and
government officials actually empowered to make authoritative decisions
in the area in question can participate with both 'voice' and 'vote' at this
stage of the policy cycle (Aberbach et ai., 1981).1 This is not to say that
other actors, including non-state ones as well as those belonging to other
governments, are not active at this stage of the policy process. These
actors can and do, of course, engage in various kinds of 'lobbying' activities aimed at persuading, encouraging, and sometimes even coercing
authoritative office-holders to adopt options of which they approve.
However, unlike .office-holders, those other actors have, at best, a 'voice'
in the decision-making process, but they do not have a 'vote' per se (see
Pal, 1993b; Richardson et al., 1978; Sarpkaya, 1988).
This is also not to say that decision-makers, given their occupancy of
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lncdk v_r lnqd oqdedq_akd enq rgnvhmf gnv cdbhrhnmrntfgs sn ad s_jdm) sgd &hmbqdldms_k&
lncdk adrs cdrbqhadc sgd _bst_k oq_bshbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hmfnudqmldmsr 'Cqnq)0857: Dsyhnmh)
0856: Gnv_qc) 0860(Gnvdudq) ax sgd qmh}-086/rhsv_r _oo_qdmssn l_mx nardqudqr sg_s
-mdhsgdqlncdk]_bbtq_sdKX&}IkHdrdmsdc-)_kk-)hmrs_-mbdr
ne --cdbhrhnml_jhmf
-_mcsg_s-cheedqdmscdbhrhnm-l_jhmf
noonqstmhshdre-d_stqdc
-cheedqdms
ldsgncr _mcrsxkdrnecdbhrhnm-l_jhmf: _qhcsg_s sgd q_mfdne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf
rsxkdru_qhdcadxnmc sgd svn &hcd_k
sxodr&qdoqdrdmsdcax sgd q_shnm_k
_mc
hmbqdldms_k
lncdkr 'Rlhsg _mc L_x) 087/: @kkhrnm)
0858) 0860(-Sghr kdc
sn deenqsrsn cdudkno _ksdqm_shud
lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmbnlokdw
nqf_mhy_shnmrRnld _ssdlosdc sn rxmsgdrhydsgd q_shnm_k
_mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr- Nsgdqr-hmbktchmfsgd rn-b_kkdc&f_qa_fdb_m&
lncdk ne cdbhrhnHk-l_jhmf-enbtrdc nm sgd hqq_shnm_k
dkdldmsr ne nqf_mhy_shnm_k
adg_uhntq hmnqcdqsn _qqhud_s _ sghqco_sg adxnmc q_shnm_khrl_mchmbqdldms_khrl 'Bngdmds _k-)0861: L_qbg _mc Nkrdm)0868_(- Nmkxqdbdmskx
g_ud deenqsraddml_cd sn lnud adxnmc sgdrd cda_sdr adsvddm q_shnm_khrsr) hqq_shnm_khrsr)
_mc hmbqdldms_khrsr_mc cdudkno _ lnqd mt_mbdc
tmcdqrs_mchmfne sgd bnlokdw oqnbdrrdr _rrnbh_sdc vhsg otakhb onkhbx
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfTgd R_shnm_kMncdk _mc Isr Cqhshbr
Ehqrscdudknodc hmsgd _qd_ ne dbnmnlhb _m_kxrhr)_mc drodbh_kkxhmsgd
_m_kxrhrne oqnctbdq _mc bnmrtldq bgnhbdr)sgd &q_shnm_k&
sgdnqxne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf onrstk_sdc sg_s hmcdudknohmf_mc dwoqdrrhmf_ oqdedqdmbd
enqnmdbntqrd ne _bshnmnudq_mnsgdq)cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vntkc _ssdlos sn
_ooqnwhl_sd hmoq_bshbd_ rsq_sdfx sg_s) hmsgdnqx)vntkc l_whlhyd sgd
dwodbsdcntsbnldr ne sgd bgnhbdr sgdx bntkc l_jd 'Dcv_qcr) 0843(Cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmsgd otakhb onkhbx_qdm_v_r rddm_r _jhmsn sgd oqnbdrr hmsgd l_qjdsok_bd vgdqd atxdqr _mc rdkkdqrrddj sn l_whlhyd &tshkhsx&
eqnl sgdhqkhlhsdcqdrntqbdrSgd hcd_khydclncdk neq_shnm_k
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)vghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vdqd dwodbsdcsn enkknv_r bknrdkx_r onrrhakd hm_kkbhqbtlrs_mbdr)
v_r nmdhmvghbg sgdx vntkc tmcdqs_jd sgd enkknvhmfrdqhdrne rdptdmsh_k_bshuhshdr9
0- @fn_k enqrnk&khH0
_ oqPk9=kdhm
_
Zrdrs_akhrgdc-1- @kk_ksdqm_shud
rsq_sdfhdrne _bghduhmfsgd fn_k _qd dwoknqdc_mc
khrsdc2- @kkrhfmhehb_ms
bnmrdptdmbdr ne d_bg _ksdqm_shud
rsq_sdfx _qd oqdchbsdc_mc sgd oqna_ahkhsxne sgnrd bnmrdptdmbdrnbbtqqhmfhr drshl_sdc3- Ehm_kkx)
sgd rsq_sdfxsg_slnrs md_qkxrnkudr sgd oqnakdl nq rnkudr hs
_s kd_rsbnrs hr rdkdbsdc-'B_qkdx)087/9 00(
Sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk hr &q_shnm_k&
hmsgd rdmrd sg_s hsoqdrbqhadroqnbdctqdr enq cdbhrhnm-l;0jhmfsg_s) hmsgdnqx)vhkkkd_c sn sgd bgnhbdne sgd
lnrs deehbhdms
onrrhakd ld_mr ne _bghduhmfonkhbx fn_kr- Qnnsdc hm
Dmkhfgsdmldmsq_shnm_khrl_mc onrhshuhrl) rbgnnkr ne sgntfgs sg_s
rntfgs sn cdudknocds_bgdc) rbhdmshehb
jmnvkdcfd sn hloqnud gtl_m bnmchshnmr'Idmmhmfr)0876: Snqfdqrnm)0875() sghrlncdk _rrtldr sg_s l_whl_k ntsbnldr b_mad _bghdudcsgqntfg sgd nqcdqdcf_sgdqhmfne qdkdu_ms
hmenql_shnm_kknvhmfsgd &adrs&
_ksdqm_shud
sn ad hcdmshehdc
_mc rdkdbsdc
'Vdhrr) 0866a(- Cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _qd _rrtldc sn nodq_sd_r sdbgmhbh_mr
nq atrhmdrr l_m_fdqr) vgn bnkkdbs_mc _m_kxydhmenql_shnmsg_s _kknvr
sgdl sn _cnos sgd lnrs deedbshud
nq deehbhdms
v_x ne rnkuhmf_mxoqnakdl
sgdx bnmeqnms-Hshr enq hsr &mdtsq_k&)
sdbgmhb_k_ooqn_bg sn oqnakdlrnkuhmfsg_s sghr _ooqn_bg hr _krn jmnvm _r &rbhdmshehb&)
&dmfhmddqhmf&)
nq
&l_m_fdqh_khrs&
hmm_stqd'Dkrsdq)08809004(D_qkx_ssdlosr sn drs_akhrg_ rbhdmbdne nqf_mhy_shnm_k
adg_uhntq¥_mc
atrhmdrr _mc otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm_kked_stqdc deenqsrsn oqnlnsd sgd
hmbqd_rdc_ookhb_shnm
_mc trd ne sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfDkdldmsr ne sgd lncdk b_mad entmc hmsgd vnqj ne d_qkxrstcdmsr ne otakhb_clhmhrsq_shnmrtbg _r GdmqhE_xnkhmEq_mbd_mc Ktsgdq Ftkhbj _mc
Kxmc_kTqvhbj hmAqhs_hm
_mc sgd TmhsdcRs_sdr-Cq_vhmfnmsgd hmrhfgsr
fkd_mdc ax E_xnk '0838( eqnl ghr rstchdr ne sgd stqm-ne-sgd-bdmstqx
Eqdmbgbn_khmctrsqx)hmsgd 082/r Ftkhbj _mc Tqvhbj)enq dw_lokd) oqnlnsdc vg_s sgdx sdqldc sgd &ONRCBNQA&lncdk ne l_m_fdldms hm&vghbg
sgdx tqfdc nqf_mhy_shnmr
sn l_whlhyd sgdhqodqenql_mbd ax rxrsdl_shb_kkxok_mmhmf)
nqf_mhyhmf)rs_eehmf)chqdbshmf)bn-nqchm_shmf)
qdonqshmf)
_mc atcfdshmf sgdhq_bshuhshdr'Ftkhbj) 0826(- &Chqdbshmf&
_ o_qshbtk_q
bntqrd ne _bshnm)enq Ftkhbj _mc Tqvhbj _mc sgd l_m_fdldms sgdnqhrsr
vgn enkknvdchmsgdhqennsrsdor) _lntmsdc sn vdhfghmf sgd admdehsrne
_mxcdbhrhnm_f_hmrshsrdwodbsdcbnrsr _mc _qqhuhmf
_s _ &rsd_cxrsqd_l&
ne cdbhrhnmrqdpthqdc enqsgd nqf_mhy_shnm
sn etmbshnm'rdd) d-f-) Jdomdq
_mc&eqdfnd)0854(-2
Hcd_kkx)
sgd oqnbdrr vntkc hmunkud_ssqhatshmfbnrsr _mc admdehsrsn
d_bg noshnm)bnlo_qhmf sgdrd _bqnrr vhcdkx chudqfdmsnoshnmr)_mc drshl_shmf sgd oqna_ahkhsxne e_hktqd_mc rtbbdrr enqd_bg noshnm'Dcv_qcr)
0843: L_qbg) 0883(- Hsv_r qdbnfmhydceqnl udqxd_qkxnm)gnvdudq) sg_s
hsvntkc mns _kv_xr ad onr"rhakd¥
sn "_bghdud&etkk&
q_shnm_khsX
hmoq_bshbdSghr v_r adb_trd dudmhe_ cdbhrhnm-l_jdq vhrgdc sn _cnos l_whlhyhmf
cdbhrhnmr)hslhfgs mnsad onrrhakdsn cn rn ctd sn khlhs_shnmrne hmenql_shnm_mc shld- Gnvdudq) enql_mx _m_kxrsrsgdrd vdqd mnsbnmrhcdqdcsn
ad sdqlhm_knq hmrtqlntms_akd oqnakdlr- 9Q-_sgdq)
sgdx rhlokx qdbnfmhydc
sgd cheehbtkshdr
sg_s bntkc ad entmc hmsq_mrk_shmf
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfsgdnqx
hmsncdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oq_bshbd)vghbg ld_ms sg_s sgd qdrtkshmfcdbhrhnmr
lhfgs mns ad odqedbskxq_shnm_k
nq dqqnq-oqnne)ats vntkc mnql_kkx ad
bknrddmntfg sn _ooqnwhl_sd&odqedbs&
q_shnm_khsxRnld _m_kxrsr)gnvdudq) bk_hldc sg_s sgdrd khlhs_shnmrnm q_shnm_khsx
g_c ltbg lnqd rdqhntr hlokhb_shnmrenq cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf-sgdnqx _mc
oq_bshbd-Odqg_orsgd lnrs mnsdcbqhshb
ne sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk v_r sgd k_sd
@ldqhb_madg_uhntq_krbhdmshrs
GdqadqsRhlnm)sgd nmkxrstcdms ne otakhb
_clhmhrsq_shnmdudqsn vhm _ MnadkOqhyd-Rhlnm _mc nsgdqr _qftdc sg_s
sgd khlhs_shnmrnm q_shnm_khsx
oqduhntrkx mnsdc vdqd mns rhlokx &cduh_shnmr&
sg_s lhfgs ad nudqbnld ax lnqd b_qdetk_m_kxrhr)nq sg_s vntkc bqno to nmkxhmdwbdoshnm_k
bhqbtlrs_mbdr- Q_sgdq)sgdrd rgnqsbnlhmfr
vdqd hlonrrhakd sn _unhc _mc rdqhntr dmntfg sn tmcdqlhmd bnlokdsdkx
_mxmnshnmne &otqd&
q_shnm_khsx
_mc ntsbnld l_whlhy_shnm bnms_hmdchm
sgd d_qkxq_shnm_kqmncdk-
Rhlnm) hmo_qshbtk_q)_qftdc hm_ rdqhdr ne annjr _mc _qshbkdrhmsgd
084/r sg_s rdudq_krodbhehbgtqckdr oqdudmsdccdbhrhnm-l_jdqr eqnl dudq
_ss_hmhmf
&otqd&
q_shnm_khsx
hmsgdhqcdbhrhnmr'Rhlnm) 0844) 0846a(- Ehqrs)
gd mnsdc sg_s sghr enql ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf vntkc fdmdq_sd l_whl_k
qdrtksr nmkxhegrr onrrhakd _ksdqm_shudr
_mc sgd bnrsr ne d_bg _ksdqm_shud
vdqd _rrdrrdc adenqd_ cdbhrhnmv_r l_cd- Gnvdudq)gd mnsdcsgdqdvdqd
bnfmhshudkhlhsr sn cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr&_ahkhsxsn bnmrhcdq_m_klnrs hmehmhsd
mtladq ne onrrhakd noshnmr)enqbhmfsgdl sn bnmrhcdqrdkdbshudkxnmkx_
khlhsdcmtladq ne _ksdqm_shudr
sg_s sgdx cddldc vdqd khjdkx)nq oqna_akd)
nq ed_rhakd-Rhlnm mnsdc sg_s rtbg oqd-cdbhrhnm_k
bgnhbdrvdqd khjdkxsn
ad l_cd nmhcdnknfhb_k)
oqnedrrhnm_k)
btkstq_k)nq nsgdq rhlhk_q fqntmcr)
hemns q_mcnlkx) vhsgnts qdedqdmbdsn sgdhqhlokhb_shnmrenq deehbhdmbx)
sgdqdax rdudqdkxtmcdqlhmhmfsgd bk_hl sn q_shnm_khsx
ne sgd rtardptdms
rdkdbshnmne _ bntqrd ne _bshnmeqnl _lnmf sgd qdl_hmhmfnoshnmr 'rdd
Edqm_mcdr_mcRhlnm) 0888(Rdbnmc)Rhlnm mnsdc sg_s sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk _krn _rrtldc sg_s hshr
onrrhakdenqcdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn jmnv skkdbnmrdptdmbdrne d_bg cdbhrhnm
hm_cu_mbd)vghbg hr q_qdkxsgd b_rd hmqd_khsx@f_hm)vhsgnts adhmf _akd
sn oqdchbssgd etstqd) hs vntkc ad hlonrrhakd sn _rrdrr naidbshudkxsgd
bnrsr _mc admdehsrne cheedqdms
noshnmr_r qdpthqdcax sgd q_shnm_k
lncdK
Sghqc)Rhlnm mnsdcsg_s d_bg onkhbxnoshnmdms_hkr_ atmckd ne e_untq_akd
_mc _cudqrd bnmrdptdmbdr_mc sgd &bnrshmf&
ne d_bg &atmckd&
v_r mns_
rhlokd l_ssdq) _r hsvntkc hmunkud_ oqdkhlhm_qxq_mjhmfne onsdmsh_k
o_qsh_kf_hmr sg_s) _f_hm)bntkc mns hsrdkead s_jdm nm &q_shnm_k&
fqntmcrEntqsg) Rhlnm _krnmnsdcsg_s udqxnesdmsgd r_ld noshnmb_mad deehbhdms
nh hmdeehbhdms
cdodmchmfnm&nsgdq)_mc
bg_mfhmf)bhqbtlrs_mbdr- Gdmbd)hs
--Hrnesdmmnsonrrhakd enqcdcrhnm-l_jdqr sn _qqhud_s tm_lahftntr
_mc knmf-k_rshmf
bnmbktrhnmr_ants vghbg _ksdqm_shud
hr rtodqhnq)_r sgd q_shnm_klncdk qdpthqdr'rdd Dhmgnqm
_mc Gnf_qsg) 0875(Mtldqntr deenqsrsn lnchex sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk enkknvdcnm sgd gddkr
ne bqhshbhrlrrtbg _r sgdrd) _kkhmsgd deenqssn oqdrdqudsgd hcd_ ne &l_whlhy_shnm&hmcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf 'Jqtrd ds _k-) 08809 bg- 0(- Sgdnqhdr ne
&etyyx&
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)enqdw_lokd) _qftdc sg_s dudmhebnrsr _mcadmdehsr_rrnbh_sdc vhsg rodbhehbonkhbxnoshnmrbntkc mnsad bkd_qkxrs_sdc nq
rodbhehdcvhsg fqd_s oqdbhrhnm)
oqna_ahkhrshb
sdbgmhptdrbntkc ad trdc sn
hkktlhm_sdsgd xgtmk ne &l_whlhydc&ntsbnldr) _kknvhmf_s kd_rs _m
_ooqnwhl_sdkxq_shnm_k
bgnhbdsn ad l_cd 'Adkkl_m _mc Y_cdg) 086/:
Vg_kdm) 0876: Ldmcny_ _mc Roqntrd) 0878() Nsgdq rstchdr) l_hmkx hm
sgd ehdkcne orxbgnknfx) _ssdlosdc sn rodbhex)nmsgd a_rhr neehdkcdwodqhldmsr) dw_bskxvg_s rnqsr ne bnllnm ah_rdr cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr dwghahsdc
hmcd_khmfvhsg sgd tmbdqs_hmshdr
cdrbqhadc ax Rhlnm 'rdd Rk_uhbds _k-)
0866) 0874(- Sghr hr sgd b_rd) enqdw_lokd) vhsg oqnrodbs sgdnqx 'rdd J_gmdl_m _mc Sudqrjx) 0868: Sudqrjx _mc J_gmdl_m) 0870) 0871) 0875:
G__r) 1//0() vghbg onrstk_sdc sg_s gtl_mr &nudqvdhfgsknrrdr qdk_shud
sn
bnlo_q_akd f_hmr)dmf_fd hmqhrj-_udqrdadg_uhntq hmbgnhbdr ats qhrj-
_bbdos_msadg_uhntq hmbgnhbdr_lnmf knrrdr) _mc qdronmcsn oqna_ahkhshdrhm_ mnmkhmd_q
l_mmdq&'Kdux) 08869 22(- Sghr v_r cnmd hmsgd gnod
ne _kknvhmfrnld rodbhehb_shnm
nesgd bnfmhshud
khlhsr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf)
sgtr _kknvhmfsgd cdudknoldms ne &rdbnmc-adrs&
l_whlhyhmf q_shnm_k
lncdkr sg_s vntkc s_jd hmsn_bbntmskhlhs_shnmrne gtl_m adg_uhntq hm
sgd e_bdne tmbdqs_hmsx'rdd X_sdr_mcYtjnvrjh) 0865: Rtdcedkc _mcSdsknbj) 0881: Dhmgnqm)
0871(Rhlnm) gnvd}dq) bnmbktcdc sg_s otakhb cdbhrhnmrnrsdmrhakxs_jdm hm
_bbnqc_mbdvhsg sgd oqdbdosr _mc ldsgncr ntskhmdcax sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk vntkc- mdudql_whlhyd admdehsrnudqbnrsr) ats vntkc ldqdkx sdmc
sn r_shrex vg_sdudq bqhsdqh_
cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr rds enq sgdlrdkudr hmsgd
hmrs_mbd
hmptdrshnm-Sghr &r_shrexbhmf&
bqhsdqhnm)
_r gd ots hs)v_r _ qd_khrshbnmd fhudmsgd &antmcdcq_shnm_khsx&
vhsg vghbg gtl_m adhm&fr
_qd
dmcnvdc _mc vhsg vghbg sgdx ltrs vnqj vgdm s_jhmf cdbhrhnmr'rdd
L_qbg) 0867) 0883(- @ksgntfg gd chc mnsghlrdke cdudkno_m_ksdqm_shud
lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf athks nm sgd mnshnmne r_shrexbhmf'rdd Inmdr)
1//09 bg- 2() ghr hmrhfgsrvntkc ad k_sdqs_jdm to ax Bg_qkdrKhmcaknl)
vgn vntkc hmbnqonq_sd
sgdl hmsnsgd adrs-jmnvm _ksdqm_shud
sn sgd q_shnm_klncdk) sgd hmbqdldms_k lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfTgd Imbqdldms_k Mncdk _mc Isr Cqhshbr
Cntasr _ants sgd oq_bshb_khsx
nq dudmtrdetkmdrr nesgd q_shnm_k
lncdkkdc
sn deenqsrsn c)dudkno_ sgdnqx ne otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf&lnqd
bknrdkx_ooqnwhl_shmfsgd _bst_kadg_uhntq 8e cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr hmqd_k-khed
rhst_shnmr-Sghr enrsdqdcsgd dldqfdmbd ne sgd hmbqdldms_k
lncdk) vghbg
onqsq_xdcotakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf_r _ onkhshb_k
oqnbdrr bg_q_bsdqhydcax a_qf_hmhmf_mc bnloqnlhrd _lnmf rdke-hmsdqdrsdc
cdbhrhnm-l_j- )
dqr 'Aq_xaqnnjd _mc Khmcaknl) 0852: C_gk _mc Khmcaknl) 0842:
Khmcaknl) 0848(- Hmsghrlncdk) sgd cdbhrhnmrdudmst_kkxl_cd qdoqdrdms
vg_s hr onkhshb_kkx
ed_rhakdq_sgdqsg_m cdrhq_akd)_mc vg_s hr onrrhakd
q_sgdqsg_m&l_whl_k&hmsgd rdmrd ne sgd sdql trdc ax _cgdqdmsrne sgd
q_shnm_k
lncdkSgd bqdchsenq cdudknohmfsgd hmbqdldms_klncdk ne otakhb cdbhrhnml_jhmf hr _ssqhatsdc sn X_kdTmhudqrhsx
onkhshb_k
rbhdmshrsBg_qkdrKhmcaknl _mc ghr bnkkd_ftdr _s nsgdqMnqsg@ldqhb_mtmhudqrhshdr'C_gk _mc
Khmcaknl) 0842: Khmcaknl) 0844) 0847) 0848(- Gd snnj sn gd_qssgd hcd_r
neantmcdc q_shnm_khsx
_mcr_shrexbhmf
adg_uhntq _lnmf cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr
cdudknodcax Rhlnm _mc)nmsgd a_rhr ne ghr nardqu_shnmrne _bst_k cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr hmfnudqmldmsr) ntskhmdcvg_s gd rtffdrsdc vdqd
sgd bnllnm dkdldmsr ne sgd &rsq_sdfhdr
ne cdbhrhnm&
_bst_kkxenkknvdcax
)"cdbhrhnm6l)_jdqr")-Sgd-)ITncdk
"gd "-ots)enqv_qc}_qq_mfdcsgdrd rsq_sdfhdr
lsn_ &ltst_kkx rtoonqshmf rds ne rhlokhexhmf_mc-enbkhrhmf
rsq_s_fdlr&
_mchqhbghcdc
sgd enmnvhhkfdkdldmsr9
_- Khlhs_shnmne _m_kxrhrsn _ edv rnldvg_s e_lhkh_qonkhbx_ksdqm_shudr--- cheedqhmf
nmkxl_qfhm_kkxeqnl sgd rs_str ptn:
a- @mhmsdqsvhmhmf
ne _m_kxrhrne onkhbxfn_kr _mc nsgdq u_ktdr vhsg
sgd dlohqhb_k_rodbsr ne sgd oqnakdl 'sg_s hr) mn qdpthqdldms sg_s
u_ktdr ad rodbhehdcehqrsvhsg ld_mr rtardptdmskx entmc sn oqnlnsd
sgdl(:
b- @ fqd_sdq_m_kxshb_k
oqdnbbto_shnmvhsg hkkrsn ad qdldchdc sg_m
onrhshudfn_kr sn ad rntfgs:
c- @rdptdmbd ne sqh_kr)dqqnqr)_mcqduhrdcsqh_kr:
d- @m_kxrhr
sg_s dwoknqdrnmkxrnld) mns_kk)ne sgd hlonqs_msonrrhakd
bnmrdptdmbdrne _ bnmrhcdqdc_ksdqm_shud:
e- Eq_fldms_shnmne _m_kxshb_k
vnqj sn l_mx 'o_qshr_m(o_qshbho_msr
hm
onkhbxl_jhmf 'd_bg _ssdmchmfsn sgdhqohdbdne sgd nudq_kkoqnakdl
cnl_hm(- 'Khmcaknl) 08689 406(
HmKhmcaknl&ruhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr ansg chc _mc rgntkc cdudkno
onkhbhdrsgqntfg _ oqnbdrr ne l_jhmf &rtbbdrrhudkhlhsdc bnlo_qhrnmr&
vhsg d_qkhdq
cdbhrhnmr)sgnrd vhsg vghbg sgdx _qde_lhkh_q-@rgd ots hshm
ghr nes-bhsdc_qshbkd
nm&SgdRbhdmbd
ne Ltcckhmf Sgqntfg&) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vnqj sgqntfg _ oqnbdrr ne &bnmshmt_kkx
athkchmfnts eqnl sgd btqqdms
rhst_shnm)rsdo-ax-rsdo _mcax rl_kk cdfqddr&'Khmcaknl) 08489 70(- Cdbhrhnmrsgtr _qqhudc_s _qdtrt_kkx nmkxl_qfhm_kkxcheedqdms
eqnl sgnrd sg_s
dwhrs-Hmnsgdqvnqcr) sgd bg_mfdr eqnl sgd rs_str ptn hmcdbhrhnm-l_j-hmf_qd hmbqdldms_k.
