Filling the void: Weak States and Strong Societies - Inter

Filling the void: Weak States and Strong Societies – A study
of organised criminal groups in South Africa
Derica Lambrechts
Abstract
In recent years there has been an increase in the activities of organised
criminal groups in South Africa. In addition, there is an observable trend in
South Africa’s gangs – they appear to be transforming into more
sophisticated and organised criminal groups. This trend begs the question:
why? Why are people getting involved in gang activity and why are gangs
becoming more sophisticated? Is there a power void, which has led to the rise
of this form of organised crime? These questions will be examined in this
paper using the theoretical framework of weak states and strong societies as
identified by political theorist Joel S. Migdal and complimented with the
work of Clapham and Jackson & Rosberg. States are defined as having the
following characteristics: The ability to govern through coercive and
administrative institutions, which enables them to fulfil the welfare needs of
its citizens, in particular, security and development; internal legitimacy, in
other words its citizens recognise the appointed government’s right to govern;
and external legitimacy, where the international sphere recognises the state
and its territorial boundaries. Strong states exhibit all these characteristics,
while weak states tend to largely exist on international recognition. A
common consequence of weakened states is that the government lacks
political will, institutional authority and organised power to provide basic
functions of the state, amongst others to secure human rights and to ensure
socio-economic welfare. If the state is unable to fulfil these functions, a
power void will result and may lead to the rise of strong societies, of which
the increase of organised criminal groups is one example. This study
investigates whether the South African state resembles features of a
weakened state and how this has impacted on the rise of organised criminal
gangs. As a case study, the organised gangs on the Cape Flats will be
investigated.
Key Words: Weak state, strong society, organised crime, gangs
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1.
Introduction
There has been a noticeable increase in the activities of organised
criminal groups in South Africa. In May 2007 the assassination of one of the
most notorious figures in organised crime networks, Yuri ‘The Russian’
Ulianitski, exposed the merciless reality of the criminal underworld to the
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public. Ulianitski was shot numerous times in the Cape Town suburb of
Milnerton, while returning from dinner with his wife and four-year-old
daughter. His daughter was also killed in the attack. At the time of his
murder, Ulianitski was out on bail in connection with charges of conspiracy
to kidnap, possession of illegal firearms and drugs, and numerous other
offences. In a more recent example, the corruption trial of the former
National Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi, and his ties with convicted
drug-trafficker, Glenn Agliotti, provides further evidence of the increase in
organised criminal activities. More importantly however, the Selebi case
provides insight into the relationship between organised crime and governing
structures in South Africa, a relationship which seems increasingly complex.
As a result of the seemingly significant correlation between organised crime
and various structures within the South African state, the legitimacy and
authority of the state is questioned.
2.
Weak states and strong societies
A great deal of research has been done on the institution of the state.
This vast range of research covers themes such as state-building vs. nationbuilding, state-building and development, understanding the state and
theories and concepts of state-building. Joel S. Migdal contributed
significantly to the last mentioned theme, through his work Strong Societies
and Weak States: State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World 1and State in Society: Studying how states and societies transform and
constitute one another.2 Migdal provides a set of theories on weak and strong
states and weak and strong societies. He argues, amongst other things, that
states in general have to provide a single political status of citizenship to all
who qualify as members of the state. This status can be declared to citizens if
the state has a single jurisdiction within specific boundaries, if hegemonic
control can be assumed over society and if the state can instruct its own
survival strategies and persist on its own.3 In order for a state to survive a
number of factors need to be present ‘including the organisational capabilities
of its leaders, population size, potential material and human resources
available, and larger international configurations.’4 For a state to survive and
be able to gain strength it has to have the ability to mobilise the society and
the capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract
resources, and use resources appropriately. Strong states are those with high
capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states find it difficult.5 These
capabilities are measured by the level of participation by the citizens in the
governing of the country, the legitimacy of the state and compliance by the
populace. What can happen in the case of weak states is that another social
organisation can attempt to gain the control lost by the state and present their
own set of survival strategies. If this does occur, the social control will be
split between the state and rival social organisations. 6 Social control can be
defined as ‘the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of
social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations in favour
of behaviour prescribed by state rules.’7 Thus, a state will have social control
if people rather behave socially as the state prescribes than what they desire
for themselves. These prescriptions are expressed in the laws of the state.8 To
summarise, a strong state will have a high level of social control, one set of
survival strategies, high level of capabilities and compliance, participation
and legitimacy. A weak state will have low social control, multiple survival
strategies, low capabilities and a low level of compliance, participation and
legitimacy.9
Furthermore, in certain strong societies, a pyramidal structure of
social control is created. This results from social organisations with
compatible and congruent rules and structures. In such a situation, the strong
state will occupy the apex of the pyramid, the rules of the state, and succeed
in merging the survival strategies of the various societies with those of the
state. The key factor of pyramidal structure of social control is that the
survival strategies of the state and that of the different societies will be
reconcilable with each other. Thus, the survival strategies of the state, the
church, the family and interest groups will coincide with one another.
In a strong society with a pyramidal structure, a strong state will
gain control by commanding the top section of the pyramid. The strong state
will succeed in merging the strategies of the state and that of the society.
This would be an ideal situation. However, a situation can arise in which a
society will have uneven levels of social control because of social
organisations with diverse rules and structures. Such a society can be
categorised as a weblike society and ‘in weblike societies no single strand of
social control holds the social fabric together, but rather a network of such
strands’.10
This notion of weak/strong states and weak/strong societies relates
back to research done by Jackson and Rosberg on Empirical and Juridical
statehood. Jackson and Rosberg differentiate between empirical and juridical
statehood in that the first mentioned refers to a state that is able to perform
the functions usually expected of a state: ‘an independent political structure
of sufficient authority and power to govern a defined territory and its
population.’11 Juridical states, however, refers to legal statehood, where a
state is recognised by international law. In addition, juridical statehood refers
to negative sovereignty, which means that no other state can intervene in state
affairs. However, in such a case, statehood is derived more from right than
fact, implicating that a state will be a de jure state only and not de facto.
Furthermore, juridical statehood negatively affects state-building –
governments will lack political will, institutional authority and organised
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power to provide basic functions of the state, including to secure human
rights and to ensure-socio economic welfare.12
Organised criminal groups can be regarded as social organisations
which have the potential to present a separate set of survival strategies in an
attempt to gain control lost by the state. This will lead to the emergence of
overtly strong societies. Thus, the rise of organised criminal groups in a
society indicates a level of fragmented social capabilities of the state and the
transformation from a de facto to a de jure state.
3.
Organised crime in South Africa – Gangs on the Cape Flats
Organised crime is a widely studied subject. In general, the term is
used to describe a set of relations between illegal organisations or to indicate
the function of a group of illegal activities, performed by a set of specific
agents.13 In addition, the structure of organised crime is a ‘concentration of
illegal power in society that can significantly influence political, economic
and social life.’14 In the South African context, there is no one comprehensive
definition of organised crime, as noted by Lebeya 15 and Gastrow.16 The 1998
Prevention of Organised Crime Act conceptualises organised crime with
regard to various chapters in the act. Chapter two of the Act discusses
offences relating to racketeering activities. Chapter three of the Act deals
with offences relating to proceeds of unlawful activities including money
laundering, assisting others to benefit from proceeds of unlawful activities,
acquisition, possession or use of proceeds of unlawful activities and failure to
report suspicion regarding proceeds of unlawful activities. Chapter four of
the act explains offences relating to criminal gang activity.17 Despite this
typology of organised crime created by the 1998 Act the lack of a generally
accepted definition of organised crime in South Africa has hampered the
combating of the crime.