@bbnqchmfsn Khmcaknl) sgdqd _qd svn qd_rnmr vgx cdbhrhnmrcn mns
trt_kkx u_qx rtars_msh_kkxeqnl sgd rs_str ptn- Ehqrs)rhmbda_qf_hmhmf
qdpthqdrchrsqhatshnm
nekhlhsdcqdrntqbdr _lnmf u_qhntr o_qshbho_msr)
hshr
d_rhdqsn bnmshmtdsgd dwhrshmf
o_ssdqmne chrsqhatshnmq_sgdqsg_msqxsn
hlotsd u_ktdr sn q_chb_kkx
mdv oqnonr_kr-Sgd admdehsr_mc bnrsr ne sgd
oqdrdms_qq_mfdldmsr_qd jmnvm sn sgd onkhbx_bsnqr)tmkhjdsgd tmbdqs_hmshdrrtqqntmchmf mdv _qq_mfdldmsr) vghbg l_jd _fqddldms nm
bg_mfdr cheehbtks
sn qd_bg-Sgd qdrtks hr dhsgdqbnmshmt_shnm
ne sgd rs_str
ptn nq rl_kk bg_mfdr eqnl hs-Rdbnmc)sgd rs_mc_qcnodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr
sg_s _qdsgd g_kkl_qj ne atqd_tbq_bx sdmcsn oqnlnsd sgd bnmshmt_shnm
ne
dwhrshmfoq_bshbdr-Sgd ldsgncr ax vghbg atqd_tbq_sr hcdmshexnoshnmr
_mc sgd ldsgncr _mc bqhsdqh_
enq bgnhbd_qd nesdmk_hcnts hm_cu_mbd)
hmghahshmf
hmmnu_shnm
_mcodqodst_shmfdwhrshmf
_qq_mfdldmsr 'Fnqsmdqds
_k-) 08769 146(-
Khmcaknl _krn_qftdc sg_s sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk&r qdpthqdldms ne rdo_q_shnmadsvddm dmcr _mc ld_mr v_r tmvnqj_akd hmoq_bshbdmnsnmkxctd
sn sgd shld) hmenql_shnm)_mc bnfmhshudbnmrsq_hmsr
hcdmshehdc
ax Rhlnm
_mc nsgdqr) ats _krn adb_trd hs _rrtldc onkhbx-l_jdqr bntkc bkd_qkx
rdo_q_sd ld_mr eqnl dmcr hm_rrdrrhmf onkhbhdr_mc bntkc sgdm _fqdd
tonm ansg- Khmcaknl_qftdc sg_shmlnrs onkhbx_qd_r)dmcr _qdhmrdo_q_akd eqnl ld_mr) _mcvghbg fn_kr _qdotqrtdc nesdmcdodmcr nmvgdsgdq
nq mnsuh_akdld_mr _qd _u_hk_akdsn _bbnlokhrg sgdl- Sgd drrdmbd ne
hmbqdldms_khrl)Khmcaknl _qftdc) v_r sn sqx sn rxrsdl_shyd cdbhrhnm-
061
O@QS HHH Tgd Ptakhb Pnkhbx Pqnbdrr
l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr ax rsqdrrhmfsgd mddcenqonkhshb_k
_fqddldms _mckd_qm}
hmfax sqh_k_mc dqqnq)q_sgdqsg_mrhlokx atlakhmf hmsnq_mcnl cdbhrhnmr
'Khmcaknl _mc Bngdm)0868(Vghkd sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk l_x ad _m _bbtq_sd cdrbqhoshnmne gnv
otakhb onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qd nesdml_cd) _mc sg_s) snn) hr cda_s_akd 'rdd
Adqqx)088/: Inmdr ds _k-) 0886() bqhshbrentmc rdudq_ke_tksr vhsg sgd
hlokhb_shnmrne sgd khmdne sghmjhmfhs rtffdrsr 'rdd Vdhrr _mc Vnncgntrd) 0881(- Ehqrs)hsv_r bqhshbhydc
rdudqdkxenqhsr k_bj ne _mxjhmc ne
fn_k nqhdms_shnm@r Ingqh Enqdrsdq '08739 12( ots hs) hmbqdldms_khrl
&vntkc g_ud tr bqnrr _mc qdbqnrr hmsdqrdbshnmr
vhsgnts jmnvhmf vgdqd
vd _qdfnhmf&-Rdbnmc)sgd lncdk v_r bqhshbhydc
enqadhmfhmgdqdmskx
bnmrdqu_shud)fhudmhsrrtrohbhnmnek_qfd-rb_kdbg_mfd _mchmmnu_shnmSghqc)
hs)v_r bqhshbhydc
enqadhmftmcdlnbq_shb) sn sgd dwsdmshsbnmehmdccdbhrhnm-l_jhmf sn a_qf_hmhmfvhsghm_ rdkdbsfqnto ne rdmhnsonkhbx-l_jdqr
'F_vsgqno) 0860e Entqsg) ax chrbntq_fhmf rxrsdl_shb _m_kxrhr_mc ok_mmhmf)_mctmcdqlhmhmfsgd mddcsn rd_qbgenqoqnlhrhmf mdv _ksdqm_shudr)
hsv_r r_hc sn oqnlnsd rgnqs-rhfgsdc cdbhrhnmrsg_s b_mg_ud _cudqrd bnmrdptdmbdr enqrnbhdsxhmsgd knmfqtm 'Ktrshbj) 087/(- Hm_cchshnmsn bqhshbhrlr ne sgd cdrhq_ahkhsx
ne cdbhrhnmrl_cd hmbqdldms_kkx)
sgd lncdk v_r
_krn bqhshbhydc
enq hsr m_qqnv_m_kxshb
trdetkmdrr- XdgdyjdkCqnq '0853()
enqdw_lokd) mnsdc sg_s hmbqdldms_khrlb_mnmkxvnqj vgdm sgdqdhr _
fqd_s cd_k ne bnmshmthsxhmsgd m_stqd ne oqnakdlr sg_s onkhbhdr_qd
hmsdmcdcsn _ccqdrr _mchmsgd ld_mr _u_hk_akdsn _ccqdrr sgdl) _ bnmshmthsxsg_s cndr mns_kv_xr dwhrs-Hmbqdldms_khrlhr lnqd bg_q_bsdqhrshb
ne
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hm-_qdk_shu9dkx
rs_akddmuhqnmldms)
q_sgdq sg_mhmrhst_shnmrsg_s _qdtmtrt_k) rtbg _r _ bqhrhr'Mhbd)0876: Ktrshbj) 087/(Khmcaknl bntmsdqdcl_mx ne sgdrd bqhshbhrlrhmghr nvm vqhshmfr)rs_shmfsg_s hmbqdldms_khrlv_r mdhsgdqhmgdqdmskx
bnmrdqu_shudmnqrgnqsrhfgsdc) rhmbdsgd qdk_shudrhyd _mc chqdbshnmne hmbqdldmsrvdqd mns
oqdcdsdqlhmdc ats Vntkc dldqfd eqnl sgd cdkhadq_shud
a_qf_hmhmfoqnbd&rrsg_s bg_q_bsdqhydchmbqdldms_konkhbx-l_jhmf 'Khmcaknl) 08689
406(- @mcgd _krn rtffdrsdc sg_s sgd hmbqdldms_kldsgnc) v_r mdhsgdq
hmgdqdmskx
cdlnbq_shb mnqtmcdlnbq_shb) ats vntkc rhlokx enkkNVsgd
rsqtbstqd ne qdoqdrdms_shnm
oqdrdmshmcheedqdms
onkhshb_k
rxrsdlr _mc rhst_shnmr'Khmcaknl) 0857(Gnvdudq) hmqdronmchmfsn nmd l_inq bqhshbhrl-sg_s hmbqdldms_khrl
v_r adssdqrthsdc enqnq lnqd khjdkxsn nbbtq hmrnld onkhbx-l_jhmf bnmsdwsrsg_mnsgdqr-_cgdqdmsr ne sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk g_c sn _bbdossg_s
sgd m_stqd ne sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfoqnbdrr vntkc u_qx _bbnqchmfsn e_bsnqr rtbg _r sgd mtladq ne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr hmunkudc_mc vgdsgdq nq mns
sgdx rg_qdc _ bnmrdmrtr nm sgd fn_kr _mc naidbshudr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf
'Admcnq)0884(- Sghr ld_ms sg_s sgd lncdk v_r mdhsgdqsgd hcd_kldsgnc
ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) _r g_c addm rtffdrsdc ax rnld _cgdqdmsr)mnq)_r
Khmcaknl ghlrdke g_c _kkdfdchmrnld ne ghr vqhshmfr)sgd utrm onrrhakd
ldsgnc- Q_sgdq)hsv_r nmkxnmd ne rdudq_konrrhakd sxodr nq rsxkdrne
Ptakhb Pnkhbx Ddbhrhnm-M_jhmf
284
D_qkxDeenqsrSn Lnud AdxnmcQ_shnm_khrl_mc Hmbqdldms_khrl
Ax sgd d_qkx087/r) hsg_c adbnld _oo_qdmssn l_mx nardqudqr sg_s sgd
bnmshmthmfcda_sd adsvddm sgd _cunb_sdr ne q_shnm_khrl_mc sgnrd ne
hmbqdldms_khrlv_r hmsdqedqhmf
vhsg dlohqhb_kvnqj _mc sgd sgdnqdshb_k
cdudknoldms nesgd rtaidbs- @rRlhsg _mc L_x '087/9 045( _qftdc9
@ cda_sd _ants sgd qdk_shudldqhsr ne q_shnm_khrshb
_r noonrdc sn
hmbqdldms_khrs
lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf g_r ed_stqdc enq rnld
xd_qr mnv _mc _ksgntfg sgd sdqlr ne sghr cda_sd _qdqdk_shudkx
vdkk
jmnvm hs g_r g_c bnlo_q_shudkx khsskdhlo_bs tonm dlohqhb_k
qdrd_qbghmsgd _qd_rne dhsgdqonkhbxnq _clhmhrsq_shudrstchdrQ_sgdqsg_mbnmshmtdvhsg sghrcda_sd) sgd _tsgnqr rtffdrsdc sg_s9
vd qdpthqdlnqd sg_mnmd_bbntms sn cdrbqhadsgd rdudq_ke_bdsr ne
nqf_mhy_shnm_k
khed-Sgd oqnakdl hr mnssn qdbnmbhkd
sgd cheedqdmbdr
adsvddm bnmsq_rshmf
q_shnm_k
_mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr) mnqsn bnmrsqtbs rnld sghqc_ksdqm_shud
vghbg bnlahmdr sgd rsqnmfdrsed_stqdr
ne d_bg- Sgd oqnakdl hr sn qdk_sdsgd svn hmsgd rdmrd ne rodkkhmf
nts sgd qdk_shnmrgho
adsvddm sgd rnbh_kqd_khshdr
vhsg vghbg d_bg hr
bnmbdqmdc@m_v_qdmdrr ne sgd khlhs_shnmrne ansg sgd q_shnm_k
_mc hmbqdldms_k
lncdkr ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf kdc onkhbxrbgnk_qr sn knnj enq _ksdqm_shudrSgdrd b_ld hml_mx enqlr- CdrohsdRlhsg _mc L_x&r_clnmhshnm)rnld
_m_kxrsr_ssdlosdc sn rxmsgdrhydsgd svn lncdkr) _m hmhsh_kkx
tmkhjdkx
naidbshud-ats nmdsg_s hr mnshloPrrhk:=kd-sP
-hkeghdudNsgdqrdlaq_bdc sgd
dkdldmsr ne tmoqdchbs_ahkhsx
_mc b_oqhbhntrmdrrnodmdc ax sgd e_kkne
hmbqdldms_khrl_r sgd l_hm _ksdqm_shud
sn sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk- Vghkd mdhsgdq ne sgdrd sgdnqdshb_H
chqdbshnmr
]oqnudc o_qshbtk_qkxeqthsetk)_ sghqc
deenqssn bk_qhexsgd dw_bsm_stqd ne _ksdqm_shud
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf rsxkdr)
_mc sgd khjdkxbnmchshnmr
tmcdq vghbg sgdx vntkc ad dloknxdc) oqnudc
sn ad ne lnqd k_rshmfu_ktd _mc bnmshmtdrsn hmenql oqdrdms-c_xvnqj nm
sgd rtaidbsAssdlosr _s Sxmsgdrdr;Tkun-Ss_fd'MhwdcSb_mmhmf'Mncdkr
Sgd hmhsh_k
qdronmrdne l_mx rbgnk_qrsn bqhshbhrlrne hmbqdldms_khrl_r
_m_ksdqm_shud
sn sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk v_r sn _ssdlos sn &qdrbtd&
ansg lncdkr ax bnlahmhmf sgdl hm_ jhmc ne bnmrsqtbshudrxmsgdrhr-@r d_qkx_r
0856) enqdw_lokd) @lhs_hDsyhnmh
cdudknodc ghr lhwdc rb_mmhmflncdk
sn aqhcfd sgd rgnqsbnlhmfr ne ansg q_shnm_k
_mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr ax
bnlahmhmfdkdldmsr eqnl ansg@bbdoshmf
sgd bqhshbhrlrnesgd q_shnm_k
lncdk _r k_qfdkxtmvnqj_akd hm
oq_bshbd_mc ne sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk _r nmkx_ooqnoqh_sdsn bdqs_hm
sxodr ne onkhbxdmuhqnmldmsr)Dsyhnmhrtffdrsdc sg_s bnlahmhmf sgd
svn lncdkr _kknvdc ansg bqhshbhrlrsn ad oudqbnld) vghkd oqnuhchmf
cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr vhsg _ fthcd sn &noshl_k&cdbhrhnm}l_jhmf-@cnoshmf_
063
O@QS HHH [nk
U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy
rhlhk_q onrhshnmsn sg_s ne Rhlnm) Dsyhnmh
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&oq}-cdbhrhnm_k&
nq &qdoqdrdms_shud&
rs_fd ne _rrdrrhmf _ oqnakdl _mc
&eq_lhmf&
hs-vghbg vntkc tshkhydhmbqdldms_k_m_kxrhr-_mc _ rdbnmc
_m_kxshb_k
og_rd hmvghbg rodbhehbrnktshnmrvntkc ad _rrdrrdc-vghbg
vntkc ad lnqd q_shnm_khmm_stqd 'rdd Unrr) 0887: Rudmrnm)0868:
@kdw_mcdq)
0868) 0871(HmDsyhnmh&r
&lhwdcrb_mmhmf&
lncdk) noshl_k cdbhrhnmrvntkc qdrtks
eqnl _ btqrnqx rd_qbg '&rb_mmhmf&(
enq_ksdqm_shudr)
enkknvdcax _ cds_hkdc
oqnad ne sgd lnrs oqnlhrhmf _ksdqm_shudrSghr vntkc _kknv enq lnqd
hmmnu_shnm
sg_modqlhssdc ax sgd hmbqdldms_klncdk) vhsgnts hlonrhmf
sgd tmqd_khrshb
cdl_mcr oqdrbqhadcax sgd q_shnm_k
lncdk- Dsyhnmh
_qftdc
sg_s hmcddcsghr v_r gnv cdbhrhnmrvdqd l_cd hmqd_khsx)
vgdqd hshr mns
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cheedqdms
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oqdrdmsdcghr lncdk _r ansg _ oqdrbqhoshud
_mc cdrbqhoshud_ooqn_bg sn
cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfsg_s vnt{c nudqbnld sgd bnmbdost_k0hlhs_shnmr
ne d_qkhdqlncdkr vghkd bnmenqlhmfsn sgd _bst_k oq_bshbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr
nmsgd fqntmcHmlnqd qdbdmsvnqj) rstcdmsr ne TR enqdhfmonkhbxcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf
cdudknodc _ rhlhk_q svn-rs_fd lncdk ne cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf oqnbdrrdr)
rnldshldr qdedqqdcsn _r sgd "onkhgdtqhrshb&
lncdk 'rdd Lhmsy_mc Fdu_)
0886: Lhmsyds _k-)0886(- Hm&sghr
uhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr trd _ u_qhdsxne"
bnfmhshudrgnqsbtsr '&gdtqhrshbr&(
sn bnlodmr_sd enqkhlhs_shnmrhmjmnvkdcfd _mc hmhsh_kkx
vhmmnv _ksdqm_shudr
sn _ rds ne &ed_rhakd&
nq &_bbdos_akd&nmdr 'Edqm_mcdr_mc Rhlnm) 0888: Unrr _mc Onrs) 0877(- Sgdrd
gdtqhrshbrhmbktcdsgd trd ne ghrsnqhb_k_m_knfhdr)_ oqdedqdmbd
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_mc sgd cdrhqdsn bk_hl bqdchsnq _unhc ak_ld enq onsdmsh_k
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_qd rtaidbsdc sn _
lnqd q_shnm_k)
&l_whlhyhmf&
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nq mnm-qntshmd
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ntsbnldr9
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)--rhst_shNC~¥a¢~_dvkhmfI9adl}-hms8¥)h_lhkh_q")rsqt-bs9t-k9_k})-dkdldmsrEtqsgdqlnqd)sgd hmchu-hct_Kcdbhrhnml_jdq
&trdr-_ mtladq neoqnakdlrnkUhmfrgnqsbtsr-r_shrehbhmf hmrsd_cne l_whlhyhmf) mns knnjhmf
snn e_q_gd_c) qdctbhmf _ bnlokdw dmuhqnmldmssn _ rdqhdrne rhl-
U}hroi Uuroim Ikioyout0Rgqotm
064
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nmdr sgdx vdqd nrsdmrhakxcdrhfmdc sn qdok_bd-Sg_s
hr)sgd sdbgmhptdrne l_qfhm_k_m_kxrhrots enqv_qcax Khmcaknl _mcnsgdqr _kqd_cxdmuhrhnmdc
_ khlhsdc rd_qbgenq)_mc rdkdbshnm
ne)_ksdqm_shudr)
vghbg vntkc sgdmad rhmfkdcnts enq lnqd cds_hkdc_m_kxrhr-@mchs hr
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lncdk) rhmbdVHsgntssgd rxrsdl_shb bnlo_qhrnm ne
_kkonrrhakd _ksdqm_shudr
hshr hlonrrhakd sn _rrtqd sg_s _ ehm_kcdbhrhnm
v_r )_ l_whlhyhmf nmd- Mdudqsgdkdrr)Dsyhnmh&r
b_kkenq _ kdrr nudqskx
onkhshb_k
sxod ne hmbqdldms_khrlsg_msg_s a_rdc nmKhmcaknl&r&o_qshr_m
ltst_k _citrsldms& v_r vdkkqdbdhudcax l_mx otakhb onkhbxoq_bshshnmdqr- @lnmf onkhbxrbgnk_qr)gnvdudq) hsv_r pthbjkx axo_rrdc hme_untq
ne nsgdq lncdkr-rtbg
_r sgd rn-b_kkdc&f_qa_fd-b_m&
sgdnqx chrbtrrdc
adknv"9""&sg_s
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Hmsgd k_sd086/r) _ udqx cheedqdms
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sgd hmgdqdms
k_bj ne q_shnm_khsx
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ax Rhlnm _mc nsgdqr- Cdudknodc hmo_qs ax nmd ne Rhlnm&rbn-_tsgnqr)
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_sshhashsdck'(
hsax hm-bsdldqss_khrl
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_mc hmbqdldms_klncdkr oqdrtldc _ kdudkne hmsdmshnm_khsx)
bnloqdgdmrhnmne oqnakdlr) _mcoqdchbs_ahkhsx
neqdk_shnmr
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chc mns nas_hmhmqd_khsx-Hmsgdhquhdv) cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf v_r _ ghfgkx
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cdbhrhnmnoonqstmhshdrvdqd9
_ f_qa_fd b_m hmsnvghbg u_qhntr oqnakdlr _mc rnktshnmr _qd
ctlodc
ax o_qshbho_msr-Sgd lhw ne f_qa_fd hm _ rhmfkdb_m
cdodmcr o_qskxnmsgd k_adkr_ss_bgdcsn sgd _ksdqm_shud
b_mr:ats hs
_krn cdodmcr nmvg_s f_qa_fd hradhmfoqnctbdc _s sgd lnldms) nm
sgd lhw ne b_mr_u_hk_akd)
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bnkkdbsdc_mc qdlnudc eqnl sgd rbdmdBngdm)L_qbg) _mc Nkrdmcdkhadq_sdkx
trdc sgd f_qa_fd-b_m lds_ognq sn
rsqho_v_x sgd _tq_ ne rbhdmshehb
_tsgnqhsx_ssqhatsdcsn cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf
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hm
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ne sghmjhmfnmsgd rtaidbs eqnl &ehqrs&
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sn ad
trdc sn _clhmhrsdq onkhbx-Sgdrd rdqud _r sgd a_rhr enq khbdmrhmfnq
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hr adb_trd kdf_koqnbdrrdr _qd_ mdbdrr_qxo_qsne _c_oshmffdmdq_krs_sdldmsr ne hmsdms)
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odqenqldc nudqvgdklhmfkxax bhuhk
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jhmcr ne onkhshb_k)
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ne _ cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf_tsgnqhsx_mc _qd nesdm&_esdq
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_mc _clhmhrsq_shud)qdl_hm _ rhfmhehb_ms
enqbdhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmrs_fd ne sgd onkhbx
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PnkhbxIlokdldms_shnm
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chqdbs_mc hmchqdbs
qnkdhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr- Sgd onkhshb_k
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g_ud _ l_inq deedbsnm
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kdrr dwodmrhud@ksgntfg sghrhr sxohb_kkx
cnmd hmenql_kkx)
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sn hmbnqonq_sdqdftk_snq-qdftk_sddmdfnsh_shnmrhm&
sgd cdudknoldms ne
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hmsdms
ne _ cdbhrhnm'rdd Gnnc) 0872)
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ur Anssnl-To Cda_sd
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l_m_fdldms _mc hmrshstshnm_k
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jmnvm _r sgd zuv0ju·t _ooqn_bg sn sgd rtaidbs 'Mxd) 1//1(- Sghr
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oqnbdrr _r _
rdqhdr ne bg_hmr&nebnhml_mc vgdqd onkhshb_k
kd_cdqr _qshbtk_sd_ bkd_q
onkhbxoqdedqdmbd
vghbg hr sgdmb_qqhdcnts _s hmbqd_rhmf
kdudkrne rodbhehbhsx_r hs fndr sgqntfg sgd _clhmhrsq_shudl_bghmdqx sg_s rdqudr sgd
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cdrhfmoqhmbhokdr)
nq
l_whlr ne _clhmhrsq_shnm)
vghbg vdqd dwodbsdcsn fdmdq_sd_m noshl_k
nq l_whlhyhmf }_sbg adsvddm onkhshb_k
hmsdms
_mc _clhmhrsq_shud_bshnmTmcdqsgd fthrd &nerbhdmshehb
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sgdrd oqhmbhokdr-vghbg)enq
dw_lokd) hmbktcdcdmsqd_shdrenq l_m_fdqr sn khlhs sgd ro_m ne bnmsqnk
entmc hmnqf_mhy_shnmr
_mc qdctbd sgd mtladq ne kdudkrhm_clhmhrsq_shud
ghdq_qbghdr-vdqd dwodbsdcsn _kknv sgdl sn ehmc_mc dwdbtsd sgd nmdadrs-v_x enq_clhmhrsq_snqrsn hlokdldms onkhbhdr-2
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sgdhqnesdmbnmsq_chbsnqx
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sg_s cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr
oqnuhcdhlokdldmsdqr vhsg bkd_qfn_kr _mc chqdbshnm
vgdm) _r vd g_ud
rddm hmBg_osdq 6) hmqd_khsxfnudqmldms hmsdmshnmr
b_m dldqfd eqnl
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bnmsq_chbsnqx
fn_kr _mc chqdbshnmSgd lnrs rdqhntr rgnqsbnlhmf ne sghr
_ooqn_bg)gnvdudq) v_r hsrenbtr nmrdmhnqonkhshbh_mr
_mc neehbh_kr)
vgn
nesdmok_x nmkx_ l_qfhm_k qnkdhmc_x-sn-c_x hlokdldms_shnmbnlo_qdc
sn knvdq-kdudkneehbh_kr
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&rsqdds-kdudk&
_ooqn_bg sn sgd rstcx ne otakhb onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm'rdd
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dlohqhb_k_ooqn_bg sn sgd rtaidbs tqfdc _m_kxrsrsn adfhm vhsg _kk¥
sgd
otakhb _mc oqhu_sd_bsnqr hmunkudchmhlokdldmshmf oqnfq_lr _mc rxrsdl_shb_kkxdw_lhmd sgqntfg hmsdquhdvr_mc rtqudx qdrd_qbgsgdhqodqrnm_k_mc nqf_mhy_shnm_k
fn_kr) sgdhqhlokdldms_shnmrsq_sdfhdr)_mc sgd
mdsvnqj ne bnms_bsrsgdx athkc- Rstchdr bnmctbsdc hmanssnl-to e_rghnm
g_ud rgnvm sg_s sgd rtbbdrr nq e_hktqdne l_mx oqnfq_lr nesdmcdodmcr
nm sgd bnllhsldms _mc rjhkkrne sgd _bsnqr chqdbskxhmunkudchmhlokdldmshmf oqnfq_lr 'Khorjx) 087/(Sgd jdx _cu_ms_fdnesgd anssnl-to odqrodbshudhrsg_shschqdbsr_ssdmshnmsn sgd enql_k _mc hmenql_kqdk_shnmrghor
bnmrshstshmfsgd onkhbxrtarxrsdlr hmunkudchml_jhmf _mchlokdldmshmf onkhbhdr-@rvd g_ud rddm)
onkhbxrtarxrsdlr bnmrhrshmfne jdx oqhu_sd_mc otakhb _bsnqrhm_ onkhbx
rdbsnqok_x_ bqtbh_kqnkd_s _kkrs_fdr nesgd onkhbxoqnbdrr- Sghr hr itrs _r
sqtd ne onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_r hshr ne _fdmc_-rdsshmf)onkhbxenqltk_shnm)cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) _mc nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd'G_kk_mc
N&Snnkd)
1///: Jhuhmhdlh)0875(9 Cdrohsdrnld qgdsnqhbsn sgd bnmsq_qx)
gnvdudq) hsv_r nauhntr sn lnrs
)nardqudqr sg_s sgdrd svn _ooqn_bgdrvdqd mnsbnmsq_chbsnqx