Since the transition to democracy in South Africa in 1994, there
has been a dramatic increase in organised crime – an increase for which the
South African law enforcement agencies were not prepared. Four years after
the transition to democracy, Shaw noted there is a lack of resources and
technical expertise to deal adequately with organised crime.18
In Southern Africa, the activities of international crime organisations
were an occurrence unknown of until the 1990’s. This does not however
mean that they suddenly appeared from nowhere. Rather, they constitute part
of the continuous changing pattern of organised crime in the sub-region that
goes back three or four decades. Little is known about the pre-1990
manifestation and historical, social and political factors that contributed to
the development of organised crime in Southern Africa.19 In South Africa, the
relatively tightly controlled border posts and airports and the harsh
discriminatory laws in place, made it very risky for Africans from states to
the north to enter the country in order to dispose of their goods or to make
contact with local criminal groups.20
The most popular route used to smuggle illegal goods into South
Africa from the Congo and Zambia, was the heavy transport road
from Zambia to South Africa used by large trucks and trailers.
Ivory, copper, cobalt and large quantities of mandrax were
transported in this way by the newly formed syndicates, also
involving South African transport drivers.21
There were some problems for the South African dealers to pay in hard
currency and thus motor vehicles stolen in South Africa became a key item in
the barter trade.
In South Africa, the relatively well-developed infrastructure, modern
telecommunication systems and technology and business practices
contributed to the development of organised crime. It matured from generally
small-scale local operations to international syndicates.22
One of the areas where organised criminal groups expanded their
activities significantly is on the Cape Flats. The Cape Flats is situated
between the Cape Peninsula and the next range of mountains to the east,
covering a distance of more than 30 kilometres. Coloured communities
relocated forcibly as a result of the Groups Areas Act from many parts of
Cape Town (including District Six) in the 1960s and 1970s led to the creation
of this area.23 In many cases families were torn apart and the majority of the
people moved had to leave their jobs, creating large-scale unemployment and
poverty. As a result, the fabric of extended families and any kind of working
class culture on the Cape Flats was gradually destroyed.24 These conditions
on the Cape Flats encouraged the formation and activities of loosely
structured gangs. Furthermore, during times of political transition, social
controls are invariably relaxed. After 1994 in South Africa the political
instability and the reopening of South African borders for trade, provided
ample opportunities for the growth of crime. Stolen goods originating in
South Africa could be exported overseas and used as currency in drug deals.
Consequently, the gangs of Cape Flats were able to spread their operations. 25
As a result of the increased activities of the gangs on the Cape Flats, violence
in the area also increased considerably.
There are no available statistics to assess the current number of
gangs on the Cape Flats; however, Standing notes that there are around 130
gangs believed to be operating in the area. These gangs include groups such
as the Americans, the Firm, the Hard Livings, the Sexy Boys and the
Mongrels. The Americas is believed to have as many as 5,000 members.26
The increased activities of gangs on the Cape Flats and their
transformation to organised criminal groups have resulted in a well-
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functioning informal economy. The structure of these gangs covers a vast
range, from highly sophisticated drug smuggling syndicates, to securely
established territory-based gangs, to lose groupings of criminals, to youths
being recruited into gangs by drug lords, to youngsters only adopting the
name of a well-known gang.27
In order to function as a state, the South African government should
be able to claim a monopoly of force in the territory of the state. The
authority of the state and the state itself will be undermined if an internal or
external organisation effectively challenges the national government.28 The
manifestation of organised criminal groups in South Africa is indeed
challenging the authority of the state by providing a sense of welfare to the
needs of its citizens, in particular, security and development. The Cape Flats
is one of the best examples where organised criminal groups as a rival social
organisation can be analysed.
4.
The criminal economy of the Cape Flats
To understand the criminal activities of gangs on the Cape Flats and
to evaluate if these groups as rival social organisations fill a power void,
explanation is needed on the term criminal economy. In order to establish a
criminal economy on the Cape Flats, gangs have developed a unique
hierarchical system that is based on the division of four classes. This
structure has provided a framework for gangsterism to proceed to a higher
level of sophistication.
As Standing explains, the first class contains a small number of
criminal elite. In this class, one will find the leaders of large gangs and major
drug merchants. They import drugs to the Cape Flats and are loosely
associated with one another. These individuals will own various legal
businesses and substantial personal capital.29
The second class operates as a form of middle management. This
comprises the second tier of larger gangs and leaders of mid-sized
gangs who operate local drug markets. These people do not import
commodities into the Flats but rely on receiving consignments from
the upper tier.30
The third class includes corrupt police, bodyguards, debt-collectors and
advisors. This class provides support and services to the first two classes.
What distinguishes the third class from the last is that the third class will
receive remuneration for their services and support from the first two classes.
This final class includes a large number of unskilled gangsters that are low
ranking members of street gangs. They are controlled by the first three
classes and do not receive any rewards for their services. They are the
consumers of the goods and services that the first three classes produce and
are relied on to fight in gang conflicts.31
With the erection of the above mentioned class structure on the Cape
Flats, it is fairly easy for the gangs on the Cape Flats to progress to bigger
operations and to compete with international organised crime syndicates. In
addition, the inability of law-enforcement agencies in understanding the
structure and operations of gangs on the Cape Flats has made the task to
monitor and combat the problem, complex, troublesome and even impossible.
The above-mentioned class structure has provided a foundation for
the spread of economic operations by the gangs of the Cape Flats: ‘Since late
1999 gangs have spread into central metropolitan areas, which provide a
market for various criminal activities.’32
Contemporary organisations on the Cape Flats can be considered as
adaptable, sophisticated, extremely opportunistic and active in a full range of
illegal and legal activities. On the Cape Flats, gangs are still involved in
lower level crimes, for example drug trafficking, prostitution and loansharking, but they have expanded to a ‘quasi-corporate’ level. These activities
include a wide variety of frauds on various levels and immigrant smuggling.33
Criminal gangs on the Cape Flats have developed themselves over
the past decades into fully functional and very lucrative syndicates. The Cape
Flats in general is an impoverished area and this is exactly the reason for the
establishment of the criminal economy of the gangs. In 2003, the
unemployment rate of the Cape Flats was approximately 46% and for people
under the age of 30, the rate was even higher – 61%. In addition to the very
low income of the residents of this area, the infrastructure of the Cape Flats is
also underdeveloped. The local state schools and hospitals are under-funded
and overcrowded and there are very little outside investment from the private
sector.34 On the Cape Flats, family structures are disintegrating and domestic
violence is a daily occurrence.
Gangs on the Cape Flats provide an income to many individuals in
these communities. The wealthy criminal elite assume the role of benefactors
and community regulators.35 In 2004 the Cape Times reported that a large
number of women on the Cape Flats are participating in prostitution, as they
have no other source of income. One family in Kleinvlei, an area close to
Kuils River, admitted that they knew of nine young women in their block
practicing prostitution. Another resident of this area commented that most
young boys come under the pressure to join gangs and most young girls sell
their bodies, either by force or out of their own free will.36 It is thus clear that
the ‘criminal economy delivers employment and goods to thousands of
individuals who are socially excluded. Without income generating crime and
cheap stolen goods…the poverty of the Cape Flats will be felt more
acutely.’37
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Gangs gain control of the community by the act of providing. Their
influence in the economic conditions of the families of the Cape Flats is so
immense that they can commit crime without the fear of being reported.
Gangs have secured their position in the community by exploiting and
abusing the economics of poverty on the Cape Flats.38 Organised criminal
groups on the Cape Flats have created their own set of survival strategies
(opposed to those of the state) as the community relies on gangs for their
social welfare and security. Gangs provide a criminal economy that the
people of the Cape Flats form part of, instead of contributing to the official,
legal economy of the state. Consequently, gangs are gaining social control
through economic dominance on the Cape Flats. This is clearly weakening
the social control of the state.
Certain prominent members of gangs on the Cape Flats receive a
significant degree of community support as they lay claim to being in control
of significant areas of the Cape Flats. What is important to note is that the
careers of these men tend to follow a similar pattern of the criminal elite in
organised crime societies. All of these men originate from poor coloured
communities. They also remain attached to the area where they grew up.