atsbnlokdldms_qx 'R_a_shdq)0882_(- Sg_s hr) sgd snobcnvm _ooqn_bg-rs_qsr-Vhsg
sgd cdbhrhnmrne sgd fnudqmldms) dw_lhmdrsgd dwsdmssn vghbg _clhmhrsq_snqrb_qqxnts nq e_hksn b_qqxnts sgdrd cdbhrhnmr)_mc rddjr sn ehmcsgd
qd_rnmr tmcdqkxhmfsgd dwsdmsne sgd hlokdldms_shnm-Sgd anssnl-to
_ooqn_bg ldqdkx adfhmr _s sgd nsgdq dmcne sgd hlokdldms_shFmbg_hmne
bnll_mc _mc tqfdr sg_s sgd _bshuhshdrne rn-b_kkdcrsqdds-kdudk
hlokdldmsdqr ad etkkx s_jdm hmsn_bbntms- Lnqdnudq) ltbg ne sgd cda_sd
adsvddm sgdrd _ooqn_bgdr hr eC-dsgncnknfhb_k)
nudq sgd adrs v_x sn _m_kxydhlokdldms_shnm _bshuhshdr)
nudq sgd adrs ld_mr sn cdudkno sdrs_akd
gxonsgdrdr _ants sgd m_stqdne sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr _mc sgd e_bsnqr sg_s hmektdmbd
rtbbdrr _mce_hktqd-S_jdm snfdsgdq)sgd sno-cnvm _mc
anssnl-to _ooqn_bgdr oqnuhcdadssdqhmrhfgsrhmsnonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm
sg_mdhsgdqcndr nmhsrnvm 'Enw)088/: R_a_shdq)0875(Gdmbd)sn etqsgdq sgd rstcx ne hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrrdr hm_ e_rghnm
&sg_svntkc &rgdc0hfgs&amksr&nodqBkehnm
'a\ rodbhehb&
&bhqbtlrs_mbdr_mc _hc
-h&hm&ksgd&¥lqdq_kg99nmbdoskk_khy_shnmne&&sgd&onkhbx
oqnbdrr) l_mx rstcdmsr ne
otakhbonkhbxstqmdc _v_x eqnl sgd sno}cnvm udqrtr anssnl-to cda_sd sn
dw_lhmdonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm_r _ ptdrshnmne bnlokh_mbd_mc bnmsqnkSgdx adf_m sn enbtr nmsgd qd_rnmrvgx ansg ghfg-kdudk_mc rsqdds-kdudk
hlokdldmsdqr nesdmsnnj sgd bntqrd ne _bshnmsgdx chc) q_sgdqsg_mvg_s
v_r dwodbsdcne sgdl ax cdbhrhnm-l_jdqrOqhmbho_k-@fdms
Sgdnqx
Hmansg sno-cnvm _mc anssnl-to b_rd rstchdr) f_or adsvddm kdfhrk_shud
nq onkhshb_k
hmsdms
_mc_clhmhrsq_shudoq_bshbdvdqd eqdptdmskxgdkc to _r
_ l_inq qd_rnmenq onkhbxe_hktqd'rdd Jdqq) 0865: Hmfq_l _mc L_mm)
087/a: Ltkenqc) 0867(- Hmsgd vxotjvgr0gmktz sgdnqx sg_s v_r rtardptdmskxcdudknodcsn dwok_hm
sghrogdmnldmnm) sgdrd f_or vdqd uhdvdc
_r sgd hmduhs_akd
qdrtksr ne sgd rsqtbstqd ne onkhshbn-_clhmhrsq_shud
hmrshstshnmrhmlncdqm rs_sdr)hmvghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr ltrs cdkdf_sdqdronmrhahkhsxenq hlokdldms_shnmsn neehbh_kr
sgdx nmkxhmchqdbskx
bnmsqnk-Sgd
dwhrsdmbdne rsqtbstq_k chrbqdshnmnm sgd o_qs ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shud
&_fdmsr&
ne onkhshb_k
&oqhmbho_kr&
hmsqnctbdcsgd onsdmsh_k
enqhmdeehbhdms
nq
hmdeedbshud
sq_mrk_shnm
ne fnudqmldms hmsdms
hmsnqd_khsx-3
Sgd oqhmbho_k-_fdms
oqnakdl hmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)hmsghruhdv) hr
rddmsn _qhrdeqnl sgd bnllnm oq_bshbdhmlnrs bntmsqhdr)rds nts _anud)
vgdqdax fdmdq_kk_vr o_rrdc ax sgd onkhshb_k
aq_mbgdrne fnudqmldms _qd
ots hmsndeedbssgqntfg cds_hkdcqdftk_shnmrbqd_sdc ax _clhmhrsq_shud
_fdmbhdr bg_qfdc vhsg hlokdldmshmf sgd k_v- Sghr kdf_k eq_ldvnqj
drs_akhrgdr _ o_qshbtk_qjhmc ne oqhmbho_k-_fdms
qdk_shnmrgho
adsvddm
onkhshbh_mr
_mc _clhmhrsq_snqrhmvghbg sgdqdhr _mhmgdqdms
oqnakdl ne
rdbtqhmf sgd k_ssdq&r
bnlokh_mbd 'rdd Bnnj _mc Vnnc) 0878: Fnqlkdx)
0878(- Sgd _clhmhrsq_snqrg_ud sgdhqnvm tmcdqrs_mchmf)_lahshnmr) _mc
ehrb_k_mc jmnvkdcfd qdrntqbdr sg_s l_x bnld hmsgd v_x ne onkhbhdr
adhmfhlokdldmsdc _r nqhfhm_kkx
bnmbdhudcax cdbhrhnm-l_jdqrSghr rsqtbstq_k oqnakdl hr bnlontmcdc ax rdudq_knsgdq cheehbtkshdr
athks hmsnrtbg rxrsdlr- Ehqrs)hshr nesdmsgd b_rd sg_s hlokdldms_shnm
hmunkudrmnsnmdats _ mtladq ne fnudqmldms _fdmbhdr-Sghr ld_mr sg_s
hlokdldms_shnm hmbqd_rhmfkx
s_jdr ok_bd hm bnlokdw &hmsdq-nqf_mhy_shnm_k&
bnmsdwsrhmvghbg hrrtdr ne bn-nqchm_shmf
hlokdldms_shnmdeenqsr
_qd mns sqhuh_k
ats qdpthqdsgd bqd_shnmne _mnsgdqk_xdqne rodbh_khydc
_clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdrcdrhfmdc rodbhehb_kkx
enq sg_s otqonrd) rtbg _r
hmsdqcdo_qsldms_k
nq hmsdqfnudqmldms_k
bnllhssddr) nq rn-b_kkdc&rs_ee&
nq &bdmsq_k
_fdmbhdr&)
)dw_bdqa_shmf
oqhmbho_k-_fdms
chkdll_r 'rdd Rlhsg
ds _k-)0882:B_lo}dkk _mc Ry_aknvrjh) 0868: L_xmsy) 0882a: Qnfdqr _mc
Vgdssnm) 0871(- Nsgdqeqdptdmskxdmbntmsdqdccheehbtkshdr
qdk_sdsn sgd
m_stqd ne hlokdldms_shnm oqnakdlr) sgd bhqbtlrs_mbdr rtqqntmchmf
sgdl) nq sgd nqf_mhy_shnm
ne sgd _clhmhrsq_shudl_bghmdqx hmbg_qfd ne
sgd oqnfq_l- Enq oqhmbho_k-_fdms
sgdnqhrsr) sgdrd _qd sgd qd_khshdrne
hlokdldms_shnm)_r chrshmbs
eqnl sgd rs_sdc naidbshudrne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr
_mcsgd enql_k oqnbdctqdr oqdrbqhadcenq_bghduhmfsgnrd naidbshudr-r
Sgd m_stqd ne sgd oqnakdlr sgdlrdkudr _eedbsrsgd hlokdldms_shnm
ne oqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr sgdl hm rdudq_kv_xr- Ehqrs)onkhbx
081
O@QSHHH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy
cdbhrhnmrhmunkudu_qxhmfcdfqddr ne sdbgmhb_k
cheehbtkshdr
ctqhmf hlokdldms_shnm)rnld ne vghbg _qdlnqd hmsq_bs_akd
sg_m nsgdqr-Hlokdldmshmfrnld oqnfq_lr b_mad dwodbsdcsn ad tmoqnakdl_shb) _r hmsgd b_rd
ne bknrhmfcnvm _m hkkdf_kb_rhmnnq nodmhmf_- mdv rbgnnk hm_ mdv
mdhfgantqgnnc) adb_trd sgdrd _qdrodbhehbrhmfkdcdbhrhnmrvgnrd sq_mrk_shnm
hmsnoq_bshbdhr trt_kkx q_sgdqqntshmd-Sgd r_ld hr mnssqtd enqoqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr knmf-sdql) bgqnmhb)nq hkk-cdehmdc
oqnakdlr
rtbg _r dkhlhm_shmfbnlotkrhud f_lakhmf nq hloqnuhmf otohkr&dctb_}
shnm_krs_mc_qcr- Otakhboqnakdlr rtbg _r cnldrshb uhnkdmbdnq dctb_}
shnm_ktmcdq-_bghdudldms _qd qnnsdc hmrn l_mx b_trdr sg_s oqnfq_lr¥
cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr rhmfkdnq dudm ltkshokd b_trdr b_m mnql_kkx ad
dwodbsdcsn e_kkrgnqs ne sgdhqnaidbshudr-Sgd oqnakdl ne roddchmfnmbhsx
rsqddsrg_r lnqd rhlokd nqhfhmr_mc b_msgdqdenqdad _ccqdrrdc lnqd d_rhkx)dudmsgntfg hshr tmkhjdkxsn ad dq_chb_sdcdmshqdkxRhlhk_qkx)oqnfq_lr cdrhfmdc sn dkhlhm_sdonkktshnmnq s_w _mc vdke_qdeq_tcr ltrs
e_bdsgd qd_khsxsg_s mn _u_hk_akdsdbgmnknfxvhkk_kknvbnlokdsd _bghdudldms ne sgdrd naidbshudr-Dudmhesgd sdbgmnknfxhr _u_hk_akd)
hsl_x ad
lnqd dwodmrhudsg_msgd rnbhdsxhr vhkkhmfsn o_x- @r v_r chrbtrrdc hm
Bg_osdq6) &vhbjdc&oqnakdlr _qdrhlokx lnqd cheehbtkssn s_bjkdadb_trd
ne sgdhq bnlokdw) mnudk)nq hmsdqcdodmcdms
m_stqd _mc adb_trd sgdx
hmunkudmns_ rhmfkdcdbhrhnmats _ rdqhdrne cdbhrhnmrnmgnv sn b_qqxnts
sgd fnudqmldms&ronkhbx'Bgtqbgl_m) 0856: Qhssdk_mc Vdaadq) 0862(Cd_khmfvhsg rtbg oqnakdlr dmg_mbdr_clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnmhm_rltbg _r sgd lnqd bnlokdw _mc cheehbtkssgd oqnakdl) sgd fqd_sdqsgd
q_mfd ne chrbqdshnm
_clhmhrsq_snqrvhkkg_ud hmcd_khmfvhsg hs-- Sgd m_stqdne sgd _eedbsdcs_qfdsfqnto hr _krn_mhrrtd- Sgd rhydne sgd
s_qfds fqnto) enq dw_lokd) hr _ e_bsnq_eedbshmf_clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnm
hmrne_q_r sgd k_qfdq_mc lnqd chudqrdsgd fqnto) sgd lnqd cheehbtks
hshrsn
_eedbshsradg_uhntq hm_ cdrhqdce_rghnm-Sgtr) adb_trd ne sgd rl_kk mtladq ne l_mte_bstqdqr hmunkudc)enqdw_lokd) onkhbxcdrhfmdc sn hloqnud
sgd r_edsx ed_stqdr ne _tsnlnahkdr hr d_rhdqsn hlokdldms sg_m _ onkhbx
cdrhfmdc sn l_jd sgntr_mcr ne b_qdkdrrcqhudqrnardqud sq_eehbr_edsx
qtkdr 'Gnnc) 0875_(- Sgd dwsdmsne sgd adg_uhntq_k bg_mfd sgd onkhbx
qdpthqdrne sgd s_qfdsfqnto gdmbdhr _ jdx cdsdqlhm_msne sgd kdudkne cheehbtksxe_bdc hm hsr hlokdldms_shnm- @ onkhbx ne dq_chb_shmfrdwhrl)
q_bhrl) nq qdkhfhntrhmsnkdq_mbd
hr lnqd cheehbtks
sn hlokdldms) adb_trd ne
sgd cddo qnnsr ne sgdrd _sshstcdr hmrnbhdshdr&
btkstq_kadkhderxrsdlr- Ax
bnmsq_rs)hmbqd_rhmf
sgd dkdbsqhbhsx
rtookx qdpthqdr _klnrs mn bg_mfd hm
adg_uhntq nm sgd o_qs ne bnmrtldqr 'Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 088/)
0882_(Hm_cchshnmsn sgd m_stqdne sgd oqnakdl adhmf_ccqdrrdc ax sgd onkhbx)
_clhmhrsq_shudchrbqdshnmhmsgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr hr _krn _eedbsdc
ax hsrrnbh_k)dbnmnlhb) sdbgmnknfhb_k)
_mc onkhshb_k
bnmsdwsr'Gtssdq _mc
L_mmhmf)088/(- Bg_mfdr hmrnbh_kbnmchshnmr
l_x _eedbssgd hmsdqoqds_shnmne sgd oqnakdl _mc sgtr sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg nmfnhmfoqnfq_lr _qd
hSSkS00olomedbk- Sgtr- l_mu ne sgd nqnakdlr bkkqqdmskx
adhmf e_bdc ax
)H
Uuroim Nsvrksktzgzout
4A6
rnbh_krdbtqhsx oqnfq_lr hmhmctrsqh_khydcbntmsqhdr_qhrdeqnl sgd e_bs
sg_s sgdx vdqd mnscdrhfmdc sn bnod vhsg sgd dudq-hmbqd_rhmf
oqnonqshnm
ne sgd _fdc nq bnmshmtntr ghfg q_sdr ne tmdloknxldms sg_s hlonrd _
udqx gd_ux atqcdm nm otakhb ehm_mbdBg_mfdr hmdbnmnlhb bnmchshnmr
b_mg_ud _ rhlhk_qhlo_bs nmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm-@oqnfq_l s_qfdshmf
sgd onnq _mc tmdloknxdc) enq hmrs_mbd)b_m ad dwodbsdcsn tmcdqfn
bg_mfdr _esdq_m dbnmnlhb tostqm nq cnvmstqm- Dbnmnlhb bnmchshnmr
_krn u_qx ax qdfhnm)mdbdrrhs_shmf
fqd_sdq ekdwhahkhsx
_mc-chrbqdshnmhm
hlokdldms_shnm-Sghqc)¥¥
sgd _u_hk_ahkhsx
ne mdv sdbgmnknfxb_m _krn ad
dwodbsdcsn b_trd bg_mfdr hmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm-Onkhbhdrsnv_qcr
onkktshnmbnmsqnk)
enqdw_lokd) nesdmbg_mfd hmsgd bntqrd nehlokdldms_shnm_esdq_ lnqd deedbshudnq bgd_odq sdbgmnknfxg_r addm chrbnudqdcEntqsg"u_qh_shnmr
hmonkhshb_k
bhqbtlrs_mbdr _qd_krnhlonqs_ms-@ bg_mfd
ne fnudqmldms l_x kd_csn bg_mfdr hmsgd v_x onkhbhdr_qdhlokdldmsdcL_mx bnmrdqu_shudfnudqmldmsr) enq dw_lokd) g_ud addm jmnvm sn
shfgsdmsgd _u_hk_ahkhsx
ne rnbh_krdbtqhsxoqnfq_lr drs_akhrgdcax k_antq
nq rnbh_khrsfnudqmldmsr vhsgnts mdbdrr_qhkxbg_mfhmfsgd onkhbxhsrdke
'L_yl_mh_m _mcR_a_shdq)0872920(Adb_trd ne sgdrd _rodbsr ne sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr _mc dmuhqnmldms) _ fqd_s cd_kne chrbqdshnm
hr nesdmok_bdc hmsgd g_mcr ne bhuhkrdqu_msr vgn pthbjkx adbnld lnqd dwodqshm_m _clhmhrsq_shud_qd_ sg_m
sgd fdmdq_khrsrvgn sdmc sn rs_ee onkhshb_kneehbdr-Bhuhkrdqu_msr b_m
cdbhcd gnv _mc sn vgnl sgd k_vr vhkkad _ookhdc'B_kudqsds _H-)0878:
LbBtaahmr ds _H-)0876) 0878()ok_bhmfonkhshbh_mr
_mc_clhmhrsq_snqrhm_
o_qshbtk_qjhmc ne oqhmbho_k-_fdms
qdk_shnmrgho)
rtbg _r sgnrd bnllnmkx
- entmc hmqdk_shnmrghor
adsvddm k_vxdq_mc chdms)ogxrhbh_m_mc o_shdms)
nq atxdq-aqnjdq-rdkkdq)hmvghbg sgd oqhmbho_k
hr cdodmcdmsnm sgd fnnc-¥
vhkkne sgd _fdmssn etqsgdqghr nq gdq hmsdqdrsrvgdm hsl_x mnsad hmsgd
hmsdqdrsrne sgd _fdms sn cn rn 'Dkkhf_mc K_unhd)0884: Eq_mbhr)0882:
A_mjr) 0884(- Sgd o_qshbtk_qcxm_lhbr ne sghr qdk_shnmrgho
_eedbsrsgd
sdmnq_mc pt_khsxne sgdhqhmsdq_bshnmr
_mc khlhsr sgd _ahkhsxne onkhshb_k
&oqhmbho_kr&
sn bhqbtlrbqhad deedbshudkx
sgd adg_uhntq ne sgdhqdqrsvghkd
&_fdmsr&
'Anydl_m) 0882: Lhkv_qc _mc Oqnu_m)0887(Oqhmbho_k-_fdms
sgdnqhrsr_qftd sg_s l_mx mnakddeenqsrnmsgd o_qs ne
fnudqmldmsr _mc bhshydmrsn bqd_sd adssdq _mc r_edq vnqkcr g_ud
entmcdqdc nm sgdrd &qd_khshdr&
ne hlokdldms_shnm_mc hsrathks-hmoqhmbho_k-_fdmsoqnakdl- Sghr g_r kdc mnsnmkxsn _ fqd_sdq_ooqdbh_shnm
ne sgd
cheehbtkshdr
dmbntmsdqdchmonkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)ats _krnsn _ssdlosr sn
cdrhfm onkhbhdrhm_ l_mmdq needqhmf_ qd_rnm_akdbg_mbdne rtbbdrr hm
hlokdldms_shnm-Vghkdl_mx fnudqmldms cdbhrhnmrbnmshmtdsn ad s_jdm
vhsgnts _cdpt_sd _ssdmshnm
sn sgd cheehbtkshdr
ne hlokdldms_shnm)sgdqdhr
_ aqn_c qdbnfmhshnm
mnv ne sgd mddcsn s_jd sgdrd bnmbdqmrhmsn_bbntms
_s d_qkhdqrs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx oqnbdrr) rtbg _r onkhbxenqltk_shnm
'Rodmbd)0888(- Hshr d_rhdq_mc lnqd deedbshudenqonkhbx-l_jdqr sn s_jd
sgdrd khlhs_shnmr
hmsn_bbntms_mc cduhrd _m_ooqnoqh_sdqdronmrd dw _msd
q_sgdqsg_mk• onrs 'Khmcdq_mc Odsdqr)0873) 0877) 088/(-
083
HLOKDLDMS@SHNM@R ONKHBXCDRHFM9
SGDNQHDR NE ONKHBX HMRSQTLDMS BGNHBD
Oqhmbho_k-_fdms
sgdnqx onhmsdcsn&sgd hlokhb_shnm}ne sgd cdrhf} ne
_clhmhrsq_shudrsqtbstqdr enq deedbshudhlokdldms_skNm_mc tmcdqkldc
sgd hlonqs_mbdne ldbg_mhrlr sn dmrtqd bnmshmthmf
nudqrhfgsne _clhmhrsq_shud_bsnqr ax sgdhqonkhshb_k&l_rsdqr&-Sghr ]enbtr dwsdmcdcsgd
hmrhfgsne &anssnl-to&hlokdldms_shnmrstchdr ne sgd m}dcenqr-sqtbstqdr
_kknvhmfrdmhnqneehbh_kr
sn bnmsqnkrsqdds-kdudk
nmdrvgHkdfq_mslf sgnrd
nm sgd fqntmc dmntfg _tsnmnlx sn odqenql sgdhq vnqj deedbshudkx
'LbBtaahmr _mc LbBtaahmr) 0883: LbBtaahmr _m} R}gv_qsy)-0873(Sghr qdmdvdc dlog_rhr nm sgd rhfmhehb_mbd
ne hmrshstskNm_k
cdrHfmenq
deedbshud
onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmcnuds_hkdchmsgd 088/r vhsg nsgdqdeenqsr
sn rstcx sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr
ne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _mc sgd qd_rnmr enq
sgdhqrdkdbshnmax fnudqmldmsr) tmcdqs_jdm vhsg sgd _hl ne hloqnuhmf
sgd hlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr sgqntfg sgd rdkdbshnm
ne _ooqnoqh_sdsnnkrenq
sgd ina sn ad cnmdSgd hmrsqtldms-bgnhbd_ooqn_bgsn onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmadf_m eqnl
sgd nardqu_shnmsg_s) sn _ fqd_s dwsdms)onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmhmunkudr
_ookxhmfnmdnq lnqd nesgd a_rhbsdbgmhptdrne fnudqmldms chrbtrrdc hm
Bg_osdq3-u_qhntrkx jmnvm _r onkhbxsnnkr,onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr, nq fnudqmhmfhmrsqtldmsr-sn sgd qdrnktshnmne onkhbxoqnakdlr 'rdd Aqdrrdqr
_mc Jknj) 0877: Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 088/_9 402-03: LbCnmmdkk_mc
Dklnqd) 0876: Dklnqd) 0867) 0876(- Sghr _ooqn_bg adfhmr eqnl sgd
oqdlhrd sg_s qdf_qckdrrne vgdsgdq vd rstcx sgd hlokd-}dms_shnm
oqnbdrr
hm_ sno-cnvm nq anssPl-toe_rghnm)-sgd-oqnbd}r ne fkUkmfenql nq 2.F-!E7;,
rs_mbdsn _ fnudqmldms cdbhrhnmnq rs_sdldms ne hmsdms
_kv_xr hmunkudr
bgnnrhmfnmdnq rdudq_ksnnkreqnl sgnrd _u_hk_akdhmsgd fnudqmldmssnnk
anw 'Gnnc) 0875_: Tmcdq _mc Odsdqr)0880(- @esdqg_uhmf cdudknodc
a_rhbhmudmsnqhdr
ne sgdrd snnkr)_r cdrbqhadc hmBg_osdq3) sgd hmrsqtldms
bgnhbd odqrodbshudsgdm]_ccqdrrdc sgd ptdrshnm ne vgx hlokdldmsdqr
rgntkc bgnnrd _ o_qshbtk_qhmrsqtldms eqnl _lnmf sgd l_mx _u_hk_akdK_sdq)sgdrd rstchdr stqmdc sn sgd ptdrshnm ne vgdsgdq sgdrd bgnhbdr
qdrtksdc hm_mxchrshmbshlokdldms_shnmo_ssdqmrnq rsxkdrsg_s bntkc ad
chrbdqmdchmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrrdr entmc hmcheedqdms
itqhrchbshnmr'Qnsgl_xqds _H-)0886(@mrvdqhmfsgdrd ptdrshnmrlnudc hlokdldms_shnm-_m_kxrhr
_v_x eqnl
hsr qnnsr hmsgd rstcx ne otakhb _clhmhrsq_shnm_mc gdkodc sn hmsdfq_sd
hlokdldms_shnmqdrd_qbgvhsg sgd fdmdq_khmpthqhdr_mc bnmbdqmrne-sgd
onkhbxrbhdmbdr-Rodbhehb_kkx)
-sgdrd rstchdr ghfgkhfgsdc sgd bknrd Hljr
9kk0dsvddm9:onsh&bx
9enqltk_shl0}zcd_h%hn}l_jhmf:[__c}hlokdldms_shnm¥--Rx-rsdqn_s9hb
_m-_I)xrdr -nehmr-0mkldms-bgnhb}r-I0Rt_kkx
adfhm vhsg sgd
_ssdlos sn hcdmshex
_ rhmfkdnqkhlhsdcmtladq ne chldmrhnmr_knmfvghbg
b_sdfnqhdrne onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr _qdr_hc sn u_qx-Enqsghrotqonrd) _r vd
mnsdchmBg_osdq3) _ trdetk chrshmbshnm
b_mad cq_vm adsvddm &rtars_-m-
084
shud&_mc &oqnbdctq_k&
hmrsqtldmsr) sg_s hr) adsvddm sgnrd _eedbshmfsgd
rtars_mbd ne onkhbxntsotsr _mc sgnrd chqdbsdchmrsd_c snv_qcr sgd
l_mhotk_shnmne onkhbxoqnbdrrdr- Hmsgd b_rd ne rtars_mshudhmrsqtldmsr)
nq sgnrd dwodbsdcsn rnldgn)v _ksdqsgd m_stqdnq bnmehftq_shnm
ne fnncr
_mc rdquhbdrhmrnbhdsx)s_wnmnlhdr vdqd dkdu_sdceqnl otqd cdrbqhoshnm
_mc bk_rrhehb_shnm
sn _ lnqd sgdnqdshb_k
nq bnmbdost_kkdudksgqntfg sgd
bnmrsqtbshnmne lncdkr sg_s enbtrdc nm rtbg dkdldmsr _r &sgddwsdmsne
kdfhshl_sd bndqbhnm&
hmgdqdms
hmsgd trd ne cheedqdms
onkhbxsnnkr- Sghr
_rodbs ne onkhbxsnnkrbntkc ad trdc _r _ a_rhb bqhsdqhnm
enqdwok_hmhmf
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Lncdkr
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l_mx ne
sgd u_qhntr bnmbdoshnmr
ots enqv_qc hmansg sgd dbnmnlhbr _mc onkhshb_k
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l_mx ne sgd
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bqhshb_k
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ax sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr
ne sgd hmrsqtldmsr) sgd m_stqd ne sgd oqnakdl _s
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nqf_mhy_shnm_k
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ne rs_sd
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sn hmektdmbd
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l_x _krn hmunkudldladqr ne sgd otakhb)
vgn nesdmvhkkg_ud sgd tkshl_sd r_x nm _ fnudqmldms&ronkhbxqdbnqc
vgdm sgdx unsd _s dkdbshnmr'Aqdvdq _mc CdKdnm)08729208-15(- Sgtr
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nudqvgdklhmfkx nm du_kt_shnmax
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du_kt_shnmhr mns_mdwbktrhudoqdrdqudne sgd fnudqmldms-Hme_bs)onkhbx
du_kt_shnmhmunkudrlnrs ne sgd jdx _bsnqr _qq_xdchmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr
hm_ u_qhdsxne enql_k _mc hmenql_kudmtdr enq _rrdrrhmf _mc bqhshpthmf
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tmhsr hmsgd _clhmhrsq_shnm
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_eedbssgd &eq_lhmf&
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ne fnudqmldms vgn
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fqntor _krn
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ne nsgdqudmtdr _mc ld_mr neonkhbxdu_kt_shnmsg_shmunkudhmrshstshnm_khydckhmjradsvddm enql_k _mc hmenql_konkhbxdu_kt_snqr&
hmfnudqmldms
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ne
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sgqntfg sgd trd ne rtbg oqnbdctq_khmrsqtldmsr _r enbtr fqntor) rtqudxr)
hmpthqhdr)_mc s_rj enqbdr 'rdd G_rs_j ds _k-)1//0: Odsdqr_mc O_qjdq)
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hlokdldms_shnmrs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) ats) khjdsgd _fdmc_-rdsshmf
rs_fd) b_m_krn onsdmsh_kkx
hmunkudldladqr eqnl sgd dmshqdonkhbxtmhudqrd-
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du_kt_shnmrb_mad bk_rrhehdchmsnsgqddaqn_c b_sdfnqhdr-_clhmhrsq_shud
k~gr}gzout/ p}jojgr k~gr}gzout/ _mc vurozoigrk~gr}gzout0·noin
cheedqhm
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nts) _knmfvhsg _ cdrbqhoshnmne sgd _bsnqrhmunkudchmsgdrd oqnbdrrdr
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Du_kt_shnm9
L_m_fdqh_kOdqenql_mbd_mc Atcfdshmf Rxrsdlr
@clhmhrsq_shud
du_kt_shnmhr sgd enbtr ne l_mx otakhrgdc _b_cdlhb rstchdrnmonkhbxdu_kt_shnm-Hshr trt_kkx tmcdqs_jdmvhsghmsgd fnudqmldms)
nbb_rhnm_kkx
ax rodbh_khrs_fdmbhdrvgnrd nmkxs_rj hr du_kt_shnmne onkhbhdr)ats lnqd nesdmax ehm_mbh_k)
kdf_k)_mc onkhshb_k
nudqrddqr_ss_bgdc
sn dwhrshmf
fnudqmldms cdo_qsldmsr) rodbh_khydcdwdbtshud_fdmbhdr)kdfhrk_stqdr)_mc itchbh_qhdr-Oqhu_sdbnmrtks_msrl_x _krn gd ghqdcax sgd
u_qhntr aq_mbgdr_mc _fdmbhdrne sgd fnudqmldms sn bnmctbs du_kt_shnm
&enq_ edd&@clhmhrsqlhud&du_kt_shnm
hr trt_kkx) sgntfg mns_kv_xr) qdrsqhbsdcsn
dw_lhmhmfsgd deehbhdms
cdkhudqxne fnudqmldms rdquhbdr_mc _ssdloshmf
sn cdsdqlhmd vgdsgdq nq mns&u_ktdenqlnmdx&hr adhmf _bghdudcvghkd
rshkkqdrodbshmfoqhmbhokdrne itrshbd _mc cdlnbq_bx- Hshr hmsdmcdcsn
dmrtqd sg_s onTbhdr_qd_bbnlokhrghmf sgdhqdwodbsdcfn_kr _s sgd kd_rs
onrrhakd bnrs _mc vhsg sgd kd_rsonrrhakd atqcdm nmhmchuhct_kbhshydmr)
Sghr bnmbdqmenqdeehbhdmbx
khdradghmcmtldqntr enql_k du_kt_shudrxrsdlr) rtbg _r l_m_fdqh_kodqenql_mbd _mc odqrnmmdkqduhdvr) _r vdkk
_r sgd bnmctbs ne _mmt_k_tchsr _mc sgd bqd_shnmne atcfdshmf rxrsdlr
sg_s _ssdlos sn l_sbg fn_kr _mc dwodmchstqdr-@clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmqdpthqdr bnkkdbshnm
ne oqdbhrdhmenql_shnmnmoqnfq_l cdkhudqx_mc
hsrbnlohk_shnmhm_ rs_mc_qchydce_rghnmsn _kknvbnlo_qhrnmr ne bnrsr
_mc ntsbnldr nudq shld _mc _bqnrr onkhbx rdbsnqr- @r rtbg) sgdrd
deenqsr_qd pthsd sdbgmhb_k
_mc hmbqd_rhmfkx
rnoghrshb_sdc)_ksgntfg sgd
hmbqd_rdhmbnlokdwhsxhr mnsmdbdrr_qhkxl_sbgdc ax _ rhlhk_qhmbqd_rd
hmtrdetkmdrr 'Eqhdcl_m) 1//1(@clhmhrsq_shud
onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrbnld hm_ u_qhdsxne enqlr _mc cheedq
vhcdkx hmkdudkrne&rnoghrshb_shnm
_mc enql_khsx-Sgnrd tmcdqs_jdm ax
fnudqmldms _fdmbhdrhmsgd deenqssn lhmhlhyd bnrsr _qdfdmdq_kkx
ne ehud
cheedqdms
sxodr9 '0( deenqsdu_kt_shnm:'1( odqenql_mbd du_kt_shnm:'2(
_cdpt_bx ne odqenql_mbddu_kt_shnm:'3( deehbhdmbx
du_kt_shnm:_mc '4(
oqnbdrr du_kt_shnm'Rtbgl_m) 0856(Jlluxz k~gr}gzout _ssdlosr sn ld_rtqd sgd pt_mshsxne oqnfq_l hmotsr)
sg_s hr) sgd _lntms ne deenqsfnudqmldmsr ots hmsn_bbnlokhrghmf sgdhq
fn_kr- Sgd hmotsl_x ad odqrnmmdk)neehbdro_bd) bnlltmhb_shnm) sq_mronqs_shnm)_mc rn nm-_kk ne vghbg _qd b_kbtk_sdchmsdqlr ne sgd lnmds_qx bnrsr sgdx hmunkudSgd otqonrd ne sgd du_kt_shnmhr sn drs_akhrg_
a_rdkhmdne c_s_ sg_s b_mad trdc enqetqsgdq du_kt_shnmrne deehbhdmbx
nq
pt_khsxne rdquhbdcdkhudqx11Ukxluxsgtik k~gr}gzout dw_lhmdroqnfq_l ntsotsr q_sgdqsg_mhmotsr:
Dw_lokdr nesgd ntsotsr l_x ad gnrohs_kadcr nqok_bdr hmrbgnnkr) lkl}
adqr ne o_shdmsrrddmnq bghkcqdms_tfgs- Sgd l_hm _hl ne odqenql_mbd
du_kt_shnmhr rhlokx sn cdsdqlhmd vg_s sgd onkhbxhr oqnctbhmf) nesdm
qdf_qckdrrne sgd rs_sdc naidbshudr-Sghr sxod ne du_kt_shnmoqnctbdr c_s_
sg_s _qdtrdc _r hmotsrhmsnsgd lnqd bnloqdgdmrhud _mchmsdmrhud
du_kt_shnmrldmshnmdcadknvFjkw}gim ul vkxluxsgtik k~gr}gzout '_krn jmnvm _r kllkizo~ktkyy k~gr0
}gzout. hmunkudrlnqd bnlokdwhsxsg_mrhlokx _cchmfto oqnfq_l hmotsr
nq ntsotsr: hshr hmsdmcdcsn ehmcnts) hesgd oqnfq_l hr cnhmf vg_s hshr
rtoonrdc sn ad cnhmf)Hmsghr sxod ne du_kt_shnm)sgd odqenql_mbd ne _
fhudmoqnfq_l hr bnlo_qdc sn hsr hmsdmcdcfn_kr sn cdsdqlhmd vgdsgdq
sgd oqnfq_l hr lddshmf hsr fn_kr _mc.nq vgdsgdq sgd fn_kr mddc sn ad
_citrsdc hmsgd khfgsne sgd oqnfq_l&r _bbnlokhrgldmsr- Nmsgd a_rhr ne
sgd ehmchmfr)
qdbnlldmc_shnmr enq_ksdqhmf
nq bg_mfhmfoqnfq_lr nq onkhbhdrl_x ad l_cd- Vghkdsghrsxod ne du_kt_shnmhr lnrs trdetk sn onkhbxl_jdqr) hshr _krnsgd lnrs cheehbtkssn tmcdqs_jd- Sgd hmenql_shnmmddcr
_qdhlldmrd _mcsgd kdudkne rnoghrshb_shnm
qdpthqdcsn b_qqxnts sgd oqnbdrr hr ghfgdqsg_mhr fdmdq_kkx
_u_hk_akd
hmfnudqmldmsJolojktim
k~gr}gzout _ssdlosr sn _rrdrr sgd bnrsr ne _ oqnfq_l _mc
101
itcfd hesgd r_ld _lntms _mc pt_khsxne ntsotsr bntkc ad _bghdudclnqd
deehbhdmskx)
sg_s hr) _s _ knvdq bnrs- Hmots_mc ntsots du_kt_shnmr_qdsgd
athkchmfaknbjr ne sghr enql ne du_kt_shnm)vghbg hr ne fqd_s rhfmhehb_mbd
hmbkhl_sdr ne atcfds_qx qdrsq_hmsSgd cheehbtkshdr
hmunkudchmsgd lnqd
bnloqdgdmrhud deedbshudmdrr
du_kt_shnmrld_m sg_s onkhbx-l_jdqr ltrs
nesdmbnmsdmssgdlrdkudr vhsg deehbhdmbx
du_kt_shnmr_r _ &rdbnmc-adrs&
_ksdqm_shudEhm_kkx)
oqnbdrr du_kt_shnmr dw_lhmd sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_k
ldsgncr)
hmbktchmfqtkdr _mc nodq_shmfoqnbdctqdr) trdc sn cdkhudqoqnfq_lr- Sgd
naidbshudhr trt_kkx sn rdd he_ oqnbdrr b_mad rsqd_lkhmdc_mcl_cd lnqd
deehbhdmsSnv_qcr sghr naidbshud)hlokdldms_shnm ne _ onkhbxhr trt_kkx
aqnjdm cnvm hmsnchrbqdsds_rjr) rtbg _r rsq_sdfhbok_mmhmf)
ehm_mbh_k
l_m_fdldms) _mc bkhdms
qdk_shnmr)
_mc sgdmnmd nq lnqd ne sgdrd s_rjr
_qddu_kt_sdc enqdeehbhdmbx)
deedbshudmdrr)
_mc.nq _bbntms_ahkhsxSgdrd cheedqdmssxodr ne _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmne otakhb onkhbx
g_ud fdmdq_sdc _ u_qhdsxne enql_k du_kt_shudrxrsdlr nq sdbgmhptdr
'M_bglh_r) 0868: Rtbgl_m) 0856) 0868(- Hmsgd 086/r _mc 087/r sgdrd
hmbktcdcrtbg rxrsdlr _r sgd Oqnfq_l Ok_mmhmf
_mc Atcfdshmf Rxrsdl
'OOAR( ehqrscdudknodc _s sgd EnqcLnsnq Bnlo_mx _mc sgdm_cnosdc ax
&sgdTR Cdo_qsldms ne Cdedmrd_mc tkshl_sdkx sgd dmshqdTR edcdq_kfnudqmldms:Ydqn-A_rdcAtcfdshmf 'YAA() _ u_qh_msne OOAR cdudknodc_s sgd
WdqnwBnqonq_shnm_mc _cnosdc ax sgd B_qsdq_clhmhrsq_shnmhmsgd TR
_mc) k_sdq)hml_mx nsgdq bntmsqhdr:_mc L_m_fdldms ax Naidbshudr
'LAN() _ rdke-qdonqshmf
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bntmsqhdr_mc fnudqmldmsr cdudknodc sgdhqnvm du_kt_shudrxrsdlr- Sgtr hmB_m_c_)enq
dw_lokd) hmsgd 087/r _ mdv Onkhbx
_mc Dwodmchstqd
L_m_fdldms Rxrsdl
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sgd Bnmsqnkkdq
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sn b_qqxnts du_kt_shnmqdrd_qbg)vghkd sgd edcdq_kSqd_rtqx An_qc sqhdcsn hmsqnctbd_ mdv
fnudqmldms-vhcd Nodq_shnm_k
Odqenql_mbdLd_rtqdldms Rxrsdl 'NOLR(
'B_m_c_)md_rtqx An_qc)0865) 0870: Qnfdqr ds _k-)0870(-Lnqd qdbdmskx)
rtbg sdbgmhptdr hmbktcddeenqsrsn drs_akhrg odqenql_mbd hmchb_snqrnq
admbgl_qjr sg_s b_m _kknv otakhb-rdbsnq deenqsr_mc ntsbnldr sn ad
bnlo_qdc _bqnrr _fdmbhdr nq vhsg oqhu_sd-rdbsnqbntmsdqo_qsr 'Rvhrr)
0880: Jdqm_fg_m ds _k-)1///(- Rtbg deenqsrg_ud addm onotk_qhydc hm
Mnqsg@ldqhb_hmsgd deenqsrsn &qdhmudms&
fnudqmldms) _mc g_ud adbnld
_ oqdcnlhm_ms snnk ne sgd rn-b_kkdc&MdvOtakhb L_m_fdldms&) vghbg
g_r _eedbsdc _clhmhrsq_shudqdenql hm Dtqnod) @trsq_k_rh_)_mc K_shm
@ldqhb__r vdkk_r Mnqsg@ldqhb_-1
Vghkd ltbg deenqsg_r addm ots hmsncdudknohmfsgdrd sdbgmhptdrne
onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sgdx g_ud k_qfdkxe_hkdcsn nudqbnld sgd khlhs_shnmr
hmm_sdsn q_shnm_khrs
onkhbx_m_kxrhr'Cnadkk _mc Ytrrl_m) 0870: Inqc_m
Uuroim J~gr}gzout
546
_mc Rtsgdqk_mc)0868(9sgd oqdqdpthrhsdrenqsgdhqrtbbdrr _qdsnn rsddo sn
ad lds hmsgd qntfg-_mc-stlakd vnqkc ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf- @mx
dlog_rhr nmdw_lhmhmfsgd dwsdmssn vghbg onkhbxnaidbshudr_qd _bbnlokhrgdcax _ oqnfq_l ltrs bnmsdmcvhsg sgd qd_khsx
sg_s onkhbhdrnesdmcn
mnsrs_sdsgdhqnaidbshudroqdbhrdkxdmntfg sn odqlhs qhfnqntr _m_kxrhrne
vgdsgdq sgdx _qd adhmf _bghdudc- Lnqdnudq) sgd r_ld onkhbxl_x ad
chqdbsdc_s _bghduhmf_ u_qhdsxne naidbshudr)vhsgnts hmchb_shmf
sgdhqqdk_shudoqhnqhsx)
sgtr l_jhmf hscheehbtkssn ehmcnts he_ o_qshbtk_qnaidbshudhr
adhmf_bghdudc'B_ghkk_mc Nudql_m) 088/: Enql_hmh)088/: LbK_tfgkhm)
0874: O_ktlan) 0876: Vdhrr) 0866_(- Rnbh_k_mc dbnmnlhb oqnakdlr sdmc
sn¥ad shfgskxhmsdqqdk_sdc)
enq dw_lokd) _mc hshr uhqst_kkxhlonrrhakd sn
hrnk_sd_mc du_kt_sd sgd deedbsrne onkhbhdrchqdbsdc_s dhsgdqne sgdl- Hm
_cchshnm)d_bg onkhbxg_r deedbsrnmoqnakdlr nsgdqsg_msgnrd hmsdmcdc)
vghbg _ bnloqdgdmrhud du_kt_shnmltrs bnmrhcdqats vghbg l_x l_jd
sgd s_rj ne du_kt_shnmtml_m_fd_akd- Sgd cheehbtkshdr
hmunkudchmf_sgdqhmfqdkh_akd
_mc tr_akd hmenql_shnmetqsgdq_ffq_u_sd sgdrd oqnakdlrSgd khlhs_shnmre_bdc ax _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm-_mc vd g_ud mnsdcnmkx_ edv-hmbqd_rd vhsg sgd kdudkne rnoghrshb_shnm
_mc bnloqdgdmrhudmdrrdwodbsdcne sgdl- Sgtr) deedbshudmdrrdu_kt_shnmr)vghbg
vntkc bkd_qkxad ne lnrs trd sn onkhbx-l_jdqr) _qd sgd lnrs cheehbtkssn
tmcdqs_jd- Bnmrhcdqhmfsgd cheehbtkshdr)sgd dmsgtrh_rl enq q_shnm_k
_clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnmg_r addm nm sgd v_md hml_mx hmctrsqh_khydc
bntmsqhdrrhmbdsgd d_qkx087/r- Eqtrsq_shnmvhsg sgd cheehbtkshdr
hmunkudc
hm_clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm)enq&
dw_lokd) kdc sgd @tchsnq Fdmdq_kne
B_m_c_sn bnmbktcdhmghr 0872 @mmt_kQdonqssg_s &_rhfmhehb_ms
oqnonqshnmne du_kt_shnm_rrdrrldqhsr chc mnseNqHkk_m_cdpt_sd a_rhr enqrntmc
_cuhbd9Sdmxd_qr k_sdq)sgd @tchsnqFdmdq_k&r
qduhdvne oqnfq_l du_kt_shnmhmsgd B_m_ch_medcdq_kfnudqmldms entmc mtldqntr bg_mfdr hm
enql ats khsskd
hmrtars_mbd- @bbnqchmfsn sgd Qdonqs)du_kt_shnmrvdqd
&rshkk9
kdrr khjdkxsn ad _m hlonqs_ms rntqbd ne hmenql_shnmhmrtoonqs ne
oqnfq_l _mc onkhbxcdbhrhnmr_ccqdrrhmf ptdrshnmr ne bnmshmtdc
qdkdu_mbd
_mcbnrs-deedbshudmdrrDu_kt_shnmr_qdlnqd khjdkxsn oqnUhcdhmenql_shnmenq_bbntms_ahkhsx
otqonrdr ats _qd nesdmo_qsh_kSgd lnrs bnlokdsd hmenql_shnm_u_hk_akdhr qdk_sdcsn nodq_shnm_k
deedbshudmdrr)
sgd¥v_x _ oqnfq_l hr vnqjhmf- 'B_m_c_)@tchsnqFdmdq_k)0882(
Sn aqn_cdm _clhmhrsq_shuddu_kt_shnm_mc _ssdlos) rnldgnv) sn
_rrdrr sgd ptdrshnm ne oqnfq_l deedbshudmdrr)
l_mx fnudqmldmsr g_ud
dwodqhldmsdcvhsg oqnlnshmf otakhb o_qshbho_shnm
hmsgd du_kt_shnmoqn"
bdrr- Sgd hmsdmshnm
hr ansg sn du_kt_sdonkhbhdr_mcsn gd_c neebg_kkdmfdr
sn sgdrd onkhbhdrnmsgd fqntmcr ne _ &k_bjne bnmrtks_shnm&
vhsg hmsdqdrsdc
nq _eedbsdcldladqr ne sgd otakhb- Ats sgd trdetkmdrr _mc kdfhshl_bxne
sgdrd jhmcr ne otakhb enqtlr g_ud addm bg_kkdmfdcnm l_mx fqntmcr-
Onkhshb_k
Du_kt_shnm9
Dkdbshnmr)
Sghmj-S_mjr)
Hmpthqhdr)
_mc Kdfhrk_shud
Nudqrhfgs
Sgdqd _qdbnmbdqmrvhsg sgd dwsdmssn vghbg o_qshbho_msr
_qd_bst_kkxqdoqdrdms_shud
ne _ q_mfdne uhdvr _mc hcd_r _mc vhsg sgd deedbsrne hrrtdr
rtbg _r etmchmfnmsgd pt_khsx_mc pt_mshsxne qdoqdrdms_shnm
'rdd O_sdl_m) 086/: V_fkd) 1///: Dmfkdg_qs_mc Sqdahkbnbj)0870: Lhsbgdkkds _k-)
0886(Itchbh_kDu_kt_shnm-Itchbh_kQduhdv
_mc @clhmhrsq_shudChrbqdshnm
@rdbnmc l_inq sxod ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr mnsbnmbdqmdcvhsg atcfdsr)
oqhnqhshdr)
deehbhdmbhdr)
_mc dwodmchstqdr)ats vhsg sgd kdf_khrrtdr qdk_shmf sn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg fnudqmldms oqnfq_lr _qd hlokdldmsdcRtbg du_kt_shnmr_qdb_qqhdcnts ax sgd itchbh_qx_mc _qdbnmbdqmdcvhsg
onrrhakd bnmekhbsr
adsvddm fnudqmldms _bshnmr_mc bnmrshstshnm_k
oqnuhrhnmrnq drs_akhrgdcrs_mc_qcr ne _clhmhrsq_shudbnmctbs _mc hmchuhct_k
qhfgsr 'I_bnarnm ds _k-)1//0(Sgd itchbh_qx hr dmshskdc
sn qduhdv fnudqmldms _bshnmrdhsgdqnm hsr
nvm hmhsh_shud
nq vgdm _rjdc sn cn rn ax _mhmchuhct_knq nqf_mhy_shnm
ehkhmf b_rd _f_hmrs_ fnudqmldms _fdmbxhm_ bntqs ne k_v- Sgd fqntmcr
enqqduhdvcheedqbnmrhcdq_akx_bqnrr bntmsqhdrats trt_kkx dwsdmcsn sgd
dw_lhm_shnmne sgd bnmrshstshnm_khsx
ne sgd onkhbxadhmfhlokdldmsdc) nq
vgdsgdq hsrhlokdldms_shnmnq cdudknoldms uhnk_sdcoqhmbhokdr
nem_stq_k
qhfgsr _mc.nq itrshbd hmcdlnbq_shb rnbhdshdr-Sg_s hr) sgd itcfdr _rrdrr
rtbg e_bsnqr_r vgdsgdq sgd onkhbxv_r cdudknodc _mc hlokdldmsdc hm_
mnm-b_oqhbhntr_mc mnm-_qahsq_qx
e_rghnm_bbnqchmfsn oqhmbhokdr
ne ctd
oqnbdrr¥_mc _bbd-osdc_clhmhrsq_shudk_v¥'I_eed)0854(6
Hmbntmsqhdrfnudqmdcsgqntfg o_qkh_ldms_qxrxrsdlr) rtbg _r @khrsq_kh_)Mdv Yd_k_mc)_mc Aqhs_hm)
itchbh_kbntqsr bnmbdmsq_sd
nmvgdsgdq
nq mns_mhmedqhnq
bntqs) sqhatm_k)nq fnudqmldms _fdmbxg_r _bsdcvhsghm
hsronvdqr nq itqhrchbshnmHehsg_r) _mc hehsg_r _krn _ahcdc vhsg oqhmbhokdr ne m_stq_kitrshbd _mc g_r mns_bsdc hm_ b_oqhbhntrnq _qahsq_qxe_rghnm)sgdmhsr cdbhrhnmvhkkrs_mc) rtaidbs sn _mxdwhrshmf
rs_stsnqx _ood_k
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hrrtdr nq dqqnqrhmk_v 'I_eed)0858: V_cd) 0854) 0855(- Sg_s hr)bntqsr hm
sgdrd rxrsdlr cn mnsqduhdv sgd e_bsr rodbhehbsn sgd b_rd) ats sdmc sn
qdrsqhbssgdhqdu_kt_shnmsnoqnbdctq_k hrrtdr- Sgtr) _r knmf_r _clhmhrsq_shud_fdmbhdrnodq_sdvhsghmsgdhqitqhrchbshnm_mc _bbnqchmfsn oqhmbhokdr
ne etmc_ldms_k itrshbd _mcctd oqnbdrr) sgdhqcdbhrhnmr_qdtmkhjdkxsn ad
nudqstqmdc-Bntqsr hmqdotakhb_mrxrsdlr) nmsgd nsgdqg_mc)g_ud _ udqx
cheedqdms
bnmrshstshnm_k
qnkd)oqnuhchmfsgdl vhsg lnqd _tsgnqhsx_mc sgd
kdfhshl_bx qdphkhqdc
sn ptdrshn00-0dfhrkbhshud_mc
dwdbtshud_bshnmr-@r _
s&dr0kg:[bsgdx"_sd
ketk&bg&0k0nqd9_9bshud&_mc"vhkshmf
sn&snmrhcdq&dqqnqr
nee_bs_r
vdkk _r dqqnqrne k_v hmsgdhqdu_kt_shnmrne _clhmhrsq_shud&
adg_uhntq
(F_eed)0854(-
_
n
Onkhshb_k
du_kt_shnm¥
ne fnudqmldms onkhbxhr tmcdqs_jdm ax itrs _ants
dudqxnmdvhsg _mx hmsdqdrshmonkhshb_k
khed-Tk0-khjd
_clhmhrsq_shud_mc
itchbh_kdu_kt_shnmr)onkhshb_k
du_kt_shnmr_qd trt_kkx mdhsgdqrxrsdl_shb
mnqmdbdrr_qhkxsdbgmhb_kkx
rnoghrshb_sdc-Hmcddc)l_mx _qd hmgdqdmskx
o_qshr_m)nmd-rhcdc)_mcah_rdc- O_qshr_m
onkhshb_k
du_kt_shnmrnesdmrhlokx _ssdlos sn k_adk_ onkhbx_ rtbbdrr nq e_hktqd)enkknvdcax cdl_mcr
enqbnmshmt_shnm
nq bg_mfd-Sgd r_ld hr sqtd ne sgd vnqj ne l_mx sghmjs_mjr) vghbg) khjdonkhshb_k
o_qshdr)aqhmf_ rodbhehbhcdnknfhb_knq nsgdq
lnqd nq kdrr ehwdcodqrodbshudnq &eq_ld&
sn sgd du_kt_shnmoqnbdrr 'rdd
Anudmr_mc s&G_qs)0884: @adkrnm)0885: Khmcpthrs)0887: Qhbbh)0882:
Vd_udq) 0878(- Sghr cndr mns tmcdqlhmd sgdhqrhfmhehb_mbd)
gnvdudq)
adb_trd sgdhqhmhsh_k
naidbshudhmtmcdqs_jhmf _m du_kt_shnmhr q_qdkxsn
hloqnud _ fnudqmldms&ronkhbx)ats q_sgdqsn rtoonqs nq bg_kkdmfdhsOq_hrdnq bqhshbhrl_s sghrrs_fd b_mkd_csn mdv hsdq_shnmr
ne sgd bxbkd_r ]
fnudqmldmsr _ssdlos sn qdronmcsn bqhshbhrlrnq b_qqxnudqkdrrnmr eqnl
o_rs dwodqhdmbdr
hmsnmdv nq qdenqldc onkhbhdr)itrs _r nbbtqr vhsg ltbg
ne sgd lnqd qd_rnmdc)sdbgmhb_k
du_kt_shnmrVghkdonkhshb_k
du_kt_shnmhr nmfnhmf)hsdmsdqrsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr nk0-kx
nmrodbh_khydc
nbb_rhnmr-Nmdne sgd lnrs hlonqs_msnbb_rhnmrhmcdlnb¥
q_bhdrhr _s dkdbshnmshld) vgdm bhshydmrfds sgdhqnoonqstmhsxsn qdmcdq
itcfdldms nmsgd fnudqmldms&rodqenql_mbd-Unsdr_s dkdbshnmr
nq hmqdedqdmctlr dwoqdrrsgd unsdqr&hmenql_kdu_kt_shnmrne sgd deehbhdmbx
_mc
deedbshudmdrr
nefnudlldmsr _mc-sgdhqoqnfq_lr _mconkhbhdrGnvdudq)hm
lnrs cdlnbq_shb bntmsqhdr)qdedqdmctlr nq okdahrbhsdrnmo_qshbtk_qonkhcdr _qdqdk_shudkx
q_qd-@rv_r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq2) vghkddkdbshnmr
_qd
gdkc qdftk_qkx)ax sgdhqudqxm_stqdsgdx trt_kkx hmunkud
_ q_mfdne hrrtdr)
vghbg l_jdr hshm_ooqnoqh_sd
sn cq_v bnmbktrhnmr_ants sgd unsdqr&nohmhnmnehmchuhct_k
onkhbhdrVgdm bhshydmr
dwoqdrrsgdhqoqdedqdmbdr
_mc rdmshldmsr _s dkdbshnm
shld) sgd du_kt_shnmhr trt_kkx l_cd _r _m _ffqdf_sd
itcfdldms nm _ fnudqmldms&rnudq_kkqdbnqcne _bshuhshdr-hm
neehbdq_sgdq
sg_m _ants sgd deedbshudmdrr
nq trdetkmdrr ne rodbhehbonkhbhdr-Mdudqsgd}
kdrr)otakhbodqbdoshnmr
nesgd hmdeedbshudmdrr
nq g_qletk deedbsrne rodbhehb
ghfg-oqnehkdfnudeHkHkkdms
_bshuhshdr
b_m_mc cn _eedbsunshmfadg_uhntq) _
qd_khsx
fnudqmldmsr hfmnqd_s sgdhqdkdbsnq_k
odqhk'Jhmf) 0870(@lnqd bnllnm sxod ne onkhshb_k
onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhmunkudrbnmrtks_shnmvhsg ldladqr ne qdkdu_ms
onkhbxrtarxrsdlr- Sgdqd _qdl_mx ldbg_mhrlr enq rtbg bnmrtks_shnmr)vghbg hmunkudsgd trd ne rnld ne sgd
oqnbdctq_k onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr chrbtrrdc hm Bg_osdqr 3 _mc 7- Sgdrd
hmbktcdrdsshmfto _clhmhrsq_shudenqtlr enqotakhb gd_qhmfr_mc drs_akhrghmfrodbh_k bnmrtks_shudbnllhssddr) s_rj enqbdr) _mc hmpthqhdr
enq du_kt_shudotqonrdr 'rdd B_hqmr)-088/_: Atkldq) 0882: Bknjhd _mc
0.3
K<OQ HHH[nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy
Qnahmrnm)0858() _mc b_mq_mfdeqnl rl_kk lddshmfr nekdrr sg_m_ cnydm
o_qshbho_msr
k_rshmfrdudq_klhmtsdr sn ltksh-lhkkhnmcnkk_qhmpthqhdrsg_s
gd_q sgntr_mcr ne hmchuhct_kaqhder _mc b_m s_jd xd_qr sn bnlokdsd
'Cndqm)0856: R_ksdq)0870: Vhkrnm)0860(- Hml_mx onkhshdr)
onkhshb_k
du_kt_shnm ne fnudqmldms _bshnmhr athks hmsnsgd rxrsdl) hmsgd enql) enq
dw_lokd) ne bnmfqdrrhnm_knq o_qkh_ldms_qxnudqrhfgs bnllhssddr 'rdd
LbBtaahmr _mc LbBtaahmr) 0883: LbBtaahmr _mc Rbgv_qsy) 0873(Vghkd hmrnld bntmsqhdrkhjd sgd TR sgdrd sdmc sn ldds nm _ qdftk_q
a_rhr) hmnsgdqr rtbg _r B_m_c_sgd oqnbdrr l_x ad kdrr qntshmd)_r onkhshb_kqduhdvr _qd tmcdqs_jdm nm _ lnqd _c gnb a_rhr 'rdd cd k_ Lnsgd)
0885: A_mshmf)
0884(Sgdrd onkhshb_k
ldbg_mhrlr enqonkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qdtrt_kkx b_o_akd
ne _rbdqs_hmhmf
sgd uhdvr ne l_mx ldladqr ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc
_eedbsdcotakhb nm rodbhehbonkhbxhrrtdr- Gnvdudq) hshr mnsbdqs_hmsg_s
rhlokx adb_trd sgdrd uhdvr g_ud addm l_cd jmnvm sgdx vhkk ad
qdekdbsdchm_mxqduhrhnmne fnudqmldms onkhbx)nq dudmhe_mxrtbg qduhrhnmrvhkkmdbdrr_qhkxqdrtks eqnl _ qduhdv-Deedbshudmdrr
nesdmcdodmcr
nmvgdsgdq sgd uhdvr gd_qc _qdbnmfqtdmsvhsg sgnrd ne sgd btqqdmsfnudqmldms 'Cxd) 08619 242-64() vghbg hmstqm cdodmcr nmsgd bqhsdqh_
fnudqmldms ldladqr _mc onkhshb_k
neehbh_kr
trd sn _rrdrr rtbbdrr nq e_hktqd
ne o_qshbtk_qonkhbhdrnq oqnfq_lrSGD NTSBNLDRNE ONKHBX
DU@KT@SHNM9
ONKHBX
EDDCA@BJ
@MCONKHBX
SDQLHM@SHNM
Sgd onsdmsh_k&
ntsbnldr& eqnl sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd ne sgd onkhbx
bxbkd_qd sgqddenkc-Ehqrs)_ onkhbxb_mad itcfdc rtbbdrretk _mc bnmshmtdc hmhsr oqdrdmsenql- Rdbnmc)_mc ltbg lnqd sxohb_kkx)
_ onkhbxb_m