Although some have moved out of the Flats and living in some of the more
upper-class areas of Cape Town, they still own property on the Flats, which
are sometimes used as informal community centers. These community
centers are locally known as shebeens, where alcohol and drugs are sold and
consumed.39 The criminal elite owns large personal fortunes that they
achieved by assuming an important position in the local criminal economy.
They control the distribution and sale of alcohol and drugs in their areas and
in addition, some have control over the local sex industry. Their activities
also include the export of stolen cars, sell stolen firearms and they also
arrange the theft of goods from factories and warehouses that are then resold
in the areas that they control. These activities are rarely their only source of
income. Each member of the criminal elite will also have broad business
interests that include hotels, nightclubs, public transport, garages, shops and
commercial fishing boats.40
Out of the above, it is clear that the criminal elite of the Cape Flats
plays an integral role in the community. They not only provide illegal goods,
but some acts of philanthropy strengthen their grip as elite even further.
Sustained charity is carried out through community investment. An example
of this is that a crime boss in Manenberg is believed to have provided money
for the establishment of a religious community center. Here local
schoolchildren are fed and training is offered to unemployed people in the
community. Certain crime bosses also provide full sponsorships to many
local football teams.41
Philanthropy on the Cape Flats takes various forms and in one
incident, there was an act of money throwing out of a car by a very well
known gang leader. This involved the leader driving his car up and down the
street and throwing money out to scrambling children and adults. 42 Thus, to
relate back to Migdal’s theories on weak states and strong societies,
organised criminal groups on the Cape Flats have managed to establish a
weblike society. As explained earlier in the paper, in a weblike society no
single strand of social control holds the social fabric together, but rather a
network of strands that is anchored around strongmen. On the Cape Flats,
there are numerous components of social control and as a result, the society is
fragmented. In addition, the criminal elite, crime bosses and gangs leaders
act as strongmen on the Cape Flats and through their leadership position
within the social organisations, they present the community with different
survival strategies than those of the state. The strongmen ensure that the
community is in a way dependent on them by presenting the public with new
community centers, providing numerous sponsorships and even delivering
cash and goods on their doorstep. By creating a criminal economy on the
Cape Flats, strongmen have secured their place in society. Furthermore,
Clapham mentions a number of areas where statehood usually fails to apply,
one of which is that the government of a state is unable to exercise effective
control over its territory.43 Such governments are unable to extend control
over the entire territory of a state and face opposition from ‘warlords, rebels
or secessionists, or the collapse of their own administrative apparatus.’44 On
the Cape Flats, the South African government faces opposition from
organised criminal organised groups for the control of that specific territory.
The economy of the Cape Flats comprises of ‘various criminal
domains centered around powerful men who rely on corrupt connections in
civil society, as well as the vast pool of criminal labour supplied from street
gangs.’45 Again, this is an indication of the social control that gangs have on
the Cape Flats.
If there are high levels of social control, the state can mobilise its
population in order to face internal and external enemies.46 The growth and
strengthening of gangs on the Cape Flats has fragmented the social control of
the state. Consequently, the state finds it difficult to mobilise the community
of the Cape Flats and to gain strength to face the internal opposition of gangs.
5.
Conclusion
The increase in organised crime in South Africa indicates the decline of state
social control. The rise of organised criminal groups on the Cape Flats
specifically indicates a level of incapacity of the state to progress to a strong
state. Even though there are policies and legislation to combat gangsterism
and organised crime, they are not implemented successfully. Gangsterism on
the Cape Flats creates weblike societies. Gangs provide a set of diverse rules
and structures to the community and therefore create fragmented social
control. The social control is anchored around gang leaders as they provide
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their own set of survival strategies to the community. Gangsterism on the
Cape Flats has produced a criminal economy that ensured their own survival
but also ensured the community to stay dependent on them. An argument that
was not explored in this paper but will form part of future research is the
establishment of triangles of accommodation on the Cape Flats. To extent to
which organised criminal groups have infiltrated local government have to be
researched to determine if governing is taking place via numerous bribes and
mutually profitable agreements between corrupt state officials and gangsters,
further resulting in a weakened state.