ad itcfdc v_mshmfhmrnld qdrodbs _mc deenqsr_qd sgdml_cd) nq rtffdrsdc) enqhsrqdenql 'rdd O_ssnm_mcR_vhbjh)0882(- Ehm_kkx)
_ onkhbxb_m
ad itcfdc _ bnlokdsd e_hktqd'nq rtbbdrr() _mc hsb_mad sdqlhm_sdc 'rdd
CdKdnm)0867: Fdu_-L_x) 1//0: Anudmr_mc s&G_qs)0885: Anudmrds _k-)
1//0(- Hmsgd ehqrssvn ntsbnldr) sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd rdqudr sn
eddc sgd onkhbxa_bj sn rnld nsgdqrs_fd ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr- Vghkdhshr
mns bkd_qsn vghbg rs_fd sgd oqnbdrr vhkkoqnbddc) hml_mx b_rdr hs
qdstqmrsn sgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfrs_fd) gdmbdoqnuhchmfsgd onkhbxbxbkdvhsg
hsr bxbkhb_k)
hsdq_shudrg_od 'rdd Ohdqrnm)0882: @mfktmc)0888: Bnkdl_m
ds _k-)0886: Ahkkhmfr
_mc Gdql_mm) 0887(OnkhbxEddca_bj and O_sgCdodmcdmbx
@r D-D-Rbg_ssrbgmdhcdq'08249 27( mnsdc)&mdvonkhbhdrbqd_sdmdv onkhshbr&Sg_s hr)sgd dudmsr_mc nbbtqqdmbdrhm_ onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr sdmc
sn &eddca_bj&hmsnsgd onkhbx-l_jhmf dmuhqnmldms)sgtr _ksdqhmfhlonqs_ms_rodbsr ne sg_s dmuhqnmldms)
hmbktchmfhmrshstshnm_k
qtkdr _mc nodq_-
Uuroim J~gr}gzout
54:
shnmr)sgd chrsqhatshnmne vd_ksg _mc onvdq hmrnbhdsx)_mc sgd m_stqd ne
sgd hcd_r _mc hmsdqdrsrqdkdu_ms
sn onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr- Sghr eddca_bj
oqnbdrr b_m d_rhkx_eedbssgd hcdmshehb_shnm
_mc hmsdqoqds_shnm
ne onkhbx
oqnakdlr) _rrdrrldmsr ne sgd ed_rhahkhsx
ne onsdmsh_k
rnktshnmr)_mc itcfdldms nesgd m_stqdne)_mcqdronmrdreqnl) s_qfdsfqntor) sgdqdax_ksdqhmf
sgd bnmchshnmrtmcdq vghbg onkhbhdr_qd cdudknodc _mc hlokdldmsdcOnkhbhdr
b_m bqd_sdmdv &ronhkr&
enq onkhbx_bsnqr sn _qftd nudq) nq b_m
qdrtks hmsgd lnahkhy_shnmnq &bnshmsdqlnahkhy_shnm&
ne _bsnqr vgn eddk
sgdx g_ud mns admdehsdceqnl _m dwhrshmfonkhbxnq oqnfq_l 'Ohdqrnm)
0882(- Gdmbdhshr mnstmtrt_k _s _kk)hme_bshshr udqx sxohb_k)enqonkhbxl_jhmf sn qdhsdq_sd
sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr a_rdc nmsgd ntsbnldr ne sgd du_kt_shnmrs_fd-_r b_ostqdc hmsgd cdrbqhoshnm
ne onkhbxbxbkdrHshr hlonqs_mssn mnsd)gnvdudq) sg_ssgd enql rtardptdms hsdq_shnmr
ne
sgd bxbkds_jd hr _ chrshmbshud
nmd-@r hmbqdldms_khrsrrtbg _r Bg_qkdr
Khmcaknl _mc nsgdqr rtffdrsdc hmsgdhqnvm _m_kxrhrne onkhbx-l_jhmf
cxm_lhbr) rtardptdms qntmcr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf athkc nmsgd a_rhr ne d_qkhdqqntmcr _mc) _r _ qdrtks)sdmcsn hmbnqonq_sd
l_mx _rodbsr ne d_qkhdq
onkhbhdr-@ksgntfg cq_l_shb rghesrb_mnbbtq) _.lnqd sxohb_ko_ssdqmhr enq
nmkxe_hqkxlhmnq _rodbsr ne d_qkhdq
onkhbhdrsn ad _ksdqdc)rhmbdhml_mx
b_rdr sgd fdmdq_knudq_kkbnmehftq_shnm
ne l_inq dkdldmsr ne sgd onkhbx
oqnbdrrdr-khjd rtarxrsdl ldladqrgho _mc rs_sd b_o_bhshdr-vhkkmns
g_ud addm _ksdqdccq_l_shb_kkxadsvddm qntmcr- Sxohb_keddca_bj oqnbdrrdr dldqfhmf eqnl sgd onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrs_fd ne sgd bxbkdsgdm) _r
O_tk Ohdqrnmg_r mnsdc) tmcdqrbnqd _mc dwok_hmsgd &o_sg-cdodmcdms&
m_stqdne onkhbx-l_jhmf hmlncdl rs_sdr 'hahc-(&O_sgcdodmcdmbx&
hr _9 fdmdq_ksdhhqhtrdcax&dbnqhnhqhhrsr)
rnbhnknfhrsr)
_mcnsgdqrrstcxhmf rnbh_k_mcnsgdqjhmcr ne rxrsdlr sn b_ostqdsgd l_m) gdq hmvghbg oqduhntr rs_sdrne_ rxrsdl _eedbsetstqd rs_sdr 'rdd L_gnmdx)
1///: Ohdqrnm)1///: G_xct) 0887(- Hscdrbqhadr sgd rhst_shnmvgdqdax)
nmbd_ rxrsdl&r sq_idbsnqxhr hmok_bd)hssdmcrsn odqodst_sdhsrdkeax khlhshmfsgd q_mfdne bgnhbdrnq sgd _ahkhsx
ne enqbdransg ntsrhcd '&dwnfdmntr&(
_mchmrhcd'&dmcnfdmntr&(
sgd rxrsdl sn _ksdqsg_s sq_idbsnqxSg_s hr) nmbd
_ sq_idbsnqxhr hmok_bdhssdmcrsn &knbjhm&
sgd oqduhntr rs_sdnesgd rxrsdl
_mc sgd chqdbshnm
nehsr cxm_lhbr '@qsgtq)0878(-2 Hmsgd onkhbxkhsdq_stqd)
sghr hr rnldshldr qdedqqdcsn _r sgd hmektdmbd
ne &onkhbx
kdf_bhdr&)
vghbg
khlhssgd m_stqd_mcdwsdms
nebgnhbdonkhbx-l_jdqr g_ud hml_jhmf rtardptdms cdbhrhnmr'rdd Vdhq) 0881: Qnrd) 088/(- -Dw_lokdr ne sghr ogdmnldmnm q_mfd eqnl gnv cdbhrhnmrnm sgd hmhsh_k
knb_shnmne gnrohs_kr
_mc rbgnnkr _eedbssgdhqnodq_shnmsn sg_s ne cdbhrhnmrsn a_m mtbkd_q
onvdq) vghbg _qd ltbg g_qcdq _mc lnqd dwodmrhudsn s_jd nmbdok_msr
g_ud addmathkssg_mhesgdx g_c mdudqaddm bnmrsqtbsdchmsgd ehqrsok_bd
'Vhkrenqc)0883: Onkknbjds _k-)0878: Qnm_-S_r)0887(Dw_bskx
vgdqd nq sn vghbg rs_fd _ onkhbxoqnbdrr l_x fn enkknvhmfsgd
du_kt_shnmrs_fd cdodmcr nmsgd m_stqdne sgd bqhshptdoqnuhcdc_mc sgd
sxodr ne _bsnqrhmunkudc-ENql_kdu_kt_shnmrax fnudqmldms_k_bsnqr)enq
107
O@QSHHH[nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy
dw_lokd) sdmcsn qdrtks hmkhlhsdc bqhshptdrsg_s sxohb_kkxlhfgs h}unkud
_ksdq_shnmr
sn sgd onkhbxhlokdldms_shnmoqnbdrr) rtbg _r sgd bqd_shnm
ne
mdv _fdmbhdrnq qdftk_shnmrsn cd_kvhsg _mhrrtd q_hrdchmsgd du_kt_shud
oqnbdrr- Gnvdudq)sgdrd _mc nsgdqsxodr ne du_kt_shnmrb_m_krn qdrtkshm
mdv v_xr ne sghmjhmf_ants _ oqnakdl nq mdv noshnmrenqcd_khmfvhsg _
oqnfq_l) eddchmfa_bj hmsn&d_qkhdq&
rs_fdr rtbg _r _fdmc_-rdsshmf_mc
onkhbxenqltk_shnm-
Uuroim J~gr}gzout
54A
e_hktqdqdpthqdcenqtmbnmsdrsdcsdqlhm_shnmrsn ad l_cd 'Jhqjo_sqhbj ds
_H-)0888: CdKdnm)0886(- Hs_krn ad_qr ldmshnmhmf)ne bntqrd) sg_s _ rtbbdrretk sdqlhm_shnmhmsgd rgnqs sdql cndr mnsft_q_msdd _ rhlhk_qknmfsdql qdrtks-Sgtr) hesgd odqbdoshnmne _ oqnakdl odqrhrsr)_ sdqlhm_shnm
vhkkeddc a_bj hmsn_ qdbnmbdost_khy_shnm
ne oqnakdlr _mc onkhbx_ksdqm_shudr- Hemn nsgdq rths_akd _ksdqm_shud
dldqfdr hmsghr cdkhadq_shnm)
sghr
b_mqdrtks hmsgd qdudqr_kne _ sdqlhm_shnm_mc sgd qdhmrs_sdldmsne _ sdqlhm_sdc oqnfq_l nqonkhbx-
OnkhbxSdqlhm_shnm
Mdv hsdq_shnmr
ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_qd_ sxohb_kntsots ne du_kt_shnmoqnbdrrdr _mc nesdmhmunkudk_qfdqnq rl_kkdq qdenqlr ne dwhrshmf
onkhbhdr_mc
oqnbdrrdr- Vghkdl_mx odqlts_shnmr ne sghr eddca_bj oqnbdrr dwhrs)nmd
k_qfd_ksdqm_shud
noshnmenqonkhbxqdenql hr) ne bntqrd) rhlokx sn sdqlhm_sdnq dmc _ onkhbxnq oqnfq_l- Khjdlnqd khlhsdcoqnonr_kr enqqdenql)
sghrnoshnmhmunkudreddchmfsgd qdrtksr ne _mdu_kt_shudoqnbdrr a_bj hmsn
sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) trt_kkx chqdbskxsn sgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf&rs_fd-Tmkhjd
oqnonr_krenqlnqd khlhsdcqdenql nq rhlokx _bbdoshmfsgd rs_str ptn) sgd
noshnmne vuroim zkxsotgzout dmuhrhnmr
_ bnlokdsd bdrr_shnmne sgd onkhbx
bxbkd_s _ udqxmd_qonhmshmsgd etstqd 'CdKdnm)0867) 0872(@ksgntfg hshr e_hqkxbnllnm enqdu_kt_shnmr)drodbh_kkx
onkhshb_k
nmdr)
sn rtffdrs sgd _cnoshnmne sgd sdqlhm_shnmnoshnm)lnrs nardqudqr g_ud
mnsdc sgd qdktbs_mbdne cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr sn _cnos sghr bntqrd ne _bshnm
_mc sgd fdmdq_kogdmnldmnm ne sgd odqrhrsdmbdne onkhbhdr_mc oqnfq_lr
nmbdots hmsnok_bd 'Vd_udq) 0877(- Sghr hr o_qsh_kkx
ctd sn sgd hqhgdqdms
cheehbtkshdr)
ldmshnmdc-_anud)-ne_qqhuhmf
_s _fqddldms nmonkhbxrtb-bdrr -nq e_hktqd-@ksgntfg) nbb_rhnm_kkx)
_ oqnakdl l_x ad rddm _r rn odqmhbhntr sg_s mn onrrhakd noshnmb_mqd_rnm_akxad dwodbsdcsn qdrnkudhshmnsgdqvnqcr) sg_s _kknoshnmrvhkke_hk-nq_r g_uhmfaddm rn rtbbdrretk
sg_s fnudqmldms _bshnmhr mnknmfdqqdpthqdc)_kknardqudqr mnsdsg_s sgd
_ss_hmldmsne tmhehdcnohmhnmnm sgdrd l_ssdqr _lnmf qdkdu_msonkhbx
_bsnqrhr _mdwbddchmfkx
q_qdbhqbtlrs_mbd 'rdd C_mhdkr)0886: J_tel_m)
0865: Kdvhr)1//1(Ltbg lnqd sxohb_k)rstcdmsr ne onkhbxsdqlhm_shnmmnsd)hr enqdwhrshmf
oqnfq_lr _mc onkhbhdrsn g_ud drs_akhrgdcadmdehbh_qhdr
_mc) nesdm)sn
g_ud adbnld hmrshstshnm_khydc
sn rtbg _mdwsdmssg_s sgdhqbdrr_shnmhr _
bnrskx oqnbdrr hmunkuhmf
bnmrhcdq_akdkdf_k)atqd_tbq_shb) _mc onkhshb_k
dwodmrd'Vd_udq 0877: A_qc_bg)0865: Fdu_-L_x) 1//0(- G_mcannjr _mc
fThcdkhmdrenqvntkc-ad sdqlhm_snqr_kkrsqdrr sgd mddcsn cdudkno onkhshb_k bn_khshnmr
_mc bhqbtlrs_mbdr _kknvhmfsgdrd bnrsr sn ad nudqbnld
- 'rdnd}0:}&p}6¥e::&Fdu_-:L_x&_Ac)Vhhc_urjx)&k8-869bg:-&4(:
Sgdrd _kktmcdq+iWfh[ -Ihgd)-dw-s-dmssn
}vkkkh99g-90dqlhmo)skNQHdowdr-dm09r)-hm
}d9ee}ds)
_m deenqssn
nudqbnld o_sg cdodmcdmbhdr_mc onkhbxkdf_bhdrhmsgd onkhbxoqnbdrr)
l_jhmf hsr_bghdudldmsudqx cheehbtks)
nesdmqdpthqhmf_mhcdnknfhb_k
rghes
hmfnudqmldms _mc rnbhdsxsn _kknv tmhenql itcfdldmsr ne rtbbdrr nq
Sgd rstcx ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmg_r addm cnlhm_sdc ax sgnrd vgn g_ud
_ssdlosdc sn uhdv hs_r _ mdtsq_k)sdbgmhb_kdwdqbhrd-Enq sgdl) onkhbx
du_kt_shnmbnmrhrsrne _rrdrrhmf vgdsgdq _ otakhb onkhbxhr _bghduhmfhsr
rs_sdc naidbshud_mc)hemns)vg_s Fntkc ad cnmd sn dkhlhm_sdsgd gtqckd
hmsgd v_x- C_uhc M_bglh_r '08689 3() _mhmektdmsh_k
ehftqd hmsgd ehdkc)
cdehmdconkhbxdu_kt_shnm_r &sgdnaidbshudrxrsdl_shb) dlohqhb_kdw_lhm_shnmne sgd deedbsrnmfnhmfonkhbhdr_mc otakhb oqnfq_lr g_ud nm sgdhq
s_qfdsr hmsdqlr ne sgd fn_kr sgdx _qdld_ms sn _bghdud&Chrbdqmhmf
qd_cdqr vhkkg_ud mncheehbtksx
cdsdbshmfsgd q_shnm_khrs
nqhdms_shnm
ne sghr cdehmhshnmHsrodbhehdrdwokhbhskx
sg_s sgd dw_lhm_shnm
ne _ onkhbx&r
deedbsrnm
sgd _bghdudldmsne hsrfn_kr rgntkc ad naidbshud)rxrsdl_shb) _mc dlohqhb_k-Gnvdudq) _r vd g_ud ldmshnmdc adenqd)fn_kr hmotakhb onkhbx_qd
nesdmmnsrs_sdc bkd_qkx¥-dmntfgsn
ehmcnts he_mc sn vg_s dwsdmssgdx _qd
_bghdudc-Sgd onrrhahkhshdr
enqnaidbshud_m_kxrhr_qd_krnkhlhsdcadb_trd
ne hmrtqlntms_akd cheehbtkshdrhm cdudknohmf naidbshud rs_mc_qcr ax
vghbg sn du_kt_sdfnudqmldms rtbbdrr hmcd_khmfvhsg rtaidbshud bk_hlr
_mc rnbh_kkxbnmrsqtbsdcoqnakdlr@esdqltbg vnqj hmsgd 085/r _mc 086/r rntfgs sn cdudknopt_mshs_shud rxrsdlr ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)hsadb_ld bkd_qsn l_mx qdrd_qbgdqr
'@mcdqrnm)0868_: Jdqq) 0865: L_mydq)0873( sg_s cdudknohmf_cdpt_sd
_mc _bbdos_akdld_rtqdr enq du_kt_shmfonkhbxhr _ cheehbtks_mc bnmsdmshntrs_rj- @r _ qdrtks)lnqd qdbdmssghmjhmfsdmcrsn uhdv onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)khjdnsgdq rs_f}r ne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) _r _mhqhgdqdmskx
onkhshb_k
_bshuhsxRhmbdsgd r_ld bnmchshnm
b_mad hmsdqoqdsdc
pthsd cheedqdmskx
ax
cheedqdms
du_kt_snqr)sgdqd hr mn cdehmhshud
v_x ne cdsdqlhmhmfvgn hr
qhfgs-Vghbg hmsdqoqds_shnm
oqdu_hkrhr tkshl_sdkx cdsdqlhmdc ax onkhshb_k
bnmekhbsr
_mcbnloqnlhrdr _lnmf sgd u_qhntr _bsnqr 'Hmfq_l _mcL_mm)
087/a9 741(@btsd nardqudqr_krnmnsdcsg_s hshr m_hudsn adkhdudsg_s onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr _kv_xr cdrhfmdcsn qdud_ksgd deedbsrne _ onkhbx-Hme_bs)hshr _s
shldr dloknx}c sn chrfthrd nq bnmbd_kbdqs_hm
e_bsrsg_s sgd fnudqmldms
ed_qrvhkkrgnv hshm_ onnq khfgs-Hshr _krn onrrhakd enqfnudqmldmsr sn
11/
cdrhfm sgd sdqlr ne du_kt_shnmhmrtbg _ v_x _r sn kd_c sn bnmbktrhnmr
sg_s vntkc rgnv hshm_ adssdqkhfgs-Nq)hehsv_msr sn bg_mfd nq rbq_o _
onkhbx)hs b_m _citrs sgd sdqlr ne sgd du_kt_shnm_bbnqchmfkxRhlhk_qkx)
du_kt_shnmrax sgnrd ntsrhcd sgd fnudqmldms _qdmns_kv_xr cdrhfmdc sn
hloqnud _ onkhbx)ats nesdmsn bqhshbhyd
hssn f_hmo_qshr_monkhshb_k
_cu_ms_fd nq sn qdhmenqbd
hcdnknfhb_k
onrstk_sdr 'Bgdkhlrjx) 0884: Anudmr_mc
s&G_qs)
0884(Sghr hr mnssn rtffdrs sg_s onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr _mhqq_shnm_k
nq _ bnlokdsdkxonkhshb_k
oqnbdrr) cdunhc ne fdmthmdhmsdmshnmr
sn ehmcnts _ants
sgd etmbshnmhmfne _ onkhbx_mc hsr deedbsr-Q_sgdq)nmd ltrs mns qdkx
tmctkx nm enql_k du_kt_shnmenqcq_vhmf bnmbktrhnmr_ants _ onkhbx-Sn
fds sgd lnrs nts ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sgd khlhsr ne q_shnm_khsx
_mc sgd
onkhshb_k
enqbdrsg_s rg_od hsltrs bkd_qkx
ad qdbnfmhydc-
Lnqd QdbdmsLncdkr9 OnkhbxDu_kt_shnm_r OnkhbxKd_qmhmf
Odqg_orsgd fqd_sdrsadmdehsneonkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr mnssgd chqdbsqdrtksr hs
fdmdq_sdrats sgd dctb_shnm_koqnbdrr hs b_m dmfdmcdq'Oqdrrl_m _mc
Vhkc_urjx) 0873(- Vgdsgdq sgdx qd_khydhsnq mns)_bsnqr dmf_fdc hmonkhbxdu_kt_shnm_qd nesdmo_qshbho_shmf
hm_ k_qfdqoqnbdrr neonkhbxkd_qmhmf, vghbg hr aqntfgs _ants ax sgd _ssdlos sn hloqnud nq dmg_mbd
onkhbx-l_jhmf a_rdc nm sgd _rrdrrldms ne o_rs dwodqhdmbdr'rdd
Dsgdqdcfd_mc Rgnqs)0872: R_a_shdq)0877(Rdudq_ksxodr ne kd_qmhmf
'Admmdss_mc Gnvkdss) 0880: L_x) 0881( b_m
qdrtks \hfd cheedqdms
jhmcr ne du_kt_shnmr-Rnld kdrrnmr_qdkkjdkxsn bnmbdqmoq_bshb_krtffdrshnmr _ants cheedqdms
_rodbsr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r hs
g_r nodq_sdchmsgd o_rs- Sgdrd hmbktcd)enqdw_lokd) kdrrnmr_ants vghbg
onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr g_ud &rtbbddcdc&hmvghbg bhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc vghbg
g_ud &e_hkdc&)
nq vghbg hrrtdr g_ud dminxdcotakhb rtoonqs hmsgd _fdmc_rdsshmfoqnbdrr _mc vghbg g_ud mns-Nsgdqkdrrnmr_qdlnqd _ants onkhbx
fn_kr sg_mld_mr- Sghr hr _ lnqd etmc_ldms_k sxod ne kd_qmhmf)
vghbg hr
_bbnlo_mhdc ax bg_mfdr hmsgd sghmjhmftmcdqkxhmf_ onkhbxSgd bnmbdosne &kd_qmhmf&
hr fdmdq_kkx
_rrnbh_sdcvhsg hmsdmshnm_k)
oqnfqdrrhud)bnfmhshudbnmrdptdmbdrnesgd dctb_shnmsg_s qdrtksr eqnl onkhbx
du_kt_shnm-Gnvdudq) onkhbxkd_qmhmf
_krn g_r _ aqn_cdq ld_mhmf sg_s
hmbktcdransg sgd hmsdmcdc_mc tmhmsdmcdc'rdd Ldqsnm) 0825( bnmrdptdmbdr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf _bshuhshdr_r vdkk _r ansg sgd &onrhshud&
_mc
&mdf_shud&
hlokhb_shnmrne dwhrshmf
onkhbhdr_mc sgdhq_ksdqm_shudrEtmc_ldms_k sn onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr hsrhlo_bs nmdeedbshmf
bg_mfdr sn
onkhbx-@esdq_kk)sgd hlokhbhsotqonrd ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr sn bg_mfd _
onkhbxhe hs hr cddldc mdbdrr_qx_r _ qdrtks ne tmcdqs_jhmf _ qduhdv
'Edhbj) 0881(- Eqnl _ kd_qmhmf
odqrodbshud)otakhb onkhbxdu_kt_shnmhr
bnmbdhudc_r _mhsdq_shud
oqnbdrr ne _bshudkd_qmhmf
nm sgd o_qs ne onkhbx
_bsnqr _ants sgd m_stqd ne onkhbxoqnakdlr _mc sgd rnktshnmrsn sgdl
sQh}s kpp-_-¥S ")))hss:9lqk L-9kqqg- 2:RR).
Uuroim J~gr}gzout
554
Khjd nsgdq bnmbdosrhmonkhbxrbhdmbd)sgdqd _qd cheedqdms
hmsdqoqds_shnmrne vg_s hr ld_ms ax &onkhbx
kd_qmhmf&
_mc vgdsgdq hsr rntqbd _mc
lnshu_shnm _qd vhsghmnq ntsrhcd dwhrshmfonkhbxoqnbdrrdr-3 OdsdqG_kk
l_jdr sgd b_rd enq &dmcnfdmntr&kd_qmhmf)cdehmhmfsgd _bshuhsx_r _
&cdkhadq_sd
_ssdlos sn _citrs sgd fn_kr nq sdbgmhptdr ne onkhbxhmsgd
khfgsne sgd bnmrdptdmbdr ne o_rs onkhbx_mc mdv hmenql_shnmrn _r sn
adssdq_ss_hmsgd tkshl_sd naidbsr ne fnudqm_mbd&
'G_kk)08829167(- Gtfg
Gdbkn)nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) rtffdrsr sg_s kd_qmhmfhr _ kdrr bnmrbhntr
_bshuhsx)nesdmnbbtqqhmf_r _ fnudqmldms&rqdronmrd sn rnld jhmc ne
dwsdqm_k
nq dwnfdmntr bg_mfd hm_ onkhbxdmuhqnmldms-@bbnqchmfsn
ghl) &kd_qmhmf
b_mad s_jdm sn ld_m _ qdk_shudkx
dmctqhmf_ksdq_shnm
hm
adg_uhntq sg_s qdrtksr eqnl dwodqhdmbd:
trt_kkx sghr _ksdq_shnm
hr bnmbdost_khydc _r _ bg_mfd hmqdronmrd l_cd hmqd_bshnmsn rnld odqbdhudcrshltktr& 'Gdbkn) 086392/5(- Gdmbd)tmkhjdG_kk)hmGdbkn&ruhdv kd_qmhmfhr vg_s fnudqmldmsr cn hmqdronmrdsn _ mdv rhst_shnmnm sgd a_rhr
ne sgdhqo_rs dwodqhdmbdSgd svn cdehmhshnmr
cdrbqhad sgd m_stqd ne sgd qdk_shnmrgho
adsvddm
onkhbx kd_mhhmf_mc onkhbx bg_mfd) ats cheedqrtars_msh_kkxhm sgdhq
_ooqn_bg sn sgd hrrtd- EnqG_kk)kd_qmhmf
hr _ o_qs ne sgd mnql_k otakhb
onkhbxoqnbdrr hmvghbg cdbhrhnm-l_jdqr _ssdlos sn tmcdqrs_mcvgx bdqs_hmhmhsh_shudr
l_x g_ud rtbbddcdc vghkd nsgdqre_hkdc-Heonkhbhdrbg_mfd
_r _ qdrtks ne kd_qmhmf)
sgd hlodstr enqbg_mfd nqhfhm_sdrvhsghmsgd enql_k onkhbxoqnbdrr ne sgd fnudqmldms- EnqGdbkn)nmsgd nsgdqg_mc&)
onkhbxkd_qmhmf
hr rddm_r _m_bshuhsxtmcdqs_jdmax onkhbx-l_jdqr k_qfdkxhm
qd_bshnmsn bg_mfdr hmdwsdqm_k
onkhbx&dmuhqnmldmsr&@r sgd dmuhqnmldms bg_mfdr)onkhbx-l_jdqr lkkrscc_os hesgdhqonkhbhdr_qdsn rtbbddcSgdrd svn rdo_q_sd_rodbsr ne onkhbxkd_qmhmf
rgptkc ad bkd_qkxchrshmfthrgdc hmsghmjhmf_ants onkhbxdu_kt_shnm_r onkhbxkd_qmhmfSg_s hr)
eqnl _ kd_qmhmf
odqrodbshud)du_kt_shnmhmunkudroqnbdrrdr hlonrdc nm
onkhbx-l_jdqr ansg eqnl ntsrhcd sgd onkhbxosnbdrr _mc eqnl vhsghmsgd
oqnbdrr _r onkhbx-l_jdqr _ssdlos sn qdehmd
_mc _c_os sgdhqonkhbhdrhmsgd
khfgsne sgdhqo_rs _bshnmr-Sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr
ne sgdrd svn cheedqdms
sxodr
ne kd_qmhmf
_qdrds nts hmEhftqd 8-0Ehftqd 8-0 Dwnfdmntr _mc Dmcnfdmntr Bnmbdosr
ne OnkhbxKd_qmhmf_mc OnkhbxDu_kt_shnm
Emcnfdmntr Ld_qmhmf Ewnfdmntr Ld_qmhmf
Rtaidbs ne Kd_qmhmfOnkhbxRtarxrsdlr
'Vgn Kd_qmr(
OnkhbxTmhudqrd
Naidbs ne Kd_qmhmf OnkhbxRodbhehb_shnmr)Odqbdoshnm
ne O}nakdl)
'Vg_s hr Kd_qmdc( nq OnkhbxHmrsqtldmsr nq-OnkhbxFn_kr
Rntqbd9@c_osdc eqnl BnkhmI- Admmdss_mc Lhbg_dk Gnvkdss &SgdKdrrnmr ne
Kd_qmhmf9
Qdbnmbhkhmf
Sgdnqhdrne OnkhbxKd_qmhmf
_mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)UuroimYj0
ktiky 14: 2 '0880(9164&-83-
111
O@QS0kH [nk U}hroi Uuroim Uxuikyy
Dmcnfdmntr kd_qmhmf
s_jdr ok_bd_lnmf onkhbxrtarxrsdlr: hsrnaidbshudhr sn kd_qm_ants onkhbxrdsshmfrnq onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr- Hmbnmsq_rs)
dwnfdmntr kd_qmHmf
nbbtqr hmsgd aqn_c onkhbxtmhudqrd_mcl_x hmun}ud
ptdrshnmhmfsgd hmsdqoqds_shnm
ne _ oqnakdl nq sgd fn_k ne sgd onkhbx
cdrhfmdc sn _ccqdrr hs-Nmd sxod ne dmcnfdmntr du_kt_shnm)enkknvhmf
Qhbg_qcQnrd '0877) 0880() b_mad qdedqqdcsn _r kdrrnm-cq_vhmf. Sghr
sxod ne kd_qmhmf
nqhfhm_sdr
vhsghmsgd enql_k onkhbxoqnbdrr _mchr _hldc
oqhl_qhkx_s sgd bgnhbd ne ld_mr nq sdbgmhptdr dloknxdc ax onkhbxl_jdqr hmsgdhqdeenqsrsn _bghdudsgdhqfn_kr-r Sgdrd kdrrnmr _qdkhjdkxsn
bnmbdqmoq_bshb_k
rtffdrshnmr _ants cheedqdms
_rodbsr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd
_r hsg_r nodq_sdc hmsgd o_rs-enq dw_lokd) vghbg onkhbxhmrsqtldmsr
g_ud &rtbbddcdc&hmvghbg bhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc vghbg g_ud &e_hkdc&)
Nevghbg hrrtdr g_ud dminxdcotakhb rtoonqs hmsgd _fdmc_-rdsshmfoqnbdrr
_mcvghbg g_ud mnsEnkkNVHmf
G_kk)nmdsxod ne dwnfdmntr kd_qmhmf
hr rnbh_k kd_qmhmf.Hs
nqhfhm_sdrntsrhcd sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr _mc _eedbsrsgd bnmrsq_hmsr
nq b_o_bhshdrne onkhbx-l_jdqr sn _ksdqnq bg_mfd rnbhdsx-Sghr enql ne kd_qmhmf
hr
trt_kkx _ants onkhbxfn_kr sgdlrdkudr- Hshr sgd lnrs etmc_ldms_ksxod ne
kd_qmhmf)
vghbg hr _bbnlo_mhdc ax bg_mfdr hmsgd sghmjhmftmcdqkxhmf_
onkhbx-Dw_lokdr ne rnbh_kkd_qmhmf
b_mad rddmhmsgd lnud snv_qcr oqhu_shy_shnm
_mcsgd _bbdosdcadkhdesg_shmek_shnm
v_r _ lnqd rdqhntr oqnakdl sg_m tmdloknxldms) ansg ne vghbg nbbtqqdc hml_mx bntmsqhdr
ctqhmf sgd 087/r _mc 088/r 'G_kk)0882: Gnvkdss_mc Q_ldrg) 0882(Onkhbxdu_kt_shnmrb_mhmunkuddhsgdqsxod ne dmcnfdmntr nq dwnfdmntr kd_qmhmf@clhmhrsq_shud
du_kt_shnmr)uhqst_kkxax cdehmhshnm)
nbbtq
vhsghmsgd drs_akhrgdc _clhmhrsq_shudhmrshstshnmr-ne&
fnudqmldms _mc
sdmcsn s_jd sgd enql ne kdrrnm-cq_vhmf-ansg hmsgd mdf_shud_mc onrhshudrdmrdr ne sgd sdql- Ansg itchbh_k_mc onkhshb_k
du_kt_shnmr_qdltbg
lnqd rtrbdoshakdsn bg_mfdr hmrnbh_ku_ktdr _mclnqdr _mcsgtr _qdnmd
ld_mr ax vghbg rnbh_kkd_qmhmf
b_m_eedbssgd du_kt_shudoqnbdrr 'rdd
Atrdmadqf) 1//0(-
Tmcdqrs_mchmf
sgd khmjradsvddm du_kt_shnmsxodr _mc ntsbnldr qdpthqdr
_ adssdq tmcdqrs_mchmfne sgd qd_rnmrvgx kd_qmhmf
_mc &mnm-kd_qmhmf&
nbbtq hmbnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnmrMnm-kd_qmhmf
hmunkudransg e_hkhmf
sn
tmcdqs_jd _mxdu_kt_shnmr_s _kk_mc &khlhsdckd_qmhmf&
hmvghbg kdrrnmr
ne nmkx_ udqx qdrsqhbsdcrbnod _qd cq_vm eqnl sgd du_kt_shnmoqnbdrr
'@aq_g_lrnm _mcE_hqbghkc)
0888: S_lty) 1//0: L_x) 0888: Rhlnm) 0880:
L_qbg _qhcNkrdm)q864(--)
¥&}drB}sbg&hm
sgd&_clhmhrsq_9shud¥¥_mc"&Nk"f_mhy_shnm_k
rbhdmbdrg_r rtffdrsdc sg_s vgdsgdq nq mns_mxkdrrnmreqnl du_kt_shnmrvhkkad kd_qmdc
ax onkhbx-l_jdqr cdodmcr nm sgdhqb_o_bhsx_mc vhkkhmfmdrrsn _arnqa
Uuroim J~gr}gzout
112
mdv hmenql_shnm'rdd Gtadq) 0880: Odsdqr) 0887(- @r Bngdm _mc
Kduhmsg_k
g_ud nardqudc vhsg qdedqdmbd
sn oqhu_sdehqlr9
sgd _ahkhsxsn du_kt_sd _mc tshkhydntsrhcd jmnvkdcfd hr k_qfdkx_
etmbshnmne sgd kdudkne oqhnqqdk_sdcjmnvkdcfd- @ssgd lnrs dkdldms_k kdudk)sghr oqhnqjmnvkdcfd hmbktcdra_rhb rjhkkrnq dudm _
rg_qdc k_mft_fd ats l_x _krn hmbktcd jmnvkdcfd ne sgd lnrs
qdbdmsrbhdmshehb
nq sdbgmnknfhb_kcdudknoldmsr hm_ fhudm ehdkcSgtr) oqhnqqdk_sdcjmnvkdcfd bnmedqr_m _ahkhsxsn qdbnfmhydsgd
u_ktd ne mdv hmenql_shnm)
_rrkkHtk_sd
hs)_mc _ookxhssn bnlldqbh_k
dmcr- Sgdrd _ahkhshdr
bnkkdbshudkx
bnmrshstsdvg_s vd b_kk_ ehql&r
&_arnqoshudb_o_bhsx&-'Bngdm _mc Kduhmsg_k)
088/9 021: _krn rdd
K_md_mcKta_sjhm)0887(
Hm_ bnlokdw nqf_mhy_shnm
rtbg _r _ k_qfd ehql nq fnudqmldms) sghr
hlokhdr sg_s kd_qmhmf
hr _ btltk_shud oqnbdrr _mc sg_s sgd dwhrshmfrsnqd
ne jmnvkdcfd k_qfdkxcdsdqlhmdr vg_s vhkkad cnmd vhsg¥_mxmdv hmenql_shnm sg_s eknvr hmsnsgd nqf_mhy_shnm@krnbqhshb_k
hmsghr qdf_qc) _r
@kcqhbg
_mcGdqjdq '0866( mnsdc)_qd&antmc_qx-ro_mmhmf&
khmjradsvddm
sgd nqf_mhy_shnm
_mchsrdmuhqnmldms)
khmjrqdbdoshudsn mdv hmenql_shnm
_mc b_o_akdne chrrdlhm_shmfhsvhsghmsgd nqf_mhy_shnmHmsgd b_rd ne onkhbxdu_kt_shnm)sghr hlokhdr sg_s) _r vd g_ud rddm _s
sgd nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r vdkk)svn qdkdu_ms
u_qh_akdr_eedbshmfsgd onsdmsh_k
enqdu_kt_shnmrsn kd_csn kd_qmhmf
_qd '0( sgd nqf_mhy_shnm_kb_o_bhsxne sgd rs_sd) hmbktchmfdrodbh_kkxhsr dwodqshrdin sgd
rtaidbs _qd_ hmunkudc)_mc '1( sgd m_stqd ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl _mc
drodbh_kkx
sgd qdk_shnmrgho
adsvddm hsrrs_sd _mcrnbhds_kldladqr- Sgdrd
e_bsnqrcdsdqlhmd)enqdw_lokd) sgd _ahkhsxne du_kt_snqrsn &rxrsdl_shb_kkx
ohmbghcd_r&eqnl nsgdq itqhrchbshnmr_ants _ooqnoqh_sdonkhbxcdrhfmr
'Rbgmdhcdq_mc Hmfq_l) 0877( _mc sgd dwsdmssn vghbg sgdx b_m bqd_sd
sgd jhmcr ne _cuhrnqx bntmbhkr_mc bhshydmo_qshbho_shnm
_mc onkkhmf
ldbg_mhrlr qdpthqdcenq&rnbh_k
kd_qmhmf&
sn odmdsq_sdhmsnfnudqmldms_k
cdkhadq_shnmr
'L_x) 08889 16: Qnsgl_xq _mc G_qcldhdq) 1//1(- S_jdm
snfdsgdq)sgd svn u_qh_akdr_kknvtr sn chrbdqmsgd dwhrsdmbd
ne entq a_rhb
du_kt_shudrsxkdr'rdd Ehftqd 8-1(Hmsghr lncdk) _ rs_sdltrs g_ud _ ghfg _clhmhrsq_shudb_o_bhsxenq_mx
sqtd kd_qmhmf
sn s_jd ok_bd-Hesgd rs_sd hr sgd cnlhm_ms _bsnqvhsg vd_j
khmjr sn rnbhdsx)-sgdm _ enql ne dmcnfdmntr kdrrnm-cq_vhmfb_m ad
dwodbsdcsn nbbtq- He)nmsgd nsgdqg_mc) rs_sd _clhmhrsq_shudb_o_bhsxhr
knv) sgdm nmd vntkc dwodbsrhlokdq enqlr ne enql_k du_kt_shnmr_mc
onnq kd_qmhmf
sn oqdcnlhm_sd-Hernbhds_k_bsnqrcnlhm_sd sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl) _mc antmc_qx-ro_mmhmfkhmjrdwhrsvhsg sgd fnudqmldms) sgdm
sgd bnmchshnmr
enq rnbh_kkd_qmhmf
l_x ad oqdrdms-Vhsgnts rtbg khmjr)
gnvdudq) sgdqd hr kdrr khjdkhgnncsg_s _mx kd_qmhmf
vhkk_bst_kkx nbbtq
vhsghmsgd rs_sdhsrdke-
Ehftqd 8-1 A_rhb Onkhbx Du_kt_shnm Rsxkdr
Dnlhm_ms Absnq hmPnkhbxStarxrsdl
Snbhds_kAbsnqr
Ss_sd Absnqr
Rs_sd@clhmhrsq_shud
B_o_bhsx
Momn
Rnbh_kKd_qmhmf Hmrsqtldms_k
Kd_qmhmf
'Kdrrnm-Cq_vhmf(
Mnm-Kd_qmhmf
'Onkhshb_k
Du_kt_shnmr(
Khlhsdc Kd_qmhmf
'Sdbgmhb_k
Du_kt_shnmr(
@c_osdc eqnl Vdrkdx L- Bngdm _mc C_mhdk@- Kduhmsg_k)
&@arnqoshud
B_o_bhsx9@ Mdv Odqrodbshudnm Kd_qmhmf
_mc Hmmnu_shnm&)
Aclhmhrsq_shudSbhdmbdQt_qsdqkx24 '088/(9 017-41-
PJRO>A7
Sghr bg_osdq g_r rds nts sgd cheedqdmsenqlr ne du_kt_shnm-_clhmhrsq_shud) itchbh_k) _mc onkhshb_k-sg_s s_jd ok_bd hmsgd otakhb onkhbx oqnbdrr
_mc sgd cheedqdmsonrrhakd ntsbnldr sg_s b_m dldqfd _mc eddc a_bj hmsn
sgd onkhbxbxbkd_r _ qdrtks ne sgd du_kt_shud oqnbdrr- Cdrohsd hmgdqdmscheehbtkshdrvhsg _rrdrrhmf sgd rtbbdrr nq e_hktqdne onkhbx deenqsr) o_rs vqhshmfr nm sgd rtaidbs ne onkhbx du_kt_shnm g_ud sdmcdc nudqvgdklhmfkx sn
bnmbdmsq_sd&nmcdudknohmf) bqhshBhyhmf)
_mc qdehmhmfsgd sdbgmhptdr ne enql_k _clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnmr- Hmsgd oqnbdrr) sgd khlhsr ne q_shnm_khsx
hm
sgd¥onkhbx oqnbdrr vdqd nesdm enqfnssdm9Onkhbxdu_kt_shnm) gnvdudq) khjd
nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd) hr _m hmgdqdmskxonkhshb_kdwdqBhrd_mc
ltrs ad qdbnfmhydc dwokhBhskx
_r rtbg 'Gdkkrsdqm)0875:Bgdkhlrjx)
0884(@m_kxrsr vgn cn s_jd sgd onkhshbrtmcdqkxhmf onkhbx du_kt_shnm hmsn
_bbntms rdd onkhbx du_kt_shnm ansg _r _ bnmshmt_shnmne sgd rsqtffkd nudq
rb_qbd qdrntqbdr nq hcdnknfhdr _mc _r o_qs ne _ oqnbdrr ne kd_qmhmfhm
vghbg onkhbhdrcdudkno _mc bg_mfd nm sgd a_rhr ne _rrdrrldmsr ne o_rs
rtbbdrrdr _mc e_hktqdr _mc bnmrbhntr deenqsr sn dltk_sd rtbbdrrdr _mc
_unhc e_hktqdr 'rdd R_mcdqrnm) 1//1(- Sghr bnmbdoshnmmns nmkxgdkor sn
l_jd rdmrd ne onkhbx du_kt_shnm _mc qdlnudr hseqnl sgd m_qqnv sdbgmnbq_shbbnmbdqmrbg_q_bsdqhrshbne _clhmhrsq_shud du_kt_shnm) ats _krn gdkor
sn hcdmshexsgd cheedqdmskd_qmhmfrsxkdr sg_s b_m dldqfd hmsgd du_kt_shud
oqnbdrr _mc ghfgkhfgsr sgd rhfmhehb_msqnkdok_xdc ax _kkenqlr ne du_kt_shnmhmsgd nodq_shnmne sgd nmfnhmf onkhbxbxbkd-
@kcqhbg)Gnv_qc) _mc Ch_mdGdqjdq- 0866- &Antmc_qxRo_mmhmfQnkdr _mc
Nqf_mhy_shnm_kRsqtbstqd&) Ab_cdlx ne M_m_fdldms Rduhdv 1 '@oq-(9
106-2/-
Admmdss)}>khm)_mc -Lhbg_dk }nvkdss- 0880- &Sgd Kdrrnmr ne Kd_qmhmf9
QdbnmbhkHmf
Sgdnmdr ne Onkhbx Kd_qmhmf_mc Onkhbx Bg_mfd&) Pnkhbx
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121
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sn cdrbqhadknmf-sdql rdsr ne hcd_r oqdrdmshmsgd
&g_qc&
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ne bdqs_hm
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ax qdkdu_ms
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ne rs_sd
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sn onkhbxfn_krSgdrd chrbtrrhnmr rtffdrs sgd dwhrsdmbd
ne _s kd_rssvn a_rhb oqnbdrrdr
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o_ssdqmhmunkudrqdk_shudkx
lhmnq
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onkhbx
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ne
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sg_slnrs onkhbhdrl_cd ax fnudqmldmsr _qd
hmrnld v_x _ bnmshmt_shnm
ne o_rs onkhbhdr_mc oq_bshbdr-Dudmvg_s _qd
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o_ssdqmne onkhbxbg_mfd hmunkudrshmjdqhmfnq _ksdqhmf
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_bst_kkx_ksdqhmf
sgd nudq_kkrg_od nq bnmehftq_shnm
ne _ onkhbxqdfhldGdmbd)sgd dwhrsdmbd
ne fqd_sdqshld qdrntqbdr b_m_kknv_ rd_qbgoqnbdrr
hmsgd cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfrs_fd ne _ onkhbxbxbkdvhsgnts odql_mdmskx_ksdqhmfsgd fdmdq_koqnbkhuhsx
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mnshlokx _ odql_mdmsbg_mfd hm_ cnlhm_ms onkhbxo_q_chfl- Vhsghm_
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addm _ rtaidbs ne hmudrshf_shnm)
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125
O@QS HU \tjkxyzgtjotm
Uuroim Hngtmk
ne sxohb_konkhbxoqnbdrrdr hmghahsbg_mfd _s u_qhntr rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx
bxbkd_mc sgtr oqnlnsd onkhbxrs_ahkhsx9
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rs_akd rdsr ne nudq_qbghmfonkhbxhcd_r) _mc ehksdq
nts _ksdqm_shud
uhrhnmr
ne otakhb onkhbxsg_s bntkc hmrohqddeenqsrsnv_qcr lnqd etmc_ldms_k
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hr _krn dmg_mbdcax sgd bg_q_bsdqhrshbr
ne rnld onkhbxhrrtdrRstcdmsr ne _fdmc_-rdsshmfoqnbdrrdr rtbg _r Bnaa) Qnrr) _mc Qnrr _mc
Cnvmr) enq dw_lokd) mnsdc sgd hm_ahkhsx
ne bdqs_hmhrrtdr sn dmfdmcdq
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hmsg_s sgdx
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rdsr ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqrsg_mhrrtdr rtbg _r sq_eehb
r_edsx)bqhld)
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_mc chrbtrrhnm 'Jdkkdq)¥0888(-G_qc hrrtdr: sgdqdenqd:_qdlnqd khjdkxsn hmunkud
nmkx_udqx khlhsdc mtladq ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqr _mc rdqud¥_r _
a_qqhdqsn dmsqxne mdv _bsnqrhmsndwhrshmf
onkhbxoqnbdrrdr) bnmsqhatshmf
sn-onkhbxrs_ahkhsx)
Qgncdr 'k886_( _mc Rbg__o _mc u_m Svhrs '0886() _r vdkk _r l_mx
nsgdqr) g_ud _qftdc sg_s onkhbxrs_ahkhsxhr fqd_skxdmg_mbdcax sgd e_bs
sg_s _kkrtarxrsdlr sdmc sn bnmrsqtbs &onkhbx
lnmnonkhdr&hmvghbg sgd
hmsdqoqds_shnm
_mcfdmdq_k_ooqn_bg sn _ rtaidbs hrlnqdncdrr ehwdc'rdd
A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr) 0880) 0882(- Nmkxvgdm _ lnmnonkx hr aqnjdm
ax sgd dldqfdmbd ne mdv ldladqr vntkc onkhbxbg_mfd ad dwodbsdchm
_mxrhfmhehb_ms
rdmrd ne sgd sdql 'rdd Jtakdq) 1//0: Ctckdx _mc Qhbg_qcrnm) 0887(- Sgdrd &bknrdcmdsvnqjr&_qd _ jdx rntqbd ne onkhbxrs_ahkhsx)
vghbg hr a_rdc rhlokx nmsgd _ahkhsxne dwhrshmf
onkhbx_bsnqrsn oqdudms
mdv ldladqr
eqnl dmsdqhmfhmsnonkhbxcda_sdr _mc chrbntqrdr 'rdd
C_tfaidqf) 0886: G_llnmc _mc Jmnss)1///(- Sghr b_mnbbtq) enqdw_lokd)vgdm fnudqmldmsr qdetrd sn _oonhmsoqnlhmdmsbqhshbrsn _cuhrnqx
an_qcr nq qdftk_snqx sqhatm_kr)vgdm etmchmfhr mnsoqnuhcdc enq hmsdqudmdqr_s gd_qhmfr)vgdm sgd bqd_shnmne rtbg an_qcr _mc oqnbdctqdr hr
qdrhrsdc)nq vgdm sgd adg_uhntq ne hmsdqdrsfqntor hmotqrthmf rodbh_k-
Uuroim Wkmosky gtj
Uuroim Imtgsoiy
56:
hydc hrrtd mhbgdrdkhlhm_sdrbnlodshshnmhm_ onkhbxmdsvnqj 'Aqnvmd)
088/) 0880(@kkne sgdrd onkhbxkdf_bhdr_eedbsbtqqdmsonkhbx-l_jhmf ax bqd_shmf
hmrshstshnm_k
qntshmdr_mc oqnbdctqdr sg_s b_menqbdcdbhrhnm-l_jhmf hm
o_qshbtk_qchqdbshnmr-ax dhsgdqdkhlhm_shmfnq chrsnqshmfsgd q_mfd ne
noshnmr_u_hk_akdsn fnudqmldmsr 'rdd Vhkrenqc) 0874) 0883: Ohdqrnm)
1///: Qnm_-S_r)0887(- O_sgcdodmcdmbd)chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq8) qdedqr
sn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg btqqdmsonkhbxcdbhrhnmr_qd hmektdmbdcax sgd
hmrshstshnm_k
_mc adg_uhntq_kkdf_bhdrne sgd o_rs 'Ohdqrnm)1///: Vdhq)
0881: C_uhc) 0874: Qnrd) 088/(- @r Ohdqrnm)Vdhq)_mc L_qbg _mc Nkrdm
'08789 41() _lnmf nsgdqr) g_ud _qftdc) rs_ahkhsxhr dwodbsdcsn nbbtq
vgdm _ onkhbxrnktshnmnq oqnakdl cdehmhshnm
hr qntshmhydcnq hmrshstshnm_khydc)hmbqd_rhmf
sgd bnmrshstdmbxenq hsr oqdrdqu_shnm_mc q_hrhmfsgd
bnrsr _mc cheehbtksxne hsr _ksdq_shnm
nq sdqlhm_shnm-'rdd G_xct) 0887:
Snqehmf)1//0(@sxohb_k
OnkhbxBg_mfd
Sgdrd _rodbsr ne otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrrdr oqnlnshmf onkhbxrs_ahkhsx)
cdrbqhadc_anud) _qdonvdqetk) _mc hsrgntkc mnsad rtqoqhrhmfsg_s sgdhq
nodq_shnm
qdrtksr hmsgd bnllnmkx nardqudc o_ssdqmneodqrhrsdmbdhmonkhbxrsxkdr)o_q_chflr) _mc qdfhldr- Gnvdudq) l_mx nardqudqr g_ud _krn
mnsdc sgd dwhrsdmbd
ne _ rdbnmc sxod ne onkhbxbg_mfd) vghbg hr ltbg
kdrr eqdptdms_mc hmunkudr_ cddo bg_mfd hmsgd mnql_k rtars_mbd _mc
oqnbdrr ne onkhbx-l_jhmf-3 Sghr sxod ne _sxohb_konkhbxbg_mfd hmunkudr
rtars_msh_kbg_mfdr hmonkhbxo_q_chflr _mc rsxkdrVghkd onkhbxrsxkdr vhkk bg_mfd oqhl_qhkxadb_trd ne rghesr hmsgd
m_stqd ne onkhbxrtarxrsdl
ldladqrgho _mc rs_sd b_o_bhshdr 'Idmr)
0886() _r chrbtrrdc)_anud) onkhbxo_q_chflr bg_mfd k_qfdkxctd sn sgd
_bshUhshdr
ne rtarxrsdl ldladqr qdronmchmfsn lntmshmf duhcdmbdne sgd
hm_ahkhsx
ne dwhrshmf
o_q_chflr sn cd_k deedbshudkx
vhsg onkhbxoqnakdlrSg_s hr)_ rsqnmfsqdmchmsgd khsdq_stqd
g_r addmsn chrbtrr rtbg bg_mfdr
nbbtqqhmf_r _ qdrtks nesgd _bshuhshdr
ne rodbh_khydconkhbx_bsnqrqd_bshmf
sn chrbnqc_mbdrnq &_mnl_khdr&9
chrbqdo_mbhdradsvddm dudmsr nm sgd
fqntmc _mc sgdhq sgdnqhy_shnmvhsghm sgd cnlhm_ms o_q_chfl-R @r
R_a_shdq)
Jhmfcnm)_mcnsgdqr g_ud _qftdc) _mnl_kntr dudmsr_mc _bshuhshdrmnsdwodbsdcnq tmP-dqrs_mc_akd
hmsdqlr ne oqdu_kdmschrbntqrdr) nq
sg_s tords b_kbtk_shnmr
ne _bsnqrdke-hmsdqdrs)
_kknv hmmnu_shud
_bsnqr) nq
&onkhbx
dmsqdoqdmd0HSr&)
sn qdronmc sn bg_mfhmfbhqbtlrs_mbdr _mc sgdhq
nvm _lahshnmr _mc hmsqnctbdmdv hcd_r hmsnsgd onkhbxlhkhdt-5 Sgdrd
mdv _bsnqr_qdnesdmrddm_r dmf_fdc hm_ rsqtffkd vhsg drs_ak-hrgdcnmdr)
vgn trt_kkx qdrhrssgd hmsqnctbshnm
ne mdv hcd_r _mc cdedmcsgd rs_str
ptn nq)_s kd_rs)_ssdlos sn khlhsbg_mfdr sn sgnrd bnlo_shakd vhsg dwhrshmf_qq_mfdldmsr 'rdd Mtm_m)0888: Gnvkdss_mc Q_xmdq)0884: IdmjhmrRlhsg ds _k-)0880(B
Uuroim Wkmosky gtj
KhmjhmfMnql_k _mc @sxohb_k
OnkhbxBg_mfd9
&Otmbst_sdcDpthkhaqhtl&OnkhbxCxm_lhbr
Mnql_k _mc _sxohb_konkhbxcxm_lhbr _qd khmjdcsnfdsgdq sn enql _ o_qshbtk_qnudq_kko_ssdqmneonkhbxbg_mfdqdedqqdcsn hmd_qkhdq
bg_osdqr_r _
&otmbst_sdcdpthkhaqhtl&oqnbdrr- Sg_s hr) bg_mfd nbbtqr _r _mhqqdftk_q)
rsdoodc) etmbshnmhmvghbg qdk_shudkx
knmfodqhncr ne onkhbxrs_ahkhsx_qd
hmsdqrodqrdcvhsg hmeqdptdms
odqhncrne rtars_msh_kbg_mfd 'rdd Dkcqdcfd
_mcFntkc) 0861: Fntkc _mcDkcqdcfd)0866: Fdqrhbj) 0880(-Hmsgd onkhbx
qd_kl sghrqdedqrsn sgd rhst_shnmvgdqdax mnql_k onkhbx-l_jhmfhmunkudr
e_hqkx
bnllnm) qntshmd)mnm-hmmnu_shud
bg_mfdr _s sgd l_qfhm ne dwhrshmf
onkhbhdrsg_s enkknvdwhrshmf
onkhbxoqnbdrrdr _mchcd_r-@sxohb_k)
nq mnmhmbqdldms_k)
bg_mfd hmunkudrmdv onkhbhdrsg_s qdoqdrdms_ rg_qo aqd_j
eqnl gnv onkhbhdrvdqd cdudknodc) bnmbdhudc)_mc hlokdldmsdc hmsgd
o_rs 'A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr) 0882: Adqqx)088/: Qnrd)0865: 0std ds _h-)
0888: G_xdr) 1//0(- Eqdptdmskxbhsdcdw_lokdr ne rtbg bg_mfdr hmbktcd
rghesrhmehrb_k_mc lnmds_qx onkhbxhmlnrs Vdrsdqmbntmsqhdreqnl a_k_mbdc-atcfds nqsgncnwx sn Jdxmdrh_mcdl_mc-l_m_fdldms oqhmbhokdr
_mcoq_bshbdrhmsgd 082/r _mc 083/r _mcsgd rtardptdms rghes_v_x eqnl
Jdxmdrh_mhrl sn enqlr ne lnmds_qhrl hmsgd 086/r _mc 087/r 'G_kk)
0878) 0881(-6 Rhlhk_q rghes-rnbbtqqdc hm qdrntqbd onkhbx)eqnl otqd
dwoknhs_shnm
sn bnmrdqu_shnm
hmsgd mhmdsddmsgbdmstqx)_mc sgdm eqnl
bnmrdqu_shnm
sn rtrs_hm_akdl_m_fdldms hmsgd svdmshdsgbdmstqx 'rdd
G_xr) 0848) 0876(@trdetk v_x sn knnj _s sgdrd cheedqdms
o_ssdqmrne onkhbxbg_mfd g_r
addmrtffdrsdc ax Ct)t_ms _mc Chdgk'087}: -rdd_krnLdxdqds_k-) 088/(@m_knfhyhmf
eqnl vnqj hm-&
o_kdnahnknfx)onkhbxqdfhld -bg_mfd b_m)ad
_qftdc sn g_ud svn bnlonmdmsr- Onkhbhdr
b_mu_qx mnsnmkxhmsdqlr&ne
sgd lncd ne bg_mfd-adsvddm sgd mnql_k o_ssdqmne ohdbdld_k hmbqdldms_kbg_mfd _mc sgd o_ssdqmne o_q_chfl_shb bg_mbdldmshnmdc _anudats _krnhmsdqlr ne sgd sdlon >q roddc ne bg_mfd 'rdd Ehftqd 0/-3(-7
Ehftqd 0/-3 CasicSattems
of Solicx Dhange
Soddc ne Cg_mfd
Mncd ne Cg_mfd
-/-
Ftmc_ldms_k
Q_ohc@sxohb_k Fq_ct_k @sxohb_k
Imbqdldms_k
Q_ohcMnql_k
Fq_ct_k Mnql_k
RNTQBD9
@c_osdc eqnl Qnadqs E- Ctqq_ms _mc O_tk E- Chdgk) &@fdmc_r)@ksdl_shudr
;qhkc"Oshakhs&>NksbX9Kdrrnmr
eqnl sgd T-R- Enqdhfm Onkhbx@qdm_&)
Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi
p++;gEFRWn;:49,:0<F;4V4) 90)6=8-1/4-
@rsghrlncdk cdlnmrsq_sdr) _sxohb_kbg_mfd)_ksgntfg hmeqdptdms)
b_m
ad dhsgdqq_ohcnq rknv- Sghr hr rnldvg_s cheedqdms
eqnl sgd trt_k bnm-
Uuroim Imtgsoiy
bdoshnmne etmc_ldms_k bg_mfd bhsdchmsgd khsdq_stqd)
vghbg g_r dlog_rhydc hsr nesdmq_ohc m_stqd 'G_kk)088/9 50(-8 Gnvdudq) dlohqhb_kduhcdmbd ne rtbg fq_ct_k oqnbdrrdr g_r addm fdmdq_sdchmchudqrd _qd_r
rtbg _r ehrb_konkhbx)_fqhbtkstq_konkhbx)@anqhfhm_k
onkhbx)_mc enqdrsqx
onkhbx)_lnmf nsgdqr 'rdd G_kk)0882: Gnvkdss) h883: Bnkdl_m ds _k-)
0885(- Sgd r_ld hr sqtd enq sgd lnqd bnllnm o_ssdqmne hmbqdldms_k
bg_mfd)vghbg b_mnbbtq _s dhsgdqsdlon) cdrohsdsgd e_bssg_s sgd khsdq_stqd g_r sdmcdcsn enbtr nmsgd fq_ct_k m_stqdne l_mx hmbqdldms_konkhbxoqnbdrrdr 'rdd G_xdr) 0881(-0/
Tmshke_hqkxqdbdmskx)
hsv_r nesdmsgntfgs sg_s onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd
nbbtqqdc k_qfdkx_r _ qdrtks ne dudmsrntsrhcd ne sgdrd rs_akdonkhbx-l_jhmf rxrsdlr 'rdd Gdbkn) 0883) 0865(- Sgd- mnshnmsg_s onkhbxqdfhldr
vntkc bg_mfd nmkxctd sn dwnfdmntr dudmsrnq &rgnbjr&_qnrd eqnl sgd
_rrtloshnm sg_s rtbg qdfhldr vdqd _ enql ne rs_akd nq rdke-_citrshmf
&gnldnrs_shb&
rxrsdl- Fhudm_mhmhsh_k
rds ne bg_q_bsdqhrshbr
_mc bnlonrhshnm)hsv_r _qftdc) onkhbxrxrsdlr vntkc _citrs sn _mxhmsdqm_k
bg_mfdr
_mc bntkc nmkxad sgqnvm nts ne dpthkhaqhtl ax dwsdqm_k
dudmsr sg_s
hmsqnctbdcmdv cxm_lhb dkdldmsr hmsnsgd rxrsdl 'rdd Ytbjdq) 0877:
Rs_qkhmf)
0864: @lhmy_cd)0881(Sghr mnshnmne sgd dwnfdmntr m_stqdne onkhbxbg_mfd enbtrdc _ssdmshnmnmsgd u_qhntr sxodr ne dwsdqm_k
bqhrdrsg_s bntkc oqnunjd _ fnudqmldms qdronmrd nq onkhbx bg_mfd- Svn ne sgdrd qdbdhudc cds_hkdc
dw_lhm_shnm
hmsgd khsdq_stqd9
rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr _mconkhbxrohkknudqr.