Notes
1 J.S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988.
2 J.S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying how sates and societies transform and constitute one another,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
3 P Du Toit, State-building and democracy in Southern Africa: A comparative study of Botswana,
South Africa and Zimbabwe, Human Science Research Council Publishers, Pretoria, 1995, p. 23.
4 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World, 1988, p. 21.
5 Migdal, op. cit., p. 22.
6 Du Toit, 1995, p. 23.
7 Migdal, op. cit., p. 22.
8 Du Toit, 1995, p.24.
9 ibid.
10 ibid., p. 25.
11 R.H. Jackson & C.G. Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the
African Crisis’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 24 (1), 1986, p. 1-31.
12 Ibid.
13 G Fiorentiti & S Peltzam, (eds), The Economics of Organised Crime, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995.
14 P Williams, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and the State’ in The Emergence of Private Authority in
Global Governance, B.R. Hall & T.J. Biersteker, (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002,
p. 161-181.
15 S.G. Lebeya, Organised Crime in the Southern African Development Community with specific
reference to motor vehicle theft, Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of South Africa, 2007.
16 P Gastrow, ‘Organised Crime in South Africa: An assessment of its nature and origins’. ISS
Monograph Series, no. 28, August 1998.
17 South Africa, Prevention of Organised Crime Act, no. 121, State Publications, Pretoria, 1998.
18 M Shaw, ‘Organised Crime in post-apartheid South Africa’. ISS Papers, no. 28, January 1998.
19 P Gastrow, (ed) ‘Penetrating State and Business: Organised Crime in South Africa’. ISS
Monograph Series, no. 86, September 2003, p. 5.
20 ibid., p. 9.
21 Ibid., p. 10.
22 A Standing, ‘Rival Views of Organised Crime’. ISS Monograph Series, no. 77, February 2003, p.
46-47.
23 Gastrow, 1998, p. 15.
24 D Pinnock, The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town, David Philip,
Claremont, 1984, p. 64.
25 A Standing, ‘The threat of gangs and anti-gangs policy’. ISS Paper, no. 166, August 2005, p. 1.
26 A Standing, Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria,
2006.
27 J Redpath, ‘The Hydra phenomenon, rural sitting ducks and other recent trends around organised
crime in the Western Cape’. Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies Conference
Papers, Technikon SA, Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies, 2001.
28 Jackson & Rosberg, 1986, p. 2.
29 A Standing, ‘Re-Conceptualizing Organised Crime’. African Security Review, vol. 12(2), 2003.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 J Redpath, ‘The gang landscape in the Western Cape’. Indicator SA, no. 18, 2001, p. 35.
33 B Haefele, ‘Gangsterism in the Western Cape’. Community Safety Monitor, no. 1, 2003, p. 7.
34 A Standing, ‘The Social Contradictions of Organised Crime on the Cape Flats’. ISS Paper, no. 74,
June 2003, p. 2.
35 ibid. p. 12.
36 J Smetherham, ‘Gang-raped and forced into prostitution’. Cape Times. 17 March 2004, p. 6.
37 Standing, ‘The Social Contradictions of Organised Crime on the Cape Flats’, 2003, p. 7.
38 Haefele, 2003, p. 18-19.
39 Standing, ‘The Social Contradictions of Organised Crime on the Cape Flats’, 2003, p. 3.
40 ibid.
41 ibid. p. 11.
42 ibid.
43 C.S. Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
44 ibid. p. 14.
45 Standing, ‘The Social Contradictions of Organised Crime on the Cape Flats’, 2003, p. 12.
46 Migdal, op. cit., p. 32.
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Derica Lambrechts is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University, South
Africa, and specialises in the teaching of Political Risk Analysis and Comparative Politics. She is
currently working on her PhD entitled: The Impact of Organised Criminal Groups on the Social
Control of the State: A Comparative study of South Africa and Kenya.