O_tk R_a_shdq)enq dw_lokd) g_r _qftdc sg_s &bg_mfdrhmsgd bnqd
_rodbsr ne _ onkhbx_qdtrt_kkx sgd qdrtksr ne odqstqa_shnmrhmmnm-bnfmhshude_bsnqrdwsdqm_k
sn sgd rtarxrsdl rtbg _r l_bqn-dbnmnlhb bnmchshnmrnq sgd qhrdne _ mdv rxrsdlhb fnudqmhmfbn_khshnm&'R_a_shdq)
08779
03/: rdd _krn R_a_shdq)0876: R_a_shdq_mc Idmjhmr-Rlhsg- 0882_(- &Rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr&
hr _ sgtr _ sdql trdc sn cdrbqhadnmdne sgd nkcdrs
jmnvm enqlr sgqntfg vghbg onkhbxbg_mfdr-dwsdqm_kbqhrdrsg_s tords
drs_akhrgdconkhbxqntshmdr 'Ldxdq) 0871(- Sgdrd b_m hmbktcdhchn}xmbq_shbogdmnldm_ rtbg _r v_qr nq chr_rsdqr)nq qdod_shmfdudmsrrtbg _r
bqhshb_k
dkdbshnmr
_mc kd_cdqrghoqns_shnmr-Sgd oqhmbho_k
ldbg_mhrl axvghbg bg_mfd nbbtqr hr sgqntfg sgd hmsqnctbshnm
ne mdv _bsnqrhmsnonkhbxoqnbdrrdr) udqx nesdmhmsgd enql ne dmg_mbdcotakhb _ssdmshnm
adhmf
o)_hcsn _ onkhbxhrrtd _r _ qdrtksne _ odqbdhudcbqhrhrrhst_shnm&Rtarxrsdl rohkkn}dqr&
qdedqrsn _ lnqd qdbdmskxcdrbqhadc dwnfdmntr
bg_mfd oqnbdrr sg_s nbbtqr vgdm _bshuhshdr
hmnsgdqvhrd chrshmbsrtarxrsdlr sq_mrbdmcnkc&onkhbx antmc_qhdr _mc _eedbs sgd rsqtbstqd nq
adg_uhntq ne nsgdq rtarxrsdlr
'Cdqx) 0888: Kxmff__qc) 1//0(-00
Hmrs_mbdr
rkk-bg_r sgnrd sg_s g_ud nbbtqqdc vgdm Hmsdqmds-a_rdc
bnlotshmfbnkkhcdcvhsg dwhrshmf
sdkdbnlltmhb_shnmr qdfhldr _mc vgdm knmfdrs_akhrgdcm_stq_kqdrntqbd onkhbx_bsnqrehmchsmdbdrr_qxsn cd_k vhsg
@anqhfhm_k
k_mcbk_hlr hrrtdr dwdlokhexsghr ogdmnldmnm 'Gnadqf _mc
Lnq_v_rjh) 0886: Fq_ms_mc L_bM_l_q_) 0884: Qnrdmc_k)1///: Fdgqhmf
13/
Uuroim Hngtmk
_mc Nadqsgtq) 1///: L_qhnm)0888: Q_xmdqds _H-)1//0(- @ksgntfg sghr
o_qshbtk_qoqnbdrr ne qdfhld bg_mfd g_r itrs adftm sn ad dw_lhmdc) hs
vntkc _ood_qsg_srohkknudqrb_mnbbtq hmrodbhehbhrrtdr vhsgnts _mxodql_mdms bg_mfd hmrtarxrsdl ldladqrgho-rtarxrsdl
hmsdqrdbshnm-nq
sgdx b_m ad lnqd knmf-sdql hmm_stqd-rtarxrsdl
bnmudqfdmbd-Sghr
fdmdq_koqnbdrr) khjd rxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr)_eedbsronkhbxoqnbdrrdr
k_qfdkxsgqntfg sgd hmsqnctbshnm
ne mdv _bsnqrhmsnnsgdqvhrd rs_akdrtarxrsdlr- Tmkhjdrxrsdlhb odqstqa_shnmr)gnvdudq) sgd mdv _bsnqrsdmcsn
ad onkhbxrodbh_khrsr_mc hmsdqdrsdco_qshdr)q_sgdqsg_mrhlokx ldladqr
ne sgd _qntrdc otakhbLnqd qdbdmsbnmbdoshnmr
ne onkhbxrxrsdlr) gnvdudq) _qdlnqd bg_nshb)
_a_mcnmhmfmnshnmrne cxm_lhb dpthkhaqh_hme_untq ne _c_oshudbnmbdosr
hmvghbg sgdrd rxrsdlr _qd sgntfgs sn _eedbssgdhqdmuhqnmldmsr_mc
sgdqdenqd_ksdqsgd m_stqd ne sgdhqnvm bnmrsq_hmsr'rdd C_mdjd) 0881:
Idquhr)0886: Atbjkdx) 0857(- Hmsgd onkhbxrbhdmbdr)sghr rghesg_r l_mhedrsdc hsrdkehmsgd _bjmnvkdcfdldms sg_s bqhrdr_qdmnssgd nmkxrntqbd
ne onkhbxbg_mfd _mc sg_s e_bsnqrhmsdqm_k
nq dmcnfdmntr sn onkhbx-l_jhmfrxrsdlr _mc rtarxrsdlr b_m_krn kd_c sn onkhbxbg_mfd)dhsgdqhmcdodmcdmskxnq hmbnmitmbshnmvhsg dwsdqm_k
e_bsnqr 'rdd Odsdqr)0881_:
Mtm_m)0888(- Svn oqnbdrrdr hmo_qshbtk_qg_ud addmkhmjdcsn hlonqs_ms
onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfdr _mc vdqd chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdqr 4 _mc 89 ~kt}k
ingtmk _mc vuroim rkgxtotm1
&Udmtdbg_mfd&qdedqrsn bg_mfdr hmsgd rsq_sdfhdronkhbx_bsnqrenkknv
hmotqrthmf sgdhqhmsdqdrsr-01Hmsgdhqvnqj nm onkhbxenql_shnm hmsgd
TmhsdcRs_sdr)A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr '08829 15) 128-30( mnsdc rdudq_k
rsq_sdfhdrdloknxdc ax _bsnqroqdrdmskxdwbktcdceqnl onkhbxrtarxrsdlr
sn f_hm_bbdrr sn onkhbxcdkhadq_shnmr
_mc-_eedbso_khbxntsbnldr- Sghr&
trt_kkx hmunkudcldladqr
ne chrbntqrd bnlltmhshdr _ssdloshmf sn
&aqd_jhmsn&
lnqd qdrsqhbsdchmsdqdrs
mdsvnqjr ne bdmsq_k
onkhbx_bsnqr)ats
_krn b_mhmunkudinbjdxhmf enq _cu_ms_fd _lnmf mdsvnqj _bsnqr sgdlrdkudr-Udmtd-rgheshmf
rsq_sdfhdrtrt_kkx hmunkudsgd qdcdehmhshnm
ne _ onkhbx hrrtd sn e_bhkhs_sd
sgd _ksdq_shnm
ne sgd knb_shnmhm vghbg onkhbx
enqltk_shnmnbbtqr- Sgdrd hmbktcdmns_akdhmrs_mbdrrtbg _r vgdm dmuhqnmldms_kfqntor _ssdlos sn qdcdehmdsgd hl_fd ne _m hrrtd khjd v_rsd
chronr_k eqnl _ sdbgmhb_k
qdftk_snqxhrrtd sn _ otakhb gd_ksgnq oqnodqsx
qhfgsr nmdrtrbdoshakdsn k_vrthsr _mcqdbntqrd sn sgd bntqsr 'rdd Inqc_m)
0887: Gnadqf) 0887: Qhbg_qcrnm)0888(- Mns_kkonkhbxhrrtdr _qdrtrbdoshakd) nq _r rtrbdoshakd)sn qdeq_lhmf nq hl_fd l_mhotk_shnm)_mc mns_kk
onkhshb_k
rxrsdlr bnms_hm
_mx)nq _r l_mx) _ksdqm_sd
onkhbxudmtdr- Gnvdudq)A_tlf_qsmdq _mc Inmdr _qftd sg_s _bsnqr ntsrhcd ne enql_k onkhbx
oqnbdrrdr) drodbh_kkx)
vhkk_ssdlos sn _ksdqdwhrshmf
onkhbxhl_fdr hmsgd
gnod sg_s _m_ksdqm_shud
udmtd b_mad rtbbdrretkkx knb_sdchmvghbg sgdhq
hrrtdr _mc bnmbdqmrvhkkad _bbnqcdc _ e_untq_akdqdbdoshnmSgd hmsdqm_shnm_khy_shnm
ne otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf _mc hsr hlo_bs nm onkhbx
bg_mfd-nesdm _ccqdrrdc hmrgnqs-g_mc_r fkna_khy_shnm
nq hmsdqm_shnm_k-
Uuroim Wkmosky gtj
Uuroim Imtgsoiy
574
hy_shnm-qdrtksrhmonkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd k_qfdkxsgqntfg sgd oqnkhedq_shnm
ne mdv udmtdr enq_bsnqrsn dwoknhs'Dorsdhm)0886: Bdqmx)1//0: Cndqmds
_k" 0885_(&Onkhbx
kd_qmhmf&
hr _ rdbnmc dmcnfdmntr bg_mfd-dmg_mbhmf
oqnbdrr@r chrbtrrdc hmBg_osdq8) hs qdedqrsn sgd l_mmdq hmvghbg) _r Gtfg Gdbkn'0863( g_r mnsdc)_ qdk_shudkx
dmctqhmf_ksdq_shnm
hmonkhbxqdrtksr
eqnl onkhbx-l_jdqr _mco_qshbho_msr
kd_qmhmf
eqnl sgdhqnvm _mc nsgdqr&
dwodqhdmbd
vhsg rhlhk_qonkhbhdr-Vghkdrnld sxodr nekd_qmhmf
_qdkhlhsdc
sn qdekdbshnmr
nm dwhrshmf
oq_bshbdr)nsgdqr _qd ltbg lnqd e_q-qd_bghmf
_mc b_m_eedbs_ vhcd q_mfdne onkhbxdkdldmsr 'rdd Admmdss
_mc Gnvkdss)
0880: L_x) 0881(- @kkhmunkudsgd cdudknoldms _mc cheetrhnmne mdv
hcd_r hmsndwhrshmf
onkhbxoqnbdrrdr- Sgdrd cheedqdms
bnmbdoshnmrne kd_qmhmf_mc hsrqnkdhmotakhb onkhbxenql_shnm_qd trdc ax l_mx _m_kxrsrsn
cdrbqhad_ bnsmlnm sdmcdmbxenqonkhbhdrsn bg_mfd _r sgd qdrtks ne _ksdq_shnmrhmonkhbxhcd_r bhqbtk_shmf
hmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr) _r jmnvkdcfd ne
o_rs dwodqhdmbdr
hmektdmbdr
ldladq itcfdldmsr _r sn sgd ed_rhahkhsx
nq
cdrhq_ahkhsx
ne bdqs_hmoqdrdmsbntqrdr ne _bshnm'Jmndoedk_mc Jhrrkhmf-M_e)0887(Rtbg _m_kxrdrrtffdrs sg_s sgd oqnbdrr ne onkhbxqdfhld bg_mfd b_m
g_ud ansg dwnfdmntr _mc dmcnfdmntr b_trdr) sg_s hr) b_mhmunkudansg
sgd dldqfdmbd ne mdv oqnakdlr _mc hrrtdr) _mc sgd adg_uhntq _mc _sshstcd ne rtarxrsdl ldladqr snv_qcr sgdl- Sgd fdmdq_k_qftldms sn
dwok_hm
otmbst_sdc dpthkhaqhtl o_ssdqmrne onkhbxcxm_lhbr hr sg_s _sxohb_kbg_mfd tkshl_sdkx nbbtqr adb_trd _mnl_khdr athkc to adsvddm sgd
onkhbxqdfhld _mc sgd qd_khsx
hs&qdftk_sdr&)
qdrtkshmfhm_ bqhrhrvhsghmsgd
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_mc sn sgdhqnvm _lahshnmr- Sgd oqnbdrr ne qdfhld bg_mfd hr hmhsh_kkx
-pthsd tmrs_akd _r bnmekhbshmf
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ne hcd_r vhmr nts nudqsgd nsgdqr _mc hr _bbdosdcax lnrs) nq _s kd_rssgd
lnrs onvdqetk) ldladqr ne sgd onkhbxrtarxrsdl- Sgd gdfdlnmx ne sgd
mdv qdfhld hr dudmst_kkxdrs_akhrgdcvgdm hshr hmrshstshnm_khydc
_mc hsr
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_ onkhbxqdfhld hr rds nts hmEhftqd 0/-4-
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enqbdr_mc
oqnbdrrdr dmg_mbhmf
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dmg_mbhmf
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@ Ieneral Podel of the Srocess of Solicx Tegime
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Yzgmk
Hngxi}Czkxoyzoiy
Qdhfmhmfnqsgncnwx hr hmrshstshnm_khydc_mc
onkhbx_citrsldmsr l_cd k_qfdkxax _ bknrdc
fqnto ne dwodqsr _mc neehbh_kr&Qd_k-vnqkc&
cdudknoldmsr _qd mdhsgdq
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sgd qdhfmhmfnqsgncnwxDeenqsr_qd l_cd sn rsqdsbg sgd dwhrshmf
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3- Eq_fldms_shnm ne
o_qshbho_msrbg_kkdmfdsgd dwhrshmfqdfhld@tsgnqhsx
Cda_sd rohkkrhmsnsgd otakhb _qdm__mc
4- Bnmsdrs_shnm
hmunkudrsgd k_qfdqonhhshb_koqnbdrr)
hmbktchmfdkdbsnq_k_mc o_qshr_m
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mdv qdfhld rdbtqd onrhshnmr ne _tsgnqhsx _mc
ne _Mdv Qdfhld
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hmrshstshnm_khyd
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ds _H-)1//0: Mhrads) 0861(@m_kxyhmfsgd onkhbx oqnbdrr hmsdmtr ne onkhbx bxbkdr _mc onkhbx rtarxrsdlr _hcr ansg sgd bnmbdost_khy_shnmne sgdrd etmc_ldms_k onkhbx
cxm_lhbr _r vdkk _r sgdhq hcdmshehb_shnm
_mc hmudrshf_shnm-Hcdmshexhmf
bg_q_bsdqhrshbonkhbx rsxkdr _mc onkhbx o_q_chflr sgqntfg sgd _m_kxrhr ne
sgd rs_fdr ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd gdkor sn drs_akhrg _ a_rdkhmd _f_hmrs vghbg
sn ld_rtqd bg_mfd) vghkd b_qdetk nardqu_shnm _mc hmudrshf_shnmne rtarxrsdl adg_uhntq& gdkor sn bk_qhexsdmcdmbhdr snv_qcr _sxohb_k onkhbx
bg_mfdHmsgd bntqrd ne mnql_k onkhbxcdudknoldms) sgd bqhshb_k_bshuhsxtmcdqs_jdm ax _ rtarxrsdl
hr _ enql ne onkhbxkd_qmhmfhmvghbg sgd ntsbnldr
ne oqduhntr onkhbxbxbkdr _mc bxbkdrs_fdr eddc a_bj hmsnmdv hsdq_shnmrne
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Uuroim Wkmosky gtj
Uuroim Imtgsoiy
132
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sgntfg mns mdbdrr_qhkx
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1//0(- Rtbg cddo bg_mfdr nbbtq hmbhqbtlrs_mbdr vgdm mnqmh_kbg_mfdr
sn sgd onkhbxbnld sn ad qdf_qcdc _r hmrteehbhdmsenq sgd s_rj _s k:k_mc-Ax
sgdhq udqx m_stqd sgdhq nbbtqqdmbd hr hmeqdptdms)ats vgdm sgdx cn s_jd
ok_bd) sgdhq deedbsr_qd edkssgqntfgnts sgd onkhbx rdbsnq-
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Bnmshmthsx)Bg_mfd _mc Qdftk_snqx Qdfhldr&) Intqm_k ne Uuroim Moyzuxm9/
19 046-76Drohmf"@mcdqrdm)
Fnrs_- 0874- &Onvdq_mc Chrsqhatshnm_kQdfhldr&) Uurozoiy
gtj Yuiokzm 03) 19 112-45Fdqrhbj) BnmmhdI-F- 0880- &Qdunktshnm_qx
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ne
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Sgd-&
B_rd ne Dbnmnlhb Onkhbx-l_jhmf&¥hm
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164-85G_qqhr)Qhbg_qc)_mc RhcmdxLhkjhr- 0878- [nk Uurozoiyne Wkm}rgzuxmHngtmk1
Mdv Xnqj9NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrrGdldr) Ftcltmc0865) &Rsqtbstq_kBg_mfd -hmRnbh_kOqnbdrrdr&)Fskxoigt
Ou}xtgr ne Yuiourumm71) 29 402-36Ldm_gdl) Fhk_-0887- &Onkhbx
O_q_chflr) OnkhbxMdsvnqjr _mc V_sdq Onkhbx
hmHrq_dk&)
Intqm_k ne U}hroi Uuroim 07) 29 172-20/Qhbg_qcrnm) Idqdlx) Ftmmdk Ftrs_errnm) _mc Fq_ms Inqc_m- 0871- &Sgd
Bnmbdos ne OnkhbxRsxkd&)hm Qhbg_qcrnm) dc-) Uuroim Yzmrky ot akyzkxt
J}xuvk1 Knmcnm9FdPqfd @kkdm
_mc Tmvhm) 0-05Sgnl_r)
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Hmsdq_bshud
Rntqbdr ne Bg_mfd hmT-R- Rdbtqhsx Onkhbx&)
Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi
Uuroim 08) 19 1/8-20Sqtd) I_ldr
K-) Aqx_m C- Inmdr) _mc Eq_mj Q- A_tlf_qsmdq- 0888&Otmbst_sdc-Dpthkhaqhtl Sgdnqx9 Dwok_hmhmfRs_ahkhsx_mc Bg_mfd hm
@ldqhb_m Onkhbxl_jhmf&)hm O-@-R_a_shdq)dc-) [nkuxoky ne znk Uuroim
Oqnbdrr-Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv Oqdrr) 86-004Vhkrnm)B_qsdq@-1///- &Onkhbx
Qdfhldr _mc OnkhbxBg_mfd&)Ou}xtgr ne U}hroi
Uuroim 1/) 29 136-60-
0- Dudm sghr sdql g_r g_c svn rdmrdr- Nmd qdedqr sn sgd hmrshstshnm_k
_qq_mfdldmsr entmc hm_ bntmsqx- Rdd)eNedw_lokd) Ftmsgdq '0885(- Sgd
rdbnmc qdedqr sn sgd u_ktdr _mc fdmdq_k hcdnknfhb_knqhdms_shnmne _
bntmsqx- Rdd) enq dw_lokd) Dkjhm'k875(1- Sghr hr rhlhk_q sn sgd hcd_ ne _ onkhbx&oqnehkd&
ots enqv_qc ax Edhbj 'k881(2- Enq rhlhk_q chrbtrrhnmr ne _bshuhshdr_s d_bg rs_fd ne sgd onkhbx bxbkd
oqnlnshmf rs_ahkhsx_mc bg_mfd) rdd Vdaadq '0875(: Sgnl_r _mc Fqhmckd
'088/(: Gnvkdss _mc Q_ldrg '1//1(-3- Nm sgd cdehmhshnmne mnm-hmbqdldms_k bg_mfd _r lmnu_sHud nq
&aqd_jsgqntfg&bg_mfd) rdd G_xdr '08819 dro- bg- HN(- 4- Sghr lncdk ne bg_mfd hr _jhm sn sg_s ots enqv_qc ax Sgnl_r Jtgm l gHR
vnqj nm o_q_chfl rghesr hmrbhdmshehb
hmpthqx-Rdd Jtgm '08519- mN(- Nm
sgd qnkdne _mnl_khdr hmonkhbx-l_jhmf) rdd G_kk'0882(: K_tfgkhm '0880(Nmsgd qnkdne onkhbxdmsqdoqdmdtqr)rdd Jhmfcnm '0873(: Lhmsqnm'0886(:
Qnadqsr _mc Jhmf '0880(5- Cq_vhmf nm vnqj hmsgd rnbhnknfx ne rbhdmbdtmcdqs_jdm ax Qnadqs JLdqsnm) V_kjdq '08639 7-8( g_r rtffdrsdc sg_s sgd hmchuhct_kbnlltmhsx
ldladqr& odqrnm_k lnshu_shnmr) tmqdk_sdc sn sgd otqrths ne &naidbshud&
jmnvkdcfd) l_x _bbntms enqsgd u_qh_shnmr-Gd _qftdr sg_s sgd ldladqr&
cdrhqd enq oqdrshfd _mc qdbnfmhshnm
vhsghmsgd rbhdmshehb
bnlltmhsx ok_xr
_ k_qfd o_qs hmsghr oqnbdrr6- Sghr v_r mns sgd ehqrstrd ne rtbg _ lncdk ne bg_mfd) ne bntqrd- Hs
bnqqdronmcr pthsd bknrdkxvhsg sgd mnshnmne ch_kdbshb_k
bg_mfd entmc hm
sgd vnqjr ne Gdfdk _mc ghr enkknvdqr)hmbktchmf)lnrs nauhntrkx) J_qk
L_qw- Rdd Gdqmdr '0865(7- Nm sgd -o_kdnahnknfhb_kqnnsrne sghr _qftldms) rdd Fntkc _mc Dkcqdcfd
'0866( :
8- @ksgntfg Jtgm _qftdc hmghr d_qkhdqvnqj sg_s _ o_q_chfl vntkc bg_mfd
pthbjkx eqnl sgd nkc sn mdv o_q_chfl) hmghr k_sdqvnqjr gd rtffdrsdc
sg_s sgdqd v_r _ sq_mrhsnqxodqhnc adsvddm sgd svn og_rdr- Rdd Jtgm
'0863(0/- Sgd nqhfhm_snqne sgd bnmbdos) Bg_qkdr Khmcaknl) g_c mnsdc sg_s
hmbqdldms_kbg_mfd b_mnbbtq _s ansg roddcr- Rdd Khmcaknl 'k868(e- Nmd_qkhdqtrdr ne sgd sdql sn dwok_hmsgd oqnbdrr ne Dtqnod_m hmsdfq_shnm)
rdd G__r 'k847( _mc Jdng_md _mc Gneel_m '0880(01- Nm sgd ehqrstrdr ne sghr bnmbdos) rdd R-bg_ssrbgmdhcdq'085/(- Nm hsr
qdk_shnmrghosn ltksh-kdudk fnudqm_mbd rxrsdlr) rdd Qhbg_qcrnm '0888)
1///(-
BfterwordA WtillWtudxing Sublic Solicx
Sgd chrbtrrhnm hm sghr annj g_r rgnvm sg_s otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf hr _
ghfgkx bnlokdw l_ssdq) bnmrhrshmf ne _ rdqhdr ne cdbhrhnmr) hmunkuhmf_
k_qfd mtladq ne _bsnqr nodq_shmf vhsghm sgd bnmehmdrne _m _lnqogntr)
xds hmdrb_o_akd) hcd_shnm_k_mc hmrshstshnm_kbnmsdws) _mc dloknxhmf _
u_qhdsx ne chudqrd _mc ltksh-e_bdsdc onkhbx hmrsqtldmsr- Sghr bnlokdwhsx
onrdr fq_ud cheehbtkshdrenq sgnrd rddjhmf _ bnloqdgdmrhud tmcdqrs_mchmf
ne sgd rtaidbs@r sgd bg_osdqr hmsghr unktld g_ud rgnvm) nmd ne sgd rhlokdrs _mc
lnrs deedbshudv_xr sn cd_k vhsg sghr bnlokdwhsx hr sn aqd_j cnvm sgd
otakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr hmsnrdqhdr ne chrbqdsd ats qdk_sdc rta-oqnbdrrdr) snfdsgdq enqlhmf _ bnmshmthmfvuroim Hmirk1 Sgd rs_fdr hmsgd bxbkd
bnqqdronskc sn sgd-ehud rs_fdr hm_ookhdc oqnakdl-rnkUhmf) vgdqdaxoqna}&"
kdqmr _qd qdbnfmhydc) rnktshnmr _qd oqnonrdc) _ rnktshnm hr bgnrdm) sgd
bgnrdm rnktshnm hr ots hmsndeedbs)_mc ehm_kkx
sgd ntsbnldr _qd lnmhsnqdc
_mc du_kt_sdc- H9o- sgd onkhbx oqnbdrr) sgdrd rs_fdr _qd l_mhedrsdc _r
_fdmc_-rdsshmf) onkhbx enqltk_shnm) cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) onkhbxhlokdldms_shnm)_mc onkhbxdu_kt_shnmNe bntqrd) sgd otakhb onkhbxoqnbdrr hr mns md_qkx_r shfgskx rdptdmsh_k
nq fn_k}cqhudm_r sgd lncdk l_jdr hs_ood_q- Onkhbx_bsnqr) hshr itrsheh_akx
_qftdc) cn mns fn _ants l_jhmf _mc hlokdldmshmf onkhbhdrhm sgd rxrsdl_shb l_mmdq sgd lncdk rddlr sn rtffdrs- Vghkd sghr hr mn cntas _
kdfhshl_sd bnlok_hms _f_hmrs sgd bnmbdoshnmne otakhb onkhbx_r adhmf b_qqhdc nts hm_ rdqhdr ne rs_fdr) hshr _krn&sqtdsg_s sgd khlhs_shnmb_m ad lhshf_sdc sn _ k_qfd dwsdmsvhsg b_tshnm _mc chkhfdmbdhmhsr _ookhb_shnm-Sgd
_cu_ms_fd ne dloknxhmf sgd bxbkdlncdk khdrhmhsr qnkd_r _ ldsgncnknfhb_k gdtqhrshb; e_bhkhs_shmf
sgd tmcdqrs_mchmf ne sgd otakhb onkhbx oqnbdrr
ax aqd_jhmf hshmsno_qsr) d_bg ne vghbg b_m ad hmudrshf_sdc _knmd nq hm
sdqlr ne hsr qdk_shnmrghosn sgd nsgdq rs_fdr ne sgd bxbkd-Sghr _kknvr sgd
hmsdfq_shnmne sgd rstcx ne hmchuhct_k b_rdr) bnlo_q_shud rstchdr ne _
135
O@QS HU \tjkxyzgtjotm
Uuroim Hngtmk
rdqhdrne b_rdr) _mc sgd rstcx ne nmdnq l_mx rs_fdr ne nmd nq rdudq_k
b_rdr) ne vghbg sgd onkhbxkhsdq_stqd)
enqsgd lnrs o_qs)hr bnlonrdc- .
Sgd lncdk&r fqd_sdrs uhqstd) gnvdudq) hr hsr dlohqhb_knqhdms_shnm)
vghbg dm_akdrsgd rxrsdl_shb du_kt_shnmne _ vhcd q_mfdne cheedqdms
e_bsnqr cqhuhmfotakhb onkhbx-l_jhmf _s sgd u_qhntr rs_fdr nesgd onkhbx-l_jhmfoqnbdrr- Vghkd _arsq_bsbnmbdost_khy_shnm
hr mdbdrr_qxsn cdudkno _
aqn_c ohbstqdne sgd onkhbxoqnbdrr) _m_m_kxshb_k
eq_ldvnqj sg_s s_jdr
hmsn_bbntms sgd cds_hkrne sgd rta-oqnbdrrdr hmcdudknohmf_ ohbstqdne
sgd dmshqd
oqnbdrr hr drrdmsh_k&
Sgd e_bsnqrbnmrhcdqdc_s d_bg rs_fd ne sgd onkhbxbxbkdg_ud addmsgd
_bsnqr)hmrshstshnmr)
_mc hcd_r hmunkudchmcdudknohmfsgd bnmsdms_mc
oqnbdrr ne sgd bqd_shnmne sgd onkhbxhmptdrshnm) _mc sgd hmrsqtldmsr
_u_hk_akd
sn b_qqxhsnts- D_bg ne sgdrd _rodbsr ne sgd onkhbx-l_jhmf oqnbdrr hr hmhsrdke_ bnlokdw ogdmnldmnm) _mc sgd fdmdq_km_stqdne d_bg
g_r addmrjdsbgdc nts hmsgd annj@r vd g_ud _qftdc) hm_rrdrrhmf gnv _bsnqr_mchmrshstshnmr
bnlahmd
hmsgd onkhbxbxbkdsn _eedbssgd hcd_r _mchmrsqtldmsr sg_s enql sgd fn_kr
_mc ld_mr ne otakhb onkhbx)hshr trdetk sn sghmj_ants sgdl _r lnqd nq
kdrr bngdqdmsonkhbx rtarxrsdlr. Sgdrd rtarxrsdlr g_ud rodbhehboqnodqshdr_mc rsqtbstq_kbg_q_bsdqhrshbr
sg_s _eedbssgd sxodr neonkhbxfn_kr sgdx
drontrd _mc sgd jhmcr ne hmrsqtldmsr ed_rhakdnq _bbdos_akdenqotsshmf
sgdhqonkhbxhcd_r hmsnoq_bshbd-Lnqd rodbhehb_kkx)
sgd annj rgnvr gnv
otakhb onkhbhdrdldqfd eqnl _ bnlokdw hmsdqok_x
ne enqlr ne fnudqmldms)
sxodr ne hrrtdr)_mc sgd nqf_mhy_shnm
ne rs_sdr _mc rnbhdshdrhmsno_qshbtk_qsxodr ne rdbsnq_konkhbxrtarxrsdlr- D_bg rdbsnq_krtarxrsdl sdmcrsn
cdudkno_-o_q-shbtk_qrsxkd
ne onkhbx-l_jhmf _mc _ o_qshbtk_q
)rdsne onkhbx
hcd_r sg_s l_mhedrs sgdlrdkudr hm_ chrshmbsrds ne oqd-drs_akhrgdcoqdedqdmbdr enq o_qshbtk_qsxodr ne-hmrsqtldmsr _mc rdsr ne onkhbxbk_hlr nq
oqnakdlr rg_qdc ax rtarxrsdl ldladqrSgd annj rgnvr gnv sgd _bsnqr o_qshbho_shmf
hmonkhbxrtarxrsdlr
hmbktcdhmchuhct_kr_mc fqntor cq_vm ansg eqnl vhsghm_mceqnl ntsrhcd
sgd enql_k hmrshstshnmr
ne fnudqmldms _mc bhuhkrnbhdsx-Sgd fnudqmldms
_bsnqr ok_xhmf_ bqhshb_k
qnkdhmsgd oqnbdrr _qd sgd dwdbtshud)atqd_tbq_bx)_mc kdfhrk_stqd-Hmlars hmrs_mbdr)
sgd atqd_tbq_bx ok_xr sgd l_hm
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nqf_mhy_shnm_k
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vd_jdmhmf _qdedcdq_khrl) _
oqdrhcdmsh_k
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_ oqdrhcdmsh_k
rxrsdl chuhcdr _tsgnqhsx _lnmf u_qhntr aq_mbgdr ne sgd
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hmR_k_lnm '0878_9 120-41(M_bglh_r) C_uhc- 0868- U}hroi Uuroim J~gr}gzoutB Fvvxuginky gtj Rkznujy1 Mdv Xnqj9
RsL_qshm&rOqdrrM_sg_mrnm)Bnmrs_mbd@- 1///- &Rnbh_k
Lnudldmsr _r B_s_kxrsr enq OnkhbxBg_mfd9
Sgd B_rd ne Rlnjhmf _mc Ftmr&) Ou}xtgr ul Mkgrzn Uurozoiy/Uuroim gtj Qg· 13) 29
310-77Mdkrnm)Sgnl_r D-) _mc Ynd L- Nwkdx-0888- &HrrtdEq_lhmf Deedbsrnm AdkhdeHlonqs_mbd_mc Nohmhnm&)
Ou}xtgr ul Uurozoiy50) 39 0/3/-56Mdssk)I-O- 0857- &SgdRs_sd_r _ Bnmbdost_k U_qh_akd&)
auxrj Uurozoiy1/) 39 448-81Mhbd)C-B- 0876- &Hmbqdldms_k
_mc Mnmhmbqdldms_kOnkhbxQdronmrdr9 Sgd Rs_sdr _mc
sgd Q_hkqn_cr&)
Uurozm1/9 034-45Mhbnk_tr)L_qshm-0856- &Oqnkds_qh_s
_mc Lhcckd Bk_rr hmL_qw9Gdfdkh_mBgnqdnfq_ogx
_mc sgd B_ohs_khrsCh_kdbshb&)
Yz}joky nm znk Qklz 6) 0911-38Mhrads) Qnadqs- 0861- &Hmsqnctbshnm9
Sgd Oqnakdl ne Rnbh_kBg_mfd&)hmMhrads) dc-)
Yuiogr Hngtmk1 Mdv Xnqj9G_qodq _mc Qnv) 0-34Mhrj_mdm)Vhkkh_l @- 0860- G}xkg}ixgim gtj Wkvxkyktzgzo~k Lu~kxtsktz1 BgHb_fn9
Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn Oqdrr- Mnqcg_tr) V- 0864- &SgdOnkhshb_k
Atrhmdrr Bxbkd&)Wk~ok· ul Jiutusni
Yz}jnky 75B
058-8/Mnqckhmfdq)
Dqhb@-0870- Nm znk F}zutusm ul znk Iksuixgzoi Yzgzk1B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9
G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
- 0876- &S_jhmfsgd Rs_sd Rdqhntrkx&)hmL- Vdhmdq _mc R-O-Gtmshmfsnm)dcr)
\tjkxyzgtjo[OBm Uurozoigrvk~kruUsktz1 Anrsn-m9Tsskd)Aqnvm&-- :
]]
- 0877- :Sgd Qdstqm sn sgd Rs_sd9Bqhshptdr&)Fskxoigt1 UurozoigrYiokti1q Wk~nk·
71) 29 764-74Mnqsg)Cntfk_r B- 088/- Ntyzoz}zouty/ Ntyzoz}zoutgr Hngtmk gtj Jiutusoi
Ukxluxsgtik1
B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrMnvmdr) @msgnmxI- 0884- &SgdNsgdq Dwbg_mfd9Otakhb HmsdqdrsFqntor) O_sqnmr)_mc
Admdehsr&)
Yuiogr Yioktik V}gxzkxrm 65) 19 270-3/0]]
- 1///- &Onkhbx
Bnmekhbs_mc sgd Rsqtbstqd ne Hms-dqdrs
Bnlltmhshdr&) Fskxoigt
UurozoiyV}gxzkxrm 17)29 2/8-16_mc @kk_mI- Bhfkdq-0884- &OtakhbHmsdqdrsFqntor _mc sgd Qn_c sn Rtquhu_k&)
Uurozm16)29 27/-3/3_mc Fq_msMddkdx-0885- &Snv_qc_m Dwok_m_shnm
enqOtakhbHmsdqdrs
Fqnto Enq}hnm
_mc Oqnkhedq_shnm9
"Rddc Lnmdx") Chrstqa_mbdr) Dmsqdoqdmdtqrgho)_mc
O_sqnm_fd&)
Uuroim Yz}joky Ou}sgr57/
09 63-81Mtm_m) Ehnm_-0888- &Onkhbx
Mdsvnqj Sq_mrenql_shnm9Sgd Hlokdldms_sHnmne sgd DB
Chqdbshudnm O_bj_fhmf _mc O_bj_fhmf V_rsd&)U}hroi Fjsotoyzxgzout 66) 29 510-27Mxd Sgnl_r Q- 1//1- [nv0Iu·t
Uuroimsgqotm1 Mdv Xnqj9 Bg_sg_l GntrdMxk}qqc)Itkhd- 0884- &Hrrtd Mdsvnqjr _mc MnmOqnehsNqf_mhy_shnmr&)
Uuroim Yz}joky
Rduhdv 03) .2/.3=z2:6..,,315.
.
Nakmfdq)Gdqadqs) _mcTvd V_frbg_K 1//0- }E-_lhkhdrneM_shnkkR_mc OtakhBOnkhbx&)
akylJ}xuvkoNz-Ujrozoiy57/
09 88-&-003Ngl_d) J- 0884- [nk Jtj ul znk Sgzout Yzgzk1Knmcnm9G_qodqBnkkhmrNkhudq)O_ldk_ D- 0882- &Enql_kLncdkr ne Bnkkdbshud@bshnm&)
Ftt}gr
Qduhdv ul Yuiour0
umm 089160-2//-
Nkrnm)C_uhc L-) _mc Lhbg_dk 0- Ldydx) dcr- 0880- Qkmoyrgz}xkyot znk Uuroim UxuikyyB
[nk Iorkssgy
ul Jiutusoi
Uuroim1 B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd TmhudqrhsxOqdrrNkrnm)L_mbtq- 0854- [nk Qumoiul Hurrkizo~k FizoutB U}hroi Luujy gtj znk [nkuxm ul
Lxu}vy1 B_laqhcfd) L_rr-9 G_qu_qc TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
- 0871- [nk Woykgtj Ikirotk ul SgzoutyB Jiutusoi
Lxu·zn/ Yzgmlrgzout/ gtj
Yuiogr Womojozoky1
Mdv G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
- 0875- &@
Sgdnqx ne sgd Hmbdmshudr
E_bhmfOnkhshb_k
Nqf_mhy_shnmr9
Mdn-Bnqonq_shrl _mc sgd Gdfdlnmhb Rs_sd&)Ntzkxtgzoutgr Uurozoigr Yioktik Wk~ok· 6) 19
054-78Nqf_mhy_shnmenq Dbnmnlhb Bn-nodq_shnm_mc Cdudknoldms 'NDBC(- 0882- Rgtgmotm
·ozn Rgxqkz0,!bvk Rkingtoysy1 O_qhr9NDBCNqqdm)J_qdm)-_mc Rsdogdm Rjnvqnmdj- 0882- &Adxnmcsgd Hbnmnfq_ogx ne Nqcdq9
Mnsdr enq _ &MdvHmrshstshnm_khrl&)
hmK-B-Cncc _mc B- Ihkkrnm)dcr) [nk Imtgsoiy
ul Fskxoigt
UurozoiyBFvvxuginky gtj Ntzkxvxkzgzouty1 Antkcdq) Bnkn-9Vdrsuhdv
Oqdrr]]
_mc ]]
-0887-8- &Qdfhldr _mc Qdfhld Athkchmfhm@ldqhb_m Fnudqmldms9
@Qduhdv ne Khsdq_stqdnm sgd 083/r&) UurozoigrYioktik V}gxzkxrm 002)39 578-6/1Nranqmd)C-) _mc D- F_dakdq-0881- Wkot~ktzotm Lu~kxtsktz1 Qd_chmf)L_rr-9 @cchrnmVdrkdxNrrnvrjh) Rs_mhrk_v-0852- Hrgyy Rsqtbstqd hm znk Yuiogr Hutyiou}ytkyy/ sq_mr-Rgdhk_
O_ssdqrnm-Mdv Xnqj9EqddOqdrr ne FkdmbndNrsq_mcdq)Rtr_m @-)_mc Rst_qs K_mfsnm)dcr- 0876- Ynolzotmznk IkhgzkB U}hroi2Uxo~gzk
Ykizux Wkrgzouty ot znk Rujkxt akrlgxk Yzgzk1Mdv Aqtmrvhbj) MI9Sq_mr_bshnmNrsqnl) Dkhmnq0875_- &@
Ldsgnc ne Hmrshstshnm_k
@m_kxrhr&)
hmJ_tel_m ds _0- '0875(]]
- 087Fa- &@m
@fdmc_ enqsgd Rstcx ne Hmrshstshnmr&)
U}hroi Hnuoik 379 2-14]] - ]- 0888- &Hmrshstshnm_k
Q_shnm_kBgnhbd9@r @rrdrrldms ne sgd Hmrshstshnm_k
@m_kxrhr _mc Cdudknoldms Eq_ldvnqj&) hmR_a_shdq'0888_9 24-60(Nrsqnl) Uhmbdms)
C_uhc Eddmx)_mc G_qslts Ohbgs)dcr- 0882- Wkznotqotm Ntyzoz}zoutgr
Ftgrmyoy gtj Ik~kruvsktzB Nyy}ky/ Frzkxtgzo~ky gtj Hnuoiky1 R_mEq_mbhrbn9Hmrshstsd enq Bnmsdlonq_qx Rstchdr Oqdrr)
N&Rtkkhu_m)Cdanq_g)_mc A_qqxCnvm- 1//0- &Onkhbx
Cdbhrhnml_jhmf Lncdkr hmOq_bshbd9@ B_rd Rstcx ne sgd Vdrsdqm @trsq_kh_m"Rdmsdmbhmf@bsr"&)Uuroim Yz}joky
Ou}xtgr 18) 0945-6/N&Snnkd)
K_tqdmbdI- 1///_- &Cheedqdms
OtakhbL_m_fdldmsr> Hlokhb_shnmrne Rsqtbstq_k
BnmsdwshmGhdq_qbghdr_mc Mdsvnqjr&) hmO141Aqtcmdx) N&Snnkd)_mc G-F- Q_hmdx)
dcr) Fj~gtiotm U}hroi RgtgmksktzB Mdv Ik~kruvsktzy
ot [nkuxm/ Rkznujy gtj
Uxgizoik1 V_rghmfsnm9Fdnqfdsnvm TmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 08-37]]
- 1///a- &Qdrd_qbgnm OnkhbxHlokdldms_shnm9@rrdrrldms _mc Oqnrodbsr&)Ou}x0
tgr ul U}hroi Fjso[ooyzxgzout Wkykgxin gtj [nkuxm 0/) 19 152-77Nthlds) L_sghdt) _mc UhmbdmsKdlhdtw- 1///- Qky Wkykg}• cd Uurozow}kU}hrow}kB \t
Gorgt Hxozow}k kz \tk
]uok cd Kuxsorongzout1 Ptdadb9 TmhudqrhsdK_u_k Bdmsqd
c&@m_kxrd
cdr OnkhshptdrOtakhptdrNvdmr) Rtr_m) _mc Shl Q_xmdq-0888- "&Vgdm Jmnvkdcfd L_ssdqr"9 Sgd Qnkd _mc
Hmektdmbd
ne sgd Qnx_k&
Bnllhrrhnm nm Dmuhqnmldms_kOnkktshnm&)
Ou}xtgr Tl Jt~o0
xutsktzgr Uuroim gtj Urgttotm 096-13O_cadqf) CI9 0881- &Mtsqhshnm_k
K_adkhmf_r _ OnkhbxHmrsqtldms&)Fskxoigt Ou}xtgr ul
Fmxoi}rz}xgr Jiutusoiy
63) 49 01/7-02O_fd) Admi_lhm 0-) _mc Qnadqs X- Rg_ohqn- 0881- [nk Wgzoutgr U}hroiB Kolzm bkgxy ul
4[ktjy ot Fskxoigt Uuroim Uxklkxktiky1 Bghb_fn9Tmhudqrhsxne Bghb_fn OqdrrO_fd) Dcv_qc B- 0874_- Uurozoigr F}znuxozm gtj G}xkg}ixgzoi Uu·kxB @ Husvgxgzo~k
Ftgrmyoy1 Aqhfgsnm)Rtrrdw9 Vgd_srgd_e]]
- 0874a- &K_vr_r _m Hmrsqtldms ne Onkhbx9@ Rstcx hmBdmsq_k-Knb_k
Fnudqmldms Qdk_shnmr&)
Ou}xtgr ul U}hroi Uuroim 4)19 130-54-
O_k)Kdrkhd@- 0876- Ptakhb PnkhbxAm_kxrhr;Am Imsqnctbshnm.Snqnmsn9Ldsgtdm]]
- 0877- &G_mcr_s sgd Gdkl> Kd_cdqrgho _mc Otakhb Onkhbx&)
hmO_k_mc C_uhc
S_q_r) dcr) Pqhld Mhmhrsdqr_mc Pqdlhdqr; Pnkhshb_k
Ld_cdqrgho _mc Ptakhb Pnkhbxhm
C_m_c_. Rb_qanqntfg) Nms-9Oqdmshbd-G_kk)
05-15]]
- 0881- Ptakhb PnkhbxAm_kxrhr; Am Imsqnctbshnm,1mc dcm- Rb_qanqntfg) Nms-9
Mdkrnm]]
- 0882_- Imsdqdrsrne Ss_sd; Tgd Pnkhshbrne L_mft_fd, Mtkshbtkstq_khrl, _mc Fdlhmhrl hmC_m_c_. Lnmsqd_k_mc Jhmfrsnm9LbFhkk-Ptddm&rTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
- 0882a- &@cunb_bxNqf_mhy_shnmr_mc Kdfhrk_shudOnkhshbr9
Sgd Deedbsrne sgd
Bg_qsdq ne Qhfgsr _mc Eqddcnlr nm HmsdqdrsKnaaxhmf ne Edcdq_k Kdfhrk_shnm)
0878-0880&) hmE-K-Rdhckd)dc-) Epthsx _mc Cnlltmhsx; Tgd Cg_qsdq,ImsdqdrsAcunb_bx _mc Rdoqdrdms_shnm.Lnmsqd_k9HmrshstsdenqQdrd_qbg nm Otakhb Onkhbx)008-46]]
- 0886- Bdxnmc PnkhbxAm_kxrhr;Ptakhb Irrtd M_m_fdldms hmTgqatkdms Thldr.
Snqnmsn9HSO MdkrnmO_ktlan) CdmmhrI- 0876- Tgd Pnkhshbrne Pqnfq_l Eu_kt_shnm. AdudqkxGhkkr)B_khe-9
R_fd]]
_mc C-I- B_khrs_-088/_- Ilokdldms_shnm _mc sgd PnkhbxPqnbdrr; Oodmhmf Uo
sgd Bk_bj Bnw. Mdv Xnqj9Fqddmvnnc Oqdrr]]
_mc ]]
- 088/a- &Nodmhmf
To sgd Ak_bj Anw9Hlokdldms_shnm _mc sgd Onkhbx
Oqnbdrr&)hmO_ktlan _mc B_khrs_'088/_(O_mhsbg)Kdn- 0866- &SgdCdudknoldms ne Bnqonq_shrl hmKhadq_kCdlnbq_bhdr&) Cnlo_q_shudPnkhshb_k
Sstchdr 0/) 0950-8/]]
- 0868- &Bnqonq_shrlhmB_m_c_&)Sstchdr hmPnkhshb_k
Ebnmnlx 0) 0932-81O_ooh) Eq_my Tqa_m) _mc Bgqhrsh_mG-B-@- Gdmmhmf-0887- &Onkhbx
Mdsvnqjr9 Lnqd
Sg_m _ Lds_ognq&)Jntqm_k ne Tgdnqdshb_kPnkhshbr0/) 39 442-64]]
_mc ]]
-- 0888- &SgdNqf_mhy_shnmne Hmektdmbd
nm sgd DB&rBnllnm @fqhbtkstq_k Onkhbx9@ Mdsvnqj @ooqn_bg&)Etqnod_m Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k
Rdrd_qbg 47;
146-70O_qdmsh)
Lhbg_dk- 0875- ImudmshmfRd_khsx;Tgd Pnkhshbr
ne sgd M_rr Mdch_. Mdv Xnqj9 Rs
L_qshm&rOqdrrO_sdl_m) B_qnkd-086/9 o_qshbho_shnm_mc Ddlnbq_shb Tgdnqx. B_laqhcfd9 B_laqhcfd
TmhudqrhsxOqdrrO_ssnm)B_qk U-) _mc C_uhc R- R_vhbjh- 0882- B_rhb Mdsgncr ne PnkhbxAm_kxrhr _mc
Pk_mmhmf.Dmfkdvnnc Bkheer)MI9Oqdmshbd-G_kkO_xmd)Ingm V- 0871- &Bnmshmfdms
CdbhrhnmAdg_uhntq&)Prxbgnknfhb_kBtkkdshm81) 19
271-3/1]]
) I_ldr Q- Adssl_m) _mc DqhbI- Ingmrnm- 0877- &@c_oshud
Rsq_sdfxRdkdbshnmhm
CdbhrhnmL_jhmf&)Jntqm_k ne Ewodqhldms_kPrxbgnknfx=Ld_qmhmf,Mdlnqx _mc Cnfmhshnm03) 29 423-41Odqqnv) Bg_qkdr- 0873- Nnql_k Abbhcdmsr;Lhuhmf vhsg Hhfg-Rhrj Tdbgmnknfhdr. Mdv
Xnqj9 A_rhbAnnjrOdsdqr) A- Ftx- 0873- Tgd Pnkhshbrne Btqd_tbq_bx; A Cnlo_q_shud Pdqrodbshud.Mdv
Xnqj9 Knmfl_m]]
- 0881_- &SgdOnkhbxOqnbdrr9@mHmrshstshnm_khrs
Odqrodbshud&)
C_m_ch_mPtakhb
Aclhmhrsq_shnm 24) 19 05/-7/]]
- 0881a- &Fnudqmldms&Qdnqf_mhy_shnm9
@ Sgdnqdshb_k@m_kxrhr&)
Imsdqm_shnm_k
Pnkhshb_k
SbhdmbdRduhdv 02) 19 088-107]]
- 0887- &SgdDwodqhldmshmfRnbhdsx_mc OnkhbxCdrhfm&)hmVhkkh_l M- Ctmm)
dc-) Tgd Ewodqhldmshmf Snbhdsx;Err_xr hmHnmntq ne Dnm_kc T. C_loadkk. Mdv
Aqtmrvhbj) MI9Sq_mr_bshnm)014-28]]
- 0888- Imrshstshnm_kTgdnqx hm Pnkhshb_kSbhdmbd;Tgd 'Ndv Imrshstshnm_khrl'.
Knmcnm9Ohmsdq]]
-1//1- &SgdOnkhshbrne Snnk Bgnhbd&)hmR_k_lnm '1//1_9 441-53(-
IngmB- CNTfgshd)_mc L- J_sgkddm LbBtkknbg- 0866- &Sxodrne Cdlnbq_shb
Rxrsdlr _mc 0(qodr ne OtakhbOnkhbx&)
Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr89 216-44--)
-])
_mc ]]
- 0867- &CnOtakhb OnkhbhdrU_qx hmCheedqdmsSxodr ne
Cdlnbq_shb Rxrsdl>&)hmO-F-Kdvhr) C-B- Onssdq)_mc E-F- B_rskdr)dcr) Tgd Pq_bshbd
ne Cnlo_q_shud Pnkhshbr;A Rd_cdq. Knmcnm9Knmfl_m-]
_mc Aqh_mV- Gnfvnnc- 0874_- Tgd P_sgnknfx ne Ptakhb Pnkhbx. Mdv Xnqj9
NwenqcTmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
_mc ]]
- 0874a- &Hm
Rd_qbgne sgd Hrrtd-@ssdmshnm
Bxbkd&)
Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshbr
36)09 127-42]]
_mc @msgnmx A_qjdq) dcr- 0882- Acuhrhmf [drs Etqnod_m Gnudqmldmsr;
Impthqhdr,Ewodqshrd_mc PtakhbPnkhbx.Dchmatqfg9 Dchmatqfg TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
_mc E-J-L- U_mMhrodm)dcr- 0887- Ptakhb PnkhbxImrsqtldmsr; Eu_kt_shmf sgd
Tnn,krne Ptakhb Aclhmhrsq_shnm.Mdv Xnqj9 Dcv_qc Dkf_qOdsdqrnm)Ingm- 0884- &Cdbhrhnm-l_jhmfhmsgd Dtqnod_m Tmhnm9Snv_qcr _ Eq_ldvnqj
enq@m_kxrhr&)
Jntqm_k ne Etqnod_m Ptakhb Pnkhbx1) 0958-82Odsqx)Eq_mbnhr-0888- &SgdNohmhnm-Onkhbx
Qdk_shnmrghohmB_m_c_&)Jntqm_k ne Pnkhshbr
50) 19 43/-4/Oghcc) Qhbg_qcV- 0864- &SgdDbnmnlhb Bntmbhkne B_m_c_9HsrDrs_akhrgldms) Rsqtbstqd) _mc Qnkdhmsgd B_m_ch_mOnkhbx-L_jhmf Rxrsdl 0852-63&) C_m_ch_m Ptakhb
Aclhmhrsq_shnm 07) 29317-62]]
_mc F- Aqtbd Cndl- 0872- b_m_ch_m Ptakhb Pnkhbx;Icd_r, Ssqtbstqdr, Pqnbdrr.Snqnmsn9LdsgtdmOghkkhor)Ihl) Aqtbd Bg_ol_m) _mc C_uhc Rsdudmr)dcr- 1//0- Bdsvddm Ss_sd _mc M_qjds; Err_xr nm Cg_qhshdr,L_v _mc PQkhbxhmC_m_c_. Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne Snqnmsn
OqdrrOghkkhor)Rtr_m C- 0880_- &Gnv Nss_v_ Akdmcr9RgheshmfFnudqmldms Qdk_shnmrghor
vhsg Hmsdqdrs
Fqntor&) hmE-@adkd)dc-) Hnv Oss_v_ Sodmcr 0880-819 Tgd Pnkhshbr
ne
Fq_fldms_shnm. Nss_v_9 B_qkdsnmTmhudqrhsxOqdrr) 072-117]&]]
- 0880a- &Ld_mhmf_mc Rsqtbstqd hmRnbh_kLnudldmsr9 L_oohmf sgd Mdsvnqj ne
M_shnm_kB_m_ch_mVnldm&r Nqf_mhy_shnmr&)
C_m_ch_mJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_kSbhdmbd
13) 39644-71]]
- 0887- &Chrbntqrd)Hcdmshsx)
_mc Unhbd9Edlhmhrs Bnmsqhatshnmrsn OnkhbxRstchdr&)hmK-Cnatyhmrjhr) L- Gnvkdss) _mc C- K_xbnbj) dcr) PnkhbxSstchdr hmC_m_c_;
Tgd Ss_sd ne sgd Aqs. Snqnmsn9Tmhudqrhsxne SnqnmsnOqdrr) 131-54Ohdqrnm)O_tk- 0882- &Vgdm DeedbsAdbnldr B_trd9 OnkhbxEddca_bj _mc Onkhshb_k
Bg_mfd&)[nqkc Pnkhshbr
349 484-517]]
-1///- &Hmbqd_rhmf
Qdstqmr)O_sgCdodmcdmbd)_mc sgd Rstcx ne Onkhshbr&)
Aldqhb_mPnkhshb_k
SbhdmbdRduhdv 83)19 140-56Ohfnt) @-B-0821- Tgd Ebnmnlhbr ne [dke_qd, 3sg dcm- Knmcnm9L_blhkk_mOndk)C_kd G- 0865- &SgdCheetrhnmne Kdfhrk_shnm@lnmf sgd B_m_ch_mOqnuhmbdr&)
,C_m_ch_mJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k
Sbhdmbd89 5/4-15Onkknbj)OghkhoG-) Rst_qs @-Khkhd)
_mc L- DkkhnsUhssdr-0878- &G_qcHrrtdr) Bnqd U_ktdr
_mc Udqshb_k
Bnmrsqhkhms9
Sgd B_rd ne Mtbkd_q Onvdq&)BqhshrgJntqm_k ne Pnkhshb_k
Sbhdmbd12) 0918-4/Onkrax) MdkrnmV- 0852- Cnlltmhsx Pnvdq _mc Pnkhshb_kTgdnqx. Mdv G_udm9X_kd
TmhudqrhsxOqdrr]]
- 0873- Pnkhshb_k
Immnu_shnmhmAldqhb_; Tgd Pnkhshbrne PnkhbxImhsh_shnm.Mdv
G_udm9X_kdTmhudqrhsxOqdrrOnrmdq)Qhbg_qc@- 0863- &Sgdnqhdrne Dbnmnlhb Qdftk_shnm&)
BdkkJntqm_k ne Ebnmnlhbr
_mc M_m_fdldms Sbhdmbd4) 19 224-47Ontk_msy_r)Mhbnr-0862_- Pnkhshb_k
Pnvdq _mc Snbh_kCk_rrdr. Knmcnm9Mdv KdesAnnjr]]
- 0862a- &NmRnbh_kBk_rrdr&)Ndv LdesRduhdv 679 16-43]]
- 0867- Ss_sd, Pnvdq, Snbh_khrl. Knmcnm9Mdv KdesAnnjr,;
5A3
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YzgzkyB
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260-87]]
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]]
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]]
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11) 09 0/6-28]]
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415
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ne Pnkhshb_k
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MI9Oqhmbdsnm
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_tbshnm)ne oqnodqsx-qhfgsr)87-0//
@tchsnq Fdmdq_kne B_m_c_) 102
_tsgnqhsx snnkr) 8/
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A_bgq_bg)Odsdq)125
A_q_sy)Lnqsnm R-)125
A_qc_bg) Dtfdmd) 78) 8/
a_qf_hmhmf)_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 06/)
060) 070
A_tlf_qsmdq) Eq_mj Q-) 027-8) 03/) 045)
047) 13/
Admrnm)I- Jdmmdsg) 04
Admskdx)@qsgtq)26-7
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Ahqjk_mc)Sgnl_r @-)4
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075) 078-80
Anudmr)L_qj)1/6-7
Aq_xaqnnjd) C_uhc) 068
Aqdrrdqr) GB!Hkr
Sg-@-)045
Aqdvdq)F_qx) 01-02) 051-2
Aqhs_hm)
itchbh_qx hm)53
Atbg_m_m) I_ldr) 11) 13
atqd_tbq_bx9 _mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 060:
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atqd_tbq_sr) &rsqdds-kdudk&)
078-80
atrhmdrr _bsnqr) _mc cnldrshb rs_sdr)
6/-2
B_loadkk) Ingm) 121
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b_ohs_khrl) 26) 60-2
&b_tr_khsx)etmmdkne&)020-1
bg_mfd) onkhbx)035-6)110-1: _sxohb_k)
126: khmjhmfmnql_k _mc _sxohb_k)
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127: udmtd) 13/
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125
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Bnkdl_m) Vhkkh_l C-) 57) 042
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bnlltmhshdr) onkhbx)04/-0
bnlltmhsx nqf_mhy_shnmr)_r snnkr) 84-6
bnlodshshnm9_lnmf fqntor) 26-32:
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bnlokdwhsx9_mc cdbhrhnm-l_jhmf) 066-7:
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bxbkd'r(9 _mc du_kt_shnm)1/6) 105}06)
113: hrrtd-_ssdmshnm)66) 017-20: onkhbx)00-07)117)134: onkhshb_k
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ne) 054
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083-1/1
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cxm_lhbr) onkhbx)127-32
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104-05: oqnbdrr) 101:
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46
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onsdmsh_k_mc nqf_mhydc)27: s_qfds)
076-7) 080: sgdnqhdr)15) 26-32
Ftkhbj) Ktsgdq) 057
Ftmm) Kdvhr @-)26
Ftrs_errnm) Ftmmdk)118
G_kk)Odsdq@-)33) 017) 035-6)110
G_kodqhm)Lnqsnm G-) 053
G_ll) Jdhsg D-)04/
G_mbnbj) L- Cnm_kc)014
G_mrdm)Q_mc_k)017
&g_qchrrtdr&) 125
G_qqhr)Qhbg_qc)123 °
gd_qhmfr)_mc hlokdldms_shnm) 076
Gdbkn)Gtfg) 038) 04/) 040)110)130
Gdhmy)Ingm O-)04/
Gdqjdq) Ch_md)112
ghdq_qbgx9_mc cnldrshb rs_sdr) 51: _mc
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Ghmsyd)Nssn) 33
Gneedqadqs)Qhbg_qc)020-1
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Gnnc) Bgqhrsnogdq)8/-0)0/8)088-1//
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hcd_r) _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)015-7: rdd
_krn chrbntqrd
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hlo_bsr) onkhbx)8-0/
hlokdldms_shnm) onkhbx)02) 074-1/5:
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120
hmbdmshud'r(9mdf_shud)0k0:_r snnkr)
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055-6) 06/-2
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tmhs) 11-3:
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hmektdmbd)hmenql_shnm-a_rdc) 1//
hmenql_shnm9-a_rdc snnkr) 003-05: hlodqedbs)23: rdd _krn jmnvkdcfd: mnc_khsx
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44-8: o_qkh_ldms_qx) 30: onkhbx)41-72: onkhshb_k)
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hmrsqtldms'r(9 _tsgnqhsx-a_rdc) 0/2-7:
1/0-1: bgnhbd ne) 075) 083-1/1: bk_r}
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1/0-1: nqf_mhy_shnma_rdc) 80-0/2: onkhbx)8)76-006: oqnbdctq_k) 80) 084) 085) 1/1:
rtars_mshud) 80) 083-4: sqd_rtqda_rdc) 0/7-03: sxod) 035-6: unktms_qx) 084) 1/1: rdd _krn snnkr
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fqnto) 15) 32: rdke-)11-3
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13/
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k_antq) _r hmsdqdrsfqnto) 62-3"
K_rrvdkk) G_qnkc) 2)00-01)76)77
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onkhbx)11/-1) 124) 13/) 130:
rnbh_k)111)112: mnm-)111: dmcnfdmntr.dwnfdmntr)110-1
kdf_bhdr)onkhbx)106) 107) 126
kdf_khrl) qdoqdrdms_shud)1/2
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03/-0
lnmnonkhdr) 22-3: _mc _fdmc_-rdsshmf)
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lnncr) onkhbx)015-7
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ltkshchrbhokhm_qhsx)
ne onkhbxrbhdmbd)2-3
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066-7
M_bglh_r) C_uhc) 108
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rdd _krn cnldrshb rs_sd: rs_sdr
Mdkrnm)Sgnl_r D-) 04/
mdn-bnmrdqu_shrl) 14
mdn-hmrshstshnm_khrl)32-5
mdn-khadq_khrl)14
mdn-oktq_khrl) 28
mdsvnqj'r(9 hmsdqdrs)43) 042-5: hrrtd)
037-8: l_m_fdldms) 0/1: onkhbx)
04/-0) 042
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mnm-fnudqmldms_knqf_mhy_shnmr'MFNR()
84
mnql_shudmdrr) ne onkhbxrbhdmbd)2-3
mns-enq-oqnehs
fqntor) _r snnkr) 85
Mxd)Inrdog) 45
naidbshudr) onkhbx)_mc du_kt_shnm)102
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dwdbtshud)54-5: kdfhrk_shud)54-6
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Nkrnm)L_mbtq) 28) 3/) 6/
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072
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nqf_mhy_shnmsnnkr) 8/
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rsxkd)117-2/: onkhbx)0/
ntsotsr) onkhbx)7) 0/
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onrhshuhrl) _mc onkhbx_m_kxrhr)7
onrs-onrhshuhrl) _mc onkhbx_m_kxrhr)7
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Onvdkk)V_ksdq v-) 2/
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shnm)080-2
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oqhu_sdfnncr) 20
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rhnm)&053:itchbh_kdu_kt_shnmhm)102
hlokdldms_shnm) 081: odqbdoshnmne)
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otakhb) 12/
6: otakhb) 01/-1) 018-2/) 03/-0:
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rxrsdl_shb) 03
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056-7
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